The Homology of Music and Myth: Views of Lévi-Strauss on Musical Structure

Author(s): Pandora Hopkins

Source: Ethnomusicology, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May, 1977), pp. 247-261
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of Society for Ethnomusicology
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 THE HOMOLOGY OF MUSIC AND MYTH:
VIEWS OF LtVI-STRAUSS ON MUSICAL STRUCTURE1

Pandora Hopkins

As the myths themselves are based on secondary codes (the

primary codes being those that provide the substance of
language), the present work is put forward as a tentative draft
of a tertiary code, which is intended to ensure the reciprocal
translatability of several myths. This is why it would not be
wrong to consider this book itself as a myth: it is, as it were,
the myth of mythology. (L6vi-Strauss 1964:12)

Thus,Levi-Strauss,
in presenting my views concerning the mythological theories of
I must see myself (if I am to accept the above declaration at
face value) as working with a quaternary code. Nevertheless, I am accepting
the invitation of Gilbert Chase, put forward in his exemplary background
article on LUvi-Strauss, to write a separate essay relating to ". . . what he has
to say on the 'homology' of music and myth" (Chase 1972:154). Perhaps
Chase and I may feel rather complacently secure from the criticisms of others,
since it is doubtful if anyone can readily bring to mind the proper numerical
adjective to describe the code such a critic would be using. Be this as it may,
I would like to begin this study with a quotation that demonstrates the
serious interest of Levi-Strauss in musical construction; for it is my conviction
that the musical analogies are indeed an integral part of his philosophy,
although not necessarily in ways that have thus far been described. I do not
agree with Chase that "there is more meat in it [this work] for the
musicologist (and not necessarily the ethnomusicologist) than for the folklorist
or the traditional mythologist" (ibid.: 156). But we shall return to this, as well
as to the ideas expressed in the introductory quotation. First, let us consider
the above-mentioned quotation on musical structure:

Perhaps because the combination of musical expression with intellect

is less obvious, musicians do not seem to have experienced the same
constraints in explaining the logical scope of their art. Harmony and
counterpoint treatises demonstrate how the different structural distributions
exist and become perceptible only through the relationships of keys,
pitches, tonal qualities, and rhythm. For a long time, there has been
recognized in the field of music two principal means of composition: the
juxtaposition of one structure with another, or the maintenance of the same
structures while transforming their perceptible supports (1971:582).

Claude LUvi-Strauss was so thoroughly impressed by the structural

nature of European art music-and its long history of musical analysis-that he

247

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248 ETHNOMUSICOLOGY, MAY 1977

has utilized concepts from this body of musical thought (includi

set forms themselves) as the intellectual framework for his mon
on mythology (Levi-Strauss 1964, 1967, and 1971). His purpos
more ambitious than simply a description, or even an e
mythology. He views myths as exhibiting structures similar
constructions that have been so minutely scrutinized by Europea
thus, he hopes that analytical methods-or models-drawn fr
analysis will enable him to see analogous mythological struct
way as to shed light on the pattern-forming nature of the hum
(LUvi-Strauss 1971:583).
We are all well acquainted with the hazards of sweeping gen
as well as with the obsession for discovering universal truths
leads to them. In the present case, the problems are obvious: How
seriously attempt to analyze over 800 myths belonging to d
spanning two continents of the world through apparatus drawn
elite tradition from western Europe-and, at that, a musical
scholar, S. Diamond, reacts with perhaps understandable vi
approach:
His commitment to an abstract, metalinguistic paradigm, combined
disinterest in particular languages, has here led the anthropologist
impossible situation, which can only be understood on grounds oth
those he has himself proposed. That situation can be defined as the
avoidance of the particularity of self and other. Ethnology becomes an
exercise in an infinitely regressive series-neither the observor nor the
observed can be located relative to each other; they can only be reduced to
a common denominator....

and he continues by quoting Lvi-Strauss in the first volume of th

under discussion: "it is in the last resort immaterial whether.. . the tho
processes of the American Indians take shape through the medium
thought, or whether mine take place through the medium of theirs" (L
Strauss 1971:13). The criticism concludes:

It is enough to bear in mind that error compounded exponentially remains

error-"facts" like Scripture can be quoted to fit almost any systematic
hypothesis. In marshaling so many details, L6vi-Strauss pays ironic tribute t
empiricism, while proving that the data never speak for themselves. It is the
organization of LUvi-Strauss' ideas that creates his facts-as a cyclotron
creates subatomic particles.
LUvi-Strauss is, in short, a successful iconoclast, who has violated both
the most romantic and the most technical demands of his colleagues. And
yet, his reputation among anthropologists remains exalted in spite of th
criticism to which his work is subjected: this being a symptom of the
unwitting reorientation of the profession (Diamond 1974:295).

