TITLE: CALTEX (PHIL.), INC. V.

PALOMAR
G.R. NO. 19650 DATE: September 29, 1966
PONENTE: NATURE:
FACTS:
Petitioner conceived the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” where participants have to estimate the actual number of
liters a hooded gas pump can dispense during a specific period of time. There was no fee or consideration required
to be paid, nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join the contest. Foreseeing the extensive
use of mail for advertising and communications, Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster General but
was denied citing said contest is a “gift enterprise” deemed as a non-mailable matter under the anti-lottery provisions
of the Postal Law. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief.
ISSUE/S:
W/N the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” falls under the term “gift enterprise” which is banned by the Postal Law.
DOCTRINES | HELD:
Doctrine: Construction is defined as the “art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of
the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, among
others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law”. It applies in this case in
how the ponencia examined the meaning of “lottery” to come to a conclusion. Specifically, it applied when the court
looked into what lottery meant: consideration, prize, and chance. This allowed for a decisive interpretation of the
word in question.
RULING:
No, said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word “lottery” is defined as a game of chance where the elements of
which are (1) consideration, (2) chance, and (3) prize. The term “gift enterprise” and “scheme” in the provision of
the Postal Law making unmailable “any lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money or any real
or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind” means such enterprise as will require consideration as
an element. The intent of the prohibition is to suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt
public morals. There being no element of consideration in said contest, the spirit of the law is preserved.
NOTES:
1. Definition of Statutory Construction

1
MANILA LODGE NO. 761, BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE ORDER OF THE ELKS,
INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF MANILA, and
TARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-41001. September 30, 1976.]

CASTRO, J p: NATURE: NATURE AND PURPOSE

FACTS:
On June 26, 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1360 which
authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area
was to form part of the Luneta extension. The Act provided that the reclaimed area
"shall be the property of the City of Manila" and that "the City of Manila is hereby
authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land formed by the Luneta extension
. . . at the north end not to exceed �ve hundred feet by six hundred feet in size, for a
hotel site, and to lease the same, with the approval of the Governor General, to a
responsible person or corporation for a term not to exceed ninety-ninety years."
Subsequently, the Philippine Commission passed on May 18, 1907 Act No. 1657,
amending Act No. 1360, so as to authorize the City of Manila either to lease or to sell
the portion set aside as a hotel site. The total area reclaimed was a little over 25
hectares. The City of Manila applied for the registration of the reclaimed area, and
on January 20, 1911, O.C.T. No. 1909 was issued in the name of the City of Manila.
For the remainder of the Luneta Extension, that is, after segregating therefrom the
portion sold to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, a new Certi�cate of Title No. 2196 3
was issued on July 17, 1911 to the City of Manila.

Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, subsequently sold the said 5,543.07 square meters to
the Elks Club, Inc., to which was issued TCT No. 67488. 4 The registered owner, "The
Elks Club, Inc.," was later changed by court order to "Manila Lodge No. 761,
Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Inc."

The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1360 which authorized the City of
Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. Subsequently Act No. 1657 amended the
former act which states that the City of Manila was authorized to sell or lease the set
aside for hotel site. The City of Manila sells the land to Manila Lodge No. 761 then
the latter sold the land to Tarlac Development Corporation. The City of Manila filed a
petition for re-annotation of its right to repurchased. The TDC then filed a complaint
that the City of Manila was estopped from repurchasing the property.

The Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, contends, in its petition for review on certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. L-41001, that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) disregarding the
very enabling acts and/or statutes according to which the subject property was, and
still is, patrimonial property of the City of Manila and could therefore be sold and/or
disposed of like any other private property; and (2) in departing from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings when it simply made a general a�rmance of
the court a quo's �ndings and conclusions without bothering to discuss or resolve
several vital points stressed by the BPOE in its assigned errors.
ISSUE/S:
WON Court of Appeals did not correctly interpret Act No. 1360, as amended by Act
No. 1657, of the Philippine Commission
DOCTRINES | HELD:

RULING:
It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must give effect to the
general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four
corners of the statute, and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and
not only a particular provision thereof, should be considered. It is, therefore,
necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to
unravel the legislative intent.
The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant
of a "public" nature, the same having been made to a local political subdivision. Such
grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee. 33 One compelling
reason given for the strict interpretation of a public grant is that there is in such
grant a gratuitous donation of, public money or resources which results in an unfair
advantage to the grantee and for that reason, the grant should be narrowly
restricted in favor of the public. 34 This reason for strict interpretation obtains
relative to the aforesaid grant for although the City of Manila was to pay for the
construction of such work and timber bulkheads or sea walls as may be necessary
for the making of the Luneta extension, the area to be reclaimed would be �lled at
the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila, with
material dredged from Manila Bay. Hence, the letter of the statute should be
narrowed to exclude matters which if included would defeat the policy of the
legislation.

The reclaimed area, an extension to the Luneta, is declared to be property of the City
of Manila. Property, however, is either of public ownership or of private ownership.
35 What kind of property of the City is the reclaimed land? Is it of public ownership
(dominion) or of private ownership? We hold that it is of public dominion, intended
for public use.
Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or sale of the northern portion of the
reclaimed area as a hotel site. The subject property is not that northern portion
authorized to be leased or sold; the subject property is the southern portion. Hence,
applying the rule of expresio unius est exlusio alterius, the City of Manila was not
authorized to sell the subject property. The application of this principle of statutory
construction becomes the more imperative in the case at bar inasmuch as not only
must the public grant of the reclaimed area to the City of Manila be, as above stated,
strictly construed against the City of Manila, but also because a grant of power to a
municipal corporation, as happens in this case where the city is authorized to lease
or sell the northern portion of the Luneta extension, is strictly limited to such as are
expressly or impliedly authorized or necessarily incidental to the objectives of the
corporation.
It is not necessary, therefore, that a plaza be already construed or laid out as a plaza
in order that it be considered property for public use. It is su�cient that it be
intended to be such. In the case at bar, it has been shown that the intention of the
lawmaking body in giving to the City of Manila the extension to the Luneta was not a
grant to it of patrimonial property but a grant for public use as a plaza.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions in both G.R. Nos. L-41001 and L-41012 are denied for
lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of June 30, 1975, is hereby
affirmed, at petitioners' cost.
NOTES:
PEOPLE V. CONCEPCION, G.R. NO. L-19190, NOVEMBER 29, 1922
November 29, 1922


FACTS:
By telegrams and a letter of confirmation to the manager of the Aparri branch of the Philippine National Bank,
Venancio Conception, President of the Philippine National Bank, between April 10, 1919, and May 7, 1919,
authorized an extension of credit in favor of "Puno y Conception, S. en C." in the amount of P300,000.
The said firm is a co-partnership whereby the wife of the defendant is a member of. The notes, together with the
interest, were taken up and paid by July 17, 1919.
Section 35 of Act No. 2747, effective on February 20, 1918, just mentioned, to which reference must hereafter
repeatedly be made, reads as follows: "The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of
the members of the board of directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks." Section 49 of the same Act
provides: "Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished by a fine not to
exceed ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not to exceed five years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment." These two sections were in effect in 1919 when the alleged unlawful acts took place, but were
repealed by Act No. 2938, approved on January 30, 1921.
The Court of First Instance Cagayan charged the defendant with a violation of Section 35 of Act No. 2747.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. 2747, which were repealed by
Act No. 2938.
DOCTRINES | HELD:

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance Cagayan that the defendant is
proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. It is hereby shown by the acknowledged fact that in this instance the
defendant was tempted to mingle his personal and family affairs with his official duties, and to permit the loan
of P300,000 to a partnership of no established reputation and without asking for collateral security. Regardless if
the section 35 and section 49 Act No. 2747 were repealed by Act No. 2938, prior to the filing of the information
and the rendition of the judgment, it has been declared that “Where an Act of the Legislature which penalizes an
offense repeals a former Act which penalized the same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter
depriving the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old
law.” The doing of the inhabited act, inhibited on account of public policy and public interest, constitutes the
crime.
NOTES:
1. BANKS AND BANKING; "CREDIT AND LOAN." DEFINED AND DISTINGUISHED. — The "credit" of
an individual means his ability to borrow money by virtue of the con7dence or trust reposed by a lender that he
will pay what he may promise. A "loan" means the delivery by one party and the receipt by the other party of a
given sum of money, upon an agreement, expresses or implied, to repay the sum loaned, with or without
interest. The concession of a "credit" necessarily involves the granting of "loans" up to the limit of the amount
fixed in the "credit."
2. ID.' "LOAN" AND "DISCOUNT" DISTINGUISHED. — To discount a paper is a mode of loaning money,
with these distinctions: (1) In a discount, interest is deducted in advanced, while in a loan, interest is taken at the
expiration of a credit; (2) a discount is always on double-name paper; a loan is generally on single name paper.

1
TITLE: FEDERATION OF FREE FARMERS, MELQUIADES BETIOS, CRESENCIANO FERNANDEZ,
SANCHO PEREZ and AGATON POSA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., VICTORIAS MILL DISTRICT PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION,
INC., and, ALL SUGARCANE PLANTERS OF SUGARCANE PLANTATIONS SITUATED IN THE
VICTORIAS MILLING DISTRICT, WHO HAVE AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER, SINCE JUNE 22, 1952,
MILLED THEIR SUGARCANE IN THE MILL OF VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., respondents.
G.R. NO. [L-41161] DATE: [September 10, 1981.]
PONENTE: BARREDO, J NATURE: Constitutionality, legislative intent, legislative
purpose & legislative meaning.

FACTS:

Four separate petitions of the respective parties concerned for the review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 47298-R, entitled Federation of Free Farmers, et al. vs. Victorias Milling Co., Inc., et al.,
of August 12, 1975. August 12, 1975. the Court of Appeals held that notwithstanding the provisions of the
Sugar Act of 1952, Republic Act 809, that providing of any increase in the share of the proceeds of milled
sugarcane and derivatives obtained by the planters from the centrals in any sugar milling district in the
Philippines, 60% of said increase shall correspond to and should be paid by the planters to their respective
laborers, the laborers of the planters affiliated to the Victorias Milling District who are members of or represented
by the Federation of Free Farmers, one of the petitioners, have not been fully paid their share thus provided by
law, corresponding to crop years 1955 to 1974, in spite of clear evidence in the record showing that the increase
of 4% in the share of the Planters, Victorias Milling District, corresponding to all the years since the enforcement
of the aforementioned Act had already been paid by petitioner Victorias Milling Co., Inc. to said planters. That
even the shares of the laborers corresponding to crop years 1952-1955, when by operation of the Act, the
increase was 10% had not been paid, and the planters of the district and Victorias Milling Co., Inc. are jointly and
severally liable to the said laborers for all said alleged unpaid amounts.

The four parties that involve in the said case namely Federation of Free Farmers (FFF), Planters, the
individual planters Santos and Tikol and lastly Central (Victoria) a milling company.
• The Federation of Free Farmers allegedly that they have not been paid from 1952-53 despite the 10%
increase and from 1953-1974 with the 4% increase. CA ruled planters and Victorias jointly and severally
liable. FFF claimed that Planters and Victorias entered into an agreement when they have no legal right
because the law has already provided the ratio of division.
• Victorias claimed that they should not be held jointly and severally liable. The action filed was not founded
on torts but on either an obligation created by a contract or by law, and even if on torts, the action has
prescribed. They have paid the Planters so the Planters should only be the one sued and is Republic Act
No. 809, otherwise known as the 'Sugar Act of 1952,' constitutional, and did the Court of Agrarian Relations
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the laborers' suit at the time the same was filed on November 9,
1962, which is the starting point of this case.
• The Planters claim they have freedom to stipulate ration as they might agree. And that they have paid the
laborers.
• Individual Planters Santos and Tikol claimed that among the planters in the Victorias District, complain that
the decision of the the Court of Appeals ignored their plea of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over their
persons in spite of their proven claim that they had not been properly served with summons, and that the
portion of said decision holding them jointly and severally liable with VICTORIAS and the PLANTERS to the
latter's laborers for the amounts here in question has no factual and legal basis, considering they were not
1
 parties to the pertinent questioned agreements.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not R.A. 809 is constitutional.
2. Whether or not there was freedom of the centrals and the planters to agree on how they would share the
proceeds of the milled sugarcane, regardless of the ratios specified in Section 1, of the R.A 809 Act.
3. Whether or not the Court of Agrarian Relations has jurisdictions over cases involving between planters and
their workers.
4. Whether or not the liability of the class suit and its propriety is to be shared among others.
DOCTRINES | HELD:
a) Yes, R.A. 809 is constitutional. The court held that R.A. 809, as a social legislation sounded not only on
police power but more importantly on the social welfare mandates of the Constitution, is undoubtedly
constitutional in all its aspects and relevant to the instant cases.
b) Yes, the court held that there is nothing in said law that excludes the right of the parties to enter into new
contracts, and in said new contracts, they could provide for a ratio of sharing different from that stipulated
in Section 1 of the Act, provided that any increase in their share in the proceeds of milling that the
PLANTERS would get, 60% thereof must be paid by them to their respective plantation laborers.
Considering the purpose, the legislative meaning, which is not clearly disclose in the language of the act,
thus indicated, which is to give the laborers a share for as long as sugar is produced, and the planters
receive an increased participation. The legislative intent is, thus, to make the act operative irrespective
whether there exists a milling agreement between the central and sugar planters.
c) Yes, The Court of Agrarian Relations has jurisdiction to such circumstances. The court held that the Court
of Agrarian Relations has jurisdiction over controversies between sugar planters and their plantation
workers. Considering the number of laborers involved, the class suit initiated by the laborers and the
FEDERATION was proper. The court specifically stated “By and large, Sections 1 and 7 of Republic Act
1267, which created the Court of Agrarian Relations, and which was the law at the time of the filing of the
FEDERATION'S suit on November 10, 1962, contemplated the transfer from the Court of Industrial
Relations of all controversies of whatever nature involving agricultural laborers, particularly those referring
to the employer-employee relationship with the respective employers which naturally include the sugar
planters and their plantation workers. Hence, it cannot be said that the trial court, the Court of Agrarian
Relations of Bacolod City, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the vital petition that spawned the instant
cases before Us.”
d) The court held that under the statute, only the PLANTERS, including appellants Primo Santos and Roberto
Tirol, are solidarily liable to the LABORERS for the amounts due them from 1952 to 1973, per their own
admission in their complaint and the extant evidence, however, the LABORERS had already been paid their
share in the 1952-53 to 1954-55 crop years, except for the unpaid balance of P180,679.38 and in all other
respects, the judgment of the Appellate Court should be affirmed insofar as the liability of the PLANTERS
to their laborers are concerned.
RULING:
Judgment affirmed with modifications.

