MARIT. POL. MGMT.

, JANUARY–MARCH 2005
VOL. 32, NO. 1, 3–13

The impact of port and trade security initiatives on

maritime supply-chain management

RUTH BANOMYONG*
2, Pra Chan Road, Thammasat Business School, Thammasat University,
Bangkok 10200, Thailand

The fundamental objective of the Container Security Initiative (CSI) is to engage

both so-called ‘mega-ports’ (ports sending the highest volume of ocean going
container traffic into the US) and the national governments where these ports
are located in a way that will facilitate the pre-screening of outbound containers
destined to the US. The emerging issue of security as a key factor in global supply
chains can be perceived as inconsistent with the objective of facilitating inter-
national trade (Dulbecco and Laporte, 2003). However, this perception does
not stand up to analysis. Security is an evident part of the mainstream supply-
chain paradigm while security can also become a driver for trade facilitation. The
purpose of this paper is therefore to discuss the impact of the US CSI on maritime
supply chains. The first section will mostly be related to the issue of security and
supply chains while the second section will investigate CSI and its impact while
exploring some of the financing implications of the security initiative.

1. Introduction
The key role of an integrated logistics system is to assist in the production,
consumption and distribution, or the ‘supply chain’, of goods and services. This
means that goods must be produced and delivered to the market (or customer) in
the right quantity, required quality—without defect—and at a competitive price.
Integrated and seamless logistics can play an important role in facilitating global
supply-chain processes.
It is therefore important that the movement of goods can be made by combining
several modes of transport from one point or port of origin via one or more interface
points to a final point or port where one carrier or many carriers jointly organize the
whole transport process. Integrated transport is an efficient transport system that
provides the physical operation to be carried out within the environment of simple
streamlined documentation, efficient management with effective control, a single
liability system and provides a service which is totally reliable, predictable, and
fully meeting the needs of the customer.
However, the efficient operation of transport modes and nodal points are depen-
dent on reduced barriers, institutions and simplified legal regime in order to effec-
tively implement integrated logistics operations. It is viewed that trade is not possible
without transport; therefore support for integrated transport will facilitate national
and international trade by ensuring an uninterrupted and smooth flow of cargo and
giving better control over the supply chain.

* e-mail: [email protected]

Maritime Policy & Management ISSN 0308–8839 print/ISSN 1464–5254 online # 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/0308883042000326102
4 R. Banomyong

The events of September 11, 2001 have created paranoia on possible terrorists’
related incidents, especially against the US. The institutional response on the threats
let to the implementation by the US Customs department of a strategic programme
known as the Containers Security Initiative (CSI). The purpose of the CSI is to
secure what is believed to be the most vulnerable but indispensable link in the global
supply chain: the ocean going container.
The purpose of this paper is therefore to discuss the impact of CSI on supply-
chain management processes. The first section will concentrate on the issue of
security and global supply chain while the second section will focus on CSI and
its impact on the financing aspects of implementing security initiative.

2. Security and global supply chain

The security of the global supply chain can be perceived as inconsistent with
the objective of facilitating international trade [1]. Security is very much part of
mainstream supply-chain paradigm while security can also become a driver for
trade facilitation.

