EMILIO M. R. OSMEÑA and PABLO P.

GARCIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity of §11(b) of R.A. No.
6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from selling or giving
free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the
Commission on Elections.1 Petitioners are candidates for public office in the forthcoming
elections. Petitioner Emilio M. R. Osmeña is candidate for President of the Philippines, while
petitioner Pablo P. Garcia is governor of Cebu Province, seeking reelection. They contend
that events after the ruling in National Press Club v. Commission on Elections2 "have called
into question the validity of the very premises of that [decision]."3

There Is No Case or Controversy to Decide,

Only an Academic Discussion to Hold

NPC v. COMELEC upheld the validity of §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 against claims that it abridged
freedom of speech and of the press.4 In urging a reexamination of that ruling, petitioners
claim that experience in the last five years since the decision in that case has shown the
"undesirable effects" of the law because "the ban on political advertising has not only failed
to level the playing field, [but] actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the poor
candidate[s]"5 by depriving them of a medium which they can afford to pay while their more
affluent rivals can always resort to other means of reaching voters like airplanes, boats,
rallies, parades, and handbills.

No empirical data have been presented by petitioners to back up their claim, however.
Argumentation is made at the theoretical and not the practical level. Unable to show the
"experience" and "subsequent events" which they claim invalidate the major premise of our
prior decision, petitioners now say "there is no need for 'empirical data' to determine whether
the political ad ban offends the Constitution or not."6 Instead they make arguments from
which it is clear that their disagreement is with the opinion of the Court on the
constitutionality of §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 and that what they seek is a reargument on the
same issue already decided in that case. What is more, some of the arguments were already
considered and rejected in the NPC case.7

Indeed, petitioners do not complain of any harm suffered as a result of the operation of the
law. They do not complain that they have in any way been disadvantaged as a result of the
ban on media advertising. Their contention that, contrary to the holding in NPC, §11(b) works
to the disadvantage of candidates who do not have enough resources to wage a campaign
outside of mass media can hardly apply to them. Their financial ability to sustain a long
drawn-out campaign, using means other than the mass media to communicate with voters,
cannot be doubted. If at all, it is candidates like intervenor Roger Panotes, who is running for
mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, who can complain against §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646. But
Panotes is for the law which, he says, has "to some extent, reduced the advantages of
moneyed politicians and parties over their rivals who are similarly situated as ROGER
PANOTES." He claims that "the elimination of this substantial advantage is one reason why
ROGER PANOTES and others similarly situated have dared to seek an elective position this
coming elections."8
What petitioners seek is not the adjudication of a case but simply the holding of an academic
exercise. And since a majority of the present Court is unpersuaded that its decision in NPC is
founded in error, it will suffice for present purposes simply to reaffirm the ruling in that
case. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. This is what makes the present case different from
the overruling decisions9 invoked by petitioners.

Nevertheless, we have undertaken to revisit the decision in NPC v. COMELEC in order to

clarify our own understanding of its reach and set forth a theory of freedom of speech.

No Ad Ban, Only a Substitution of

COMELEC Space and COMELEC
Time for the Advertising Page and
Commercials in Mass Media

The term political "ad ban," when used to describe §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is misleading, for
even as §11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time to political
candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to procure and itself allocate to the candidates space
and time in the media. There is no suppression of political ads but only a regulation of the
time and manner of advertising.

Thus, §11(b) states:

Prohibited Forms of Elections Propaganda. — In addition to the forms of election

propaganda prohibited in Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, or other mass media,
or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print
space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission
as provided under Section 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective
public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign
period.

On the other hand, the Omnibus Election Code provisions referred to in §11(b) read:

Sec. 90. Comelec space. — The Commission shall procure space in at least one
newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in
the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or
periodical in said province or city, which shall be known as "Comelec Space" wherein
candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of
charge, equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the
area in which the newspaper is circulated. (Sec. 45, 1978 EC).

Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The Commission shall procure radio and television time to
be known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially among
the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this
purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of
the campaign. (Sec. 46, 1978 EC)
The law's concern is not with the message or content of the ad but with ensuring media
equality between candidates with "deep pockets," as Justice Feliciano called them in his
opinion of the Court in NPC, and those with less resources.10 The law is part of a package of
electoral reforms adopted in 1987. Actually, similar effort was made in 1970 to equalize the
opportunity of candidates to advertise themselves and their programs of government by
requiring the COMELEC to have a COMELEC space in newspapers, magazines, and
periodicals and prohibiting candidates to advertise outside such space, unless the names of
all the other candidates in the district in which the candidate is running are mentioned "with
equal prominence." The validity of the law was challenged in Badoy, Jr. v. COMELEC.11 The
voting was equally divided (5-5), however, with the result that the validity of the law was
deemed upheld.

There is a difference in kind and in severity between restrictions such as those imposed by
the election law provisions in question in this case and those found to be unconstitutional in
the cases cited by both petitioners and the Solicitor General, who has taken the side of
petitioners. In Adiong v.
COMELEC12 the Court struck down a regulation of the COMELEC which prohibited the use of
campaign decals and stickers on mobile units, allowing their location only in the COMELEC
common poster area or billboard, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or his
political party, or at his residence. The Court found the restriction "so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned
car."13 Nor was there a substantial governmental interest justifying the restriction.

[T]he constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal
opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article
II, Section 26 and Article XIII, Section 1 in relation to Article IX(c) Section 4 of the
Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private
vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of
expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal
significance.14

Mutuc v. COMELEC15 is of a piece with Adiong. An order of the COMELEC prohibiting the
playing of taped campaign jingles through sound systems mounted on mobile units was held
to be an invalid prior restraint without any apparent governmental interest to promote, as the
restriction did not simply regulate time, place or manner but imposed an absolute ban on the
use of the jingles. The prohibition was actually content-based and was for that reason bad as
a prior restraint on speech, as inhibiting as prohibiting the candidate himself to use the
loudspeaker. So is a ban against newspaper columnists expressing opinion on an issue in a
plebiscite a content restriction which, unless justified by compelling reason, is
unconstitutional.16

Here, on the other hand, there is no total ban on political ads, much less restriction on the
content of the speech. Given the fact that print space and air time can be controlled or
dominated by rich candidates to the disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a substantial
or legitimate governmental interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the
COMELEC under Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, which provides:

The commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment
or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other
public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges,
or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or
 its subsiding. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity,
time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

The provisions in question involve no suppression of political ads. The only prohibit the sale
or donation of print space and air time to candidates but require the COMELEC instead to
procure space and time in the mass media for allocation, free of charge, to the candidates. In
effect, during the election period, the COMELEC takes over the advertising page of
newspapers or the commercial time of radio and TV stations and allocates these to the
candidates.

Nor can the validity of the COMELEC take-over for such temporary period be
doubted.17 In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins,18 it was held that a court order
compelling a private shopping center to permit use of a corner of its courtyard for the
purpose of distributing pamphlets or soliciting signatures for a petition opposing a UN
resolution was valid. The order neither unreasonably impaired the value or use of private
property nor violated the owner's right not to be compelled to express support for any
viewpoint since it can always disavow any connection with the message.

On the other hand, the validity of regulations of time, place and manner, under well-defined
standards, is well-nigh beyond question.19 What is involved here is simply regulation of this
nature. Instead of leaving candidates to advertise freely in the mass media, the law provides
for allocation, by the COMELEC, of print space and air time to give all candidates equal time
and space for the purpose of ensuring "free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections."

In Gonzales v. COMELEC,20 the Court sustained the validity of a provision of R.A. No. 4880
which in part reads:

Sec. 50-B. Limitation upon the period of Election Campaign or Partisan Political
Activity. — It is unlawful for any person whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any
group, or association of persons, whether or not a political party or political
committee, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except
during the period of one hundred twenty days immediately preceding an election
involving a public office voted for at large and ninety days immediately preceding an
election for any other elective public office.

The term "Candidate" refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public
office, regardless of whether or not said person has already filed his certificate of
candidacy or has been nominated by any political party as its candidate.

The term "Election Campaign" or "Partisan Political Activity" refers to acts designed
to have a candidate elected or not or promote the candidacy of a person or persons to
a public office which shall include:

(a) Forming Organizations, Associations, Clubs, Committees or other

groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or
candidate;
 (b) Holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings,
rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against a candidate or party; . . .

In Valmonte v. COMELEC,21 on the other hand, the Court upheld the validity of a COMELEC
resolution prohibiting members of citizen groups or associations from entering any polling
place except to vote. Indeed, §261(k) of the Omnibus Election Code makes it unlawful for
anyone to solicit votes in the polling place and within a radius of 30 meters thereof.

These decisions come down to this: the State can prohibit campaigning outside a certain
period as well as campaigning within a certain place. For unlimited expenditure for political
advertising in the mass media skews the political process and subverts democratic self-
government. What is bad is if the law prohibits campaigning by certain candidates because of
the views expressed in the ad. Content regulation cannot be done in the absence of any
compelling reason.

Law Narrowly Drawn to Fit

Regulatory Purpose

The main purpose of §11(b) is regulatory. Any restriction on speech is only incidental, and it
is no more than is necessary to achieve its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in
the use of mass media for political advertising. The restriction on speech, as pointed out in
NPC, is limited both as to time and as to scope.

Petitioners and the dissenters make little of this on the ground that the regulation, which they
call a ban, would be useless any other time than the election period. Petitioners state: "[I]n
testing the reasonableness of a ban on mountain-skiing, one cannot conclude that it is
limited because it is enforced only during the winter season."22 What makes the regulation
reasonable is precisely that it applies only to the election period. Its enforcement outside the
period would make it unreasonable. More importantly, it should be noted that a "ban on
mountain skiing" would be passive in nature. It is like the statutory cap on campaign
expenditures, but is so unlike the real nature of §11(b), as already explained.

Petitioners likewise deny that §11(b) is limited in scope, as they make another quaint
argument:

A candidate may court media to report and comment on his person and his programs,
and media in the exercise of their discretion just might. It does not, however, follow
that a candidate's freedom of expression is thereby enhanced, or less abridged. If
Pedro is not allowed to speak, but Juan may speak of what Pedro wishes to say, the
curtailment of Pedro's freedom of expression cannot be said to be any less limited,
just because Juan has the freedom to speak.23

The premise of this argument is that §11(b) imposes a ban on media political advertising.
What petitioners seem to miss is that the prohibition against paid or sponsored political
advertising is only half of the regulatory framework, the other half being the mandate of the
COMELEC to procure print space and air time so that these can be allocated free of charge to
the candidates.

Reform of The Marketplace of Ideas,

Not Permissible?
Petitioners argue that the reasoning of NPC is flawed, because it rests on a misconception
that Art. IX-C, §4 mandates the absolute equality of all candidates regardless of financial
status, when what this provision speaks of is "equality of opportunity." In support of this
claim, petitioners quote the following from the opinion of the Court written by Justice
Feliciano:

The objective which animates Section 11(b) is the equalizing, as far as practicable, the
situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the
undue advantage offered by huge campaign "war chests."24

The Court meant equalizing media access, as the following sentences which were omitted
clearly show:

Section 11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time "for campaign
or other political purposes" except to the Commission on Elections ("Comelec").
Upon the other hand, Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code require the
Comelec to procure "Comelec space" in newspapers of general circulation in every
province or city and "Comelec time" on radio and television stations. Further, the
Comelec is statutorily commanded to allocate "Comelec space" and "Comelec time"
on a free of charge, equal and impartial basis among all candidates within the area
served by the newspaper or radio and television station involved.25

On the other hand, the dissent of Justice Romero in the present case, in batting for an
"uninhibited market place of ideas," quotes the following from Buckley v. Valeo:

[T]he concept that the government may restrict the speech of some elements in our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of the others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment which was designed to "secure the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources" and "to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people.26

But do we really believe in that? That statement was made to justify striking down a limit on
campaign expenditure on the theory that money is speech. Do those who endorse the view
that government may not restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice of
others also think that the campaign expenditure limitation found in our election laws27 is
unconstitutional? How about the principle of one person, one vote,28 is this not based on the
political equality of voters? Voting after all is speech. We speak of it as the voice of the
people — even of God. The notion that the government may restrict the speech of some in
order to enhance the relative voice of others may be foreign to the American Constitution. It
is not to the Philippine Constitution, being in fact an animating principle of that document.

Indeed, Art. IX-C, §4 is not the only provision in the Constitution mandating political equality.
Art. XIII, §1 requires Congress to give the "highest priority" to the enactment of measures
designed to reduce political inequalities, while Art. II, §26 declares as a fundamental principle
of our government "equal access to opportunities for public service." Access to public office
will be denied to poor candidates if they cannot even have access to mass media in order to
reach the electorate. What fortress principle trumps or overrides these provisions for political
equality?

Unless the idealism and hopes which fired the imagination of those who framed the
Constitution now appear dim to us, how can the electoral reforms adopted by them to
implement the Constitution, of which §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, in relation to §§90 and 92 are
part, be considered infringements on freedom of speech? That the framers contemplated
regulation of political propaganda similar to §11(b) is clear from the following portion of the
sponsorship speech of Commissioner Vicente B. Foz:

MR. FOZ. . . . Regarding the regulation by the Commission of the enjoyment or

utilization of franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public
utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges or
concessions granted by the Government, there is a provision that during the election
period, the Commission may regulate, among other things, the rates, reasonable free
space, and time allotments for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections.
This has to do with the media of communication or information.29

On the Claim that the Reforms

Have Been Ineffectual

Petitioners contend that §11(b) is not a reasonable means for achieving the purpose for
which it was enacted. They claim that instead of levelling the playing field as far as the use of
mass media for political campaign is concerned, §11(b) has abolished it. They further claim
that §11(b) does not prevent rich candidates from using their superior resources to the
disadvantage of poor candidates.

All this is of course mere allegation. As stated in the beginning, what petitioners claim to be
the nation's experience with the law is merely argumentation against its validity. The claim
will not bear analysis, however. Assuming that rich candidates can spend for parades, rallies,
motorcades, airplanes and the like in order to campaign while poor candidates can only
afford political ads, the gap between the two will not necessarily be reduced by allowing
unlimited mass media advertising because rich candidates can spend for other propaganda
in addition to mass media advertising. Moreover, it is not true that §11(b) has abolished the
playing field. What it has done, as already stated, is merely to regulate its use through
COMELEC-sponsored advertising in place of advertisements paid for by candidates or
donated by their supporters.

It is finally argued that COMELEC Space and COMELEC Time are ineffectual. It is claimed that
people hardly read or watch or listen to them. Again, this is a factual assertion without any
empirical basis to support it. What is more, it is an assertion concerning the adequacy or
necessity of the law which should be addressed to Congress. Well-settled is the rule that the
choice of remedies for an admitted social malady requiring government action belongs to
Congress. The remedy prescribed by it, unless clearly shown to be repugnant to fundamental
law, must be respected.30 As shown in this case, §11(b) of R.A. 6646 is a permissible
restriction on the freedom of speech, of expression and of the press.

Dissenting, Justice Panganiban argues that advertising is the most effective means of
reaching voters. He adverts to a manifestation of the COMELEC lawyer that the Commission
"is not procuring [Comelec Space] by virtue of the effects of the decision of this Honorable
Court in the case of Philippine Press Institute (PPI) vs. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272."31

To be sure, this Court did not hold in PPI v. COMELEC that it should not procure newspaper
space for allocation to candidates. What it ruled is that the COMELEC cannot procure print
space without paying just compensation. Whether by its manifestation the COMELEC meant
it is not going to buy print space or only that it will not require newspapers to donate free of
charge print space is not clear from the manifestation. It is to be presumed that the
COMELEC, in accordance with its mandate under §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 and §90 of the
Omnibus Election Code, will procure print space for allocation to candidates, paying just
compensation to newspapers providing print space.

In any event, the validity of a law cannot be made to depend on the faithful compliance of
those charged with its enforcement but by appropriate constitutional provisions. There is a
remedy for such lapse if it should happen. In addition, there is the COMELEC Time during
which candidates may advertise themselves. Resolution No. 2983-A of the COMELEC
provides:

Sec. 2. Grant of "Comelec Time." — Every radio broadcasting and television station
operating under franchise shall grant to Commission, upon payment of just
compensation, at least thirty (30) minutes of prime time daily, to be known as
"Comelec Time", effective February 10, 1998 for candidates for President, Vice-
President and Senators, and effective March 27, 1998, for candidates for local elective
offices, until May 9, 1998. (Emphasis added).

Failure of Legislative Remedy Bespeaks

of More than Congressional Inaction

The fact is that efforts have been made to secure the amendment or even repeal of §11(b) of
R.A. No. 6646. No less than five bills32 were filed in the Senate in the last session of Congress
for this purpose, but they all failed of passage. Petitioners claim it was because Congress
adjourned without acting on them. But that is just the point. Congress obviously did not see
it fit to act on the bills before it adjourned.

We thus have a situation in which an act of Congress was found by this Court to be valid so
that those opposed to the statute resorted to the legislative department. The latter
reconsidered the question but after doing so apparently found no reason for amending the
statute and therefore did not pass any of the bills filed to amend or repeal the statute. Must
this Court now grant what Congress denied to them? The legislative silence here certainly
bespeak of more than inaction.

Test for Content-Neutral Restrictions33

In Adiong v. COMELEC34 this Court quoted the following from the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in a case sustaining a Los Angeles City ordinance which prohibited the
posting of campaign signs on public property:

A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power

of the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if
the incident restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest. (Id., at 377, 20 L Ed 2d 672, 88 S Ct 1673.
(City Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466 US 789, 80 L Ed 2d 772, 104 S Ct 2118
[1984])35

This test was actually formulated in United States v. O'Brien.36 It is an appropriate test for
restrictions on speech which, like §11(b), are content-neutral. Unlike content-based
restrictions, they are not imposed because of the content of the speech. For this reason,
content-neutral restrictions are tests demanding standards. For example, a rule such as that
involved in Sanidad v. COMELEC,37 prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers
from campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have a compelling
reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict scrutiny. These restrictions, it will
be seen, are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional
invalidity. In addition. they will be tested for possible overbreadth and vagueness.

It is apparent that these doctrines have no application to content-neutral regulations which,

like §11(b), are not concerned with the content of the speech. These regulations need only a
substantial governmental interest to support them.38 A deferential standard of review will
suffice to test their validity.

Justice Panganiban's dissent invokes the clear-and-present-danger test and argues that
"media ads do not partake of the 'real substantive evil' that the state has a right to prevent
and that justifies the curtailment of the people's cardinal right to choose their means of
expression and of access to information." The clear-and-present-danger test is not, however,
a sovereign remedy for all free speech problems. As has been pointed out by a thoughtful
student of constitutional law, it was originally formulated for the criminal law and only later
appropriated for free speech cases. For the criminal law is necessarily concerned with the
line at which innocent preparation ends and a guilty conspiracy or attempt begins.39 Clearly, it
is inappropriate as a test for determining the constitutional validity of laws which, like §11(b)
of R.A. No. 6646, are not concerned with the content of political ads but only with their
incidents. To apply the clear-and-present-danger test to such regulatory measures would be
like using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when a regular hammer is all that is needed.