NOTES:
LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; REPUBLIC ACT 809 (SUGAR ACT OF
1952); CONSTITUTIONALITY THEREOF REAFFIRMED IN CASES AT BAR. — Republic Act 809 (Sugar Act of
1952), as a social legislation founded not only on police power but more importantly on the social welfare mandates

2
of the Constitution, is undoubtedly constitutional in all its aspects and relevant to the instant cases. The position of
the Court of Appeals thereon is well studied and discussed and totally correct, being as they are substantially in
line with the pertinent considerations on the same point expressed in the Court's decision in the case of Associacion
de Agricultores de Talisay- Silay, Inc., 88 SCRA 294, which upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 809.

CONNECTION TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: LEGISLATIVE INTENT, LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE &

LEGISLATIVE MEANING.
• LEGISLATIVE INTENT — The intent of the legislature is the law, and the key to, and controlling factor in,
its construction or interpretation. It comprehends the purpose and meaning. It is the vital part the essence
of the law.
• LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE — The reason why a particular statute was enacted by the legislature, why the
statutes should be so construed so as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.
• LEGISLATIVE MEANING — it is what being sought of the legislative intent it is what the law, by its
language, means.

AT THE CASE AT BAR “The purpose of the R.A. 809 is shown it is to compel the continuous production of sugar
and to grant planters’ laborers a share in the increased participation of the planters in the sugar produce.
Considering the purpose, the legislative meaning, which is not clearly disclose in the language of the act, thus
indicated, which is to give the laborers a share for as long as sugar is produced, and the planters receive an
increased participation. The legislative intent is, thus, to make the act operative irrespective whether there exists a
milling agreement between the central and sugar planters.”

3
TITLE: MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC., petitioner and appellant, vs. GAMES AND AMUSEMENTS
BOARD, ET AL., respondents and appellees. PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB, INC., petitioner-intervenor and
appellant.

G.R. NO. L-127127 DATE: FEBRUARY 29, 1960

PONENTE: BARRERA, J. NATURE:
FACTS:
The authorized racing days specifically designated and distributed in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309 the basic
law on horse racing in the Philippines amended by Republic Act No. 983 are as follows:

(1) Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society for 12 Sundays,

(2) Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) - 6 Sundays
(3) White Cross - 4 Sundays
(4) Grand Derby Race of Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society - 1 Sunday
(5) Private Individuals and entities - 29 Sundays.

However, Republic Act No. 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO from 6 to 12 Sundays,
but without specifying the days on which they are to be run. To accommodate these additional races, Games and
Amusements Board (GAB) resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private individuals and entities
by six.

Appellants protested that the said increase should be taken from the 12 Saturdays reserved to the President,
for charitable relief or should be assigned to any day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday and Legal Holiday.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the petitioner has a vested right to the unreserved Sundays.
DOCTRINES | HELD:
In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary written
document, it is not enough to obtain information as to the intention or meaning of the author or authors, but also to
see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity. In
short, the purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what the author meant by the language he used, but also to
see that the language used expresses that meaning. The legal act, so to speak, is made up of two elements — an
internal and an external one; it originates in intention and is perfected by expression. Failure of the latter may
defeat the former.
RULING:
No, the appellant has no vested right to the unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24 Saturdays (except holidays)
because their holding on races for these days are merely permissive, subject to the licensing and determination by
the GAB. When, therefore, Republic Act No. 1502 was enacted increasing by 6 the sweepstakes draw and races
but without specifying the days for holding them, the GAB had no alternative except to make room for the
additional races, as it did, form among the only available racing days unreserved by any law - the Sundays on
which the private individuals and entities have been permitted to hold their races, subject to licensing and
determination by GAB.
NOTES:

1
TITLE: Immaculada Garcia, petitioner vs Social Security Commission Legal and Collection, respondents

G.R. No. 170735 December 17, 2007

PONENTE: NATURE:
FACTS:
Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, Eduardo de Leon, Pacita Fernandez, Consuelo Villanueva were directors
of Impact Corporation. The corporation was engaged in the business of manufacturing aluminum tube
containers and operated two factories. One was a “slug” foundry factory located in Nueva Ecija, while the other
was an extrusion plant in Cainta Rizal.

On May 8, 1985, the Union of Impact Corporation filed a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor.
Subsequently, the Ministry of Labor certified the labor dispute for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). The Ministry of Labor noted the inability of Impact Corporation to pay wages,
13th month pay and SSS remittances due to cash liquidity problems.

On July 3, 1985, the Social Security Commission filed a case for the collection of unremitted SSS Premium
contributions withheld by Impact Corporation from its employees. On December 1, 1995, the SSS filed an
amended petition wherein the directors of Impact Corporation were directly impleaded as respondents. The
amounts sought to be collected with penalties of 3% interest per month from August 1980 – Dec 1984
amounting to 503,787.45 + 2,485,519.67 = 2,989,307.12 pesos.

The petitioner contended that she cannot be made personally liable for the corporate obligations of Impact
Corporation since her liability extended only to the extent of her unpaid subscription. Also in her defense, she
insisted that she was a mere director without managerial function. The petitioner challenges the finding of the
court of appeals that under Sec. 28 of the Social Security Law, a mere director or officer of an employer
corporation, and not necessarily a “managing” director or officer can be held liable for the unpaid SSS premium
contributions.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Immaculada Garcia, is liable to pay the unremitted SSS Premium contributions and
penalties (3% per month from the date of contribution falls due until paid). By the way other directors are dead
(DECEASED), making her the sole surviving director of Impact Corporation.
DOCTRINES | HELD:

RULING:
Yes she is liable to pay, Immaculada L. Garcia as sole surviving director of Impact Corporation is ordered by
the Court of Appeals to pay for the collected and unremitted SSS contributions of Impact Corporation.

It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the
law, a careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. Nowhere
in the provision or in the Decision can it be inferred that the persons liable are absolved from paying the
unremitted premium contributions.

Elementary is the rule that when laws or rules are clear, it is incumbent upon the judge to apply them
regardless of personal belief or predilections - when the law is unambiguous and unequivocal, application not
interpretation thereof is imperative. However, where the language of a statute is vague and ambiguous, an
interpretation thereof is resorted to. An interpretation thereof is necessary in instances where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. A law is deemed ambiguous
when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses.

The situation of petitioner, as a director of Impact Corporation when said corporation failed to remit the SSS
premium contributions falls exactly under the fourth situation. Section 28 of the Social Security Law imposes a
civil liability for any act or omission pertaining to the violation of the Social Security Law:

Sec. 28 If the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an association, partnership, corporation
or any other institution, its managing head, directors or partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in this
Act for the offense.

The case is REMANDED to the SSS for computation of the exact amount and collection thereof.

NOTES:
SEC. 22. Remittance of Contributions.