However with Levi-Strauss (unlike most generalizers) the problems

his approach are often more obvious than the insights that led him to
them. He has admitted that the criticism against his wholesale cro

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 HOPKINS: HOMOLOGY OF MUSIC AND MYTH 249

language and cultural boundary lines is the most serious of

theories; and he has devoted some space in his last volum
to a defense. His explanation has been grossly misunders
tors on it (see, for example, Diamond 1974:294). This m
concerns his argument that translations of myths are
purposes, because it is impossible to obtain the original.
that by original version he means versions in the original
he explicitly states that, from his point of view, the origin
is not in any language at all. Myth, like music, is not tr
other form of communication; again, like music, it is
formable" in shape, but neither myth nor music exis
language (1971:579). All literary manifestations, he tells us,
or oral, must have had an individual creation, and every
potentially a myth (ibid.:560). Only when one of these
begins to have a life of its own-which happens as soon as it
other individuals-can it be called a myth (ibid.:560).
It is of special significance that, in his conception of m
does not make the usual lines of distinction (drawn on eith
ethnological grounds). Anyone, he asserts, (of literate or n
can originate a myth, although when communicated th
already exists in a secondary code. It becomes clear that he
declaration quoted at the beginning of this paper; accordin
himself is creating myth, if his theories are to be taken up
others. Hence, he remains one of the few scholars who pla
midst of the universe he surveys and can with equanim
last resort immaterial whether.. . the thought processe
Indian take shape through the medium of my thought, or
place through the medium of theirs." Some of his view
position of phenomenologists (from whom he has received

As happens in the case of an optical microscope, which is incapable of

revealing the ultimate structure of matter to the observer, we can only
choose between various degrees of enlargement: each one reveals a level of
organization which has no more than a relative truth and, while it lasts,
excludes the perception of other levels (1964:3).

His convictions concerning the primacy of thinking over language are

not new. Some years ago, while attending a meeting of anthropologists and
linguists, he complained:

... we have been behaving as if there were only two partners-language on

the one hand, culture on the other-and as if the problem should be set up
in terms of the causal relations: Is it language which influences culture? Is it
culture which influences language? But we have not been sufficiently aware
of the fact that both language and culture are the products of activities
which are basically similar. I am now referring to this uninvited guest which

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250 ETHNOMUSICOLOGY, MAY 1977

has been seated during this conference beside us and which

mind (LUvi-Strauss 1963:71).

In La Penste sauvage (considered to be an introductory volume to

Mythologiques), Levi-Strauss has questioned the significance often ascribed to
literacy. According to a well-known historian, the seventeenth through nine-
teenth centuries in Europe were "the three centuries in which literary
languages ruled supreme. These were the same centuries that saw the triumph
of rationalism, of individualism, of capitalism, of the nation-state-all the
familiar features that mark the classic era of European world dominance."
Language during that time was ". . . fixed in the dead print of grammars and
dictionaries," it had become more intellectual than sensual through the
predominance of the sense of sight over the sense of hearing (Hughes
1964:38ff). This line of thought, popularized by McLuhan and others, was
reflected in the classification of societies according to whether or not they
were literate. Lvi-Strauss has produced evidence to demonstrate the point
that abstract thought and the practice of science itself are not the exclusive
prerogatives of our society: "Knowledge as systematically developed as this
clearly cannot relate just to practical purposes .... The thought we call
primitive is founded on this demand for order." He points out that agri-
culture, the domestication of animals, pottery, and weaving can only be
arrived at by logical mental process (Levy-Strauss: 1962).
Thus, the search, in Mythologiques, for basic structural patterns of the
human mind follows a consistent line of thought on the part of Levi-Strauss.
It is further consistent that he survey other fields besides that of language for
this study. Of the four fields he isolates as being particularly efficacious for
structural analysis (language, mathematics, music and myth), he singles out
music as being most closely related to myth in this respect (1971:579).
Music and myth, while both untranslatable into terms other than
themselves, are basically structural; the component parts of each are infinitely
convertible, each within its own sphere. Each contains a basic dichotomy:
theme, countertheme, both of which can be inverted, rhythmically distorted
(through augmentation, diminution or otherwise), modally transformed, or
presented in a new timbre. This he calls the capacith anagrammatique
(ibid.:577 and 581f). Further, both music and myth are coded schemes
(music, of sounds, and myth, of images) that are culturally determined (and
vary from society to society) but have what he refers to as an "external level"
(a physiological dimension, in the case of music, and historical facts or
"supposed facts," in the case of myth). The cultural (internal) level itself has
two levels: a large reservoir of culturally determined possibilities (in music, for
example, of specific pitches used by a society) and schemes that involve
certain of the total possibilities available (1964:15 and 1971:584). In both
cases, there must be an auditor who plays a necessary, complementary role in

