Technical Assessment of Ballistic Missile Defence Shield:

Threat Asymmetry and Transition in Deterrence

Furqan Khan, Student of BS (Hons.) International Relations; National Defence University,
Pakistan.

Abstract 250
Introduction
India’s BMD Development
From Deterrence by Punishment to Deterrence by Denial: Role of BMD
India’s Multi-Tier BMD Complex
PAD 100
AAD 200
BMD and Indian Strategic Parameters
Deployment Mechanism
Less a Shield than a Sword 800
Offensive-Defensive Paradox and BMD 500
Countermeasures
Regional Implications
Conclusion 400
Abstract

Introduction
The silent politics of Cold War and ensuing technological advancement re-sketched the
strategic deterrence mechanism of major powers. The developments of the Cold War has
shaped the evolution of strategic calculations and deterrence manoeuvring in the nuclear
sphere where states relied on Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) to peaceful strategic
environment. MAD was based on “maintenance of strategic nuclear forces that could survive a
first strike in sufficient numbers to pose an unacceptable threat to the adversary’s population
and industrial centers”.1 However, the gradual uncertainty in war and nature of nuclear conflict

1
Flax, Alexander. “Ballistic Missile Defense: Concepts and History.” Daedalus 114, no. 2 (1985): 33-52.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20024977.
with sophisticated ballistic and cruise missiles have challenged the concept of simple nuclear
missile deterrence and MAD. Kumar argues that “missile defences were initially seen as an ideal
way out of the Mutually Assured Destruction trap. While threats of assured destruction and
massive retaliation have primarily guided deterrence equations between nuclear powers, the
propriety of leaving space for mutual vulnerability is now finding few takers”. 2 From Nike Zeus
Missiles in 1950s to the MIM PAAC-4 Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
in 2019, the United States has developed a comprehensive missile defence shield to protect its
interests at home and abroad. Proponents of the BMD in the US doubt the perception of
nuclear deterrence and believe that expecting nuclear restraint from the so-called ‘rogue sates’
is “historically misguided and strategically unsound”.3 The desire to build missile defense
system is equally inspired by the “missile renaissance” identified by sophistication in missile
technology including speed, precision and credible strike capabilities of the latest cruise and
ballistic missiles in post war era.4 Such a sophistication is visible in multiple delivery systems
including “guided and unguided rockets, artillery and mortars, supersonic and subsonic long-
range cruise missiles with improved guidance and evasion, guided and manoeuvring re-entry
vehicles, depressed trajectory ballistic missiles, ballistic missiles improved in range, survivability
and mobility, anti-ship missiles of various kinds, missile boosted hypersonic glide vehicles, and
missile boosted anti-satellite weapon systems”.5 Ballistic Missile Defense is a reaction to the
mentioned sophistication in missile technology but in South Asia, the introduction of BMD
system has accelerated lethality of delivery vehicles including missiles. For example, India’s
move to develop its Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) shield prompted Pakistan to arm its missiles
with Multiple Independently Targetable Vehicle (MIRV).

India’s BMD Development

2
A. Vinod Kumar, “The Dragon’s Shield: Intricacies of China’s BMD Capability”, Institute of Defence Studies and
Analyses, February 25, 2010, 10.
3
William T. Tow and William Choong, “Asian Perceptions of BMD: Defence or Disequilibrium”, Contemporary
Southeast Asia, Vol 23, No 3, pp. 379-400, December 2001.
4
Thomas Karako, “Missile Defense and Nuclear Posture Review”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol 11, No 3, NPR
Special Edition, pp. 48-64, Fall 2017.
5
Ibid
Indian Ballistic Missile Defense program is part of the Integrated Guided Missile Defense
Program (IGMDP) which was launched by Indian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in 1983 to build a
“comprehensive range of advanced guided missiles”. IGMDP is the mother program for all the
mainstream Indian guided missiles including short, mid and long range Agni ballistic missile,
surface to air Prithvi missile, a multi-target handling surface to air Akash missile system, the
anti-tank ‘fire and forget’ Nag missile and the short range SAM Trishul.6 The quest for
developing a credible Missile Defense Shield began in early 1990s, possibly in reaction to
Pakistan’s acquisition of M-9 and solid-fuelled M-11 SRBMs from China. Initially, India acquired
S-300 SAM system from Russia to ensure safety of major Indian cities but they tried to look for
a credible and permanent solution which could have been possible by developing its own BMD
system. At that time, India possessed enough deterrence in place including Prithvi and Agni; a
reliable source of deterrence by retaliation. However, India was inspired by a global change in
perception from the deterrence by retaliation to the deterrence by denial. However, Indian
Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) did not have sufficient technology to
independently develop any such system. Therefore, India approached a number of friendly
countries for cooperation in developing the BMD system.7

