Economic Cycles
Economic Cycles
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Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg GmbH
Gilbert Abraham-Frois (Ed.)
Non-Linear Dynamics
and Endogenous Cycles
Springer
Editor
Prof. Gilbert Abraham-Frois
University Paris X Nanterre
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
200, Avenue de la Republique
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F-9200l Nanterre Cedex, France
Abraham-Frois, Gilbert:
Non-linear dynamics and endogenous cycles / Gilbert Abraham-
Frois. - Berlin ; Heidelberg ; New York ; Barcelona ; Budapest ;
Hong Kong ; London ; Milan ; Paris ; Santa aara ; Siugapore ;
Tokyo: Springer, 1998
(Lecture Dotes in ecoDomics and mathematical systems ; 463)
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DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-58901-0
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Table of Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1
Gilbert Abraham-Frois; Nanterre (France)
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Introduction
ics: A Note on Day's (1982) model") considers new aspects of Day's orig-
inal (1982) contribution. Two aspects of his paper are under discussion
here. Day's contribution may be viewed as a prototype of a model that
can exhibit chaotic dynamics with an ad hoc modification of the standard
text-book approach to nea-classical growth theory. The first aim of this
paper to provide a plausible explanation which can be used to justify the
presence of the "pollution effect": this effect can be reinterpreted within
the framework of a disaggregate economy, as a consequence of heterogene-
ity amongst entrepreneurs, specially in their expectations behaviour. Such
reformulation of Day's seminal model suggest that volatile expectations
may be a cause of growth irregularity even in a one-sector economy, when
commodity markets are imperfect. Another aspect of complex dynamics is
under discussion in Dufrenot's paper. By using bifurcation analysis, it is
shown that solutions to non-linear difference equations that produce irreg-
ular fluctuations are highly sensitive to a variation of the parameters. This
implies that even when conditions for stable growth are present, transient
chaos may be observed; consequently, the economy may be quite long to
converge towards a sequence of capital accumulation which is monotone
over time.
model are two large compared to their values in real life. G .Dufrenot and
L.Mathieu's paper (" Non linear dynamics and utility functions in over-
lapping generations model") provide some theoretical arguments that may
explain why cyclical and complex paths cannot be ruled out. Following
an early suggestion by Dreze and Modigliani, and using a methodology
initiated by Sato, they show a close connection between the hypotheses
made on the Slutzky equations corresponding to excess demand functions
and classes of utility functions from which cycles and complex dynamics
emerge.
In the same frame of analysis (OLG models), M.Botomazava and
V.Touze examine" Pay-as- You-Go System under Permanent Business Cy-
cle". Relying on Reichlin's (1986) model, they give conditions for the ex-
istence and stability of cycles when a pay-as-you-go system is introduced.
To obtain a permanent cycle, a condition is crucial. Nevertheless, this cycle
around the steady state level can be interpreted as two inter generational
inequality criteria. Some computing results are specially interesting: when
the payroll tax rate rises, the lowest welfare level (Rawlsian criteria) and
the intergenerational inequality (egalitarian criteria) can grow up.
on Money and the General Theory include, according to R.A & A.R
substantial indications on which it is possible to rely on order to explain the
macroeconomic emergence and persistance of economic fluctuations. The
only obstacle lies in the apparent contradictory elements which are present
in Keynes's works; according to to the post-Wicksellian viewpoint of the
Treatise, the emphasis is put on the divergence between the natural and
the market rates of interest and on its effects upon the demand for credit,
while the General Theory stresses the role of human psychology (including
on the stock exchange) in the determination of investment decisions. The
paper shows how it is possible to build a single framework allowing to cope
with both components of the contradictions and, therefore, to explain why
it was only apparent.
G.ABRAHAM-FROIS
Part 1
1 Introd uction
This study presents an adaptive economizing model of economic growth
based on boundedly rational agents that incorporates infrastructure in
terms of physical and human capital and a utility function based on a
lexicographic preference ordering of present and future potential consump-
tion. We show that capital accumulation trajectories are both generically
asymptotically stable and generically unstable, converging to a steady state
or fluctuating around one depending on the weight given by a given gener-
ation to its heirs.
Our model is a descendant of the L-D-L growth model originally set
forth by Leontief (1965) and developed by Day (1967), Lin (1987), and Day
and Lin (1991). Although this approach is closely related to the temporary
equilibrium analysis explored in macroeconomic settings by Grandmont
and Laroque (1973), (1986), (1990) it is not equivalent even in the case
of a single generation. This is because the introduction of infrastructure
induces a restriction on capital labor substitution which, when combined
with imperfect foresight, permits factors to be used inefficiently. In such
cases the marginal products of capital and labor used in production are
always positive but the marginal product of the total work force or that
of the total capital stock is negative. Also, because of the opportunity
cost of resources used in infrastructure, the usual competitive equilibrium
distribution conditions are modified.
Section 1 describes preferences. Section 2 reviews the RFS produc-
tion function, and section 3 derives the consumption/savings strategy
when preferences have a specific lexicographic character and adaptive ex-
pectations are naive. Section 4 considers the existence and the stabil-
ity /instability properties of capital accumulation paths.
10
2 Preferences
where v(·) and w(·) are twice differentiable, v' > 0, w' > 0, v" < 0, w" < 0
and v(O) = w(O) = 0. 1
a[v(e) + w(e l - e)l + a 2 [v(e) + w(e l - e)l + ... l~a [v (e) + w(e l - e)l
'I/J[v(e) + w(e l - e)l
where a is the time preference with 0 < a < 1 and 'I/J = a/(l - a). As noted
above, however, in general ei f. et+l so that this equivalence can hold exposte
only at a stationary state. See above.
12
3 Technology
Y = BF{K,L) (2)
where Y is aggregate output, L is the available supply of labor, K is
production capital, and B represents the "neutral" level of technology. It
is assumed that F{·) is concave, twice differentiable and homogeneous of
the first degree, that
and that
· of
11m Ii of
K-O u
!3K=OO= L-O
m !3L'
u
(3)
The total work force, x, consists of the labor force employed directly in
market production, L, and the infmstructural work force, L. That is,
(4)
We assume that one adult equivalent is used in activities internal to the
family and one adult equivalent is allocated to either the socioeconomic
infrastructure or to market production. According to this treatment, x is
the number of adults equivalents employed outside the family. Equivalently,
it is the number of "families."
y_ { 0 ,(Z,X) ~ C
(8)
- BF (Z - /-LX, IIX - Z) ,(Z,x) E C
where the feasibility cone is
1 1
C:= {(Z,x) I /-Lx S Z S IIX} == {(Z, x) I -Z S X S - S Z}.
II /-L
We thus arrive at a Restricted Factor Substitution (RFS) production
function called for by Eisner (1993), Kaldor (1959), and Solow (1959), and
derived by Day and Zou (1994).
Dividing through both sides of (8) by X and taking advantage of the
homogeneity of FO, we get the production function in per capita terms,
y_ { 0 ,Z E ZO:=\(/-L,II)
(9)
- BF (Z - /-LX, IIX - Z) ,Z E Z':=(/-L,II)
where the production capital/work force ratio is z = Z/x and the out-
put/total work force ratio is y = Y/x. Consequently, the infrastructure
determines the range offeasible capital/labor ratios, Z' := (/-L, II).
Given the assumptions stated above, routine calculations show that fO
is twice differentiable, and strictly concave for the feasible capital ratios,
that is,
and that
Zou (1991, pp. 58-60) showed that for any given output level, the efficient
capital/labor combinations lie in a cone, say C·, within the feasibility
cone C, but the isoquants on which these combinations lie approach the
boundaries of C asymptotically and extend outside C·. In other words,
C \ C* contains capital/labor ratio combinations that are feasible but
inefficient. The rays defining C· are determined by constants, say J-L*, v·
with J-L < J-L* < v* < v which defines the interval of efficient capital/labor
ratios
Z *·.= [*
J-L ,v *] ,
0 ,(Z,x)~C
y= { I (13)
B (Z - ILx)f3 (vx - Z) -f3 ,(Z,x)EC
where B= B v f3- I . In terms of the capital/labor ratio,
,z ~ ZO
(14)
,z E Zf.
The feasibility cone Zf = (IL, v). The rays define the efficiency cone are
given by
Consider the factor combinations shown. Point A lies outside the effi-
ciency cone. The same amount of output could be obtained by a combi-
nation D. Such a point would exhibit excess capacity and unemployment,
but it would necessarily involve free disposal of capital and labor. Points C
involves an increase in output which could be attained by reallocating some
production capital to the infrastructure. This would require fungibility in
the short run and, although excess capacity would be eliminated, some
labor would have to be unemployed. Point B would involve the same in-
creased output level as points A and C but with full employment. It would
require an increase in production capital and the reallocation of part of the
labor force to the infrastructure.
All these of those moves from A to B, C or D would require a complete
knowledge of the production function and the ability to exploit it within
the current time period. They would also require a complete fungibility of
human and production capital in the short run, that is, within the current
production period.
Interpreted literally, this means that if the political and economic admin-
istrators and managers could perceive and understand society's production
structure as a whole. More production and a higher standard of living could
be achieved for any given combination outside of C· by rearranging capital
and labor so as to obtain a combination within C· . It seems to us unrealistic
to suppose that they always manage to do this. In any case, we consider
the situation where they do not. 3
(15)
where yl is anticipated sustainable income level for the next generation,
Zl, is the planned future capital stock. The capital bequest sufficient to
sustain this standard of living is equal to the amount of capital remaining
at the end of the period plus sufficient investment to allow for population
growth. Therefore,
1
zl = --[y - e + (1- 6)z]. (16)
l+n
Suppose our forward looking agents perceive current output y and the
current rate of return r. Suppose further that they use the latter as a basis
for the consumption/bequest trade-off. If rl is the rate of return anticipated
for the next period, then, in effect,
yl = Y + r(zl - z) (17)
Given these assumptions, the consumer's budget set is
its contributions. Some references are given in Day and Zou (1994).
17
Our model's agents are assumed to observe their income wealth and
the marginal product of capital directly and use this information in their
decisions. In theory, however,
(ii) there exists a total capital total work force ratio, Z E dZ s such that
~ r- (n + 6) 1 .
(eqUivalently
~
r=
(l+n)
1/J + (n + 6)).
p= l+n =-;j
Proof From Proposition 1 we can give an explicit form for h(z). There
must exist a unique capital/labor ratio Zlll such that J.L < Zlll < 1/ and
B J'(ZIll) = (n+6). If B J(ZIll) - (n+6)zll' > c, clearly there exist z', Z" with
J.L < z' < Z" < Zlll < 1/ such that BJ(z') = c and BJ(ZIl) - (n + 6)zll = c.
See figure 3.
IJf(;; )
i; {
C{
~----'---.
.,11 zl/l
5 Capital Accumulation
,Zt E Z'
,Zt E Z"
, Zt E Z8
,Zt E Z'"
(22)
which is illustrated in figure 4.
:';:" :;'"
Bof'(Z") - (n + 8) 1
(23)
l+n =~.
If B > Bo, then
Proof If the initial capital labor ratio is smaller than zl(= Zll), then c = c
and c1 < C. If z E Z', then Zt+l = [~+!r Zl -+ 0 as t -+ 00.
21
C
1 (-
C,
Bj()
Zl , Zl,
B!'(Zl) - (n
l+n
+ 6)) < - c,
Similarly, we have Z3 < Z2, Z4 < Z3, ... , Zt+l < Zt. As long as z' < Z < z",
we have s(z) = Bj(z) - c. Thus,
Zl - Z2 =
(n + 6)Zl - Bj(Zl) + c,
l+n
(n + 6)Z2 -Bj(Z2) +c
Z2 - Z3 = .
l+n
Remember that P(Zl) > 0, so that B!'(Zl) > (n + 6), we have
Therefore, for an initial Zl such that z' < Zl < z", there exists a sufficiently
large t such that Zt+l E Z'. This means that for any initial Zl < z", Z will
eventually be reduced to such a level that savings are no longer positive.
Therefore, Z --+ 0 as t --+ 00.
If z/.L > Zt > Zl, we know that s(z) > (n + 6)z. This implies that
Zt+l > Zt . •
(except those that hit z after a finite number of periods) eventually exhibit
persistent fluctuations around the steady state.
w'(g(z) - c) = t/Jpw'(c 1 - c)
i
Since r = (n + 8) + ===} lim"".....oo z(t/J) = z* ===} lim""..... oo (}'(z) = -00, it
is easy to see that ()' (z) is a continuous function of t/J and ()' (z) < 1 for all
t/J > O. Let
6 Example
The first order condition when both present and potential future consump-
tion are both positive is
1
-.
(C-1_-C)1-0 -p
_ (26)
'IjJ c- C
Substituting for c\ using (18) and doing some rearranging, it follows that
(28)
In figure 5 capital/labor and income trajectories are shown.
24
-'--------_. ..--.--.---
(I» The Ca"il,ili/I.ahar llatio Trajectory
References
[1] Boserup, Ester, 1981, Population and Technological Change, A Study
of Long Term Trends, The Chicago University Press, Chicago.
[2] Day, Richard H. and Jean-Luc Walter, 1989, "Economic Growth in
the Very Long Run: On the Multiple-Phase Interaction of Population,
Technology, and Social Infrastructure," Chapter 11 in W. Barnett,
J. Geweke, K. Shell (eds.), Economic Complexity: Chaos, Sunspots,
Bubbles and Nonlinearity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[3] Day, Richard H. and Gang Zou, 1994, "Infrastructure, Restricted
Factor Substitution and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, 23, 149-166.
[4] Day, Richard H., 1996, "Satisficing Multiple Preferences In and Out
of Equilibrium," in R. Fabella and E. de Dios (eds.), Choice, Growth
and Development: Emerging and Enduring Issues, University of the
Philippines Press, The Philippines.
[5] Eisner, Robert, 1993, A Presentation paper at the Annual Meeting of
the American Economic Association, Los Angeles.
[6] Grandmont, Jean-Michel and Guy Laroque, 1973, "Money in a Pure
Consumption Loan Model," Journal of Economic Theory, 6, 382-395.
[7] Grandmont, Jean-Michel and Guy Laroque, 1986, "Stability of Cycles
and Expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, 40, 138-151.
[8] Grandmont, Jean-Michel and Guy Laroque, 1990, "Economic Dynam-
ics with Learning," in Equilibrium Theory and Applications, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge.
[9] Kaldor, Nicholas, 1959, "Economic Growth and the Problem of Infla-
tion," Economica, 26, 287-298.
[lOJ King, Robert G., and Sergio Bebelo, 1990, "Government Spending in a
Simple Model of Endogenous Growth," Journal of Political Economy,
98, 126-150.
[l1J North, Douglass C., 1981, Structure and Change in Economic History,
W.W. Norton and Company, New York.
[12J Solow, Robert M., 1956, "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic
Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70,65-94.
26
[13] Solow, Robert M., 1959, "Is Factor Substitution a Crime? If So, How
Bad? Reply to Professor Eisner," Economic Journal, 69, 597-599.
[14] World Bank, 1994, Infmstructure for Development: World Develop-
ment Report, Oxford University Press, New York.
[15] Zou, Gang, 1991, Growth with Development, Ph.D. Dissertation, Uni-
versity of Southern California, Los Angeles.
Neo-Classical Growth and
Complex Dynamics: A Note on
Day's (1982) Model
Gilles DUFRENOT
1 Introduction
N
Kt+1 = sF(Kt , Lt ) [1 + ntl, nt = (liN) L git(Ajt ) (4)
i=l
(5)
(7)
or
(8)
Assuming that all firms employ the same quantity of capital and labor,
we write
Then, we sum up the firms on each side of (8) and thus get:
or
N
Kt+1 = sF(Kt ,Lt)[l + (liN) Lgit(Ajt)l (11)
i=l
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
32
In the general case, if we note the average aggregate function by nt, this
term will be negative if the entrepreneurs, taken as a whole, are pessimistic
about the level of activity for the forthcoming period (this is the case in
our example). Conversely, a positive value will indicate moods of optimism.
(5) For illustration we choose a Cobb-Douglas production function as
is frequently used in neoclassical one-sector growth models. Since the
functional F(Kit , Lit) is independent of i, we assume that f(kt} is the
reduced production function of the economy. The per-capita production
is a continuous function of the capital-labor ratio and it has continuous
derivatives of all required orders for k t > O. In particular, the marginal
productivity of capital is a decreasing function of k t , while the marginal
productivity oflabor is increasing with kt . This implies that j' (k t ) > 0 and
((Kd < O.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that nt is dependent on both the value of
k t and its sign. As one can easily understand this variable does fluctuate
following the variation of aggregate expected demand. Indeed, since we
assume that return to scale are constant, the supply of good and the
demand for factors of the firms are a priori undetermined (they vary
between 0 and infinity). In other words, there exists an infinity of capital-
labor ratio corresponding to the optimal profit. Production is therefore
determined by the level of aggregate demand that entrepreneurs forecast.
Those try to find the proof of their expectations in the decisions of all
others and mechanisms of self fulfillment of representations take place. If
a majority of firms are pessimistic, then they will anticipate a decrease
in demand in comparison to its present level. Their expectations will
realize itself on its own: to avoid loss from the predicted decrease, each
entrepreneur will reduce his investment and the number of workers; the
wages they do not pay will effectively decrease the aggregate demand. If
such behaviors are observed, then the sign of will be negative. In order to
facilitate the comparison with Day's model, we assume for illustration that
nt = h(kt} = -kt . This means that during the periods of increasing per-
capita output the economy resources tend to go beyond the level of global
demand, thereby inducing firms to reduce capital accumulation.