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 HOPKINS: HOMOLOGY OF MUSIC AND MYTH 251

the communicative act, which is likened by Levi-Strauss

(1971:585). Both are "instruments for the obliteration of ti
"diachronic and synchronic" (1964:15 and 1958:218). These
in their linguistic sense, seem inappropriately applied to
Strauss is referring, not to approaches of study, but to
simultaneous presentations of material (see Chase 1973:32;
1973).
Levi-Strauss has been accused of ethnocentricity in his use of European
art-music models for mythological analysis. However, the mere fact of this
usage is not enough to convict him; for, if, from his viewpoint, a scholar can
invent myth, there is no reason to make an essential line of distinction
between art and folk musics. Sometimes, his critics display a complete lack of
musical understanding, as the one who complains that Lvi-Strauss ignores
West African drum music:

Among such peoples [West African] a drummer may, either alone or in

combination with others, create incredibly complex contrapuntal rhythms,
which disappear at the moment of invention; they are not fixed in any
system of notation. Themes may be relatively limited, but the elaboration is
rich and everyone seems capable of "invention"; indeed the distinction
between theme and elaboration becomes trivial, merely academic under such
circumstances (Diamond 1974:298).

This scholar shares the common academic fallacy of assuming that only
written records have any permanency; and he further associates the existence
of formal structure with permanency. Thus, he does a gross disservice to West
African music and shows his lack of knowledge concerning the nature of
improvisation.
Levi-Strauss is in fact especially interested in musical improvisation; he is
well aware of the improvisatory nature of earlier western art music (of the
tonal variety that interests him) and deplores the fact that ". . . music comes
to be insidiously disassociated from improvisation upon structures up to the
point where one is confused with the other. . ." (1971:582). In making these
observations, Levi-Strauss shows himself to be more than usually knowledgeable
about a tradition that, up until recent years, has exhibited a gradual tendency
toward standardization with a concomitant increase in the separation of
composer and performer roles. Many of the assumptions often made concern-
ing the supposed essential differences between folk and art music are made as
a consequence of the faulty association of a particular (and short-lived) style
of art music within the entire tradition (and generalizations therefrom).
Especially significant is Levi-Strauss's description of the creative process
in art music: Composers, he says, use ". . . the works of their predecessors as a
point of departure for creating works that nonetheless have a marked
individual style, impossible to confuse with any other" (1971:578). This
passage demonstrates his awareness of the traditional nature of art music; but

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252 ETHNOMUSICOLOGY, MAY 1977

it is of more particular interest to us than that, because i

exposition of the kind of mental structures he has in mind. H
denied the idea that these structures are universal, archetypa
since this is another area of his thinking that has been widely
by his critics, it is worth quoting him in full:

... these are already structures which, by transformation, pro

structures, and the existence of structure itself is foremost [of f
importance]. Less confusion would be produced concerning the
human nature as we persist in using it, if people had noticed t
not intend to thus designate a piling up of pre-ordained and
structures, but rather molds from which are produced forms that
entities without being obliged to remain identical, either during
of human existence from birth or death or, in the case of human
for all times and all places (1971:561).

Thus, it is the pattern-forming nature of the human m

Strauss sees as universal first and foremost; this pattern-
manifests itself in different spheres of human activity
communicatory codes within these spheres are culturally dete
case of music, those who share a particular sound system
induce) specific emotional (affective) responses in one another
Lvi-Strauss, "The musical work is a system of sounds capa
the mind of the auditor, of affecting the emotions" (1971:582
has constructed sound systems from which particular structu
Thus there are two levels of cognitive, culturally-determined
The affective response of the auditor is determined by h
intellectually interpret the cultural codes involved. It is this
of cognitive, perceptual, and affective factors that makes mu
meaningful field for structural analysis. We remember that h
"Perhaps because the combination of musical expression with
obvious, musicians do not seem to have experienced the sam
explaining the logical scope of their art."
Levi-Strauss is not alone in his interest in the non-verbal manifestations
of the human intellect. Rudolf Arnheim has presented an impressive mass of
evidence in support of what he terms "visual thinking":

The arts are neglected because they are based on perception, and perception
is disdained because it is not assumed to involve thought (Arnheim 1969:3).

