FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 190809. February 13, 2017.]

DE LA SALLE ARANETA UNIVERSITY , petitioner, vs . JUANITO C.

BERNARDO , respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO , J : p

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court led by De La Salle-Araneta University (DLS-AU) seeking the annulment and
reversal of the Decision 1 dated June 29, 2009 and Resolution 2 dated January 4, 2010
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106399, which af rmed in toto the Decision 3
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 043416-05.
The NLRC reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter's Decision 4 dated December 13,
2004 in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-02729-04 and found that respondent Juanito C.
Bernardo (Bernardo) was entitled to retirement benefits.
On February 26, 2004, Bernardo led a complaint against DLS-AU and its
owner/manager, Dr. Oscar Bautista (Dr. Bautista), for the payment of retirement
bene ts. Bernardo alleged that he started working as a part-time professional lecturer
at DLS-AU (formerly known as the Araneta University Foundation) on June 1, 1974 for
an hourly rate of P20.00. Bernardo taught for two semesters and the summer for the
school year 1974-1975. Bernardo then took a leave of absence from June 1, 1975 to
October 31, 1977 when he was assigned by the Philippine Government to work in
Papua New Guinea. When Bernardo came back in 1977, he resumed teaching at DLS-AU
until October 12, 2003, the end of the rst semester for school year 2003-2004.
Bernardo's teaching contract was renewed at the start of every semester and summer.
However, on November 8, 2003, DLS-AU informed Bernardo through a telephone call
that he could not teach at the school anymore as the school was implementing the
retirement age limit for its faculty members. As he was already 75 years old, Bernardo
had no choice but to retire. At the time of his retirement, Bernardo was being paid
P246.50 per hour. 5
Bernardo immediately sought advice from the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) regarding his entitlement to retirement bene ts after 27 years of
employment. In letters dated January 20, 2004 6 and February 3, 2004, 7 the DOLE,
through its Public Assistance Center and Legal Service Of ce, opined that Bernardo
was entitled to receive bene ts under Republic Act No. 7641, otherwise known as the
"New Retirement Law," and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Yet, Dr. Bautista, in a letter 8 dated February 12, 2004, stated that Bernardo was
not entitled to any kind of separation pay or benefits. Dr. Bautista explained to Bernardo
that as mandated by the DLS-AU's policy and Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA),
only full-time permanent faculty of DLS-AU for at least ve years immediately
preceeding the termination of their employment could avail themselves of the post-
employment bene ts. As part-time faculty member, Bernardo did not acquire
permanent employment under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, in relation
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 to the Labor Code, regardless of his length of service.
Aggrieved by the repeated denials of his claim for retirement bene ts, Bernardo
led before the NLRC, National Capital Region, a complaint for non-payment of
retirement benefits and damages against DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista.
DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista averred that DLS-AU is a non-stock, non-pro t
educational institution duly organized under Philippine laws, and Dr. Bautista was then
its Executive Vice-President. DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista countered that Bernardo was
hired as a part-time lecturer at the Graduate School of DLS-AU to teach Recent
Advances in Animal Nutrition for the rst semester of school year 2003-2004. As
stated in the Contract for Part-Time Faculty Member Semestral, Bernardo bound
himself to teach "for the period of one semester beginning June 9, 2003 to October 12,
2003." The contract also provided that "this Contract shall automatically expire unless
expressly renewed in writing." 9 Prior contracts entered into between Bernardo and
DLS-AU essentially contained the same provisions. On November 8, 2003, DLS-AU
informed Bernardo that his contract would no longer be renewed. DLS-AU and Dr.
Bautista were surprised when they received a letter from Bernardo on February 18,
2004 claiming retirement bene ts and Summons dated February 26, 2004 from the
NLRC in relation to Bernardo's complaint. 1 0
DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista maintained that Bernardo, as a part-time employee, was
not entitled to retirement bene ts. The contract between DLS-AU and Bernardo was for
a xed term, i.e., one semester. Contracts of employment for a xed term are not
proscribed by law, provided that they had been entered into by the parties without any
force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and
absent any other circumstance vitiating consent. That DLS-AU no longer renewed
Bernardo's contract did not necessarily mean that Bernardo should be deemed retired
from service. CAIHTE

DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista also contended that Bernardo, as a part-time employee,
was not entitled to retirement bene ts pursuant to any retirement plan, CBA, or
employment contract. Neither was DLS-AU mandated by law to pay Bernardo
retirement bene ts. The compulsory retirement age under Article 302 [287] of the
Labor Code, as amended, is 65 years old. When the employee reaches said age, his/her
employment is deemed terminated. The matter of extension of the employee's service
is addressed to the sound discretion of the employer; it is a privilege only the employer
can grant. In this case, Bernardo was effectively separated from the service upon
reaching the age of 65 years old. DLS-AU merely granted Bernardo the privilege to
teach by engaging his services for several more years after reaching the compulsory
retirement age. Assuming arguendo that Bernardo was entitled to retirement bene ts,
he should have claimed the same upon reaching the age of 65 years old. Under Article
291 of the Labor Code, as amended, all money claims arising from employer-employee
relations shall be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrues.
Still according to DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista, Bernardo had no cause of action
against Dr. Bautista because the latter was only acting on behalf of DLS-AU as its
Executive Vice-President. It is a well-settled rule that a corporation is a juridical entity
with a legal personality separate and distinct from the people comprising it and those
acting for and on its behalf. There was no showing that Dr. Bautista acted deliberately
or maliciously in refusing to pay Bernardo his retirement bene ts, so as to make Dr.
Bautista personally liable for any corporate obligations of DLS-AU to Bernardo.
Finally, DLS-AU asserted that Bernardo failed to establish the factual and legal
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 bases for his claims for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
There was no proof of the alleged value of the pro ts or any other loss suffered by
Bernardo because of the non-payment of his retirement bene ts. There was likewise no
evidence of bad faith or fraud on the part of DLS-AU in refusing to grant Bernardo
retirement benefits.
On December 13, 2004, the Labor Arbiter rendered its Decision dismissing
Bernardo's complaint on the ground of prescription, thus:
[T]he age of sixty- ve (65) is declared as the compulsory retirement age under
Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended. When the compulsory retirement
age is reached by an employee or of cial, he is thereby effectively separated
from the service (UST Faculty Union v. National Labor Relations Commission,
University of Santo Tomas , G.R. No. 89885, August 6, 1990). As mentioned
earlier, [Bernardo] is already seventy- ve (75) years old, and is way past the
compulsory retirement age. If he were indeed entitled to receive his retirement
pay/bene ts, he should have claimed the same ten (10) years ago upon
reaching the age of sixty-five (65).
In this connection, it would be worthy to mention that the Labor Code
contains a speci c provision that deals with money claims arising out of
employer-employee relationships. Article 291 of the Labor Code as amended
clearly provides:
"ART. 291. MONEY CLAIMS. — All money claims
arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the
effectivity of this Code shall be led within three (3) years from
the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall forever
be barred.
xxx xxx xxx
The prescriptive period referred to in Article 291 of the Labor Code, as
amended applies to all kinds of money claims arising from employer-employee
relations including claims for retirement benefits.
The ruling of the Supreme Court in De Guzman v. Court of Appeals , (G.R.
No. 132257, October 12, 1998), squarely applies to the instant case:
"The language of Article 291 of the Labor Code does not
limit its application only to "money claims speci cally recoverable
under said Code," but covers all money claims arising from
employer-employee relations. Since petitioners' demand for
unpaid retirement/separation bene ts is a money claim arising
from their employment by private respondent, Article 291 of the
Labor Code is applicable. Therefore, petitioners' claim should be
led within three years from the time their cause of action
accrued, or forever barred by prescription."
It cannot be denied that the claim for retirement bene ts/pay arose out
of employer-employee relations. In line with the decision of the Supreme Court
i n De Guzman, it should be treated as a money claim that must be claimed
within three years from the time the cause of action accrued.
Thus, upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of sixty- ve (65),
[Bernardo] was effectively separated from the service. Clearly, such was the time
when his cause of action accrued. He should have sought the payment of such
bene ts/pay within three (3) years from such time. It cannot be denied that
[Bernardo] belatedly sought the payment of his retirement bene ts/pay
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 considering that he led the instant Complaint only ten (10) years after his
cause of action accrued. For failure to claim the retirement bene ts/pay to
which he claims to be entitled within three (3) years from the time he reached
the age of sixty-five (65), his claim should be forever barred. 1 1
The Labor Arbiter decreed:
WHEREFORE , premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the instant Complaint on the ground that the claim for retirement
benefits/pay is already barred by prescription. 1 2
Bernardo appealed the foregoing Labor Arbiter's Decision to the NLRC, arguing
that since he continuously worked for DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista until October 12, 2003,
he was considered retired and the cause of action for his retirement bene ts accrued
only on said date. There was clearly an agreement between Bernardo and DLS-AU that
the former would continue teaching even after reaching the compulsory retirement age
of 65 years. In addition, under Republic Act No. 7641, part-time workers are entitled to
retirement pay of one-half month salary for every years of service, provided that the
following conditions are present: (a) there is no retirement plan between the employer
and employees; (b) the employee has reached the age of 60 years old for optional
retirement or 65 years old for compulsory retirement; and (c) the employee should have
rendered at least ve years of service with the employer. Bernardo avowed that all
these conditions were extant in his case. DETACa

