Cerezo v.

Atlantic Gulf

The plaintiff’s son was engaged in filling in a trench in which a gas main had been laid.
He entered a portion of the trench at a point a little distance away from where he
was working for purposes of his own, and while there the trench caved in and buried
him, causing suffocation before he could be rescued. The trench was only a little over
four feet deep, and its walls had stood, unshored, for over a week. There was no
evidence that the walls showed signs of giving way. Furthermore, had the deceased
been erect in the dirt and it is probable that he would have escaped without serious
injury whatever. The accident was a most unusual one and must be considered one
that could not have been foreseen. Hence, the employer cannot be held liable
therefore.

Under the common law in the United States, an employer was obliged to provide
reasonably safe ways, works, and machinery for his employees. He could defend an
action for damages arising out of an industrial accident by proving his own freedom
from negligence, the plaintiff’s contributory negligence, that the injury was cause by
the negligence of a fellow servant, or that it happened through one of the risks
assumed by the employee. The Employers’ Liability Act did not affect his duty to
provide safe ways, works, and machinery; nor the doctrines of assumption of risks
and contributory negligence. It did abolish, in part, the fellow servant doctrine, that
is to say, so far as it related to the negligence of a superintendent, with a special
clause of even greater scope in favor of railroad employees.

After providing reasonably safe ways, works, and machinery and exercising the care
of a good father of a family, the employer’s liability is limited, under the Civil Code, to
those accidents which could have been foreseen.

Tamayo v. Gsell

1. That the boy Braulio Tamayo, whose age neither he nor his father, Paciente
Tamayo, knows, nor does it appear of record, but which, in the opinion of the court,
is about eleven or twelve years, was one of the workmen employed in the match
factory, situated in Santa Ana, Manila, and owned by the defendant, Carlos Gsell. On
the 13th of March, 1914, the boy met with an accident which consisted of an injury
caused by the knife of one of the machines of the factory which cut the little ring

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fingers on the right hand, the latter of which was severed.

2. That the accident arose by reason of his being assigned by Eugenio Murcia, one
of the foremen employed in the factory, to perform work to which he was not
accustomed. He was put at the machine of Arcadio Reyes only the day of the
accident, in spite of his persistent and manifest opposition to assist the machinist; his
work was to recover strips, used in the manufacture of match boxes, from the
machine, Exhibit 1, which were extracted from the said machine from the wood
placed therein. At the same time he had to clean out the pieces of wood form said
strips, which stuck in the machine and obstructed its proper working. Prior to the
date in question the only work entrusted to the boy, Braulio Tamayo, was to pick over
the piles of wood from which the strips used in the manufacture of match boxes
were made and select the best pieces for the purpose.

As I have already stated the Supreme Court holds in this very case that, under the
law of the Philippine Islands, the plaintiff is not entitled to damages, as he proved no
damages except those arising from pain and suffering. It says:

We now come to the consideration of damages. As above stated, the record fails to
disclose to what extent, if any, the earning capacity of Braulio Tamayo has been
diminished by reason of the injuries. He could not, therefore, recover any amount if
this action had been brought under the Civil Code, as the services for medical
attendance and salary during the confinement have been paid by the defendant.
(Marcelo vs. Velasco, 11 Phil. Rep., 287; Algarra vs. Sandejas, 27 Phil. Rep., 284). But
this court has never held that slight lameness or permanent injuries and pain and
suffering are not elements of damages, but simply that damages cannot be allowed
for the former, unless the extent of the diminution of the earning power or capacity
is shown, and that the Civil Code does not include damages for the latter.

Allied Banking Corporation v. BPI

FACTS: On October 10, 2002, a check in the amount of P1,000,000.00 payable to

"Mateo Mgt. Group International" (MMGI) was presented for deposit and accepted
at petitioner's (Allied Bank) Kawit Branch. The check, post-dated "Oct. 9, 2003", was
drawn against the account of Marciano Silva, Jr. (Silva) with respondent BPI Bel-Air
Branch. Upon receipt, petitioner sent the check for clearing to respondent through

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the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC).

The check was cleared by respondent and petitioner credited the account of MMGI
with P1,000,000.00. On October 22, 2002, MMGI’s account was closed and all the
funds therein were withdrawn. A month later, Silva discovered the debit of
P1,000,000.00 from his account. In response to Silva’s complaint, respondent
credited his account with the aforesaid sum.

Petitioner filed a complaint before the Arbitration Committee, asserting that

respondent should solely bear the entire face value of the check due to its negligence
in failing to return the check to petitioner within the 24-hour reglementary period as
provided in Section 20.1of the Clearing House Rules and Regulations (CHRR) 2000. In
its Answer with Counterclaims, respondent charged petitioner with gross negligence
for accepting the post-dated check in the first place. It contended that petitioner’s
admitted negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the loss.

