306 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION, VOL. 50, NO.

4, DECEMBER 2007

The Evolving Face of Ethics in Technical and Professional

Communication: Challenger to Columbia
—PAUL M. DOMBROWSKI

Abstract—Our view of ethics in professional and technical communication has evolved, paralleling developments
throughout society. Earlier views on ethics and values have grown into a broad perspective of complex gradations
with people at many levels affecting eventual practical outcomes. This newer perspective includes not only persons
but social forces and organizations. The organizational culture of NASA, for example, was specifically identified
by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) as one of the causes of faulty communication leading to
a terribly tragic event. The Challenger investigations of 20 years earlier, on the other hand, focused primarily on
physical events, secondarily on professional judgments, and only little on the social and cultural context of the
disaster. We learn by failures but also by self-examination. As we see how ethics and values impact technical events,
we understand that technological progress is ultimately a human endeavor in which reflection and judgment is as
important as measurement and observation.

Index Terms—Challenger, Columbia, ethics, language, NASA, organizational culture, philosophy, professional
communication, rhetoric, shuttle, technical communication, values.

Ethics has always been an important subject

because it involves decisions and judgments about
of time. This approach gives us concrete texts to
serve as starting ground. The drawback is that, for
some, the study of detailed theories can seem arid
how we relate to one another, whether in the or abstruse (e.g., Emmanuel Levinas’s theory). An
technological realm or the social realm. We expect over-involvement in systematizing and theorizing
others to behave ethically toward us, and they can make ethics seem to lose its punch and miss
expect likewise of us. We all are aware, too, of its purpose of practical effect.
dramatic contemporary lapses of ethical practice
and of ethical debates about advances in the There are alternatives to traditional systematic
scientific and technical world such as stem cell approaches, of course. Both the Association for
research, the disposal of radioactive waste, and Computing Machinery (ACM), Forum on Risks
remedying the Digital Divide. to the Public in Computers and Related Topics,
and the society of Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibility (CPSR) offer online forums
ETHICS AS A SUBJECT for discussing applied, less-formalistic approaches
Ethics, despite or because of its fundamental to ethics issues of a technological nature. Or one
importance, is one of the most difficult subjects to could adopt a practical variant of the Golden Rule
talk about sensibly and effectively, like politics and and posit that some course of action is ethically
religion. The subject of ethics is also complicated problematic if we would not wish to be on the
by its perceived overlap with the moral, the legal, receiving end of the action as a stakeholder or
and the religious. Many of us feel that we know consumer. Whatever the approach, however, the
intuitively what is ethical and what is not—like important thing is that we begin, foster, and
some people feel about art—and we feel this deeply continue the on-going discussion of ethics.
and earnestly, regardless of what others might Many scholars have studied the emergence of
think. It is a subject that practically guarantees ethics as an area of study within professional and
controversy and differences of opinion. technical communication. Allen and Voss’s book,
Ethics in Technical Communication: Shades of Grey,
There are many approaches to ethics as an area for instance, reveals typical practical dilemmas
of study. The standard approach grounded in that many communicators might face [1]. My book,
systematic theories—like those of Aristotle, Plato, Ethics in Technical Communication, deals with
Kant, and utilitarians—is sanctioned by the course ethical issues about how knowledge originates,
how it will be used, and how realistic are the
claims made about technology and science [2]. In
Manuscript received June 30, 2006; revised February 5, 2007.
The author is with the Department of English,
a number of articles, too, I have shown the ethical
University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816 USA dimensions of technical and professional discourse
(email: [email protected]). [3], [4]. Over the last two or three decades, an
IEEE 10.1109/TPC.2007.908729 expansive understanding of the concept of ethics in