After getting disappointed from Russia, India decided to seek assistance from Israel whose
Arow-1 ABM system with long range Green Pine radar attracted the DRDO experts. However,
India failed to acquire the system due to the involvement of US technology in developing Green
Pine radars.8 Nevertheless, India succeeded in developing “target acquisition and fire control”
Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR) jointly with the Israelis. The LRTR was capable of tracking
multiple targets simultaneously and hence became principle radar for the Prithvi Air Defense
(PAD) which makes the first tier of the multi-tier Indian Ballistic Missile Defense shield.

6
Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP), Global Security, Retrieved on August 7, 2019.
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/igmdp.htm
7
A Vinod Kumar, “A Phased Approach to India’s Missile Defence Planning”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, Issue 2,
March 2008, pp.171-95.
8
Ashok Sharma, “India’s Missile Defense Program: Threat Perception and Technological Evolution”, Manekshaw
Papers, Center for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), Knowledge World Publishers Pvt Limited, New Delhi, Page 3-5,
November 15, 2009.
Besides LRTR, India also required guidance radar to track incoming hostile airborne targets. For
this, India jointly developed guidance and tracking radar with Thales, a French firm. Following
successful work on radars, DRDO acquired formal permission for developing the Anti-Ballistic
Missile system in 1998. However, international concerns and scrutiny of the nuclear
programmes of India and Pakistan kept the Indian government from publicizing the ambitious
project. In the meantime, the withdrawal of the US from the ABM treaty in 2000 also provided
India an opportunity to place itself as BMD capable nuclear power. The treaty ensured mutual
vulnerability as the basis of nuclear deterrence in the Cold War whose dismissal reflected a
departure in favour of deterrence by denial and encouraged states to employ Anti Access/ Area
Denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Frank O’Donnel and Yogesh Joshi argue that “Moving away from
the Cold War concept of nuclear deterrence, the super power was now endorsing defense
against nuclear weapons. India saw this policy reversal as an opportunity to develop its own
capabilities”.9 Besides advocating Bush’s plans for developing comprehensive Ballistic Missile
Defense, India grabbled the opportunity to gain maximum advantages and publicly endorsed its
own BMD programme; thereby leading them to test the Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) and Advance
Air Defense (AAD) in November 2006 and December 2007 respectively.

From Deterrence by Punishment to Deterrence by Denial: The Role of

Ballistic Missile Defense
Deterrence is an important element of nuclear strategy where adversary is discouraged to carry
out undesired action. It is effective only if the threat of responsive annihilation is
communicated in pretext of a hostile intent. This is because ‘deterrence works on the enemy’s
intentions” and its effectiveness is the outcome of psychological acknowledgement of the
retaliatory outburst to any contemplated action.10 Such a strategic aim is achieved in two
different ways i.e. Deterrence by Punishment and Deterrence by Denial. Deterrence by
Punishment is threatening the adversary for costs higher than benefits anticipated by the
enemy prior to the attack. This is usually placed in response to a credible threat which requires
9
Frank O’Donnell and Yogesh Joshi, “India’s Missile Defense: Is the Game Worth the Candle?” The Diplomat,
August 2, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/indias-missile-defense-is-the-game-worth-the-candle/.
10
Lt Col Andreas Shmidt, “The Role of BMD in Deterrence”, Journal of Joint Air power Competence Center, June 20,
2018. https://www.japcc.org/the-role-of-bmd-in-deterrence/
a combination of capability and will. The capability should be effective enough in delivering a
“combination of risk and cost” to the enemy’s doorstep.11 Deterrence by Punishment demands
capabilities that cut across full spectrum of threat with weapons reaching swiftly to the enemy,
defeating its defences, destroying main targets and devastating its military and population with
counter-force and counter-value strikes.12 The Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) concept of
the Cold War served as Deterrence by Punishment for both the United States and USSR, based
on a mutual realization that of imposing “unacceptable damage” to each other from massive
nuclear forces on both sides.13