Arnheim comments in passing that music ".. . is one of the most potent
outlets of human intelligence" (ibid.: 18), and mentions the high prestige value
historically accorded music in our culture where it was once classified in the
quadrivium, the group within the Liberal Arts considered to be based on
numbers.

The high esteem of music and the disdain of the fine arts derive, of course,
from Plato, who in his Republic had recommended music for the education

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 HOPKINS: HOMOLOGY OF MUSIC AND MYTH 253

of heroes because it made human beings partake in the mathem

and harmony of the cosmos, located beyond the reach of the senses;
whereas the arts, and particularly painting, were to be treated with caution
because they strengthened man's dependence on illusory images (Arnheim
1969:2).

Levi-Strauss's downgrading of painting in comparison with music is indeed

reminiscent of Platonic thinking:

There is no true equality, then, between painting and music. The former
finds its materials in nature: colors are given before they are used. .... It
seems to me that this congenital subjection of the plastic arts to objects
results from the fact that the organization of forms and colors within sense
experience ... acts ... as an initial level of articulation of reality. Only
thanks to it are they able to introduce a secondary articulation which
consists of the choice and arrangement of the units, and in their interpreta-
tion according to the imperatives of a given technique, style or manner-that
is, by their transposition in terms of a code characteristic of a given artist or
society (L6vy-Strauss 1964:19).

This is not the only aspect of his thought that suggests Greek
philosophy. The notion of affective communication described above is notice-
ably close to Plato's conception of ethos; we remember that Greek heroes
were only allowed to study certain modes and instruments, those that could
be expected to induce the appropriate emotions in soldiers. It is thus
especially interesting that Lvi-Strauss gives musical communication a cathartic
function:

Every melodic phrase or harmonic development offers an adventure.

The listener surrenders his (own) mind and his feeling to the composer's
initiative; and if tears of joy flow at the end, it is because this adventure-
which has lasted, from beginning to end a far shorter time than if he had
been involved in a real adventure-has been crowned with a success and a
feeling of happiness of which real adventures offer few examples....
(Consequently) each work ought to offer a speculative formula to seek and
find an issue whose problems are establishing, properly speaking, its theme
(1971:589).

This function of music is important to Levi-Strauss because of the

analogy he again draws with myth: "procuring the pleasant illusion that
contradictions could be surmounted and difficulties resolved, it is a character-
istic shared by both" (ibid.:590). He then proceeds to test the universality of
this theory, for he feels that, if he is correct, it should be possible to find a
manifestation of this function in any particular musical work. For his
experiment, he utilizes the well-known orchestral music for the ballet, the
Bolero, by Ravel; and he chooses this work precisely because a recent theorist
has described it in terms that seem to flatly contradict his thesis. The
composer, Henri Pousseur, in reference to this work, explains that:

One might object that there is at least one exception to this universality of
oscillating forms, periodic in the large sense; this would be precisely the*

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254 ETHNOMUSICOLOGY, MAY 1977

process of simple transformation, developing itself in a

without returning on itself. . . (an) extreme case of uninterr
ality, perfectly continued . . . having this in common that th
that is to say that it is not possible to go beyond in this dir
it would be necessary then to continue by returning back
1970:246 & LUvi-Strauss 1971:590 who quotes section after

Levi-Strauss was also aware that Ravel himself did not take the Bolero
very seriously; he was genuinely surprised that it became so popular. Ravel is
known to have commented: "Unfortunately, it is empty of music" and to
have explained its popularity by saying, "It's the style" (Myers 1960:81).
Upon another occasion, he was more explicit about his intentions:

I am particularly desirous that there should be no misunderstanding

about this work. It constitutes an experiment in a very special and limited
direction and should not be suspected of aiming at achieving anything other
or more than what it actually does. Before its first performance, I issued a
warning to the effect that what I had written was a piece lasting seventeen
minutes and consisting wholly of "orchestral tissue without music"-of one
long, very gradual crescendo. There are no contrasts, and there is practically
no invention save the plan and the manner of execution. The themes are
altogether impersonal... folk tunes of the usual Spanish-Arabian kind, and
(whatever may have been said to the contrary) the orchestral writing is
simple and straightforward throughout, without the slightest attempt at
virtuosity.... I have carved out exactly what I intended and it is for the
listeners to take it or leave it (Seroff 1953:251).