The reason for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction of speech is that
content-based restrictions distort public debate, have improper motivation, and are usually
imposed because of fear of how people will react to a particular speech. No such reasons
underlie content-neutral regulations, like regulations of time, place and manner of holding
public assemblies under B.P. Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. Applying the O'Brien
test in this case, we find that §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is a valid exercise of the power of the
State to regulate media of communication or information for the purpose of ensuring equal
opportunity, time and space for political campaigns; that the regulation is unrelated to the
suppression of speech; that any restriction on freedom of expression is only incidental and
no more than is necessary to achieve the purpose of promoting equality.

The Court is just as profoundly aware as anyone else that discussion of public issues and
debate on the qualifications of candidates in an election are essential to the proper
functioning of the government established by our Constitution. But it is precisely with this
awareness that we think democratic efforts at reform should be seen for what they are:
genuine efforts to enhance the political process rather than infringements on freedom of
expression. The statutory provision involved in this case is part of the reform measures
adopted in 1987 in the aftermath of EDSA. A reform-minded Congress passed bills which
were consolidated into what is now R.A No. 6646 with near unanimity. The House of
Representatives, of which petitioner Pablo P. Garcia was a distinguished member, voted 96 to
1 (Rep. Eduardo Pilapil) in favor, while the Senate approved it 19-0.40

In his recent book. The Irony of Free Speech, Owen Fiss speaks of "a truth that is full of irony
and contradiction: that the state can be both an enemy and a friend of speech; that it can do
terrible things to undermine democracy but some wonderful things to enhance it as
well."41 We hold R.A. No. 6646, §11(b) to be such a democracy-enhancing measure. For
Holmes's marketplace of ideas can prove to be nothing but a romantic illusion if the electoral
process is badly skewed, if not corrupted, by the unbridled use of money for campaign
propaganda.

The petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Kapunan and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PUNO, J., separate concurring;

In G.R. No. 132231, petitioners assail the constitutionality of Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 and
Resolution No. 2974 of the COMELEC implementing said law. They contend:

THE POLITICAL AD BAN IS MOVED BY AN INVALID LEGISLATIVE INTENT, ULTRA

VIRES ON THE PART OF CONGRESS, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE VERY
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION UPON WHICH IT IS SOUGHT TO BE GROUNDED.

II

CONTRARY TO THE HOLDING IN NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, THE POLITICAL AD BAN

IS NOT LIMITED IN TIME AND SCOPE OF APPLICATION.

A. THE POLITICAL AD BAN IS NOT LIMITED IN DURATION; IT IS ABSOLUTE, ALL-

ENCOMPASSING, COMPREHENSIVE AND UNLIMITED.

B. THE POLITICAL AD BAN IS NOT LIMITED IN SCOPE OF APPLICABILITY. INSOFAR

AS THE CANDIDATE'S FREEDOM TO EXPRESS THROUGH THE MASS MEDIA, IT IS
ABSOLUTE, ALL-EMCOMPASSING, COMPREHENSIVE AND UNLIMITED.

III

THE POLITICAL AD BAN UNDER SECTION 11(B), R.A. 6646 CONSTITUTES PRIOR
RESTRAINT, AND CARRIES A HEAVY PRESUMPTION AGAINST VALIDITY.

IV

THE POLITICAL AD BAN IS NOT A REASONABLE NECESSARY MEANS TO ACHIEVE

THE DESIRED END.
 A. INSTEAD OF "LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD," INSOFAR AS THE
USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES IS CONCERNED,
THE POLITICAL AD BAN HAS ABOLISHED THE PLAYING FIELD.

B. THERE IS NO REASONABLE NECESSITY FOR THE AD BAN,

BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PREVENT THE RICH CANDIDATE FROM
USING HIS SUPERIOR RESOURCES TO THE UNDUE DISADVANTAGE
OF THE POOR CANDIDATE.

C. THERE IS NO REASONABLE NECESSITY FOR THE POLITICAL AD

BAN BECAUSE ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS ARE LEGALLY IN PLACE IN
ORDER TO PREVENT THE RICH CANDIDATE FROM TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS SUPERIOR RESOURCES.

THE POLITICAL AD BAN VIOLATES THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE INFORMED

ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN.

VI

THERE IS NO NEED FOR "EMPIRICAL DATA" TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE

POLITICAL AD BAN OFFENDS THE CONSTITUTION OR NOT.

The Solicitor General and the petitioners-in-intervention likewise contend that section 11(b)
of R.A. No. 6646 is unconstitutional principally because it impairs freedom of speech and of
the press.

A quick glance at petitioners' arguments against section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 will show that
they are mere rehash of arguments in the NPC case. The lack of new arguments is a tribute to
the brilliant majority decision and equally enlightening dissenting opinions in said case
which petitioners now seek to reexamine. A repetition of the NPC rationale is thus
unnecessary.

I wish, however, to advert to the dissent of Madam Justice Romero which cites Buckley
v. Valeo,1 a 1976 case where a divided us Supreme Court ruled that limits on campaign
expenditures violate the guarantee of freedom of speech. The essence of the Buckley ruling
is that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment . . ."2

A reading of American legal literature, however, will reveal that Buckley has been widely
criticized by libertarians because its pro-business thrust has pernicious effects on efforts to
achieve much needed electoral reforms.3 Typical of the criticisms is the observation of wright
that the Buckley Court ". . . has given protection to the polluting effect of money in election
campaigns. As a result, our political system may not use some of its most powerful defenses
against electoral inequalities."4 The barrage of criticisms caused the US Supreme Court to
modify its absolute support for free speech in Buckley. In the 1990 case of Austin v. Michigan
State Chamber of Commerce,5 it upheld the constitutionality of a Michigan law that prohibited
corporations from using corporate treasury funds to support or oppose any candidate for
office. Retreating from Buckley, the Austin Court recognized the state's compelling interest in
regulating campaign expenditure. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall, an
icon of libertarians declared: "Michigan identified as a serious danger the significant
possibility that corporate political expenditures will undermine the integrity of the political
process, and it has implemented a narrowly tailored solution to that problem." In his
concurring opinion, the last of the libertarians in the US High Court, Mr. Justice Brennan,
held: "In MCFL, we held that a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA), . . . similar to the Michigan law at issue here, could not be applied constitutionally to
a small, anti-abortion advocacy group. In evaluating the First Amendment challenge,
however, we acknowledged the legitimacy of Congress' concern that organizations that
amass great wealth in the economic marketplace should not gain unfair advantage in the
political marketplace."

There is less reason to apply the discredited Buckley decision in our setting. Section 11(b) of
R.A. No. 6646 is based on provisions of our Constitution which have no counterparts in the
US Constitution. These provisions are:

Art. II, sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

Art. XIII, sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.

Art. IX (c) (4). The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate
the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits from the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all
grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable
equal rates therefor for public information campaigns and forms among candidates in
connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.

A member of the Constitutional Commission, now our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr., well explained these new wrinkles in our Constitution, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

Aware of the lamentable fact in the Philippines; no gap between these two
unavoidable extremes of society is more pronounced than that in the field of politics,
and ever mindful of the dire consequences thereof, the framers of the present
Constitution saw it fit to diffuse political power in the social justice provisions. Ours
has been a politics of the elite, the rich, the powerful and the pedigreed. The victory of
a poor candidate in an election is almost always an exception. Arrayed against the
vast resources of wealthy opponent, the former, even if he is the most qualified and
competent, does not stand a fighting chance. Of course, there have been isolated
instances — but yet so few and far between — when poor candidates made it.6

He stressed that this thrust for political equality is an improvement of our past Constitutions
which merely sought to establish equality in the economic and social fields.7
It is difficult to think why such an egalitarian law like Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 should be
condemned when it equalizes the political opportunities of our people. The gap between the
perfumed few and the perspiring many in our country is galloping at a frightening pace. As
the cost of election spirals at an immoral speed, levers of the political power are wielded
more and more by the wealthy alone. The subject law attempts to break this control by
reducing the purchasing power of the peso of the rich in the political freemarket.

Political equality is a touchstone of democracy. The guaranty of freedom of speech should

not be used to frustrate legislative attempts to level the playing field in politics. R.A. No. 6646
does not curtail speech as it no more than prevents the abusive use of wealth by the rich to
frustrate the poor candidate's access to media. It seems to me self-evident that if Congress
can regulate the abuse of money in the economic market so can it regulate its misuse in the
political freemarket. Money talks in politics but it is not the specie of speech sanctified in our
Constitution. If we allow money to monopolize media, the political freemarket will cease to be
a market of ideas but a market for influence by the rich. I do not read freedom of speech as
meaning more speech for the rich for freedom of speech is not guaranteed only to those who
can afford its exercise. There ought to be no quarrel with the proposition that freedom of
speech will be a chimera if Congress does not open the opportunities for its exercise. When
the opportunities for its exercise are obstructed by the money of the rich, it is the duty of
Congress to regulate the misuse of money — for in the political marketplace of ideas, when
money win, we lose.

Let us not also close our eyes to the reality that in underdeveloped countries where sharp
disparities in wealth exist, the threat to freedom of speech comes not only from the
government but from vested interests that own and control the media. Today, freedom of
speech can be restrained not only by the exercise of public power but also by private power.
Thus, we should be equally vigilant in protecting freedom of speech from public and private
restraints. The observation of a legal scholar is worth meditating, viz.: "With the development
of private restraints on free expression, the idea of a free marketplace where ideas can
compete on their merits has become just as unrealistic in the twentieth century as the
economic theory of perfect competition. The world in which an essentially rationalist
philosophy of the first amendment was born has vanished and what was rationalism is now
romance."8

I vote to dismiss the petitions.

Melo, J., concurs.

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

I share the opinion of those who continue to uphold the decision in the National Press Club
vs. Commission on Elections case that has sustained the validity of Section 11(b) of Republic
Act ("R.A.") No. 6646, otherwise also known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.

Petitioners, in seeking a re-examination of the decision of this Court in the National Press
Club case, no more than invoke anew Section 4, Article III, of the Constitution to the effect
that —

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of press,

on the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.
It is their submission that Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 18(e) of Comelec
Resolution No. 2974 should be declared unconstitutional. These contested provisions state:

Sec. 11. Prohibited forms of election propaganda. — In addition to the forms of

election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall
be unlawful;

xxx xxx xxx

b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or
any person making use of the mass media to sell or give free of charge print space or
air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as
provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective
public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign
period.

Sec. 18. Prohibited forms of election propaganda. — It is unlawful

xxx xxx xxx

e. For any radio broadcasting or television station or any person making use of
broadcast media to sell or give, free of charge, any air time for campaign and other
political purposes, except thru "COMELEC Time," allotted to the Commission
pursuant to Section 92 of the Omnibus Election Code.

I see, however, in the above provisions a faithful compliance and due observance of the
language, intent and spirit of the Constitution itself, Article IX(C)(4) of which reads:

Sec. 4. The Commission [on Elections] may, during the election period, supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all
grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections. (Emphasis supplied.)

It might be worth mentioning that Section 26, Article II, of the Constitution also states that the
"State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law." I see neither Article IX (C)(4) nor Section 26, Article II, of
the Constitution to be all that adversarial or irreconcilably inconsistent with the right of free
expression. In any event, the latter, being one of general application, must yield to the
specific demands of the Constitution. The freedom of expression concededly holds, it is true,
a vantage point in the hierarchy of constitutionally-enshrined rights but, like all fundamental
rights, it is not without limitations.

The case is not about a fight between the "rich" and the "poor" or between the "powerful"
and the "weak" in our society but it is to me a genuine attempt on the part of Congress and
the Commission on Elections to ensure that all candidates are given an equal chance to
media coverage and thereby be equally perceived as giving real life to the candidates' right of
free expression rather than being viewed as an undue restriction of that freedom. The
wisdom in the enactment of the law, i.e., that which the legislature deems to be the best in
giving life to the Constitutional mandate, is not for the Court to question; it is a matter that
lies beyond the normal prerogatives of the Court to pass upon.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

Melo and Purisima, JJ., concur.

ROMERO, J., dissenting;

A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds . . . .1

Not wishing to be held hostage by Emerson's "hobgoblin," I dare to break away from a past
position and encapsulize my ruminations in a dissenting opinion.

When, If At All, May The Court Reverse Itself?

The majority, reiterating the 1992 decision NPC v. COMELEC, holds that Section 11(b) of R.A.
6646 is a reasonable restriction on the freedom of expression guaranteed by the
Constitution.2 Our six-year experience with the ban on political advertisements, however,
constrains me to dissent. While it is desirable, even imperative, that this Court, in accordance
with the principle of stare decisis, afford stability to the law by hewing to doctrines previously
established, said principle was never meant as an obstacle to the abandonment of
established rulings where abandonment is demanded by public interest and by
circumstances.3 Reverence for precedent simply as precedent cannot prevail when
constitutionalism and public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which should be
abandoned or modified should be abandoned or modified accordingly. More pregnant than
anything else is that the court should be right.4

I submit that our country's past experience in the 1992 and 1995 elections, as well as
contemporary events, has established that Section 11(b) of R.A. 6646 falls short of the
rigorous and exacting standard for permissible limitation on free speech and flee press.

In 1992, this Court, in NPC v. COMELEC, gave constitutional imprimatur to Section 11(b),
pronouncing the same to be authorized by Article IX(C), Section 4 of the Constitution which
reads:

Sec. 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation
and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special
privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or
its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity,
time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forms among candidates in connection with the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

Prefatorily, it must be borne in mind that Article IX(C), Section 4 of the Constitution, is
essentially an express manifestation of the comprehensive police power of the State.
Police power, it has been declared often enough, rests upon public necessity and upon the
right of the state and the public to self-protection. For this reason, its scope expands and
contracts with changing needs.5 In the words of Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz:

Police power is dynamic, not static, and must move with the moving society it is
supposed to regulate. Conditions change, circumstances vary; and to every such
alteration the police power must conform. What may be sustained as a valid exercise
of the power now may become constitutional heresy in the future under a different
factual setting. Old notions may become outmoded even as new ideas are born,
expanding or constricting the limits of the police power. For example, police
measures validly enacted fifty years ago against the wearing of less than sedate
swimsuits in public beaches would be laughed out of court in these days of
permissiveness. . . (T)he police power continues to change even as constraints on
liberty diminish and private property becomes more and more affected with public
interest and therefore subject to regulation" (Emphasis ours).6

Thus, when the temper and circumstances of the times necessitate a review, this Court
should not hesitate to reverse itself, even on constitutional issues; for the legal problems
with which society is beset continually cannot be merely considered in the abstract, but must
be viewed in light of the infinite motley facets of human experience. As aptly stated by Mr.
Justice Holmes, "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."

By way of illustration, we first held, in the celebrated Flag Salute Case,7 that:

the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of
national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which
it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Under a system of complete separation
of church and state in the government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious
significance. Saluting the flag does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag
salute is no more a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a public
official or by a public candidate for admission to the bar.

xxx xxx xxx

The children of Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the

flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to
the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school
population which by far constitute the great majority.

The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot
mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory
laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.

The Court further predicted that exempting Jehovah's Witnesses from participating in the flag
ceremony would ultimately lead to a situation wherein:

[T]he flag ceremony will become a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very
few participants, and the time will come when we would have citizens untaught and
uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the flag and love of country,
admiration for national heroes, and patriotism-a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all
because a small portion of the school population imposed its will, demanded and was
granted an exemption.
Thirty-two years later, events caught up with the changing political climate, such that an
undivided Court pronounced, in Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of
Cebu8 that:

the idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and
recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from
one's job or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present
generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their
right to free speech and the free exercise of religious profession and worship.

xxx xxx xxx

The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent. Absent such
a threat to public safety, the expulsion of petitioners from the schools is not justified.

The Court held that its earlier prediction of dire consequences had not come to pass. It
concluded that exempting Jehovah's Witnesses from attending flag ceremonies would not
produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the flag
and love of country, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism."

In much the same manner, in the early case of People v. Pomar,9 the Court struck down as
violative of the freedom of contract, a statute prescribing a thirty-day vacation with pay both
before and after confinement arising from pregnancy. The Court said:

The rule in this jurisdiction is, that the contracting parties may establish any
agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem advisable, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals or public policy.

Citing American cases that espoused the prevailing laissez faire doctrine, the Court ruled that
the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual guaranteed by
the due process clause. The Court also cited the "equality of right" principle, holding that
"(i)n all such particulars the employer and the employee have equality of right, and any
legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract,
which no government can legally justify in a free land . . . Police power, the Court conceded,
is an expanding power; but it cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state . . . If
the people desire to have the police power extended and applied to conditions and things
prohibited by the organic law, they must first amend that law.10

Sixteen years later, the validity of the above pronouncement was rejected by the Court
in Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. CIR,11 which rationalized its volte-face stance, thus: "(i)n
the midst of changes that have taken place, it may likewise be doubted if the pronouncement
made by this court in the case of People v. Pomar . . . still retains its virtuality as a living
principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public
interests."

Similarly, events subsequent to the Court's ruling in Avelino v. Cuenco12 impelled the Court to
reverse its original position. In this case, the Court initially refused to take cognizance of the
raging controversy to determine who was the rightful president of the Philippine Senate,
ruling that in view of the separation of powers, the question was a political one not within its
jurisdiction. Despite such a ruling, almost one-half of the members of the Senate refused to
acknowledge Mariano Cuenco as the acting President, as a result of which legislative work
came to a standstill. In the words of Justice Perfecto, "the situation has created a veritable
national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be expected from any quarter other
than this Supreme Court. . . . The judiciary ought to ripen into maturity if it has to be true to
its role as spokesman of the collective conscience, of the conscience of humanity." The
Court, thus, assumed jurisdiction over the case, rationalizing that supervening events
justified its intervention.

From the foregoing, it can be seen that the inexorable march of events, and the liberalizing
winds of change may very well signal a needed shift in our conception of the permissible
limits of regulation in the name of police power. Verily, while the validity of NPC
v. COMELEC may have been etched on granite at the time of its promulgation, events
subsequent thereto now call into question the very underpinnings of said ponencia. To my
mind, the hoary maxim that "time upsets many fighting faiths" still holds true, and the Court
must be ever resilient and adaptable in order to meet the protean complexities of the present
and future generation.

In NPC v. COMELEC, the Court held that:

(N)o presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or

regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal
opportunity among candidates for political office, although such supervision or
regulation may result in some limitation of the right of free speech and free press. For
supervision or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely
conceivable without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the
general, time-honored one — that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that
the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and
convincingly proving that assertion.

This upends the familiar holding that "any system of prior restraint of expression comes to
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity, with the
Government carrying a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such a
restraint."13 This presumption was even reiterated in the recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo
v. CA,14 wherein we ruled that "deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility
against all prior restraints on speech . . . Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by
the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of
the respondent . . . to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down." NPC v. COMELEC, insofar as it bestows a presumption of
validity upon a statute authorizing COMELEC to infringe upon the right of free speech and
free press, constitutes a departure from this Court's previous rulings as to mandate its re-
examination.

In this connection, it bears emphasis that NPC v. COMELEC was the product of a divided
court, marked as it was by the strong dissents of Mr. Justices Cruz, Gutierrez, and Paras.
This fact gains significance when viewed in light of the changes in the composition of the
court. While a change in court composition, per se, does not authorize abandonment of
decisional precedents, it is apropos to keep in mind the pronouncement by the Court
in Philippine Trust Co. and Smith, Bell and Co. v. Mitchell.15 which reads as follows:
 Is the court with new membership compelled to follow blindly the doctrine of the
Velasco case? The rule of stare decisis is entitled to respect. Stability in the law,
particularly in the business field, is desirable. But idolatrous reverence for precedent,
simply as precedent, no longer rules. More important than anything else is that the
court should be right. (Emphasis ours)

Are The Restrictions Imposed by Sec. 11(b) Of R.A.

