Early logic machines

and the problem of

elimination

Amirouche Moktefi
Tallinn University of Technology,
Estonia
 Unnoticed pioneering work?
‘… it is interesting to wonder what the course of computer
development and implementation would have been like had the
work of Jevons and Marquand become widely known and
elaborated, rather than having many individuals rediscover
principles and methods that had been developed 50 years
earlier.’ (G. H. Buck & S. M. Hunka, ‘W. S. Stanley, Allan
Marquand, and the origins of digital computing’, IEEE Annals
of the History of Computing, 21(4), 1999, p. 26)

‘… Peirce in 1887 was successfully doing what the mainstream

of logic ad computing science was just beginning to do around
1950. That Charles Peirce was roughly 63 years ahead of his
time can perhaps be described as the curse of his career’ (K. L.
Ketner & A. F. Stewart, ‘The early history of computer design:
Charles Sanders Peirce and Marquand’s logical machines’, The
Princeton University Library Chronicle, 45 (3), 1984, p. 211.)
Opening: Calculus vs Analysis
 Calculus vs Analysis
‘A calculus, in the sense of the definition I just gave, a system of
signs, enabling a person by following a routine of rules, to solve any
problem of a given kind, in order to fulfil its purpose to perfection
should pass from pre-miss to conclusion in the smallest number of
steps possible; while my design in these algebras I invented was
virtually, and in the system of existential graphs was quite definitely
and consciously, to dissect the inferential process into as many steps
as possible’ (C. S. Peirce, MS 498, 1906)

2 x 10 = 20
 Calculus vs Analysis
‘A calculus, in the sense of the definition I just gave, a system of
signs, enabling a person by following a routine of rules, to solve any
problem of a given kind, in order to fulfil its purpose to perfection
should pass from pre-miss to conclusion in the smallest number of
steps possible; while my design in these algebras I invented was
virtually, and in the system of existential graphs was quite definitely
and consciously, to dissect the inferential process into as many steps
as possible’ (C. S. Peirce, MS 498, 1906)

2 x 10 = 2+2+2+2+2+2+2+2+2+2
= 1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1
=(20)
‘Can you do Addition?’ the White Queen asked.
‘What’s one and one and one and one and one
and one and one and one and one and one?’

‘I don’t know,’ said Alice. ‘I lost count.’

(Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, 1872)
“Symbolical reasoning may be said to have pretty much the
same relation to ordinary reasoning that machine-labour has
to manual labour. In the case of machine labour we see
some ingeniously contrived arrangement of wheels, levers,
&c., producing with speed and facility results which the
hands of man without such aid could only accomplish
slowly and with difficulty, or which they would be utterly
powerless to accomplish at all. In the case of symbolical
reasoning we find in an analogous manner some regular
system of rules and formulae, easy to retain in the memory
from their general symmetry and interdependence,
economizing or superseding the labour of the brain, and
enabling any ordinary mind to obtain by simple mechanical
processes results which would be beyond the reach of the
strongest intellect if left entirely to its own resources.”
(H. MacColl (1880): Symbolical reasoning. Mind 5 (17): 45)
‘I believe that I can best make the relation of my ideography to ordinary language
clear if I compare it to that which the microscope has to the eye. Because of the
range of its possible uses and the versatility with which it can adapt to the most
diverse circumstances, the eye is far superior to the microscope. Considered as an
optical instrument, to be sure, it exhibits many imperfections, which ordinarily remain
unnoticed only on account of its intimate connection with our mental life. But, as
soon as scientific goals demand great sharpness of resolution, the eye proves to be
insufficient. The microscope, on the other hand, is perfectly suited to precisely such
goals, but that is just why it is useless for all others.’ (G. Frege, Begriffsschrift,
1879/1967, p. 6)
The Logical Sausage Machine

A. J. Swinburne (1887), Picture Logic, p. 35

 Logical machines

‘Logical machine: [...] An instrument devised to facilitate by mechanical means

the handling of logical symbols or diagrams.
There are three such instruments which merit attention:
(1) [Jevons] (2) [Venn] (3) [Marquand]’ (James Mark Baldwin, ‘Logical machine’,
Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 1902)
The Problem of Elimination
- ‘the general problem of Formal Logic’ (Boole, On the Foundations of
the Mathematical Theory of Logic, 1856: 97)