LUvi-Strauss, however, was not willing to accept this invitation; for, in

his words:

Even if Ravel used to describe the Bolero as an instrumental crescendo and

pretended to see in it only an exercise in orchestration, it is clear that the
enterprise gets deeply involved in other things; when it is a question of
music, poetry, and painting, one could not go far in the analysis of works
of art if one limited oneself to what their authors have said or even believed
they have done (1971:590).

Levi-Strauss's exhaustive analysis of Ravel's Bolero is of central impor-

tance to his thesis, and we shall, therefore, consider it in some detail. His aim
is to find unconscious structuring in the work-patterns that have manifested
themselves despite the avowed intention of the composer; and he seeks first
for the structure he has posited as the most essential to all human beings,
what he sees as the fundamental duality of being and not being (that has
manifested itself, according to the theories explicated in his four volumes in
such oppositions as raw and cooked). The importance of this analytical
experiment to Levi-Strauss may be gauged by its position in the structure of
his own work where it occurs at the conclusion of the fourth and final
volume.
In the Bolero, Levi-Strauss finds basic oppositions between two themes
(which he refers to as subject and counter-subject) and their responses; an

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 HOPKINS: HOMOLOGY OF MUSIC AND MYTH 255

oscillation between binary and ternary rhythms; and an alterna

two modal flavors (although the second of these last is never fu
He presents a graph to illustrate the symmetrical nature of the
and argues that "... the whole work seeks to surmount
oppositions that are enmeshed with one another" (1971:594).
tions (rhythmic, tonal, and melodic) are resolved through the sy
various opposing factors and through a brief return to the orig
after the sudden change of key only 15 measures from the
modulation in the work):

In order to reconcile these oppositions, the composer addresses him

the outset to the only musical dimension not yet brought into this
discussion: that of instrumental timbres. First presented in solo, the
instruments then perform in pairs, following which they are combined into
increasingly large numbers until it becomes clear that the entire resolution
disappears upon arrival at the tutti, that is to say when quality is changed
into quantity and all the sonorous volume provided is not of any help at all.
But then, at the moment when this orchestral aggravation arrives at the
breaking point, the happy solution to this impotence breaks forth from an
area where one would never have looked if the preceding defeats had not
led one to it. Despairing about bringing this to such a head and not being
able to further inflate the sound [and] as an ultimate resort, the orchestra
changes key: it modulates (1971:595).

He maintains that this "celebrated modulation" has been prepared "by

what might be called a rhythmic modulation" and further believes that the
new key itself (E major) has been foreshadowed by the countersubject
through a series of relationships that may seem somewhat forced:

... this modulation-into E major-is related to the key of c# minor, the

enharmonic equivalent of D} which is related to the tonality of F minor
(subdominant minor of the tonic) toward which the counter subject has
been vainly heading (1971:595).

Levi-Strauss (aided by the analytical skills of the late Rene Leibowitz)

has indeed succeeded in demonstrating the existence of formal, interrelated
structures in this work, both in its larger dimensions and in its subdivisions
down to the smallest of motivic details. Whether he has been successful in
proving that these factors are of predominate musical importance and produc
(in their eventual synthesis) the required resolution of conflict is anothe
matter. In order to accept Lvi-Strauss's interpretation, one must agree th
the Bolero is a traditional example of tonal composition. Yet from the
harmonic point of view the utilization of chordal resources is so unambitious
that we could describe the work as a single-chord chaconne (being based
almost entirely on a composite of the C and G major chords) while the ba
relentlessly reiterates the dominant, tonic notes in ostinato fashion. The tona
ambiguity is further enhanced by the "countersubject" which not only leads
away from the tonal matrix of the work (as stressed by Levi-Strauss) but also