6646 on Freedom of Expression Valid?

Preliminaries having been disposed of, we proceed to the crux of the matter. Freedom of
speech has been defined as the liberty to know, to utter and to argue freely according to
conscience, above all liberties. It thus includes, not only the right to express one's views, but
also other cognate rights relevant to the free communication of ideas, not excluding the right
to be informed on matters of public concern.

The Court, in NPC v. COMELEC, found the restrictions imposed by Section 11(b) on the
freedom of expression, to be valid. First, the prohibition is limited in the duration of its
applicability and enforceability to election periods. Precisely, this is what makes the
prohibition more odious. It is imposed during the campaign period when the electorate
clamors for more and accurate information as their basis for intelligent voting. To restrict the
same only defeats the purpose of holding electoral campaigns — to inform the qualified voter
of the qualifications of candidates for public office, as well as the ideology and programs of
government and public service they advocate, to the end that when election time comes, the
right of suffrage may be intelligently and knowingly, if not always wisely, exercised. Opening
all avenues of information to the estimated 36.4 million voters is crucial for their intelligent
exercise of the right of suffrage in the May 11 polls, considering that they will be voting for an
average of thirty elective positions.16

Second, the prohibition is of limited application, as the same is applied only to the purchase
and sale of print space and air time for campaign or other political purposes. "Section 11(b)
does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television
stations of news or newsworthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political
parties and programs of government." It does not reach commentaries and expressions of
belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in
respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth. To be sure,
newspapers, radio, and television stations may not be restricted from reporting on
candidates, their qualifications, and programs of government, yet, admittedly, the freedom of
expression of the candidates themselves in the manner they choose to, is restricted.
Candidates are thereby foreclosed from availing of the facilities of mass media, except
through the filtering prism of the COMELEC.

Not to be overlooked is the stark truth that the media itself is partisan. In a
study17 commissioned by the COMELEC itself to determine whether certain newspapers
adhered to the principles of fairness and impartiality in their reportage of the presidential
candidates in the 1992 elections, the results disclosed that newspapers showed biases for or
against certain candidates. Hence, the contention that "Section 11(b) does not cut off the flow
of media reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates, their qualifications and
platforms and promises" simply is illusory. Editorial policy will always ensure that favored
candidates receive prominent coverage while less favored ones will get minimal exposure, if
at all. This underscores the need to give candidates the freedom to advertise, if only to
counteract negative reporting with paid advertisements, which they cannot have recourse to
with the present prohibition. Worse, the ban even encourages corruption of the mass media
by candidates who procure paid hacks, masquerading as legitimate journalists, to sing them
paeans to the high heavens. Wittingly or unwittingly, the mass media, to the detriment of
poor candidates, occasionally lend themselves to the manipulative devices of the rich and
influential candidates.

Finally, it is alleged that while Section 11(b) prohibited the sale or donation by mass media of
print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, COMELEC, by way of
exception, was mandated to purchase print space or air time, which space and time it was
required to allocate, equally and impartially, among the candidates for public office. Hence,
whatever limitation was imposed by Section 11(b) upon the right to free speech of the
candidates was found not to be unduly repressive or unreasonable inasmuch as they could
still realize their objective as long as it was coursed through COMELEC. COMELEC it was
that shall decide what, who, which media to employ and the time allocation for the candidates
who signify their desire to avail of the agency's air time and print space. Why accord to
COMELEC such powers in the name of supervision and regulation at the expense of the
constitutionally hallowed freedom of expression?

Given the conditions then prevailing, the Court's ruling in NPC v. COMELEC may have been
valid and reasonable; yet today, with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the prohibition
has become a woeful hindrance to the exercise by the candidates of their cherished right to
free expression and concomitantly, a violation of the people's right to information on matters
of public concern. As applied, it has given an undue advantage to well-known popular
candidates for office.

In the hierarchy of fundamental civil liberties, the right of free expression occupies a
preferred position,18 the sovereign people recognizing that it is indispensable in a free society
such as ours. Verily, one of the touchstones of democracy is the principle that free political
discussion is necessary if government is to remain responsive to the will of the people. It is a
guarantee that the people will be kept informed at all times sufficiently to discharge the
awesome responsibilities of sovereignty.

Yet, it is also to be conceded that freedom of expression is not an absolute right. The right or
privilege of free speech and publication has its limitations, the right not being absolute at all
times and under all circumstances. For freedom of speech does not comprehend the right to
speak whenever, however, and wherever one pleases, and the manner, and place, or time of
public discussion can be constitutionally controlled.19

Still, while freedom of expression may not be immune from regulation, it does not follow that
all regulation is valid. Regulation must be reasonable as not to constitute a repression of the
freedom of expression. First, it must be shown that the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from that of a particular class requires such regulation. Second, it must appear
that the means used are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

As to the first, in NPC v. COMELEC, this Court declared that the ban on political advertising
aims to assure equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public service by equalizing, as
far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from
enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign "war chests."

While there can be no gainsaying the laudable intent behind such an objective, the State
being mandated to guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, the prohibition
has had the opposite effect. Instead of "equalizing" the position of candidates who offer
themselves for public office, the prohibition actually gives an unfair advantage to those who
have had wide media exposure prior to the campaign period. Instead of promoting the
interests of the public in general, the ban promotes the interest of a particular class of
candidates, the prominent and popular candidates for public office. What is in store for the
relatively obscure candidate who wants to pursue his candidacy? Eager to trumpet his
credentials and program of government, he finds himself barred from using the facilities of
mass media on his own. While incumbent government officials, show business personalities,
athletes and prominent media men enjoy the advantage of name recall due to past public
exposure, the unknown political neophyte has to content himself with other fora, which,
given the limited campaign period, cannot reach the electorate as effectively as it would
through the mass media. To be sure, the candidate may avail himself of "COMELEC Space"
and "COMELEC Time," but the sheer number of candidates does not make the same an
effective vehicle of communication. Not surprisingly, COMELEC Chairman Pardo, at the Oral
Argument held by the Court en banc, admitted that no candidate has as yet applied for
COMELEC air time and space.

More telling, the celebrities are lavished with broader coverage from newspapers, radio and
television stations, as well as via the commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by
reporters, broadcasters, editors, commentators or columnists, as they are deemed more
newsworthy by media, thus generating a self-perpetuating cycle wherein political unknowns,
who may be more deserving of public office, campaign in relative obscurity compared to their
more popular rivals. Instead of equalizing opportunities for public service, the prohibition not
only perpetuates political inequality, but also invidiously discriminates against lesser-known
candidates.

While Article IX(C), Section 10 of the Constitution provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for
any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination," Article IX(C),
Section 4 is nothing if not antithetical to the former provision as, in its application, it is
productive of a situation wherein political neophytes are blatantly discriminated against.
Much as we recognize the basic canon in Constitutional construction that the Constitution
must be interpreted in such a way as to harmonize all its provisions if the Charter is to be
construed as a single, comprehensive document and not as a series of disjointed articles or
provisions, the predictable effect is for one provision to negate the other.

As to the second requisite, experience shows that the ban on political advertisements has
not been reasonably necessary to accomplish its desired end. First, there are more than 70
provinces, more than 60 cities and more than a thousand municipalities spread all over the
archipelago. Previous elections have shown that the ban on political advertising forces a
candidate to conduct a nationwide whistle-stop campaign to attain maximum exposure of his
credentials and his program of government. Obviously, this necessitates tremendous
resources for sundry expenses indispensable for political campaigns, all within a limited
period of 90 days. Given the enormous logistics needed for such a massive effort, what are
the chances for an impecunious candidate who sincerely aspires for national office?

On the other hand, radio and television reach out to a great majority of the populace more
than other instruments of information and dissemination, being the most pervasive, effective,
and inexpensive. A 30-second television advertisement, costing around P35,000.00 at present
rates, would, in an instant, reach millions of viewers around the country in the comfort of
their homes. Indeed, the use of modern mass media gives the poor candidate the opportunity
to make himself known to the electorate at an affordable cost. Yet, these means of
communication are denied such candidates due to the imagined apprehension that more
affluent candidates may monopolize the airwaves. This fear, however, need not materialize as
the COMELEC is precisely empowered to regulate mass media to prevent such a monopoly.
Likewise, the ceiling on election spending imposed by law upon all candidates, regardless,
will also serve as a deterrent.

Second, the means employed is less than effective, for with or without the ban, moneyed
candidates, although similarly barred from buying mass media coverage, are in a position to
lavish their funds on other propaganda activities which their lesser-endowed rivals can ill-
afford. Furthermore, we take judicial notice of the inability of COMELEC to enforce laws
limiting political advertising to "common poster areas." Many places in cities have been
ungainly plastered with campaign materials of the better off candidates. What use is there in
banning political advertisements to equalize the situation between rich and poor candidates,
when the COMELEC itself, by its failure to curb the political excesses of candidates,
effectively encourages the prevailing disparities? Why then single out political advertising?
What is the reasonable necessity of doing so?

To be realistic, judicial notice must be taken of the fact that COMELEC, in narrowing down its
list of "serious" candidates, considers in effect a candidate's capability to wage an effective
nationwide campaign — which necessarily entails possession and/or availability of
substantial financial resources. Given this requirement, the objective of equalizing rich and
poor candidates may no longer find relevance, the candidates ultimately allowed to run being
relatively equal, as far as resources are concerned. Additionally, the disqualification of
nuisance candidates, allegedly due to their inability to launch serious campaigns, itself casts
doubt on the validity of the prohibition as a means to achieve the state policy of equalizing
access to opportunities for public service. If poor and unknown candidates are declared unfit
to run for office due to their lack of logistics, the political ad ban fails to serve its purpose, as
the persons for whom it has been primarily imposed have been shunted aside and thus, are
unable to enjoy its benefits.

It must be kept in mind that the holding of periodic elections constitute the very essence of a
republican form of government, these being the most direct act and participation of a citizen
in the conduct of government. In this process, political power is entrusted by him, in concert
with the entire body of the electorate, to the leaders who are to govern the nation for a
specified period. To make this exercise meaningful, it is the duty of government to see to it
that elections are free and honest and that the voter is unhampered by overt and covert
inroads of fraud, force and corruption so that the choice of the people may be untrammelled
and the ballot box an accurate repository of public opinion. And since so many
imponderables may affect the outcome of elections — qualifications of voters and
candidates, education, means of transportation, health, public discussion, private
animosities, the weather, the threshold of a voter's resistance to pressure — the utmost
ventilation of opinion of men and issues, through assembly, association and organizations,
both by the candidate and the voter, becomes a sine qua non for elections to truly reflect the
will of the electorate.

With the prohibition on political advertisements except through the Comelec space and time,
how can a full discussion of men, issues, ideologies and programs be realized? Article III,
Section 4 of the Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances." Implicit in this guarantee is the right of
the people to speak and publish their views and opinions on political and other issues,
without prior restraint and/or fear of subsequent punishment. Yet Section 11(b), by
authorizing political advertisements only via the COMELEC effectively prevents the
candidates from freely using the facilities of print and electronic mass media to reach the
electorate. A more blatant form of prior restraint on the free flow of information and ideas can
hardly be imagined. To be sure, it does not constitute an absolute restriction, but it is
restriction nonetheless, as odious and insidious as any that may be conceived by minds
canalized in deepening grooves.

I hold that, given our experience in the past two elections, political advertisements on radio
and television would not endanger any substantial public interest. Indeed, allowing
advertisements would actually promote public interest by furthering public awareness of
election issues. The objective, equalizing opportunities for public service, while of some
immediacy during election times, does not justify curtailing the citizen's right of free speech
and expression.

Not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought
to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a
writing instrument to be stilled. For these reasons, any attempt to restrict these
liberties must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or
remotely but by clear and present danger. The rational connection between the
remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other context might support
legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest
on firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion would restrain orderly
discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have clear support in
public danger, actual or impending. Only the greatest abuses, endangering permanent
interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.20

No such clear and present danger exists here as to justify banning political advertisements
from radio and television stations.

Past experience shows that the COMELEC has been hard put effectively informing the voting
populace of the credentials, accomplishments, and platforms of government of the
candidates. There are 17,396 national and local elective public positions21 which will be
contested by an estimated 100,000 candidates22 on May 11, 1998. For national positions, the
list has been trimmed down to 11 candidates for president, 9 candidates for vice-president,
and 40 candidates for senator. It is difficult to see how the number of candidates can be
adequately accommodated by "COMELEC Space" and "COMELEC Time." Resolution No.
2983 of the COMELEC, issued in compliance with Section 92 of B.P. 881, mandates that at
least thirty minutes or prime time be granted to the Commission, free of charge, from
February 10, 1998 until May 9, 1998.23 Thirty minutes of prime-time for eighty-nine days (89) is
scarcely enough time to introduce candidates to the voters, much less to properly inform the
electorate of the credentials and platforms of all candidates running for national office. Let us
be reminded that those running for local elective positions will also need to use the same
space and time from March 27 to May 9, 1998, and that the COMELEC itself is authorized to
use the space and time to disseminate vital election information.24 Clearly, "COMELEC Space"
and "COMELEC Time" sacrifices the right of the citizenry to be sufficiently informed
regarding the qualifications and programs of the candidates. The net effect of Section 11(b)
is, thus, a violation of the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern and
makes it a palpably unreasonable restriction on the people's right to freedom of expression.
Not only this, the failure of "Comelec Space" and "Comelec Time" to adequately inform the
electorate, only highlights the unreasonableness of the means employed to achieve the
objective of equalizing opportunities for public service between rich and poor candidates.

Again, NPC v. COMELEC finds Section 11(b) valid, as paid political advertisements are
allowed in fora other than modern mass media, thus: "aside from Section 11(b) of R.A. 6646
providing for 'COMELEC Space' and 'COMELEC Time,' Sections 9 and 10 of the same law
afford a candidate several venues by which he can fully exercise his freedom of expression,
including freedom of assembly." A concurring opinion points to the mandate of COMELEC to
encourage non-political, non-partisan private or civic organizations to initiate and hold in
every city and municipality, public fora at which all registered candidates for the same office
may participate in, the designation of common poster areas, the right to hold political
caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, and other assemblies, as well as the
publication and distribution of campaign literature. All these devices conveniently gloss over
the fact that for the electorate, as shown in surveys by the Ateneo de Manila University's
Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs, mass media remains to be the most important and
accessible source of information about candidates for public office.

It must be borne in mind that the novel party-list system will be implemented in the
impending elections. The party-list system, an innovation introduced by the 1987
Constitution in order to encourage the growth of a multi-party system is designed to give a
chance to marginalized sectors of society to elect their representatives to the Congress. A
scheme aimed at giving meaningful representation to the interests of sectors which are not
adequately attended to in normal legislative deliberations, it is envisioned that system will
encourage interest in political affairs on the part of a large number of citizens who feel that
they are deprived of the opportunity to elect spokesmen of their own choosing under the
present system. It is expected to forestall resort to extra-parliamentary means by minority
groups which would wish to express their interests and influence governmental policies,
since every citizen is given a substantial representation.25

Under R.A. 7941, known as the Party-List System Act, the labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas worker and professional sectors26 will have the opportunity to elect representatives
to Congress. With the prohibition on political advertisements, however, those parties who
wish to have their candidates elected as sectoral representatives, are prevented from directly
disseminating their platforms of government through the mass media. The ban on political
advertisements thus serves as a deterrent to the development of self-reliance, self-
development, logistical and organizational capability on the part of sectoral
parties/organizations, even as it inhibits them from reaching their target audiences. What
more effective way of depriving them of the chance of consolidating a mass base sorely
needed for a fair chance of success in a highly competitive political exercise. Likewise, with
the inability of the candidates to reach the sectors they seek to represent, the right of the
people belonging to these sectors to be informed on matters of concern to them is likewise
violated.27

Finally, NPC v. COMELEC invokes the specter of the "captive audience" to justify its stand
against political advertisements. Describing political advertisements as "appealing to the
non-intellective faculties of the captive and passive audience," it says that anyhow, the only
limitation imposed by Section 11(b) upon the free speech of candidates is on their right to
bombard the helpless electorate with paid advertisements commonly repeated in the mass
media ad nauseam.

Suffice it to say that, with the exception of obscenity, seditious speech, libel, and the like, it is
not for this Court to determine what the people may or may not watch or read. Even "mind-
numbing" political advertisements are subject to the constitutional safeguard of due process.

Freedom Of Speech Expression Remains A Fresh

and Vital Verity
The guarantee of the freedom of speech which has been defined by Wendell Phillips as "the
instrument and guarantee and the bright and consummate flower of all liberty," has always
been granted a predominant status in the hierarchy of individual rights.28 It is founded on the
belief that the final end of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties and that
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth.29 Its purpose is to preserve an uninhibited marketplace
of ideas where truth will ultimately prevail.30 "An individual who seeks knowledge and truth
must hear all sides of the question, consider all alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it
to opposition and make full use of different minds. Discussion must be kept open no matter
how certainly true an accepted opinion may be; many of the most widely accepted opinions
have turned out to be erroneous. Conversely, the same principles apply no matter how false
or pernicious the new opinion may be; for the unaccepted opinion may be true and partially
true; and even if false, its presentation and open discussion compel a rethinking and
retesting of the accepted opinion.31 As applied to instant case, this Court cannot dictate what
the citizen may watch on the ground that the same appeals only to his non-intellective
faculties or is mind-deadening and repetitive. A veritable "Big Brother" looking over the
shoulder of the people declaring: "We know better what is good for you," is passé.

As to the puerile allegation that the same constitutes invasion of privacy, making the Filipino
audience a "captive audience," the explosive growth of cable television and AM/FM radio will
belie this assertion. Today, the viewing population has access to 12 local TV channels,32 as
well as cable television offering up to 50 additional channels. To maintain that political
advertisements constitute invasion of privacy overlooks the fact that viewers, with the surfeit
of channels, can easily skip to other TV channels during commercial breaks — a fact which,
coupled with the now ubiquitous remote control device, has become the bane of advertisers
everywhere.

The line between gaining access to an audience and forcing the audience to hear is
sometimes difficult to draw, leaving the courts with no clearcut doctrine on issues arising
from this kind of intrusion. This is specially true in cases involving broadcast and electronic
media. The US cases cited as authorities on the captive audience phenomenon, which,
incidentally, did not involve the issue of election campaigns,33 provide little guidance as to
whether freedom of speech may be infringed during the campaign period for national
elections on account of the individual's right to privacy.34 Prudence would dictate against an
infringement of the freedom of speech if we are to take into consideration that an election
campaigns is as much a means of disseminating ideas as attaining political office35 and
freedom of speech has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during
election campaigns.36 In Buckley v. Valeo, a case involving the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act, the United States Supreme Court per
curiam held that:

the concept that the government may restrict the speech of some elements in our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of the others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment which was designed to "secure the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources" and "to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people. (emphasis supplied) 37

The fear that the candidates will bombard the helpless electorate with paid advertisements,
while not entirely unfounded, is only to be expected considering the nature of political
campaigns. The supposition however that "the political advertisements which will be
"introjected into the electronic media and repeated with mind deadening frequency" are
commonly crafted not so much to inform and educate as to condition and manipulate, not so
much to provoke rational and objective appraisal of candidates' qualifications or programs as
to appeal to the intellective faculties of the captive and passive audience" is not a valid
justification for the infringement of so paramount a right granted by the Constitution
inasmuch as it is the privilege of the electorate in a democratic society to make up their own
minds as to the merit of the advertisements presented. The government derives its power
from the people as the sovereign and it may not impose its standards of what is true and
what is false, what is informative and what is not for the individual who, as a "particle" of the
sovereignty is the only one entitled to exercise this privilege.