The second way is Deterrence by Denial which is preventing the adversary from taking any
target desired and goals anticipated by hostile forces usually by physical means.

Being a defensive weapon system, the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is a vital instrument of
Deterrence by Denial whose feasibility is measured in terms of the degree of effectiveness
against the incoming ballistic missiles. With the technological evolution in modern weapon
systems, the concept of deterrence has transformed from deterrence by punishment to
deterrence by denial in the later part of the Cold War. The methodology of missile interception
from using nuclear warheads to the use of hit-to-kill technology with kinetic energy to destroy
ballistic missiles in exo-atmospheric midcourse phase over the decades following World War II
has opened up new avenues for the use of BMD technology. The use of Nike Zeus by the United
States to kill German V2 in the “Wizard Program” laid foundation for the tradition of killing
incoming ballistic missiles in 1960s.14 The role of BMD in esteeming deterrence can be
measured by the technical assessment of threat posed by varieties of modern ballistic missiles.
Such missiles are classified into SRBMs, IRBMs and ICBMs by range, regular re-entry vehicles,
manoeuvring re-entry vehicles and hypersonic glide vehicles by type of warhead, conventional,
chemical, biological and nuclear by payload, fixed site, mobile launch, submarine and air

11
Ibid
12
A. Wess Mitchell, “The Case for Deterrence by Denial” The American Interest, August 12, 2015. https://www.the-
american-interest.com/2015/08/12/the-case-for-deterrence-by-denial/
13
Henry D. Sokolski, “Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, its Origin and Practice”, November 2014.
14
Lt Col Andreas Shmidt, “The Role of BMD in Deterrence”, Journal of Joint Air power Competence Center, June 20,
2018. https://www.japcc.org/the-role-of-bmd-in-deterrence/
launched by platform, and finally, liquid or solid fuelled by the propellant. 15 The diversity in
ballistic missiles forms a larger counter-defensive complex; thereby delivers promising
annihilation in the first strike which leaves the deterrence by punishment in quicksand. This
pushed nations for developing Ballistic Missile technologies to prevent or at least mitigate the
threat posed in first strike by highly advanced nuclear ballistic missiles.

BMD: A Hole in the Deterrence

BMD is taken for wielding the defences against adversary’s attacks and hence a significant contribution
to the deterrence strategy. It’s use in defensive context glorifies its role as “non-escalating means”
working in realm of a pool of deterring capabilities.16 However, a BMD can only reduce the degree of
penetration intended by the adversary’s ballistic missiles. It cannot achieve 100% interception capability
which, rather than enforcing deterrence, results in higher risk of successful ballistic missile attack and
the consequences which leaves the cost of having a ballistic missile defense system unacceptable. This
reduces the credibility of the threats and hence the deterrence. This is because successful deterrent
does not only require the communication of intent but also capability to which any BMD falls short in
delivering a complete efficiency. Hence deterrence by denial effect of the BMD augments rather than
mitigate the gravity of conventional or nuclear conflict.

