Geopolitical Analysis of FATA

FATA, which is about the size of Switzerland with a population of over 3 million, is
composed of seven agencies: Bajaur, Khyber Agency, Hurram Agency, Mohmand
agency, Orakzai, South Waziristan and North Waziristan. This rugged and
mountainous area, with its many passes (including the Khyber Pass), has been a
strategically important gateway to many invaders – Turks, Mughals, Persians and
Greeks to name a few. FATA, and Baluchistan to the south of it, is separated from
Afghanistan by the Durand Line. The Durand Line, named after Sir Mortimer
Durand who surveyed and established this division in 1890 of 1893, is the 2,500-
kilometre border drawn by the British colonial rulers of India between today’s
Pakistan and Afghanistan. The border was delimited in such a way as to avoid
cutting through tribal territories. But inevitably, tribes were bisected, notably the
Muhmands and Wazirs. And while the Durand Line has been the de facto border
between British India (later Pakistan) and Afghanistan, the government in Kabul
has still to recognise it officially.

Political Administration of FATA

The British policy towards the tribal belt was based on a mix of persuasion,
pressure and armed intervention. Britain instituted its “Forward Policy,” which
essentially consisted of ‘pacifying’ the tribes as far west as possible. This
eventually led to the 1897-1898 Tribal Wars. Realizing it would never be possible
to completely subdue the frontier tribes, the colonial administration decided to
implement the Close Border Policy which involved establishing a number of tribal
agencies, enclosed by a chain of posts and cantonments, where the Pukhtun
tribes would be allowed to govern their society according to their own laws and
customs1.

Although the founder and first Governor-General of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali

Jinnah, withdrew Pakistan’s army from FATA, Pakistan retained the colonial
1
Rakisits, Claude, “National Integration in Pakistan: The Role of Religion, Ethnicity and the External Environment”,
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Queensland, 1986, p. 221.
administrative and legal structures, codified in a special legal framework, the
Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) 1901. The FCR mixes traditional customs and
norms with discretionary police, judicial and executive authority in the political
agent. By doing so, it chose to treat FATA’s population as separate from, and
unequal to, other Pakistani citizens. Pakistan continued to provide allowances
and subsidies. In return the local tribes declared their loyalty to Pakistan.

The political agent (PA), a federal, and at times provincially recruited, bureaucrat
heads the local administration of each FATA agency. He is all powerful. Backed
by khassadars and levies (tribal militias), as well as paramilitary forces that
operate under army control, the PA exercises a mix of extensive executive, judicial
and revenue powers and has the responsibility of maintaining law and order and
suppressing crime in the tribal areas.

The FCR preserves the Pukhtun tribal structure of jirga (council of elders) to which
the political agent can refer civil and criminal matters. The jirga ascertains guilt
or innocence after hearing the parties to a dispute and passes verdicts on the
basis of rewaj (custom). However, the PA retains ultimate authority. The
political agent initiates cases, appoints the jirga, presides over trials and awards
punishments without even the technical possibility of revision by a regular court
of law.

The PA grants tribal elders the status of malik (with the consent of the governor)
on the basis of male inheritance. But the PA can also arbitrarily withdraw,
suspend or cancel malik status if he deems the individual is not serving the
interests of the state. Maliks receive financial privileges from the administration
in line with their tribe’s cooperation in suppressing crime, maintaining social
peace and in general supporting the government. The state relies on the services
and collaboration of these maliks to administer FATA. Like the British before
them, the Pakistan state rewards the loyal Maliks with a special status, financial
benefits and other official rewards. This anachronistic legal arrangement
continues to this day. So while FATA is formally a part of Pakistan, it more closely
resembles a colony whose population lives under laws and administrative
arrangements that set it apart from the rest of the country.
However, particularly relevant to Pakistan’s involvement in the “war on terror”,
are FCR clauses that empower the political agent to punish an entire tribe for
crimes committed on its territory by fines, arrests, property seizures and
blockades2. The political agent can order detention of all or any members of the
tribe, seize their property or block their access to the settled districts if he has
“good reason” to believe that a tribe or its members are “acting in a hostile or
unfriendly manner,” have “failed to render all assistance in their power” to help
apprehend criminals, “connived at, or abetted in a crime” or “suppressed
evidence” of an offence.

And while Pakistan’s 1973 constitution guarantees fundamental rights for citizens
residing in the entire territory of the country, which includes the tribal areas
,Article 247 (7) bars the Supreme Court and the High Court from exercising any
jurisdiction under the constitution in relation to a Tribal Area, unless parliament
by law allows it.