(6) This follows by combining equations (4) and (5) and by dividing
each side of equation (4) by . We further assume that the growth rate of
the population is O. The results are unaltered when a positive growth rate
is assumed.
33
Xt = ¢kt +0 (19)
where 0 and ¢ are two real parameters. This implies:
Xt - 0
kt = - ¢ - = (1/¢)Xt - (O/¢) (20)
and:
(24)
•
Remark 1 Under the assumptions made above on the parameters ¢ and 0
the equation (24) is much more simpler to study than equation (17). f.L can
thereby be considered as the bifurcation parameter that we vary and from
which the bifurcation points of the saving rate are deduced.
Remark 2 The values of the saving rate are expressed as follows. Prom
equation (17) we know that sA = B. Since f.L = -B 2/4 + (B/2),we have
B2 - 2B + 4f.L = 0, which implies B 1,2 = 1 ± (1 - 4f.L)1/2 with f.L < 1/4. We
deduce that 81,2 = 1/A ± (1 - 4f.L)1/2/A. Given the restrictions above, we
only consider the greatest solution. We shall assume henceforth that A = 4.
36
Lemma 3 The successive iterates of the map P(Xt, {L) are written in the
form of two polynomials in Xt and {L.
Proof. We first calculate Xt+2 as P2(Xt, {L ) = P[P(Xt, {L)] = (x~ + {L)2 + {L
and develop this expression:
(28)
Thus P3(Xt, {L) is written as the sum of two polynomials, one in Xt, of
degree 8 and the other in {L of degree 4.
Suppose that the previous relations are satisfied in the order k-l:
Note that, just as G3 (J.L) = [G 2(J.L»)2 + J.L in equation (30), the term of
the highest degree in Xt is given by xt-1x2
= xt
and the highest degree of
Gk(lL) is given by the highest degree of Gk- 1 (IL), that is 2k- 2 x 2 = 2k - 1 •
Now, we establish the following proposition.
[G k _ 1 (1L»)2 + IL = 0 (31)
from which we deduce that:
(32)
Assuming that all the terms of the sequence (Gk(J.L», k = 1,2, ... are
positive, the expression above reduces to:
(34)
from which:
(35)
One finally obtains:
(36)
or:
38
One can easily show that a limit value of this sequence is:
Period-doubling bifurcation
General formulation
(40)
39
Example
If, k=2, then the equality G 2(JL) = 0 implies that JL2 + JL = 0 and so
JL = 0 or JL = -1. This equality also implies -JL = (_JL)1/2 and thus both
solutions can be considered as the fixed points of the first-order difference
equation -JLHI = (-JLi)1/2. We only use the first solution, which implies
s = (lIA[l + vis].
Repeating this for all subsequent values of k leads to the usual pitchfork
bifurcation, which is characterized by a limit value s2 towards which all the
successive values of the saving rate converge. Table 1 indicates the order of
the stable limit-cycles corresponding to the values of the saving rate. The
cumulation point is s=s2=0.7246620535.
k 21 2:.1 23 24
S 0.6035533835 0.70019511271 0.7194537996 0.7235359939
k 25 21> 27 21!S
S 0.7244083315 0.7245950748 0.7246350677 0.7246436295
k 29 210 ... 200
s 0.7246454651 0.7246458627 ... 0.7246620535
Table 1. Savmg rate values and penod-doubhng bIfurcatIOn
Period-halving bifurcation
General formulation
The values of the saving rate which bring such a bifurcation are obtained
by seeking the values of JL for which the 2k - 1 maximums and minimums
of the kth iterates of the map P(Xt, JL) become identical to the 2k - 1 fixed
points of its (k - l)th iterates. The procedure requires three steps.
40
First step
One writes down the equations which give the abscissa of the fixed point
of the kth iterate of the map P(Xt,f.l)' These points correspond to the 2k
fixed points of a k-period cycle:
(41)
Second step
It is interesting then to note that the iterate of the map P(Xt, f.l) admits
2k - 1 critical points (that is 2k - 1 points for which the first derivative of
P( Xt, f.l) equals zero). Noting their respective ordinates as Xc, XC" XC2 , ... ,
one assumes that :
or:
Third step
Finally, substituting XCk +2(f.l) = GCk +2(f.l) for Xt in equation (41), one
gets:
(44)
For each k, there is one value amongst all the values of f.l that verify
equation (44), which leads to a stable cycle with an even periodicity.
Example
If, we suppose that Xa is a point of a two-period cycle, then we have
Xa = p2(xa, f.l) (step 1). Assuming that Xa is also a fixed point of P(Xt, f.l),
we write Xa = P( Xa , f.l). Thus, by substituting in the left-hand side of the
first equation Xa with its expression given in the last equation, one gets
P(xa,f.l) = P 2(x a ,f.l)' This equality holds for Xa = 0.866120202. Assuming
that Xa can be written as f.l~ + f.lu (second step), we substitute this value
in the equation P(xa, f.l) = p2(xa, f.l) (third step) and get:
41
In applying these three steps, one obtains the following values for
the saving rate (see table 2), to which correspond stable cycles whose
periodicity is decreased by half as one increases the parameter s.
(46)
(4) The procedure used above can be generalized to any rth iterate
pr(Xt,jL) of the function P(Xt,jL) , where r = m x 2i, m=3,4,5, ... , and
i=1,2,3, ... Suppose that (8;:X2') and (8;:X2')* are bifurcation points of the
saving rates which allow to define both period-doubling and period-halving
bifurcations (just as (82') and (82')* were bifurcation points for P(Xt,jL)).
One interesting point is that we know from bifurcation analysis, that cycles
of period m x 2i exist for values of the bifurcation parameter belonging
to a certain range of values leading to period-halving cycles. Here, this
would implies that there exists values (8;:X2') and (8;:X2')* which lie in
the interval [( 82' ), (82i)*] for each i. These values lead to another ordering
of the saving rate values:
(48)
The existence of a period-doubling bifurcation thereby implies that
aperiodic fluctuations when they exist are not without a "certain order".
This "order" reflects a strong sensitivity of the model to the saving rate
values.
The Li and Yorke's [11] theorem used by Day in his paper, which has been
generalized by Li et al. [12], says that when odd-period cycles exist chaotic
fluctuations occur. Without going back on what has already been said on
43
this point in the literature, we just seek to draw the reader's attention on the
following point. One can construct for odd-period cycles the same type of
structure and ordering of the saving rate parameter, as the ones previously
described for cycles with even periodicity. In this view, we consider here the
period-3 cycle, which corresponds to the odd-period cycle with the highest
order in Sarkovskii's [13J relation. Since the methods are similar to those
described above, we avoid technical details and expose directly the main
results.
Let us define the interval [(8 3), (8 3)*], where (83) and (8 3)* correspond
for p 3(Xt, /1) = P[P[P(Xt, /1)]] to (8 2') and (8 2')* for p2' (Xt, /1) in the
preceding paragraph. We thus decompose the expression of the successive
iterates of the map P3(Xt, /1) into two polynomials in Xt and /1, which are
respectively noted <P~(Xt) and (h(/1). The bifurcation points are solutions
of the following equations (the approach is the same as above to obtain the
period-doubling bifurcation):
v v v 2 v
k 3 x 2u 3 X 21 3 X22 3 x 2;$
S 0.810 1064046 0.8141127724 0.8153023078 0.8156292668
k 3 x 25 3 X 26 .,. 3 x 200
s 0.8156655041 0.8156854345 ... 0.8156854472
Table 3. Savmg rate values and penod-3 doubhng bifurcatIOn
Similarly, one can apply to the map p 3 (Xt, /1) the arguments held above
to define the period-halving bifurcation associated to P(Xt, /1). We have
reported in the table below the different values of the saving rate for
44
k 3x2°O ... 3 x 2° 3 X 25
S 0.8156854472 ... 0.81568544722 0.8156854726
k 3 x 24 3 x 2;5 3 x 2~ 3 X 21
S 0.8156884065 0.8157308581 0.8157556535 0.8161786889
Table 4. Savmg rate values and penod-3 halvmg blfurcatIOn
Just as was previously seen for the cycles with even periodicity, we can
construct a similar ordering here for the period-3 cycle. This ordering leads
to the following relation:
(50)
4 Concluding remarks
References
[1] Day, R., and Gang Z., (1994), "Infrastructure, Restricted Factor
Substitution and Economic Growth", Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization, 23, pp.149-166.
[2] Day, R., (1995), "L'existence hors de l'equilibre", Revue Economique,
46, pp.1461-1471.
[3] Nishimura, K. and Yano, M., (1995), "Non-linear Dynamics and Chaos
in Optimal Growth: An Example", Econometrica, 63, pp.981-1001.
[4] Grandmont, J.M., Pintus, P., and, De Vilder R., (1996), "Capital-
Labor substitution and Competitive Nonlinear Endogenous Business
Cycles", Cepremap working paper, forthcoming.
[5] Day, R., (1982), "Irregular Growth Cycles", American Economic Re-
view, 72, pp.406-414.
[6] Lorenz, H.W., (1993), Nonlinear Dynamical Economics and Chaotic
Motion, Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg.
46
Business Cycles
Hysteresis Arising from
Individual Inertia and
Behavorial Heterogeneity
Reiner FRANKE
1 Introduction
3The formulation of the dynamic adjustment equations that close the model
involves more feedback effects than would perhaps be necessary to put forward
our main points. The advantage of the more elaborate model is that it gives rise
to smooth, and in a a sense even realistic time paths - although at the present
stage of research we do not wish to overemphasize such a step towards calibration.
51
SIn the language of the physical sciences, these rules define an elementary
hysteresis operator with local memory; cf. Mayergoyz (1991), pp. xiv, 2.
55
f d e
bold ••
prudent •• 1 t
a b c
There is, however, only one exception, namely for m = 1 and Jl-o = Jl-1 =
Jl-max, where an inequality in the Jl--coordinates might not be strict. The
final stair is given by the vertical line connecting vertex Vm = (Am' Jl-m)
with the hypotenuse of the triangle ~ if Am < Jl-m; otherwise Vm is itself a
point on the hypotenuse. The entire interface, i.e. the set of these vertices,
is denoted by V,
Agents with the lower switching values, (\ Jl-) below the interface, are bold,
while switching values (A, Jl-) in the complementary region above V indicate
that such an agent has opted for the prudent set of strategies. Hence, by
virtue of the hypothesis of a uniform distribution of agents, the proportion
of bold agents in the total population is simply determined by the area
below the staircase line, divided by the total area of the triangle ~.6 In
explicit terms, let Tk = Tk(V) be the area of the trapezoid defined by the
vertices Vk- 1 and Vk. That is, starting from Vk = (Ak, Jl-k) in clockwise
orientation (k=2 in Figure 2), Tk is bounded by the four points (Ak,Jl-k),
(Ak, Ak), (Ak-1, Ak-1), (Ak-1, Jl-k), so that
If the final vertex Vm comes to lie on the hypotenuse of ~, .Am = Jl-m, the
trapezoid Tm degenerates to a triangle. Writing T(~) for the area of the
limiting triangle ~ itself, one has
The share of bold agents in the total population, which we designate b, can
therefore be represented by the mapping B = B(V),
1
L
m
b = B(V):= T(~) Tk(V) (1)
k=l
6In the general case, the distribution of agents may be represented by a density
(or weight) function on fl.. Calculating the proportion of bold agents then involves
the evaluation of an integral, similar as in Mayergoyz (1991), p. 2.
57
f.l
prudent
" I
1f 1f 1fo
7
/'
V"4
7ro
, "
7T' 'If
7 Of course, the argument equally applies if initially all agents are bold
because of 7r 0 ~ J.t,.,.o.a:. The corresponding interface V in this case is just given
by the top line of the triangle 1:1, the vertices being Vo = (>'min, J.t,.,.o.a:) and
VI = (J.tmaa:, J.tmo.a: ); cf. the remark on the ordering of the vertices.
59
moves the vertex V; further to the left. At the moment, however, when
the payoff reaches >'2, where >'2 corresponds to the vertex V2, there is a
sudden disproportional increase in the number of switching agents. Here
we also encounter bold agents with an upward switching value JL ~ JL3
(but JL ::; JL2), who now switch in their behaviour back to prudent. The
geometric implication is that as 7[ resumes its fall below >'2, the previous
vertex V2 is wiped out. From then on it is the vertical line connecting
V2 with the hypotenuse that shifts to the left, until 7[ = 7[". Writing
V~' = (A~,JL~) = (7[",JL2), the change in 7[ from 7[' to 7[" shapes the new
three-vertex interface V" = {Vo, Vl,V~'}. The elimination of vertices will
later be an important feature in the analysis of hysteresis effects.
In describing the effects of an increase in the payoff from the initial value
7[0' as sketched in Figure 4, a new vertex emerges. As a first step, define
V4 as the point V4 = (A4, JL4) = (7[0' 7[0)' Then as 7[ starts to rise, V4 moves
upwards along the hypotenuse of ~. At 7[ = 7[', say, prudent agents with an
upward switching value JL between 7[0 and 7[' have converted to boldness.
These are the agents with switching values (A, JL) in the triangle specified by
the corners (7[0' 7l'0), (7[0,7[') and (7[',7['). Setting V~ = (7[',7['), the interface
corresponding to the payoff 7[ = 7[' is given by V' = {VO , Vb V2, V3, VI}.
Continuing the increase in 7[ shifts the horizontal line with end-points
V~ and (7[0,7[') = (A3,7[') upwards (note that V3 = (A3,JL3) = (7[0,JL3)). As
7[ rises beyond JL3 we observe'a similar effect as above, namely, the vertex
% is wiped out. There are also prudent agents with a downward switching
value A less than 7[0 = >'3 (but exceeding A2) who adopt the bold strategies,
if JL3 ::; JL ::; 7[ with respect to their upward switching value JL. The payoff
7l' = 7[" therefore gives rise to the interface V" = {Vo, Vi, V2, V~'}, where
VI' = (7[",7[11). The vertices in the set V" would, of course, be renumbered
before the analysis were taken any further.
The rules determining the modification of the interface as the payoff 7[
changes may be compactly summarized by a mapping cP = cp(7[, V),
The terms old and new can be seen as referring to the previous and the
present period in a discrete-time setting. It is then understood that the old
payoff 7[0, in the previous period, constituted the A-coordinate of the final
vertex Vm , that is, Am = 7[0' The precise definition of the mapping cP in
algebraic terms is given in the Appendix.
We are now also in a position to reconstruct the motions of the payoff
that may have generated the interface V = {Vo, VI, V2, %} in Figure 2.
Initially, 7[ may have fallen short of Am in and all agents may have been
prudent. A steady rise in 7[ until 7l' = JLI and then down to 7[ = Al will have
produced vertex VI. Vertices V2 and V3 are the outcome of the subsequent
oscillations in 7[ with peaks JL2 and JL3 and the interposed trough A2. The
60
payoff is then presently at 7f = A3. 8 Note that the speed of these payoff
variations has no bearing on the shape of the interface.
To sum up the impact of fluctuations in the payoff 7f on the population
composition, the vertices of the interface V are brought into existence by
the turning points of these motions. Furthermore, each peak in 7f wipes out
the vertices of V whose p-coordinates are below this local maximum of the
time series, while each trough wipes out the vertices whose A-coordinates
are above this local minimum.
After this introduction into the working of the model, a basic hysteresis
effect can be revealed. The aggregate behaviour of agents in macroeconomic
theory is usually modelled in a way that assigns to every vector of inde-
pendent variables a uniquely determined outcome of the individual actions.
For example, the theory assigns to each set of prices a definite quantity of
a good demanded or supplied in the aggregate. If the independent variable
is the expected payoff 7f, then according to this supposition every value of
7f would be associated with a specific value b of the share of bold agents in
the total population (to which might correspond a certain level of aggre-
gate demand for physical capital goods or a financial asset). However, in
the present framework with the discontinuous adjustments of the microe-
conomic units such a functional relationship holds no longer true.
As a case in point, refer to Figure 4 and consider the share of bold agents
b that may be induced by the payoff 7f'. As discussed above for the upward
movement of the payoff, b was given by the (normalized) area below the
interface {Vo, VI, V2, V3, V1}. Now, suppose that the payoff continues to rise
until 7f" and subsequently returns to the previous value 7f'. Owing to the
inertia in the behaviour of the individual agents, not all agents having
switched from prudent to bold in the upturn of 7f have also switched back
to prudent during the subsequent descent. Geometrically, the agents who
have turned bold in response to the rise of 7f from 7f' to 7f" are represented
by the area between the two dashed lines in Figure 4, which is bounded by
the lines connecting the six points VI = (7f',7f'), VI' = (7f",7f"), (A2,7f"),
(A2, P3), V3 = (A3, P3), and (A3,7f'). From these bold agents only those
with switching values (A,p) in the triangle VI, V4 = (7f',7f"), VI' have
resumed the prudent behaviour as the payoff has fallen back to 7f'. This
argument shows that in order to determine the share of agents who, given
the expected payoff 7f, have adopted the set of bold strategies, one must
know the history of the time path of 7f. To be precise, not the history in
every detail but only the turning points of the payoff, and only those that
are not dominated by subsequent turning points, i.e., those that have not
been wiped out in the course of time.