ISSUE: What does the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance enunciate?

RULING: The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of
the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where
it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might
have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s
negligence. The doctrine necessarily assumes negligence on the part of the
defendant and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not
apply except upon that assumption. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of
the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the
supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Moreover, in situations where the
doctrine has been applied, it was defendant’s failure to exercise such ordinary care,
having the last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, which was the proximate cause of
the occurrence of such loss or injury.

ISSUE: Does the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance apply in this case?
RULING: YES. In this case, the evidence clearly shows that the proximate cause of the
unwarranted encashment of the subject check was the negligence of respondent
who cleared a post-dated check sent to it thru the PCHC clearing facility without
observing its own verification procedure. As correctly found by the PCHC and upheld

3
by the RTC, if only respondent exercised ordinary care in the clearing process, it could
have easily noticed the glaring defect upon seeing the date written on the face of the
check "Oct. 9, 2003". Respondent could have then promptly returned the check and
with the check thus dishonored, petitioner would have not credited the amount
thereof to the payee’s account. Thus, notwithstanding the antecedent negligence of
the petitioner in accepting the post-dated check for deposit, it can seek
reimbursement from respondent the amount credited to the payee’s account
covering the check.

Engada v. CA

November 29, 1989 1:30 pm: Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney
with the owner Sheila Seyan as passnger.

The speeding Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Rogelio Engada came from the opposing
direction and swerved to its left encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw. In
attempt to avoid the pick-up, Seyan shouted at Iran to swerve to the left but the
Engada also swerved to its right hitting the Tamaraw at its right front passenger side
causing its head and chassis to separate from its body.

Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. Seyan and Iran were
brought to Barotac Nuevo Medicare Hospital. Seyan suffered a fracture on the right
femur, lacerated wound on the right foot, multiple contusions, abrasions, blunt
abdominal injury, and lacerations of the upper-lower pole of the right kidney. Upon
discharge, she Seyan incurred P130,000 in medical expenses. The Toyota Tamaraw
jeepney ended up in the junk heap totalling a loss of P80,000
MTC: Engada guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence with serious
physical injuries
CA: Affirmed MTC Engada appealed alleging that CA failed to consider that he
already relayed his intention to go back to his lane by flashing the pick-up’s right
signal light. He submits that at that moment Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, had no
more reason to swerve to his left

ISSUE: W/N under the doctrine of last clear chance Iran should be liable.

HELD: NO. CA affirmed.

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Engada's negligence was the proximate cause of the collision in abandoning his lane,
he did not see to it first that the opposite lane was free of oncoming traffic and was
available for a safe passage after seeing the Tamaraw jeepney ahead, he did not slow
down emergency rule

An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to

act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his own negligence - Iran cannot be faulted at a distance
of 30 meters from it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it approached
the Tamaraw, denied Iran time and opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There
was no clear chance to speak of.

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes

FACTS:
There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the
lobby of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back.
According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the
penthouse for the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as
Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the latter’s gift. He
lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud
voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the
party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time,
Dr.Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.

Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the
manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr.
Filart’s sister, Ms. ZenaidaFruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told
Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s group. She wasn’t able to ask it personally
with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone and doesn’t want to
interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered
that the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She

5
even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.

During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close Ms. Lim was when
she approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we
nearly kissed each other”. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention
to relay the request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene
causing everybody to know what happened.

The trial court dismissed the complaint, giving more credence to the testimony of Ms.
Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court
likewise ruled that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he
was uninvited. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as
it found more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered
him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests. CA held
petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka “AmangBisaya”, an entertainment
artist.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.

RULING:
No. Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to
leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms.
Lim who did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be
humiliated in requesting him to leave the party.

Art. 19. of the Civil Code states that: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith”. When a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform with the norms enshrined in Article and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. The
object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed
not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.
These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad
faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or

6
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.

Art. 21. of the Civil Code also states that: “Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage”.Article 2165 refers to acts contra
bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2)
but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it
is done with intent to injure.

As applied to herein case Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by
animosity against him. The manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was
likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. Ms. Lim having been in
the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to
be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not
inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct. Considering
the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave
the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant
to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause
embarrassment to him.

Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he
was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21
of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as
its liability springs from that of its employees.

Pantaleon v. Amex

FACTS:
After the Amsterdam incident that happened involving the delay of American Express
Card to approve his credit card purchases worth US$13,826.00 at the Coster store,
Pantaleon commenced a complaint for moral and exemplary damages before the RTC
against American Express. He said that he and his family experienced inconvenience
and humiliation due to the delays in credit authorization. RTC rendered a decision in
favor of Pantaleon. CA reversed the award of damages in favor of Pantaleon, holding
that AmEx had not breached its obligations to Pantaleon, as the purchase at Coster

7
deviated from Pantaleon's established charge purchase pattern.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not AmEx had committed a breach of its obligations to Pantaleon.
2. Whether or not AmEx is liable for damages.