(a) The contribution imposed in the preceding Section shall be remitted to the SSS within the first ten (10) days
of each calendar month following the month for which they are applicable or within such time as the
Commission may prescribe. Every employer required to deduct and to remit such contributions shall be liable
for their payment and if any contribution is not paid to the SSS as herein prescribed, he shall pay besides the
contribution a penalty thereon of three percent (3%) per month from the date the contribution falls due until
paid. If deemed expedient and advisable by the Commission, the collection and remittance of contributions
shall be made quarterly or semi-annually in advance, the contributions payable by the employees to be
advanced by their respective employers: Provided, That upon separation of an employee, any contribution so
paid in advance but not due shall be credited or refunded to his employer.

SEC. 28. Penal Clause.

(e) Whoever fails or refuses to comply with the provisions promulgated by the Commission, shall be punished
by a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00),
or imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1) day nor more than twelve (12) years, or both, at the
discretion of the court: Provided, That where the violation consists in failure or refusal to register employees or
himself, in case of the covered self-employed or to deduct contributions from employees’ compensation and
remit the same to the SSS, the penalty shall be a fine of not less Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) nor more than
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) and imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1) day nor more
than twelve (12) years.

(f) If the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an association, partnership, corporation or any
other institution, its managing head, directors or partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in this Act for
the offense.
REPUBLIC V. LACAP
G.R. NO. 158253 MARCH 2, 2007
NATURE:
FACTS:
Case is a petition for certiorari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed, with modifications,
ruling by the RTC granting the complaint for Specific Performance and damages filed by Lacap against RP
· Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap and two other
contractors were pre-qualified
· Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain baranggay, and thereafter
undertook the works and purchased materials and labor in connection with
· On Oct 29, 1992, the Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end product and found it
100% completed according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH
· DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved final release of funds due to Lacap’s
license as contractor having expired
· Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng that the Contractors
License Law (RA 4566) does not provide that a contract entered into by a contractor after expiry of license is
void and that there is no law that expressly prohibits or declares void such a contract
· DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Indorsement on July 20 1994 recommending
that payment be made to Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no payment was issued
· On July 3, 1995, respondent filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner
before the RTC.14
· On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did not appeal to the COA the decision of the
District Auditor to disapprove the claim.
· Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,the RTC issued an Order
dated March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but it
was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.
· On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the State
· Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision ordering DPWH to pay Lacap for the
contract of the project, 12% interest from demand until fully paid, and the costs of the suit
CA affirmed the decision but lowered interest to 6%
ISSUE/S:
WON a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects
DOCTRINES | HELD:

RULING:
A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does not exonerate him from
corresponding fines thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
“SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a
bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a
construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of
contracting in this country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence of any
kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an
expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be
sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos. The "plain
meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
1
must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It
does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired.
Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid
for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed
under the law.
NOTES:
Plain meaning rule: Verba Legis. If Statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given it its literal
meaning and applied without its interpretation. The wordings of RA 4561 are clear.

2
NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY V. MASADA SECURITY AGENCY
G.R. NO. 163448 MARCH 8, 2005
NATURE:
FACTS:
● Masada entered into a 1 year contract to provide security services to NFA-REGION 1. Upon the expiration of the
said contract, the parties extended the effectivity thereof on a monthly basis under same terms and condition.

● The Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (RTWPB) issued wage orders mandating increases in the
daily wage rate. Masada requested NFA to increase the of the monthly contract rate[1]. NFA only granted the request
only with respect to the increase in daily wage.

● [1] Consisting of: (1)daily minimum wage of the security guards; (2) overtime pay; (3) holiday pay (4)13th month
pay; (5) holiday and rest day pay; (6) Social Security System [SSS]; (7) Pag-ibig premiums as well as administrative
costs and margin.

● Respondent filed a case for recovery of sum of money against NFA with the RTC.

● NFA CONTENTION: Respondent cannot demand an adjustment on the said salary benefits because it is bound by
their contract expressly limiting NFA’s obligation to pay only the increment in the daily wage.

ISSUE/S:
WON respondent is entitled to recover from NFA wage related benefits of the security guards.

(Supreme Court): WON the liability of principals in service contracts under Section 6 of RA 6727 and the wage orders
issued by the RTWPB is limited only to the increment in the minimum wage.

DOCTRINES | HELD:

RULING:
RTC Ruling: NFA is liable to pay the security guards’ wage related benefits pursuant to RA 6727, because the basis of the
computation of said benefits, like overtime pay, holiday pay, SSS and Pag-ibig premium, is the increased minimum wage. It
also found NFA liable for the consequential adjustments in administrative costs and margin.

NFA appealed to the Court of Appeals but was dismissed

Payment of the increases in the wage rate of workers is ordinarily shouldered by the employer. Section 6 of RA 6727,
however, expressly lodged said obligation to the principals or indirect employers in construction projects and establishments
providing security, janitorial and similar services.
The court found merit in NFA’s contention that its additional liability under the aforecited provision is only limited to the
payment of the increment in the statutory minimum wage rate i.e. the rate for a regular eight (8) hour work day.

Moreover, the law secures the welfare of the workers by imposing a solidary liability on principals and the service
contractors. Under the second sentence of Section 6 of RA 6727, in the event that the principal or client fails to pay the
prescribed wage rates, the service contractor shall be held solidarily liable with the former.

1
The parties therefore acknowledged the application to their contract of the wage orders issued by the RTWPB pursuant to
RA 6727. There being no assumption by NFA of a greater liability than that mandated by Section 6 of the Act, its obligation
is limited to the payment of the increased statutory minimum wage rates which, as admitted by respondent, had already been
satisfied by NFA. Under Article 1231 of the Civil Code, one of the modes of extinguishing an obligation is by payment.
Having discharged its obligation to respondent, NFA no longer have a duty that will give rise to a correlative legal right
of respondent. The latter’s complaint for collection of remuneration and benefits other than the increased minimum
wage rate, should therefore be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 2004 decision and the April 30, 2004 resolution of the Court
of Appeals which dismissed petitioner National Food Authority’s appeal and motion for reconsideration, respectively, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 76677, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by respondent MASADA Security Agency,
Inc., docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-43988, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon, City, Branch 83, is ordered
DISMISSED.

NOTES:
Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. Since the increase in wage referred to in Section 6 pertains to the
“statutory minimum wage” as defined herein, principals in service contracts cannot be made to pay the corresponding wage
increase in the overtime pay, night shift differential, holiday and rest day pay, premium pay and other benefits granted to
workers. While basis of said remuneration and benefits is the statutory minimum wage, the law cannot be unduly expanded
as to include those not stated in the subject provision.

2
Commissioner of Internal Revenue V. American Express International
G.R. NO. 152609 June 29, 2005
Panganiban, J NATURE:
FACTS:
● American Express international is a foreign corporation operating in the Philippines, it is a registered taxpayer.
Also, A VAT Taxpayer is the Philippine Branch of AMEX USA and was tasked with servicing a unit of
AMEXHongkong Branch and facilitating the collections of AMEX-HK receivables from card members situated in
the Philippines and payment to service establishments in the Philippines.