The Economy of the Tribal Areas

FATA is one of Pakistan’s most economically backward areas. Per capita income is
half that of the very low national per capita income of $500; some 60% of the
population lives below the national poverty line. Per capita public development
expenditure is reportedly one third of the national average. Social development
indicators are shockingly low. The overall literacy rate is 17.42% compared to
56% nationally. Male literacy is 29%, female literacy a mere 3% compared to the
national 32% for females. There are only 41 hospitals for a population of 3.1
million. FATA has a per doctor rate of 1:6,762 compared to the national 1:1,359.
Natural resources, including minerals and coal, are under exploited. Most locals
depend on subsistence agriculture since there is little industrial development and
few jobs. This situation is made worse by the fact that about 15% of the
population is between the ages of 15 and 22.

The political agent is FATA’s chief development agent and planner. He is all
powerful in that sphere as well. One of the PA’s main instruments of economic

2
FCR (1901), sections 21-24
control is the granting of export and import permits for each agency. These
export permits are a much sought after prize. Import permits for wheat and
other basic necessities are another source of patronage distribution. Moreover,
the political agent approves and carries out developmental works based on
political and administrative considerations. There is “almost no input from the
local population or even their parliamentary representatives in development
initiatives.3”And to make things worse, the economy is completely distorted by
the thriving trade in arms, drugs, as well as other cross-border smuggling. These
are a direct consequence of the events in neighbouring Afghanistan. Poor law
enforcement at FATA’s borders with Afghanistan encourages lucrative smuggling
of luxury consumer goods, causing significant revenue losses in uncollected duties
and taxes.

Not only has the army done nothing or has been unable to stop this smuggling,
but this trade provides the Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani supporters, the
militants in the FATA agencies, with funds and arms.

FATA’s Four Political Periods

The first period: 1947 – 1979

The inclusion of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and FATA in the
Pakistan scheme was probably one of the most troublesome problems facing the
departing British administration. In NWFP there was the charismatic Khan Abdul
Ghaffar Khan, nicknamed the “Frontier Gandhi,” who led a Muslim organisation
(Khudai Khidmatgars – Servants of God) which advocated the establishment of an
independent state for the Pukhtuns, i.e., Pukhtunistan4. This organisation
considered Mohammad Jinnah’s Muslim League a British creation and therefore
opposed the idea of Pakistan as being a British invention. On the other hand, the
Pukhtunistan scheme was ardently supported by Afghanistan and the Congress
Party. The Afghan authorities, not recognizing the Durand Line, wanted the
‘Pakistani’ Pushtuns to either join Afghanistan or create their own state of
Pukhtunistan out of NWFP and parts of Baluchistan, but without including the
3
“Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,” Op. Cit., p 9
4
Entessar, N., “Baluchi Nationalism,” in Asian Affairs, Vol. 7, No 2, Nov – Dec. 1979, p. 79
Pukhtun areas of Afghanistan. Afghanistan also demanded that Pakistan provide
Afghanistan access to the sea by giving it a special corridor through Baluchistan or
creating a free afghan zone in Karachi. A second source of trouble for the Muslim
League came from the Congress Ministry of Dr Khan Sahib, the brother of the
“Frontier Gandhi” in NWFP. Fearing that a Congress-led NWFP would opt not to
join Pakistan-to-be, the Muslim League put pressure on the British to call a
referendum, directly asking the people for their decision. The plebiscite, held in
July 1947, only offered two choices: to either join India or Pakistan; there was no
Pukhtunistan option. Dr Khan called for a massive boycott of the plebiscite. The
results were very close: of the 51% of eligible voters who took part, 97% voted for
Pakistan, i.e., only 50.5% of the population voted in favour of joining Pakistan.
One week after Partition, Governor-General Jinnah sacked Dr Khan, as allowed
under the adapted Government of India Act, 1935, for fear that the Pukhtunistan
issue could be used by Afghanistan and India to create domestic problems for
Pakistan5.

The new chief minister, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, used a heavy-handed
approach towards the Pukhtun, including using the army and air force to suppress
disturbances in the Tribal areas.This confirmed that already then Pakistan’s
central authority interfered in FATA’s affairs. Although the central authorities,
particularly under Zulfiqar Bhutto (1971 – 1977) intervened on a regular basis in
the provincial affairs of NWFP including dismissing the Governor of NWFP on 12
February 1973 ,and arresting Wali Khan, the National Awami Party (NAP) leader,
on charges of secession, FATA was generally left on its own. Interestingly, Afghan
President Daud was close to reaching an agreement with PM Bhutto in August
1976, which involved Afghanistan’s recognition of the Durand Line in return for
the release of Pukhtun and Baluch National Awami Party (NAP) leaders from
Pakistani gaols.

The second period: 1979 – 2001

With the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979, the political dynamics between
Islamabad and FATA took a dramatic turn. One of the main causes was, of course,

5
Al Mujahid, Sharif, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, Studies in Interpretation, Karachi, Quai-i-Azam Academy, 1981, p. 135.
the influx of some 3 million Afghan refugees who settled in NWFP and FATA and
which inevitably led to clashes between the local residents and the refugees.
Most disputes were, however, settled by the Jirgas.