The NLRC, in its Decision dated June 30, 2008, reversed the Labor Arbiter's ruling
and found that Bernardo timely led his complaint for retirement bene ts. The NLRC
pointed out that DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista, knowing fully well that Bernardo already
reached the compulsory age of retirement of 65 years old, still extended Bernardo's
employment. Thus, Bernardo's cause of action for payment of his retirement bene ts
accrued only on November 8, 2003, when he was informed by DLS-AU that his contract
would no longer be renewed and he was deemed separated from employment. The
principle of estoppel was also applicable against DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista who could
not validly claim prescription when they were the ones who permitted Bernardo to work
beyond retirement age. As to Bernardo's entitlement to retirement bene ts, the NLRC
held:
Equally untenable is the contention that [Bernardo], being a part time
employee, is not entitled to retirement bene ts under Republic Act No. 7641.
Indeed, a perusal of the retirement law does not exclude a part time employee
from enjoying retirement bene ts. On this score, Republic Act No. 7641 explicitly
provides as within its coverage "all employees in the private sector, regardless of
their position, designation, or status, and irrespective of the method by which
their wages are paid" (Section 1, Rules Implementing the New Retirement Law)
(Underlined for emphasis). The only exceptions are employees covered by the
Civil Service Law; domestic helpers and persons in the personal service of
another; and employees in retail, service and agricultural establishments or
operations regularly employing not more than ten employees (ibid) . Clearly,
[Bernardo] does not fall under any of the exceptions.
Lastly, it is axiomatic that retirement law should be construed liberally in
favor of the employee, and all doubts as to the intent of the laws should be
resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purpose (Re: Gregorio
G. Pineda, 187 SCRA 469, 1990). A contrary ruling would inevitably defy such
settled rule. 1 3
In the end, the NLRC adjudged:
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 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING
ASIDE the appealed decision of the Labor Arbiter. Accordingly, a new one is
issued nding [Bernardo] entitled to retirement bene ts under Republic Act No.
7641 and ordering [DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista] to pay [Bernardo] his retirement
bene ts equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month of his latest salary for every
year of his service. Other claims are hereby denied for lack of merit. 1 4
In a Resolution dated September 15, 2008, the NLRC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista for lack of merit.
DLS-AU led before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC for (1) holding that
Bernardo was entitled to retirement bene ts despite the fact that he was a mere part-
time employee; and (2) not holding that Bernardo's claim for retirement bene ts was
barred by prescription.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on June 29, 2009, af rming in
toto the NLRC judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the coverage of, as well as the
exclusion from, Republic Act No. 7641 are clearly delineated under Sections 1 and 2 of
the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule II of the Labor Code, as well as the Labor
Advisory on Retirement Pay Law; and part-time employees are not among those
excluded from enjoying retirement bene ts. Labor and social laws, being remedial in
character, should be liberally construed in order to further their purpose. The appellate
court also declared that the NLRC did not err in relying on the Implementing Rules of
Republic Act No. 7641 because administrative rules and regulations issued by a
competent authority remain valid unless shown to contravene the Constitution or used
to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended.
The Court of Appeals additionally determined that Bernardo's cause of action
accrued only upon his separation from employment and the subsequent denial of his
demand for retirement bene ts. To the appellate court, the NLRC was correct in
applying the equitable doctrine of estoppel since the continuous extension of
Bernardo's employment, despite him being well over the statutory compulsory age of
retirement, prevented him from already claiming his retirement bene ts for he was
under the impression that he could avail himself of the same eventually upon the
termination of his employment.
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE , the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed
Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, dated 30 June 2008, is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. [Bernardo's] application for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
accordingly DENIED . 1 5
The Motion for Reconsideration of DLS-AU was denied by the Court of Appeals in
its Resolution dated January 4, 2010.
Hence, DLS-AU lodged the present petition before us, raising the following
issues:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT PART-TIME EMPLOYEES ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE

COVERAGE OF THOSE ENTITLED TO RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER
REPUBLIC ACT NO. [7641].