0361-1434/$25.00 © 2007 IEEE

DOMBROWSKI: EVOLVING FACE OF ETHICS IN TECHNICAL AND PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION 307

technical discourse has evolved. This movement, includes a detailed research study of collaborative
which will be discussed later, displaces the focus writing at NASA [8]. A still-later volume, published
from the clarity and correctness found in earlier in 1994, dealt with the topics of the rhetoric of
studies to a wider focus on complex, critical science, social constructionism, feminist critiques
theories of language, ethics, and culture. As a of science, and ethics [9]. Thus, over only a 23
result, it is now common to think in terms of social year period, this series demonstrates an evolving
context and historical circumstances as much as it recognition of the fundamental importance of
is on individuals and events in isolation. ethics, values, and social context in shaping
technical discourse. Within that same period, in
Reflecting on this course of development, it appears 1989 the Society for Technical Communication
that an important watershed event has occurred. published Technical Communication and Ethics,
In the past, the assumption of most ethical critics edited by Brockmann and Rook [10].
has been that ethics is basically a personal matter,
the responsibility of individual persons. I recall In journal articles in our field, ethics was not a
the stirring words of Andrei Sakharov, commonly significant presence until the 1970s. Even then,
known as the father of the H-bomb of the Soviet ethics appeared almost entirely in the form of the
Union, who later turned anti-weapons activist and values of correctness, clarity, and impersonality
still later was awarded the Noble Prize in Peace in only, as noted in a survey of ethics articles from
1975: about 1975 to 2000 [5]. Since those early days,
however, ethics has become an integral part of
If I feel myself free, it is specifically because I
our understanding of technical and professional
am guided by my concrete moral evaluation,
communication as a practice.
and I don’t think I am bound by anything
else . If not me, who? [5, p. 624] IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION
reflects this expanding, evolving understanding of
Nevertheless, the trend now is to consider as equally
the role of ethics in discourse, too. In December
important as the individual, the complex social
2004, for instance, the special issue devoted to
context in which individuals think and act. The
case studies involved a strong ethics or values
following discussion deals not only with ethics with
component in every one of the cases presented.
respect to technical, scientific, and professional
Gattis explores the role of criteria, and the values
communication, but also with a broader scope
embodied in them and their usage, by relating
to include such areas as environmental ethics,
the recommendation reports about the Texas
feminist ethics, and cultural ethics. It assumes
A&M bonfire accident [11]. Strothers reveals the
a rough comparability between ethics and value
complicated context of crisis communication
systems.
associated with 9/11 [12]. Nelson-Burns explores
evaluation factors and decisions associated with
HISTORICAL PROGRESSION the degradation of materials at a nuclear power
plant [13]. Eichmans Cochran reveals the difficult
One clear indication of how far we have come in and conflicting representations of knowledge
understanding the manifold ethical dimensions involving one of the national laboratories [14].
of our profession can be gained from reviewing House, Watt, and Williams discuss the rhetoric
the groundbreaking Baywood Technical and ethics of whistle-blowing associated with
Communication Series. The first volume, published the Enron debacle [15]. Zoetewey and Staggers
in 1971, spanned 14 essays and covered topics examine the importance of stakeholder involvement
such as defining the field, evaluating writing, and in deliberative technical rhetoric in a particular
readability, but held nothing on ethics or values, airline disaster, thus expanding the scope of the
and nothing on the social nature and context of interests and values that should be involved in
technical writing [6]. The second volume, published decision-making [16]. This collection thus shows
in 1983, spanned 12 essays and is notable because that discourse—to one extent or another—always
several dealt directly with rhetoric, which situates stems from, is about, or looks toward some value
discourse within a particular social context—with system, whether implicitly or explicitly.
the values embodied in the rhetoric of science
and technologies, and with scientific writing as a An entire special issue of Technical Communication
social act [7]. A later volume, published in 1991, Quarterly (Summer 2001) was devoted to ethics in
dealt entirely with collaboration either in small or technical communication. The articles grappled
large groups or within an entire organization, and with the complexities and subtleties of putting
308 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION, VOL. 50, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2007

ethics into practice, going well beyond traditional This broadening scope of ethical perspective is more
philosophical theories. Sullivan and Martin, for readily seen in the many articles published in the
instance, developed a “retrospective narrative” sub-areas of critical theory, feminism and gender
approach to reflect on the principles and choices issues, specific ethical theoretical approaches,
that went into a particular piece of writing [17]. environmental ethics, and visual ethics. The articles
Salvo developed an “ethics of engagement” approach cited here for the most part are limited to those
to usability testing that expands the scope of published since 2000. (For the period between1975
ethical responsibilities to broader communication to 2000, see my article “Ethics and Technical
and a broader sphere of communication [18]. Faber Communication: The Past Quarter Century” [5].)
reported on his study of generational differences My apologies for any articles I have overlooked or
in values among engineering students about such omitted because of their appearance in my earlier
matters as individual versus group identification review article.
and loyalty to organizations [19]. Kienzler sought
to cultivate ethical awareness in students, Critical Theory Katz’s influential article in 1992
focusing on the psychological theories of moral on ethics with regard to Nazi human extermination
development [20]. Hawthorne, similarly, undertook technology is one of the most widely cited and
the cultivation of ethical awareness in students, provocative articles in professional and technical
relying on traditional ethical theories, audience communication among academic readers [26]. The
analysis, and practical writing applications [21]. Journal of Technical Writing and Communication in
Dragga, in the introductory essay, cautions about 2004 and 2006, for example, published a reaction
Richard Rorty’s pragmatic approach to ethics: to Katz’s 1992 article followed by Katz’s rejoinder
[27], [28]. The provocative power of the article, I
Social constructionists, like Rorty, echoing
believe, is that it directly confronts the oft-supposed
the sophists, see ethical principles as the
duality that technology is either value-indifferent
subjective creations of specific human beings
and therefore beyond ethics, or that it is always
within specific situations. Ideally, this newer
a reflection and enactment of particular value
ethics encourages sensitivity to multiple voices,
systems.
to dialogue and dissensus, but at its worst is
erratic, aimless, ineffective, and incoherent. Tillery, as another example, uses the hermeneutical
[22, p. 246] approach of Gadamer to reveal and critique power
relations in professional discourse.
Another indicator of the broadening scope of the We need to teach our students that ethical
ethics perspective is found in articles dealing writing entails a delicate negotiation between
with pedagogy, instructional content and manner, the demands of the workplace and the demands
and the relation between the academic and of a greater society, and no writing task, no
non-academic spheres. For instance, in “Employed matter how seemingly trivial, is immune from
Students: Ethical and Legal Issues in the Technical the pressures of the power structure. [29, p.
Communication Classroom” Jennings reviews 113]
several forms of normative ethics, applies ethical
analysis to actual instructional incidents, and Chambers focuses on C. S. Pierce’s particular
provides guidelines for ethical awareness in an ethical and philosophical system and adapts it
instructional setting [23]. Jennings also recently for instructional use in a continuing education
received a grant from the National Endowment for course for professional engineers, emphasizing its
the Humanities specifically to conduct a seminar conflict resolution perspective [30]. Faber uses
on ethics for the technical and professional Michel Foucault’s theory of language to critique
communication curriculum [24]. the notion of intuitive ethics. This approach
displaces our focus from the individual and his
or her responsibilities, and redirects it to the
Broadening in still another direction, Harrington
culture that constructs, and indeed creates, the
and Ruppel explore values, advantages, and
individual—with our sense of individuality and
disadvantages relating to telecommuting—focusing
freewill being only an illusion [31]. As Faber states,
primarily on the intangibles of trust and shared
emotional understanding; this focus indicates the Foucault’s work on ethics emerges directly
growing awareness of the importance of values and from his analysis and critique of the ways
perceptions contrasted to tangible and measurable individuals unconsciously allow themselves to
factors of professional discourse [25]. be transformed into organizational subjects
DOMBROWSKI: EVOLVING FACE OF ETHICS IN TECHNICAL AND PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION 309