Moreover, improvement in the Ballistic Missile Defence drives modernization and lethality of the
delivery vehicle on part of the adversary. The adversary tries to develop capabilities that render the
BMD system obsolete by leaking into the defences. The capabilities include MIRV technology, the high
altitude nuclear blast or the Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attack and using swift or manoeuvrable re-
entry vehicles with unpredictable flight paths that reduces interception probabilities, resulting in
successful delivery of threat. For example, UK deployed UGM-23 Polaris SLBM in response to the BMD
around Moscow whose defended footprint stretched about 450 nm in front of Moscow while 950 miles
beyond it. Also, a BMD not only reduces the threshold of conflict but also multiplies the lethality of
weapons used by the adversary. Hence a credible BMD has the ability to deter the use of certain

15
Ibid
16
Ibid
weapons but can also result in an aggravated conflict. Therefore, BMD fluctuates the deterrence stability
or the ‘Holy Grail’ of arms control.17

Indian Multi-Tier BMD Complex

In November 2006, India became 4th nation on earth to have successfully tested the indigenously
developed Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system. The system consists of two layers that are designed
to intercept any conventional or nuclear missile threat at both endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric
altitude. The systems include Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) and Advanced Air Defense (AAD).

Prithvi Air Defense (PAD)

Prithvi Air Defense is the first indigenous BMD system employed by India in November 2006. The system
is armed with two-staged missiles that can intercept missiles in the exo-atmospheric altitude of 80km.
PAD can engage any ballistic missile of class that ranges from 300km to 2000 km with a speed 5 times
the speed of sound (Mach 5). The system is guided by inertial navigation system in the midcourse by the
Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR) while in terminal phase by the active radar homing. LRTR is also
known as the Swordfish which was jointly developed by India and Israel and sketched around the EL/M-
2080 Green Pine radar of Arrow-2 missile defense system. However, India’s LRTR is a target acquisition
and fire control radar sufficiently modified in “transmit-receive modules, signal processing computers
and power supply”.18

Advanced Air Defense (AAD)

Advance Air Defense is the second tier of Indian Ballistic Missle Defense shield which is designed to
intercept incoming missiles at the Endo-atmospheric altitude of almost 30 kms. The system employs a
two-staged missile interceptor propelled by solid fuel. AAD relies on the same navigation system as that
of PAD i.e. inertial navigation system with ground based radars provides midcourse information and is
guided by active radar homing in terminal phase. The system is subjected to multiple test missions since
December 2007 on ballistic missile Prithvi II, with improvement in varying dimensions, from guidance
system to the range of interception and manoeuvrability.

17
Michael Krepon, “The Holy Grail of Deterrence Stability”, Arms Control Wonk, July 9, 2018.
https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1205441/the-holy-grail-of-deterrence-stability/

18
Brig (Retd) Rajev Bhutani, “Operationalization of India’s Ballistic Missile Defense”, Center for Joint Warfare
Studies, New Delhi, 2017.
Inspired by the successful tests of the Advance Air Defense, the Indian scientists have developed a more
advanced version of the missile known as Surface-to-Air Ashwin Advance Air Defense system.

Akash Air Defense System

BMD and Indian Strategic Parameters

India’s perception on BMD development is taken in view of the volatile nuclear strategic environment in
the region. The country is vulnerable to a variety of ballistic and cruise missiles of varying capacities
from two nuclear armed adversaries, Pakistan and China. The modernization of nuclear forces by China
and fast growing nuclear arsenal of Pakistan keeps India in fear of being disadvantaged in a ‘joint
fighting capability’ in case of war with Pakistan and China. Therefore, India believes in keeping a
sufficient BMD force to hold sway in defeating Chinese Area Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities in
Western Pacific while broaden prospects for a limited war with Pakistan.19 Indian experts mention the
possibility of a Bolt-from-the-Blue strike as rationale for having proactive defences which is largely
attributed to the domestic politics of Pakistan, though makes little sense in terms of the credibility held
by Pakistan’s Strategic Forces. Rajesh Basrur explains that a “limited BMD can also deter a state with
revisionist intentions that would want to carry out a Bolt-from-the-Blue strike. In other words, if
generating dissuasion in the mind of the aggressor is central to nuclear deterrence, a limited BMD shield
could potentially achieve that in the South Asian context”.20

Deployment Mechanism
Indian experts frame the deployment of Ballistic Missile Defense system in the following possible
mechanisms.