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 II.

WHETHER OR NOT A CLAIM FOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS FILED BEYOND THE

PERIOD PROVIDED FOR UNDER ART. 291 OF THE LABOR CODE HAS
PRESCRIBED. 1 6
We find the instant petition bereft of merit.
Bernardo is not questioning the
termination of his employment, but
only asserting his right to retirement
benefits.
There is no dispute that Bernardo was a part-time lecturer at DLS-AU, with a
xed-term employment. As a part-time lecturer, Bernardo did not attain permanent
status. Section 93 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools provided:
Sec. 93. Regular or Permanent Status. — Those who have served the
probationary period shall be made regular or permanent. Full-time teachers who
have satisfactorily completed their probationary period shall be considered
regular or permanent.
Per Section 92 of the same Regulations, probationary period for academic
personnel "shall not be more than three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service for
those in the elementary and secondary levels, six (6) consecutive regular semesters of
satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level, and nine (9) consecutive trimesters of
satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered
on the trimester basis."
Thus, jurisprudence identi ed the requisites which should concur for a private
school teacher to acquire permanent status, viz.: (1) the teacher is a full-time teacher;
(2) the teacher must have rendered three consecutive years of service; and (3) such
service must have been satisfactory. 1 7 aDSIHc

Considering the foregoing requirements, a part-time employee would not attain

permanent status no matter how long he had served the school. 1 8 Bernardo did not
become a permanent employee of DLS-AU despite teaching there as a part-time
lecturer for a total of 27 years.
Our jurisprudence had likewise settled the legitimacy of xed-term employment.
In the landmark case of Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, 1 9 the Court pronounced:
From the premise — that the duties of an employee entail "activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer" —
the conclusion does not necessarily follow that the employer and employee
should be forbidden to stipulate any period of time for the performance of those
activities. There is nothing essentially contradictory between a de nite period of
an employment contract and the nature of the employee's duties set down in
that contract as being "usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer." The concept of the employee's duties as being "usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer" is not
synonymous with or identical to employment with a xed term. Logically, the
decisive determinant in the term employment should not be the activities that
the employee is called upon to perform, but the day certain agreed upon by the
parties for the commencement and termination of their employment
relationship, a day certain being understood to be "that which must necessarily
come, although it may not be known when." Seasonal employment, and
employment for a particular project are merely instances of employment in
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 which a period, where not expressly set down, is necessarily implied.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of
legislation culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly
appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent circumvention of the
employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said article
indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral agreements
con icting with the concept of regular employment as de ned therein should be
construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out:
agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It should
have no application to instances where a xed period of employment was
agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress
or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any
other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that
the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms
with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter.
Unless thus limited in its purview, the law would be made to apply to purposes
other than those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and
arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and unintended
consequences.
