CIVIL LAW

Principle of constructive fulfillment, Article 1186 of the Civil Code

2018 Jun 20
G.R. No. 195999
3rd Division

LILY S. VILLAMIL, SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS RUDY E. VILLAMIL,

SOLOMON E. VILLAMIL, TEDDY E. VILLAMIL, JR., DEBORAH E. VILLAMIL,
FLORENCE E. VILLAMIL, GENEVIEVE E. VILLAMIL, AND MARC ANTHONY E.
VILLAMIL, PETITIONER, V. SPOUSES JUANITO ERGUIZA AND MILA ERGUIZA,
RESPONDENTS.
Held:
Parties entered into a contract to sell

A contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller,

while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property despite delivery
thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the said property exclusively
to the latter upon his fulfillment of the conditions agreed upon, i.e., the full payment
of the purchase price and/or compliance with the other obligations stated in the
contract to sell. Given its contingent nature, the failure of the prospective buyer to
make full payment and/or abide by his commitments stated in the contract to sell
prevents the obligation of the prospective seller to execute the corresponding deed
of sale to effect the transfer of ownership to the buyer from arising.[31] A contract to
sell is akin to a conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's
obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain
event, so that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would
stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.[32] In a contract to sell, the
fulfillment of the suspensive condition will not automatically transfer ownership to
the buyer although the property may have been previously delivered to him. The
prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by entering into a
contract of absolute sale.[33] On the other hand, in a conditional contract of sale,
the fulfillment of the suspensive condition renders the sale absolute and the
previous delivery of the property has the effect of automatically transferring the
seller's ownership or title to the property to the buyer.[34]
The Civil Code defines a contract of sale, thus:

Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.

Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract because it is perfected by mere

consent. The essential elements of a contract of sale are the following:

a) Consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in

exchange for the price;
b) Determinate subject matter; and
c) Price certain in money or its equivalent.
Under this definition, a Contract to Sell may not be considered as a Contract of Sale
because the first essential element is lacking. In a contract to sell, the prospective
seller explicity reserves the transfer of title to the prospective buyer, meaning, the
prospective seller does not as yet agree or consent to transfer ownership of the
property subject of the contract to sell until the happening of an event, which for
present purposes we shall take as the full payment of the purchase price. What the
seller agrees or obliges himself to do is to fulfill his promise to sell the subject
property when the entire amount of the purchase price is delivered to him. In other
words the full payment of the purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition,
the non-fulfillment of which prevents the obligation to sell from arising and thus,
ownership is retained by the prospective seller without further remedies by the
prospective buyer. In Roque vs. Lapuz, this Court had occasion to rule:

Hence, We hold that the contract between the petitioner and the respondent was a
contract to sell where the ownership or title is retained by the seller and is not to
pass until the full payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive
condition and failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but simply an event
that prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding
force.

Stated positively, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the full
payment of the purchase price, the prospective seller's obligation to sell the subject
property by entering into a contract of sale with the prospective buyer becomes
demandable as provided in Article 1479 of the Civil Code which states:

Art. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is
reciprocally demandable.

An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price

certain is binding upon the promisor if the promise is supported by a consideration
distinct from the price.
Now, the next question to be resolved is whether the suspensive condition, i.e.,
judicial approval of the sale of the minor owners' shares, upon which the obligation
of the sellers to execute a deed of sale depends, is fulfilled.

PRINCIPLE OF CONSTRUCTIVE FULFILLMENT APPLIES

Article 1186 of the Civil Code reads:

Article 1186. The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily
prevents its fulfillment.

This provision refers to the constructive fulfillment of a suspensive condition, whose

application calls for two requisites, namely: (a) the intent of the obligor to prevent
the fulfillment of the condition, and (b) the actual prevention of the fulfillment. Mere
intention of the debtor to prevent the happening of the condition, or to place
ineffective obstacles to its compliance, without actually preventing the fulfillment, is
insufficient.[42]

Petitioner and her then co-owners undertook, upon receipt of the down payment
from respondent-spouses, the filing of a petition in court, after which they promised
the latter to execute the deed of absolute sale whereupon the latter shall, in turn,
pay the entire balance of the purchase price. The balance of the consideration shall
be paid only upon grant of the court's approval and upon execution of the deed of
absolute sale.