1. Deployment of a comprehensive land and sea-based BMD system across the country to deal
with the offensive first strike.
2. The second option is to secure the “critical population centres, command and control centres,
nuclear forces and vital economic zones”.21

19
Kamlesh K. Agnihotri, “China’s ‘Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile’ Based Anti-Access Concept: Implications of a
Southward Re-orientation”, Journal of Defence Studies 7, no. 1 (2013): 9–30.
20
Rajesh M. Basrur, “Missile Defense and South Asia: An Indian Perspective”, Stimson Center, Washington D.C, 7,
2002.
21
Balraj Nagal, “India and Ballistic Missile Defense: Further a Defensive Deterrent”, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, June 30, 2016. https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-and-ballistic-missile-
defense-furthering-defensive-deterrent-pub-63966
 3. Thirdly, the deployment of BMD in a “selective coverage of command and control centres,
nuclear forces and important metropolitan cities”.22
4. Fourth is to deploy BMD to protect strategic command and control centres, nuclear assets and
the capital New Delhi.
5. Lastly, deployment to protect the instrumental command and control centres and New Delhi to
retain the second strike capability.

The first two options require a comprehensive Area Ballistic Missile Defense while the rest of the three
demands Point Ballistic Missile Defense system. Generally, Area BMD is preferred over the Point BMD
for it ensures safety of large metropolitan cities and strategic installations whose location is bound to
remain uncertain.23 However, deployment of BMD along the first two mechanisms remains highly
unlikely for a number of reasons. The cost-exchange ratio and technology required for fielding such a
comprehensive coverage squarely grounds Indian capacity and capability. India cannot afford a “pan-
national missile interception capability” due to financial constraints.24 This is also because Pakistan and
China holds a variety of ballistic and cruise missiles which make the systems vulnerable to ground and
air attacks, especially in the border regions. In addition to this, no BMD can detect and intercept a low-
flying cruise missile which can knock out Indian BMDs with an intended Destruction of Enemy Air
Defense (DEAD) mission from Pakistan or China. Joshi and O’Donnell argue that “India also realized that
a limited BMD, especially to secure its political leadership and nuclear command and control against a
first strike, would augment the credibility of its second-strike nuclear posture”.25 Therefore, India will
choose selective coverage of important strategic command and control centres and the capital so as to
retain the capability to respond to a first strike with a “vital retaliatory nuclear force”. India believes in
offsetting the gap between its No First Use policy against Pakistan’s First Use of nuclear weapons by
using missile defense shield to avoid annihilation of its capability of assured destruction in a first strike
by the adversary. Such a calculation, however, remains prey to the uncertainty of the missile defense
shield since no BMD can effectively counter 100% of the incoming hostile targets. Attendant to the fact,
however, India will be able to secure its “retaliatory capability and the command and control elements
necessary to launch a second strike”. Christopher Clary is a US scholar who maintains that “Indian

22
Ibid
23
Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman, “Strategic Defenses and First Strike Stability”, Report for the Ford
Foundation, RAND, November, 1986.
24
Frank O’Donnell and Yogesh Joshi, “India’s Missile Defense: Is the Game Worth Candle?”, The Diplomat, 2
August, 2013.
25
Ibid
policymakers must be willing to make the calculation that whatever safety comes from missile defenses
of dubious effectiveness outweighs the risk that come from a Pakistani nuclear arsenal that is larger
than it would be without Indian missile defences”.26 The DRDO’s scientific advisor Vijay Kumar
Saraswat’s assessment suggest that at least two regiments of the Ballistic Missile Defense will cover
about 400 sq. Km which is enough coverage to protect New Delhi. According to reports of the India
Today, a leading Indian media firm, India initiated arrangements for protecting New Delhi under the
program “Defense for Delhi” in 2003 which also includes Mumbai, for the city hosts a number of
significant “nuclear storage facilities”.27

Hence, Indian will choose not to defend the entire territory but limited strategic, political and military
installations for second strike against any “unauthorized and accidental launch” or a “Bolt-from-the-
Blue” strike by the adversary.28

Less a Shield than a Sword

statement, “If you
have the shield, it is easier to use the sword.”