Such interpretation puts the seal on [Bibiso v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. ]
upon the effect of the expiry of an agreed period of employment as still good
rule — a rule reaf rmed in the recent case of Escudero v. Of ce of the President
(G.R. No. 57822, April 26, 1989) where, in the fairly analogous case of a teacher
being served by her school a notice of termination following the expiration of
the last of three successive fixed-term employment contracts, the Court held:
"Reyes' (the teacher's) argument is not persuasive. It loses
sight of the fact that her employment was probationary,
contractual in nature, and one with a de nitive period. At the
expiration of the period stipulated in the contract, her appointment
was deemed terminated and the letter informing her of the non-
renewal of her contract is not a condition sine qua non before
Reyes may be deemed to have ceased in the employ of petitioner
UST. The notice is a mere reminder that Reyes' contract of
employment was due to expire and that the contract would no
longer be renewed. It is not a letter of termination. The
interpretation that the notice is only a reminder is consistent with
the court's finding in Labajo, supra. x x x."
Bernardo's employment with DLS-AU had always been for a xed-term, i.e., for a
semester or summer. Absent allegation and proof to the contrary, Bernardo entered
into such contracts of employment with DLS-AU knowingly and voluntarily. Hence,
Bernardo's contracts of employment with DLS-AU for a xed term were valid, legal, and
binding. Bernardo's last contract of employment with DLS-AU ended on October 12,
2003, upon the close of the rst semester for school year 2003-2004, without DLS-AU
offering him another contract for the succeeding semester.
Nonetheless, that Bernardo was a part-time employee and his employment was
for a xed period are immaterial in this case. Bernardo is not alleging illegal dismissal
nor claiming separation pay. Bernardo is asserting his right to retirement bene ts given
the termination of his employment with DLS-AU when he was already 75 years old.
As a part-time employee with fixed-
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 term employment, Bernardo is
entitled to retirement benefits.
The Court declared in Aquino v. National Labor Relations Commission 2 0 that
retirement bene ts are intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his
life, lessening the burden of worrying for his nancial support, and are a form of reward
for his loyalty and service to the employer. Retirement bene ts, where not mandated by
law, may be granted by agreement of the employees and their employer or as a
voluntary act on the part of the employer.
In the present case, DLS-AU, through Dr. Bautista, denied Bernardo's claim for
retirement bene ts because only full-time permanent faculty of DLS-AU are entitled to
said bene ts pursuant to university policy and the CBA. Since Bernardo has not been
granted retirement bene ts under any agreement with or by voluntary act of DLS-AU,
the next question then is, can Bernardo claim retirement bene ts by mandate of any
law?
We answer in the affirmative.
Republic Act No. 7641 is a curative social legislation. It precisely intends to give
the minimum retirement bene ts to employees not entitled to the same under
collective bargaining and other agreements. It also applies to establishments with
existing collective bargaining or other agreements or voluntary retirement plans whose
benefits are less than those prescribed in said law. 2 1
Article 302 [287] of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7641,
reads:
Art. 302 [287]. Retirement. — Any employee may be retired upon
reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining
agreement or other applicable employment contract.
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such
retirement bene ts as he may have earned under existing laws and any
collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided however, That
an employee's retirement bene ts under any collective bargaining and other
agreement shall not be less than those provided herein.
In the absence of retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement
bene ts of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age
of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty ve (65) years which is hereby
declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in
said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent
to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at
least six (6) months being considered as one whole year. ETHIDa

Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half month
salary shall mean fteen (15) days plus one twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month
pay and the cash equivalent of not more than ve (5) days of service incentive
leaves.
xxx xxx xxx
Retail, service and agricultural establishments or operations
employing not more than ten (10) employees or workers are exempted
from the coverage of this provision.
Violation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and subject to the
penal provisions provided under Article 288 of this Code. (Emphases ours.)
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 Book VI, Rule II of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code clearly describes the
coverage of Republic Act No. 7641 and speci cally identi es the exemptions from the
same, to wit:
Sec. 1. General Statement on Coverage. — This Rule shall apply to
all employees in the private sector, regardless of their position,
designation or status and irrespective of the method by which their
wages are paid, except to those speci cally exempted under Section 2
hereof . As used herein, the term "Act" shall refer to Republic Act No. 7641,
which took effect on January 7, 1993.
Section 2. Exemptions. — This Rule shall not apply to the following
employees:
2.1 Employees of the National Government and its political
subdivisions, including Government-owned and/or controlled
corporations, if they are covered by the Civil Service Law and its
regulations.
2.2 Domestic helpers and persons in the personal service of another.
(Deleted by Department Order No. 20 issued by Secretary Ma. Nieves R.
Confessor on May 31, 1994.)
2.3. Employees of retail, service and agricultural
establishments or operations regularly employing not more than ten
(10) employees. As used in this sub-section:
(a) "Retail establishment" is one principally engaged in
the sale of goods to end-users for personal or household use. It
shall lose its retail character quali ed for exemption if it is
engaged in both retail and wholesale of goods.
(b) "Service establishment" is one principally engaged
in the sale of service to individuals for their own or household use
and is generally recognized as such.
(c) "Agricultural establishment/operation" refers to an
employer which is engaged in agriculture. This term refers to all
farming activities in all its branches and includes, among others,
the cultivation and tillage of the soil, production, cultivation,
growing and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural
commodities, dairying, raising of livestock or poultry, the culture of
sh and other aquatic products in farms or ponds, and any
activities performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or
in conjunctions with such farming operations, but does not
include the manufacture and/or processing of sugar, coconut,
abaca, tobacco, pineapple, aquatic or other farm products.
(Emphases ours.)
Through a Labor Advisory dated October 24, 1996, then Secretary of Labor, and
later Supreme Court Justice, Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Secretary Quisumbing),
provided Guidelines for the Effective Implementation of Republic Act No. 7641, The
Retirement Pay Law, addressed to all employers in the private sector. Pertinent
portions of said Labor Advisory are reproduced below:
A. COVERAGE
RA 7641 or the Retirement Pay Law shall apply to all employees in the
private sector, regardless of their position, designation or status and irrespective
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 of the method by which their wages are paid. They shall include part-time
employees, employees of service and other job contractors and
domestic helpers or persons in the personal service of another.
The law does not cover employees of retail, service and agricultural
establishments or operations employing not more than [ten] (10) employees or
workers and employees of the National Government and its political
subdivisions, including Government-owned and/or controlled corporations, if
they are covered by the Civil Service Law and its regulations.
xxx xxx xxx
C. SUBSTITUTE RETIREMENT PLAN
Quali ed workers shall be entitled to the retirement bene t under RA
7641 in the absence of any individual or collective agreement, company policy
or practice. x x x (Emphasis ours.)
Republic Act No. 7641 states that "any employee may be retired upon reaching
the retirement age x x x;" and "[i]n case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to
receive such retirement bene ts as he may have earned under existing laws and any
collective bargaining agreement and other agreements." The Implementing Rules
provide that Republic Act No. 7641 applies to "all employees in the private sector,
regardless of their position, designation or status and irrespective of the method by
which their wages are paid, except to those speci cally exempted x x x." And Secretary
Quisumbing's Labor Advisory further clari es that the employees covered by Republic
Act No. 7641 shall "include part-time employees, employees of service and other job
contractors and domestic helpers or persons in the personal service of another."
The only exemptions speci cally identi ed by Republic Act No. 7641 and its
Implementing Rules are: (1) employees of the National Government and its political
subdivisions, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations, if they are
covered by the Civil Service Law and its regulations; and (2) employees of retail, service
and agricultural establishments or operations regularly employing not more than 10
employees.
Based on Republic Act No. 7641, its Implementing Rules, and Secretary
Quisumbing's Labor Advisory, Bernardo, as a part-time employee of DLS-AU, is entitled
to retirement bene ts. The general coverage of Republic Act No. 7641 is broad enough
to encompass all private sector employees, and part-time employees are not among
those speci cally exempted from the law. The provisions of Republic Act No. 7641 and
its Implementing Rules are plain, direct, unambiguous, and need no further elucidation.
Any doubt is dispelled by the unequivocal statement in Secretary Quisumbing's Labor
Advisory that Republic Act No. 7641 applies to even part-time employees.
Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
Bernardo's claim for retirement bene ts cannot be denied on the ground that he was a
part-time employee as part-time employees are not among those speci cally
exempted under Republic Act No. 7641 or its Implementing Rules. Said rule of statutory
construction is explained thus: cSEDTC