Government may regulate constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling

interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the said interest without
unnecessarily interfering with the guarantee of freedom of expression. Mere legislative
preference for one rather than another means for combating substantive evils may well be an
inadequate foundation on which to rest regulations which are aimed at or in their operation
diminish the effective exercise of rights so necessary to maintenance of democratic
institutions.38

It should be noted that legislature has already seen fit to impose a ceiling on the candidates'
total campaign expenditures39 and has limited the political campaign period to 90 days for
candidates winning for national office and 60 days for congressmen and other local officials.
With these restrictions, it cannot be gainsaid that the constitutional provision on social
justice has been sufficiently complied with. We see no reason why another restriction, must
be imposed which only burdens the candidate and voters alike. To make matters worse, we
are not even certain as to the efficacy of the "ad ban" in curtailing the feared consequences
of the object of its restriction. Of course, this is not to say that the law is being struck down
as unconstitutional mainly because it is efficacious or inefficacious. If this is the only issue
which confronts us, there would have been no need to give due course to the petition
inasmuch as we would be inquiring as to the wisdom of the law and treading into an area
which rightfully belongs to the legislature. Verily, courts cannot run a race of opinions upon
points of right, reason and expediency with the law-making power.40

Freedom of Expression Incompatible With Social Justice?

The constitutional question at hand is not just a simple matter of deciding whether the "ad
ban" is effective or ineffective in bridging the financial disparity between the rich and poor
candidates. Sec 11(b) of RA No. 6646 strikes at the very core of freedom of expression. It is
unconstitutional not because we are uncertain as to whether it actually levels the playing
field for the candidates but because the means used to regulate freedom of expression is on
all points constitutionally impermissible. It tells the candidates when, where and how to
disseminate their ideas under pain of punishment should they refuse to comply. The
implications of the ban are indeed more complex and far reaching than approximating
equality among the rich and poor candidates.

The primacy accorded the freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our

constitutional system. The trend as reflected in Philippine and American decisions is to
recognize the broadest scope and assure the widest latitude to this guaranty. It represents a
profound commitment to the principle that debate of public issue should be uninhibited,
robust and wide open and may best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are or even stirs people to anger.41

The repression of expression in an attempt to level the playing field between the rich and the
poor candidates is not only unrealistic but goes beyond the permissible limits of freedom of
expression as enshrined in the constitution. Social justice is a laudable objective but it
should not be used as a means to justify infringement of the freedom of expression if it can
be achieved by means that do not unnecessarily trench on the individual's fundamental right.
The case of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration,42 is particularly enlightening. In said
case, we had occasion to state that:

Hand in hand with the announced principle, herein invoked, that "the promotion of
social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all people should be
the concern of the state", is a declaration with which the former should be reconciled,
that "the Philippines is a Republican state" created to secure to the Filipino people
"the blessings in independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy."
Democracy as a way of life enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary
components freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in pursuit of
happiness. . . . Social justice does not champion division of property or equality of
economic status; what it and the Constitution do guarantee are equality of economic
opportunity, equality of political rights, equality before the law, equality between
values given and received . . .

While we concede the possibility that the rich candidates may dominate the airwaves to the
detriment of the poor candidates, the latter should not be prevented from replying. While they
may be restricted on account of their financial resources, they are not denied access to the
media altogether. This is what is meant by the phrase "equal time, space, equal opportunity
and the right of reply" under Article IX (C)(4) of the 1987 Constitution which was inserted by
the framers of the Constitution as a reaction to a 1981 ruling of the Supreme Court that when
the president speaks over radio or television, he speaks not as representative of his party but
of the people and therefore opposition parties have no right to demand equal time.43

It is ironic that the guarantee of freedom of expression should be pitted against the
constitutional provision on social justice because the freedom of speech is the most potent
instrument of public opinion, not to speak of its being the most effective weapon for effecting
political and social reforms. Certainly, an infringement of the freedom of speech in a less
than heroic attempt at attaining social justice cannot be countenanced, for in the ultimate
analysis social justice cannot flourish if the people's right to speak, to hear, to know and ask
for redress of grievances is watered down.

A word on the intervenors' argument that Resolution No. 2983, Section 2, insofar as it directs
every radio broadcasting and television station to provide COMELEC with air time free of
charge constitutes taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The
COMELEC, anticipating its vulnerability to said challenge passed Resolution 2983-A on
March 3, 1998 requiring that it pay just compensation for its COMELEC time.

Buckley vs. Valeo and Existing US Jurisprudence

The novelist George Orwell once said, "In a society in which there is no law, and in theory no
compulsion, the only arbiter of behavior is public opinion. But public opinion, because of the
tremendous urge to conformity in gregarious animals, is less tolerant than any other system
of law." For want of legislature to equalize the playing field between the rich and the poor
candidates, it has, by imposing a complete prohibition on paid political advertisements,
burned down a house to roast a pig. For fear of accusations that it might be treading into an
area which rightfully belongs to the legislature, the Court today, by sanctioning an
unnecessary infringement on the freedom of speech, has unwittingly allowed the camel's
nose into the tent.
My colleague, Justice Reynato Puno, in his separate opinion, apparently overlooked the
thrust of our dissenting opinion when we quoted the case of Buckley v. Valeo.44 Lest we be
misunderstood, we have in no way relied on the Buckley v. Valeo case for the grant of the
instant petition inasmuch as it has never escaped our notice that legislature has already seen
fit to impose a ceiling on the candidates' total campaign expenditures45 Precisely, we have
repeatedly emphasized in the dissenting opinion that we see no reason why another
restriction must be imposed on the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which only
burdens the candidates and electorates alike when legislature has already taken steps to
comply with the constitutional provision on social justice by imposing a ceiling on the
candidates' total campaign expenditures and limiting the campaign period to 90 days for
candidates running for national office and 60 days for congressmen and other local officials.
We have mentioned Buckley if only to underscore the fact that due to the primacy accorded
to freedom of speech, courts, as a rule are wary to impose greater restrictions as to any
attempt to curtail speeches with political content. To preserve the sanctity of the status
accorded to the said freedom, the US Supreme Court has, in fact, gone as far as invalidating
a federal law limiting individual expenditures of candidates running for political office.

In any case, to address some misconceptions about existing jurisprudence on the matter, we
now present a brief discussion on Buckley and the preceding US cases. In the case
of Buckley v. Valeo, a divided US Supreme Court, per curiam held that a federal law limiting
individual contributions to candidates for office served the state's compelling interest in
limiting the actuality and appearance of corruption. However a law limiting expenditures by
candidates, individuals and groups was held unconstitutional. The rationale for the
dichotomy between campaign expenditures and contributions has been explained in this
wise — campaign contributions are marginal because they convey only an undifferentiated
expression of support rather than the specific values which motivate the support.
Expenditures, on the other hand, as directly related to the expression of political views, are
on a higher plane of constitutional values. The Court, in noting that a more stringent
justification is necessary for legislative intrusion into protected speech said, "A restriction on
the amount of money a person or a group can spend on political communication necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth
of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every
means of communicating in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money."46

A more discerning scrutiny of the US cases following Buckley, would show that
while Buckley has been widely criticized, it has, to date, never been modified, much less
discredited. In California Medical Association vs. FEC,47 a law limiting the amount an
incorporated association can contribute to a multi-candidate political committee was upheld.
The spending was viewed not as independent political speech but rather as "speech by
proxy," hence, the spending was deemed analogous to group contributions which can be
regulated.

In FEC vs. National Conservative Political Action Comm.48 the US Supreme Court invalidated a
section of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act which makes it a criminal offense for
an independent political committee to spend more than $1,000 to further the election of
a presidential candidate who elects public funding. National Conservative Political Action
Committee (NCPAC) and the Fund for a Conservative Majority (FCM), two political action
committees or PAC's, solicited funds in support of President Reagan's 1980 presidential
campaign. The PAC's spent these funds on radio and television advertising in support of
Reagan. The Court, relying on Buckley v. Valeo and the distinction it drew between
expenditures and contributions, held that the independent expenditures of the political
committees were constitutionally protected for they "produce speech at the core of the First
Amendment" necessitating a "rigorous standard of review." Justice Rehnquist, for the court,
likened the restriction to allowing a speaker in a public hall to express his views while
denying him use of the amplifier. As in Buckley, independent expenditures, not coordinated
with candidates' political campaign, were seen as presenting a lesser danger of political quid
pro quos. The Court then proceeded to reject efforts to support the statutory limitation on
expenditures on the basis of special treatment historically accorded to corporations
inasmuch as the terms of the Campaign Fund Act "apply equally to an informal neighborhood
group that solicits contributions and spends money on a presidential election campaign as to
the wealthy and professionally managed PAC's."

In the case of FEC v. Massachussets Citizens for Life (MCFL),49 a provision of the Federal
Election Campaign Act prohibiting direct expenditure of corporate funds to a non-profit,
voluntary political association concerned with elections to public office was struck down as
unconstitutional. No compelling government interest was found to justify infringement of
protected political speech in this case where a small voluntary political association, which
had no shareholders and was not engaged in business, refused to accept contributions from
either business corporations or labor unions.

In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,50 the case cited by Justice Puno, a Michigan
statute prohibiting corporations from making campaign contributions from their general
treasury funds to political candidates was held not to violate the first amendment even
though the statute burdened expressive activity mainly because the statute was sufficiently
narrowed to support its goal in preventing political corruption or the appearance of undue
influence — it did not prohibit all corporate spending and corporations were permitted to
make independent expenditures for political purposes from segregated funds but not from
their treasuries. Notably, the non profit corporation involved in this case, the Michigan
Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter referred to as the Chamber of Commerce), lacked three of
the distinctive features of MCFL, the organization involved in the FEC vs. National
Conservative Political Action Comm51 case, namely: (1) The Chamber of Commerce, unlike
MCFL, was not formed just for the purpose of political expression (2) The members of the
Chamber of commerce had an economic reason for remaining with it even though they might
disagree with its politics and (3) The Chamber of Commerce, unlike MCFL, was subject to
influence from business corporations which might use it as a conduit for direct spending
which would pose a threat to the political marketplace.

From the foregoing, it should be obvious that Austin in fact supports the holding in Buckley
v. Valeo and "refines" it insofar as as it allows the regulation of corporate spending in the
political process if the regulation is drawn with sufficient specificity to serve the compelling
state interest in reducing the threat that "huge corporate treasuries" will distort the political
process and influence unfairly the outcome of elections.

The ad ban, undoubtedly, could hardly be considered as a regulation drawn with sufficient
specificity to serve compelling governmental interest inasmuch as it imposes a complete
prohibition on the use of paid political advertisements except through Comelec time and
space despite the fact that Congress has already seen fit to impose a ceiling on the
candidates' total campaign expenditures. While it seems a rather fair proposition that
Congress may regulate the misuse of money by limiting the candidates' total campaign
expenditures, it seems a rather curious supposition that Congress through the ad ban can
regulate the misuse of money by telling the candidates how, when and where to use their
financial resources for political campaigns. Obviously, it is one thing to limit the total
campaign expenditures of the candidates and another to dictate to them as to how they
should spend it.
Freedom of expression occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of human values. The
priority gives the liberty a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions and it is
the character of the right, not the limitation which determines what standard governs the
choice. 52 Consequently, when the government defends a regulation on speech as a means to
redress past harm or prevent anticipated harm, it must do more than simply "posit the
existence of the disease sought to be cured.53 It must demonstrate that the recited harms are
real, not merely conjectural and that the regulation will alleviate these harms in a material
way.54

As earlier pointed out, legislature has already seen fit to impose a ceiling on the total
campaign expenditures of the candidates and has limited the campaign period for 90/60 days.
We see no reason why another restriction must be imposed which only burdens the
candidates and voters alike. The fact alone that so much time has been devoted to the
discussion as to whether the ad ban does in fact level the playing field among the rich and
poor candidates should be a strong indication in itself that it is a dubious intrusion on the
freedom of expression which should not be countenanced.

Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices make their initial foothold by furtive approaches
and minimal deviations from legal modes of procedure. Hence, courts must be extremely
vigilant in safeguarding the fundamental rights granted by the Constitution to the individual.
Since freedom of expression occupies a dominant position in the hierarchy of rights under
the Constitution, it deserves no less than an exacting standard of limitation. Limitations on
the guarantee must be clearcut, precise and, if needed readily controllable, otherwise the
forces that press towards curtailment will eventually break through the crevices and freedom
of expression will become the exception and suppression the rule.55 Sadly, the much vaunted
ad ban failed to live up to such standard and roseate expectations.

Freedom of Expression In Historical Context

At this juncture, as we celebrate the Centennial of our Philippine Independence, it is timely to

call to mind that wars and revolutions have been fought, not only in our shores and in our
time, but in centuries past, halfway around the globe to keep these subject rights inviolate.
To stretch our memories, Spain's adamant denial of basic freedoms to our hapless
forefathers, among others, sparked the Philippine revolution. Jose Rizal, in "Filipinas
Despues de Cien Años"56 described the reform a sine quibus non, saying, "The minister, . . .
who wants his reforms to be reforms, must begin by declaring the press in the Philippines
free." The Filipino propagandists who sought refuge in the freer intellectual climate of Spain
invariably demanded "liberty of the press, of cults, and of associations57 through the columns
of "La Solidaridad."

One of the more lofty minds unleashed his fierce nationalistic aspirations though the novels
Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo, necessarily banned from the author's native land.
Eventually, the seeds of these monumental works ignited the flame of revolution, devouring
in the process its foremost exponent, albeit producing a national hero, Jose Rizal. The mighty
pen emerged victorious over the colonizers' sword.

The Malolos Constitution, approved before the turn of century on January 20, 1899, enshrined
freedom of expression in Article 20 of its Bill of Rights, thus:

Article 20 Neither shall any Filipino be deprived:

 1. Of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the
use of the press or other similar means.58

This right, held sacrosanct by the Filipino people and won at the cost of their lives found its
way ultimately in the Constitutions of a later day, reenforced as they were, by the profound
thoughts transplanted on fertile soil by libertarian ideologies. Why emasculate the freedom of
expression now to accord a governmental agency a power exercisable for a limited period of
time for the dubious purpose of "equalizing" the chances of wealthy and less affluent
candidates?

In summary, I hold that Section 11(b) of R.A. 6646, in the six years that have elapsed since it
was upheld as being in consonance with the fundamental law, has now become out of sync
with the times and, therefore, unreasonable and arbitrary, as it not only unduly restrains the
freedom of expression of candidates but corollarily denies the electorate its fullest right to
freedom of information at a time when it should flourish most.

For the reasons stated above, I VOTE to declare Section 11(b) of R.A. 6646
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., dissent.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting;

The Court, by a majority vote, decided to uphold the ban on political advertising, as provided,
under Section 11(b)1 of RA 6646, and to reiterate the 1992 ruling in National Press Club
vs. Comelec2 for two main reasons:

1. To equalize "as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by
preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign
'war chests.'" In other words, the intention of the prohibition is to equalize the
"political playing field" for rich and poor candidates.

2. While conceding that Section 11(b) of RA 6646 "limit[s] the right of free speech and
of access to mass media of the candidates themselves," the Court justifies the ad ban
by alleging that: (a) it is limited, first, in its "duration," (i.e. the ban applies only during
the "election period") and, second, in its "scope" (i.e. the prohibition on the sale and
the donation of print space and air time covers only those for "campaign and other
political purposes", time does not restrict the legitimate reporting of news and
opinions by media practitioners who are not candidates); and (b) the Comelec is
authorized to procure, by purchase or donation, media time and space which are to be
fairly, freely and equally distributed among the candidates. Otherwise stated, the grant
of Comelec time and space, free of charge, to said candidates makes up for the
admitted infringement of the constitutional right to free speech and access to mass
media during the campaign period.

With all due respect, I disagree with the majority's view and join the stirring Dissenting
Opinions of Justices Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.,3 Isagani A.
Cruz4 and Edgardo L. Paras5 in NPC vs. Comelec, and of Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in the
present case. I will no longer repeat their cogent legal arguments. Let me just add my own.

1. Ad Ban Not Pro-Poor

but Anti-Poor
The majority argues that the ad ban is pro-poor, because it prevents the rich from buying
media time and space which the poor cannot afford or match. This argument assumes that
media advertising is expensive and, thus, beyond the reach of the poor.

I respectfully submit that such argument is bereft of factual basis. True, a full-page ad in a
major broadsheet6 may be priced at about P100,000; a 30-second commercial in a major
television channel,7 anywhere from P15,000 to P90,000 depending on the time and the
program; while air time of an equal duration in a leading radio station, anywhere from P300 to
P4,500.8 But even with such price tags, media ads are not necessarily expensive, considering
their nationwide reach, audience penetration, effectiveness and persuasive value.

Realistically, expenses are involved in a candidacy for a national office like the presidency,
the vice presidency, and the senate. In recognition of this, the law has limited campaign
expenditures to ten pesos (P10) for every voter in the case of candidates for president and
vice president, and three pesos (P3) per voter in their constituencies, for other
candidates.9 Anyone — whether rich or poor — who aspires for such national elective office
must expect to spend a considerable sum, whether of his own or from allowable donations,
to make himself and his platform or program of government known to the voting public.

Media Ads

Comparatively Cheaper

While a one-page black-and-white ad in a major daily costs about P100,000, it is replicated,

however, in about 250,000 copies 10 circulated to an equal number of offices and
households nationwide on the very same day of its publication. Each newspaper copy has an
average readership of six. Hence, the ad is exposed to about 1.5 million (250,000 x 6)
people all over the country. Consider, too, that people discuss what they read while they
congregate in barber shops, corner stores, and other places where people gather.
Sometimes, radio and TV broadcasters pick up and comment on what they read in
newspapers. So, the reach, pass-on readership, multiplier effect and effectivity of a
broadsheet ad are practically immeasurable.

On the other hand, let us consider the alternative of printing and distributing a poster or
handbill of similar size. The actual printing cost of such handbill on newsprint is twenty
centavos (P.20) per copy.11 The cost of P250,000 copies (the circulation of a major daily)
would thus be P50,000 (250,000 x P.20). But that is only the printing cost. To disseminate
these handbills nationwide on the same day of printing without the distribution network of a
major newspaper is almost impossible. Besides, the cost would be horrendous. To
approximate the circulation of a major newspaper, the most practical substitute would be the
mails. Ordinary mail is now P4.00 per posting. Hence, the distribution cost through the mails
would be P1 million (250,000 copies x P4.00). And this does not include the manual work and
cost of sorting, folding and individually addressing these 250,000 pieces of mail matter. (This
alternative assumes the availability of a mailing list equivalent to the reach of a newspaper.)
Even if third-class mail is used, the distribution cost alone will still be P3.00 per individual
mailing, or P750,000 for all 250,000 copies.12

This alternative is not only much more expensive but much less effective as well, because it
has no guarantee of same-day delivery, has a diminished readership multiplier effect and is
tremendously cumbersome in terms of sorting and distribution.
Furthermore, a candidate need not buy one-page ads. He can use quarter-page ads at one
fourth the cost or about P25,000 only per issue. To be effective in his ad campaign, he may
need to come out once every three days (to be spread out among the different dailies) or 30
times during the 90-day campaign period13 for national candidates. Hence, he will spend, for
the entire duration of the campaign, about P750,000 (P25,000 x 30). I repeat, to advertise a
one-fourth page ad at least 30 times in various major dailies, a candidate needs to spend only
P750,000 — an amount less than the alternative of printing and distributing nationwide ONLY
ONCE a less timely and less effective equivalent leaflet or poster.