Offensive-Defensive Paradox and the Nature BMD

Like the liquidity of most of the terms in the social sciences, the terms ‘Offensive’ and
‘Defensive’ renders different meanings for different players involved in an adversarial dilemma.
Dietrich Fischer in his book, Preventing War in the Nuclear Age, unfolds the complexity by
defining terms in pure nature that “purely defensive arms increases the security of the country
acquiring them but do not reduce the security of any other state” while “purely offensive arms
threatens the security of the potential opponents, but do not (absolutely) strengthen the
security of the country acquiring them”.29 Parallel to the latter case, the acquisition of S-400

26
Manoj Joshi, “Government Baffled Over DRDO Chief's Claim on Missile Shield,” Mail Today, July 18,
2012, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/government-baffled-over-drdo-chief-claim-on-missile-
shield/1/208850.html.
27
Charles D. Ferguson and Bruce W. McDonald, “Nuclear Dynamics in a Multipolar Strategic Ballistic Missile
Defense World” Federation of American Scientists (FAS), July 2017.
28
Balraj Nagal, “India and Ballistic Missile Defense: Further a Defensive Deterrent”, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, June 30, 2016. https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-and-ballistic-missile-
defense-furthering-defensive-deterrent-pub-63966
29
Dietrich Fischer, “Preventing War in a Nuclear Age’’, Rowman and Allan held Publishers, London and Canberra, P.
47-49, 1983.
ABM System will not only be failed in securing Indian assets from Pakistan’s air attack but will
also create security dilemma by reducing the security of Pakistan. It means the Indian argument
that this ‘Air-Defense System’ serves as a ‘defensive’ weapon in Indian strategic calculation is
totally nullified.30

Similarly, President Obama’s advocacy to supply ‘defensive lethal weapons’ to Ukraine against
Russia also sparked a debate in for if a defensive weapon can also be ‘lethal’? Colin Clark tried
to defend the terminology and argued that ‘‘any weapon is defensive if you are using it to
defend yourself or your country. And since Putin is aggressor here, if we supply weapons (be
that Juvenile Anti-Tank Missile) to those fighting against him they are, by definition, defensive’’.
He went on to add that if Russia provides arms to the rebels then ‘‘he (Putin) might simply say
he is ‘defending’ the rights of Russians’’. 31This also suggests that any weapon (irrespective of
its characteristic features) can be labelled as offensive or defensive depending upon the intent;
thereby rendering the term ambiguous in its exclusive investigation.

S-400 ABM
Each battalion of the S-400 ABM system comprises of eight launchers, equipped with radars, a
command and control post with additional capacity of 16 missiles of variable characteristics.
The system has the capability to engage 36 air-bone targets simultaneously with maximum
speed of 15 Mach or 17000 kms/hour.32 The system comprises of multi-layered radar umbrella
that preserves the system’s capability to engage targets at long-ranges.

According to Dr Carlo Kopp, the leading aerospace expert from the Australian Air Power, S-400
system employs the ‘optional acquisition radars’ bearing capability to engage and defeat
modern stealth aircrafts such as the F-22 raptor of the US and Russian Su-35 flanker. The
system operates at multiple frequencies such as VHF and L-band; thereby engaging fighter jets

30
Ibid
31
“Who, What, Why: What is a defensive Weapon”, Magazine Monitor, February 5, 2015.
https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-magazine-monitor-31141840
32
“Anti-aircraft missile system S-400 'Triumph”, Rocket Technology. http://rbase.new-
factoria.ru/missile/wobb/s400/s400.shtml
with stealth coating. This is because most of the stealth aircrafts have been designed to
overcome the low-detection capability of the X-band radars.33