● On April 13, 1999, [respondent] filed with the BIR a letter-request for the refund of its 1997 excess input taxes in the
amount of P3,751,067.04, which amount was arrived at after deducting from its total input VAT paid of
P3,763,060.43 its applied output VAT liabilities only for the third and fourth quarters of 1997 amounting to
P5,193.66 and P6,799.43, respectively. The CTA ruled in favor of the herein respondent holding that its services are
subject to zero-rate pursuant to Section 108(b) of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 and Section 4.102-2

● It filed with BIR a letter-request for the refund of its 1997 excess input taxes, citing as basis Section 110B of the
1997 Tax Code, which held that “xxx Any input tax attributable to the purchase of capital goods or to zero-rated
sales by a VAT-registered person may at his option be refunded or credited against other internal revenue taxes,
subject to the provisions of Section 112.” In addition, respondent relied on VAT Ruling No. 080-89, which read, “In
Reply, please be informed that, as a VAT registered entity whose service is paid for in acceptable foreign currency
which is remitted inwardly to the Philippine and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the
Central Bank of the Philippines, your service income is automatically zero rated xxx” Petitioner claimed, among
others, that the claim for refund should be construed strictly against the claimant as they partake of the nature of tax
exemption. CTA rendered a decision in favor of respondent, holding that its services are subject to zero-rate. CA
affirmed this decision and further held that respondent’s services were “services other than the processing,
manufacturing or repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines” and paid for in
acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP.

ISSUE/S:
W/N the company is subject to zero-rate tax pursuant to the Tax Reform Act of 1997. YES
W/N AMEX Phils is entitled to refund. YES.

DOCTRINES | HELD:

RULING:
First Issue:
YES. As a general rule, the value-added tax (VAT) system uses the destination principle. However, our VAT law itself
provides for a clear exception, under which the supply of service shall be zero-rated when the following requirements are met:
(1) the service is performed in the Philippines; (2) the service falls under any of the categories provided in Section 102(b) of
the Tax Code; and (3) it is paid for in acceptable foreign currency that is accounted for in accordance with the regulations of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Since respondent's services meet these requirements, they are zero-rated. Petitioner's
Revenue Regulations that alter or revoke the above requirements are ultra vires and invalid.
Second Issue:
YES. Section 102 of the Tax Code provides for the VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. Section
102B particularly provides for the services or transactions subject to 0% rate: (1) Processing, manufacturing or repacking goods
for other persons doing business outside the Philippines which goods are subsequently exported, where the services are paid
for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP; (2) Services other
than those mentioned in the preceding subparagraph, e.g. those rendered by hotels and other service establishments, the
consideration for which is paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and
1
regulations of the BSP Under subparagraph 2, services performed by VAT-registered persons in the Philippines (other than the
processing, manufacturing or repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines), when paid in
acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the R&R of BSP, are zero-rated. Respondent renders service
falling under the category of zero rating. As a general rule, the VAT system uses the destination principle as a basis for the
jurisdictional reach of the tax. Goods and services are taxed only in the country where they are consumed. Thus, exports are
zero-rated, while imports are taxed. In the present case, the facilitation of the collection of receivables is different from the
utilization of consumption of the outcome of such service. While the facilitation is done in the Philippines, the consumption is
not. The services rendered by respondent are performed upon its sending to its foreign client the drafts and bulls it has gathered
from service establishments here, and are therefore, services also consumed in the Philippines. Under the destination principle,
such service is subject to 10% VAT. However, the law clearly provides for an exception to the destination principle; that is 0%
VAT rate for services that are performed in the Philippines, “paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in
accordance with the R&R of BSP.” The respondent meets the following requirements for exemption, and thus should be zero-
rated: (1) Service be performed in the Philippines (2) The service fall under any of the categories in Section 102B of the Tax
Code (3) It be paid in acceptable foreign currency accounted for in accordance with BSP R&R.
In the present case, respondent has relied upon VAT Ruling No. 080-89, which clearly recognizes its zero rating.
Changing this status will certainly deprive respondent of a refund of the substantial amount of excess input taxes to which it is
entitled.
Again, assuming arguendo that VAT Ruling No. 040-98 revoked VAT Ruling No. 080-89, such revocation could not
be given retroactive effect if the application of the latter ruling would only be prejudicial to respondent. Section 246 of the Tax
Code categorically declares that "[a]ny revocation . . . of . . . any of the rulings . . . promulgated by the Commissioner shall not
be given retroactive application if the revocation . . . will be prejudicial to the taxpayers."
It is also basic in law that "no . . . rule . . . shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated." No
indication of such retroactive application to respondent does the Court find in VAT Ruling No. 040-98. Neither do the
exceptions enumerated in Section 246 of the Tax Code apply.
Though vested with the power to interpret the provisions of the Tax Code and not bound by predecessors' acts
or rulings, the BIR commissioner may render a different construction to a statute only if the new interpretation is in
congruence with the law. Otherwise, no amount of interpretation can ever revoke, repeal or modify what the law says.

NOTES:
● Interpretation Unnecessary, Section 102 is very clear. No Interpretation is needed. Neither can conditions or
limitations be introduced where none is provided for. Rewriting the law is a forbidden ground that only Congress
may tread on. The court may not construe a statute that is free from doubt, there is no room for interpretation only
for application. The court has no choice but to see that mandate is obeyed.
● "Consumed Abroad" Not Required by Legislature
Interpellations on the subject in the halls of the Senate also reveal a clear intent on the part of the legislators not to
impose the condition of being "consumed abroad" in order for services performed in the Philippines by a VAT-registered
person to be zero-rated
● Ejusdem Generis
The canon of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis or "of the same kind or specie" does not apply to Section
4.102-2(b)(2) of RR 7-95 as amended by RR 5-96.
First, although the regulatory provision contains an enumeration of particular or specific words, followed by the
general phrase "and other similar services," such words do not constitute a readily discernible class and are patently not of the
same kind. Project studies involve investments or marketing; information services focus on data technology; engineering and
architectural designs require creativity. Aside from calling for the exercise or use of mental faculties or perhaps producing
written technical outputs, no common denominator to the exclusion of all others characterizes these three services. Nothing

2
sets them apart from other and similar general services that may involve advertising, computers, consultancy, health care,
management, messengerial work — to name only a few.
Second, there is the regulatory intent to give the general phrase "and other similar services" a broader meaning. Clearly,
the preceding phrase "as well as" is not meant to limit the effect of "and other similar services."
Third, and most important, the statutory provision upon which this regulation is based is by itself not restrictive. The
scope of the word "services" in Section 102(b)(2) of the Tax Code is broad; it is not susceptible of narrow interpretation
● Meaning of "as well as"
Section 4.102-2(b)(2) of RR 7-95 was subsequently amended by RR 5-96 to read as follows:
"Section 4.102-2(b)(2) — 'Services other than processing, manufacturing or repacking for other
persons doing business outside the Philippines for goods which are subsequently exported, as well as
services by a resident to a non-resident foreign client such as project studies, information services,
engineering and architectural designs and other similar services, the consideration for which is paid for in
acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP.'"
Aside from the already scopious coverage of services in Section 4.102-2(b)(2) of RR 7-95, the amendment introduced
by RR 5-96 further enumerates specific services entitled to zero rating. Although superfluous, these sample services are meant
to be merely illustrative. In this provision, the use of the term "as well as" is not restrictive. As a prepositional phrase with an
adverbial relation to some other words, it simply means "in addition to, besides, also or too."
Neither the law nor any of the implementing revenue regulations aforequoted categorically defines or limits the
services that may be sold or exchanged for a fee, remuneration or consideration. Rather, both merely enumerate the items of
service that fall under the term "sale or exchange of services."