A similar detailed comparison of cost-benefit could be written for radio and television. While,
at initial glance, the rates for these electronic media may appear high, still they could be
proven more beneficial and cheaper in the long term because of their "value-for-money"
appeal.14

Candidates Should Not Be Denied

Option to Use Media Ads

From the foregoing, it is clear that mass media truly offers an economical, practical, and
effective means by which a relatively unknown but well-qualified political candidate who has
limited resources, particularly one running for a national office, may make known to the
general public during the short campaign period15 his qualifications, platform of government,
stand on vital issues, as well as his responses to questions or doubts about his capabilities,
his character or any other matter raised against him. Deprived of media ads, the rich
candidate, unlike his poor opponent, resorts to expensive propaganda — the holding of
public meetings and rallies before large but oftentimes "paid" crowds, helicopter stops and
motorcades spanning several towns and cities, the production of ingenious materials,
giveaways and other products, and the incessant printing and distribution of various
campaign paraphernalia. These forms of electoral promotion ineluctably require a large
political machinery and gargantuan funds (organization + people/supporters +
communication gadgets + vehicles + logistics). To combat this formidable and expensive
election behemoth, the poor candidate's most viable alternative may be media advertising.

In NPC vs. Comelec, it was feared that the "unlimited purchase of print space and radio and
television time . . . by the financially affluent [was] likely to make a crucial difference." But I
say such fear is unfounded. First, because campaign expenses are limited by law. Second,
the possibility of the abuse and misuse of media ads by the "financially affluent" is not an
argument in favor of their total withdrawal, for — to use the very words of the majority in NPC
— "there is no power or authority in human society that is not susceptible of being
abused."16 Third, the absence of access to media advertising totally deprives the poor
candidate of his most formidable weapon in combating the "huge campaign war chests" of
rich contenders.

THE POINT IS: IT IS INCORRECT TO SAY THAT MEDIA ADVERTISING SHOULD BE BANNED
BECAUSE ONLY THE RICH CAN AFFORD IT OR, FOR THAT MATTER, THEY MAY ABUSE OR
MISUSE IT. Quite the contrary, in terms of reach, pass-on readership, multiplier effect and
cost-benefit advantage, media advertising may be the cheapest and most effective campaign
mechanism available. I am not suggesting that every candidate should use media ads. In the
final analysis, it is really up to the candidates and their campaign handlers to adopt such
mode and means of campaigning as their budgets and political strategies may
require.16a What I am stressing is that candidates, whether rich or poor, should be given the
option of campaigning through media, instead of being forced to use other forms of
propaganda that could turn out to be less effective and more expensive.
 2. Ad Ban Not Limited;
Comelec Time and Space Inutile

I now come to the second major point. The majority rationalizes the ad ban by saying that it
has a very limited duration and scope and that, in any event, the Comelec's grant of free
media time and space to candidates more than makes up for the violation of their
constitutional right. I disagree.

Ad Ban Not
Limited in Duration

The ad ban is constitutional because, according to the majority, it is limited in duration for
the reason that it is enforced only during the election period. In my humble view and with all
due respect, this is both erroneous and illogical. A political advertisement is relevant only
during the campaign period — not before and not after. As petitioners put it, a ban on
mountain-skiing during the winter season cannot be said to be limited in duration, just
because it is enforced during winter. After all, skiing is indulged in only when the mountains
slopes are covered with snow. To add a further parallel, a ban against the planting of rice
during the rainy season is not limited simply because it covers only that season. After all,
nobody plants rice during summer when the soil is parched. In the same manner, campaign
ads are not resorted to except during the campaign period. And their prohibition does not
become any less odious and less comprehensive just because the proscription applies only
during the election season. Obviously, candidates need to advertise their qualifications and
platforms only during such period. Properly understood, therefore, the prohibition is not
limited in duration but is in fact and in truth total, complete and exhaustive.

Ad Ban Neither
Limited in Scope

The majority also claims that the prohibition is reasonable because it is limited in scope; that
is, it refers only to the purchase, sale or donation of print space and air time for "campaign or
other political purposes," and does not restrict news reporting or commentaries by editors,
columnists, reporters, and broadcasters. But the issue here is not the freedom of media
professionals.17 The issue is the freedom of expression of candidates. That the freedom of the
press is respected by the law and by the Comelec is not a reason to trample upon the
candidates' constitutional right to free speech and the people's right to information. In this
light, the majority's contention is a clear case of non sequitur. Media ads do not partake of
the "real substantive evil" that the state has a right to prevent18 and that justifies the
curtailment of the people's cardinal right to choose their means of expression and of access
to information.

Besides, what constitutes "campaign or other political purposes"? Neither RA 6646 nor the
majority provides an explanation. If candidates buy 30 column-inches of newspaper space or
one hour of prime radio/TV, time everyday, and if they retrain professional journalists to use
such space/time to defend them from attacks and to promote their platforms of government,
should such purchase be covered by the ad ban, or should it be allowed as an exercise of the
freedom of journalists to express their views? Even more insidiously, should regular
columnists' daily defense of their chosen candidates and daily promotion of their platforms
of government constitute donated space for "campaign and other political purposes"?19

Ad Ban Not Compensated for or

Justified by Free "Comelec Time"
Finally, the majority opines that the grant of free Comelec media time and space to
candidates more than makes up for the abridgment of the latter's right to buy political
ads.20 With due respect, I believe this is hollow and shallow.

In its Compliance dated March 13, 1998, Comelec tell us that under its Resolution No. 3015, it
gave due course to eleven candidates for president,21 nine for vice president,22 and forty for
senator.23 It is claimed however that, all in all, there are really about 100,000 candidates
running for about 17,000 national and local positions in the coming elections, from whom a
voter is expected to choose at least 3024 to vote for. With so many candidates, how can the
ordinary, sometimes nonchalant, voter ever get to know each of the political hopefuls from
whom he will make an intelligent selection? In the crucial choice for president alone, how can
ordinary citizens intelligently and sufficiently assess each of the 11 candidates in order to
make a sensible choice for a leader upon whom to entrust the momentous responsibility of
carving the country's path in the next millennium?

The Comelec answers these questions with Resolution No. 2983-A, promulgated on March 3,
1998, in which it asks "every radio broadcasting and television station operating under
franchise [to] grant the Commission, upon payment of just compensation, at least thirty (30)
minutes of prime time daily, to be known as 'Comelec time' effective February 10, 1998 for
candidates for President, Vice President and Senators, and effective March 27, 1998 for
candidates for local elective offices, until May 9, 1998," to be allocated "by lottery" among
candidates requesting its use. But Comelec, in the same Compliance, informed the Court that
"it is not procuring 'Comelec space' (in any newspaper) by virtue of the effects of the
decision of this Honorable Court in the case of Philippine Press Institute (PPI) vs. Comelec,
244 SCRA 272."25

In sum, the Comelec intends to secure 30 minutes of "Comelec time" from every radio and
broadcasting station to be allocated equally to all candidates. The Comelec does not state
exactly how it intends to allocate — except "by lottery" — these 30 minutes per station to the
17,000 candidates, considering that these stations do not have the same reach, audience and
penetration. The poll body does not say exactly how many stations are involved, what budget
allocation, if any, it has for the purpose,26 when each candidate will be allowed to speak and
for how long, how the Comelec intends to cover the 77 provinces, 68 cities and 42,000
barangays nationwide, and many other details. Moreover, while the Comelec smugly speaks
of free Comelec time being effective on "February 10, 1998" for national candidates,
Resolution 2983-A itself was promulgated only on March 3, 1998.

Up to this writing, I have yet to hear of any major candidate using this so-called free Comelec
broadcast time. In fact, during the oral argument of this case on March 5, 1998, Comelec
Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo frankly admitted that no candidate had applied for an allocation
of Comelec time. Not even petitioners. This is the best testament to the utter inutility and
ineffectivity of Comelec time. Indeed, it cannot be a substitute, much less a viable alternative,
to freely chosen but paid for media ads. It cannot compensate for the violation of the
candidates' right to free speech and media access, or for the electorate's right to information.

If the real objective is to level the playing field for rich and poor candidates, there must be, as
there already are, a cap on election expenses and a shortening of the campaign period. The
incapability of the Comelec to effectively monitor and strictly implement such expense and
time limitations should not take its toll upon constitutionally enshrined liberties of the people,
including the candidates. To prohibit access to mass media, except only through Comelec
time — which has been indubitably shorn to be sorely insubstantial, insignificant and inutile
— is not, and is far from being, a solution to the problems faced by poor candidates. The
simple remedy is to lift the media ban.

Epilogue

The ad ban is a blatant violation of the candidates' constitutional right to free speech 27 and
the people's right to information.28 Being the last refuge of the people and the guardian of the
Constitution, this Court should then, with alacrity, view the ban with suspicion, if not with
outright rejection.29 To repeat, the alleged limitations are in reality nonexistent; and the "pro-
poor" justification, without logic.

To say that the prohibition levels the playing field for the rich and the poor is to indulge in a
theoretical assumption totally devoid of factual basis. On the contrary, media advertising may
be — depending on a contender's propaganda strategy — the cheapest, most practical and
most effective campaign medium, especially for national candidates. By completely denying
this medium to both the rich and the poor, this Court has not leveled the playing field. It has
effectively abolished it! Far from equalizing campaign opportunities, the ban on media
advertising actually favors the rich (and the popular) who can afford the more expensive and
burdensome forms of propaganda, against the poor (and the unknown) who cannot.

The allegation that the prohibition is reasonable because it is limited in duration and scope is
itself most unreasonable, bereft as it is of logic and basis. Even more shallow is the argument
that the Comelec-given media time and space compensate for such abridgment. In fact, the
Comelec is not even procuring any newspaper space. In any event, the fact that not even the
poorest candidates have applied for available opportunities is the best testament to its
dubiousness. That petitioners who are seasoned political leaders prefer to pay for their own
media ads rather than to avail themselves of the Comelec freebies refutes the majority's
thesis of compensation. Indeed, the free things in life are not always the best.30 They mat just
be a bureaucratic waste of resources.

Before I close, a word about stare decisis. In the present case, the Court is maintaining the ad
ban to be consistent with its previous holding in NPC vs. Comelec. Thus, respondent urges
reverence for the stability of judicial doctrines. I submit, however, that more important than
consistency and stability are the verity, integrity and correctness of jurisprudence. As Dean
Roscoe Pound explains, "Law must be stable but it cannot stand still." Verily, it must correct
itself and move in cadence with the march of the electronic age. Error and illogic should not
be perpetuated. After all, the Supreme Court, in many cases,31 has deviated from stare
decisis and reversed previous doctrines and decisions. It should do no less in the present
case.

Elections can he free, honest and credible not only because of the absence of the three
execrable "G's" or "guns, goons and gold." Beyond this, the integrity and effectivity of
electoral democracy depend upon the availability of information and education touching on
three good "P's" — principles, platforms and programs of the candidates. Indeed, an
intelligent vote presupposes a well-informed voter. If elections must be rid of patronage,
personalities and popularity as the main criteria of the people's choice, we must allow
candidates every opportunity to educate the voters. And corollarily, the people must be
accorded every access to such information without much effort and expense on their part.

With all due respect, I submit that the ad ban is regressive, repressive and deceptive. It has
no place in our constitutional democracy.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition and to CONDEMN Section 11(b) of RA 6646 as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and VOID.

Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., dissent.

Separate Opinions

PUNO, J., separate concurring;

In G.R. No. 132231, petitioners assail the constitutionality of Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 and
Resolution No. 2974 of the COMELEC implementing said law. They contend:

THE POLITICAL AD BAN IS MOVED BY AN INVALID LEGISLATIVE INTENT, ULTRA

VIRES ON THE PART OF CONGRESS, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE VERY
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION UPON WHICH IT IS SOUGHT TO BE GROUNDED.

II

CONTRARY TO THE HOLDING IN NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, THE POLITICAL AD BAN

IS NOT LIMITED IN TIME AND SCOPE OF APPLICATION.

A. THE POLITICAL AD BAN IS NOT LIMITED IN DURATION; IT IS ABSOLUTE, ALL-

ENCOMPASSING, COMPREHENSIVE AND UNLIMITED.

B. THE POLITICAL AD BAN IS NOT LIMITED IN SCOPE OF APPLICABILITY. INSOFAR

AS THE CANDIDATE'S FREEDOM TO EXPRESS THROUGH THE MASS MEDIA, IT IS
ABSOLUTE, ALL-EMCOMPASSING, COMPREHENSIVE AND UNLIMITED.

III

THE POLITICAL AD BAN UNDER SECTION 11(B), R.A. 6646 CONSTITUTES PRIOR
RESTRAINT, AND CARRIES A HEAVY PRESUMPTION AGAINST VALIDITY.

IV

THE POLITICAL AD BAN IS NOT A REASONABLE NECESSARY MEANS TO ACHIEVE

THE DESIRED END.

A. INSTEAD OF "LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD," INSOFAR AS THE

USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES IS CONCERNED,
THE POLITICAL AD BAN HAS ABOLISHED THE PLAYING FIELD.

B. THERE IS NO REASONABLE NECESSITY FOR THE AD BAN,

BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PREVENT THE RICH CANDIDATE FROM
USING HIS SUPERIOR RESOURCES TO THE UNDUE DISADVANTAGE
OF THE POOR CANDIDATE.
 C. THERE IS NO REASONABLE NECESSITY FOR THE POLITICAL AD
BAN BECAUSE ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS ARE LEGALLY IN PLACE IN
ORDER TO PREVENT THE RICH CANDIDATE FROM TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS SUPERIOR RESOURCES.

THE POLITICAL AD BAN VIOLATES THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE INFORMED

ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN.

VI

THERE IS NO NEED FOR "EMPIRICAL DATA" TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE

POLITICAL AD BAN OFFENDS THE CONSTITUTION OR NOT.

The Solicitor General and the petitioners-in-intervention likewise contend that section 11(b)
of R.A. No. 6646 is unconstitutional principally because it impairs freedom of speech and of
the press.

A quick glance at petitioners' arguments against section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 will show that
they are mere rehash of arguments in the NPC case. The lack of new arguments is a tribute to
the brilliant majority decision and equally enlightening dissenting opinions in said case
which petitioners now seek to reexamine. A repetition of the NPC rationale is thus
unnecessary.

I wish, however, to advert to the dissent of Madam Justice Romero which cites Buckley
v. Valeo,1 a 1976 case where a divided us Supreme Court ruled that limits on campaign
expenditures violate the guarantee of freedom of speech. The essence of the Buckley ruling
is that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment . . ."2

A reading of American legal literature, however, will reveal that Buckley has been widely
criticized by libertarians because its pro-business thrust has pernicious effects on efforts to
achieve much needed electoral reforms.3 Typical of the criticisms is the observation of wright
that the Buckley Court ". . . has given protection to the polluting effect of money in election
campaigns. As a result, our political system may not use some of its most powerful defenses
against electoral inequalities."4 The barrage of criticisms caused the US Supreme Court to
modify its absolute support for free speech in Buckley. In the 1990 case of Austin v. Michigan
State Chamber of Commerce,5 it upheld the constitutionality of a Michigan law that prohibited
corporations from using corporate treasury funds to support or oppose any candidate for
office. Retreating from Buckley, the Austin Court recognized the state's compelling interest in
regulating campaign expenditure. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall, an
icon of libertarians declared: "Michigan identified as a serious danger the significant
possibility that corporate political expenditures will undermine the integrity of the political
process, and it has implemented a narrowly tailored solution to that problem." In his
concurring opinion, the last of the libertarians in the US High Court, Mr. Justice Brennan,
held: "In MCFL, we held that a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA), . . . similar to the Michigan law at issue here, could not be applied constitutionally to
a small, anti-abortion advocacy group. In evaluating the First Amendment challenge,
however, we acknowledged the legitimacy of Congress' concern that organizations that
amass great wealth in the economic marketplace should not gain unfair advantage in the
political marketplace."
There is less reason to apply the discredited Buckley decision in our setting. Section 11(b) of
R.A. No. 6646 is based on provisions of our Constitution which have no counterparts in the
US Constitution. These provisions are:

Art. II, sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

Art. XIII, sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.

Art. IX (c) (4). The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate
the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits from the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all
grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable
equal rates therefor for public information campaigns and forms among candidates in
connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.

A member of the Constitutional Commission, now our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr., well explained these new wrinkles in our Constitution, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

Aware of the lamentable fact in the Philippines; no gap between these two
unavoidable extremes of society is more pronounced than that in the field of politics,
and ever mindful of the dire consequences thereof, the framers of the present
Constitution saw it fit to diffuse political power in the social justice provisions. Ours
has been a politics of the elite, the rich, the powerful and the pedigreed. The victory of
a poor candidate in an election is almost always an exception. Arrayed against the
vast resources of wealthy opponent, the former, even if he is the most qualified and
competent, does not stand a fighting chance. Of course, there have been isolated
instances — but yet so few and far between — when poor candidates made it.6

He stressed that this thrust for political equality is an improvement of our past Constitutions
which merely sought to establish equality in the economic and social fields.7

It is difficult to think why such an egalitarian law like Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 should be
condemned when it equalizes the political opportunities of our people. The gap between the
perfumed few and the perspiring many in our country is galloping at a frightening pace. As
the cost of election spirals at an immoral speed, levers of the political power are wielded
more and more by the wealthy alone. The subject law attempts to break this control by
reducing the purchasing power of the peso of the rich in the political freemarket.

Political equality is a touchstone of democracy. The guaranty of freedom of speech should

not be used to frustrate legislative attempts to level the playing field in politics. R.A. No. 6646
does not curtail speech as it no more than prevents the abusive use of wealth by the rich to
frustrate the poor candidate's access to media. It seems to me self-evident that if Congress
can regulate the abuse of money in the economic market so can it regulate its misuse in the
political freemarket. Money talks in politics but it is not the specie of speech sanctified in our
Constitution. If we allow money to monopolize media, the political freemarket will cease to be
a market of ideas but a market for influence by the rich. I do not read freedom of speech as
meaning more speech for the rich for freedom of speech is not guaranteed only to those who
can afford its exercise. There ought to be no quarrel with the proposition that freedom of
speech will be a chimera if Congress does not open the opportunities for its exercise. When
the opportunities for its exercise are obstructed by the money of the rich, it is the duty of
Congress to regulate the misuse of money — for in the political marketplace of ideas, when
money win, we lose.