Foucault’s ethical project can be seen as a rather, the concern is with value systems that
cultural critique since it examines how culture underlie the discussion and that define the
creates individuals’ value systems. [31, p. 195] purposes and goals of the communications.
Compounding the tension is the debate about
Feminism and Gender Issues Durack explores authority—whether environmental decisions should
the gender influences that shaped various sewing be left to “experts,” or to the public as non-experts.
machine manuals in the 19th century, differences Killingsworth urges a contemporary ecological
that were highly influential in contributing to sensitivity attuned to localization in our teaching
the persuasiveness, usability, and marketability because “environmental ethics makes clear the
of their associated technological products [32]. connection of various regions to one another
David explores the value-ladenness of seemingly through the media of air, water, and land” [39, p.
innocuous portraits of professional women, 371].
which differ significantly from portraits of men at
comparable professional levels. These differences Visual In the visual realm, one of most stimulating
reflect historical context and assumptions about developments has been a series of two articles
power and gender [33]. Thompson and Smith published in Technical Communication, jointly
explain that feminist and gender perspectives in authored by Dragga and Voss, entitled “Cruel Pies:
technical communication studies are important The Inhumanity of Technical Illustrations” and
in introducing, discussing, and revising our “Hiding Humanity: Verbal and Visual Ethics in
ideas about communication. They also note that Accident Reports” [40], [41]. The co-authors call
contemporary feminist studies have moved to for a more humanizing ethic for many technical
“a postmodern critique of visual, verbal, and illustrations, which otherwise fail to communicate
mechanical ‘technologies,’ which previously were the humanity of victims or potential victims,
not considered political” [34, p. 183]. Though especially in impersonal graphics such as bar
their review of 20 articles on gender issues found and pie charts. Their follow-up article elaborates
that these studies “provided little support for the this theme while replying to criticisms of their
existence of gender differences,” this avenue of earlier one. For example, they claim that showing
criticism is important in fostering political calls for only the mechanical features of an accident site
action [34, p. 441]. “leads writers to ignore or minimize the human
dimension of the accident” [40, p. 62]. Other critics,
Among the most sophisticated and intensive however, contend that dispassionate numbers have
explorations of gender issues are Sauer’s several an important ethical importance for two main
studies of hazard and risk communication within reasons: (1) they avoid the excessive stimulation
the mining industry [35], [36]. By identifying the of emotionality, and (2) they focus attention on
assumptions and values lying behind conventional mechanical aspects as the causes of the subsequent
discourse in this field—whether by the industry or harm to persons.
by regulatory agencies—Sauer reveals the absence As another example, Hofmann is renowned
or suppression of other values and perspectives for extolling the virtues of visual language and
that have great significance and immediacy for graphic instruction. We can see his work as being
the workers and their families. In particular, the motivated by concerns for usability and therefore
knowledge and judgments of workers and their marketability, but his work can also be seen as an
spouses is excluded, suppressed, or ignored expression of cross-cultural sensitivity—making
precisely because they are non-technical and one’s meaning clear to others, and trying to be
personally invested. But by valuing objectivism and as helpful as possible to the receivers of our
aloofness and by devaluing subjectivity and lived communication. Such sensitivity reflects a values
experience, Sauer explains, the industry does a motivation.
disservice to workers and their families.
General Articles of a more general ethical nature
Environmental Waddell explains the role of from 2000 to the present are summarized below.
environmental values in a number of articles • Kienzler and David, responding to recent
on sustainable development and environmental ethics scandals throughout the professional
communication [37], [38]. The issues are complex world, developed a professional communication
and heated because so much is at stake and curriculum that provides a limited discussion
because the root concern has little to do with the of ethics theory and writing projects to practice
accuracy of the content of the communications; putting these theories to practical effect [42].
310 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION, VOL. 50, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2007