Regional Implications
The expeditious military modernization will catalyse the existing arms race in South Asia.
Feeling disadvantaged from the rapid advancement of India’s military capabilities, Pakistan is
likely to augment its military power with more offensive weapons. The acquisition of S-400
especially will prompt Pakistan to increase its nuclear stockpile and Low Yield Nuclear
Weapons which will drag down nuclear threshold: thereby increasing the chances of nuclear
confrontation. This is because “India’s military modernization is reducing Pakistan’s
conventional deterrent” and hence leading to a nuclear arms race.34 Referring to this, the
former US’ Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Lovoy posits that “India’s military
modernization program has led to a growing disparity between the Indian and Pakistani
conventional military capabilities” which will lower the nuclear threshold.35

The acquisition of S-400 system is likely to ignite a new wave of instability in South Asia. As
predicted by a professor at King’s College London, Harsh V. Pant, that “Indian BMD will fuel
instability and affect bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, which might further lower
the nuclear threshold and tempt Pakistan to go for a nuclear first-strike. The offense/defence
paradox explains that in the mind of a state without BMD, the threat of a pre-emptive strike
will increase”.36

The long range interception and diverse featured capabilities of S-400 challenges the existing
inventory of Pakistan Armed Forces. However, every weapon renders multiple weaknesses with

33
Carlo Kopp, “СамоходныйЗенитныйРакетный Комплекс 40Р6 / С-400 «Триумф»’’, Air Power Australia, 2009-
2012.
34
Zafar Khan, “India’s Ballistic Missile Defense: Implications for South Asian Deterrence Stability”, The Washington
Quarterly, Volume 40, Issue 3,187-202, October 5, 2017.

35
Peter R. Lavoy, “Islamabad's Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation,” extracted from Henry D.
Sokolski, ed, Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, January, 2008), p.
134.
36
Hasan Ehtisham, “India’s BMD will offer false sense of security”, The Tribune, September 12, 2017.
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1503613/indian-bmd-will-offer-false-sense-security/
possible countermeasures that can be employed to neutralize its capability. The long range S-
400 ABM, though, is an advanced weapon system but holds enough space for counter-
measures. This is because the Indo-Pak border region, especially the LoC, is highly covered with
jungles, hills and mountains which can impede and distort the tracking capability of the radar of
S-400. The system overcomes this impediment by employing the mast assembly but this largely
reduces its ‘shoot and scoot’ capability; thereby making it vulnerable to a counter strike. The
exaggerated 40N6E missile of S-400 with a range 400kms is yet to be displayed and is unlikely to
be added to the exported version of the system even if showcased by Moscow. Therefore, the
primary weapon used by S-400 is 48N6 missile with a range of 240km which cannot engage
airborne targets at above 27km altitude and hence will fail to intercept modern ballistic
missiles. S-400 is useful in targeting US ballistic missiles which lags almost 30kms from the
Russian shores but is less likely to benefit India in countering Pakistan’s ballistic missiles due to
a travel distance of not more than 5 minutes. Moreover, the S-400 missile system holds a shelf
life of just 10 years which means that India will waste those US$ 5.2 billion in-case the system is
not used in a war until 2030.37

Counter Measures to S-400 ABM

EMP attack on coms38

Responding to the possible acquisition of S-400 ABM by India, Pakistan pledged to “develop
capabilities which render any BMD system ineffective and unreliable” and “to address threats
from any kind of destabilizing weapon system”.39 This suggests a possible strategy and
countermeasures that are to be employed by Pakistan in future so as to neutralize the threat of
S-400. Instead of acquiring a similar multi-billion dollar BMD system as deterrent, Pakistan can
employ the following tactics to neutralize or at least minimize the threat posed by S-400. This
can be done by employing both the

37
ShahidRaza, “Indo-Russian S-400 Deal: Implication for Pakistan”, Global Village Space, November 17, 2018.
https://www.globalvillagespace.com/indo-russia-s-400-deal-implications-for-pakistan-shahid-raza/
38
Flax, Alexander. "Ballistic Missile Defense: Concepts and History." Daedalus 114, no. 2 (1985): 33-52.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20024977.
39
Shafqat Ali, “India’’s Purchase of S-400 to destabilize Strategic Stability: FO”, The Nation, October 20, 2018.
 1. Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) and
2. Destruction of Enemy Air Defense (DEAD) capabilities.