Let us not also close our eyes to the reality that in underdeveloped countries where sharp
disparities in wealth exist, the threat to freedom of speech comes not only from the
government but from vested interests that own and control the media. Today, freedom of
speech can be restrained not only by the exercise of public power but also by private power.
Thus, we should be equally vigilant in protecting freedom of speech from public and private
restraints. The observation of a legal scholar is worth meditating, viz.: "With the development
of private restraints on free expression, the idea of a free marketplace where ideas can
compete on their merits has become just as unrealistic in the twentieth century as the
economic theory of perfect competition. The world in which an essentially rationalist
philosophy of the first amendment was born has vanished and what was rationalism is now
romance."8

I vote to dismiss the petitions.

Melo, J., concurs.

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

I share the opinion of those who continue to uphold the decision in the National Press Club
vs. Commission on Elections case that has sustained the validity of Section 11(b) of Republic
Act ("R.A.") No. 6646, otherwise also known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.

Petitioners, in seeking a re-examination of the decision of this Court in the National Press
Club case, no more than invoke anew Section 4, Article III, of the Constitution to the effect
that —

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of press,

on the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.

It is their submission that Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 18(e) of Comelec
Resolution No. 2974 should be declared unconstitutional. These contested provisions state:

Sec. 11. Prohibited forms of election propaganda. — In addition to the forms of

election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall
be unlawful;

xxx xxx xxx

 b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or
any person making use of the mass media to sell or give free of charge print space or
air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as
provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective
public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign
period.

Sec. 18. Prohibited forms of election propaganda. — It is unlawful

xxx xxx xxx

e. For any radio broadcasting or television station or any person making use of
broadcast media to sell or give, free of charge, any air time for campaign and other
political purposes, except thru "COMELEC Time," allotted to the Commission
pursuant to Section 92 of the Omnibus Election Code.

I see, however, in the above provisions a faithful compliance and due observance of the
language, intent and spirit of the Constitution itself, Article IX(C)(4) of which reads:

Sec. 4. The Commission [on Elections] may, during the election period, supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all
grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections. (Emphasis supplied.)

It might be worth mentioning that Section 26, Article II, of the Constitution also states that the
"State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law." I see neither Article IX (C)(4) nor Section 26, Article II, of
the Constitution to be all that adversarial or irreconcilably inconsistent with the right of free
expression. In any event, the latter, being one of general application, must yield to the
specific demands of the Constitution. The freedom of expression concededly holds, it is true,
a vantage point in the hierarchy of constitutionally-enshrined rights but, like all fundamental
rights, it is not without limitations.

The case is not about a fight between the "rich" and the "poor" or between the "powerful"
and the "weak" in our society but it is to me a genuine attempt on the part of Congress and
the Commission on Elections to ensure that all candidates are given an equal chance to
media coverage and thereby be equally perceived as giving real life to the candidates' right of
free expression rather than being viewed as an undue restriction of that freedom. The
wisdom in the enactment of the law, i.e., that which the legislature deems to be the best in
giving life to the Constitutional mandate, is not for the Court to question; it is a matter that
lies beyond the normal prerogatives of the Court to pass upon.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

Melo and Purisima, JJ., concur.

ROMERO, J., dissenting;

A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds . . . .1

Not wishing to be held hostage by Emerson's "hobgoblin," I dare to break away from a past
position and encapsulize my ruminations in a dissenting opinion.

When, If At All, May The Court Reverse Itself?

The majority, reiterating the 1992 decision NPC v. COMELEC, holds that Section 11(b) of R.A.
6646 is a reasonable restriction on the freedom of expression guaranteed by the
Constitution.2 Our six-year experience with the ban on political advertisements, however,
constrains me to dissent. While it is desirable, even imperative, that this Court, in accordance
with the principle of stare decisis, afford stability to the law by hewing to doctrines previously
established, said principle was never meant as an obstacle to the abandonment of
established rulings where abandonment is demanded by public interest and by
circumstances.3 Reverence for precedent simply as precedent cannot prevail when
constitutionalism and public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which should be
abandoned or modified should be abandoned or modified accordingly. More pregnant than
anything else is that the court should be right.4

I submit that our country's past experience in the 1992 and 1995 elections, as well as
contemporary events, has established that Section 11(b) of R.A. 6646 falls short of the
rigorous and exacting standard for permissible limitation on free speech and flee press.

In 1992, this Court, in NPC v. COMELEC, gave constitutional imprimatur to Section 11(b),
pronouncing the same to be authorized by Article IX(C), Section 4 of the Constitution which
reads:

Sec. 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation
and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special
privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or
its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity,
time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forms among candidates in connection with the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

Prefatorily, it must be borne in mind that Article IX(C), Section 4 of the Constitution, is
essentially an express manifestation of the comprehensive police power of the State.

Police power, it has been declared often enough, rests upon public necessity and upon the
right of the state and the public to self-protection. For this reason, its scope expands and
contracts with changing needs.5 In the words of Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz:

Police power is dynamic, not static, and must move with the moving society it is
supposed to regulate. Conditions change, circumstances vary; and to every such
alteration the police power must conform. What may be sustained as a valid exercise
of the power now may become constitutional heresy in the future under a different
factual setting. Old notions may become outmoded even as new ideas are born,
expanding or constricting the limits of the police power. For example, police
 measures validly enacted fifty years ago against the wearing of less than sedate
swimsuits in public beaches would be laughed out of court in these days of
permissiveness. . . (T)he police power continues to change even as constraints on
liberty diminish and private property becomes more and more affected with public
interest and therefore subject to regulation" (Emphasis ours).6

Thus, when the temper and circumstances of the times necessitate a review, this Court
should not hesitate to reverse itself, even on constitutional issues; for the legal problems
with which society is beset continually cannot be merely considered in the abstract, but must
be viewed in light of the infinite motley facets of human experience. As aptly stated by Mr.
Justice Holmes, "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."

By way of illustration, we first held, in the celebrated Flag Salute Case,7 that:

the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of
national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which
it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Under a system of complete separation
of church and state in the government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious
significance. Saluting the flag does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag
salute is no more a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a public
official or by a public candidate for admission to the bar.

xxx xxx xxx

The children of Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the

flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to
the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school
population which by far constitute the great majority.

The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot
mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory
laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.

The Court further predicted that exempting Jehovah's Witnesses from participating in the flag
ceremony would ultimately lead to a situation wherein:

[T]he flag ceremony will become a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very
few participants, and the time will come when we would have citizens untaught and
uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the flag and love of country,
admiration for national heroes, and patriotism-a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all
because a small portion of the school population imposed its will, demanded and was
granted an exemption.

Thirty-two years later, events caught up with the changing political climate, such that an
undivided Court pronounced, in Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of
Cebu8 that:

the idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and
recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from
one's job or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present
generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their
right to free speech and the free exercise of religious profession and worship.
 xxx xxx xxx

The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent. Absent such
a threat to public safety, the expulsion of petitioners from the schools is not justified.

The Court held that its earlier prediction of dire consequences had not come to pass. It
concluded that exempting Jehovah's Witnesses from attending flag ceremonies would not
produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the flag
and love of country, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism."

In much the same manner, in the early case of People v. Pomar,9 the Court struck down as
violative of the freedom of contract, a statute prescribing a thirty-day vacation with pay both
before and after confinement arising from pregnancy. The Court said:

The rule in this jurisdiction is, that the contracting parties may establish any
agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem advisable, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals or public policy.

Citing American cases that espoused the prevailing laissez faire doctrine, the Court ruled that
the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual guaranteed by
the due process clause. The Court also cited the "equality of right" principle, holding that
"(i)n all such particulars the employer and the employee have equality of right, and any
legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract,
which no government can legally justify in a free land . . . Police power, the Court conceded,
is an expanding power; but it cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state . . . If
the people desire to have the police power extended and applied to conditions and things
prohibited by the organic law, they must first amend that law.10

Sixteen years later, the validity of the above pronouncement was rejected by the Court
in Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. CIR,11 which rationalized its volte-face stance, thus: "(i)n
the midst of changes that have taken place, it may likewise be doubted if the pronouncement
made by this court in the case of People v. Pomar . . . still retains its virtuality as a living
principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public
interests."

Similarly, events subsequent to the Court's ruling in Avelino v. Cuenco12 impelled the Court to
reverse its original position. In this case, the Court initially refused to take cognizance of the
raging controversy to determine who was the rightful president of the Philippine Senate,
ruling that in view of the separation of powers, the question was a political one not within its
jurisdiction. Despite such a ruling, almost one-half of the members of the Senate refused to
acknowledge Mariano Cuenco as the acting President, as a result of which legislative work
came to a standstill. In the words of Justice Perfecto, "the situation has created a veritable
national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be expected from any quarter other
than this Supreme Court. . . . The judiciary ought to ripen into maturity if it has to be true to
its role as spokesman of the collective conscience, of the conscience of humanity." The
Court, thus, assumed jurisdiction over the case, rationalizing that supervening events
justified its intervention.
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the inexorable march of events, and the liberalizing
winds of change may very well signal a needed shift in our conception of the permissible
limits of regulation in the name of police power. Verily, while the validity of NPC
v. COMELEC may have been etched on granite at the time of its promulgation, events
subsequent thereto now call into question the very underpinnings of said ponencia. To my
mind, the hoary maxim that "time upsets many fighting faiths" still holds true, and the Court
must be ever resilient and adaptable in order to meet the protean complexities of the present
and future generation.

In NPC v. COMELEC, the Court held that:

(N)o presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or

regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal
opportunity among candidates for political office, although such supervision or
regulation may result in some limitation of the right of free speech and free press. For
supervision or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely
conceivable without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the
general, time-honored one — that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that
the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and
convincingly proving that assertion.

This upends the familiar holding that "any system of prior restraint of expression comes to
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity, with the
Government carrying a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such a
restraint."13 This presumption was even reiterated in the recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo
v. CA,14 wherein we ruled that "deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility
against all prior restraints on speech . . . Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by
the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of
the respondent . . . to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down." NPC v. COMELEC, insofar as it bestows a presumption of
validity upon a statute authorizing COMELEC to infringe upon the right of free speech and
free press, constitutes a departure from this Court's previous rulings as to mandate its re-
examination.

In this connection, it bears emphasis that NPC v. COMELEC was the product of a divided
court, marked as it was by the strong dissents of Mr. Justices Cruz, Gutierrez, and Paras.
This fact gains significance when viewed in light of the changes in the composition of the
court. While a change in court composition, per se, does not authorize abandonment of
decisional precedents, it is apropos to keep in mind the pronouncement by the Court
in Philippine Trust Co. and Smith, Bell and Co. v. Mitchell.15 which reads as follows:

Is the court with new membership compelled to follow blindly the doctrine of the
Velasco case? The rule of stare decisis is entitled to respect. Stability in the law,
particularly in the business field, is desirable. But idolatrous reverence for precedent,
simply as precedent, no longer rules. More important than anything else is that the
court should be right. (Emphasis ours)

Are The Restrictions Imposed by Sec. 11(b) Of R.A.

6646 on Freedom of Expression Valid?

Preliminaries having been disposed of, we proceed to the crux of the matter. Freedom of
speech has been defined as the liberty to know, to utter and to argue freely according to
conscience, above all liberties. It thus includes, not only the right to express one's views, but
also other cognate rights relevant to the free communication of ideas, not excluding the right
to be informed on matters of public concern.

The Court, in NPC v. COMELEC, found the restrictions imposed by Section 11(b) on the
freedom of expression, to be valid. First, the prohibition is limited in the duration of its
applicability and enforceability to election periods. Precisely, this is what makes the
prohibition more odious. It is imposed during the campaign period when the electorate
clamors for more and accurate information as their basis for intelligent voting. To restrict the
same only defeats the purpose of holding electoral campaigns — to inform the qualified voter
of the qualifications of candidates for public office, as well as the ideology and programs of
government and public service they advocate, to the end that when election time comes, the
right of suffrage may be intelligently and knowingly, if not always wisely, exercised. Opening
all avenues of information to the estimated 36.4 million voters is crucial for their intelligent
exercise of the right of suffrage in the May 11 polls, considering that they will be voting for an
average of thirty elective positions.16

Second, the prohibition is of limited application, as the same is applied only to the purchase
and sale of print space and air time for campaign or other political purposes. "Section 11(b)
does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television
stations of news or newsworthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political
parties and programs of government." It does not reach commentaries and expressions of
belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in
respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth. To be sure,
newspapers, radio, and television stations may not be restricted from reporting on
candidates, their qualifications, and programs of government, yet, admittedly, the freedom of
expression of the candidates themselves in the manner they choose to, is restricted.
Candidates are thereby foreclosed from availing of the facilities of mass media, except
through the filtering prism of the COMELEC.

Not to be overlooked is the stark truth that the media itself is partisan. In a
study17 commissioned by the COMELEC itself to determine whether certain newspapers
adhered to the principles of fairness and impartiality in their reportage of the presidential
candidates in the 1992 elections, the results disclosed that newspapers showed biases for or
against certain candidates. Hence, the contention that "Section 11(b) does not cut off the flow
of media reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates, their qualifications and
platforms and promises" simply is illusory. Editorial policy will always ensure that favored
candidates receive prominent coverage while less favored ones will get minimal exposure, if
at all. This underscores the need to give candidates the freedom to advertise, if only to
counteract negative reporting with paid advertisements, which they cannot have recourse to
with the present prohibition. Worse, the ban even encourages corruption of the mass media
by candidates who procure paid hacks, masquerading as legitimate journalists, to sing them
paeans to the high heavens. Wittingly or unwittingly, the mass media, to the detriment of
poor candidates, occasionally lend themselves to the manipulative devices of the rich and
influential candidates.

Finally, it is alleged that while Section 11(b) prohibited the sale or donation by mass media of
print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, COMELEC, by way of
exception, was mandated to purchase print space or air time, which space and time it was
required to allocate, equally and impartially, among the candidates for public office. Hence,
whatever limitation was imposed by Section 11(b) upon the right to free speech of the
candidates was found not to be unduly repressive or unreasonable inasmuch as they could
still realize their objective as long as it was coursed through COMELEC. COMELEC it was
that shall decide what, who, which media to employ and the time allocation for the candidates
who signify their desire to avail of the agency's air time and print space. Why accord to
COMELEC such powers in the name of supervision and regulation at the expense of the
constitutionally hallowed freedom of expression?

Given the conditions then prevailing, the Court's ruling in NPC v. COMELEC may have been
valid and reasonable; yet today, with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the prohibition
has become a woeful hindrance to the exercise by the candidates of their cherished right to
free expression and concomitantly, a violation of the people's right to information on matters
of public concern. As applied, it has given an undue advantage to well-known popular
candidates for office.

In the hierarchy of fundamental civil liberties, the right of free expression occupies a
preferred position,18 the sovereign people recognizing that it is indispensable in a free society
such as ours. Verily, one of the touchstones of democracy is the principle that free political
discussion is necessary if government is to remain responsive to the will of the people. It is a
guarantee that the people will be kept informed at all times sufficiently to discharge the
awesome responsibilities of sovereignty.

Yet, it is also to be conceded that freedom of expression is not an absolute right. The right or
privilege of free speech and publication has its limitations, the right not being absolute at all
times and under all circumstances. For freedom of speech does not comprehend the right to
speak whenever, however, and wherever one pleases, and the manner, and place, or time of
public discussion can be constitutionally controlled.19

Still, while freedom of expression may not be immune from regulation, it does not follow that
all regulation is valid. Regulation must be reasonable as not to constitute a repression of the
freedom of expression. First, it must be shown that the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from that of a particular class requires such regulation. Second, it must appear
that the means used are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

As to the first, in NPC v. COMELEC, this Court declared that the ban on political advertising
aims to assure equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public service by equalizing, as
far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from
enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign "war chests."

While there can be no gainsaying the laudable intent behind such an objective, the State
being mandated to guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, the prohibition
has had the opposite effect. Instead of "equalizing" the position of candidates who offer
themselves for public office, the prohibition actually gives an unfair advantage to those who
have had wide media exposure prior to the campaign period. Instead of promoting the
interests of the public in general, the ban promotes the interest of a particular class of
candidates, the prominent and popular candidates for public office. What is in store for the
relatively obscure candidate who wants to pursue his candidacy? Eager to trumpet his
credentials and program of government, he finds himself barred from using the facilities of
mass media on his own. While incumbent government officials, show business personalities,
athletes and prominent media men enjoy the advantage of name recall due to past public
exposure, the unknown political neophyte has to content himself with other fora, which,
given the limited campaign period, cannot reach the electorate as effectively as it would
through the mass media. To be sure, the candidate may avail himself of "COMELEC Space"
and "COMELEC Time," but the sheer number of candidates does not make the same an
effective vehicle of communication. Not surprisingly, COMELEC Chairman Pardo, at the Oral
Argument held by the Court en banc, admitted that no candidate has as yet applied for
COMELEC air time and space.

More telling, the celebrities are lavished with broader coverage from newspapers, radio and
television stations, as well as via the commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by
reporters, broadcasters, editors, commentators or columnists, as they are deemed more
newsworthy by media, thus generating a self-perpetuating cycle wherein political unknowns,
who may be more deserving of public office, campaign in relative obscurity compared to their
more popular rivals. Instead of equalizing opportunities for public service, the prohibition not
only perpetuates political inequality, but also invidiously discriminates against lesser-known
candidates.

While Article IX(C), Section 10 of the Constitution provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for
any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination," Article IX(C),
Section 4 is nothing if not antithetical to the former provision as, in its application, it is
productive of a situation wherein political neophytes are blatantly discriminated against.
Much as we recognize the basic canon in Constitutional construction that the Constitution
must be interpreted in such a way as to harmonize all its provisions if the Charter is to be
construed as a single, comprehensive document and not as a series of disjointed articles or
provisions, the predictable effect is for one provision to negate the other.

As to the second requisite, experience shows that the ban on political advertisements has
not been reasonably necessary to accomplish its desired end. First, there are more than 70
provinces, more than 60 cities and more than a thousand municipalities spread all over the
archipelago. Previous elections have shown that the ban on political advertising forces a
candidate to conduct a nationwide whistle-stop campaign to attain maximum exposure of his
credentials and his program of government. Obviously, this necessitates tremendous
resources for sundry expenses indispensable for political campaigns, all within a limited
period of 90 days. Given the enormous logistics needed for such a massive effort, what are
the chances for an impecunious candidate who sincerely aspires for national office?

On the other hand, radio and television reach out to a great majority of the populace more
than other instruments of information and dissemination, being the most pervasive, effective,
and inexpensive. A 30-second television advertisement, costing around P35,000.00 at present
rates, would, in an instant, reach millions of viewers around the country in the comfort of
their homes. Indeed, the use of modern mass media gives the poor candidate the opportunity
to make himself known to the electorate at an affordable cost. Yet, these means of
communication are denied such candidates due to the imagined apprehension that more
affluent candidates may monopolize the airwaves. This fear, however, need not materialize as
the COMELEC is precisely empowered to regulate mass media to prevent such a monopoly.
Likewise, the ceiling on election spending imposed by law upon all candidates, regardless,
will also serve as a deterrent.

Second, the means employed is less than effective, for with or without the ban, moneyed
candidates, although similarly barred from buying mass media coverage, are in a position to
lavish their funds on other propaganda activities which their lesser-endowed rivals can ill-
afford. Furthermore, we take judicial notice of the inability of COMELEC to enforce laws
limiting political advertising to "common poster areas." Many places in cities have been
ungainly plastered with campaign materials of the better off candidates. What use is there in
banning political advertisements to equalize the situation between rich and poor candidates,
when the COMELEC itself, by its failure to curb the political excesses of candidates,
effectively encourages the prevailing disparities? Why then single out political advertising?
What is the reasonable necessity of doing so?