Here, there is no doubt that petitioner prevented the fulfillment of the suspensive
condition. She herself admitted that they did not file any petition to seek approval of
the court as regards the sale of the shares of the minor owners.[43] In addition, the
other co-owners sold their shares to petitioner such that she was able to
consolidate the title in her name.[44] Thus, the condition is deemed constructively
fulfilled, as the intent to prevent fulfillment of the condition and actual prevention
thereof were definitely present. Consequently, it was incumbent upon the sellers to
enter into a contract with respondent-spouses for the purchase of the subject
property.

Declaration of Presumptive Death – Guidelines to aid the public, PVAO

and AFP in making or dealing with claims for death benefits
2018 Apr 25
G.R. No. 230751
3rd Division

ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, PETITIONER, V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that would have warranted the
application of Article 41 of the FC because petitioner was not seeking to remarry. A reading of Article 41 of the FC
shows that the presumption of death established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid
subsequent marriage under the said law. Thus:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death of Wilfredo as a
prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that
the same was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as
amended."[10]

Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner
was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code[11] as the
basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding presumptions of death
for any civil purpose, to wit:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten
years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that
his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard
of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for
four years.
Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death of Wilfredo was
misleading and grossly improper. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner was based
on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.

Petitioner's Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death Ought to Have Been Dismissed; A Petition Whose Sole
Objective is to Declare a Person Presumptively Dead Under the Civil Code, Like that Filed by the Petitioner Before
the RTC, Is Not a Viable Suit in Our Jurisdiction

The true fault in the RTC's decision, however, goes beyond its misleading fallo. The decision itself is objectionable.

Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo under the Civil
Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This is because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole
objective is to have a person declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no
court has any authority to take cognizance of the same.

CRIMINAL LAW
Elements – Kidnapping for Ransom
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 232361
September 26, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FRANCISCO

DAMAYO Y JAIME, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

In order that the accused can be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
the crime, namely:

(a) the offender is a private individual;

(b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;

(c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and

(d) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present:

(1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days;

(2) it is committed by simulating public authority;

(3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained
or threats to kill him are made; or

(4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.[12]

If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his
detention is immaterial. Also, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the
purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. It is settled
that the curtailment of the victim's liberty need not involve any physical restraint
upon the latter's person and it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in
an enclosure or treated him harshly. The crime of serious illegal detention is
committed by detaining a person or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. Its
essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable
proof the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 235652
July 09, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. XXX AND YYY,*

ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Trafficked minor (10 y/o)

Qualified by: accused are parents of victim BBB

For: prostitution, dancing naked in front of a webcam

Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 defines the term "Trafficking in Persons" as the

"recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or
without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by
means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of
a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which
includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs." The same provision further provides that "[t]he recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation
shall also be considered as 'trafficking in persons' even if it does not involve any of
the means set forth in the preceding paragraph." ." The crime of "Trafficking in
Persons" becomes qualified under, among others, the following circumstances:

Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – The following are considered as

qualified trafficking:

(a) When the trafficked person is a child;

xxxx

(d) When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who
exercises authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a
public officer or employee;

RA No. 9165 vs RA No. 10640 - conduct of physical inventory and photograph

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 229047
April 16, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RAMONCITO

CORNEL Y ASUNCION, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Appellant was acquitted.

To ensure an unbroken chain of custody, Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 specifies:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.

Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21 (a) of the IRR of R.A. No.
9165 provides:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items[.]

On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among
other modifications, it essentially incorporated the saving clause contained in the
IRR, thus:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official
and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided,
That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where
the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office
of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

“Numerous drug trafficking activities can be traced to operations of highly organized

and powerful local and international syndicates. The presence of such syndicates
that have the resources and the capability to mount a counter-assault to
apprehending law enforcers makes the requirement of Section 21(a) impracticable
for law enforcers to comply with. It makes the place of seizure extremely unsafe for
the proper inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs.”

xxxx

Section 21(a) of RA 9165 needs to be amended to address the foregoing situation.