[b. in Yo ]
60.0
50.0
40.0
.
30.0
9The trough and peak values of w being given by w' and w", respectively, the
interface at the trough value was constituted by {(Ao, /-Lo), (w', w")}, and at the
peak value by {( Ao , /-Lo), err", w")}. With w on the downswing, the interface was
{(Ao, /-Lo), (w, w")}, on the upswing it was {(Ao, /-Lo), (-rr', 7f"), (7f, 7f)}.
lOIn the terms of the physical sciences, we have a hysteresis transducer
with nonlocal memory, constructed as a superposition of elementary hysteresis
nonlinearities with local memories (cf. Mayergoyz 1991, pp. xiv-xvi, 3).
62
In the previous section, the evolution of the expected payoff was treated
as exogenously given. We now extend the basic framework and introduce
a number of new variables and relationships such that the payoff 7r is
fully endogenized. The resulting dynamic model, if unperturbed, is able
to produce steady state growth paths as well as oscillatory motions.
The subsequent analysis is concerned with their potential to give rise to
additional hysteresis phenomena.
In the following the microeconomic units are conceived as heterogeneous
firms, which generally expand at different speeds. Since part of their fixed
capital investment must be externally financed, these firms are also faced
with the choice of adopting more or less risky financial postures. Let a
firm's financial practices be represented by a single variable called exposure.
A higher value of a firm's exposure may, for example, be associated with
higher borrowing relative to cash flow, or a greater proportion of short-
term debt in total liabilities. Limiting firms to two types of behaviour
in this respect, which we continue to identify as bold and prudent, the
corresponding levels of exposure are denoted by eb and ep (eb > ep ). They
are coupled with two distinct growth rates of the stock of physical capital,
9b and 9p (9b > 9p), to which the bold and prudent firms respectively
aspire. The switching of individual firms between the two types of policy
is governed by the same principle as above.
A higher value of exposure indicates greater vulnerability to disruptions
in the normal functioning of the financial sector. The financial market
conditions are captured by a measure of distress, d. High levels of distress
can be related to high interest rates and an unwillingness of banks to
refinance positions as the firms' debt payments become due. Low values of
d, on the other hand, are reflective of a state of tranquillity. Certainly, d has
also a psychological dimension. Financial distress will be a key determinant
of the expected payoffs to the two strategies of exposure.
Besides the differential payoff 7r and the interface V in the (A, JL)-plane,
other variables in our economy are e, aggregate exposure; gk, the growth
rate of the aggregate capital stock; gi, the growth rate of aggregate (net)
investment; and g, the growth rate of aggregate output which the firms
expect to prevail on average over the next few months or even years. With
a view to the ensuing computer simulations, the formulation is in discrete
time with a fixed adjustment period of length h,u At the beginning of the
present period t, the variables 7rt-h, Vt-h, gf-h' gt-h, dt - h are historically
llLet us say that time is measured in 'years'. The process of going to the
limit, h -+ 0, will mathematically be well-defined and would result in a piecewise
specified system of differential equations. That is, a 'regime switching' would
occur if a vertex of the interface is wiped out.
63
given from the previous period. We first state the recursive adjustment
equations to determine, on this basis, the state of the economy in period
t, subsequently a few comments are added (further details can be found in
the appendix). With respect to positive constant adjustment parameters
(3k,{3g,{3d and three functions fy = fy(gi), fd = fd(e,g), f7r = f7r(d,g), the
dynamic system reads as follows:
Equations (3) and (4), which determine the new interface and the resulting
share of bold firms, are known from Section 4. In the aggregate, firms
intend to expand their capital stocks at the rate btgb + (l-bt}gp. Equation
(5) acknowledges the financial and technical difficulties of adjusting actual
to desired capital stocks and supposes a partial adjustment mechanism
towards this target rate with coefficient {3k. Equation (6) is no more than
an identity for the growth rate of investment, the discrete-time analogue of
the equation i = k + gk in continuous time (which is obtained from the
logarithmic differentiation of the definition gk = k = 1/ K, where I is net
investment, K the capital stock, and the caret designates growth rates).
The term fy in equation (7) stands for the actual growth rate of aggregate
output. Based on the notion of a multiplier process, which moderates
in a depression or boom phase, f y is devised as an increasing S-shaped
function of the growth rate of investment (under 'normal' conditions, i.e.
over a medium range of gi, the two growth rates of output and investment
coincide). As firms are supposed to live in an uncertain environment and 9
is to represent output expectations, not for the next adjustment period, but
over a longer time horizon, we stipulate that 9 is revised only partially in the
direction of the currently observed growth rate fy. The emerging equation
(7) is formally equivalent to the specification of adaptive expectations. 12
Equation (8) defines aggregate exposure. In the determination of the
12 Arguments from the literature which defend the use of an adaptive expec-
tations mechanism in macroeconomic modelling are collected in Franke (1994).
Suffice it here to mention the contribution by Heiner (1988, especially p. 272),
who demonstrated that in an uncertain world with imperfect information, par-
tial adjustments indeed represent a reasonable mechanism of the revision of
expectations.
64
changes in financial distress d, note first that distress on the credit markets
depends on the (expected) cash flows of firms as well as their amount of
contractual payments. These aspects are here captured by the expected
macroeconomic growth rate 9 and aggregate exposure e. The function
fd = fd(e,g) in (9) represents the corresponding self-sustaining level of
distress; the notion is that this level would be reproduced over time if e and
9 remained constant. Clearly, 8fd/8e > 0, 8fd/8g < O. However, we assume
that it takes some time until the changes in e and 9 take full effect in new
loan contracts. Accordingly, equation (9) describes gradual adjustments of
the actual degree of financial distress towards its self-sustaining level fd,
with adjustment speed (3d .
Finally, equation (10) specifies the payoff expectations as being influ-
enced by the conditions firms find on the financial markets, and by the
prospects of future economic growth. The expected differential payoffs 11'
of bold strategies with their higher indebtedness are therefore negatively
affected by financial distress, while the more aggressive policy will yield
higher increases in profits than the prudent strategies when the economy
expands at a faster pace. Hence 8f7r/8d < 0 and 8f7r/8g > O.
Although equations (3-10) constitute a well-defined dynamic process
and the computations involved are straightforward, there is an important
point in which they differ from ordinary systems of difference equations.
The latter exhibit a definite number of state variables, which is the
dimension of the system. Because of the central role of the interface, it
is here impossible to determine a (finite) dimension. The interfaces may be
parametrized by their vertices, so that the dimension of a given interface
would be given by twice the number of its vertices. However, if the process
generates cyclical motions then, as seen in the preceding section, the
number of vertices of the interface may increase. The problem is that we
cannot tell in advance the number of vertices to be shaped in the course of
the process; it might even be infinitely many.
System (3 -10) gives rise to a notion of equilibrium. In a rest point, the
four growth rates will all be equal, 9 = y1< = gi = fy(gi). Expressing their
relation to the share of bold firms as g* = g*(b):= bgb + (1 - b)gp, and
similarly for exposure in (8), e = e(b), the corresponding level of financial
distress is obtained from (9) as d = fd(b):= fd(e(b), g*(b)). Inserting it in
function (10) yields the payoff
On the other hand, equations (3) and (4) have to be taken into account. If
we now have a given interface V, this means that via the payoff 71'* and the
mapping 4>, the newly generated interface V* must be reproduced in the
equilibrium. That is, 4>(11'* (b), V*) = V* = 4>(1I'*(b), V). V* is reproduced
if (and only if) the payoff does not change or, what amounts to the same, if
the share of bold firms remains constant. A state of rest of the economy is
65
Since the given interface V may have any shape, this argument demon-
strates that there exists a huge set of steady state positions, much 'larger'
indeed than a one-dimensional manifold. The interface V* = <I>(1I"*(b*), V)
itself can be viewed as constituting a reference equilibrium for the actual
economy in a state with interface V. V* will generally be shifted as V
changes in the course of the dynamic process.
(Ct.d, Ct.", 'Yd, 'Y", 0'",1/1 are all constant parameters.) Function (14) limits
distress to values between zero and one, so that in the discussion below, d
and the shocks to d can be expressed in percentage terms. The intercept
'Yd in (14) serves to shift the initial equilibrium value of d to a convenient
level. Similarly, 0'" and 'Y" scale and shift the payoff function (15) such
that the model's initially given interface can bring about a particularly
nice equilibrium composition of firms, namely, a 50 per cent share of bold
firms, b~. The system always starts from this equilibrium configuration,
which is then disturbed by an exogenous shock to d.
The parameter 1/1 in (15) represents the differential distress losses of bold
firms if d is high. The effects of expected output growth, which reduce
financial distress and raise the payoffs to the bold strategies, are measured
by Ct.d and Ct.", respectively. It is these latter coefficients on which we
concentrate, where three pairs (Ct.", Ct.d) are considered. Somewhat loosely,
they may be characterized as follows.
We are mostly concerned with the stable scenarios, as they can be em-
ployed to investigate a possible relationship of system (3 -10) to a random
walk process. The economy is correspondingly subjected to repeated shocks.
67
In the present framework, the variables most prone to such exogenous per-
turbations are associated with the financial markets and their psychology,
which is our reason for focusing attention on shocks to the level of financial
distress, d. It is furthermore assumed that these shocks arrrive infrequently.
That is, after the economy has been thrown out of a state of rest by a shock
to d, it has sufficient time to converge close to a - possibly new - equilib-
rium until the next shock occurs. It may be conjectured that if the shocks
are i.i.d. with zero mean, then, though perhaps somewhat distorted, this
stochastic process has the basic features of a random walk.
To scrutinize this idea, let the economy start from an initial equilibrium
with a share of bold firms b~ and consider the sequence bt, b2,b3, . .. of
equilibrium shares of bold firms that is generated by a sequence of random
shocks to financial distress. The change from one equilibrium b"k to the next
b"k+I may be summarized by a function F = F(Ok' V*(k)), where Ok denotes
the shocks to d and V*(k) is the equilibrium interface associated with b"k.
Thus,
k = 0, 1,2, ... (16)
The expression F(Ok' V*(k)) being a random variable, equation (16) is
indeed reminiscent of a random walk. The problem to be studied is how the
random shocks Ok and their probability distribution are transformed by the
mapping F. To this end, we consider a given equilibrium interface V* and
inquire into the typical shape of the function 0 f--+ F(o, V*). Subsequently,
it has also to be indicated how this function is affected by a change in the
type of V*.
The initial equilibrium interface V* underlying our numerical examples
is similar to the interface V' = {Yo, VI, "2, V3, Vn in Figure 4. The
important feature to note is that it connects horizontally to the hypotenuse
of the limiting triangle 6.. Denote the corresponding equilibrium share of
bold firms by b'. Then, consider a one-time negative shock to d, which
instantaneously raises the payoff differential from its initial equilibrium
value rr' to rr". The resulting interface is V" = {Yo, VI, V2, V;'} (before
renumbering the vertices; the elimination of V3 is here inessential). It has
already been observed in the discussion of the loop-hysteresis at the end
of Section 3 that a fall of rr from rr" back to rr' does not re-establish the
previous population composition, i.e., rr' and, thus, b' can no longer produce
an equilibrium after the negative shock has materialized. In fact, the new
equilibrium payoff must be smaller, and the new equilibrium share of bold
firms must be larger (this is demonstrated in the Appendix).
Things are different if financial distress experiences a positive shock.
Returning to the initial equilibrium interface V' = {Yo, VI, V2, V3, Vn in
Figure 4, suppose the shock to d is limited in size, such that the resulting
fall in the payoff does not wipe out vertex V3 . For example, let the shock
give rise to V = {Yo, Vb V2, V3, V4 } as the new interface. In this case an
increase in rr back to the original level rr' does set up the previous share b'
68
of bold firms, and the initial interface V' continues to constitute a state of
equilibrium.
However, a new equilibrium comes into being if the positive shock to d
is so strong that the fall in 1f' eliminates a vertex (vertex Vs in Figure 4).
Similarly as before it can be shown that such an equilibrium is associated
with a smaller share of bold firms, while its interface connects horizontally
to the hypotenuse of !:l.. At least for a certain range of shocks, the decrease
in the equilibrium share brought about by a positive shock to d will be less
than the increase resulting from a negative shock of the same size. This
asymmetry in the equilibrium response is illustrated by the solid line in
Figure 6. In terms of the discussion above, this curve is the graph of the
function 61-+ b' +F(6, V') (b' und V' determining the original equilibrium).
The zero slope for extreme values of 6 is due to the fact that all shocks
6 ~ 49% induce the same degenerate interface, the instantaneous effect
being a reduction of the payoff to such a low level that all firms are prudent.
Likewise, all shocks 6 :5 - 29% lead to an increase in 1f' that temporarily
induces all firms to turn bold.
The numerical data underying the solid line in Figure 6 correspond to
Scenario 1 with its monotonic convergence. As a consequence, the new
equilibrium share will be actually reached by the dynamic process after a
one-time shock to d has occurred.
[ b J EQUllfbriu" . . . . . . . . .
70
GO
. -.... -.. _-_ .
..... .--------_.-".'
.-'
~-.-.
SO
Figure 6 New equilibrium share (in %) of bold firms arising from a shock
6 (in %) to financial distress; solid line represents Scenario 1, dashed line
Scenario 2.
69
The case in which the original equilibrium interface has a vertical con-
nection to the hypotenuse of /). can be dealt with in an analogous way. The
function F(8, V') is again decreasing in 8, but now its constant segment
extends over an interval of negative shocks, and the slope is steeper for
positive 8. The qualitative reactions of the equilibrium share b* of bold
firms are summed up in Table 1.
sign is much more limited, or there may be no effect at all. For example,
let the equilibrium interface V*(k) connect vertically to the hypotenuse of
~ and let a positive shock 8k occur, which leads to a (moderate) fall in
the share of bold firms, bk+1 < bk. Since according to Table 1, V*(k + 1)
has a horizontal connection to the hypotenuse, a subsequent sequence of
positive shocks, unless they wipe out a vertex, do not alter the equilibrium
composition of the population of firms. The share of bold firms would be
reduced if some of these shocks are stronger, but, as Figure 6 demonstrates,
not proportionately so. A stronger reaction in b* would only occur if the
shocks changed their sign. Besides, this fact suggests that the innovations
in bk are weakly negatively autocorrelated.
To illustrate these remarks, Scenario 1 of process (3-10) has been
simulated under the assumption that a shock to financial distress occurs
every 4 years. 13 This time span was long enough for the system to converge
close to the, old or new, equilibrium position. A sample of the resulting
time series of the aggregate capital growth rate gk is shown in the upper
panel of Figure 7. By virtue of the delayed adjustments of gk in equation
(5), this series is smoother than the series of the actual population share
bt or the stepwise movements of the equilibrium share b~. Three 'growth
regimes' can be clearly distinguished, though the numerical differences in
the growth rates are not too large. In the interval between (roughly) t= 15
and t = 50, the growth rate gk hovers around a trend value of about 3.8% (in
the initial equilibrium, gk=3.5% prevailed), in the time interval [105,130)
trend growth is slightly above 3.6%, and in the interval [140, 160) it is
slightly above 3.9% .
have no impact at all. These observations may here suffice to point out
that a pure random walk has a significantly different character from the
hysteresis in the dynamics (3 -10), when, being universally stable with
monotonic convergence, this process is subjected to repeated infrequent
shocks.
Tune
Serles
of gk
In this section it will first be seen that even if the assumption of universal
stability is maintained, the consequences of a perturbation of the steady
state may be markedly different if convergence is cyclical. We may again
invoke Figure 4 and let a starting equilibrium interface have the shape of
V' = {Vo, VI, V2, V3 , Vn with its horizontal connection to the hypotenuse of
72
L).. Consider then a positive shock to d which drives the payoff from Tr' down
to Tro. The shock-induced interface being given by V = {Yo, VI, \12, V3, V4 },
it has already been noted that this does not change the equilibrium position.
If direct convergence prevails, the process would therefore end up in the
initial interface V'. Under cyclical stability, however, the upward motion of
the payoff will not come to a halt at Tr' but will overshoot this equilibrium
value. 15
The point is that once the payoff has passed Tr', the situation resembles
that of a negative shock occurring to the original steady state, i.e., from
then on V' no longer constitutes an equilibrium. Denoting the interface
arising from the payoff Trt at time t by V(t), we can utilize (essentially)
the same argument as in the previous section to infer an increment
in the corresponding equilibrium share of bold firms: Trt > Tr' implies
b*(V(t)) > b*(V'). Moreover, b*(V(t» increases as long as Trt continues
to rise. When Trt begins to fall, for example after a peak at Tr=Tr" in Figure
4 with the interface V" = {Yo, VI, \12, V~'}, the equilibrium share stays
constant: b*(V(t» = b*(V"). Some of the previous increase in b* is undone
after the next overshooting, when Trt passes the payoff level corresponding
to b*(V"). The equilibrium share starts to rise again after the payoff has
reached a lower turning point, etc., until these oscillations will have died
out. In contrast to direct convergence, where a positive shock to financial
distress has a zero or negative impact on the final level of b* , under cyclical
convergence this effect is positive.