2.1. The secure supply chain

Logistics involve a wide range of related activities, including storage, inventory
management, materials handling and order processing. Logistics management is
an integrative process that seeks to optimize the flow of materials and supplies
from suppliers throughout the organization in order to satisfy the customer.
If all firms involved in a particular supply chain optimize their logistical systems
independently of other firms in that chain, the management of product flow across
the whole chain, or ‘pipeline’, is likely to be sub-optimal. Attempts to overcome this
problem have resulted in the creation of ‘supply-chain management’. Supply-chain
management extends the principles of logistics management to customers and
suppliers, crossing geographical and organizational boundaries [2].
Supply-chain management will also lead to stricter requirement on service level
related to frequency, reliability, lead-time, information provision, and risks of
damage to cargo, security of the cargo, complexity of administrative procedures,
and the increasing number of smaller consignments.
The security of the supply chain, like the efficiency of the chain, concerns both
the physical flow and the information flow from origin to customers. In a supply
chain there is no benefit if certain links or stakeholders are operating efficiently while
others are not. It is the total performance of the supply chain from origin to final
consumption that is relevant. Each link in the supply chain is dependent on
the previous link in order to achieve continuity, synchronization and enhanced
final customer service level. The security issue is directly related to the performance
measurement of any supply chain. This means that all security conditions must be
met and guaranteed in order for goods to move unhindered within supply chains.
The supply chain of maritime transportation has experienced important changes
during the last 25 years and several ports have specialized in the concentration of
transhipment activities [3]. The ocean going containers ensure flexibility of shipments
and several ports are dedicated to this technology and are, as a consequence,
consolidating their status as hub centres. Economic growth and development have
restructured the nature and pattern of maritime supply chains with new demands
within the main trading region.
 The impact of port and trade security initiatives 5

Hub centres thus require specialized high-capacity transhipment infrastructures.

However, infrastructures are not the only dimension in port restructuring. Maritime
supply chains are structured by an integration of maritime services and transhipment
functions to maritime distribution functions at hub centres [4]. The security of these
hub centres as nodal links in the maritime supply chain is of critical importance.
The world has become a system of maritime links in which individual ports are
linked into intricate patterns of dependency in hub/feeder relationships as well as
into end-to-end shipping linkages that reflect the increasing trade dependencies
among regions [5]. This trade dependency is conducted within a broader competitive
regional environment, with the development of maritime supply chain underlining
the need for efficiency as well as security; and these conditions have impacted upon,
and will continue to have an impact on, management strategies of ports around
the world [6].
Since the events of 9/11, security is now considered one of the necessary pre-
conditions for a high-performance maritime supply chain that is able to guarantee
high economic performances. The search for global supply-chain efficiency is
currently leading towards the development of techniques, which allows a wide
variety of unforeseen events to be overcome [7] through the use of prevention mea-
sures. This is even more evident by the ‘just-in-time’ paradigm and ‘door-to-door’
service that require a high security level coupled with low inventory level and efficient
movements between several points of origins and destinations.
However, security has a cost. Supply-chain security is leading to an increase in
logistics costs and may even exert a negative pressure on economic growth for all
countries involved. The short-term effect will be negative but the medium- to long-
term impact is likely to be beneficial to certified and recognized operators. This will
permit the creation of dedicated secure supply chains where supply-chain processes
are considered more efficient. More security could therefore mean greater facilitation
with a possible expansion of trade. It must not be forgotten that the cost of delays
and procedures linked to the trade of goods is estimated between 5 and 13% of the
value of goods traded [8]. But, security issues, if not dealt with properly, can also
become the main cause of delays. Table 1 describes the main players involved with
the security of the global supply chain.
The stakeholders are diverse with often-conflicting objectives but it is of interest
to all parties to improve the security of global supply chains.

2.2. Public interest in secure supply chain

It is important to guarantee the protection of global supply chains and its capacity
to serve international markets. If a port is considered secure, it is likely to benefit
from increased traffic of goods, but in reality only a uniform level of security in all
ports will reduce the risk of disruption to global supply chains. It is not enough just
to have a number of selected secure ports if other ports in the vicinity are not
assessed by the same criteria, except if non-secure ports are withdrawn from the
main maritime networks.
World markets have become increasingly ‘globalized’ [9]. To a large extent, this
reflects the fact that the majority, if not all, countries are adjusting to the strong
trade liberalization pressures observable around the world. These pressures stem
from international trade agreements, including the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). There is also
the development of other trading blocs like the European Union, the Association
6 R. Banomyong

Table 1. Players in the security supply chain.