• Spigelman and Grobman reveal first-hand the Flying the space shuttle is an inherently dangerous
numerous difficulties in developing an entire activity. Like that of an airliner, the shuttle’s design
professional writing program that integrates a is a balancing act between weight and performance
thorough preparation for professional practice versus safety and cost. Designers try to anticipate
with a thorough exposure to classical principles the hazards in which the space shuttle will operate,
of rhetoric, ethics, and ethos in the academic and develop a machine with an acceptable safety
tradition [43]. margin. In the case of Challenger, they did not
• Moore develops an analytical approach to expect to face freezing temperatures at launch time;
understanding and enacting persuasion in in the case of Columbia, they did not expect any
a professional context, particularly when foreign matter ever to strike the thermal protection
significant power differentials exist [44]. system. It is a credit to the bravery of the men and
His approach deals with the argumentative women who fly the shuttle that they understand
intangibles (i.e., values) of legitimacy, and accept the risks involved. As the Columbia
determination, and goodwill, revealing the key Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) observed:
role in communication of all types of values. “Columbia’s failure to return home is a harsh
• Dragga’s influential study of the operative reminder that the Space Shuttle is a developmental
ethical practices and principles among actual vehicle that operates not in routine flight but in the
professional and technical communicators realm of dangerous exploration” [49, p. 25].
showed that they often act on intuition rather
than on systematic theories, and have difficulty The CAIB was charged with investigating the
articulating the bases of their ethics [45]. causes of the disaster and recommending means of
• Markel applies a class of ethical theories to preventing similar disasters in the future; it did not
an argument for their broad application in explore culpability. Besides the ethical dimensions
professional and technical discourse [46]. of NASA history and culture, there are many other
• Longaker is particularly interested in operating dimensions to the disaster, but they are beyond the
in the boundary area between ethics and political scope of this article (e.g., political and economic
theory, specifically with a historical materialist pressures, outsourcing maintenance, debris from
approach (in the manner of Marx) [47]. This a bolt catcher, and wind shear). Indeed, the
approach is incorporated into a professional investigation was strained from the start, mainly
writing course in order to reveal the juncture because the CAIB chairman insisted on complete
between culture and economics and to develop independence from NASA. The important thing is
students who are “elite and influential knowledge that the CAIB strongly and clearly implicated the
workers” [47, p. 78]. culture, history, and organization of NASA as a
major causative factor (aside from the proximate
mechanical details of the failure of the thermal
protection system and the breakup of the vehicle).
CHALLENGER AND COLUMBIA Though the CAIB identified a number of important
“missed opportunities” as events or decisions that
Background is important in making sense of what could have unfolded differently but did not, they
happened and why in these shuttle disasters. We do not refer to these as causes [49, p. 145 and
should avoid a hasty rush to judgment along the throughout Ch. 6].
lines of something terrible happened; therefore,
someone made a mistake and should suffer The CAIB report strongly emphasizes the parallels
consequences for this lapse. As Perrow explains between the Challenger and Columbia reports,
in his ground-breaking work Normal Accidents yet there are several significant differences in
(published before the Challenger disaster), modern their circumstances. The commission instituted by
complex technologies can be expected to suffer then-President Reagan, commonly known as the
accidents by their nature as complex systems of Rogers Commission, included heavy involvement by
advanced technologies [48]. This is particularly true NASA, which many people believed compromised
for high-risk technologies that are characterized by the commission’s disinterestedness. Indeed,
“interactive complexity,” or the “tight coupling” of concern about disinterestedness was the reason
processes. Perrow is especially concerned about a separate, major congressional investigation of
inappropriate attributions of causation to human the loss of Challenger was begun. As I point out in
operator error, which oftentimes masks larger-scale an earlier article, the presidential commission and
features of the system that can make catastrophic the congressional committee came to significantly
failures practically “inevitable” [48, p. 3]. different conclusions, despite having examined the
DOMBROWSKI: EVOLVING FACE OF ETHICS IN TECHNICAL AND PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION 311

same evidence and largely the same testimony [50]. strengthened as the investigation progressed,
The presidential commission concluded that the with the result that this report, in its findings,
primary cause of the disaster was the burn-through conclusions, and recommendations, places as
of the solid rocket motor due to a failed O-ring. much weight on these causal factors as on the
They also concluded, in fairly confused language, more easily understood and corrected physical
that the secondary communication difficulties were cause of the accident Cultural traits and
of a systematic (i.e., impersonal) causative nature. organizational practices detrimental to safety
Thus, physical failure seemed more significant were allowed to develop, including: reliance
than personal and organizational failures. The on past success as a substitute for sound
congressional committee, on the other hand, engineering practices; organizational barriers
highlighted poor judgment and decision-making on that prevented effective communication
the part of particular people involved. of critical safety information and stifled
professional differences of opinion; lack
In the case of Columbia, however, the of integrated management across program
presidentially-appointed commission headed by elements; and the evolution of an informal chain
Admiral Gehman struggled for independence from of command and decision-making processes
NASA right from the start. As a result, its formal that operated outside the organization’s rules.
charter went through three iterations. In addition, [emphasis added] [49, p. 9]
when the Columbia report was presented to NASA,
it was received in an atmosphere of tension and Mission Confusion From the very beginning of the
veiled resentment. As evidence of the impartiality of shuttle program, there was confusion about what
the Gehman commission, we should note that no the shuttle was intended to accomplish—its raison
congressional committee was formed to conduct an d’être. The shuttle program sprang from a plan for
alternative investigation specifically as a counter to the manned exploration of Mars. When that mission
the presidential commission. fell through in the late 1960s, NASA sought another
mission for the program and found it in launching
In the case of Challenger, several scholars have
military satellites into orbit. As the CAIB explains:
voiced similar opinions. Winsor, for example,
suggests that most of us automatically assume, NASA needed a new rationale for the Shuttle.
incorrectly, that individuals are to blame in That rationale emerged from an intense
disasters such as this. To the contrary, she argues three-year process that attempted to
that the accident instead shows the “uncertain, reconcile the conflicting interests of NASA, the
socially conditioned nature of discourse” in complex Department of Defense, and the White House.
organizational situations [51, p. 8]. Winsor also [49, p. 22]
explains that the decision to launch was in fact
Since then, the shuttle has been tasked with myriad
quite ambiguous in the minds of NASA managers.
missions, including supply of the International
Organizational pressures probably did influence
Space Station, though it is no longer used to launch
managers at both NASA and Morton Thiokol, she
military satellites.
notes, but “this does not mean these managers
made decisions contrary to evidence” [51, p. 10]. Experimental versus Operational In January
1972, President Nixon lauded the nascent shuttle
Perspective The CAIB report begins by stating
in terms that would later haunt the program
the broad perspective that the board took regarding
when he made the following statement: “It will
responsibility and social origination:
revolutionize transportation into near space,
The Board recognized early on that the accident by routinizing it” [emphasis by CAIB] [49, p. 22].
was probably not an anomalous, random In 1981, President Reagan, on the occasion of
event, but rather likely rooted to some degree the very first shuttle launch involving Columbia,
in NASA’s history and the human space flight said, “beginning with the next flight, the Columbia
program’s culture. Accordingly, the Board and her sister ships will be fully operational,
broadened its mandate at the outset to include ready to provide economical and routine access
an investigation of a wide range of historical to space” [emphasis by CAIB] [49, p. 23]. The
and organizational issues, including political board concluded, to the contrary, that the shuttle
and budgetary considerations, compromises, has never advanced beyond its experimental and
and changing priorities over the life of the developmental stage—it has always been a research
Space Shuttle Program. The Board’s conviction test vehicle. Unfortunately, many influential
regarding the importance of these factors figures, from the president on down, have treated
312 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION, VOL. 50, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2007