To be realistic, judicial notice must be taken of the fact that COMELEC, in narrowing down its
list of "serious" candidates, considers in effect a candidate's capability to wage an effective
nationwide campaign — which necessarily entails possession and/or availability of
substantial financial resources. Given this requirement, the objective of equalizing rich and
poor candidates may no longer find relevance, the candidates ultimately allowed to run being
relatively equal, as far as resources are concerned. Additionally, the disqualification of
nuisance candidates, allegedly due to their inability to launch serious campaigns, itself casts
doubt on the validity of the prohibition as a means to achieve the state policy of equalizing
access to opportunities for public service. If poor and unknown candidates are declared unfit
to run for office due to their lack of logistics, the political ad ban fails to serve its purpose, as
the persons for whom it has been primarily imposed have been shunted aside and thus, are
unable to enjoy its benefits.

It must be kept in mind that the holding of periodic elections constitute the very essence of a
republican form of government, these being the most direct act and participation of a citizen
in the conduct of government. In this process, political power is entrusted by him, in concert
with the entire body of the electorate, to the leaders who are to govern the nation for a
specified period. To make this exercise meaningful, it is the duty of government to see to it
that elections are free and honest and that the voter is unhampered by overt and covert
inroads of fraud, force and corruption so that the choice of the people may be untrammelled
and the ballot box an accurate repository of public opinion. And since so many
imponderables may affect the outcome of elections — qualifications of voters and
candidates, education, means of transportation, health, public discussion, private
animosities, the weather, the threshold of a voter's resistance to pressure — the utmost
ventilation of opinion of men and issues, through assembly, association and organizations,
both by the candidate and the voter, becomes a sine qua non for elections to truly reflect the
will of the electorate.

With the prohibition on political advertisements except through the Comelec space and time,
how can a full discussion of men, issues, ideologies and programs be realized? Article III,
Section 4 of the Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances." Implicit in this guarantee is the right of
the people to speak and publish their views and opinions on political and other issues,
without prior restraint and/or fear of subsequent punishment. Yet Section 11(b), by
authorizing political advertisements only via the COMELEC effectively prevents the
candidates from freely using the facilities of print and electronic mass media to reach the
electorate. A more blatant form of prior restraint on the free flow of information and ideas can
hardly be imagined. To be sure, it does not constitute an absolute restriction, but it is
restriction nonetheless, as odious and insidious as any that may be conceived by minds
canalized in deepening grooves.

I hold that, given our experience in the past two elections, political advertisements on radio
and television would not endanger any substantial public interest. Indeed, allowing
advertisements would actually promote public interest by furthering public awareness of
election issues. The objective, equalizing opportunities for public service, while of some
immediacy during election times, does not justify curtailing the citizen's right of free speech
and expression.
 Not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought
to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a
writing instrument to be stilled. For these reasons, any attempt to restrict these
liberties must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or
remotely but by clear and present danger. The rational connection between the
remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other context might support
legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest
on firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion would restrain orderly
discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have clear support in
public danger, actual or impending. Only the greatest abuses, endangering permanent
interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.20

No such clear and present danger exists here as to justify banning political advertisements
from radio and television stations.

Past experience shows that the COMELEC has been hard put effectively informing the voting
populace of the credentials, accomplishments, and platforms of government of the
candidates. There are 17,396 national and local elective public positions21 which will be
contested by an estimated 100,000 candidates22 on May 11, 1998. For national positions, the
list has been trimmed down to 11 candidates for president, 9 candidates for vice-president,
and 40 candidates for senator. It is difficult to see how the number of candidates can be
adequately accommodated by "COMELEC Space" and "COMELEC Time." Resolution No.
2983 of the COMELEC, issued in compliance with Section 92 of B.P. 881, mandates that at
least thirty minutes or prime time be granted to the Commission, free of charge, from
February 10, 1998 until May 9, 1998.23 Thirty minutes of prime-time for eighty-nine days (89) is
scarcely enough time to introduce candidates to the voters, much less to properly inform the
electorate of the credentials and platforms of all candidates running for national office. Let us
be reminded that those running for local elective positions will also need to use the same
space and time from March 27 to May 9, 1998, and that the COMELEC itself is authorized to
use the space and time to disseminate vital election information.24 Clearly, "COMELEC Space"
and "COMELEC Time" sacrifices the right of the citizenry to be sufficiently informed
regarding the qualifications and programs of the candidates. The net effect of Section 11(b)
is, thus, a violation of the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern and
makes it a palpably unreasonable restriction on the people's right to freedom of expression.
Not only this, the failure of "Comelec Space" and "Comelec Time" to adequately inform the
electorate, only highlights the unreasonableness of the means employed to achieve the
objective of equalizing opportunities for public service between rich and poor candidates.

Again, NPC v. COMELEC finds Section 11(b) valid, as paid political advertisements are
allowed in fora other than modern mass media, thus: "aside from Section 11(b) of R.A. 6646
providing for 'COMELEC Space' and 'COMELEC Time,' Sections 9 and 10 of the same law
afford a candidate several venues by which he can fully exercise his freedom of expression,
including freedom of assembly." A concurring opinion points to the mandate of COMELEC to
encourage non-political, non-partisan private or civic organizations to initiate and hold in
every city and municipality, public fora at which all registered candidates for the same office
may participate in, the designation of common poster areas, the right to hold political
caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, and other assemblies, as well as the
publication and distribution of campaign literature. All these devices conveniently gloss over
the fact that for the electorate, as shown in surveys by the Ateneo de Manila University's
Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs, mass media remains to be the most important and
accessible source of information about candidates for public office.
It must be borne in mind that the novel party-list system will be implemented in the
impending elections. The party-list system, an innovation introduced by the 1987
Constitution in order to encourage the growth of a multi-party system is designed to give a
chance to marginalized sectors of society to elect their representatives to the Congress. A
scheme aimed at giving meaningful representation to the interests of sectors which are not
adequately attended to in normal legislative deliberations, it is envisioned that system will
encourage interest in political affairs on the part of a large number of citizens who feel that
they are deprived of the opportunity to elect spokesmen of their own choosing under the
present system. It is expected to forestall resort to extra-parliamentary means by minority
groups which would wish to express their interests and influence governmental policies,
since every citizen is given a substantial representation.25

Under R.A. 7941, known as the Party-List System Act, the labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas worker and professional sectors26 will have the opportunity to elect representatives
to Congress. With the prohibition on political advertisements, however, those parties who
wish to have their candidates elected as sectoral representatives, are prevented from directly
disseminating their platforms of government through the mass media. The ban on political
advertisements thus serves as a deterrent to the development of self-reliance, self-
development, logistical and organizational capability on the part of sectoral
parties/organizations, even as it inhibits them from reaching their target audiences. What
more effective way of depriving them of the chance of consolidating a mass base sorely
needed for a fair chance of success in a highly competitive political exercise. Likewise, with
the inability of the candidates to reach the sectors they seek to represent, the right of the
people belonging to these sectors to be informed on matters of concern to them is likewise
violated.27

Finally, NPC v. COMELEC invokes the specter of the "captive audience" to justify its stand
against political advertisements. Describing political advertisements as "appealing to the
non-intellective faculties of the captive and passive audience," it says that anyhow, the only
limitation imposed by Section 11(b) upon the free speech of candidates is on their right to
bombard the helpless electorate with paid advertisements commonly repeated in the mass
media ad nauseam.

Suffice it to say that, with the exception of obscenity, seditious speech, libel, and the like, it is
not for this Court to determine what the people may or may not watch or read. Even "mind-
numbing" political advertisements are subject to the constitutional safeguard of due process.

Freedom Of Speech Expression Remains A Fresh

and Vital Verity

The guarantee of the freedom of speech which has been defined by Wendell Phillips as "the
instrument and guarantee and the bright and consummate flower of all liberty," has always
been granted a predominant status in the hierarchy of individual rights.28 It is founded on the
belief that the final end of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties and that
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth.29 Its purpose is to preserve an uninhibited marketplace
of ideas where truth will ultimately prevail.30 "An individual who seeks knowledge and truth
must hear all sides of the question, consider all alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it
to opposition and make full use of different minds. Discussion must be kept open no matter
how certainly true an accepted opinion may be; many of the most widely accepted opinions
have turned out to be erroneous. Conversely, the same principles apply no matter how false
or pernicious the new opinion may be; for the unaccepted opinion may be true and partially
true; and even if false, its presentation and open discussion compel a rethinking and
retesting of the accepted opinion.31 As applied to instant case, this Court cannot dictate what
the citizen may watch on the ground that the same appeals only to his non-intellective
faculties or is mind-deadening and repetitive. A veritable "Big Brother" looking over the
shoulder of the people declaring: "We know better what is good for you," is passé.

As to the puerile allegation that the same constitutes invasion of privacy, making the Filipino
audience a "captive audience," the explosive growth of cable television and AM/FM radio will
belie this assertion. Today, the viewing population has access to 12 local TV channels,32 as
well as cable television offering up to 50 additional channels. To maintain that political
advertisements constitute invasion of privacy overlooks the fact that viewers, with the surfeit
of channels, can easily skip to other TV channels during commercial breaks — a fact which,
coupled with the now ubiquitous remote control device, has become the bane of advertisers
everywhere.

The line between gaining access to an audience and forcing the audience to hear is
sometimes difficult to draw, leaving the courts with no clearcut doctrine on issues arising
from this kind of intrusion. This is specially true in cases involving broadcast and electronic
media. The US cases cited as authorities on the captive audience phenomenon, which,
incidentally, did not involve the issue of election campaigns,33 provide little guidance as to
whether freedom of speech may be infringed during the campaign period for national
elections on account of the individual's right to privacy.34 Prudence would dictate against an
infringement of the freedom of speech if we are to take into consideration that an election
campaigns is as much a means of disseminating ideas as attaining political office35 and
freedom of speech has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during
election campaigns.36 In Buckley v. Valeo, a case involving the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act, the United States Supreme Court per
curiam held that:

the concept that the government may restrict the speech of some elements in our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of the others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment which was designed to "secure the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources" and "to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people. (emphasis supplied) 37

The fear that the candidates will bombard the helpless electorate with paid advertisements,
while not entirely unfounded, is only to be expected considering the nature of political
campaigns. The supposition however that "the political advertisements which will be
"introjected into the electronic media and repeated with mind deadening frequency" are
commonly crafted not so much to inform and educate as to condition and manipulate, not so
much to provoke rational and objective appraisal of candidates' qualifications or programs as
to appeal to the intellective faculties of the captive and passive audience" is not a valid
justification for the infringement of so paramount a right granted by the Constitution
inasmuch as it is the privilege of the electorate in a democratic society to make up their own
minds as to the merit of the advertisements presented. The government derives its power
from the people as the sovereign and it may not impose its standards of what is true and
what is false, what is informative and what is not for the individual who, as a "particle" of the
sovereignty is the only one entitled to exercise this privilege.
Government may regulate constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling
interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the said interest without
unnecessarily interfering with the guarantee of freedom of expression. Mere legislative
preference for one rather than another means for combating substantive evils may well be an
inadequate foundation on which to rest regulations which are aimed at or in their operation
diminish the effective exercise of rights so necessary to maintenance of democratic
institutions.38

It should be noted that legislature has already seen fit to impose a ceiling on the candidates'
total campaign expenditures39 and has limited the political campaign period to 90 days for
candidates winning for national office and 60 days for congressmen and other local officials.
With these restrictions, it cannot be gainsaid that the constitutional provision on social
justice has been sufficiently complied with. We see no reason why another restriction, must
be imposed which only burdens the candidate and voters alike. To make matters worse, we
are not even certain as to the efficacy of the "ad ban" in curtailing the feared consequences
of the object of its restriction. Of course, this is not to say that the law is being struck down
as unconstitutional mainly because it is efficacious or inefficacious. If this is the only issue
which confronts us, there would have been no need to give due course to the petition
inasmuch as we would be inquiring as to the wisdom of the law and treading into an area
which rightfully belongs to the legislature. Verily, courts cannot run a race of opinions upon
points of right, reason and expediency with the law-making power.40

Freedom of Expression Incompatible With Social Justice?

The constitutional question at hand is not just a simple matter of deciding whether the "ad
ban" is effective or ineffective in bridging the financial disparity between the rich and poor
candidates. Sec 11(b) of RA No. 6646 strikes at the very core of freedom of expression. It is
unconstitutional not because we are uncertain as to whether it actually levels the playing
field for the candidates but because the means used to regulate freedom of expression is on
all points constitutionally impermissible. It tells the candidates when, where and how to
disseminate their ideas under pain of punishment should they refuse to comply. The
implications of the ban are indeed more complex and far reaching than approximating
equality among the rich and poor candidates.

The primacy accorded the freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our

constitutional system. The trend as reflected in Philippine and American decisions is to
recognize the broadest scope and assure the widest latitude to this guaranty. It represents a
profound commitment to the principle that debate of public issue should be uninhibited,
robust and wide open and may best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are or even stirs people to anger.41

The repression of expression in an attempt to level the playing field between the rich and the
poor candidates is not only unrealistic but goes beyond the permissible limits of freedom of
expression as enshrined in the constitution. Social justice is a laudable objective but it
should not be used as a means to justify infringement of the freedom of expression if it can
be achieved by means that do not unnecessarily trench on the individual's fundamental right.
The case of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration,42 is particularly enlightening. In said
case, we had occasion to state that:

Hand in hand with the announced principle, herein invoked, that "the promotion of
social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all people should be
the concern of the state", is a declaration with which the former should be reconciled,
 that "the Philippines is a Republican state" created to secure to the Filipino people
"the blessings in independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy."
Democracy as a way of life enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary
components freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in pursuit of
happiness. . . . Social justice does not champion division of property or equality of
economic status; what it and the Constitution do guarantee are equality of economic
opportunity, equality of political rights, equality before the law, equality between
values given and received . . .

While we concede the possibility that the rich candidates may dominate the airwaves to the
detriment of the poor candidates, the latter should not be prevented from replying. While they
may be restricted on account of their financial resources, they are not denied access to the
media altogether. This is what is meant by the phrase "equal time, space, equal opportunity
and the right of reply" under Article IX (C)(4) of the 1987 Constitution which was inserted by
the framers of the Constitution as a reaction to a 1981 ruling of the Supreme Court that when
the president speaks over radio or television, he speaks not as representative of his party but
of the people and therefore opposition parties have no right to demand equal time.43

It is ironic that the guarantee of freedom of expression should be pitted against the
constitutional provision on social justice because the freedom of speech is the most potent
instrument of public opinion, not to speak of its being the most effective weapon for effecting
political and social reforms. Certainly, an infringement of the freedom of speech in a less
than heroic attempt at attaining social justice cannot be countenanced, for in the ultimate
analysis social justice cannot flourish if the people's right to speak, to hear, to know and ask
for redress of grievances is watered down.

A word on the intervenors' argument that Resolution No. 2983, Section 2, insofar as it directs
every radio broadcasting and television station to provide COMELEC with air time free of
charge constitutes taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The
COMELEC, anticipating its vulnerability to said challenge passed Resolution 2983-A on
March 3, 1998 requiring that it pay just compensation for its COMELEC time.

Buckley vs. Valeo and Existing US Jurisprudence

The novelist George Orwell once said, "In a society in which there is no law, and in theory no
compulsion, the only arbiter of behavior is public opinion. But public opinion, because of the
tremendous urge to conformity in gregarious animals, is less tolerant than any other system
of law." For want of legislature to equalize the playing field between the rich and the poor
candidates, it has, by imposing a complete prohibition on paid political advertisements,
burned down a house to roast a pig. For fear of accusations that it might be treading into an
area which rightfully belongs to the legislature, the Court today, by sanctioning an
unnecessary infringement on the freedom of speech, has unwittingly allowed the camel's
nose into the tent.

My colleague, Justice Reynato Puno, in his separate opinion, apparently overlooked the
thrust of our dissenting opinion when we quoted the case of Buckley v. Valeo.44 Lest we be
misunderstood, we have in no way relied on the Buckley v. Valeo case for the grant of the
instant petition inasmuch as it has never escaped our notice that legislature has already seen
fit to impose a ceiling on the candidates' total campaign expenditures45 Precisely, we have
repeatedly emphasized in the dissenting opinion that we see no reason why another
restriction must be imposed on the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which only
burdens the candidates and electorates alike when legislature has already taken steps to
comply with the constitutional provision on social justice by imposing a ceiling on the
candidates' total campaign expenditures and limiting the campaign period to 90 days for
candidates running for national office and 60 days for congressmen and other local officials.
We have mentioned Buckley if only to underscore the fact that due to the primacy accorded
to freedom of speech, courts, as a rule are wary to impose greater restrictions as to any
attempt to curtail speeches with political content. To preserve the sanctity of the status
accorded to the said freedom, the US Supreme Court has, in fact, gone as far as invalidating
a federal law limiting individual expenditures of candidates running for political office.

In any case, to address some misconceptions about existing jurisprudence on the matter, we
now present a brief discussion on Buckley and the preceding US cases. In the case
of Buckley v. Valeo, a divided US Supreme Court, per curiam held that a federal law limiting
individual contributions to candidates for office served the state's compelling interest in
limiting the actuality and appearance of corruption. However a law limiting expenditures by
candidates, individuals and groups was held unconstitutional. The rationale for the
dichotomy between campaign expenditures and contributions has been explained in this
wise — campaign contributions are marginal because they convey only an undifferentiated
expression of support rather than the specific values which motivate the support.
Expenditures, on the other hand, as directly related to the expression of political views, are
on a higher plane of constitutional values. The Court, in noting that a more stringent
justification is necessary for legislative intrusion into protected speech said, "A restriction on
the amount of money a person or a group can spend on political communication necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth
of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every
means of communicating in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money."46

A more discerning scrutiny of the US cases following Buckley, would show that
while Buckley has been widely criticized, it has, to date, never been modified, much less
discredited. In California Medical Association vs. FEC,47 a law limiting the amount an
incorporated association can contribute to a multi-candidate political committee was upheld.
The spending was viewed not as independent political speech but rather as "speech by
proxy," hence, the spending was deemed analogous to group contributions which can be
regulated.

In FEC vs. National Conservative Political Action Comm.48 the US Supreme Court invalidated a
section of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act which makes it a criminal offense for
an independent political committee to spend more than $1,000 to further the election of
a presidential candidate who elects public funding. National Conservative Political Action
Committee (NCPAC) and the Fund for a Conservative Majority (FCM), two political action
committees or PAC's, solicited funds in support of President Reagan's 1980 presidential
campaign. The PAC's spent these funds on radio and television advertising in support of
Reagan. The Court, relying on Buckley v. Valeo and the distinction it drew between
expenditures and contributions, held that the independent expenditures of the political
committees were constitutionally protected for they "produce speech at the core of the First
Amendment" necessitating a "rigorous standard of review." Justice Rehnquist, for the court,
likened the restriction to allowing a speaker in a public hall to express his views while
denying him use of the amplifier. As in Buckley, independent expenditures, not coordinated
with candidates' political campaign, were seen as presenting a lesser danger of political quid
pro quos. The Court then proceeded to reject efforts to support the statutory limitation on
expenditures on the basis of special treatment historically accorded to corporations
inasmuch as the terms of the Campaign Fund Act "apply equally to an informal neighborhood
group that solicits contributions and spends money on a presidential election campaign as to
the wealthy and professionally managed PAC's."
In the case of FEC v. Massachussets Citizens for Life (MCFL),49 a provision of the Federal
Election Campaign Act prohibiting direct expenditure of corporate funds to a non-profit,
voluntary political association concerned with elections to public office was struck down as
unconstitutional. No compelling government interest was found to justify infringement of
protected political speech in this case where a small voluntary political association, which
had no shareholders and was not engaged in business, refused to accept contributions from
either business corporations or labor unions.