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256 ETHNOMUSICOLOGY, MAY 1977

is melodically structured on the notes of an equivocal dimin

chord.
There is no doubt that the sudden modulation in the final section of
this work comes as a surprise and has a powerful effect upon the listener at
that point; but it is highly doubtful all would agree that the return to the
original key in the final coda (which concludes with the ambiguity of a plagal
cadence) constitutes a satisfactory resolution of the engendered tension-that
there is in fact a resolution at all. Even the conflicting nature of the "subject"
and "countersubject" could be questioned, for they exhibit both rhythmic
and motivic interrelationships that serve to impress at least this observer with
their similarity rather than the reverse. And, again, since an extremely
restricted number of rhythmic motives are repeated constantly throughout the
work, it would seem that their repetition, rather than the perceived binary-
ternary oscillation within the motives themselves, is considerably more im-
portant. It is difficult not to conclude that this reiteration of harmonic,
melodic, and rhythmic material makes an obvious contribution to the
gathering momentum of the "orchestral crescendo."
Levi-Strauss has indeed found a convicing example for proving the
essential structural character of music. However, his contention that every
musical work contains within it a resolution of conflicts remains questionable.
The difference of opinion on this matter between Levi-Strauss and the
composer of the Bolero is occasioned by the differing degree of importance
accorded by each to the role of timbre in the communicatory message of the
totality. The questions brought to the surface by these conflicting viewpoints
are important because they involve LUvi-Strauss's notion of intentionality, a
concept that has been much debated and is of central importance to his view
of structuralism. As has been pointed out: "Levi-Strauss clearly asserts that
meaning is intentional since the receiver has to perceive it and understand it
and in so doing he casts it in his own mold" (Rossi 1974:25). He has
articulated this point explicitly in relation to music when, as described above,
he refers to the listener as playing a necessary role in musical communication
(a role, we remember, he likened to that of a participant in "carnal union").
Since the work under discussion became immensely popular, it seems reason-
able to seek out the reasons that made it meaningful to so many people at
that time. Were its auditors impressed by the subtle and skilled craftsmanship
employed within a narrow scope of highly limited traditional materials
(harmonic, melodic and rhythmic) or were they interested and affected
by the previously described momentum wrought chiefly by an obvious (but
original and bold) use of orchestral resources? Ravel, as has been noted above, re-
marked: "It is the style." Indeed, the most dramatic changes in European mu-
sical styles concerned a new emphasis on orchestration as a meaningful entity
in itself (showing the influence of music from the part of the world where

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 HOPKINS: HOMOLOGY OF MUSIC AND MYTH 257

matters of timbre have traditionally played a predominant role)

difficult not to make the obvious conclusion.
Thus, there seem to be at least two cognitive structures through which
Ravel's Bolero may be perceived, only one of which was intended by the
composer (the one shared, in all likelihood, by most auditors). We have seen
that LUvi-Strauss believes that affective musical communication takes place
through cognitive structures and that the listener plays a necessary role in the
reception of messages. That the intentions of the sender must be communi-
cated seem implicit in his bitter criticism of contemporary western art
composition, when he asks:

What has happened to the first level of articulation, which is as indispens-

able in musical language as in any other, and which consists precisely of
general structures whose universality allows the encoding and decoding of
messages (1964:24)?

This inadmissability of new structures seems to have been contradicted by

LUvi-Strauss in his last work when, in defending himself from his critics, he
declares that all (oral and written) literary works are individually created,
although some may become common property as flexible molds for new
transformations.

The confusion here seems to revolve around what is meant by "new." If

Levi-Strauss simply means that all new human efforts must in some sense deal
with the transformation of known material in order to operate on a
communicative level, then it is possible to accept some of his ideas on
unconscious communication. Certain composers of contemporary music, for
example, have maintained that they have severed all ties with tradition;
however, it is apparent that atonal music could only achieve an effect as such
on those who were already conversant with tonal music-and, we might add,
those who would be most impressed by an "orchestral crescendo" might be
expected to be those to whom the dramatic utilization of instrumental
resources was still a novelty. Such communication must be seen as intentional,
I believe, although existing beneath the level of articulate reality.
However, the confusion cannot be cleared up so easily. For Livi-Strauss
does not follow his (essentially liberating) ideas to their logical conclusions.
Indeed, the fundamental importance of his theories seems to be obscured by
what may be described as the old practice of putting the cart before the
horse. While the goal of his research is to lead the way to an understanding of
what remains constant in human thought patterns despite diverse cultural
manifestation, he actually presents his theories through patterns of thought
that he has determined in advance. First and foremost, it is by no means
self-evident that all peoples see being and non-being as an essential dichotomy.
The assumption of a binary foundation to musical manifestations cannot be
corroborated by either cross-cultural evidence or even by evidence from the