it as fully operational and able to be repeatedly Challenger disaster” [49, p. 109]. Taken as a whole,
used like a jet airliner. these documents show fundamental conflicts about
the same technical entity—the space shuttle as
Though the CAIB acknowledges that “after the either an experimental or as an operational system.
Challenger accident, the Shuttle was no longer
described as ‘operational’ in the same sense as
Language and Meaning Definitions played a role
a commercial aircraft,” they also noted that “the
in the disaster, too, but more in the sense of the
Shuttle was mischaracterized by the 1995 Kraft
very human act of defining rather than impersonal
report as ‘a mature and reliable system’” [49, 118].
definitions per se. And these acts of defining were
As a result, of this mischaracterization, NASA
acts of collective authority by managers for the
used the shuttle to carry out operational missions
most part. Among the most glaring of several
without the close attention to anomalies that is
confused or complicated definitions are “in family”
usual for a “development vehicle” [49, p. 118].
and “out of family” as they pertain to debris damage
to the shuttle thermal protection system (TPS)
Organizational History and Confusion An entire
[49, p. 122]. Keep in mind that by design the TPS
chapter (5) is devoted to the organizational and
was intended never to be impacted by debris of
programmatic history from Challenger to Columbia.
any size. As numerous shuttle flights returned
For many reasons, the shuttle program had an
with debris damage of various degrees, these were
ever-shrinking piece of the budgetary pie, the result
categorized as being “in family,” meaning having
of which was enormous pressure to accomplish
happened in the past. “Out of family,” on the other
more with less. This meant tight constraints on
hand, supposedly indicated that some substantial
resources for anticipated expenditures and even
deviance from previous experience and expectation
less for unanticipated events such as preventing
based on that experience had occurred (rather than
tile damage caused by foam strikes.
on design specifications). The difficulty is that new
The CAIB also points out that changes in instances of “out of family” damage in the past
administrators and lines of authority within NASA came to define the new boundaries of “in family”
complicated communication and decision-making for the future. Thus what seemed like a reasonable
within the agency. One dimension of this definition with well-described boundaries and
complication and potential for confusion is the functional significance became instead like an
repeated contradictory and conflicting messages “elastic waistband” that simply expanded to fit
about the safety of the shuttle program. For whatever explanation seemed desirable [49, p. 196].
instance, an Office of Technology Assessment
report in 1989 stated that the reliability of the In the case of Challenger, a similar phenomenon
shuttle was “uncertain, but has been estimated occurred regarding “acceptable risk. ” Though early
to range between 97 and 99 percent” [49, p. instances of O-ring charring (discussed next) were
103]. The Augustine Committee in 1990 reported, considered “anomalous,” over time they came to
“NASA has not been sufficiently responsive to valid constitute an experience base indicative of safety,
criticism and the need for change” [49, p. 103]. and were described as an “acceptable risk” [49,
Quite differently, in 1995 the internal Kraft report p. 196]. An even more surprising phenomenon
claimed that the shuttle was now a mature and occurred regarding the design specifications of the
reliable system. The CAIB, however, commented O-ring seal system. It was designed as a pair of seals
parenthetically, “The [Kraft] report characterized such that if one should fail, the other would serve
the Space Shuttle in a way that the Board judges to as a backup. It was therefore initially classified
be at odds with the realities of the Shuttle Program” with a criticality rating of 1-R (for redundant).
[49, p. 108]. Another internal NASA group, the Later, though, it was learned that some seals were
Aerospace Safety Advisory Board, took issue with not sealing properly, in effect making it a simplex
the Kraft report, stating that “the Space Shuttle rather than duplex system. Therefore, the system
may never be mature enough to totally freeze the was re-designated as having a criticality rating
design” [49, p. 108]. And in 1995, NASA engineer of 1, meaning that failure could be catastrophic.
José Garcia wrote to President Clinton directly Memos were circulated to this effect to many
about his concern about the loss of civil service people, including to the astronauts. Surprisingly,
personnel to support the shuttle, as the program the Challenger investigators found that even some
moved to the privatization of maintenance and of the astronauts themselves continued to perceive
support. He said that these changes were “the the O-ring system as redundant, even though
biggest threat to the safety of the crew since the they had signed off on memos to the contrary.
DOMBROWSKI: EVOLVING FACE OF ETHICS IN TECHNICAL AND PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION 313