- ‘George Boole […] first put forth the problem of logical science in
its complete generality: — Given certain logical premises or conditions, to
determine the description of any class of objects under those conditions. Such was the
general problem of which the ancient logic had solved but a few isolated
cases […] Boole showed incontestably that it was possible, by the aid of a
system of mathematical signs, to deduce the conclusions of all these
ancient modes of reasoning, and an indefinite number of other
conclusions. Any conclusion, in short, that it was possible to deduce from
any set of premises or conditions, however numerous and complicated,
could be calculated by his method’ (W. S. Jevons, ‘On the mechanical
performance of logical inference’, 1870: 499)

- ‘the central problem of symbolic logic’ (J. N. Keynes, Formal Logic,

1906: 506)
 The Problem of Elimination

Concrete Representation Formal

Premises Premises

Natural Formal
Elimination Calculus
Language Language

Concrete Formal
Conclusion Interpretation Conclusion
The Problem of Elimination
 x y

No x is y

Boole Peirce

Intersection of x and y is x is included in not-y

empty
‘On the diagrammatic and
mechanical representation of
propositions and reasonings’,
1880

‘Logical diagrams for

n terms’, 1881

‘The logical spectrum’,

1885
Rivalry and collaboration
‘So little trouble is required to sketch
out a fresh diagram for ourselves on
each occasion, that it is really not
worth while to get a machine to do
any part of the work for us.’
(J. Venn, Symbolic Logic, 1894, p. 134)

‘Conclusions which [Boole] could

obtain only by pages of intricate
calculation, are exhibited by the
machine after one or two minutes of
manipulation.’ (W. S. Jevons, The
Principles of Science, 1883, 113-114)
 A friendly contest
- ‘There are now two systems of notation, giving the same
formal results, one of which gives them with self-evident force
and meaning, the other by dark and symbolic processes.’ (Jevons,
Pure Logic, 1864, p. 75)

- ‘Four different algebraic methods of solving problems in

logic of non-relative terms have already been proposed by
Boole, Jevons, Schröder, and MacColl. I propose here a fifth
method which perhaps is simpler and certainly more natural
than any of the others.’ (C. S. Peirce, ‘On the algebra of logic’,
1880: 37)

- ‘There are in existence five algebras of logic, - those of Boole,

Jevons, Schröder, McColl, and Peirce, - of which the later ones
are all modifications, more or less slight, of that of Boole. I
propose to add one more to the number.’ (C. Ladd, ‘On the
algebra of logic’, 1883: 17)
 Boole’s challenge

‘In none of the above examples has it been my

object to exhibit in any special manner the
power of the method […] I would, however,
suggest to any who may be desirous of forming
a correct opinion upon this point, that they
examine by the rules of ordinary logic the
following problem, before inspecting its solution;
remembering at the same time that, that
whatever complexity it possesses might be
multiplied indefinitely, with no other effect than
to render its solution by the method of this
work more operose, but not less certainly
attainable.’
(Boole, Laws of Thought, 1854: 146)
 Peirce and his ‘school’

C. S. Peirce, ‘On the algebra of logic’, 1880: 39

‘So far as I am aware this constitutes the
first systematic attempt that has been
made to deal with formal reasonings of
the most complicated character without
the aid of mathematical symbols and
without abandoning the ordinary non-
equational or predicative form of
proposition. In this attempt I have met
with greater success than I had
anticipated; and I believe that the
methods which I have formulated will be
found to be as easy of application and as
certain in obtaining results as the
mathematical, symbolical, or
diagrammatic methods of Boole, Jevons,
Venn and others’
(J. N. Keynes, Formal Logic, 1884, vii)
Logic Machines
Jevons’ Logic Machine (1869-)

A B C
A B Not-C
A Not-B C
A Not-B Not-C
Not-A B C
Not-A B Not-C
Not-A Not-B C
Not-A Not-B Not-C

All A are B
No B is C
No A is C
Venn’s Machine (1880-)
Marquand’s Machine (1881-)
 Peirce’s input