3
Morales V. Subido
G.R. NO. L-29658 November 29, 1968
NATURE:
FACTS:
● The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police Department.
He was designated as acting chief of police of Manila when the former chief resigned. He was also
appointed to the same position by the Mayor of Manila.
● Respondent Abelardo Subido, commissioner of the civil service, approved the designation of petitioner as
acting chief but rejected his permanent appointment for “failure to meet the minimum educational and civil
service eligibility requirements for the said position” and instead certified other persons as qualified for the
position to be filled. Subido cites sec. 10 of the Police Act of 1966 (RA 4864).
● Morales asserted that there were various changes made in House Bill 6951, now RA 4864. According him,
the House bill division deleted an entire provision and substituted what is now section 10 of the Police Act
of 1966. He posits that what was approved by the Senate on third reading was the version as amended at
the behest of Senator Rodrigo, not the present version cited by Subido. Morales submitted the certified
photo static copies as evidences of the drafts of the bill. Under the version he presented, he is qualified for
the position, being only a high school graduate who has served the city’s police department for at least
eight years from the rank of captain and/or higher.
● It would thus appear that the Bill was changed during the course of the engrossment of the bill, more
specifically in the proofreading thereof; that the change was made not by Congress but only by an
employee thereof; and that what purportedly was a rewriting to suit some stylistic preferences was in truth
an alteration of meaning. It is for this reason that the petitioner would have the Court look searchingly into
the Journal to solve the matter.
ISSUE/S:
W/N the Petitioner was correct in his petition that the changes in the bill entitles him to be chief of police. NO
DOCTRINES | HELD:
● Enrolled bill Doctrine. The signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive as to its due
enactment.
RULING:
The motions for reconsideration are denied.

At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase "has served as officer in the Armed Forces" was inserted in
the proposed measure. No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's
degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or
police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or
any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed
Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher. It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was
in the nature of an addition to the phrase "who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with
the rank of captain and/or higher," under which the petitioner herein, who is at least a high school graduate (both
parties agree that the petitioner finished the second year of the law course) could possibly qualify. However,
somewhere in the legislative process the phrase ["who has served the police department of a city or"] was dropped
and only the Rodrigo amendment was retained. The present insistence of the petitioner is that the version of the
provision, as amended at the behest of Sen. Rodrigo, was the version approved by the Senate on third reading, and
that when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion
of the phrase "or has served as chief of police with exemplary record". In support of this assertion, the petitioner
submitted documents to prove his contentions: It would thus appear that the omission — whether deliberate or
1
unintended — of the phrase, "who has served the police department of a city or was made not at any stage of the
legislative proceedings but only in the course of the engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the proofreading
thereof; that the change was made not by Congress but only by an employee thereof; and that what purportedly
was a rewriting to suit some stylistic preferences was in truth an alteration of meaning. It is for this reason that the
petitioner would have us look searchingly into the matter. The petitioner wholly misconceives the function of the
judiciary under our system of government. As we observed explicitly in our decision, the enrolled Act in the office
of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute
as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover
what really happened.

The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of
what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise
we would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did
happen in the labyrinth of law-making with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative
process. The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in
Congress.

NOTES:
● Principle of the enrolled bill. The text of the act as passed and approved is deemed importing absolute
verity and is binding on the courts
The court held that an enrolled bill "imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts". The enrolled bill is
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

● THAT ENROLLED BILL PREVAILS OVER THE LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE
RULE.
We are not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be
sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each
house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on
the journal, is a question which we do not now decide. All we hold is that with respect to matters not expressly
required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

2
TITLE: People v. Garcia y Madrigal
G.R. NO. L-2873 DATE: Feb. 28, 1950
PONENTE: NATURE:
FACTS:
● Eugenio Garcia Madrigal was found guilty of the crime of robbery. He was 17 years of age at the time of
the commission of the crime.
● The lower court, ignoring defendant's minority, sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of from 4 years,
2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor. He was also sentenced to pay the
offended party, jointly and severally with the other accused, the sum of P85 as indemnity. Republic Act
No. 47 (Oct 3, 1946), which amended article 80 of the Revised Penal Code by reducing from 18 to 16 the
age below which accused have to "be committed to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or
charitable institution," instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison, has given rise to the controversy.
● The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implication has also amended paragraph 2 of article
68 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that when the offender is over fifteen and under eighteen
years of age, "the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period."
ISSUE/S:
W/N Eugenio, being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, was entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of article 68, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.
DOCTRINES | HELD:
All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part
thereof, and that conflicting intentions in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced
upon the court by an unambiguous language.

RULING:
Eugenio was sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 4 months of arresto mayor and not more than 2 years and
4 months of prision correccional which is already one degree lower than what the law prescribed. The appellant
will pay the costs of this appeal.

One other rule of interpretation that quarrels with the theory of implied repeal or amendment is that penal law is to
be construed, in case of doubt, strictly against the state. "Criminal and penal statutes must be strictly construed,
that is, they cannot be enlarged or extended by intendment, implication, or by any equitable considerations. In
other words, the language cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms in order to carry into effect
the general purpose for which the statute was enacted. Only those persons, offenses, and penalties, clearly
included, beyond any reasonable doubt, will be considered within the statute's operation. They must come clearly
within both the spirit and the letter of the statute, and where there is any reasonable doubt, it must be resolved in
favor of the person accused of violating the statute; that is, all questions in doubt will be resolved in favor of those
from whom the penalty is sought." (Statutory Construction, Crawford, pp. 460-462.). [The offense charged in the
information of which the appellant was found guilty is punishable under article 294, case No. 5, of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by section 6 of Republic Act No. 18, with prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its medium period. The penalty one degree lower than this is arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its medium period. There being no modifying circumstance, the appropriate
penalty in the present case is from 6 months and 1 day of arresto mayor to 2 years and 4 months of prision
correccional. Being entitled to an indeterminate penalty as provided in section 1 of Act No. 4103 as amended, the
accused should be, and he is hereby sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 4 months of arresto mayor and not
more than 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional. In all other respects the appealed judgment is affirmed.
The appellant will pay the costs of this appeal.
1
NOTES:
● The resolution on Motion for Reconsideration further discussed the effects of the amendment of Art 80 of
the RPC. It also emphasized that there is no room for construction in this case as there is no
ambiguity in RA no. 47.

● All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part
thereof, and that conflicting intentions in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded, unless
forced upon the court by an unambiguous language.

This rule applies in the construction of a statute and its amendment, both being read together as a whole. "An
amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute has been repealed, and a new and independent
act in the amended form had been adopted in its stead; or, as frequently stated by the courts, so far as regards any
action after the adoption of the amendment, as if the statute had been originally enacted in its amended form. The
amendment becomes a part of the original statute as if it had always been contained therein, unless such
amendment involves the abrogation of contractual relations between the state and others. Where an amendment
leaves certain portions of the original act unchanged, such portions are continued in force, with the same meaning
and effect they had before the amendment. So where an amendatory act provides that an existing statute shall be
amended to read as recited in the amendatory act, such portions of the existing law as are retained, either literally
or substantially, are regarded as a continuation of the existing law, and not as a new enactment."