AI; mentioned, this reasoning includes the case of a negative shock to
distress, so that it, too, raises the equilibrium share of bold firms in the
new state of rest. Varying the strength of the shocks to d in the numerical
example of our Scenario 2 and computing the resulting new equilibria yields
the second response function of b* in Figure 6, which is depicted as the
dashed line. The effects in the cyclical scenario depend heavily on the first
peak and trough values after the shock. Hence the fact that the reactions
to the negative shocks are not unambigously stronger or weaker than in
Scenario 1 must be ascribed to the interplay of the variables in the dynamic
process as a whole. Some explanations could be given for the specific case
under consideration, but they seem hard to generalize.
A mirror-image argument to the process above establishes that if the
initial equilibrium interface is vertically connected to the hypotenuse of L).,
then all shocks to d, again positive and negative shocks alike, reduce the
share of bold firms in the new equilibrium. While Figure 6 suggests that b*
is a strictly increasing (or decreasing, respectively) function of the size of
the shocks 8, there are also examples to be found where this relationship is
15 As may be expected from the weak amplifying forces under cyclical stability,
the downward jump in the payoff caused by the initial positive shock actually
initiates a further decrease in Tr for a short while, before the stabilizing mechanism
sets in.
73
i6If an equilibrium position with payoff 11"* has been approached by way of
dampened oscillations, there will be many vertices close together in a vicinity of
(A, p.) = (11"*,11"*) (or infinitely many in a mathematical abstraction). Whether
such an interface is classified as having a vertical or horizontal connection to
the hypotenuse of Ll will depend on the shape that remains when the 'nearest'
vertices to (11"*, 11" *) are wiped out by the shock.
74
Figure 6 illustrates that the shocks in the cyclical scenario, in one direction
at least, have a weaker impact on the equilibrium share b* than in Scenario
1. This finds its expression in the fact that the simulations of Scenario 2
yield a distribution of the F(8k , V*(k)) with a lower standard deviation
(the exact values are 1.29% in Scenario 2 versus 2.27% in Scenario 1).
We may now address the problem of instability and ask what happens
if the process does not converge to an equilibrium. It is easily seen that
system (3-10) has built in a global negative feedback mechanism, which
prevents the trajectories from exploding. If, for example, all firms adopt
the set of bold strategies for a longer while, then sooner or later the
corresponding aggregate exposure (equation (8)) dampens the psychology
of financial markets and raises financial distress d to similarly excessive
levels (see (9); at least if, as here assumed, the growth rate coefficient
ad in the distress function (14) is not too large): This rise in d inexorably
reduces the differential payoffs from bold behaviour in (10), and those firms
with the highest A-switching values return to the prudent strategies. An
analogous argument applies should all firms have become prudent. If, on
the other hand, no equilibrium is approached, it follows that the economy
must undergo persistent fluctuations. From a Minskian point of view, which
stresses the influence of financial markets on real activity, these oscillations
might even be seen as a constituent part of a theory of endogenous business
cycles.
It has been noted before that when a vertex is wiped out, the process
gives rise to a discontinuity in the increments of the share of bold firms
from one short period to another. One may surmise that this switching in
the regimes of the ordinary difference equations leads to chaotic dynamics.
It turned out, however, that the sudden changes were not so serious in this
respect. In all our simulation runs the motions soon developed into regular
oscillations which, for all practical purposes, can be described as strictly
periodic. Thus, the economy no more converges to a point of equilibrium,
but to a closed cycle (or a closed orbit, more technically). Similarly as with
the shifting equilibria above, it will be expected that these cycles are not
unique and that different shocks induce convergence to different cycles.
A condition for the equilibria of the process to become unstable is that
the growth effects in the two functions 111: and Id in equations (14) and
(15), as measured by the slope coefficients a11: and ad of the perceived
rate of growth, are sufficiently strong. An example is Scenario 3, which
was made explicit in the preceding section. Let us then perform the same
experiment as with the previous two scenarios and perturb the steady state
position by a shock to financial distress. The first remarkable effect to be
observed is the phenomenon of corridor stability (as Leijonhufvud has called
it). A positive shock does not change the equilibrium, which is already
known. It turns out that its stability is preserved when the shock is small
enough, where convergence is virtually monotonic. The critical value of the
perturbation is about 8 = 0.98%. If 8 exceeds this benchmark, then in its
75
adjustment back to 71"* the payoff overshoots this initial equilibrium value.
Unlike Scenario 2, the acceleration in the oscillations then setting in is so
vigorous that they are no longer dampened. As indicated, these fluctuations
are attracted by a periodic orbit. Interestingly, negative shocks, which do
affect the equilibrium position, are totally destabilizing, i.e., the periodic
cycles come into being however small in modulus the shocks may be. The
corridor stability arising in this way is therefore one-sided, as we may say.
Under sustained growth cycles, a unique steady state position in ordinary
dynamic systems, though not manifest in the time series, has still a role
to play as a state of reference. Since furthermore the equilibrium values
are often a satisfactory proxy for the time averages of the variables, the
steady state provides a theoretical and, to some extent, even practical
basis of the analysis. In the present dynamics, the steady state which we
used for reference is, and remains, not only virtual, it is also continuously
shifting. Such a system has no more firm anchor. A notion of equilibrium
is maintained, but it is devoid of any deeper meaning.
Besides the time averages of selected variables, another characterization
of the limit cycles are the peak and trough values of the share of bold
firms. Upon systematic variations of the shocks 8, both of them are seen
to increase weakly as the (positive and negative) shocks increase in size;
the troughs somewhat more than the peaks, so that the amplitude slightly
decreases. This is shown by the upper and lower lines in Figure 8. Additional
details of the outcome of the present calibration are given in the Appendix.
6~
60
55
~ ~
"------.J
~o
45
-aD -~o 0 ~D aD 30 [ • J
Figure 8 Share of bold firms (in %): peak and though values of the limit
cycles in Scenario 3 induced by shock 8 (in %); convergence to a new
steady state if they coincide.
76
to perceive. One reason is that the cycles do not appear to differ very much
in their characteristics. The variations in the peak and trough values of b
in Figure 8 are relatively small as the shocks 8 are systematically increased
(the scale of b in Figures 6 and 8 is the same). On the other hand, the
shocks in the dynamic economy occur rather frequently in comparison to
the time required to approach the limit cycle. These two features combined
may cause the noise of the shocks to dominate the changes in the true
cycle characteristics, to which the system would converge if it had been
given enough time. Or, if we study the moving time averages of a smooth
cyclical series like gk, there will be only a limited scope for them to evolve
as being governed by a random walk.
This supposition is essentially brought out by the shock-generated time
series of the aggregate capital growth rate gk in the bottom panel of Figure
7. Contrasting it with the other two scenarios, the larger scale in the third
panel should be noticed, which is due to the wider fluctuations in this
scenario. Especially the shocks between t = 70 and t = 90 have a much
stronger effect on the amplitude. The different pattern of the bottom series
makes it also more difficult to recognize the three growth regimes of the
previous scenarios. Referring to the time averages of gk, however, two of
them are still present with approximately the same growth rates as before,
though they stand out less clearly as in the top panel. These are the first
and third regime, i.e., the time intervals [15,50] and [140,160]. On the other
hand, the growth regime over the period [105, 130] with its distinctly lower
growth rate in the upper two panels has disappeared; here average growth
takes place at almost the same level as in the first interval.
Moreover, quite surprisingly when looking at the first hundred 'years',
and knowing that these cycles are basically endogenous, temporarily the
oscillations nearly vanish. This phenomenon can be explained on the basis
of the discussion of Figure 8. A strong positive shock to financial distress
has precipitated a deep fall in gk around t=90, such that, ifleft to itself, the
system would converge to a single equilibrium position. It happens that the
subsequent shocks do not decisively disturb these adjustments. A steady
state growth path is actually reached 20 time units later. Then, around
t = 115, another positive shock to d arrives. Here the Leijonhufvud corridor
stability criterion applies. The shock is so small that the eonomy returns
to a new steady state, with an only slightly higher rate of growth. From
t = 128 on, the shocks are in the 'normal' range and the conomy resumes
its cyclical behaviour.
Apart from hysteresis in the - only mildly - shifting time averages of
gk, it might be said that the process also displays hysteresis in kind: from
sustained oscillations to steady growth, and back to sustained cycles again.
Though, this switching in qualitative behaviour will not be expected to
take place too often.
78
7 Conclusion
8 Appendix
Given V = {Vo,vl, ... ,Vm } = {(Ao,/-Lo),(Ab/-Ll), ... , (Am,/-Lm)} and
a (new) value of the payoff, 1T, distinguish two cases in determining the
corresponding new interface.
Case 1, 1T ~ Am : Determine k = min {i: 1T ~ Ai} and set
<I> (1T, V) = {(Ao, /-Lo),(Al, /-Ll)' ... , (Ak-b /-Lk-d, (max[1T, Amin], /-Lk)}
As for 1T ~ Amin, recall Ao = Amin, so that <I>(1T, V) = {(Ao, /-Lo)}
{( Am in , /-Lmax)} for these extreme payoffs.
Case 2, 1T > Am : Determine
k = { min {i: /-Li ~ 1T} if /-Lm ~ 1T
m+1 else
and set
In particular, for 1T ;::: /-Lmax one has <I> (1T, V) = {(Amin, /-Lmax), (/-Lmax, /-Lmax)}.
Derivation of the Investment Growth Rate g; in Equation (6):
Given the length of the adjustment period h, let hIt be the volume of
aggregate net investment over the time interval [t, t+h) and K t the capital
stock at time t. Specify the (annualized) growth rates gf = (Kt+h-
Kt)/hKt and g; = (It - It-h)/hIt - h . Using It = (Kt+h - Kd/h = gf K t ,
one computes
hgf_h K t- h
+
hKt-h
k
gt - gtk_h KKk
= (1+h t - t-h) +
h gf-h hKt - h gt-h
Thus, fy(gi) has slope lover the interval [g-ry},g+ryI], slope ayl over
the two intervals [g-ry2, g-ryI] and [g+ry}, g+ry2], and slope a y2 else.
Numerical Details of the Simulations:
9 0.03 ryl = 0.03 ry2 0.06
/3g 2.00 ayl 0.667 a y2 0.25
/3k 1.00 gp 0.01 gb 0.06
/3d 1.00 h 0.05
On the basis of Amin = 0 and "'max = 10, the initial equilibrium interface
V*, which accomplishes b* = B(V*) = 50%, is given by
V* = {(O, 10), (1,9), (2,8), (3,7), (n*, n*)} , n* = 6.3166
The special value of n* (the same in the three scenarios) is brought about
by the parameters (11< = 10, 'l/J = 0.30, rd = ad 9 in the payoff and distress
functions (14,15), and
a1< 0 ad 0 2.81662
a1< = 4 ad = 1 2.11662
a1< = 5 ad 2.5 1.94162
in Scenario 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
Discussion of Equation (16) in Scenario 1
With respect to the discussion following equation (16), it has to be
shown that in response to a negative shock to d, the payoff in the new
equilibrium is smaller, and the new equilibrium share of bold firms is
larger. To see this, refer to the value n* = n*(b) in equation (11), which
the payoff must attain in equilibrium. In the initial equilibrium we have
n' = n*(b' ), V' = <I>(n/, V'), and the fixed-point equation (12) reads
b' = B[<I>(n/, V')] = B[<I>(n*(b' ), V')]. With respect to the shock-induced
interface V", the strict inequality B[<I>(n, V")] > b' = B[<I>(n/, V')] holds
for all payoffs n;::: n'P In particular, B[<I>(n*(b' ), V")] > B[ <I>(n*(b' ), V')]
= b'. Since b f---+ B[<I>(n*(b), V")] is a decreasing function (cf. the remark
following equation (12)), the solution b of the new fixed-point equation
B[<I>(n*(b), V")] = b must exceed the original share b'. Since we have
n*(b) < n' < n", i.e., the payoff has to fall from n" to its new equilibrium
level, it follows that the equilibrium interface changes its shape and is now
vertically linked to the hypotenuse of the Do-triangle.
Closed Orbits in Scenario 3:
Besides the peaks and troughs of the share of bold firms mentioned in the
text, the present calibration of the model in Scenario 3 yields the following
features of a typical cycle. The trough values of the perceived rate of growth
g, the aggregate capital growth rate gk, and the growth rate of investment
gi (a second derivative so to speak) are, respectively, -1.42%, 3.46%, and
-3.68% per unit of time; the corresponding peaks are 8.67%, 4.04%, and
11.95% (recall that practically all growth rates are instantaneous). The
I7For example, the interface in Figure 4 that now corresponds to n ' is given by
V= {Vo, VI, V2, V4 }. Clearly, the area below V is larger than the area below V' =
{Vo, VI, V2, V3, Vn, which equals B[cfI(n/, V'}] (apart from the normalization).
81
period of the cycle is 7.55 time units, where the phases from peak to
trough and from trough to peak are almost symmetric. The fluctuations
in 9 and gi are not too unrealistic compared to ordinary business cycles if
the underlying time unit is taken as a year. A shortcoming in this business
cycle interpretation is the small amplitude in the capital growth rate -
unless the concept of gk is refined and gk is viewed as an aggregate desired
growth rate of fixed capital. Since already the mean g:= gbb+ (1- b)gp was
an aggregate target rate of growth, g and gk would be associated with two
different time horizons. So it has to be admitted that this interpretative
construction is somewhat artificial. If beyond the purely theoretical thrust
of the model, calibration of these cycles is seen as an important task to
validate the model, then a more detailed specification of the adjustments
in the real sector is demanded.
References
[1] Blanchard, O.J. and Summers, L.H. (1986), "Hysteresis and the Eu-
ropean unemployment problem", in S. Fischer (ed.), NBER Macroeco-
nomics Annual 1986. Cambridge: MIT Press; pp.15-78
[2] Blanchard, O.J. and Summers, L.H. (1987), "Hysteresis in unemploy-
ment", European Economic Review, 31, 288-295
[3] Cross, R. (1994), "The macroeconomic consequences of discontinuous
adjustments: selective memory of non-dominated extrema", Scottish
Journal of Political Economy, 41, 212-221
[9] Giavazzi, F. and Wyplosz, C. (1985), "The zero root problem: a note
on the dynamic determination of the stationary equilibrium in linear
models", Review of Economic Studies, 52, 353-357
82
[12J Miller, M.H. and Orr, D. (1966), "A model of the demand for money
by firms", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80, 413-435
Non Linear Dynamics and
Utility Functions in
Overlapping Generations
Models
Gilles DUFRENOT and Laurent MATHIEU
1 Introduction
Grandmont [7] was among the first to study the possibility of self-sustaining
cycles in the overlapping generations models. In his paper, the origin of
these cycles is the conflict between the substitution effect and the income
effect due to variations of relative prices. Grandmont's approach has been
criticized on empirical basis : income effects in the model are too large
compared to their values in real life. Our paper, conversely, provides some
theoretical arguments that explains why cyclical and complex paths cannot
be ruled out. In this view, we examine the problem of endogenous fluctu-
ations in pure exchange economies from the viewpoint of macroeconomic
theories of consumption and saving.
Many studies explore the idea that in the face of uncertainty concerning
anticipated labor income, consumers can be more or less prudent (Carrol
and Summers [2], Carrol [1]). Also, the role of risk aversion has been
investigated (Shapiro [9], Dynan [4]). The propensity to consume out of
labor income depends on both factors which appear as potential sources of
fluctuations in aggregate consumption and saving. Moreover, recent works
exploring the importance of these factors have reached the conclusion that
the combination of risk aversion and prudent behavior may be a major
cause of the very unstable nature of aggregate saving (Dubois and Bonnet
[3]). These observations motivate our analysis.
Following an early suggestion by Dreze and Modigliani [5], we show that
the degree of curvature of an offer curve (or equivalently, the substitution
and income effects) can be expressed in terms of the first, second, and
third derivatives of the utility functions that describes preferences of the
consumers. Those derivatives are considered for they contain information
on prudent behaviors and attitudes towards risk in the face of uncertainty.
To achieve this result, we start from the methodology initiated by Sato
84
[8J which shows a close connection between the hypotheses made on the
Slutsky equations corresponding to excess demand functions and classes of
utility functions from which cycles and complex dynamics emerge.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In
Section 3 we derive classes of utility functions. Section 4 uses some
simulations to illustrate the nonlinear dynamics of consumption associated
to each type of utility functions.
2 The Model
This model, which is based on an overlapping generations model, is com-
posed of two distinct agents each living two periods. In the first period the
agent is in the younger generation; while in the second he is in the older
generation. In this pure exchange economy, each agent receives units of
a good which is neither produced nor stored. The population is constant
and both generations engage in goods exchanges. The market driven by
a system of relative prices. The model is based on the following assump-
tions. There is a representative agent in each generation who determines
how much to consume in the current period cf and in the future period
£1+1. The representatives' utility function U (cf, £1+1) is additively separa-
ble and satisfies the usual assumptions (monotonicity and concavity). The
endowment in the two periods of his life are given as w = (wY, WO).
Based on these assumptions, the structure of the economy is represented
by the following two equations .
• Following Gale [6J, a program is called feasible if the aggregate
consumption equals aggregate endowments in each period:
(1)
• A program is called competitive if a young agent maximises his utility
under the budget constraint:
(5)
(6)
(9)
86
u~' o -1 )
o U~' -J.Lt (10)
-1 -J.Lt o
and the determinant is:
(11)
~ ~ (0
= IHBI + cHI - w IHBI
O)~
{ dJ1.. (13)
dC~±l - >. ( 0 0) J1..u;'
dJ1.. = IHBI + ct +1 - w IHBI
Note that I~% et IN ~I are the slopes of the hicksian demand curves of
c¥ and cf+I'
.