An important element complicating the refugee situation was the presence in the
Tribal areas of the Mujahideen, the Western-supported anti-Afghan government
guerrillas, who launched their attacks against the Soviet and Afghan forces from
Pakistani territory. Bin Laden was, of course, one of those Mujahideen leaders
then supported by the West. And like the situation some 20 years later, the
Pakistan government was unable or unwilling to control the activities of these
insurgents, with some of these rebel groups establishing quasi-government
enclaves in the tribal areas. Realising the damage the presence of these
Mujahideen were having on the local scene, a Jirga of elders in FATA demanded in
1985 that Islamabad recognise the Soviet-backed government in Kabul and return
the refugees after having come to an acceptable agreement with the Afghan
authorities. The embedding of the Mujahideen in the tribal areas was facilitated
by General Zia-ul Haq’s Islamization process in Pakistan and Islamabad’s close
relationship with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Both factors made it conducive for
the increase in the political clout of the Islamic parties. This included the very
substantial growth in the number of Madrassas (religious schools) the most
radical of which spawned the Mujahideen fighters. Given the low level of socio-
economic development in the Tribal areas, it is not surprising that up to 80% of
boys still go to these Madrassas for their education today. The overwhelming
majority of the Madrassas are run by the Jamiat-e-Ulama Islam (JUI), an Islamic
party which believes in the revival of Islamic values according to the Sharia. The
JUI is an ideological sole mate of the Taliban. Not surprisingly, most of the
founders of the Taliban went through these JUI-run Madrassas. Not only did the
introduction of some $66 billion worth of weapons between 1978 - 1992
compound the gun culture in the region, but the presence of thousands of
Mujahideen led to the creation of a worldwide network of Afghan war veterans of
all nationalities. One of these organisations was al-Qaeda.Another complicating
factor in the Afghan-Pakistan relationship at the time was the thriving heroin
trade which involved a major tribe, the Afridi, whose members straddle the
Durand Line in the area of the Khyber Pass. The drug smugglers were given
military and moral support by the Soviet-backed Afghan government in return for
the Afridi’s support in stopping the crossing into Afghanistan of the Mujahideen.
Under intense Western pressure to do something about this growing heroin
trade, General Zia-ul-Haq’s government in Pakistan having failed to stop the
heroin trade, including having farmers grow alternative crops, decided to send
para-military forces into the Khyber Agency in 1985. Over a six-week period it
destroyed 100 houses belonging to heroin traders as well as a number of
laboratories Moreover, with the aim of preventing a resurgence of the elicit trade
and check arms smuggling, the government decided to permanently station law
enforcement agents in the agency and build fortified posts in strategic
locations.This marked the beginning of the central authorities’ regular
interference in FATA affairs.

There was some support for the military action, as there was a genuine sentiment
that something had to be done to arrest the heroin trade. But there was also a
feeling that the root cause of the heroin problem in FATA was the continued
implementation of the Frontiers Crime regulations, the lack of universal adult
franchise, the lack of social and political integration with the rest of the country
and the low level of development which only benefited a few maliks. Benazir
Bhutto’s civilian government attempted to deal with some of these issues by
introducing adult franchise in FATA in 1996. However, Bhutto’s political
liberalization only went so far. Political parties were - and still are - formally
forbidden from extending their activities into the agencies. However, mullahs
have always enjoyed free entry. This has assisted the Islamic parties to further
consolidate their political influence in the area. Moreover, not only does FATA
have no representation in NWFP’s provincial legislature, but while the
constitution mandates representation for FATA in the national parliament, the
parliament cannot legislate on any matter concerning FATA. This makes the
FATA-elected members of Parliament rather superfluous.

The third period: 2001 – 2008

Following their defeat in October 2001, the Taliban and al-Qaeda escaped across
the border into the tribal areas of Pakistan. Hundreds of these foreign fighters
settled and married into local tribes. They have since then established safe
havens in FATA, especially in South and North Waziristan and Bajaur Agency, and
have been attacking coalition forces in southern and eastern Afghanistan with
success, particularly since 2005. It is important to remember that the links that
were developed between Afghan, Pakistani and Arab groups during the 1980s
were still active and are now being used against US and NATO forces in
Afghanistan.Part of the Pukhtun’s tribal honour is to offer hospitality, regardless
whether the guest is welcomed or not, a criminal, a friend or an enemy.
Accordingly, it was easy for these militants to settle down in FATA. However, it
has become obvious in the last year or so that some of these militants,
particularly the non Pukhtun, i.e., the Arabs, Chechens, Uzbeks and Uighurs, are
starting to overstay their welcome. Deadly battles causing scores of fatalities
have broken out between the local residents and these non-Pukhtuns, particularly
in early 2007.6