Apparently the desire to fly and the organizational had experienced charring, some almost burning
pressures to do so outweighed sensible caution. through entirely. At first, these instances were
referred to as “anomalous.” Over time, though,
Normalization of Deviance The CAIB at several as successive flights returned with charring and
points highlighted the process described above with the vehicle intact, the instances came to be
as a major contributing causal factor, and one perceived as normal and of little concern. The
that reflects both history and organizational board quotes Nobel laureate Richard Feynman’s
context. Adopting a term coined by sociologist famous dissenting opinion in the Challenger report
Diane Vaughan, they referred to this process as by the presidential commission:
“the normalization of deviance,” by which what
is initially perceived as deviant and anomalous The phenomenon of accepting flight
and therefore cause for concern is reinterpreted seals that had shown erosion and blow-by in
as normal and acceptable because it happens previous flights is very clear . Erosion was
often [49, p. 130]. They also referred to this as the a clue that something was wrong. Erosion
Shuttle Program turning “the experience of failure was not something from which safety can be
into the memory of success” [49, p. 181]. inferred . In these situations, subtly, and
often with apparently logical arguments, the
In the case of Columbia, the deviance involved criteria are altered so that flight may still
continual instances of damage to the TPS by foam be certified in time. They therefore fly in
debris falling from the external tank or elsewhere. a relatively unsafe condition. [emphasis by
Keep in mind that the TPS was designed with CAIB] [49, p. 130]
the explicit understanding that it, including the
wing leading edges, would never be struck by Confusing Assumptions Another striking parallel
anything. Langewiesche, with The Atlantic Monthly, between Columbia and Challenger with ethical
reported the following in his extensive interview dimensions in technical decision-making has to
with chairman Gehman after publication of the do with a reversal of conventional assumptions.
CAIB report: In the case of Columbia, the Debris Assessment
Team met on day seven of the flight to seek special
Falling foam had plagued the shuttle from the
Department of Defense imagery to determine the
start, and indeed had caused damage on most
degree of damage to the shuttle. Their request was
missions. In 1988 the Atlantis took a heavy hit.
denied because there was no “mandatory need” for
Its commander told the CAIB that the shuttle’s
such imagery requests. But practically the only
belly looked as if it had been blasted with
way the team could have demonstrated such need
shotgun fire. [52, p. 78]
would have been by having imagery of the kind it
As mission after mission returned without was seeking, the CAIB noted:
disaster yet with tile damage, this deviation from
Analysts on the Debris Assessment Team
specification came to be considered unremarkable,
were in the unenviable position of wanting
even normal. It thus was no longer perceived as an
images to more accurately assess damage
indicator of serious risk. As the CAIB report stated,
while simultaneously needing to prove
The acceptance of events that are not to Program managers, as a result of their
supposed to [have] happened has been assessment, that there was a need for
described by sociologist Diane Vaughan as images in the first place. [emphasis by CAIB]
the “normalization of deviance.” The history [49, p. 157]
of foam-problem decisions shows how NASA
first began and then continued flying with foam In the case of Challenger, on the other hand, in
losses, so that flying with these deviations from the crucial review meeting held the night before
design specifications was viewed as normal and the launch, engineers faced a radical reversal
acceptable. [49, p. 130] of assumptions as well. Typically, engineers are
expected to present positive proof that the shuttle
The CAIB states that the parallels between is flightworthy, arguing against the presupposition
Columbia and Challenger are “striking.” In the of managers that the shuttle is not flightworthy.
Challenger’s case, the O-rings on the rocket This presupposition is much like the presumption
boosters were designed never to be exposed to of innocence in a law court, erring on the side
the heat and pressure of the explosive exhaust of safety and conservatism. In this particular
gases. From the earliest missions, however, it was meeting, however, managers turned the tables by
noted with serious concern that some O-rings asking engineers to prove with certainty that the
314 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION, VOL. 50, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2007