The governments Customs have the duty to protect the national economy and society
instead of merely focusing on goods control at the border
The traders Reliable, secure and efficient supply chain will theoretically contribute
to global trade expansion
The ports Security will represent a critical variable in terms of competitiveness
The service providers Key player in terms of security as they move goods and information.
The insurance providers Increase security less insurance premium
Source: Adapted from [7].

of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation
(APEC) and the growth of intra-Asian trade. These trade-policy initiatives have a
common objective: to open up new trading opportunities by facilitating international
trade.
Global economic integration relies upon efficient global supply chains but
integration can only succeed if security is guarantee as there is a relative degree of
mistrust among trading nations. Certain trade routes are served by relatively fewer
transport operators; with less favourable operational conditions and where risks
are higher, etc. For these countries, this situation results in failure to develop
their international trade potential, higher price for imports, lower foreign exchange
earnings from exports, restricted investment and employment, and, thus, in limited
economic growth.
The competitiveness of internationally traded products is greatly influenced
by various factors, which build up the overall logistics cost within global supply
chains.
The main ones are:
1. Cost
The cost associated with the physical transfer of the goods is an essential
piece of information in the negotiation of an international trade transaction
[10]. To maintain a product’s competitiveness, the seller must make sure that
his or her cost is as low as possible. However, on any particular trade route,
this cost is made up of a number of costs elements corresponding to the
services provided along each specific link. These elements cannot always be
clearly quantified beforehand:
. Some cost elements (direct costs) are directly related to the logistics service
provided. In general, they are based on published tariffs, which reflect
the local market conditions, the quality of the service, and the manage-
ment capacity of the service provider. These considerations depend on the
state of the local infrastructure and equipment, and on the local infra-
structure/equipment maintenance policy to provide reasonable transport
services.
. Other cost elements (indirect costs) are a consequence of the service pro-
vided. They build up as financial costs resulting from poor operations (low
speed, unexpected delays, etc.) as additional costs (e.g. increased insurance
premiums), or as ‘consequential costs’ (e.g. sales opportunities lost because
goods are not readily available). They reflect the efficiency of the services,
 The impact of port and trade security initiatives 7

the level of risk involved, and the capacity of the service providers to cope
with administrative and operational problems.
2. Time
Transit time is an important element as goods in transit cost money [11].
Any reduction in transit time would therefore reduce the overall cost of the
delivered goods. Transit times can be improved by increasing transport speed
while cargo is moving on any particular transport mode, and/or by reducing
idle time while cargo is waiting at some interface point for its next
movement. The lack of proper co-ordination of transport operations or the
excessive burden of administrative and documentary requirement might
neutralize any effort or investment in increasing commercial speed.
To reduce the financial cost of their inventories, producers favour
arrangements that supply the required input goods ‘just in time’ (JIT), that
is, within a short time span just before the anticipated use in production
or sale [12]. Under these conditions, time reliability is very important.
An industry under tight schedule operations (JIT supply chains) cannot
afford delays on delivery [13].
3. Safety
Safety of goods is equally important. Any loss or damage, because of theft,
mishandling, poor quantity packaging or physical damage caused by acci-
dent, will result in the non-availability of the goods at the expected time and
place, and in the expected conditions. The financial consequences of such
non-availability, in addition to the cost of loss or damage, are similar to the
time reliability consequence mentioned above.
4. Risk
Uncertainties of schedules, breakages, loss, pilferage, rules and regulations,
etc., are some of the issues faced by traders and may disadvantage exporters
and importers.
5. Security
Security measures are necessary to guarantee the protection of global supply
chains against acts of terrorism or any possible unexpected threat. Beyond
the loss of human life and material destructions, a terrorist attack will
disrupt the flow of goods within global supply chain.
The above-mentioned considerations indicate that trading opportunities can
benefit from better-organized and secured supply-chain services. To take advantage
of secure supply chains by increasing their competitiveness, sellers and buyers must
adapt their commercial practices and governments must provide the transport/
logistics service providers with an institutional, regulatory, and operational environ-
ment, which can stimulate and guarantee the level of security needed for the efficient
movement of goods.
A secure supply-chain approach must encompass not only the economic,
commercial and operational aspects of the international movement of goods,
but also all issues related to the facilitation of trade and the responsibility for the
goods while in transit.
To take into account all interests involved in the development of secure supply
chain, the relationships between traders, services providers and governments must
be clearly identified and proper co-ordination in the implementation of security
measures must also be established. The development of secure supply chains will
8 R. Banomyong