(Letter from Peirce to Marquand,

30 December 1886

K. L. Ketner & A. F. Stewart, ‘The early history of

computer design: Charles Sanders Peirce and
Marquand’s logical machines’, The Princeton University
Library Chronicle, 45 (3), 1984, pp. 187-224
Discussion
What is a logical machine?
‘The secret of all reasoning machines is after all very
simple. It is that whatever relation among the objects
reasoned about is destined to be the hinge of a
ratiocination, that same general relation must be capable
of being introduced between certain parts of the
machine […] This is the same principle that lies at the
foundation of every logical algebra […] every machine is
a reasoning machine, in so much as there are certain
relations between its parts, which relations involve other
relations that were not expressly intended […]
Accordingly, it is no figure of speech to say that the
alembics and cucurbits of the chemist are instruments of
thought, or logical machines.’
(C. S. Peirce, ‘Logical machines’, American Journal of
Psychology, 1, 1887, p. 168)
 ‘Reading’ the conclusion

‘... in point of fact neither of the machines really gives the

conclusion of a pair of syllogistic premises; it merely presents a
list of all the possible species in the universe, and leaves us to pick
out the syllogistic conclusions for ourselves.’
(C. S. Peirce, 1887, ‘Logical machines’, American Journal of
Psychology, pp. 167-168 )
[‘We no more want an original machine, than [...] an American
board of college trustees would hire an original professor’]

‘The result that comes out and is presented by the machine, is not
really the conclusion. The process is not finished when the
machinery stops; and the rest is left to be done by the mind. What
is called ‘reading’ the conclusion is to some extent making it.’
(F. H. Bradley, 1883, Principles of Logic, p. 357)
The logical-diagram machine
‘It is but a very small part of the entire process,
which goes to form a piece of reasoning, which they
are capable of performing. For, if we begin from the
beginning, that process would involve four tolerably
distinct steps [...] Finally, the results have to be
interpreted or read off. This last step generally gives
rise to much opening for skill and sagacity [...] I
hardly see how any machine can hope to assist us [in
this step]; so that it seems very doubtful whether any
thing of this sort really deserves the name of a
logical engine.’
(John Venn, Symbolic Logic, 1894, pp. 133-134)
Couturat’s criticism of Venn diagrams

This diagrammatic method […] does not show

how the data are exhibited by cancelling certain
constituents, nor does it show how to combine
the remaining constituents so as to obtain the
consequences sought. In short, it serves only to
exhibit one single step in the argument, namely
the equation of the problem […] Hence it is of
very little use, inasmuch as the constituents can
be represented by algebraic symbols quite as well
as by plane regions, and are much easier to deal
with in this form.
(Louis Couturat, The Algebra of Logic, 1914, 75)
 Couturat’s criticism

Concrete Representation Formal

Premises Premises

Natural Formal
Elimination Calculus
Language Language

Concrete Formal
Conclusion Interpretation Conclusion
What does the machine do?
 Couturat’s criticism answered

Concrete Representation Formal

Premises Premises

Natural Formal
Elimination Calculus
Language Language

Concrete Formal
Conclusion Interpretation Conclusion
Limited number of terms

‘… the logical machines that have thus far been devised

can deal with but a limited number of different letters.
The unaided mind is also limited in this as in other
respects; but the mind working with a pencil and plenty
of paper has no such limitation […] This is what makes
algebra the best of all instruments of thought; nothing is
too complicated for it.’ (C. S. Peirce, ‘Logical machines’,
American Journal of Psychology, 1, 1887, p. 169)
The Utility Problem
Theoretical utility and practical futility
‘The chief importance of the machine is of a purely theoretical
kind. It demonstrates in a convincing manner the existence of an
all-embracing system of Indirect Inference, the very existence of
which was hardly suspected before the appearance of Boole’s logical
works […] my object will be fully accomplished should this machine
be considered to demonstrate the existence and illustrate the nature
of a very simple and obvious method of Indirect Inference of
which Dr Boole was substantially the discoverer.’
(W. S. Jevons, ‘On the mechanical performance of logical inference’,
Philosophical Transactions, 160, 1870, pp. 517-518)

‘I may remark that these mechanical devices are not likely to possess
much practical utility. We do not require in common life to be
constantly solving complex logical questions.’ (W. S. Jevons, The
Principles of Science, 1883, 112)
 Artificiality