We did not realize this in 2002 where the safety of the law enforcers and other
persons required to be present in the inventory and photography of seized illegal
drugs and the preservation of the very existence of seized illegal drugs itself are
threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of drug syndicates at the place of
seizure. The place where the seized drugs may be inventoried and photographed
has to include a location where the seized drugs as well as the persons who are
required to be present during the inventory and photograph are safe and secure
from extreme danger.

It is proposed that the physical inventory and taking of photographs of seized illegal
drugs be allowed to be conducted either in the place of seizure or at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending law enforcers. The proposal will provide
effective measures to ensure the integrity of seized illegal drugs since a safe
location makes it more probable for an inventory and photograph of seized illegal
drugs to be properly conducted, thereby reducing the incidents of dismissal of drug
cases due to technicalities.

Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that

the seizure or confiscation is invalid or illegal, as long as the law enforcement
officers could justify the same and could prove that the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are not tainted. This is the effect of the inclusion in the
proposal to amend the phrase "justifiable grounds." There are instances wherein
there are no media people or representatives from the DOJ available and the
absence of these witnesses should not automatically invalidate the drug operation
conducted. Even the presence of a public local elected official also is sometimes
impossible especially if the elected official is afraid or scared.[16]

The foregoing legislative intent has been taken cognizance of in a number of cases.
Just recently, We opined in People v. Miranda:[17]
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance
with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. 9165 may not always be possible. In
fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 which is now
crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provide that the said
inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office
of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. 9165 under justifiable
grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized
items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer or team. Tersely put, the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of
R.A. 9165 and the IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the
items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a)
there is justifiable ground for non compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved. In People v. Almorfe, the Court
stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the
reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved. Also, in People v. De Guzman, it was
emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact,
because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.[18]

Under the original provision of Section 21, after seizure and confiscation of the
drugs, the apprehending team was required to immediately conduct a physical
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of (1) the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the DOJ, and
(4) any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. It is assumed that the presence of these
three persons will guarantee "against planting of evidence and frame up," i.e., they
are "necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from
any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity."[19] Now, the amendatory law mandates that
the conduct of physical inventory and photograph of the seized items must be in the
presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected
public official and (3) a representative of the National Prosecution Service Qr the
media who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. In the
present case, the old provisions of Section 21 and its IRR shall apply since the
alleged crime was committed before the amendment.

According to the CA, there was no break or gap in the chain of custody, hence, the
prosecution was able to establish with moral certainty that the specimen submitted
to the crime laboratory and found positive for dangerous drugs, and finally
introduced as evidence against appellant was the same dangerous drug that was
confiscated from him, thus:

In the case at bench, We find that the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu
taken from appellant were clearly established by the prosecution. There was no
showing that PO1 Angulo lost possession of the said illegal drug from the time it
was taken from the appellant until its turn over to the investigator at the police
station. The sachet of shabu was immediately marked upon the arrival of the buy-
bust team at the Barangay Hall of East Rembo, Makati in the presence of: (1) SPO1
Randy L. Obedoza who served as PO1 Angulo's back-up during the operation; (2)
appellant; and (3) four barangay tanods. An inventory was conducted and a Chain
of Custody and Inventory Receipt were then prepared on the same night.
Thereafter, the evidence was turned over by PO1 Angulo to the investigator, PO2
Michelle V. Gimena (PO2 Gimena). After the pertinent papers were drawn-up by
10:15 P.M., the illegal drug was returned by PO2 Gimena to PO1 Angulo. PO1
Angulo was the one who turned over the confiscated item to PSI Rendielyn L.
Sahagun (PSI Sahagun), the Forensic Chemist for laboratory examination. To
safeguard the integrity of their office, PSI Sahagun marked the plastic sachet
containing the confiscated item with D-941-13A RLS. The original copy of
Chemistry Report No. D-941-13 and the evidence submitted was retained by the
Southern Police District Crime Laboratory until presentation before the trial.[20]

This Court rules otherwise. In this case, PO1 Angulo testified that the inventory was
not conducted at the place of the arrest but at the Barangay Hall of East Rembo
COMMERCIAL:

RA 10142, Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act (FRIA) of 2010.