also demand the need for properly regulated service providers. This can result in an
increased level of competitiveness for all three key players.
Traders can expect the economic and financial benefits from the use of secure
supply chains in the forms of the following factors:
. Reduced transit-time; increased time reliability; and increased security of cargo,
particularly at interface points.
. Reduced transport costs (resulting from the use of modern transport-related
technologies: ocean going containers, EDI, etc.).
. Closer commercial relationships with services providers.
. Greater awareness and understanding of supply chain and logistics related
issues influencing their trade.
Service providers can expect the following benefits:
. The importance of their profession as international logistics service providers.
This is particularly important in the development of their relationship and their
recognition with governmental agencies.
. Commercial incentives to adopt new technologies such as the Internet and EDI.
. A need to reconsider their marketing strategies, for example logistics service
providers to concentrate their activities in ‘niche’ operations to serve specific
commodities on specific trade routes [14].
Governments will theoretically benefit from secure supply chains since it offers
an opportunity to update trade and transport related administrative procedures
and regulations. A secure national supply chain will facilitate commerce with
other trading partners, in particular with the US.

3. The container security initiative and its impact

The globalization of the world economy and the increasing threat of terrorism have
placed pressure on the world’s governments, especially Customs administrations.
Merchants have demanded faster, more standardized and uniform service while
governments require more revenues and more secure borders. At the same time
Customs must produce trade statistics and enforce other agency laws (i.e. health,
intellectual property, etc.) at the nation’s border. Customs are faced with the
prospect of balancing the requirement of facilitation with the increased importance
of security enforcement as a consequence to the emerging terrorist threats. Using
a traditional approach to Customs practices and procedures is not practical for
security issues. In the European Union and in other regional grouping (e.g. AFTA
or APEC), Customs have reduced their day-to-day work and the number of officers
to concentrate mainly on intelligence gathering rather than high-profile policing.
Table 2 is a review of the traditional Customs operation still in service today in
a number of countries contrasted with the more modern approach being put in place
in many countries.
In order to implement secure maritime supply chains, Customs are required
to facilitate the container flows, through minimization of import/export documents
and to permit the movement of cargo to and from ports under bond or in a sealed
container. However, with the multitude of US led security initiatives, the facilitation
of container movement is perceived as hindered, especially by exporters in the main
trading partners of the US.
 The impact of port and trade security initiatives 9

Table 2. Customs procedures.

Customs procedure
or practice Traditional Customs Modern Customs

International Standards Non conformance or only Full conformance with all

of the WCO [15] partial conformance international Customs standards
and WTO [16] for classification, value, and
procedure
Customs automation No or only partial Full automation
Measures of performance Limited output measures, Full measures of compliance &
process measures and facilitation leading to improved
frequently the wrong measures performance
Tariff system Complex and high duty rates Simplified & reduced duties
Revenue collection Prior to entry of goods Entry & collection separate.
Duties paid after entry
Enforcement and Characterized by manual Minimal inspections and paper
compliance approach inspections nearing 100% documentation
and paper reviews
Information Provided at time of entry Advance and historical
information prior to arrival
of goods and conveyance
Personnel Poorly trained and low skilled Highly trained and professional
Appeals of Customs Limited and unknown appeal Fully defined appeals process
decisions and process, limited publication within and beyond Customs,
transparency notice of rules and practices full transparency and
co-operation with trade
Results Low and unknown compliance, High and measured compliance,
high cost for government and lower costs for government
industry and poor facilitation and industry, vastly improved
facilitation and framework for
continued improvement
Source: Adapted from [17].

