G.R. No. 210542. February 24, 2016. Rosalina Carodan, Petitioner, vs. China Banking CORPORATION, Respondent
G.R. No. 210542. February 24, 2016. Rosalina Carodan, Petitioner, vs. China Banking CORPORATION, Respondent
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SERENO, CJ.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeking to set aside
the Decision2 dated 9 July 2013 and the Resolution3 dated 29
November 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA), Ninth
Division, Manila, in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 95835. The CA denied
petitioner’s appeal assailing the Decision4 dated 23 June 2010 issued
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16 Id., at p. 30.
17 Id.
18 Id., at p. 31.
19 Id.
20 Id., at p. 32.
21 Id., at pp. 35-36.
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debtors.22 It reiterated that the two were liable for the full
payment of the principal amount plus the agreed interest, charges,
penalties and attorney’s fees, with recourse to reimbursement from
Rosalina and Madeline.23
China Bank also disputed the claim of Rebecca and Barbara that
upon their payment to the bank of P1.5 million, the Real Estate
Mortgage over their properties was cancelled. Their claim was
disputed because, even after their payment of P1.5 million, Rebecca
and Barbara were still indebted in the amount of P1.3 million
exclusive of interest, charges, penalties and other legitimate fees.24 CB says the cancellation of the
Furthermore, respondent stated that if there was a cancellation of mortgage was for separate loans
- Rebecca and Barbara were still
mortgage, it referred to other mortgages securing other separate loan considered as principals of the
obligations of Barbara and Rebecca; more particularly, that of loan
Barbara.25
Rosalina filed her Answer with Counterclaim and Crossclaim.26
She alleged that on 2 July 1997, she and Barbara executed (1) a Real
Estate Mortgage covering Rosalina’s lot and ancestral house, as well
as Barbara’s eight residential apartments, annotated as an
encumbrance at the back of the TCTs corresponding to the
properties as evidenced by the Annexes to the Answer; and (2) a
Surety Agreement to secure the credit facility granted by the bank to
Barbara and Rebecca up to the principal amount of P2.8 million.27
Rosalina further stated that the execution of the contracts was “made
in consideration of the long-time friendship” between Barbara and
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22 Id., at p. 37.
23 Id., at p. 38.
24 Id., at p. 39.
25 Id.
26 Id., at pp. 173-231.
27 Id., at pp. 174-175.
28 Id., at p. 154.
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29 Id., at p. 175.
30 Id., at pp. 176-177.
31 Id., at p. 177.
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32 Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors
or some or all of them simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall
not be an obstacle to those which may subsequently be directed against the others, so
long as the debt has not been fully collected. (1144a)
33 Records, p. 177.
34 Id.
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35 Id., at p. 178.
36 Id., at pp. 238-248.
37 Id., at pp. 240-241.
38 Art. 2089. A pledge or mortgage is indivisible, even though the debt may be
divided among the successors-in-interest of the debtor or of the creditor.
Therefore, the debtor’s heir who has paid a part of the debt cannot ask for the
proportionate extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as long as the debt is not
completely satisfied.
Neither can the creditor’s heir who received his share of the debt return the pledge
or cancel the mortgage, to the prejudice of the other heirs who have not been paid.
From these provisions is expected the case in which, there being several things
given in mortgage or pledge, each one of them guarantees only a determinate portion
of the credit.
The debtor, in this case, shall have a right to the extinguishment of the pledge or
mortgage as the portion of the debt for which each thing is specially answerable is
satisfied. (1860)
39 Records, p. 243.
40 Id., at p. 244.
41 Id., at p. 245.
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43 Id., at p. 250.
44 Id., at p. 389.
45 Id., at p. 614.
46 Id.
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47 Id., at p. 615.
48 Id.
49 Id., at p. 617.
50 Rollo, pp. 97-98.
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As for the deficiency, the CA cited BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v.
Avenido.53 The Supreme Court had ruled therein that the creditor
was not precluded from recovering any unpaid balance on the
principal obligation if the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the
property, subject of the real estate mortgage, would result in a
deficiency.54 The CA ultimately affirmed the RTC Decision in toto55
and denied the Motion for Reconsideration.56 Hence, this Petition.