shuttle was not flightworthy, for which they were Though the CAIB did not use the word “unethical”
unprepared and indeed unable to do. As engineer in its report, their message as a whole is clear that
Boisjoly later explained: the principal responsibility for the disaster lies
with management and the organizational culture,
This was a meeting where the determination
despite also citing several “missed opportunities” by
was to launch, and it was up to us to prove
particular persons [49, p. 145]. Thus the burden of
beyond a shadow of a doubt that it was not safe
responsibility that we usually associate with ethics
to do so. This is in total reverse to what the
has been shifted in the minds of the CAIB from the
position usually is in a preflight conversation
traditional nexus in persons to the nexus in layers
or flight readiness review. It is usually exactly
of social context and history.
opposite to that. [53, p. 93]
Thus, a reversal of argumentative assumption, Sadly, the CAIB is not sanguine about the
rather than technical information, completely likelihood of the culture change that it strongly
undid the outcome engineers were arguing for. recommends for NASA: “Without these changes, we
have no confidence that other ‘corrective actions’
History as Cause These organizational causes are will improve the safety of Shuttle operations.
of long standing because the culture is refractory to The changes we recommend will be difficult to
change. The CAIB report devotes its entire Chapter accomplish—and will be internally resisted” [49,
8, “History as Cause: Columbia and Challenger,” to p. 13]. This sentiment is amplified by investigator
the organizational history, as it explains systemic Brigadier General Duane Deal in his supplement
effects that link the loss of Challenger to the loss to the report. Deal would rather the CAIB
of Columbia. “History is not just a backdrop or change several of its “observations” to concrete
a scene-setter. History is cause” [49, p. 195]. recommendations that must be satisfied before the
And the history is embodied in the organization. shuttle returns to flight, and he writes the following
Furthermore, the CAIB notes the interplay between in his report supplement:
individual and social responsibility. They explain,
for example, that though the Flight Readiness History shows that NASA often ignores strong
Review process involves numerous engineers recommendations; without a culture change, it
and managers, it yields a collective decision is overly optimistic to believe NASA will tackle
“built on consensus verified by signatures of all something relegated to an ‘observation’ when it
responsible parties, [which] in effect renders no has a record of ignoring recommendations. [49,
one accountable” [emphasis added] [49, p. 198]. Vol. II, Appendix D.a, p. 9]
In another significant indication of the shift from
an individual to an organizational focus, the CAIB Additional information comparing the Challenger
addresses the repeated failures of managers to and Columbia accident reports can be found
respond to engineers’ concerns. These failures in my recent article entitled “The Two Shuttle
reveal the very real effects of intangible attitudes: Accident Reports: Context and Culture in Technical
Communication” [54].
Engineers’ failed attempts were not just
a matter of psychological frames and
interpretations. The obstacles these engineers THE PROFESSIONAL DILEMMA
faced were political and organizational. They
were rooted in NASA history and the decisions In considering any ethical dilemma in light of
of leaders that had altered NASA culture, this expansive view of ethical responsibility, we
structure, and the structures of the safety might naturally ask ourselves “where lies the
system and affected the social context of burden—with the individual or with the social
decision-making for both accidents. In neither context?” For me, the observations of Parnas, often
impending crisis [Challenger or Columbia] called the father of software engineering, about his
did management recognize how structure and own remarkable opposition to claims made for the
hierarchy can silence employees . In perhaps original Star Wars missile defense system (Strategic
the ultimate example of engineering concerns Defense Initiative) captures the intermixing of the
not making their way upstream, Challenger individual and the social within a single perspective.
astronauts were told that the cold temperature For Parnas, it is like two sides of a single coin. As
was not a problem, and Columbia astronauts an individual professional engineer, he has a sense
were told that the foam strike was not a of ethical responsibility; while at the same time, as
problem. [49, p. 202] an engineering professional, he is a personification
DOMBROWSKI: EVOLVING FACE OF ETHICS IN TECHNICAL AND PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION 315

of what the society of engineering professionals of technology is designed, the way it is actually
feels it should be as an ethical collective body. used, and to some degree even the shape of the
technology itself, and so technical communication
As a professional:
pedagogy should highlight both rhetoric and ethics
• I am responsible for my own actions and
[56]. As he writes,
cannot rely on any external authority to
make my decisions for me. The knowledge and awareness that students
• I cannot ignore ethical and moral issues. I gain is certainly important, but acting through
must devote some of my energy to deciding that knowledge is an equally important goal for
whether the task that I have been given is of technical communication pedagogy. Learning
benefit to society. [55, p. 122] how to use communication media in the service
of social action is central to nonacademic
communication curricula. Further, it is the
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROFESSION ability for students to learn how to act with
Where are we headed? It is hard to say except a sense of responsibility, with an awareness
that current trends are unlikely to slacken. It is of the ethical dimension of their actions
likely that the understanding of how ethics and that becomes a central issue in curriculum
values play a fundamental role in discourse will development. [56, p. 155]
continue to expand in scope. And, as we already
know, rhetoric and values are intertwined, so the Porter, as another example, explains how the
continued expansion of ethics investigations will use of new internetworking technologies presents
be coupled with continued investigations into the entirely new ethical and rhetorical issues, as
rhetorical character of technical and professional well as new forms of old issues. Owing to the
discourse. newness of this situation, laws cannot be relied
upon as comprehensive guides to the issues that
My own opinion is that this expansion will technical and professional communicators face.
not necessarily make ethics more tenuous or For this reason, it is incumbent on technical
indeterminate. Though there are organizational and professional communication academics to
and social responsibilities that are often ignored, cultivate a sense of ethical responsibility for this
neglected, or otherwise not acted upon even environment, for the sake of the students, but also
as scholars make such instances plainer, in for society generally. While hard and fast rules
the long run the decision to act, at least in the cannot be prescribed, certainly a critical awareness
positive sense, will continue to be undertaken can be cultivated and a general stance can be
by individuals who understand and respond to articulated to anticipate ethical dilemmas after
concerns somehow larger than their particular graduation [57].
organizations or societies, and somehow greater
than their individual selves. Unfortunately, the In addition, Freeman and Peace’s book Information
inverse will also continue to be true in the negative Ethics: Privacy and Intellectual Privacy, recently
sense—regardless of the ethical intentions of reviewed in this TRANSACTIONS, covers a range of
organizations or of individuals, these aspirations topics from ethical decision-making to parasitic
will continue to be undone from time to time by computing, including the complexities of the
individuals making key decisions. post-9/11 environment [58].