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of

one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is
expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a
number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed
puts an end to that which is implied. Expressum facit cessare tacitum. Thus,
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 where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not,
by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are
canons of restrictive interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the
natural workings of the human mind. They are predicated upon one's own
voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed from the premise that
the legislature would not have made speci ed enumeration in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and con ne its terms to those
expressly mentioned. 2 2
The NLRC and the Court of Appeals did not err in relying on the Implementing
Rules of Republic Act No. 7641 in their respective judgments which favored Bernardo.
Congress, through Article 5 of the Labor Code, delegated to the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) and other government agencies charged with the
administration and enforcement of said Code the power to promulgate the necessary
implementing rules and regulations. It was pursuant to Article 5 of the Labor Code that
then Secretary of Labor Ma. Nieves R. Confesor issued on January 7, 1993 the Rules
Implementing the New Retirement Law, which became Rule II of Book VI of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code.
In ruling that Bernardo, as part-time employee, is entitled to retirement bene ts,
we do no less and no more than apply Republic Act No. 7641 and its Implementing
Rules issued by the DOLE under the authority given to it by the Congress. Needless to
stress, the Implementing Rules partake the nature of a statute and are binding as if
written in the law itself. They have the force and effect of law and enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with nality in an
appropriate case by a competent court. 2 3
Moreover, as a matter of contemporaneous interpretation of law, Secretary
Quisumbing's Labor Advisory has persuasive effect. It is undisputed that in
administrative law, contemporaneous and practical interpretation of law by
administrative of cials charged with its administration and enforcement carries great
weight and should be respected, unless contrary to law or manifestly erroneous. 2 4
We further nd that the Implementing Rules and Secretary Quisumbing's Labor
Advisory are consistent with Article 4 of the Labor Code, which expressly mandates
that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code,
including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor."
There being no compelling argument herein to convince us otherwise, we uphold the
legality and validity of the Implementing Rules and Secretary Quisumbing's Labor
Advisory, and likewise apply the same to Bernardo's case.
For the availment of the retirement bene ts under Article 302 [287] of the Labor
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7641, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the employee has reached the age of 60 years for optional retirement or 65 years for
compulsory retirement; (2) the employee has served at least ve years in the
establishment; and (3) there is no retirement plan or other applicable agreement
providing for retirement bene ts of employees in the establishment. Bernardo — being
75 years old at the time of his retirement, having served DLS-AU for a total of 27 years,
and not being covered by the grant of retirement bene ts in the CBA — is
unquestionably quali ed to avail himself of retirement bene ts under said statutory
provision, i.e., equivalent to one-half month salary for every year of service, a fraction of
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 at least six months being considered as one whole year. 2 5
Bernardo's employment was
extended beyond the compulsory
retirement age and the cause of
action for his retirement benefits
accrued only upon the termination of
his extended employment with DLS-
AU.
Article 306 [291] of the Labor Code mandates:
Art. 306 [291]. Money claims. — All money claims arising from
employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be
led within three years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise
they shall be forever barred.
DLS-AU invokes UST Faculty Union v. National Labor Relations Commission , 2 6
wherein it was held that when an employee or of cial has reached the compulsory
retirement age, he is thereby effectively separated from the service. And so, DLS-AU
maintains that Bernardo's cause of action for his retirement bene ts, which is patently
a money claim, accrued when he reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years
old, and had already prescribed when Bernardo led his complaint only 10 years later,
when he was already 75 years old.
We are not persuaded.
The case of UST Faculty Union is not in point as the issue involved therein was
the right of a union to intervene in the extension of the service of a retired employee.
Professor Tranquilina J. Marilio (Prof. Marilio) already reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years old, but was granted by the University of Sto. Tomas (UST)
an extension of two years tenure. We ruled in said case that UST no longer needed to
consult the union before refusing to further extend Prof. Marilio's tenure.
A cause of action has three elements, to wit, (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. 2 7
Bernardo's right to retirement bene ts and the obligation of DLS-AU to pay such
bene ts are already established under Article 302 [287] of the Labor Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7641. However, there was a violation of Bernardo's right only after
DLS-AU informed him on November 8, 2003 that the university no longer intended to
offer him another contract of employment, and already accepting his separation from
service, Bernardo sought his retirement bene ts, but was denied by DLS-AU. Therefore,
the cause of action for Bernardo's retirement bene ts only accrued after the refusal of
DLS-AU to pay him the same, clearly expressed in Dr. Bautista's letter dated February
12, 2004. Hence, Bernardo's complaint, led with the NLRC on February 26, 2004, was
led within the three-year prescriptive period provided under Article 291 of the Labor
Code.
Even granting arguendo that Bernardo's cause of action already accrued when he
reached 65 years old, we cannot simply overlook the fact that DLS-AU had repeatedly
extended Bernardo's employment even when he already reached 65 years old. DLS-AU
still knowingly offered Bernardo, and Bernardo willingly accepted, contracts of
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 employment to teach for semesters and summers in the succeeding 10 years. Since
DLS-AU was still continuously engaging his services even beyond his retirement age,
Bernardo deemed himself still employed and deferred his claim for retirement bene ts,
under the impression that he could avail himself of the same upon the actual
termination of his employment. The equitable doctrine of estoppel is thus applicable
against DLS-AU. In Planters Development Bank v. Spouses Lopez , 2 8 we expounded on
the principle of estoppels as follows: SDAaTC

Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that whenever a party has, by
his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another
to believe that a particular thing is true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot,
in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to
falsify it.
The concurrence of the following requisites is necessary for the principle
of equitable estoppel to apply: (a) conduct amounting to false representation or
concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression
that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party
subsequently attempts to assert; (b) intent, or at least expectation that this
conduct shall be acted upon, or at least in uenced by the other party; and (c)
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the actual facts.
Inaction or silence may under some circumstances amount to a
misrepresentation, so as to raise an equitable estoppel. When the silence is of
such a character and under such circumstances that it would become a fraud
on the other party to permit the party who has kept silent to deny what his
silence has induced the other to believe and act on, it will operate as an
estoppel. This doctrine rests on the principle that if one maintains silence, when
in conscience he ought to speak, equity will debar him from speaking when in
conscience he ought to remain silent.
DLS-AU, in this case, not only kept its silence that Bernardo had already reached
the compulsory retirement age of 65 years old, but even continuously offered him
contracts of employment for the next 10 years. It should not be allowed to escape its
obligation to pay Bernardo's retirement bene ts by putting entirely the blame for the
deferred claim on Bernardo's shoulders.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the instant Petition is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The Decision dated June 29, 2009 and Resolution dated January 4, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106399 are AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 38-49; penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario with Associate Justices
Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Vicente S. E. Veloso concurring.

2. Id. at 51-52.
3. Id. at 176-182.

4. Id. at 147-156.
5. NLRC rollo, pp. 22-23.

6. Id. at 29.
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 7. Id. at 30.

8. Id. at 32.
9 Id. at 20.

10. Id. at 11.

11. Rollo, pp. 153-156.

12. Id. at 156.

13. Id. at 181.

14. Id. at 181-182.

15. Id. at 48.

16. Id. at 17.

17. St. Mary's University v. Court of Appeals, 493 Phil. 232, 237 (2005).

18. Id. at 239.

19. 260 Phil. 747, 756-757, 763-764 (1990).

20. 283 Phil. 1, 6 (1992).

21. MLQU v. National Labor Relations Commission, 419 Phil. 776, 783 (2001).

22. Malinias v. Commission on Elections, 439 Phil. 319, 335-336 (2002), citing Ruben E. Agpalo,
Statutory Construction, (1990), pp. 160-161, which, in turn, cited People v. Aquino , 83
Phil. 614 (1949); Lerum v. Cruz , 87 Phil. 652 (1950); Canlas v. Republic , 103 Phil. 712
(1958); Lao Oh Kim v. Reyes , 103 Phil. 1139 (1958); Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of
Appeals, 165 Phil. 161 (1976); Escribano v. Judge Avila , 174 Phil. 490 (1978); Santos v.
Court of Appeals, 185 Phil. 331 (1980); Velazco v. Blas, 201 Phil. 122 (1982).
23. Samson v. Restrivera, 662 Phil. 45, 60 (2011).

24. Amores v. Acting Chairman, Commission on Audit, 291-A Phil. 445, 450 (1993).
25. Under Book VI, Rule II, Section 5.2 of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, the "one-half
month salary" shall include all of the following:

  (a) Fifteen (15) days salary of the employee based on his latest salary rate. As used
herein, the term "salary" includes all remunerations paid by an employer to his
employees for services rendered during normal working days and hours, whether such
payments are xed or ascertained on a time, task, piece of commission basis, or other
method of calculating the same, and includes the fair and reasonable value, as
determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, of food, lodging or other
facilities customarily furnished by the employer to his employees. The term does not
include cost of living allowances, pro t-sharing payments and other monetary bene ts
which are not considered as part of or integrated into the regular salary of the
employees.

 (b) The cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leave.

 (c) One-twelfth of the 13th month pay due the employee.

  (d) All other bene ts that the employer and employee may agree upon that should be
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 included in the employee's retirement pay.

26. 266 Phil. 441, 448 (1990).

27. Auto Bus Transport System, Inc. v. Bautista, 497 Phil. 863, 875 (2005).
28. 720 Phil. 426, 441-442 (2013).

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