RULING:
1. Yes. The popular notion that credit card purchases are approved “within seconds,”
there really is no strict, legally determinative point of demarcation on how long must
it take for a credit card company to approve or disapprove a customer’s purchase,
much less one specifically contracted upon by the parties. One hour appears to be
patently unreasonable length of time to approve or disapprove a credit card
purchase.

The culpable failure of AmEx herein is not the failure to timely approve petitioner’s
purchase, but the more elemental failure to timely act on the same, whether
favorably or unfavorably. Even assuming that AmEx’s credit authorizers did not have
sufficient basis on hand to make a judgment, we see no reason why it could not have
promptly informed Pantaleon the reason for the delay, and duly advised him that
resolving the same could take some time.

2. Yes. The reason why Pantaleon is entitled to damages is not simply because AmEx
incurred delay, but because the delay, for which culpability lies under Article 1170,
led to the particular injuries under Article 2217 of the Civil Code for which moral
damages are remunerative. The somewhat unusual attending circumstances to the
purchase at Coster – that there was a deadline for the completion of that purchase
by petitioner before any delay would redound to the injury of his several traveling
companions – gave rise to the moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and social humiliation sustained by Pantaleon, as concluded by the
RTC.

Mendoza v. Gomez

Facts: As a result of a vehicular collision resulting from the driver’s negligence,

respondents suffered physical injuries and the Isuzu truck sustained extensive

8
damages. Hence, this case for damages. Respondents argued that although the
registered owner of the bus was Lim, the actual owner of the bus was Cirilo Enriquez
(Enriquez), who had the bus attached with Mayamy Transportation Company
(Mayamy Transport) under the so-called "kabit system." Respondents then
impleaded both Lim and Enriquez.

Issue: Who is liable? Who is deemed as Mendoza’s (driver) employer? Is it Enriquez,

the actual owner of the bus or Lim, the registered owner of the bus?

Ruling:
The registered owner is deemed the employer of the negligent driver, and is thus
vicariously liable under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The
registered owner of the motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and
the actual employer is considered merely as an agent of such owner. Thus, whether
there is an employer-employee relationship between the registered owner and the
driver is irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner who the law
holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by
the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways

As such, there can be no other conclusion but to hold Lim vicariously liable with
Mendoza.

This does not mean, however, that Lim is left without any recourse against Enriquez
and Mendoza. Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment, the registered
owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual employer of
the driver; and under Article 2181 of the Civil Code, whoever pays for the damage
caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has
paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.

[Supplementary Notes:]
Generally, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee (culpa in
eligiendo) or in the supervision over him after the selection (culpa vigilando), or
both.

9
The presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure; consequently, it may be
rebutted. Accordingly, the general rule is that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in the selection and supervision of his employee he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved of liability.

However, with the enactment of the motor vehicle registration law, the defenses
available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code - that the employee acts beyond the
scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage – are no longer available to the registered owner of the
motor vehicle, because the motor vehicle registration law, to a certain extent,
modified Article 2180.

Anonuevo v. CA

FACTS
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his bicycle, while Aonuevo, traversing the
opposite lane was driving a Lancer car owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the
employer of Aonuevos brother. Aonuevo was in the course of making a left turn
towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious
injuries and had to undergo four operations.

Villagracia instituted an action for damages against P&G Phils., Inc. and Aonuevo
before the RTC. He had also filed a criminal complaint against Aonuevo before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequently acquitted
of the criminal charge. Aonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations
when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets. He posits that Article
2185 of the Civil Code applies by analogy.

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was
violating any traffic regulation.

1. W/N Art. 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply to non-motorized vehicles,
making
Villagracia presumptively negligent --> N

10
There is pertinent basis for segregating between motorized and non-motorized
vehicles. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion. is
capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the same
time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in
the event of an accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar
to the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass, and
greater combustibility due to the use of fuel.

2. W/N Villagracia was negligent for failure to comply with traffic regulations --> N
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the personal
judgment of the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which determines
what would be reckless or negligent. Aonuevo asserts that Villagracia was negligent
as the latter had transgressed traffic regulations. However, Aonuevo was speeding as
he made the left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the
accident.

Even assuming that Aonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not
equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclists part would not have acquitted
the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn.

3. W/N Villagracia is guilty of contributory negligence --> N

As between Aonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Aonuevo as solely
responsible for the accident. The petition does not demonstrate why this finding
should be reversed. It is hard to imagine that the same result would not have
occurred even if Villagracias bicycle had been equipped with safety equipment.