A host of scholars point out that the current Even among the most technology-minded thinkers,
electronic environment of technical and we see an increasing awareness and sense of
professional communication raises new issues of responsibility—even alarm—over the emerging
ethical concern. Our responsibility as scholars in influence of technology in all forms on our world
this field is to examine critically and reveal the and our being. Though apprehension about letting
dimensions of those potential responsibilities, a genie with powers greater than our own out of
to cultivate in our students an awareness of the the bottle is not new, I think we will continue to
potential for such issues, and to provide them a see more and more conscientious concerns such as
range of approaches for dealing with such issues those voiced by Bill Joy, the co-founder of Sun and
responsibly. co-inventor of Java in a Wired magazine article in
2000. Joy’s article entitled “Why the Future Doesn’t
Johnson, for instance, points out that rhetoric—and Need Us,” explains that the latest technologies such
with it ethics—is implicated in the way all manner as robotics and nanotechnology hold the potential
316 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION, VOL. 50, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2007

to evolve themselves with complete indifference to representing difficult, multi-faceted issues, often
humanity. Joy’s concern is essentially ethical: involving highlighting the approach of one’s own
organization against the approaches of opponents
The experiences of the atomic scientists clearly
or competitors. At what point, one must ask
show the need to take personal responsibility,
ethically, does selective representation lead to
the danger that things will move too fast, and
confusing or misleading consumers, stakeholders,
the way in which a process can take on a life
and the citizenry?
of its own . We must do more thinking up
front if we are not to be similarly surprised and The environment is certainly one of these areas in
shocked by the consequences of our inventions. which technical and professional communication
[59, p. 262] can be ethically fraught, as the following scenarios
For Joy, the metaphysical world of ethics is as demonstrate:
important as the 1s and 0s of the technology he • The alleged suppression or distortion of
created. scientific discourse and expert opinion about
the magnitude and cause of global warming, in
I think the same frame of mind will pervade our field which technical documents were allegedly edited
as communicators committed to technology and for political interests.
science will also become increasingly concerned • The debate about the suitability of Yucca
about the ethical or values dimensions of what they Mountain as a national long-term depository of
communicate about. This concern will include not nuclear waste, in which very low probabilities
only the manner of their communication but also in the very distant future are balanced against
the likely consequences of putting technologies concerns about homeland security and
into practice. Though part of the impetus for such immediate environmental risks.
concern will come from the legal world out of a • The debate about the revival of the US nuclear
desire to limit liability exposure, another important power industry, including the streamlining of
part of the impetus will be a keener sense of our the NRC/DOE review and licensing process, in
shared humanity. This involves us as not only those which probabilities of risk are balanced against
who communicate, but also as the receivers of concerns about oil dependency and global
other’s communications, and as users of emerging warming.
technologies. • The debate about the environmental risks of
drilling for oil in off-shore fields or in Arctic
International technical and professional wildlife refuges, in which the environmental
communication is increasingly important as risks of indeterminate magnitude are compared
the globalization of commerce, transportation, against immediate economic benefits.
communication, and whole societies progress. This • Commercial and government efforts to represent
increased interchange between nations is also the desirability of increasing the use of
among cultures, and therefore also among value coal for energy production in the face of
systems. For this reason, an increased awareness increasing demand for energy and concerns
of and sensitivity to values and ethical differences about oil dependency, which could focus
among cultures will become increasingly necessary largely or exclusively on the positive benefits
for corporations and institutions to remain both while minimizing or ignoring the negative
competitive and successful. At the same time, I consequences. On the other hand, in a context
think this highlighting of differences will also have in which eco-activists are portraying the use of
an inverse effect—the highlighting of commonalities coal for energy as an intrinsically unacceptable
among cultures and ethical systems, and also a activity, it might be difficult to portray one’s
gradual assimilation, perhaps, across cultures position even-handedly.
toward those commonalities. Useful objects of study
in this direction are the European Union itself and A detailed example of the application of an
the International Organization for Standardization ethical perspective to technical and professional
(ISO). communication appears in two articles by Dragga
(working at Texas Tech) and Voss (working at
There are many contemporary contexts in which Lockheed Martin) in Technical Communication
the ethical dimensions of technical, scientific, or mentioned earlier [40], [41]. They argue that visual
professional communication are not significant, illustrators have an ethical responsibility to make
and others in which they are clearly salient. In salient the humanity of those involved in order to
such situations, communicators are tasked with effect the proper response from an audience. For
DOMBROWSKI: EVOLVING FACE OF ETHICS IN TECHNICAL AND PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION 317

example, in mining accidents, rather than solely renounce war and alter their traditional perceptions
depicting the mechanical devices involved in their of national sovereignty, he quotes the famous
spatial situation, human figures or photographs manifesto drafted by Bertrand Russell and Albert
are necessary to communicate the human toll such Einstein on which the conference was founded:
accidents take. These two articles inspired a great
We appeal, as human beings, to human beings:
number of letters to the journal editor, responses
Remember your humanity and forget the rest.
both agreeing and disagreeing. Recall that it is
If you can do so, the way lies open to a new
intrinsic to almost any substantive discussion
paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you
of ethics that there will be serious and earnest
the risk of universal death. [61, p. 1]
disagreements, as there were regarding this pair
of articles.
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Polytechnic Institute (RPI). He is a Professor of English at the
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