The expreSSlOns (c0
t +1 - w
0) ~
IH BI and (0
ct + 1 - w0) J1..u;'
IH BI d escn'be the
income effects of a relative price variation.
(14)
(15)
87
(16)
(17)
Xl> 0, ~l >0
Similarly, the same elasticity for an old agent is given by
-A /-Lt
(18)
EC~+1lu=u = IHBI ~
t+l
(19)
Eo
Ct + 1
lu= u- = (20)
Once again, this equation is the product of two expressions: the marginal
propensity of the younger to consume (see Sato [8] pp. 105 for the proof)
and the inverse of relative risk aversion coefficient of the older. Assuming
that the first expression is constant, then the elasticity (20) is constant if
the relative risk aversion coefficient is constant. We obtain the following
expressions for the utility functions of the old agent:
(21)
88
(22)
{ Ul (cf) = rlln(Lllcf)
U2 (c~+1) = r2ln (Ll2~+1)
where
where
Xl> 0, Lll >
X2 > 0, Ll2 >
°° (24)
This selection is made according to the hypothesis that the marginal
propensities of the younger and the older to consume are constant.
The consumption dynamics are studied by considering both the opti-
mality conditions of the consumer maximisation program (7) and equation
(1)
89
c=
Y
t
f( Y)
Ct = 1+
[rr2 CY_WII]
cr
2
!...l. .:.L-::.-
Ct
where
u-t(x-)
"
= _1 _1
TiKi 2-k
[K-'I (1 - k) (x-"-. ".,.,_)Jt=k + tn-
2-k
T' (26)
where Ki < 0, Ti > 0, 'T/. E !R and k E !R\ {O, 1, 2}
1 -.
0,8
0,6
0,4
0,2
o~--~--~~~~~--~
°
0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8
0,8
0,6
0,4
0,2
O~----'-----'-----'-----r----.
0,8
0,6
0,4
0,2
O~----r----.-----.-----.----~
0,8
0,6
0,4
............................ (
0,2
0,8
: : I:~;.:i:?].:
0,2
:; ;:
0,6 J::a·:·:·:"·:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:···:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:·:-:·:·:··:·V
0,4
0,2
o
o 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8
Figure 8 : Chaos
94
(28)
(29)
o o -1
>.dJ1-t u.2" -J1-t (30)
-dw Y + cf+l d J1-t -J1-t 0
U~' 0 -1
d ol (31)
ct +1 = IHBI 0 >'dJ1-t -J1-t
-1 -dw Y + Cf+ldJ1-t 0
where IHBI is the determinant of the bordered hessian matrix. In a more
extensive form we have:
dct+l
o 1 [-U1" J1-t dw y + U1" J1-tCt+l
= IHBI 0 d J1-t - 1\'d]
J1-t (33)
(34)
(35)
The first term on the right hand side is the substitution effect of a relative
price variation on the quantity of goods consumed by the young agent and
the old agent.
95
(37)
A s Ilt =~
u" we 0 b
\
'
tam:
-U~ (~r 1
(39)
( ~)2 U" U" c¥
u' t + 2
1
Dividing both the denominator and the numerator by (U~) 2 the equation
above becomes:
(U~)2 -U~
(40)
(U~)2 U~' + (U~)2 U~' c¥
We factor the denominator with U~' U~'
Of,
(u~r
u~' -U~
(42)
( Cu;,r
u\
+ CU~l) c¥U~'
u2
This last expression is the product of two expressions: the marginal
propension of the older to consume (see Sato [8] pp. 105 for the proof)
and the inverse of the young agent's relative risk aversion coefficient.
96
ct 1
~U~
" = kl (44)
where kl is a real number. From this equality, we deduce a second-order
differential equation:
y"
klctU1 - Ul = 0 (45)
I
• k1 = -1
this implies,
u~' -1
-U' -;yt (51)
1
(52)
(53)
(54)
U1' = 1 1
o<,{3, ~ >0 since Q1,(31 >0
{
and (56)
-1 1
(cn 2 < 0 >0
/I
U1 = o<,{3, since Q1,(31
(59)
or,
( I< )l/kl
U1' -_ Ul ( y)l/kl
Ct (60)
1'1
We integrate once more and obtain a third specification of the utility
function of the young agent:
(61)
(62)
if
99
Then,
-A f..£t
(64)
EC~+llu=u = IHBI ~
t+l
Substituting IH BI and A by their expression (note that from the first-
order condition of the maximisation program A = u~ = ~),
J.Lt
we have:
(65)
As f..£t = ~, we obtain:
1
u~ 1
(66)
u U"1 + u"2 cf+l
( ~)2
1
1,)2
(U
Eo -=
ct+1Iu=u [f U "\.2 fu"\"2]
~ (67)
u;' + l::2L
CO
U"U" .L1..L HI
1 2 u;'
or,
Eo
Ct +1
lu = u- = (68)
(69)
X 2 > 0, ~2 >0
Proof: see appendix 2.
101
Proof
Two steps are needed to prove this proposition.
8pm Ci =0 (71)
8(wY + I-ltWo)
This condition is true iff fir); is constant whith any values of c¥ and
Cf+l (see Sato [8], pp. 117 for the proof). Thus:
U~u~1/
(U;')2 - , for i = 1,2, where k
-'-' - k E ~\{O} (72)
(a) k = 1
This implies,
(74)
or,
(U:,)2
•
_U:U:"
• •
~.....c....._...,..----O (75)
(Un 2 -
(76)
In l.8iU; I= ~i Xi + Xi (77)
U; (Xi) = ~
.8i
exp (-.!:..Xi + Xi)
0i
(78)
(1 Xi + Xi ) + Oi
tion:
Ui (Xi) = 0·
.8: exp 0i (79)
*
This function is monotone and strictly concave:
(83)
103
(85)
or,
(86)
Integrating, we obtain:
(87)
or,
(88)
(89)
(90)
This yields,
(93)
which can be written as,
( U~,)2
, _ U~u~"
, ,
->---<--(U-;,""ft)2 - = - (k - 1) (94)
(c¥ - wY) U~ = (W O
- cf+1) U~ (103)
(104)
Ul
, = yr l and U2
'
=
r2
-o- (105)
Ct Ct+l
Combining all these expressions, we obtain:
(106)
Ct = Ct = ll ]
r2 Ct
(108)
!J. W"_(w")~
r
r2 (cll)2
l (en = t > 0 since (109)
[1 + [R cf:t"]
This derivative is stricly positive thus f is an increasing function of
eYt
(110)
Thus,
(111)
(112)
(113)
We obtain,
(115)
107
( CY)* Y
=wan d (cY)** -_ r1 (117)
t t
r1 +r2
4. Stability of steady states equilibria
To study the stability of the steady states equilibria, we need to
evaluate the first-order derivative when c¥ = (c¥)* and c¥ = (c¥)**.
An equilibrium value x* is stable if jJ' (x*) I< l.
• We first check this condition for the no-trade equilibrium
(c¥)* = w Y
/ ((cn*) = (118)
We deduce:
(119)
thus,
rl1-w Y
-1<---<1 (120)
r 2 wY
The term between the two inequalities is strictly positive. The
stability condition corresponding to the no-trade situation is:
r wY
- 1 < -- (121)
r2 1- w Y
As an illustration, we choose w Y = 0.5 = (cn*. The inequality
above becomes R < 1. The convergence towards the steady
state equilibrium is monotonic / ((c¥n = 0.5> 0 (this is true
under the condition R
= 0.5) .
• We now study the stability of the second steady state equilib-
rium (c¥t* = rl~r2. As f is strictly positive, we have:
r1 wY
- < - -Y (122)
r2 1- w
and one can easily see that the convergence is monotonic.
108
1. Case 1
Let us define Xl = c¥ and X2 = cf+ I' The expression of the first utility
function is:
(123)
We thus have:
, 1 ( 1
Ui (Xi) = /3i exp Qi Xi + Xi ) (124)
Proof
The dynamics of the consumption is given by (let (~/ = ri i =
1,2):
( cY - wY) _1_ - (cY _ wY) 1 (128)
t r I c¥ - t r I (W Y + WO - cn
109
so,
3. Case 3
{ u· (x·) =
t.."
-II
-
Tilt, 2-k
[K,." (1- ',...
k:.k
k) (x·." - 'I'I.)]I-k + (Il·
·,.."t (130)
where K,i < 0, Ti > 0, 'TI. E lR et k E lR\ {O, 1, 2}
The first-order derivative is written as:
(131)
Conjecture 25 WO = 0
Proof
The consumption dynamics is:
1 -L 1 -L
(ef - wY ) - [(k - 1) ef]l-k = (ef - wY ) - [(k - 1) (w Y - cn]I-1e
£1 £2
(132)
from which we deduce:
Y
-£2 (cf - .J....
wY ) {en I-Ie = (ef - wY ) (w Y -
_1_
ct) I-Ie (133)
£1
or,
(134)
and then,
(135)
References
[1] CARROL C. [1992]' "The Buffer-Stock Theory of Saving: Some Macroe-
conomic Evidence", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 61-135.
[2] CAROLL C., SUMMERS 1. [1991], Consumption Growth Parallels
Income Growth: Some New Evidence, University of Chicago Press.
[3] DUBOIS E., BONNET X. [1996], "Peut-on comprendre la hausse
imprevue du taux d'epargne des menages depuis 1990?", Economie et
Prevision, 121, 39-58.
[4] DYNAN K.E. [1993], "How Prudent are Consumers?, Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, 101, 1104-1113.
[5] DREZE J., MODIGLIANI F. [1972], "Consumption Decisions under
Uncertainty", Journal of Economic Theory, 5, 308-335.
[6] GALE D. [1973], "Pure Exchange Equilibrium of Dynamic ~conomic
Models", Journal of Economic Theory, 6, 12-36.
[7] GRANDMONT J.M. [1985], "On Endogenous Competitive Business
Cycles", Econometrica, 53, 995-1045.
[8] SATO K. [1972], "Additive Utility Functions with Double-Log Con-
sumer Demand Functions", Journal of Political Economy, 102-124.
[9] SHAPIRO M.D. [1993], "The Permanent Income Hypothesis and the
Interest Rate: Some Evidence from Panel Data", Economics Letters,
97,305-346.
Pay-as-You-Go System under
Permanent Business Cycle
Michel BOTOMAZAVA and Vincent TOUZE 1
1 Introduction
The first field concerns pay-as-you-go system. Two results coexist and
generally deal with a steady state study: the pay-as-you-go system is
or is not welfare improving. When Diamond [1965]'s OLG structure is
used (Breyer and Straub [1993]), the pay-as-you-go system is not Pareto
improving when the capital yield is higher than the social security yield i.e.
population growth rate plus wages growth rate. However, in using Barro
[1974]'s model with bequest motive, one can prove individuals offset the
pay-as-you-go system effects by an offsetting bequest such that the transfers
between generations are unaffected. Moreover, Zhang [1995] showed that
when the population rate is endogenous, a pay-as-you-go program may
stimulate growth by reducing fertility and increasing the ratio of human
capital investment per child.
Second, Gale [1973] was the first to find an example of an OLG economy
with two-period cycles. Benhabib and Day [1982]' Grandmont [1985],
Reichlin [1986] and Jullien [1988] studied the emergence of erratic or
cyclic dynamics in the context of OLG models. More recently, Galor [1992]
investigated OLG model dynamics in a two-sector structure. The main
orientation of this research is to find and to characterize cyclic or chaotic
time paths.
Third, generational equity time paths with OLG models were studied by
Phelps and Riley [1978] and Rodriguez [1981]. These authors investigated
the properties of "maximin" growth as meant by Rawls [1971]: so a fair
society would program its taxes and resulting stocks of capital and national
debt so as to maximize the lifetime utility of generations with having the
lowest welfare level. In these studies, the growth is stable and convergent.
A case of generational equity where the growth is cyclic has been studied
by Reichlin [1986]. He searches and finds a fiscal policy rule which implies
equal welfare for all generations when it is announced.
In this paper, we use these three economic concepts to study the effects of
change in a pay-as-you-go system. Our pay-as-you-go system is particular.
No direct pension is distributed but old age public expenditures are
financed by a payroll tax. This public good cannot perfectly substitute
for private good 2 •
In a first part, we present Reichlin [1986]'s model when this pay-as-you-
go system is introduced. We find a steady state capital general explicit form
related to exogenous economic parameters.
Then, in the second part, the conditions for the existence and the stability
of the cycles are given. As we want to obtain a permanent cycle, we must
accept to have a parameter which varies when the payroll tax changes.
This condition is necessary but we propose and then show that it could be
the result of a special maximization behavior. Consequences are interesting
since we can study the pay-as-you-go effects on an efficiency criterium such
as the steady state level and on intergenerational justice criteria such as a
welfare range gap (the egalitarian criterium) or such as the lowest welfare
level (the maximin/Rawlsian criterium).
In the last part, we define an example where functional forms are known.
By using computing simulations, we find there are cases where the lowest
welfare level, the intergenerational inequality and the steady state level
can grow up if the payroll tax rate rises. These results show two interesting
conflicts: a conflict between efficiency (steady state) and equity (welfare
range) criteria and a conflict between two equity criteria (welfare range
and lowest welfare level).
2If the public expenditures consumption can pertfectly substitute for private
good, i.e. if one additional unit of old age public expenditures gives the same
additional welfare as one additional unit of private good consumption, the pay-
as-you-go system is an unfunded pension system. In our numerical example,
old age public good consumption can be perfectly substitute for private good
consumption.
113
° °
age public good consumption and leisure utilities respectively u (c), iL(g)
and v (l) with derivatives satisfying: u' > 0, u" ::; 0, iL' > 0, iL" < and
v' > 0, v" > and where the private good consumption is denoted c, the
old age public expenditures g and the individual labor supply l. Households
have perfect foresights. The wage is denoted Wt and interest factor R t . The
program of each household is:
c~~f. u(ct+l)+iL(gt+l)-v(lt)
{ Ct+l = Rt+1(1- T)Wtlt (1)
gt+ 1 = TWt+1lt+ 1
{=:} Max U(Rt+l(l- T)Wtlt) + iL (gt+d - v(lt) (2)
It
(5)
114
A little computation gives the following wages and interest factor dynamics:
{
R
i3.(l-T)__
w t ---"'-~
-
k.
1_k'±2
(6)
t+l - 13 (l-T) k.±l
(7)
Proposition 2.1:
Under 13 > l~T [GI] and H(l) - lH'(l) > 0 [G2] or H(l) - lH'(l) < 0
[G2'] , there is a unique positive solution from (10), Ie = ~",,-l (i3g-=:~!1)
with"" (l) = H(l) and Ie = 0 is a trivial solution.
Proof
The fixed points are solutions to (13- l~T)1e = (~Ie) .Positive solution
H
exists if and only if 13 > l~T [GI]. There exists an explicit form for Ie if and
only if"" (l) is monotonic. That is true if H (l) > lH' (l) [G2] , then"" (l) is
increasing or if H (l) < lH' (l) [G2'] , then"" (l) is decreasing. •
Proposition 2.2
Under conditions [GI] and [G2] , the steady state capital increases with
T and under conditions [GI] and [G2'] , the steady state capital decreases
with T.
115
Proof
ali: _
aT -
1 ./,-11 ( (l-r)!)
(,8(1-T)-1)20/ ,8(1-1'")-1 > 0 ·f . / , - 1 · ·
1 'f"
.
IS Increasmg an
d ali:
Err =
1 ./,-11 ( (l-r)l!)
(,8(1-r)-1)2 0/ ,8(1 r)~l < 0 1·f ./,-1·
0/
d .
IS ecreasmg.
•
Proposition 3.1
In a neighborhood of the steady state, the dynamics of the economy will
be cyclical if and only if:
(a,{3,r) E {(a,{3,r) E IR _+2 x [0,1[/ (1- r){3 < 2 et H' (~k) =! }[C3].
Proof
In a neighborhood of (k, x), the dynamics of the system are approximated
by:
( ~~::~ ) ~ P. ( :: ) (11)
with dk = k - k, dx =x - x and
There are two conditions on eigenvalues for cycles. The first one is that
eigenvalues module must be equal to 1, (I-r)~H'(~k) = 1 and the second
one is that eigenvalues must be complex (1- r){3 < 2. •
Proposition 3.2
Under [CI], [C2] / [C2'] and [C3] the capital cycle frequency increases
with respect to r.
Proof
Under (C3] , there exists an orthogonal matrix N such as (11) becomes:
( ~~::~ ) ~ N- (~ ~) N (
1
:: ) (12)
Set () be the argument of the eigenvalues. One has: A = cos () + i sin () and
X = cos () - i sin () with ()= arccos ( (m;T)) . The cycle period T = is 2;
decreasing with respect to () and the frequency () is increasing with respect
V
i!.
to r: ae = 2 ••
aT I -(!3(li-r)r
.th
( ~t
Xt
) = (si!e -~:) (
0 1
dk t
dXt
)
where ~a (Xt) = ~h: (x) (Xt - x)2 - th:' (x) (Xt - x)3 +0 (Xt - x)5) .
( (1 + ii) r - II (a) r 3 , 4> + B (a) +h (a) r2) with (1 + ii) = I). (a) I . Further-
more, II (a) is given by:
Corollary 3.5
In the case of a dynamic system (10) the condition for an invariant
2
attractive circle is (Ha) - H::' > 0 [G4], in a neighborhood of a', with
1/
a' = (1 - T) {3.