It is believed by US authorities that a proactive stance by Customs in

screening ocean going containers before they reach the US will significantly contri-
bute to Customs, in particular US Customs, overall efforts to secure borders against
dangers that might be introduced through commercial traffic.

3.1. The US container security initiative

The US CSI consists of four core elements [18]. These are:
1. to establish security criteria to identify high risk containers;
2. to pre-screen those ocean going containers identified as high risk before they
arrive at US ports;
3. to use advance technology to quickly pre-screen high-risk containers;
4. to develop the use of smart and secure ocean going containers.
10 R. Banomyong

From an American perspective, CSI is an effort to enhance the security of global

maritime supply chains. Through bilateral agreements with major ports and national
Customs agencies around the world it would be possible for the US to theoretically
achieve a far greater level of security than screening all ocean going containers
at their port of arrival in the US. A critical element for the success of the CSI will
be the availability of advance information in order to perform efficient pre-screening
targeting. Risk assessments and trade analysis will form part of the decision-making
process regarding the pre-screening of containers. On a similar note, the WCO on
28 June 2002 also passed a unanimous resolution that will enable ports in all 161
member nations to develop security initiatives along the CSI model.
According to US Customs, only 2% of inbound containers are physically
inspected each year for a total of around 6 million sea containers [19]. This places
a heavy reliance on the good faith of the shippers and the accuracy of the docu-
mentation. This system worked adequately when the only risk was commercial
under-reporting and the occasional smuggling. The terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 dramatically changed the risk factors and led to a re-examination of
government-related procedures to imports into the US. Increasingly, physical inspec-
tion by Customs officials is a last resort. Physical inspection of one container might
involve at least two inspectors and last a full day.
Despite the good intentions of CSI, there exist problems in terms of implementa-
tion. Some ports have publicly stated that their participation to CSI is contingent
upon efficient integration of new security practices related to physical container
inspections at the port of departure while others do admit that the integration of
CSI will not be easy and may results in congestion and decline in terms of through-
put. The US Customs relationships with the so-called ‘mega-ports’ continue to be
defined as these ports are very careful to minimize any resulting inefficiencies caused
by the CSI. However, ports not specifically targeted by US Customs are concerned
that those ports within the CSI may gain an unfair competitive advantage as
pre-screened cargo will be given priority in terms of faster clearances through US
ports of entry.

3.2. The customs’ trade partnership against terrorism

The US Customs Initiative on Supply-Chain Security or C-TPAT (Customs’
Trade Partnership against Terrorism) has already been implemented in a number
of countries; this is because many US importers and their suppliers have been
‘advised’ to join this initiative. Eventually the scheme will cover the entire supply
chain of the US importers, which includes foreign manufacturers, suppliers, sup-
pliers’ vendors, contractors and sub-contractors, warehouse providers, as well as air,
sea and land carriers.
Theoretically, the primary benefit of joining C-TPAT will be the expedited
processing of cargo. Importers who are not C-TPAT members may, over time,
find their shipments subjected to higher scrutiny and added examination with no
guarantee of processing times.
Even though US Customs is inviting importers to join the scheme in phases, it is
‘an offer that cannot be refused’. The security recommendations will eventually
become the actual requirements to be complied with by importers and their suppli-
ers, extending to the carriers. Notices will be posted in the US Customs’ website to
announce the phased expansion of the C-TPAT membership and open enrolment
 The impact of port and trade security initiatives 11

for importers. Individual US importers will have to sign a Memorandum of

Understanding (MOU) to participate in the C-TPAT.
At the US Customs’ website, there are guidelines on security recommendations
for manufacturers, importers, brokers, air carriers, land carriers and sea carriers. For
manufacturers and importers, for example, these recommendations cover physical
security, access controls, procedural security, personnel security manifest pro-
cedures, conveyance security, and education and training awareness. Most of these
measures are already in place at manufacturing establishments that do business
with US importers and the guidelines would serve as a checklist for compliance.
It is important to consider that compliance has to be verifiable and traceable.
Exporting companies should obtain recommendations as soon as possible so that
they can start the documentation of processes for future compliance assessments.
Shippers that are involved with US importers’ supply chain should pay attention
to the requirements and start implementing the security measures and keeping
records. C-TPAT is designed for the entire trade community. It will eventually
cover all large and small- and medium-sized importers in the US, and all parties
in the supply chain of these importers.