Keywords: RA 10142, Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act (FRIA) of 2010.

May the Rehabilitation Rules be applied to resolve the present petition, when the
subject petition for rehabilitation was filed under the Interim Rules?

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 191939
March 14, 2018

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, PETITIONER,[1] V. IN THE MATTER OF

THE PETITION TO HAVE STEEL CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
PLACED UNDER CORPORATE REHABILITATION WITH PRAYER FOR THE
APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED REHABILITATION PLAN, EQUITABLE PCI
BANK, INC., RESPONDENT.

On 11 September 2006, Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB), as creditor, filed a

petition for the corporate rehabilitation of its debtor SCP with the RTC.

On 12 September 2006, the RTC issued an Order[6] (the subject order) granting
EPCIB's petition

ABC contends that it was deprived of its right to due process when the RTC ordered
ABC to restore SCP's current account and to credit back the amount previously set
off. ABC asserts that it was not yet bound by the 12 September 2006 stay order
when it made the setoff on 15 September 2006 because jurisdiction over it had not
yet been acquired by the rehabilitation court; the stay order was only published on
16 September 2006.

ABC further contends that when it offset the proceeds in the subject account, it
merely applied the provisions of law on legal compensation, since SCP had already
incurred a default in its obligations rendering operative the terms of the TR it had
issued.

ISSUE:

The central argument to the present petition is that the RTC could not invalidate an
act already consummated prior to the date that the subject order was published,
since it was only on said date that the court acquired jurisdiction over ABC. ABC
primarily bases its assertion on Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules,[7] which
considers rehabilitation proceedings as in rem and jurisdiction over all those
affected acquired only upon publication of the notice commencing proceedings.

Held:

This Court is thus tasked to determine when the subject order took effect for
purposes of compliance, and whether the rehabilitation court can reverse or
invalidate acts that are inconsistent with its stay order and are made after its
issuance but prior to its publication.

APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT REHABILITATION RULES,

THE REHABILITATION COURT PROPERLY INVALIDATED ABC'S ACTION.

The rehabilitation petition was filed by EPCIB under A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC dated 21
November 2000, or the 2000 Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation (Interim Rules).

On 27 August 2013, however, the Court enacted A.M. No. 12-12-11-SC, or the
Financial Rehabilitation Rules of Procedure (Rehabilitation Rules), which amended
and revised the Interim Rules and the subsequent 2008 Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Rehabilitation (2008 Rules), in order to incorporate the significant
changes brought about by Republic Act No. 10142 (R.A. No. 10142), otherwise
known as the Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of 2010 (FRIA).[8]

The Rehabilitation Rules provides that the court shall issue a commencement order
once it finds the petition for rehabilitation sufficient in form and substance.[9] This
commencement order primarily contains: a declaration that the debtor is under
rehabilitation, the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver, a directive for all creditors
to file their verified notices of claim, and an order staying claims against the
debtor.[10] The rehabilitation proceedings shall be deemed to have commenced
from the date of filing of the petition,[11] which is also termed the commencement
date.

UNDER THE SAME RULES, THE EFFECTS OF SUCH COMMENCEMENT

ORDER SHALL RETROACT TO THE DATE THAT THE PETITION WAS FILED,
AND RENDERS VOID ANY ATTEMPT TO COLLECT ON OR ENFORCE A
CLAIM AGAINST THE DEBTOR OR TO SET OFF ANY DEBT BY THE
DEBTOR'S CREDITORS, AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT DATE, to wit:

SEC. 9. EFFECTS OF THE COMMENCEMENT ORDER. - The effects of the

court's issuance of a Commencement Order shall retroact to the date of the filing of
the petition and, in addition to the effects of a Stay or Suspension Order described
in the foregoing section, shall

xxx

(B) prohibit or otherwise serve as the legal basis for rendering null and void the
results of any extrajudicial activity or process to seize property, sell encumbered
property, or otherwise attempt to collect on or enforce a claim against the debtor
after the commencement date unless otherwise allowed under these Rules, subject
to the provisions of Section 49 of this Rule;

(C) serve as legal basis for rendering null and void any set-off after the
commencement date of any debt owed to the debtor by any of the debtor's
creditors; (emphasis supplied)