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258 ETHNOMUSICOLOGY, MAY 1977

tradition with which he is most familiar. While he makes allowances for

different scale systems within his cultural grid, he nonetheless makes assum
tions concerning certain common characteristics of these systems: the
istence of an hierarchical arrangement among the notes, for example
(1964:16) and the concept of resolution (1971:590).
The necessity for justifying these a priori assumptions may be the cau
of some of the weakest arguments in his study. There is an apparent
contradiction concerning L'vi-Strauss's interest in the willingness of musici
to "explain the logical scope of their art" and his insistence upon unconsciou
use of structures by composers. But Levi-Strauss has invented an histor
hypothesis that attributes to the very existence of this analytical tradition
Europe (and the consequent development of self consciousness among mu
cians) a gradual disintegration of the quality of the music itself as structur
and ornamental factors became more and more confused with one another;
and he points to the gradual disappearance of the improvisatory tradition (as
referred to above in this paper.) "The musical language has thus been
progressively detached from what has made its distinctive character for a long
time," until finally the traditional roles of form and content in music become
reversed in contemporary works that Levi-Strauss does not hesitate to call
examples of "anti-music" (1971:582). Elsewhere, he quotes the French
composer, Boulez, to the effect that: in serial music:
There is no longer any preconceived scale or preconceived forms-that is,
general structures into which a particular variety of musical thought can be
inserted.... Classical tonal thought is based on a world defined by
gravitation and attraction, serial thought on a world which is perpetually
expanding (1964:23).

Unfortunately, the idea of a progressive analytical consciousness is not in

accord with the facts as we know them. Theoretical treatises have had a long
history; and the progression (so far as composer involvement with theory is
concerned) seems to have gone in the other direction: As time went on, the
theorist became more and more differentiated from the musician, not the
other way around. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, for example,
the French composer, Rameau, established the principles according to which
tonal harmony has since been viewed (until questioned by Heinrich Schenker
almost two hundred years later). In the preface to his famous treatise on
harmony, Rameau complained:

In whatever progress music has made thus far, it appears that the more
sensible the ear becomes of its marvelous effects, the less curious is the
mind to fathom its true principles .... Such writings as have come down to
us from the ancients make it very clear that reason alone enabled them to
discover the greater part of music's properties (Strunk 1950:564).

Livi-Strauss makes it clear that, for his explication of mythological

structures, he is not interested in the forms of pretonal music any more than
those of post-tonal music. Again, he presents a justification in the form of an

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 HOPKINS: HOMOLOGY OF MUSIC AND MYTH 259

historical hypothesis; and he tells us that seventeenth-centur

the structures of myth (which had always had them) (1
apart from the metaphysical aspect of this theory, it is evid
formal structures (comparable to the fugue to which h
connection) had played an important role in European music
time. As a matter of fact, the very changes in style tha
consider themselves to be writing in a "New Practice" at the
Baroque period were in opposition to the kind of musical
interests LUvi-Strauss; Monteverdi and others of his persuas
the structural intricacies of late Renaissance music and attem
portray emotions found in verbal texts.
It is important that these seemingly premature (and
judgments concerning the universality of particular stru
obscure the actual significance of this work. Levi-Strauss, we
insisted that it is the existence of structuring that is of
(1971:561). Structuring (the systematic and meaningful in
parts within a totality) may be seen to not only be an e
western art music but also of many (if not all) musics of
been carefully described through complex verbal and pictori
as far back in time as the ancient Indian epic, the Ramayana
an account of the raga system). That it is also present in mu
having formal analytical models is apparent from descrip
folk musicians. However, it is further apparent that musical
not depend upon descriptions, formal or otherwise, for proo
which is demonstrated by the very fact that interaction am
takes place within carefully circumscribed rules of appropria
propriateness that are as difficult for outsiders to learn as it
grammatical system of a foreign language. In the conclu
volume of Mythologiques, LUvi-Strauss defends himself from
not see the significance of his views on affective communica

. the preceding apparent digressions [the Bolero analysis] play

They demonstrate that, contrary to what critics have affirmed,
ignored the importance of the affective life. I only refuse to .
myself to that form of mysticism that proclaims the intuitive a
character of moral and aesthetic sentiments, and even at times maintains
that they illuminate the consciousness independently of all intellectual
apprehension of their object (1971:596).

In highlighting the cognitive component in affective communication,

LUvi-Strauss has made it possible to compare classificatory systems (and,
therefore, patterns of thought) that have been traditionally considered dif-
ferent in kind and not comparable. In concentrating on human thought as
primordial to its cultural manifestations, he is able to ignore standard lines of
societal demarcation (according to literary or technological achievement, for
example). Thus, Lvi-Strauss's concepts are liberating; they free the scholar

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 260 ETHNOMUSICOLOGY, MAY 1977

from making assumptions that have never been proved bu

to avoid. They should lend themselves fruitfully to furth
transformations.