‘I have no high estimate myself of the interest or

importance of what are sometimes called logical
machines [...] it is very seldom that intricate logical
calculations are practically forced upon us; it is
rather we who look about for complicated
examples in order to illustrate our rules and
methods. In this respect logical calculations stand
in marked contrast with those of mathematics,
where economical devices of any kind may
subserve a really valuable purpose by enabling us
to avoid otherwise inevitable labour.’ (John Venn,
Symbolic Logic, 1894, pp. 133)
A Challenge to Logicians (1892)
 The serious business of logic
‘Formal logic centers its whole attention on the least important part of
reasoning, a part so mechanical that it may be performed by a machine,
and fancies that that is all there is in the mental process. For my part, I
hold that reasoning is the observation of relations, mainly by means of
diagrams and the like. It is a living process.’ (C. S. Peirce, Letter to J. M.
Hantz, 29 March 1887)

‘[S]ymbolic logic as such consists of a solution of particular problems,

which are on the same plane as the solution of geometrical or algebraic
problems and, though concerned with the abstract forms of subject
and predicate, as specially scientific as these mathematical processes –
no more logic than they are, and related to logic precisely as they are.
Incidentally there is a little elementary logic involved, but the real and
serious problems of logic proper do not appear, nor is the symbolic
logician able to touch them. In comparison with the serious business of
logic proper, the occupations of the symbolic logician are merely trivial.’
(J. Cook Wilson, Statement and Inference, 1926, p. 637)
[‘an execrably bad logician’ (P. Geach 1978, p. 123)]
 The serious business of logic
“Over the past ten years, in three universities in Britain and
America, I have in vain asked logicians of high distinction to solve
this problem. Even when I gave them Carroll’s own solution and
asked them to test the argument of correctness, they still tended to
scamper off like white rabbits, even though the latter was a task for
which their training had prepared them. Occasionally they would
counterattack, and demand an explanation of my “antiquarian
interest.” (Bartley III 1977, 25)

“Bartley has been surprised to find that eminent modern logicians

did not accept his challenge to tackle one of the problems in
predicate logic set by Lewis Carroll who had techniques and an
acquired knack for solving such problems. Bartley does not realize
that such skills have no more to do with serious logic than a
calculating boy’s ability to raise 123,456,789 to a high power in his
head has to do with number theory.” (Geach 1978, p. 124)
 What is the use of this?
Couturat - 10 Novembre 1905 : ‘Can you indicate a particular
problem we could cite as an example of application of logistic (as the
examples we cite for the algebra of logic)? I know that the great
application of logistic is the reconstruction of mathematics that you
undertook; but I would like to have a small isolated example to cite,
to convince the sceptics and practical people who always ask: ‘What
is the use of this?’’ (p. 546)

Russell - 21 Novembre 1905 : ‘At the moment, I cannot find any

problem of the kind you ask. Anyway, il seems to me that even if we
did cite such an example, this would only give little utility to logistic.
For my part, if I had to recommend logistic, I would say: Since 2000
years, we inquire the nature of infinity, space and time: on the
theories we invent for the purpose, we build metaphysical systems, et
we authorise ourselves theories about the relation of humans to the
Universe, etc. Yet, these problems, we can only solve them with
logistic. Hence, those who grant that it is good to study philosophy
cannot deny that it is good to study logistic.’ (p. 549)
 What is the use of this?
‘Fortunately, we have already lost the habit of requiring that each mathematical
speculation needs “practical usefulness”. It is however not less appropriate to tackle
the question whether in physics or technique such complex systems of propositions
exists. We think that we should answer these questions affirmatively. Example: Let the task
be to design networks of connections in automatic telephone stations. It is
necessary to determine the following: 1) If the station will work correctly for an
arbitrary combination of possible occurrences in the working station. 2) If the
station contains some redundancies.
Each of these combinations is a proposition, each small commutator is a logic ”Or-
Or”, all together - a system of qualitative (non quantitative) “propositions”, leaving
nothing more to be desired regarding complexity and intricacy.
Does it follow that, when solving such problems, every time some ingenious
method - in many cases just a simple routine method – of trials on a graph should be
used?
Is it right, that regardless of the existence of the already elaborated algebra of logic,
the specific algebra of switching networks should be considered as a utopia?
(Paul Ehrenfest, Review of Louis Couturat’s Algebra of Logic (1910). Translated in:
Stankovic, R.S., Astola, J.T., (eds.), Reprints from the Early Days of Information Sciences,
Paul Ehrenfest - Remarks on Algebra of Logic and Switching Theory, Tampere University
of Technology, 2010)
Early logic machines
and the problem of
elimination

Amirouche Moktefi
Tallinn University of Technology,
Estonia