Before this Court, petitioner Rosalina now imputes error to the
CA’s affirmance of the RTC Decision. She says that the CA Decision
was not in accord with law and jurisprudence in holding that
petitioner, jointly and severally with Barbara and Rebecca, was
liable to pay China Bank’s deficiency claim after the bank’s release
of the collateral of the principal debtors. Respondent bank’s alleged
act of exposing Rosalina’s property to the risk of foreclosure despite
the indivisible character of the Real Estate Mortgage supposedly
violated Article 2089 of the New Civil Code.57
China Bank filed its Comment58 claiming that all the grounds
cited by petitioner were “mere reiterations, repetitions, or rehashed
grounds and arguments raised in the Appellant’s Brief x x x which
were exhaustively passed upon and
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51 Id., at p. 44.
52 Id., at pp. 44-45.
53 G.R. No. 175816, 7 December 2011, 661 SCRA 758.
54 Rollo, p. 46.
55 Id., at p. 47.
56 Id., at p. 24.
57 Id., at p. 14.
58 Id., at pp. 172-185.
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Loan transactions in banking institutions usually entail the
execution of loan documents, typically a promissory note, covered
by a real estate mortgage and/or a surety agreement.61 In the instant
case, petitioner Rosalina admitted that she was a party to these loan
documents although she vehemently insisted that she had received
nothing from the proceeds of the loan.62 Meanwhile, respondent
bank offered in evidence the Promissory Note, the Real Estate
Mortgage and the Surety Agreement signed by the parties.
We find that Rosalina is liable as an accommodation mortgagor.
In Belo v. PNB,63 we had the occasion to declare:
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59 Id., at p. 174.
60 Id., at p. 179.
61 Gateway Electronics Corporation v. Asianbank Corporation, 395 Phil. 353;
574 SCRA 698 (2008).
62 Records, pp. 174-175; p. 154
63 405 Phil. 851; 353 SCRA 359 (2001).
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64 Id., at p. 371.
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1207 thereof, when there are two or more debtors in one and
the same obligation, the presumption is that the obligation is
joint so that each of the debtors is liable only for a
proportionate part of the debt. There is a solidarity liability
only when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so
provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires.67
(Citations omitted)
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65 Palmares v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 664, 680-681; 288 SCRA 422, 435-
436 (1998).
66 327 Phil. 364; 257 SCRA 578 (1996).
67 Id., at p. 373; pp. 587-588.
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68 E. Zobel, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 352 Phil. 608, 614-615; 290 SCRA 1, 6-7
(1998).
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69 Suico Rattan & Buri Interiors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138145, 15
June 2006, 490 SCRA 560.
70 Supra note 38.
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71 BPI v. Reyes, 680 Phil. 718, 725; 664 SCRA 700, 707 (2012), citing BPI
Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Avenido, supra note 53.
72 Records, pp. 13-14.
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Also, in PNB v. Luzon Surety Co., Inc.,74 the Court hinted at the
possibility of the surety’s discharge from liability. It was recognized
in that case that in this jurisdiction, alteration can be a ground for
release. The Court clarified, though, that this principle can only be
successfully invoked on the condition that the alteration is material.
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Failure to comply with this requisite means that the surety cannot be
freed from liability. Applying this doctrine in that case, the Court
ruled that the alterations in the form of increases in the credit line
with the full consent of the surety did not suffice to release the
surety.
Meanwhile, in Palmares v. CA,75 the Court ruled:
It may not be amiss to add that leniency shown to a debtor
in default, by delay permitted by the creditor without change
in the time when the debt might be demanded, does not
constitute an extension of the time of payment, which would
release the surety. In order to constitute an extension
discharging the surety, it should appear that the extension of
the time was for a definite period, pursuant to an enforceable
agreement between the principal and the creditor, and that it
was made without the consent of the surety or with the
reservation of rights with respect to him. The contract must be
one which precludes the creditor from, or at least hinders him
in, enforcing the principal contract with the period during
which he could otherwise have enforced it, and which
precludes the surety from paying the debt. (Citations omitted)
In E. Zobel, Inc. v. CA, et al.,76 the Court upheld the validity of
the provision on the continuing guaranty — which we had earlier
interpreted as a surety consistent with its contents and intention of
the parties. The Court upheld the validity of the provision despite the
insistence of the surety that he
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83 Rollo, p. 617.
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