2
TITLE: People v. Nazario
G.R. NO. L-44143 DATE: August 31, 1988
PONENTE: NATURE:
FACTS:
● Eusebio Nazario, petitioner was charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance in an information filed by
the Provincial Fiscal, dated October 9, 1968, as follows: That in the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in the Municipality
of Pagbilao, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then the owner and operator of a fishpond situated in the barrio of Pinagbayanan, of said
municipality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously refuse and fail to pay the municipal taxes in the
total amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTY TWO CENTAVOS (P362.62), required of
him as fishpond operator as provided for under Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended, inspite of repeated
demands made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, to pay the same.
● By way of confession and avoidance, the petitioner would admit having committed the acts charged but would claim
that the ordinances are unconstitutional, or, assuming their constitutionality, that they do not apply to him in any
event. He was found guilty thus this petition.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for being ambiguous and uncertain
W/N the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto
DOCTRINES | HELD:

RULING:
1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond thus he comes with the term
“Manager”. He was the one who spent money in developing and maintaining it, so despite only leasing it from the national
government, the latter does not get any profit as it goes only to Nazario. The dates of payment are also clearly stated
“Beginning and taking effect from 1964 if the fishpond started operating in 1964”.
2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it can’t be that the amendment under Ordinance 12 is being
made to apply retroactively. Also, the act of non-payment has been made punishable since 1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is
not imposing a retroactive penalty
The trial court returned a verdict of guilty and disposed as follows:
From their evidence the prosecution would want to show to the court that the accused, as lessee or operator of a fishpond in
the municipality of Pagbilao, refused, and still refuses, to pay the municipal taxes for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in
violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and
finally amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 112, series of 1966.

On the other hand, the accused, by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the taxes sought to be collected have already
lapsed and that there is no law empowering municipalities to pass ordinances taxing fishpond operators. The defense, by
their evidence, tried to show further that, as lessee of a forest land to be converted into a fishpond, he is not covered by said
municipal ordinances; and finally that the accused should not be taxed as fishpond operator because there is no fishpond yet
being operated by him, considering that the supposed fishpond was under construction during the period covered by the taxes
sought to be collected. Finally, the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside of the power
of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is
ambiguous and uncertain.

There is no question from the evidences presented that the accused is a lessee of a parcel of forest land, with an area of
27.1998 hectares, for fishpond purposes, under Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 1066, entered into by the accused and the
government, through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on August 21, 1959.
There is no question from the evidences presented that the 27.1998 hectares of land leased by the defendant from the
government for fishpond pur­poses was actually converted into fishpond and used as such, and therefore defendant is an
operator of a fishpond within the purview of the ordinance in question.

1
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965 and further
amended by Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao, Quezon; and hereby sentences him to
pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a day, and to pay the costs of this
proceeding. The appeal is DISMISSED

NOTES:
● CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; WHEN CONSIDERED VAGUE; VAGUE STATUTES REPUGNANT
TO THE CONSTITUTION.
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1)
it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.|||
● ORDINANCES AT BAR HAS STANDARDS THAT CLARIFY IMAGINED AMBIGUITIES.
The ordinances in question set forth enough standards that clarify imagined ambiguities. While such standards are not
apparent from the face thereof, they are visible from the intent of the said ordinances.|||
● ACT MUST BE UTTERLY VAGUE ON ITS FACE.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction.
Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U. S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three
or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by."
Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all "because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but
does not annoy others.'" Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" act whose obscurity is evident
on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise language — but which nonetheless
specifies a standard though defectively phrased — in which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction. It must further
be distinguished from statutes that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. In that
event, such statutes may not be challenged whenever directed against such activities.
● ORDINANCES AT BAR NOT TAINTED WITH VAGUENESS.
In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is unmistakable from their very
provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term
"manager." He does not deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into the
fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them. While it appears that it is the National Government which owns
them, the Government never shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the
burden of tax under the said ordinances. Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. Ordinance No. 15,
in making the tax payable "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau
of Fisheries," is unequivocal about the date of payment, and its amendment by Ordinance No. 12, reckoning liability
thereunder "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964," does
not give rise to any ambiguity. In either case, the dates of payment have been definitely established. The fact that the
appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates — as far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965, and
1966 is concerned — presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinances vague. In addition, the
same would have been at most a difficult piece of legislation, which is not unfamiliar in this jurisdiction, but hardly a vague
law.
|||

2
TITLE: Angara v. Electoral Commission
G.R. NO. 45081 DATE: July 15, 1936
PONENTE: NATURE:
FACTS:
1. In the election of Sept. 17, 1935, Angara (herein petitioner) and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, Dionision Mayor
(Respondents) were candidates voted to be members of the national assembly (NA) for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas.
2. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15,
1935, he took his oath of office.
3. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed.
4. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On
Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA.
5. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest (the
prescribed period for filing of protests had already ended on December 3, and the respondent was late in filing his protest
because he filed the protest after December 3.).
6. Ynsua claims that there was no constitutional or legal provision which stated that members of the NA cannot be contested
after confirmation of the NA.. EC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Petitioner then files a protest to the Supreme Court
(SC) questioning EC’s jurisdiction over the case. ( Petitioner argues that, EC could only regulate proceedings, that SC has
jurisdiction to pass upon fundamental questions in the issue since it is an interpretation of the constitution)
7. The Solicitor General (SolGen) argues that EC is a constitutional body which has jurisdiction to try all contested cases
re:elections and said acts is beyond SC. Further, Res #8 did not deprive EC of its jurisdiction. Since EC acquired jurisdiction
over the election protest, the Motion to dismiss filed in EC is not reviewable by the SC
ISSUE/S:
a) W/N the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the
foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative
b) W/N the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by
resolution of the National Assembly
DOCTRINES | HELD:

RULING:
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with cost against the petitioner.

The SC has jurisdiction over the ELECOM: separation of powers granted by Consti (through separate articles for each
branch) but check and balances maintain coordination among the branches. When there are conflicts between the boundaries
of powers and functions of each branch, the Judiciary has the power to review and resolve these conflicts through Judicial
Review (referred to as Judicial Supremacy). This however is limited to actual cases and controversies. - that judicial
supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to
see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. -
ELECOM acted within its jurisdiction since ELECOM is recognized as an independent quasi-judicial body which is not an
inferior tribunal, or corporation, board, or person, and is granted the powers to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA. The present constitution granted the ELECOM with all the powers
exercised by the legislature relating to the said function of ELECOM, and this includes the regulation of the rules and
procedures of election protests. The confirmation of NA of its members is not required and does not limit the ELECOM of

1
its power to fix dates for election protest, or else this would undermine the power and functions of the ELECOM

1)In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional
nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral
Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting
claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
2) The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in
matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of
that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And
thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. Therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission
met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When,
therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the
National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been
organized. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members
of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by
the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional
power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. HELD The Electoral
Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the
resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing a protest against the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such
time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral
commission is hereby denied, with cost against the petitioner.
NOTES:
WHAT IS MEANT BY "JUDICIAL SUPREMACY". — The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who
is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of
the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees
to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution.

FAMILIARITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION WITH THE HISTORY AND
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD; ELECTORAL COMMISSION IS THE
EXPRESSION OF THE WISDOM AND ULTIMATE JUSTICE OF THE PEOPLE. — The members of the Constitutional
Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many
of them were familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the world. When, therefore, they
deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of
passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must
have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened
peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of
our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its

2
creation, the plan was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of
the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the
people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)

THE POWER TO PROMULGATE INCIDENTAL RULES AND REGULATIONS LODGED ALSO IN THE
ELECTORAL COMMISSION BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION. — The creation of the Electoral Commission carried
with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure
to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive powers to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in
the Electoral Commission.

3
TITLE:People v. Carlos
G.R. NO. L-239 DATE: June 30,1947
PONENTE: NATURE:
FACTS:
● The appellant Apolonio Carlos was found guilty of treason by the People’s Court, sentenced to reclusion perpetua
(lifetime/permanent imprisonment) and to pay a fine of P 7000.
● The lower court was able to find one day of July or August 1944 at around 2 or 3 in the morning a truck pulled up in
front of a house in Constancia St., Sampaloc Manila where a certain Martin Mateo lived. Carlos together with
Japanese military alighted together broke into Martin Mateo’s house then later to Fermin Javier’s house. Martin
mateo, Ladislao Mateo and Fermin Javier were captured by biding hands, they were put inside the truck and were
brought to Fort Santiago, tortured and released after 6 days. Reason: they refused to talk about the whereabouts of
Marcelino Mateo, a guerrilla that was able to escape the Japanese Fermin Javier on the other hand was also arrested
because he was a suspected/ confirmed by Carlos as a guerrilla.
● CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: MERE QUESTION OF THE LAW. -
Regarding the fourth assignment of error, appellant advances the following proposition: "The People's Court Law
(Commonwealth Act No. 682) is unconstitutional and void in many parts and as a whole because:

● Why PEOPLE’S COURT ACT (PCA) is unconstitutional: 4 errors 1. The lower Court cannot convicted of treason
because there is a settled principle in international law when a territory is under the governance of an enemy, all
political laws of the previous government are suspended. Thus our laws at that time have no binding effect because
crime of treason is a political complexion. Likewise Philippine laws are inconsistent and suspended, without force
and effect. Allegiance (legal obligation) distinguishable from loyalty. Thus, decision should be reversed because the
law that created it is unconstitutional. -law created PCA is non-binding Japanese law is in force, therefore making it
unconstitutional -PCA contains provisions entirely foreign to the subject matter -Second provision: retaining the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (it should try and decide cases against threats to national security)
● Section 14: Disqualification of SC Justices and procedure of their substitution 1. PCA deprives persons similarly
situated of equal protection of the laws 2. Political offenders accused by PC are denied of preliminary investigation
while others are entitled to. 3. PO accused by PC have a limited right to appeal while the accused charged by courts
of first instance have an absolute right to appeal. 4. Appeals involving person who held public office under Phil.
Exec. Comm and Phil. Rep or any branch are to be heard and decided by a substantially different SC thus lacking
uniformity in rulings over the same subject matter. 5. provision change the existing rules of Court on the subject of
bail 6. Art 125 of RPC: Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authority (shall be allowed
upon request to communicate confer any time with his attorney or counsel)
ISSUE/S:
W/N Crime of treason should be reversed because PCA is unconstitutional.
DOCTRINES | HELD:

RULING:
DECISION: SC AFFIRMED DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT

CONTENTION OF THE STATE: 1. PC is a special court with restricted jurisdiction created under the stress of an
emergency and national security, operate on limited period only imposed by economic necessity and other factors of public
policy. Main concern is the trial and disposition of the cases over 6000 held by US military to be turned over to
Commonwealth government. 2. In view of the great numbers of offenders with limited time, amount of labor will take time if
all of which are allowed to have P.I considering there’s an urgency in disposing the cases. P.I is n9t a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution. 3. PC is a collegiate court while CFI is of single judge. Appeal is not constitutional but a
statutory right. Admitted fact already saves court the provision of being objected from being unconstitutional. 4. No merit on
contention since it is beyond the subject of constitutional guarantee.

The disqualification of some or majority of SC to the PC and their substitution by people from CA, not a new court in the
eyes of the law. -A court possesses a separate personality from the men who compose them -lack of uniformity: constitution
1
does not ensure uniformity of judicial decisions neither does it assure immunity from judicial error. 5. granting bail to
political offenders detained by US army and released to the commonwealth but not to other political offenders 6. suspended
to those political detainees
CRIME: treason Any person who, owing allegiance to (the United States or) the Government of the Philippine Islands, not
being a foreigner, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid or comfort within the Philippine
Islands or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed P20,000 pesos.

RECLUSION TEMPORAL: Max- 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day to 20 years Medium: 14 yrs, 8 mos and 1 day to 17 years and 4
months Minimum: 12 yrs, 1 day to 14 yrs and 8 months
NOTES:
WISDOM OF LAW A LEGISLATIVE CONCERN.
These objections go to the wisdom of the law and to matters of policy. This being so, it is enough that the Congress
deemed it necessary to incorporate these provisions in Commonwealth Act No. 682. It is not the province of the courts to
supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a
legislative concern. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 661.)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION REGARDING UNIFORMITY OF RULES OF COURT, SCOPE OF. — It is
the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court which are required by section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution to be
uniform for all courts of the same grade. The People's Court is not a court of the same grade, considering many of its
special features, and its purposes, as the Court of First Instance or any other existing court in the Philippines, 80 that the
adoption of special rules of procedure for said court different from those applicable to Courts of First Instance is not
violative of this constitutional mandate. More than this, the last sentence of the section expressly authorizes the Congress
"to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines."

2
TITLE:Quintos v. Lacson
G.R. NO. L-8062 DATE: July 18, 1955
PONENTE: NATURE:
FACTS:
● Plaintiff appellee Jose Quintos was appointed patrolman in the Manila Police Department in December, 1945, and
on December 16, 1947, he was promoted to the position of detective in the same police department. He duly
qualified and assumed office successively for the two posts.
● On July 3, 1952, Arsenio H. Lacson as Mayor of the City of Manila dismissed supposedly for lack or loss of
confidence, dismissed five detectives among them Jose Quintos.
● To annul this order of dismissal and to prevent its execution he filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for injunction against Mayor Lacson and Chief of Police Dionisio S. Ojeda.
● Pending trial the lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants not to carry out the
order of dismissal. After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Quintos granting injunction.

ISSUE/S:
W/N summary dismissal of a Manila city detective under the provisions of Executive Order No. 264, in view of Republic
Act No. 557 is valid
DOCTRINES | HELD:

RULING:
SC affirmed ruling
We have heretofore ruled upon this very point, holding that City detectives are members of the police force and that the
manner of their dismissal is governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 557.
Counsel for appellants, conscious of the previous ruling of this court on the subject suggests, even urges us to review such
ruling. We see no reason or occasion for making any change of revision. We are convinced that our interpretation and
application of the laws involved is correct. If said laws are deemed unwise and detrimental to the discipline and
efficiency of detectives in Manila and other chartered cities, proper representations and requests may be made to
the Legislature. As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them
regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary.
|||
NOTES:
COURTS; DUTY TO INTERPRET AND APPLY LAWS. — As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional
provision, it is the duty of the courts to interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise and salutary.
If the law is deemed unwise and detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of public officers, proper representations and
requests may be made to the legislature.
|||