On part of the DEAD strategy, Pakistan can knock out the S-400 battery sites through multiple
means. India is likely to deploy three out of five batteries along the Pakistani border to protect
its military installations. It means the system will be static and can be destroyed through
Human and Remote Intelligence. Pakistan can employ its air-launched cruise missiles with
enough stand-off range to be fired from a safe airspace to knockout the system.

India cannot acquire 100% escape from the Chinese and Pakistani nuclear-tipped missile strikes.
Balraj Nagal posits that they will “use saturation strikes, mixing of conventional and nuclear
missiles and extensive use of decoys to confuse the interceptors, and will attack space, cyber
and ground systems” to offset India’s BMD capabilities.40 This is important because India’s
nascent BMD will face challenges of “differentiating between conventional and nuclear
missiles” which will complicate options for India to counter-strike.41

The DEAD capability can be assured by acquiring “the SY-400 short-range precision-attack
ballistic missile system and the YJ-12 air-launched missile” from the Chinese with an intended
strike to hit the Enemy Air Defense (EAD). Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems (MLRS) such as
the Chinese A-300 with a CEP of only 30-45 meters can be used to neutralize the S-400
batteries. Anticipating this threat, India will presumably deploy the system at least 300km off
the western border, enabling Pakistan Air Force to penetrate. Pakistan can counter the threat
by enhancing its Ababeel based MIRV technology with a multiple number of decoys on board
along with nuclear warheads. Also, the threat can be mitigated by developing Hypersonic Glide
Vehicle (HGV) which can penetrate the multi-layered air defence installations.42 Moreover,
Pakistan is also accumulating a huge inventory of drones (having very small signatures) that can
enable Pakistan to overwhelm the S-400 ABM in a ‘swarm attack’ where the target is saturated

40
Balraj Nagal, “India and Ballistic Missile Defense: Further a Defensive Deterrent”, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, June 30, 2016. https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-and-ballistic-missile-
defense-furthering-defensive-deterrent-pub-63966
41
Ibid
42
Shahid Raza, Global Village Space, Nov 17, 2018.
to respond. This is evident by the immediate Sino-Pak deal for the acquisition of 48 Wing Long-
II high-end armed drones following the Indo-Russian S-400 deal on October 5, 2018.43

False Sense of Security

Terming as a ‘booster shot’ for the India forces, the IAF chief reflected the utmost reliance India
puts on the shoulders of this particular defence system.44 One of the associated repercussions
with the S-400 ABM System is that it will give India a false sense of security; hence enabling
New Delhi to go ahead with the pre-emptive strikes against Pakistan. This, however, is myth to
claim that S-400 will become the ultimate safeguard of India in case of hostile situation
between the two countries. This is because just as there is an anti-node for every node, there
exist countermeasure to every weapon irrespective of its lethality and threat.45 India’s
acquisition of S-400 ABM system “neither destabilize(s) Pakistan’s defensive fence nor make(s)
ineffective its offensive strikes” capabilities.46 Just as described in the previous section, Pakistan
can counter the threat of S-400 system by increasing the size of the attack with cost effective
weapons including air-launched cruise missiles like Ra’ad and YJ-12 and SRBM SY-400, MIRV
equipped Ababeel with multiple decoys, deploying MLRS such as the Chinese A-300. Moreover,
the three batteries, if deployed at the western border, are unlikely to cover the entire Indian
land mass which renders possibilities for counter-value strikes on Indian cities through IRBMs
such as Ababeel and Shaheen-III.47

Conclusion

43
DilsherDhillon, “China is all set to sell 48 military drones to Pakistan”, The Business Insider, October 10, 2018.
44
Rahul Singh, “Rafale, S-400 air-defence systems booster dose, says Air Force chief”, Hindustan Times, Oct 03,
2018.
45
Congressional Record, V. 146, Pt. 10, July 10, 2000 to July 7, 2000.

46
Dr Zafar NawazJaspal, “S-400: False sense of security”, Pakistan Observer, October 18, 201

47
Mansoor Ahmad, “Nuclear Weapons and their Impact on Stability”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
June 30, 2016.