NOTE

1. I am indebted to Dan Ben-Amos for valuable comments and suggestions on

paper.

REFERENCES CITED

Arnheim, R.
1969 Visual thinking. Berkeley and Los Angeles.
Boon, J.
1972 From symbolism to structuralism: LUvi-Strauss in a literary tradition. New
York.

Chase, G.
1972 "Pirogue to the moon: the Mythologiques of Claude L6vi-Strauss" in Year-
book of the International Folk Music Council, p. 152.
1973 Two lectures in the form of a pair. I.S.A.M. Brooklyn, N.Y.
Diamond, S.
1974 "The myth of structuralism," in I. Rossi, ed., The Unconscious in Culture: the
Structuralism of Claude L&vi-Strauss in Perspective. New York.
Feld, S.
1974 "Linguistics and ethnomusicology," ETHNOMUSICOLOGY 18:197.
Hughes, H.
1964 History as art and as science. New York.
King, A.
1974 "Review essay: Claude L6vi-Strauss: Les Mythologiques," ETHNOMUSICOL-
OGY 18:101.

L6vi-Strauss, C.
1958 Anthropologie structurale. Paris. Eng. trans., Structural anthropology
York, 1973. References here to Eng. trans.
1962 La pensbe sauvage. Paris. Eng. trans., The savage mind. Chicago, 1966.
References here to Eng. trans.
1964 Mythologiques I. Le cru et le cruit. Paris. Eng. trans., The raw and the
cooked. New York, 1969. References here to Eng. trans.
1971 Mythologiques IV. L'homme nu. Paris. Quotations here are my Eng. trans.
Myers, R.
1960 Ravel: life and works. London.

Nattiez, J.
1973 "Du fonctionnalisme a L6vi-Strauss" in Musique en jeu, 7:12.
Pousseur, H.
1970 Fragments thboriques I sur la musique exp6rimentale. Brussels.
Rossi, I.
1974 "Intellectual antecedents of LUvi-Strauss' notion of unconscious," in I. Rossi,
ed., The unconscious in culture: the structuralism of Claude L6vi-Strauss in
perspective. New York.
Seroff, V.
1953 Maurice Ravel. New York.

Strunk, 0. comp. and ed.

1950 Source readings in music history. New York.

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 HOPKINS: HOMOLOGY OF MUSIC AND MYTH 261

Maurice Ravel's Bolero

F1.1 ...............
F1.2 ...............
Pic. . ..............
Ob. .
Ob.2 (& Ob.d'A) . .
Eng.Hs .........
Eb C . .............
Bb C1.1 ...........
Bb C1.2 ...........
B.C1. .............
Bsn 1 .............
Bsn 2 .............
C.Bpn .............
4 Hns .. .......

D Trp . .......
3 C Trps ..........
.............

3 Trb....

Tba
Spino Sax .........
Spno Sax..........
Ten. Sax ..........
Timp ....
S Dr...........
Gng. ..........
CymT ........
B.Dr....
Cel. ... .........
Hp ..........
Vln, .............

Vln 2 ..

Via

Vel. ............
C.B. .............
Thematl struoore, ..Ia Ib Ia Ib IIa IIb IIa IIb Ia Ib Ia Ib IIa IIb IIa IIb Ia Ib Ia
Tonal -agntert C ......................................................................................

F1.2 .............
Pic .......

0b.i .............
0b.2 ......... ..
Eng.H ...... .. _
Bb CI.I ..........
Bb C 2 ..........
Bo CI . ......I....
Bsn 1 ...........
Bsn 2 . .......
C.Bsn ..........
Hns .............

D Trp . ...........
3 C Trps.......... _

3 Trb . ..........

Tba ...........
Spino Sax....
Ten. Sax,,.,,,....
Timp......
S.Dr. ..........
Gng ..............
Cym. . . ........
B.Dr.. .........
Hp .............
Vln 1 ...........

Vln 2 ............

Via ............

VCl. .... ........

C.B.

Ib IIa IIb IIa IIb Sa Ib la Ib IIa IIb IIa IIb la Ib IIa IIb' b K
(c)

Key to graphb Four measures = Ia = "subject" IIa = "counter subject"

Ib = "response = coda
K = ca IIb = "response"to counter subject

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