3.3. Financing the security—who should pay?

Most experts agree that maritime transportation and logistic activities traditionally
have been among the largest costs in international trade. But in contrast to that,
the most significant advances in modern logistics have not been in cost reduction,
but in improved processes to move goods and materials between nations in a timely
and seamless manner. Distance is critical in international logistics. International
marketers require systems designed to handle the challenges of distance in a manner
that is timely and transparent to customers.
Distance in international logistics equates to transportation speed and depen-
dency. As a general rule, the longer the average distance of movement, the greater
is the total cost of transportation. This increased transportation cost results from
firms seeking to maintain flexibility while reducing or avoiding extensive inventory
commitment. Improved flexibility and lower average inventories translate into an
increased number of small shipments moving under positively controlled logistical
operations. The distances involved and the specialized nature of international
requirements have created a dependence by shippers on third-party providers,
such as logistics service providers, capable of providing a broad range of value-
added services to assure logistical continuity.
However, the implementation of CSI and other security initiatives have also
placed an increased burden in terms of processes and costs for all the players in
global supply chains. This would mean that for CSI to be fully sustainable as a
process in global supply chains, the financing of CSI must also be equitable or fair.
There are two possible sources for financing CSI:
1. Payment by users
A tax or a fee can be levied by the relevant authorities. This fee or tax can
be either ad-valorem or specific but it seems that a specific fee might be the
most appropriate. This specific fee can be collected to finance the extra
process, equipments and technology used for CSI. The use of appropriate
INCOTERMS will become critical in deciding whether the exporter or the
importer should pay this specific fee.
12 R. Banomyong

2. Public sources
Financing can be national where each government is responsible for all
security initiatives within its borders, but this type of financing is biased as
most developed countries would already have the majority of equipment in
place while the developing countries would have to invest a significant
amount in order to achieve acceptable levels of security.
Financing can be also international where the importing countries, such as the
US, provide a grant to the implementation of CSI around the world. However, there
must be a guarantee by the receiving government that the grant will be utilized to
upgrade the security to an acceptable level as defined in the CSI. Soft loans can also
be provided but they are usually considered unfair as they can contribute to the
excessive debt of developing countries.
Public financing runs the risk of not achieving the desired level of security in
global supply chains. Bilateral financing may help in the implementation of security
initiatives but the financial sustainability of the initiatives must be demonstrated.
The collection of funds from whatever source is necessary in order to finance
security initiative but it is an insufficient condition for the guaranteeing of full global
supply-chain security. However, the present trend is for exporters to fund these
security initiatives thus increasing their financial burden.

5. Summary
In order to benefit from efficient and effective global supply chains, the security-
related activities incurred must be completely synchronized with the requirement of
the said global supply-chain management. Security initiatives are now being consid-
ered part of the key logistical activities but it is at the same time one of the most
problematic activities, especially in an international context. If the security activity
fails to perform, this will surely impact on the competitiveness of global supply
chains.
These security initiatives will theoretically facilitate access to major international
markets through the use of secure hub centres and interface points. As markets are
becoming ‘globalized’, trading opportunities can be improved by implementing
security initiative in global supply chains. An efficient and secure maritime supply
chain can help build and sustain the competitiveness of internationally traded prod-
ucts by reducing transit time, reducing transport costs, and increasing reliability and
cargo security. However, this may create a two-tier system where priority of access
will be given to recognized secure maritime supply chains and non-secure hub centres
or interface points will lose out in term of competitiveness.

References and notes

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 The impact of port and trade security initiatives 13

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Paper presented at the IAME Conference, Halifax, Canada, 14 September.
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