Not only has a Taliban mini-state in the tribal areas been established - and this is
bad news for Pakistan in the long-term – but it has also led to the creeping
Talibanization of FATA and neighbouring NWFP, including in the Swat valley. This
has included imposing Shariah law, attacking music and video shops, closing
barber shops and killing women working in schools or for NGOs. It has
encouraged pro-Taliban Pakistani militants to flex their muscles, including
murdering politicians, killing innocent Pakistani civilians, attacking army personnel
and assassinating government officials, including by using suicide bombers. So
who are these pro-Taliban fighters in the tribal areas? Simply put, they are
Pukhtun tribesmen who have been radicalized by the rhetoric of Jihad which
started almost 30 years ago with the anti-Soviet jihad, continued during the
Afghan civil war and the subsequent Taliban rule and finally today with the
presence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the region. They also include an
increasing number of Punjabis whose families had been evicted from their lands
in southern Punjab in the 1980s and have accordingly become landless. They

6
“Waziristan Clash toll rises” in Dawn – the Internet, March 22, 2007
include military commanders who fought the Soviets as well as the Northern
Alliance and, of course, many unemployed youth who have been drawn to the
Jihad “as a way of gaining a livelihood or enhancing their social importance and
power.”

They cooperate closely with the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters. In an attempt to
hunt down the Taliban, al Qaeda fighters and Pakistani militants, the Pakistan
army sent 80,000 troops into the tribal areas, and lost over 1,000 troops in the
fighting. A negative consequence of the use of the military has been the political
displacement of the Political Agent and the Maliks who kept the system working
in favour of the pro-Taliban.

The use of American Predator strikes – sometimes unilaterally without the

Pakistan government’s prior agreement – has fuelled an already strong anti-
American mood in Pakistan, in general, and in the tribal areas, in particular.
Reportedly, there is a “tacit understanding” between Washington and the
Pakistani army that permits US strikes on foreign rebels in Pakistan, but not
against Pakistani Taliban.7

If the goal is to discourage the local population in the tribal areas from providing
support to the Taliban, using indiscriminate military means only is clearly not
going to be successful in the long term. On the other hand, making deals with
local leaders and mullahs, as the Pakistan Government did in South Waziristan
(April 2004 and Feb 2005) and North Waziristan (Sept 2006) - which called on the
tribesmen to expel the foreign militants and end cross-border attacks into
Afghanistan in return for the army stopping major operations in those agencies
and pulling most of its soldiers out of tribal area - was not the way to go either.

The fourth period: 2008 – Present

Realising that using strictly military means to deal with the militants in the Tribal
areas was not working, the new civilian government in Islamabad is considering a
combination of well-targeted military strikes, especially against high value Taliban
and al-Qaeda leaders and commanders, and political and socioeconomic

7
US Stepping Up Unilateral Attacks in Pakistan: Report”, in AFP, March 27, 2008
programs to bring the tribal areas into mainstream Pakistan political and
economic life. This approach would also include negotiations with Pakistani
militants willing to put down their arms. The government’s aim is to convince the
local population, through non-lethal measures, that there is much more to be
gained for them by being fully integrated with the rest of Pakistan than by
supporting the Taliban. As in parts of southern and eastern Afghanistan today,
local residents have acquiesced to Taliban-type rule out of fear of the militants
combined with resentment against a corrupt administration and draconian laws.
The pro-Taliban militants are able to restore order quickly and dispense speedy
justice. Accordingly, two of the measures the new federal government is
considering to induce the locals to drop their support for the Taliban and their
fellow travellers are repealing the Frontiers Crimes Regulations (FCR) in FATA and
fully integrating politically the tribal areas into the neighbouring province of
NWFP.

While there has been some opposition to the repeal of the FCR in some quarters,
these are measures that are on the whole welcomed by the local residents of
FATA. Certainly, the National Awami Party-led government in NWFP is fully
supportive of this idea. Importantly, now that Islamic parties were soundly
defeated in the recent provincial and national elections, the pro-Taliban militants
can no longer rely on their political support to promote their agenda. The people
of NWFP have made very clear that they reject religious extremism. And more
importantly, they have also rejected the religious parties’ corrupt and
incompetent rule in the province. For over 40 years we have seen the increasing
involvement of external players in FATA, notably the Mujahideen, the Taliban and
al-Qaeda, the Pakistan military and Islamic parties. The result has been a break
down of the traditional societal structure. The new provincial and national civilian
governments must now use their new popular mandate - and the people’s
rejection of the Islamic parties - to assist the people of the tribal areas to
integrate economically as well as politically with the rest of Pakistan.