When T changes, the [G3] cycle condition cannot stay verified. That's
why, we propose to endogenize 0: with respect to T and {3.
Proposition 3.6
Under [G1] , [G2] / [C2'] and y1j;-l1 (y) H" (1j;-1 (y» > -H' (1j;-1 (y»)
[C5] or y1j;-l1 (y) H" (1j;-1 (y») > -H' (1j;-1 (y») [G5'] where y = ~g=:~!l '
if 0: = (1 - T) {3r (s) with r (s) = e-~ (s)' s = ~(l-\)-l and e (y) =
Proof:
e (y) must be inversive. If e' (y) > 0 or if e' (y) < 0, that's true . •
How to justify this relation? A simple way is to suppose that it is the
result of a very special maximization behavior. That's why, we add these
new assumptions:
i) there exists a relation between labor productivity and collective effort;
ii) workers prefer to have or not to have a pay-as-you-go system;
118
iii) workers choose effort level and labor supply independently. They
know that minimal effort is not optimal because there is a collective but
not individual positive link between wages and effort.
Proposition 307
Under [CIJ, [C2J / [C2'], [C3J and [C5J / [C5'J there always exists a
functional form of utility Z(e,{3,r) = -~a(e)2 + (1- r){3r (i3(l_lrj_l)
a (e) where a (e) is the relation between effort and labor productivity with
0:' (e) > 0 and a" (e) ~ 0 such as the optimal condition 8Z(~f'T) = 0
implies cycle.
Proof:
One can verify easily that 8Z(~f'T) = 0 gives cycle condition a
(1 - r),8 r (s). Moreover, this solution is optimal because 82Z~:f'T)
_0:'2 (e) < O. •
x (-{3r(s) + (i3g~~l!:1)2r'(S))
(i3(1-~)-1)2 (1 + (1 - r) ~ (,8 (1 - r) - 1)
4 Example
4.1 THE MODEL
Suppose v(l) = ~l2 + bl; u(c) = c and 3 u(g) = >.g. The household
economic behavior is the solution to Max u(ct+d + u(gtH) - v(lt} +
e,ct+l,lt
3If >. = 1, public good and private good are perfectly interchangeable and the
pay-as-you-go system is equivalent to an traditional no contributive unfunded
pension system. So T can be considerd like an intergenerational transfert rate.
119
Hence, by using capital per head dynamic equation (10), we can write:
Utility parameters
1a b or d·IsuttTIty J a = 0.003
b = 0.1
public good utility ). = 1
effort utility 'Y = 100
capital productivity (3 = 2.1
Production parameters ~
labor productivity and effort 8 = 1
Initial values ko = kl = 1000
~~----------------~~~----~
200
-200
-~
-~+--------,----~~,---------,-~
Figure 1 - Capital per head phases diagram for T = 0.26, ... ,0.268
lOCO . , . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
7SO
500
250
-250
-500
-750
-lOCO
-1250 +--------,--------....----------r----'
o lOCO
em
100
200
-200
-100
-em
0 1000 1500
Figure 3 - Life Cycle Welfare phases diagram for T = 0.26, ... ,0.268
Figure 3 gives welfare phases diagram. The elliptic forms moving to the
right characterize the T rising. That's also true for figures 1 and 2. Two
sorts of conflict are interesting: a conflict between efficiency (variation of
the steady welfare state level which is identified by the center of a elliptic
form) and equity (variations of the welfare range) criteria and a conflict
between two equity criteria (variations of the welfare range and variations
of the lowest welfare level). Indeed, when T rises, the graphs on figure 3 show
that the steady welfare state level, the lowest welfare level and the welfare
range rise. Therefore, the Rawlsian criterium consisting in maximizing the
lowest welfare level is increasing with respect to T. However, the egalitarian
criterium consisting in reducing the intergenerational welfare range is
decreasing with respect to T. Finally, the efficiency criterium consisting
in maximizing the steady welfare state level is increasing with respect to T.
Time paths are not perfectly periodic because this model is not linear
and chaotic time paths exist. It is why on the graphs, we can see that all
the values of the interval [k min ; kmaxl seem to be on the path. Then, discrete
paths seem to look like to continuous time cycles.
5 Conclusion
the debate about equity and efficiency of the pay-as-you-go system when
the payroll tax rate is modified in an original fashion. Indeed, by using
computing simulation, an increase in the intergenerational transfer rate i.e.
the payroll tax rate can have two effects on welfare:
i) first on steady welfare state i.e. the efficiency reference level which
rises;
ii) second on welfare range. If the range rises, the increase of T is not
improving according to the pure egalitarian criterium. On the contrary,
if the increase of one half range is inferior to the increase of steady
welfare state, the increase of T is improving according to Rawlsian criterium
because the lowest level of welfare rises.
One of our next perspectives of study consists in specifying analytically
these latter found effects by using computing simulations. Notably, it can
be done by writing economic variables time paths (capital, consumption
and welfare) in the following way: Xt = x + A cos (Bt + <p) where the range
is denoted A , the frequency B, the phase <p and the capital, consumption
or welfare steady state x.
Another perspective consists in suppressing the permanent economic
cycle condition and in investigating all chaotic time paths with respect
to T.
References
[1] ALLAIS M. [1947], Economie et interet, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris.
[2] BARRO R.J. [1974], "Are Gouvernement Bonds Net Wealth?", Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 82, 1095-1117.
[3] BENHABIB J. and R. DAY [1982], "A Characterization of Erratic Dy-
namics in the Overlapping Generations Model", Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 4, 37-55.
[4] BREYER F. and M. STRAUB [1993], "Welfare Effects of Unfunded
Pension Systems when Labor Supply is Endogenous", Journal of
Public Economics, 50 , 77-91.
[5] DIAMOND P. A. [1965], "National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth
Model", American Economic Review, 55 , 1126-1150.
[6] GALE D. [1973], "Pure Exchange Equilibrium of Dynamic Economic
Models", Journal of Economic Theory, 6 , 2-36.
123
Keynesian Models
Relaxation Cycle, Chaotic
Dynamics and Limit Cycle: a
Model with Keynesian
"Flavour"
Gilbert ABRAHAM-FROIS and Edmond BERREBI
1 Introduction
The graph has the following characteristics: it goes through the origin
with slope v; this slope decrease slowly till stabilization; it turns over
after for higher differences of incomes, which does not seem quite relevant.
Moreover, in case of decreases of income, this function gives rise to negative
investment, which is at least annoying.
To avoid these problems, we suggest to introduce an autonomous invest-
ment so that the investment function now writes:
(la)
There is no loss of generality by writting 10 = 1, since this means a change
of unit in income level; hence the investment function suggested :
Yi = Ct + It (6)
on gets, by replacing Ct and It by their value in 5 or 3 :
Yi = Ct + It (7)
= Yi-I - sZt - (1 - c) sYi-2 + VZt-1 - VZ;_I + 1 (8)
<=>
Yi - Yi-I -sZt - (1 - c) SYi-2 + VZt-l - VZLI +1
<=>
Zt -sZt - (1 - c) sYi-2 + VZt-l - VZ;_l +1
One can write q = v - s, difference between accelerator v and propensity
to consume s. So this equation can now be written as :
In this case, on which we will skip rather quickly, one finds a kind of
chaotic dynamics which is rather well known; main characteristics will be
shown as follows. Relation (8) becomes:
- 2~J
3v3 q + s
q + 1 and since 1" (zi) = 6 (q + s) zi > 0, point (zi, I (zi)) is
a local minimum.
r
All terms of the series {z, I (z) ,12 (z), ... , (z) , ... } where z > 0 will
be positive if local maximum I (zi) < Zl where Zl is the positive real root
of I (z) = qz - (q + s) z3 + 1 = o.
Special case 10 = 0
131
This entails deep changes in the dynamic evolutionj there will appear
cycles of different kind, which may be associated - or not - with chaotic
evolution; moreover, another difference appears: in the first model, the
general evolution depended only on q = v - Sj now, it depends first on v et
second on (1 - c) s, which obviously means changes in q.
From equations (2) and (11), one gets the following system of two
equations :
(8) { Yi = Yi-l + Zt
Zt = [q + (1 - c) s] Zt-l - (q + s) Zl-l - (1- c) SYi-1 +1
One can represent solution of (8) system in the phase diagram (Yi, Zt)
where Zt = Yi - Yi-l. The phase diagram is here of the discrete type - using
difference equations - when usual presentations uses differential equations.
We shall figure too the time-sequence (Y1 , Y2 , .•• , Yi) for particular values
of accelerator v and to eternal rate of saving (1 - c) s.
In previous workl, we have studied the case where v took different
values for (1 - c) s constant; we shall insist specially on the situation where
(1 - c:) s tends to zero.
For a special value of v, say v = 1.75, one can depict the phase diagram
(Yi, Zt) and the time sequence Yi corresponding to different values of eternal
rate of saving (1 - c:) s.
According to the values of (1 - c) s, it appears for the phase diagram of
system (8) either:
(1 - c) s Forms Figure
0.08 closed curve 3a
0.25 butterfly 3b
0.45 clouds 3c
0.60 signature 3d
0.70 bracelet 3e
0.85 separate segments 3f
Those phase diagrams presented on fig. 3 are all strange attractors since,
when t goes to infinity, points (Yt, Zt) go back to these attractors without
regularity.
Fig.3a Fig.3b
......•
Fig.3c Fig. 3d
.....
Fig.3e Fig.3f
134
-
~··········-···~·········r···························· .~..............:.ii ' .. :~... "'" . • •.............. "x"
Fig.3i
Figure 3: Phase diagram for v = 1.75 and (1 - c) s variable
So part part corresponding to Zt < 0 (which lies under the ayt axis) is
symetrical of part corresponding to Zt > 0 (which lies above the ayt axis)
around point ((l!£js' 0). Consequently, one shall look at the superior part
of the cubic and afterwards find its symmetry around point ((l!e)s' 0).
When (l-E)s turns to 0 and for instance has for value 0.0001, there ap-
pear "relaxation cycles" with or without chaotic dynamic. When starting
from point (Yo = (l!e)s = 10000, Zo = 0.5) different cases come to evi-
dence:
...................
r································8······
~.
~
~ ...... -. ................ ~ ................ . ,....;c.
.
. ~. .
r- .. - . .
. .
Since term {1!e>s becomes very large when (1 - £)8 -0, ratio ~~! =
;:=~:::.~ -00 except if [q+ (1-£)8 -lJZt-l - (q+8)Z{_1 - X t - l + 1 = 0.
Let us consider the phase diagram (Xt, Zt) or (yt, Zt) with representation
of unity on Y axis proportional to (1 - £)8.
q + (1 - £)8 - 1 Z- q+(1-£)8-1
Zl= 3(q + 8) et 2- - 3(q + 8)
Xl = [q + (1 - £)8 - 1 - (q + 8)Zr] Zl + 1
= [q + (1- £ )8 - 1- q+(I-e)S-I] .
3 V/q+(l-e)s-l
3(q+s)
+ 1
2 q+(I-e)s-13 +1
(q+s)
3y'3
is a local maximum.
X 2 = [q + (1 - £)8 - 1 - (q + 8)Z~] Z2 + 1
=- [q + (1 - £)8 - 1 _ q+{1-;e)s-l] q+(l-e)s-l + 1
3(q+s)
2 ,------
-3y'3
is a local minimum.
Let us notice, by coming back to (Y}, Zl) and (Y2, Z2), and since
X = (1 - £)8Y, that Y values becomes very large and would go out of
the diagram if we had not taken for unity (l~e)s on Y axis.
138
····x·
There are also the limits of the (yt, Zd wich are solution to (8) system,
where initial value (Yo, Zo) is situated on the cubic or in its immediate
neighbourhood. Cubic of figures 8 to 11 (and their immediate neibourhood)
constitue the attraction basin for (8) model. Let us look, for instance, to
figure 8 where cubic associated to (1 - c)s = 0.0001 and v = 1.5. Starting
from point (Yo, Zo) = (1820, 0.5) situated near the left extremity of the
cubic, we can see that the (yt, Zt) of (8) model goes the right, first rather
slowly (since there are some Zt < a and some Zt > 0, there having larger
influence than the negative ones) then more quickly when all Zt come
to be positive and consequently yt are always increasing. This evolution
continues to the neighbourhood of point (Y}, Zt} where Y1 = 11120 is the
cubic local maximum. In point (Y}, Zt}, ~f tends to infinity and points
(yt, Zt) move to the half-straight line going down from (Yl> Zl)' They are
attracted by the inferior part of the cubic which they join at point C1 .
In CI, Zt < a and points (yt, Zt) decrease on the cubic to point (Y2, Z2)
where Y2 = 8880 and ~f tends again to infinity. From this point (Y2, Z2),
points (yt, Zt) of the model move to the half straight line up to point C2
situated on the cubic and after that move on, keeping always on the cycle
(Y1 , Zl)/CI/(Y2 , Z2)/C2 which stands as a limit cycle for (8) model.
If now v goes throught different values (say 1.75, then 1.87 and at last
2.12), keeping (1 - c) s = 0.0001, one can see a decreasing amplitude of the
cubic; on the other hand, the amplitude of the relaxation cycle -enriched
successively by bifurcations and chaotic zones- goes increasing (cf. figures
9, 10, 11).
So the upper part of the cubics goes from Y = 3400 to Yl = 11890. The
lower part (symetrical from the upper part around point ((1!E)8 = 10000)
goes from Y2 = 8110 to 20000 - Y = 16600. The relaxation cycle, which
appears as a limit cycle of model (8) goes from 8110 to 11890.
If the starting point is close to the relaxation cycle, the representation
of the series (¥t, Zt) is given in the phase diagram by the relaxation cycle
(in the paper, one choses Yo = {1!E)8 and Zo = 0.5 when one wants that
the successive points (¥t, Zt) to be situated on the relaxation cycle).
On the other hand, if the starting point of the cubic (Yo, Zo) is located
to the left (resp. to the right) frontier of the relaxation cycle and after that
to the cycle itself on which one travels indefinitely (figures 13 and 14).
!~
..
~';
;~ ~
~ ............ - •••••••••,
. .................... •.............................K..
.
.f
I '
~
1'!Jl;:;;'························x
For (1-C:)8 given and negligible, it has been observed inside the relaxation
cycle a chaotic zone growing in importance with v. If the starting point
(Yo, Zo) is located on the superior part of the cubic, the series (Yi, Zt) is
drawn (when arriving to the local maximum (Yt, Zl) where g
--+ 00), to
the chaotic zone of the inferior part. Let us suppose that in this chaotic
zone, one has some Zt > 0 and some Zt < 0, with relative influence quasi-
equivalent, but slight avantage for Zt > 0; consequently, terms (Yi, Zt)
will stay during a "certain time" in a vertical strip [Y1 Y1] before going
left to the local minimum (Y2, Z2) where ;~ comes to infini~. Successive
terms (Yi, Zt) will then linger, symetricaliy, in a vertical strip [Y2 Y 2 ] before
going right. So there will appear a relaxation cycle with two thick frontiers
[Y1 Y1] and [Y2 Y2 ] (cf. figure 15).
............................•.
• The revenue level oscillates mainly between two values (" high" and
"low" level) ; around these two levels, there are minor fluctuations
and one could think that they are due to exogenous shocks , the
length of "high" and "low" level stages are quite variable.
• Moreover, the stage of quick changes which appear on these diagrams
have no connection with the "fast dynamics" which appeared in the
cubic analysis. It is just the other way; as is appears in the simulation,
it is the stage of "slow" dynamics (in the phase diagram) which
corresponds to the abrupt change in the time series. The two levels of
revenue (" high" and "low") have variable length because the system
wanders then through the" chaotic" part of the curve.
142
• the chaotic behavior becomes clear when one examines the change in
revenue level Zt = Doyt; all precedent diagrams have been drawn in
(yt, Zt) coordinates; it is the revenue change of Zt which suffers most
important and unexpected changes. Revenue level yt is sul;ljected to
strong vibration with oscillations less important than these appearing
for Zt.
as the limit of the series (yt, Zt) solutions of model (8) when the starting
point (Yo, Zo) is either on the upper part of th cubic with Yi > Yo > Y2
either on the lower branch with Yo> YI
If the starting point (Yo, Zo) is situated either on the lower part of the
cubic with Y2 < Yo < YI or on the upper part with Yo < Y2, point (yt, Zt)
solutions of (8) have for limit a vertical strip (y2 Y2 ] symetrical to the strip
[YI YI ] around point [(I!E)8; 0] .
So relaxation cycle has burst out ; limit of series (yt, Zt) depends
on initial conditions. For instance, for (1 - c)s = 0.0001, we have such
situation when 2.136 < v < 2.263; if v = 2.263, [YI , YI ] = [13623,13716]
and [Y2 , Y2 ] = [6284,6377].
When Q > 2,59809, one has negative Zt > 0 and positive Zt. If positive
Zt have more influence, the system will arive to the local maximum (Y1 , Zl)
and then diverges.
On the other hand, if positive and negative Zt are mutually neutralized,
the system stays in a narrow strip around the straight line Y = (t':e:)s. This
is the situation represented by fig. 20 where (1 - e)8 = 0.0001, v = 2.8 and
(Yo, Zo) = (10020,0.5).