Ramos v. COL Realty

Facts:
Petitioner Ramos is the employer of Rodel Ilustrisimo. While Rodel was driving
the Ford Expedition of petitioner an accident ensued, wherein it bumped with a
Corrolla Altis driven by Aquilino Larin and owned by Respondent COL Realty. Due to
the impact of the vehicular mishap, the passenger of the sedan was injured.

A case was filed against Ramos making him solidarily liable with his driver.

11
Ramos in his opposition argued that he cannot be held solidarily liable since it is
Aquilnio's negligence that is the proximate cause of the accident. He further argued
that when the accident happened, Aquilino violated an MMDA order, i.e. prohibiting
the crossing is the place where the accident happened.

Issue:
Whether or not Ramos may be held liable since the proximate cause of the
accident is his employee's negligence.

Ruling:
No. There is no doubt that Aquilino’s violation of the MMDA prohibition against
crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of
the accident.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous

sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury
to some person might probably result therefrom.

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue

from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific
untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a
prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident
occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a
natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is
considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the
ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest
error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article
2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate

12
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.

As to the alleged Rodel's contributory negligence- the court finds it unnecessary

to delve into it, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is
the immediate and proximate cause of the accident. Rodel’s contributory negligence
has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent
whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will have the effect
of mitigating the award of damages in his favor.

PNR v. Vizcara

FACTS:
1. Vizcara was driving a passenger jeep headed towards Bicol to deliver onion crops.
2. While crossing the railroad track in Tiaong, Quezon, a PNR train, then being
operated by Estranas, suddenly turned up and rammed the passenger jeepney.
3. It resulted death of Vizcara and his companions, while others sustained physical
injuries.
4. Heirs of deceased and the survivors filed for an action for damages against PNR,
Estranas and Saga, the alternate driver of the train before RTC Palayan.
5. Victims alleged that the proximate cause of the fatalities and injuries sustained by
the victims was the PNRs gross negligence in not providing adequate safety measures
to prevent injury to persons and properties.
a. They pointed out that in the railroad track of Tiaong, Quezon where the accident
happened, there was no level crossing bar, lighting equipment or bell installed to
warn motorists of the existence of the track and of the approaching train.
b. The "Stop, Look and Listen" signage was poorly maintained. The "Stop" signage
was already faded while the "Listen" signage was partly blocked by another
signboard.
6. PNR: they exercised due diligence in operating the train and monitoring its
roadworthiness. They asseverate that right before the collision, Estranas was driving
the train at a moderate speed;
a. That driver was blowing his horn to warn motorists
b. The cars were on full stop, but as he approached the intersection, passenger
jeepney crossed the trackes
c. He stepped the brakes, but it did not come to a complete stop
7. RTC: ruled in favor of victims; PNR, Estranas and Saga should pay the victims.

13
8. CA: affirmed with modification (as to the award of damages).
a. PNR's failure to install sufficient safety devices in the area, such as flagbars or
safety railroad bars and signage, was the proximate cause of the accident.
9. MR by PNR was denied.

ISSUE: WON the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of PNR et al?

HELD: Yes.
NEGLIGENCE
1. Negligence was defined as the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not
do.
2. Time-honored test was: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
3. To emphasize, the RTC ruled that it was the petitioners failure to install adequate
safety devices at the railroad crossing which proximately caused the collision. This
finding was affirmed by the CA; It is a well-established rule that factual findings by
the CA are conclusive on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court.
o Both courts ruled that the petitioners fell short of the diligence expected of it,
taking into consideration the nature of its business, to forestall any untoward
incident. In particular, the petitioners failed to install safety railroad bars to prevent
motorists from crossing the tracks in order to give way to an approaching train
Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence.

14
4. It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of
exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at
railroad crossings, which duties pertain both to the operation of trains and to the
maintenance of the crossings.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
1. Conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm
he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for
his own protection.
2. Here, we cannot see how the respondents could have contributed to their injury
when they were not even aware of the forthcoming danger. It was established during
the trial that the jeepney carrying the respondents was following a ten-wheeler truck
which was only about three to five meters ahead.
When the truck proceeded to traverse the railroad track, Reynaldo, the driver of the
jeepney, simply followed through. He did so under the impression that it was safe to
proceed.

3. The accident would not have happened had the petitioners installed reliable and
adequate safety devices along the crossing to ensure the safety of all those who may
utilize the same.

LAST CLEAR CHANCE: NOT APPLICABLE

1. Where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later
in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose
fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had
the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is
chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom.
- the proximate cause of the collision was the petitioners negligence in ensuring that
motorists and pedestrians alike may safely cross the railroad track. The unsuspecting
driver and passengers of the jeepney did not have any participation in the
occurrence of the unfortunate incident which befell them. Likewise, they did not
exhibit any overt act manifesting disregard for their own safety. Thus, absent
preceding negligence on the part of the respondents, the doctrine of last clear
chance cannot be applied.

15