145
Figure 20: Central limiting strip v = 2.8, (1 - e)S = 0.0001 and Yo = 1020
It appears that the upper branch of the cubic looks like the bifurcation
diagram of fig. 2 ; however, stable cycles and chaotic zone appear when one
goes from right to left in the cubic but from left to right in the bifurcation
diagram. There are more basic differences between the two diagrams. On
a bifurcation diagram, one can observe a limit point, a stable cycle, or a
chaotic evolution for a given value of v - S ; all points of the cycle or of the
chaotic dynamic are situated on the same vertical line drawn from point of
abscisse v - S . On the other hand, stable cycles or chaotic dynamics are
situated on parallel vertical lines distant by Zt since Yi = Zt + Yi-I. But
since all these lines are squeezed one upon another, one has the impression
that these points are on the same straight line (distance between two
straightlines is about one when Yi is about 10000).
A last difference must be noticed ; in the bifurcation diagram one has
on each straight line the whole dynamics of (Zt) for a particular value of
v - S ; in the upper (or lower) part of the cubic, one has the same value of
v - s ; in the upper (or lower) part of the cubic, one has the same value
of v - s + (1 - e)S ; each vertical line corresponds to a particular Yi and
indicates just one point (Yi, Zt) of the series defined by (S) model.
References
[1] G. ABRAHAM-FROIS and E. BERREBI [1995], InstabiliU, cycles,
chaos, Economica
1 Introduction
with more or less confidence. Among the first may be mentioned the existing
stock of various types of capital-assets and of capital-assets in general and
the strength of the existing consumer's demand for goods which require for
their efficient production a relatively larger assistance from capital. Among
the latter are future changes in the type and quantity of the stock of capital-
assets and in the tastes of the consumer, the strength of effective demand
from time to time during the life of the investment under consideration, and
the changes in the wage-unit in terms of money which may occur during
its life. We may sum up the state of psychological expectation which covers
the latter as being the state of long term expectations. " (Keynes, 1936,
pp. 147-48).
Therefore, on the one hand, some determinants of long run expectations
are fairly well known and their inclusion in the new investment decision-
making process seems simple and clear-cut. On the other hand, for the
remaining determinants, knowledge is replaced by ignorance, namely by a
situation of " extreme precariousness of the basis of knowledge. " (Keynes,
1936, p. 149).
" Precariousness" is reinforced by the influence exerted by financial mar-
kets on the behaviour of investors. The division between owners and man-
agers indeed allows financial agents to modify their investment decisions
when they correspond to the acquisition of shares. Now, these acquisitions
are not independent from the state of the stock exchange. The possibility
for investors to reconsider their commitments increases the " precarious-
ness " of investment expectations even more. We indeed know that " it is
of the nature of organised investment markets, under the influence of pur-
chasers largely ignorant of what they are buying and of speculators who are
more concerned with forecasting the next shift of market sentiment than
with a reasonable estimate of the future yield of capital-assets that, when
disillusion falls upon an over-optimistic and over-bought market, it should
fall with sudden and even catastrophic force. " (Keynes, 1936, p. 316).
Hence, in the General Theory, the emphasis is put on the variation of
the marginal efficiency of capital: " The trade cycle is best regarded, I
think, as being occasioned by a cyclical change in the marginal efficiency
of capital, though complicated and often aggravated by associated changes
in the other significant short-period variables of the economic system. "
(Keynes, 1936, p. 313).
What about the long-run rate of interest? For Keynes, this rate is less
unstable than the marginal efficiency of capital and, therefore, it only plays
a complementary role in the emergence and development of the business
cycle. The decrease of the efficiency of capital therefore implies the rise of
the rate of interest and not the reversal. During the depression, as soon as
the marginal efficiency of capital begins to decrease, agents try indeed to
sell their inventories of goods and assets in order to avoid the decrease of
their price. The level of liquidity preference therefore increases and, ceteris
paribus, enhances the rise of the interest rate and hence reinforces the
151
depression.
AB a result, two different points of view seem to prevail. On the one hand,
the existence of credit allows the possibility of a divergence between the
natural and the market rate in favour of the latter. This divergence in turn
underpins the phase of expansion. On the other hand, long-run expectations
encourage investment decisions and, hence, expansion or depression phases.
Some authors have interpreted the opposition between these two points of
view as the consequence of the respective different roles given by Keynesians
or Post-Keynesians to banks and financial markets. This opposition must
however be questioned.
Accordingly, we propose a formal framework allowing the analysis of the
compatibility of these developments contained respectively in the Treatise
and in the General Theory. We shall try to point out that, far from being
contradictory, these developments can be combined in order to provide a
more satisfactory explanation of the emergence and persistence of business
cycles.
Y=C+I (1)
where C and I respectively refer to the volume of national aggregated
consumption and investment. In addition :
Y=wN+P (2)
where P refers to the level of gross profits, and N refers to the level of
employment. The nominal wage rate w is, in line with the Cambridge
tradition, determined by a bargaining process that is exogenous to the
model.
The consumption level, C, is given by:
152
Q
N=- (5)
I
In addition, let us assume that the price of the produced good is given
by means of an exogenous mark up m:
P = (1 +m)w (6)
I
Thus, with a given a capital/output ratio v, the real sector of our model
is completely described.
The description of the financial sector borrows from the analysis de-
veloped by Gallegati and Gardini (1991) and by Franke and Semmler
(1991,92).1. One main difference can be found in the fact that we con-
sider two distinct interest rates. The first rate Z , is parametrically fixed by
the banks and refers to the " bank rate " of the Treatise. The second one,
i, is detemined by the equilibrium on the assets market and refers to the
long-term rate of the General Theory.
Let us assume for simplicity that the money supply MS is constant and
exogenous. The demand for money has three components: a transactional
and precautionary element T R, a speculative component consistent with
the notion of liquidity preference of the General Theory, SP, and finally a
component related to the demand for finance Exfi. 2 .
Accordingly, assume that:
TR=kY, (7)
where 0 < k < 1 is the reciprocal of the velocity of money
SP = SP(i) (8)
Exfi = b (9)
1 Hence, for a detailed presentation of the financial sector see Gallegatti and
Gardini (1991) and Franke and Semler (1992).
2 As we know, the " finance motive" historically appears after the publication
of the General Theory.
153
It is now time to indicate how the real and financial sectors are connected.
from a Keynesian perspective, this link is to be found in the financing of
investment activity. From this standpoint, three sources of financing are
taken into account in the model: retained net profits A, debt (bank loans)
iJ , and finally access to financial markets M .Thus we obtain:
(10)
Let us assume that the internal financing constraint is a proxy for the
ability of firms to fulfill their debt commitments. Hence, according to
Kalecki's increasing risk principle, new external finance raised by the firms
is proportional to net profits, i.e. net cash flow A. We have :
iJ = (b-1)A (11)
with b > 1, and where A is given by
A =,BIT - iD (12)
The investment function we have retained is the following :
I = bA + a( r e - i) (13)
where a > 0 and b > 1 are two real positive parameters. Thus, investment
decisions depend both on net cash flow A and on the difference between the
expected profit rate and the current market interest rate. Consequently (h-
1) refers to the weight of financial constraints undergone by firms (Gallegati
et Gardini 1991)3.
Assume, moreover, that the expected profit rate is given by the ensuing
relation:
r e = R(d,X) (14)
where d refers to the debt/capital ratio and X refers to the state of
confidence. Let us suppose that R is a continuous derivable positive function
satisfying R~ > O.
According to Minsky (1980, 82), the evolution of the leverage ratio D/K
during the cycle precedes an increase (respectively a decline) of the financial
fragility of the economy. A small D / K ratio' is first associated with high
expected profits, i.e. R~ > O. Progressively, a rise in D / K signals a future
deterioration of profitability, hence R~ becomes negative. 4 •
Since the real positive variable X refers to the notion of " state of confi-
dence" of the General Theory mentioned in the introduction of the paper,
3 A simple combination of equations (10), (11) and (13) shows that the amount
of investment financed by the financial market is given by At = a(r" - i).
"'Thus, the function R(d,X) can be specified as follows:
R(d,X) = a.d + {3d + oX, with a. < O,{3 > 0 and 0 > O.
154
(15)
Replacing Y and b by their respective values in K and D, we have:
i = L(K,D)
Hence, this type of LM curve with L ~ < 0 and Lv > 0 (cf. Annex 1)
gives the equilibrium or market interest rate as a function of the capital
stock and of the stock of debt.
The real and financial sectors of our model having been described, it is
now possible to determine the stationary state of the economy and to turn
to the analysis of its dynamical properties.
(17)
D=(b-l)A (18)
As we know, variations in the psychological variable representing in-
vestors' confidence are an essential ingredient in Keynes' conception of
macroeconomic instability in the General Theory. We give a somewhat
simplified, but sufficient for our purpose representation of the evolution
of that variable. Let us simply assume that its movement is given by the
following relation:
x = H(X) (19)
where H is a continuous function defined for all X > 0, satisfying
H(X*) = 0 and H'; i=- 0 for X* > 0 5 .
In line with Keynesian business cycles models based on fluctuations of the
state of confidence which usually refer to the General Theory's Notes on the
Trade Cycle and to the 1937 QJE' article (Woodford 1989, Caminati 1989),
the evolution of the state of confidence, which is basically a psychological
variable is autonomous. Function H captures the idea that this variable will
fall (rise) if a deterioration (improvement) of present conditions is expected.
Let us for instance consider the upswing period of a cycle. Investors who
are optimistically minded should expect confidence to increase more or less
steadily. Conversely, after the crisis, during the downswing period, investors
should expect confidence to decrease. However, as noticed by Boyd and
Blatt (1988), as time goes on, " the memory of the last panic becomes less
vivid, and investors become more willing to look farther into the future
with confidence that their predictions and expectations will be met " (p.
65), bringing about a reversal of opinion. 6.
From equations (17)-(18)-(19) a unique stationary state can easily be
derived. We obtain the following result:
5We can for instance specify this function as follows: H(X) = (hX2 + 82 X,
with (h < 0 and (h > O.
6 A complementary approach consists, in line with Kalecki (1937) and Minsky,
in taking into account the role of increasing risk and of financial fragility. As
noticed by Franke and Semmler (1991), this risk embodied in a function of the
debt capital ratio DjK exerts negative effects on the state of confidence. Thus,
in that case we have H~ < O.
156
Assume that M > SP(i*) where i* refers to the market interest rote
evaluated at the stationary state. System (18) (19) then has a unique strictly
positive stationary point E = (K*, D*, X*). We obtain:
K* -- -lv(SP(i*)-M)
kw(l+m) ,
D* -- f*K were
h f -- /3m1"
lvi' X -- X*7
Proof:
- On the one hand, it is clear that iJ = 0 implies A = O. Hence, D* = tjJK,
with
tjJ = (3,m~.
v.
At the stationary point, the debt/capital ratio, D/K, is
constant and equal to tjJ.
- On the other hand, k = 0 implies :b
A = r e -i. Thus, at the stationary
point we have r - i = 0, the expected profit rate is equal to the market
e
rate. Consequently, r e = R(f, X*) = i*. Now, the equilibrium condition in
the money market implies:
[Proof:
The model admits complex roots if: (Ji1 - J 22 )2 + 4J21 Ji2 < 0
Replacing the element of the Jacobian matrix by their respective values
evaluated at the stationary state given in Annex 2, we obtain : (Ji1 -
J22 )2 = (C2R~* + C3)2 ¢:} 4J21 Ji2 = 4( C4R~* + C5 )
where coefficients C2, C3, C4, C5 are the following:
C2 = IVW~~;~:» < 0
C3 = i (b - 1) (1 - S;'{iO)) + bi </> - ~~:~/ti':))
c -
4 -
(b-1)ak(l+m)¢
Iv(M-SP(i*))
>0
C5 = i(b - l)((b - 1)a - b)</>
Then, complex roots exist if:
C22R~*2 + (2C2C3 + 4C4)R~* + (C32 + 4C5 ) < 0
Assume now that C32 + 4C5 < 0, we obtain:
R' R!.... = -(C2C3+2C4)±v'(C2C3+2C.)-C2(C3+4C5)
£'
4,
d C2
Consequently, the model has two complex roots if R < R~ < ~,.J
We then make two assumptions related to the banking rate, i , and on
the state of confidence, X, in a neighbourhood of the stationary state which
ensure the existence of a Hopf bifurcation from the left.
Assumption 1
We suppose that r > i . The bank rate i charged by banks is lower than
the actual profit rate r:
(22)
Assumption 2
In a neighbourhood of the stationary state, we have H'; # O. We
assume moreover that H'; # O. That around the stationary state, the
state of confidence is sensitive to small perturbations in opinion, but a
feedback effect prevails. Thus, assumption 2 means that fluctuations in the
psychological variable are not the main destabilizing factor in the model. 8
Under assumptions 1 and 2 we obtain the following result.
[Proof:
8It is obvious that this condition is true when the function H(X) is specified
as in note 3 above.
158
4 Concluding remarks
5 Appendix
Annex 1
Annex 2
References
[1] ARENA R. and RAYBAUT A. (1995), "Cycles et croissance, un point
de vue ne o-kaldorien", Revue Economique, Nov-Dec.
[2] ASADA T. and SEMMLER W. (1992), "Growth, Finance and Cy-
cles", Working paper New School for Social Research, New York.
[3] BOYD I. and BLATT J.M. (1988), Investment, Confidence and Busi-
ness Cycles, Springer Verlag.
[4] CAMINATI M. (1989), "Cyclical Growth and Long-Term Prospects",
Political Economy, Vol. 5 N° 2 p.107.
[5] DELLI GATTI D., GARDIN! L. and GALLEGATI M. (1993), "In-
vestment Confidence, Corporate Debt and Income Fluctuations",
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 22, October, p.154-
161.
[6] FRANKE R. (1992), "Stable, Unstable, and Persist ant Cyclical Be-
haviour in a Keynes-Wicksell Monetary Growth Model", Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers, 44, p.242-56.
[7] FRANKE R. and SEMMLER W. (1991), "Expectations, Dynamics,
Financing and Business Cycles. ", in Profits, Deficits and Instability
edited by D.B Papadimitriou MacMillan
[8] GALEGATI M. and GARDIN! L. (1991), "A Non Linear Model of
Business Cycles with Money and Finance", Metroeconomica, Vol 42
N° 1 p.l
[9] GUCKENHEIMER J. and HOLMES P. (1986), Non Linear Oscilla-
tions Dynamical Systems and Bifurcations of Vector Fields, Springer
Verlag
[10] JARSULIC M. (1993), "Complex Dynamics in a Keynesian Growth
Model ", Metroeconomica, Vol. 44 Fev. p. 43.
[11] KALECKI M. (1937a), "A theory of the Business Cycle", Review of
Economic Studies, Feb. p. 77.
[12] KALECKI M. (1937b), " The Principle of Increasing Risk", Econo-
metrica, Nov p. 441.
[13] KEYNES J.M. (1930), A Treatise on Money, Vol 1 et 2, in The
Collected Writings, vol 5 and 6, MacMillan 1971.
161
Methodological Issues
Business Cycles, Chaos and
Predictability
Alfredo MEDIO l
those events directly change only agents' expectations. The latter case has been
extensively studied in recent years in the economic literature under the label
"sunspots" .
167
3Even when the outcome is periodic, however, if the periodicity is long and
the time path very complicated, one may question the idea that well-informed
real economic agents would actually forecast it correctly: all the more so if the
outcome is quasi periodic, possibly with a large number of incommensurable
frequencies.
168
of r for which we can prove this claim rigorously is 4. The reason for this
result is that - when r = 4 - map (2) can be trasformed into a even simpler
equivalent map. Introducing the invertible change of co-ordinates
A formidable result originally due to Ulam and von Neumann shows that
this transformation preserves most dynamical properties of the map. In par-
ticular, it preserves certain properties that charaCterizes chaotic behaviour
such as the Lyapunov characteristic exponent and metric entropy4.
Since map (4) is semilinear and therefore easy to study, we shall concen-
trate our discussion on it, knowing that the basic results of the investigation
can be referred back to the more "realistic" map (2).
In our previous intuitive discussion of chaos, we came to the conclusion
that from the economic point of view, the fundamental characterization
of chaotic dynamics is the lack of predictability, even when the rule that
governs the dynamics is known exactly - i.e., when we assume that the
theoretical model is the "true" model.
In order to provide a more rigorous discussion of this point, we must
first of all clarify a preliminary question. If a dynamical model - a map
or a system of ordinary differential equation - is known and the state of
the system at each instant of time can be measured with absolute precision,
there is nothing left to discuss. Well-known mathematical results guarantee
that, under very general conditions, the future time evolution of the system
is also known exactly.
Absolute precision of measurement, however, is a mathematical expres-
sion without empirical content. To be convinced of that, consider the fol-
lowing proposition: "The length of this rod is 7r centimeters." A moment's
reflection will suggest that there is no way to prove that the proposition
is true. All we can prove is a different proposition such as: "The length of
this rod is between 3 and 4 cm. (or between 3.1 and 3.2 cm., or between
3.14 and 3.15", and so on and so forth)", where points on the real line
are replaced by intervals which are the smaller the greater is the (finite)
precision of our measuring device.
Although in economic models we routinely assume that the relevant
quantities are represented by real numbers (i.e., numbers typically iden-
tified by an infinite number of decimals), the quantities about which real
4For a discussion of this point, see, for example, Ruelle, 1989, pp. 40-43.
171
A1 f.Z 1
Figure 1. The Lebesgue measure m is preserved by the tent map T. Since
T-l(A) = Al U A2 and m(Al) = m(A2) = ~m(A), m(T- 1 (A)) = m(A).
172
LLRLRRRL ...
Our final goal is to verify the (un)predictability of this (partitioned)
dynamics. To do this, we must preliminarly change our perspective a take
a probabilistic point of view. Let us consider a single iteration of the map
on the partition P, as an experiment whose outcome is uncertain (it could
be L or R) and let us try to evaluate the amount of uncertainty concerning
the outcome (before the experiment), or, equivalently, the amount of
information provided by the experiment (after it). We can do this by means
of a formula known as "Shannon entropy" after the name of one of the
founders of the modern theory of information. If ~ is a random variable
taking a finite number N of values with probabilities PI. ... ,PN, then the
entropy of ~ is
N
H(~) = - LPi log(Pi) (5)
i=1
SIn the present context, whether the middle point x = 1/2 belongs to L or R
does not matter.
6These are the so-called "Khinchin axioms", see Khinchin (1957).
173
(6)
7In equation (6), we make use of the pre-image of the map T to take into
account the case in which T is non-invertible. If T is invertible, (6) can be
equivalently written as J.£(T(Ii )) = J.£(Ii).
174
112+-_~--+_--\
T-l(L) n R = RR
and
T-l(R) n L = LR T-l(R) n R = RL
It follows that the partition P l consists of the four cells LL, LR, RL, RR
each of (normalized) length 1/4 and therefore of Lebesgue measure 1/4.
Consequently, we have
(7)
By replicating the procedure just described, we can verify that partition (7)
consists of 2n cells, each of them corresponding to a sub-interval of length
175
Finally let us know consider the limit for n --+ 00 (i.e., when the number
of oservations becomes arbitrarily large) of the average uncertainty (=the
average gain in performing just another observation). We shall have
1 n 1
h(Po,m) = lim -H(V T-ipo) = lim _[_2n)Tn log(Tn)] = log 2
n---l>OC> n n---l>oo n
i=O
(8)
For any given map, the quantity defined by equation (8) depends on the
invariant measure m and on the partition Po. Let us now consider all
possible partitions of our state space, evaluate the entropy of each of them,
and find the largest one. We shall then write
(10)
i=O
The cells of that "super-partition" can be interpreted as sequences of the
symbols Land R of length n. Its entropy (i.e., its uncertainty) depends on
two factors: (i) the number of cells, namely the number of possible n-orbits8
of the system on the partitioned space L, Rj and (ii) the probability (with
respect to the invariant measure m) of each n-orbit.
It is clear that, for systems characterized by simple dynamics (e.g., orbits
tending to a fixed point, or to a periodic solution), once transients have died
out, the number of orbits with non-zero probability does not grow at all,
and entropy must be zero. Broadly speaking this means that observers of
the system will have no "surprises" and their prediction of the future course
of the system will be correct (within the prescribed approximation).
It is also clear from the definition of Shannon entropy that the limit
of the fraction (8) will be zero whenever the number of possible n-orbits
increases less than exponentially. This happens, for example, in the often
misunderstood case of quasi-periodic dynamics. In this case, the number
of possible (non-zero probability) sequences is not constant but grows at
a less than exponential rate. Consequently, their metric entropy is zero,
uncertainty disappears asymptotically and prediction is possible.
In chaotic systems, on the contrary, entropy (8) is positive since the
number of possible orbits N(n) grows exponentially. This can be easily
seen in the simple case of the "tent" map. For this purpose, consider that,
in this case the probability of each n-orbit (i.e., the probability of each cell
of partition V~=O T-lpO) is the same and equal Nlnj' The Shannon entropy
of the partition is consequently equal to
But this is not all. In fact, not all unpredictable (positive entropy)
systems are equally unpredictable. Whereas zero entropy implies that the
dynamics of a system is predictable with regards to any possible finite
partition, positive entropy simply means that the system is unpredictable
with regards to at least one partition. As we shall see in a moment, however,
there exist systems which are totally unpredictable in the sense that
they are unpredictable for any possible partition. Among these systems,
furthermore, there exists a special class called Bernoulli, which is the
"most chaotic" , or the "least predictable" of all.
Bernoulli deterministic systems are fundamental in at least two ways.
First of all, they are the essence of chaotic systems in the sense that for
any chaotic (positive entropy) system, there is at least one partition of the
state space on which its dynamics is isomorphic to a Bernoulli shift. This
property is sometimes described by saying that all chaotic (positve entropy)
systems must have a Bernoulli "factor". On the other hand, all factors of
a Bernoulli system are Bernoulli.
Secondly, the output of deterministic Bernoulli systems cannot be dis-
tinguished from that of certain stochastic processes. We shall return to this
point in a moment.
178
Keeping to the general tenor of this paper, we shall not discuss these
issues in their most general and abstract way. We shall instead try to
convey the basic idea of a "Bernoulli system" by means of the simplest
example. In so doing, we shall show that the "tent" (and the logistic map)
are indeed Bernoulli.
Let us consider again the partitioned state space E2 consisting of just
two elements L and R. Let us now construct an auxiliary state space whose
points consist of sequences of those symbols. We can now define a map a
on E2 in the following way: take a given, bilaterally infinite sequence of the
two symbols L, R and shift it one step to the left, thus:
(i) Before the shift:
... LRLLLRRLL.RRRLRLRRR . ..
(where the arbitrary "decimal point" is introduced only for the sake of
presentation). The map a acting on the space E2 in the manner indicated
above is called "shift map".
Suppose now that the probability assigned to the elements Land R of
the L, R space is, say, PL = PR = 1/2 and consider the measure J-£u that
assigns to each finite sequence of L, R a probability equal to the product
of the probability of each element of the sequence. Clearly, J-£u is invariant
with respect to a. We now have a dynamical system (E2, a, J-£u), defined by
a state space, a map and a probability measure invariant with respect to
that map.
Analogous definitions are used for one-sided sequences. In this case, the
space i;2 is the space of (one-sided) sequences of L, R and the map a- acts
by shifting the sequence one step to the left and dropping the first element
of the sequence. In this case, the (one-sided) "shift map" will act as follows.
(i) Before the shift:
.RRRLRLRRR . ..
(ii) Mter the shift:
.RRLRLRRR(Lor R) ...
[0,1] T [0,1]
hl 1h
f;2 f;2
provide a full discussion of this question here. In line with the strategy of
this paper, we shall instead illustrate the main idea by means of a simple
application to the tent map, referring the reader to the relevant literature
(see Ornstein and Weiss, 1991; Radunskaya, 1992) for a more rigorous and
general discussion and proofs.
For the tent map, and for a given partition of the state space I = [0, 1],
we can define a Markov chain on k states (the number of states depending
on the partition), such that its sample paths are indistinguishable (within
the prescribed resolution, or precision of observation) from the orbits of the
deterministic tent map9. For example, if the partition is {L,R}, i.e., if we
can only tell whether the state of the system is on the left or on the right
of the middle point of the state space [0,1]' then a Markov chain on two
states Land R, with transition matrix
(12)
o 0 1/2 1/2 o o
1/2 1/2 o 0 o o
Again it will not be possible (within the prescribed precision) to distin-
guish between a typical sample path of the Markov chain and an orbit of
the tent map on the 2k -partitioned state space.
The same exercise could be performed in relation to the "logistic" map
with chaotic parameter, although in that case the construction of the
transition matrix would be more difficult.
6 Conclusion
The implications for economics of the results just obtained are puzzling.
For example, consider the case in which a model of optimal growth gives
References
[1] Benhabib, J. and Day, R.H. (1981). Rational choice and erratic be-
haviour. Review of Economic Studies, 48, 459-47l.
1 Introduction
Is it possible to study jointly long-term memory processes and chaotic pro-
cesses? In a first sight, this interrogation can appear somewhat surprising
because of the properties showed by the two kinds of processes. Effectively,
a long-term memory process, like an ARFIMA process, is a stochastic one,
while a chaotic process is by definition a deterministic one. However, this
question finds its origins in recent works of Peters (1991, 1994) setting
number of relations between the two processes. On the one hand, Peters
showed that long-term memory and chaos concepts can be linked by the
mean of the fractal dimension: "Fractal time series are characterized as
long memory processes. They possess cycles and trends, and are the result
of a nonlinear dynamic system, or deterministic chaos" (Peters, 1991, p.
119). In this way, a long-term memory process would be a process whose
attractor has a fractal dimension. We can thus think that the link between
fractal dimension and chaos might be set by the mean of the concept of
strange attractor. However, we will show that this relation is useless in order
to detect the presence of chaotic dynamics. On the other hand, according
to Peters, long-term memory can be equivalently detected by Rj S analysis
and Lyapunov exponents since there exist nonperiodic cycles for the two
processes: "The long memory effect in equity prices has now been confirmed
by two separate types of nonlinear analysis. RIS analysis on monthly S&P
500 stock returns found a biased random walk with a memory length about
four years. The Lyapunov exponent for monthly inftation-detrended S&P
500 prices found a 42-month cycle" (Peters, 1991, p. 180).
This note proposes a critical study of links established by Peters (1991,
1994) between chaotic and long-term memory processes. To this end, after
having presented definitions of the main concepts concerning long-term
memory and chaos, we study the relations between the two notions. We
show that these links are only superficial and erroneous.
186
where
t::.BH(t) = BH (t2) - BH (tt) t::.t = t2 - t1
This relationship illustrates the self-affinity property of fractional Brownian
motion. In other words, this kind of process is statistically self-affine in the
sense that {B H (rt), t 2:: o} has the same finite dimensional distribution as
{rHBH(t),t ~ o} for all r 2:: 0 1
From the covariance function of fractional Brownian motion, we can
derive the correlation between observations separated by a very long time
span as:
C = 22H - 1 -1
In this sense, fractional Brownian motion is a long-term memory process.
Actually, we know that, in the case of a short-term memory process, the
correlation goes to zero when the distance between the two points under
consideration goes to infinity. In the case of fractional Brownian motion,
this correlation tends to 22H -1 - 1 1=0 if H 1= ~. From this correlation, it
is possible to classify time series according to their dependence structure:
• when H = !, fractional Brownian motion reduces to ordinary Brownian
motion. The correlation C is null and the process does not exhibit long-term
memory phenomenon.
• when! < H < 1, the correlation C is positive. The process displays
long-term memory and exhibits the persistence phenomenon.
• when 0 < H < !, the correlation C is negative. The process is anti-
persistent.
Economic time series are typically discrete time series. Hence, in order to
model these series by a long-term memory process, it is necessary to derive
a discrete time analogue of continuous time fractional Brownian motion.
This is accomplished with the discrete time fractional Gaussian noise and
ARFIMA processes.
INote that self-affinity is different from self-similarity although the two notions
are widely assimilated in the literature. Unlike self-similar curves, a self-affine
process (like the fractional Brownian motion) requires different scaling factors in
the two coordinates: r for t, but rH for BH(t) reflecting the special status of the t
coordinate. Each t correspond to only one value of BH but any specific BH may
occur at multiple t's. Such non-uniform scaling is known as self-affinity rather
than self-similarity.
189
and
lim k 2- 2H ,(k) = H(2H -1)
k-+oo
2Recall that its autocorrelation function is the same as whose of the fractional
Brownian motion in first differences.
3 A long-term memory process can always be approximated by an ARMA(p, q)
process, but the orders p and q necessary to obtain a relatively good approxima-
tion can be too great and render parameters estimation very difficult.
190
ARFIMA processes, d can take real values and not only integer ones. The
case of a non-integer differencing parameter is important in terms of long-
term memory. In ARMA(p, q) processes, d = 0, and refers to a time series
which has zero (or short-term) memory. In ARIMA(p, d, q) processes, dis
typically equal to one and refers to infinite memory. Thus the intermediate
case, that is d fractional, is ignored. Typically, the class of ARFIMA
processes can be used to model data dependence which is stronger than
allowed in stationary ARMA processes and weaker than implied by unit
root processes.
ARFIMA(O, d, 0) process
The analogous in discrete time of Brownian motion is the random walk
or ARIMA(O, 1,0):
{l-L)X t =Ut
where Ut is an independently and identically distributed (iid) variable. Thus
the first difference of X t is the white noise Ut in discrete time. By analogy,
one defines the fractional white noise of parameter d by:
where Ut is a white noise and (1- L)d is given by the binomial expansion:
where
and
10
00 fI:-le-tdt
if x > °
°
°
r(x) = 00 ifx=
x- 1r(1 + x) if x <
Such a defined process is called ARFIMA{O, d, 0). As the properties of
this model have been widely studied by Hosking (1981), we just synthesized
here his main results.
Let {Xt, t = 0, 1, ... } be an ARFIMA{O, d, 0) process. Then:
(i) When d < ~, {Xt} is stationary
(ii) When d > -~, {Xt} is invertible.
Hence, the {Xt } process is stationary and invertible only if -~ < d < ~.
The autocorrelation function decreases at an hyperbolic rate, thus much
slower than the simple ARMA autocorrelation function (which decreases at
a geometric rate). Because of this property, ARFIMA processes are called
long-term memory processes.
191
r(l - 2d)r(k + d)
-y(k) = r(d)r(l _ d)r(k + 1 - d)
where:
ft = V'-d Ut
Ut : W N(O, 0'2)
<I>(L) and 8(L) are lag polynomials of p and q degrees respectively.
Hence,
with
d(d + 1) d(d + l)(d + 2)
ft = Ut + dUt-t + 2! Ut-2 + 3! Ut-3 + ...
As in the case of ARFIMA(O, d, 0) processes, ARFIMA(p, d, q) processes
are long-term memory, stationary, and invertible when dE] -~, H and
d FO.
Relationship between Hurst exponent and fractional differencing parameter
Chaotic processes
Introduction: Non-linearity and determinism
For /1- > 3 there are cyclic solutions. The system goes through an infinite
number of period-doublings: stable cycles of length 2, 4, 8, 16, ... , 2n
,... successively appear and become unstable. This sequence continues
until a limit point /1-00 which is approximately equal to 3.57. At this
point the system behaves in a very complex manner. We can illustrate
some properties of this equation by plotting the bifurcation diagram4
(see Abraham-Frois and Berrebi (1995)). For values of /1- between 3.57
and 4, the bifurcation diagram exhibits black bands which correspond to
chaos separated by windows. In these windows, odd-order cycles arise. For
example, for 3.828 ... < /1- < 3.849 ... a stable cycle of period 3 emerges. It
is successively replaced by stable cycles of period 6, 12, ... , 3.2n , ... These
bifurcations accumulate at a limit point where the behavior is similar to
that at /1-00. This is generally referred to as order within chaos: chaotic
systems have an underlying order. Moreover, a further property of the
logistic equation is that if any window is magnified, the diagram displays
an exact copy of the complete diagram. This illustrates the self-similarity
characteristic of the logistic map. For Peters (1991, 1994) this characteristic
illustrates the fact that there exist a link between fractals and chaos. A
further property of chaotic systems concerns the presence of an attractor.
Definition:
SIn general, a fractal object is an object for which the Hausdorff dimension is
different from the topological dimension, and usually not an integer. Moreover,
fractal objects are self-similar.
BSee Grebogi, Ott, Pelikan and Yorke (1984).
7 Arnold's cat attractor is chaotic, but not fractal, see Eckmann and Ruelle
(1985).
195
for various series of exchange rates, stock returns and macroeconomic series
which illustrate the random character of this parameter: these procedures
(Geweke and Porter-Hudak, exact maximum likelihood, R/S analysis ... )
do not always detect long-term memory in same series, and the signs of d
are sometimes opposite (table 1).
This table relates the estimation of d according to R/ S analysis, modified
R/ S analysis (Lo, 1991), Geweke and Porter-Hudak method, and Sowell
procedure (exact maximum likelihood). Real monthly data in logarithmic
first differences, January 1974-November 1994. In brackets: t-value of d.
This table leads us to a second remark: is the relation between d and H
empirically verified? If we accept this relation from a theoretical point of
view, it seems somewhat unreasonable to use it empirically. This conclusion
directly comes from our previous remark: being not able to determine a
unique estimated value of d, how to determine a unique relation between d
and H? Table 1 illustrates this difficulty: the use of the theoretical relation
d = H - ~ gives estimations of d which are very different from these
obtained by using other methods.
Nevertheless, the dimension obtained by the relation D = 2 - H is the
dimension of a stochastic process, such as an ARFIMA process. Thus, it
cannot be the dimension of a chaotic process (or of its attractor) which is, by
definition, a deterministic process. Moreover, it should be pointed out that
the dimension given by the relation D = 2 - H is the dimension of a time
path, i.e. a time series, and not the dimension of an attractor. Effectively,
the dimension of a time series is between 1 et 2 whereas the dimension of an
attractor can be more important. Thus, the use of the relation D = 2 - H
is useless if the object under study is the calculation of a dimension of a
chaotic attractor. Moreover, we have previously mentioned that a chaotic
attractor is not necessarily an attractor with fractal dimension. Thus,
finding a fractional dimension is not enough to conclude in terms of chaotic
dynamics 9 .
As a consequence, if, as suggested by Peters (1991, 1994), there exist
a link between long-term memory and chaotic processes, this link cannot
be set through the relation D = 2 - H. A second relation between long
memory and chaos has been established by Peters by the mean of R/ S
analysis and Lyapunov exponents.
9See the previous distinction between strange attractor and chaotic attractor.
198
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