In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,50 the case cited by Justice Puno, a Michigan
statute prohibiting corporations from making campaign contributions from their general
treasury funds to political candidates was held not to violate the first amendment even
though the statute burdened expressive activity mainly because the statute was sufficiently
narrowed to support its goal in preventing political corruption or the appearance of undue
influence — it did not prohibit all corporate spending and corporations were permitted to
make independent expenditures for political purposes from segregated funds but not from
their treasuries. Notably, the non profit corporation involved in this case, the Michigan
Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter referred to as the Chamber of Commerce), lacked three of
the distinctive features of MCFL, the organization involved in the FEC vs. National
Conservative Political Action Comm51 case, namely: (1) The Chamber of Commerce, unlike
MCFL, was not formed just for the purpose of political expression (2) The members of the
Chamber of commerce had an economic reason for remaining with it even though they might
disagree with its politics and (3) The Chamber of Commerce, unlike MCFL, was subject to
influence from business corporations which might use it as a conduit for direct spending
which would pose a threat to the political marketplace.

From the foregoing, it should be obvious that Austin in fact supports the holding in Buckley
v. Valeo and "refines" it insofar as as it allows the regulation of corporate spending in the
political process if the regulation is drawn with sufficient specificity to serve the compelling
state interest in reducing the threat that "huge corporate treasuries" will distort the political
process and influence unfairly the outcome of elections.

The ad ban, undoubtedly, could hardly be considered as a regulation drawn with sufficient
specificity to serve compelling governmental interest inasmuch as it imposes a complete
prohibition on the use of paid political advertisements except through Comelec time and
space despite the fact that Congress has already seen fit to impose a ceiling on the
candidates' total campaign expenditures. While it seems a rather fair proposition that
Congress may regulate the misuse of money by limiting the candidates' total campaign
expenditures, it seems a rather curious supposition that Congress through the ad ban can
regulate the misuse of money by telling the candidates how, when and where to use their
financial resources for political campaigns. Obviously, it is one thing to limit the total
campaign expenditures of the candidates and another to dictate to them as to how they
should spend it.

Freedom of expression occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of human values. The
priority gives the liberty a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions and it is
the character of the right, not the limitation which determines what standard governs the
choice. 52 Consequently, when the government defends a regulation on speech as a means to
redress past harm or prevent anticipated harm, it must do more than simply "posit the
existence of the disease sought to be cured.53 It must demonstrate that the recited harms are
real, not merely conjectural and that the regulation will alleviate these harms in a material
way.54
As earlier pointed out, legislature has already seen fit to impose a ceiling on the total
campaign expenditures of the candidates and has limited the campaign period for 90/60 days.
We see no reason why another restriction must be imposed which only burdens the
candidates and voters alike. The fact alone that so much time has been devoted to the
discussion as to whether the ad ban does in fact level the playing field among the rich and
poor candidates should be a strong indication in itself that it is a dubious intrusion on the
freedom of expression which should not be countenanced.

Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices make their initial foothold by furtive approaches
and minimal deviations from legal modes of procedure. Hence, courts must be extremely
vigilant in safeguarding the fundamental rights granted by the Constitution to the individual.
Since freedom of expression occupies a dominant position in the hierarchy of rights under
the Constitution, it deserves no less than an exacting standard of limitation. Limitations on
the guarantee must be clearcut, precise and, if needed readily controllable, otherwise the
forces that press towards curtailment will eventually break through the crevices and freedom
of expression will become the exception and suppression the rule.55 Sadly, the much vaunted
ad ban failed to live up to such standard and roseate expectations.

Freedom of Expression In Historical Context

At this juncture, as we celebrate the Centennial of our Philippine Independence, it is timely to

call to mind that wars and revolutions have been fought, not only in our shores and in our
time, but in centuries past, halfway around the globe to keep these subject rights inviolate.
To stretch our memories, Spain's adamant denial of basic freedoms to our hapless
forefathers, among others, sparked the Philippine revolution. Jose Rizal, in "Filipinas
Despues de Cien Años"56 described the reform a sine quibus non, saying, "The minister, . . .
who wants his reforms to be reforms, must begin by declaring the press in the Philippines
free." The Filipino propagandists who sought refuge in the freer intellectual climate of Spain
invariably demanded "liberty of the press, of cults, and of associations57 through the columns
of "La Solidaridad."

One of the more lofty minds unleashed his fierce nationalistic aspirations though the novels
Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo, necessarily banned from the author's native land.
Eventually, the seeds of these monumental works ignited the flame of revolution, devouring
in the process its foremost exponent, albeit producing a national hero, Jose Rizal. The mighty
pen emerged victorious over the colonizers' sword.

The Malolos Constitution, approved before the turn of century on January 20, 1899, enshrined
freedom of expression in Article 20 of its Bill of Rights, thus:

Article 20 Neither shall any Filipino be deprived:

1. Of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the
use of the press or other similar means.58

This right, held sacrosanct by the Filipino people and won at the cost of their lives found its
way ultimately in the Constitutions of a later day, reenforced as they were, by the profound
thoughts transplanted on fertile soil by libertarian ideologies. Why emasculate the freedom of
expression now to accord a governmental agency a power exercisable for a limited period of
time for the dubious purpose of "equalizing" the chances of wealthy and less affluent
candidates?
In summary, I hold that Section 11(b) of R.A. 6646, in the six years that have elapsed since it
was upheld as being in consonance with the fundamental law, has now become out of sync
with the times and, therefore, unreasonable and arbitrary, as it not only unduly restrains the
freedom of expression of candidates but corollarily denies the electorate its fullest right to
freedom of information at a time when it should flourish most.

For the reasons stated above, I VOTE to declare Section 11(b) of R.A. 6646
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., dissent.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting;

The Court, by a majority vote, decided to uphold the ban on political advertising, as provided,
under Section 11(b)1 of RA 6646, and to reiterate the 1992 ruling in National Press Club
vs. Comelec2 for two main reasons:

1. To equalize "as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by
preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign
'war chests.'" In other words, the intention of the prohibition is to equalize the
"political playing field" for rich and poor candidates.

2. While conceding that Section 11(b) of RA 6646 "limit[s] the right of free speech and
of access to mass media of the candidates themselves," the Court justifies the ad ban
by alleging that: (a) it is limited, first, in its "duration," (i.e. the ban applies only during
the "election period") and, second, in its "scope" (i.e. the prohibition on the sale and
the donation of print space and air time covers only those for "campaign and other
political purposes", time does not restrict the legitimate reporting of news and
opinions by media practitioners who are not candidates); and (b) the Comelec is
authorized to procure, by purchase or donation, media time and space which are to be
fairly, freely and equally distributed among the candidates. Otherwise stated, the grant
of Comelec time and space, free of charge, to said candidates makes up for the
admitted infringement of the constitutional right to free speech and access to mass
media during the campaign period.

With all due respect, I disagree with the majority's view and join the stirring Dissenting
Opinions of Justices Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.,3 Isagani A.
Cruz4 and Edgardo L. Paras5 in NPC vs. Comelec, and of Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in the
present case. I will no longer repeat their cogent legal arguments. Let me just add my own.

1. Ad Ban Not Pro-Poor

but Anti-Poor

The majority argues that the ad ban is pro-poor, because it prevents the rich from buying
media time and space which the poor cannot afford or match. This argument assumes that
media advertising is expensive and, thus, beyond the reach of the poor.

I respectfully submit that such argument is bereft of factual basis. True, a full-page ad in a
major broadsheet6 may be priced at about P100,000; a 30-second commercial in a major
television channel,7 anywhere from P15,000 to P90,000 depending on the time and the
program; while air time of an equal duration in a leading radio station, anywhere from P300 to
P4,500.8 But even with such price tags, media ads are not necessarily expensive, considering
their nationwide reach, audience penetration, effectiveness and persuasive value.

Realistically, expenses are involved in a candidacy for a national office like the presidency,
the vice presidency, and the senate. In recognition of this, the law has limited campaign
expenditures to ten pesos (P10) for every voter in the case of candidates for president and
vice president, and three pesos (P3) per voter in their constituencies, for other
candidates.9 Anyone — whether rich or poor — who aspires for such national elective office
must expect to spend a considerable sum, whether of his own or from allowable donations,
to make himself and his platform or program of government known to the voting public.

Media Ads

Comparatively Cheaper

While a one-page black-and-white ad in a major daily costs about P100,000, it is replicated,

however, in about 250,000 copies 10 circulated to an equal number of offices and
households nationwide on the very same day of its publication. Each newspaper copy has an
average readership of six. Hence, the ad is exposed to about 1.5 million (250,000 x 6)
people all over the country. Consider, too, that people discuss what they read while they
congregate in barber shops, corner stores, and other places where people gather.
Sometimes, radio and TV broadcasters pick up and comment on what they read in
newspapers. So, the reach, pass-on readership, multiplier effect and effectivity of a
broadsheet ad are practically immeasurable.

On the other hand, let us consider the alternative of printing and distributing a poster or
handbill of similar size. The actual printing cost of such handbill on newsprint is twenty
centavos (P.20) per copy.11 The cost of P250,000 copies (the circulation of a major daily)
would thus be P50,000 (250,000 x P.20). But that is only the printing cost. To disseminate
these handbills nationwide on the same day of printing without the distribution network of a
major newspaper is almost impossible. Besides, the cost would be horrendous. To
approximate the circulation of a major newspaper, the most practical substitute would be the
mails. Ordinary mail is now P4.00 per posting. Hence, the distribution cost through the mails
would be P1 million (250,000 copies x P4.00). And this does not include the manual work and
cost of sorting, folding and individually addressing these 250,000 pieces of mail matter. (This
alternative assumes the availability of a mailing list equivalent to the reach of a newspaper.)
Even if third-class mail is used, the distribution cost alone will still be P3.00 per individual
mailing, or P750,000 for all 250,000 copies.12

This alternative is not only much more expensive but much less effective as well, because it
has no guarantee of same-day delivery, has a diminished readership multiplier effect and is
tremendously cumbersome in terms of sorting and distribution.

Furthermore, a candidate need not buy one-page ads. He can use quarter-page ads at one
fourth the cost or about P25,000 only per issue. To be effective in his ad campaign, he may
need to come out once every three days (to be spread out among the different dailies) or 30
times during the 90-day campaign period13 for national candidates. Hence, he will spend, for
the entire duration of the campaign, about P750,000 (P25,000 x 30). I repeat, to advertise a
one-fourth page ad at least 30 times in various major dailies, a candidate needs to spend only
P750,000 — an amount less than the alternative of printing and distributing nationwide ONLY
ONCE a less timely and less effective equivalent leaflet or poster.
A similar detailed comparison of cost-benefit could be written for radio and television. While,
at initial glance, the rates for these electronic media may appear high, still they could be
proven more beneficial and cheaper in the long term because of their "value-for-money"
appeal.14

Candidates Should Not Be Denied

Option to Use Media Ads

From the foregoing, it is clear that mass media truly offers an economical, practical, and
effective means by which a relatively unknown but well-qualified political candidate who has
limited resources, particularly one running for a national office, may make known to the
general public during the short campaign period15 his qualifications, platform of government,
stand on vital issues, as well as his responses to questions or doubts about his capabilities,
his character or any other matter raised against him. Deprived of media ads, the rich
candidate, unlike his poor opponent, resorts to expensive propaganda — the holding of
public meetings and rallies before large but oftentimes "paid" crowds, helicopter stops and
motorcades spanning several towns and cities, the production of ingenious materials,
giveaways and other products, and the incessant printing and distribution of various
campaign paraphernalia. These forms of electoral promotion ineluctably require a large
political machinery and gargantuan funds (organization + people/supporters +
communication gadgets + vehicles + logistics). To combat this formidable and expensive
election behemoth, the poor candidate's most viable alternative may be media advertising.

In NPC vs. Comelec, it was feared that the "unlimited purchase of print space and radio and
television time . . . by the financially affluent [was] likely to make a crucial difference." But I
say such fear is unfounded. First, because campaign expenses are limited by law. Second,
the possibility of the abuse and misuse of media ads by the "financially affluent" is not an
argument in favor of their total withdrawal, for — to use the very words of the majority in NPC
— "there is no power or authority in human society that is not susceptible of being
abused."16 Third, the absence of access to media advertising totally deprives the poor
candidate of his most formidable weapon in combating the "huge campaign war chests" of
rich contenders.

THE POINT IS: IT IS INCORRECT TO SAY THAT MEDIA ADVERTISING SHOULD BE BANNED
BECAUSE ONLY THE RICH CAN AFFORD IT OR, FOR THAT MATTER, THEY MAY ABUSE OR
MISUSE IT. Quite the contrary, in terms of reach, pass-on readership, multiplier effect and
cost-benefit advantage, media advertising may be the cheapest and most effective campaign
mechanism available. I am not suggesting that every candidate should use media ads. In the
final analysis, it is really up to the candidates and their campaign handlers to adopt such
mode and means of campaigning as their budgets and political strategies may
require.16a What I am stressing is that candidates, whether rich or poor, should be given the
option of campaigning through media, instead of being forced to use other forms of
propaganda that could turn out to be less effective and more expensive.

2. Ad Ban Not Limited;

Comelec Time and Space Inutile

I now come to the second major point. The majority rationalizes the ad ban by saying that it
has a very limited duration and scope and that, in any event, the Comelec's grant of free
media time and space to candidates more than makes up for the violation of their
constitutional right. I disagree.
Ad Ban Not
Limited in Duration

The ad ban is constitutional because, according to the majority, it is limited in duration for
the reason that it is enforced only during the election period. In my humble view and with all
due respect, this is both erroneous and illogical. A political advertisement is relevant only
during the campaign period — not before and not after. As petitioners put it, a ban on
mountain-skiing during the winter season cannot be said to be limited in duration, just
because it is enforced during winter. After all, skiing is indulged in only when the mountains
slopes are covered with snow. To add a further parallel, a ban against the planting of rice
during the rainy season is not limited simply because it covers only that season. After all,
nobody plants rice during summer when the soil is parched. In the same manner, campaign
ads are not resorted to except during the campaign period. And their prohibition does not
become any less odious and less comprehensive just because the proscription applies only
during the election season. Obviously, candidates need to advertise their qualifications and
platforms only during such period. Properly understood, therefore, the prohibition is not
limited in duration but is in fact and in truth total, complete and exhaustive.

Ad Ban Neither
Limited in Scope

The majority also claims that the prohibition is reasonable because it is limited in scope; that
is, it refers only to the purchase, sale or donation of print space and air time for "campaign or
other political purposes," and does not restrict news reporting or commentaries by editors,
columnists, reporters, and broadcasters. But the issue here is not the freedom of media
professionals.17 The issue is the freedom of expression of candidates. That the freedom of the
press is respected by the law and by the Comelec is not a reason to trample upon the
candidates' constitutional right to free speech and the people's right to information. In this
light, the majority's contention is a clear case of non sequitur. Media ads do not partake of
the "real substantive evil" that the state has a right to prevent18 and that justifies the
curtailment of the people's cardinal right to choose their means of expression and of access
to information.

Besides, what constitutes "campaign or other political purposes"? Neither RA 6646 nor the
majority provides an explanation. If candidates buy 30 column-inches of newspaper space or
one hour of prime radio/TV, time everyday, and if they retrain professional journalists to use
such space/time to defend them from attacks and to promote their platforms of government,
should such purchase be covered by the ad ban, or should it be allowed as an exercise of the
freedom of journalists to express their views? Even more insidiously, should regular
columnists' daily defense of their chosen candidates and daily promotion of their platforms
of government constitute donated space for "campaign and other political purposes"?19

Ad Ban Not Compensated for or

Justified by Free "Comelec Time"

Finally, the majority opines that the grant of free Comelec media time and space to
candidates more than makes up for the abridgment of the latter's right to buy political
ads.20 With due respect, I believe this is hollow and shallow.

In its Compliance dated March 13, 1998, Comelec tell us that under its Resolution No. 3015, it
gave due course to eleven candidates for president,21 nine for vice president,22 and forty for
senator.23 It is claimed however that, all in all, there are really about 100,000 candidates
running for about 17,000 national and local positions in the coming elections, from whom a
voter is expected to choose at least 3024 to vote for. With so many candidates, how can the
ordinary, sometimes nonchalant, voter ever get to know each of the political hopefuls from
whom he will make an intelligent selection? In the crucial choice for president alone, how can
ordinary citizens intelligently and sufficiently assess each of the 11 candidates in order to
make a sensible choice for a leader upon whom to entrust the momentous responsibility of
carving the country's path in the next millennium?

The Comelec answers these questions with Resolution No. 2983-A, promulgated on March 3,
1998, in which it asks "every radio broadcasting and television station operating under
franchise [to] grant the Commission, upon payment of just compensation, at least thirty (30)
minutes of prime time daily, to be known as 'Comelec time' effective February 10, 1998 for
candidates for President, Vice President and Senators, and effective March 27, 1998 for
candidates for local elective offices, until May 9, 1998," to be allocated "by lottery" among
candidates requesting its use. But Comelec, in the same Compliance, informed the Court that
"it is not procuring 'Comelec space' (in any newspaper) by virtue of the effects of the
decision of this Honorable Court in the case of Philippine Press Institute (PPI) vs. Comelec,
244 SCRA 272."25

In sum, the Comelec intends to secure 30 minutes of "Comelec time" from every radio and
broadcasting station to be allocated equally to all candidates. The Comelec does not state
exactly how it intends to allocate — except "by lottery" — these 30 minutes per station to the
17,000 candidates, considering that these stations do not have the same reach, audience and
penetration. The poll body does not say exactly how many stations are involved, what budget
allocation, if any, it has for the purpose,26 when each candidate will be allowed to speak and
for how long, how the Comelec intends to cover the 77 provinces, 68 cities and 42,000
barangays nationwide, and many other details. Moreover, while the Comelec smugly speaks
of free Comelec time being effective on "February 10, 1998" for national candidates,
Resolution 2983-A itself was promulgated only on March 3, 1998.

Up to this writing, I have yet to hear of any major candidate using this so-called free Comelec
broadcast time. In fact, during the oral argument of this case on March 5, 1998, Comelec
Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo frankly admitted that no candidate had applied for an allocation
of Comelec time. Not even petitioners. This is the best testament to the utter inutility and
ineffectivity of Comelec time. Indeed, it cannot be a substitute, much less a viable alternative,
to freely chosen but paid for media ads. It cannot compensate for the violation of the
candidates' right to free speech and media access, or for the electorate's right to information.

If the real objective is to level the playing field for rich and poor candidates, there must be, as
there already are, a cap on election expenses and a shortening of the campaign period. The
incapability of the Comelec to effectively monitor and strictly implement such expense and
time limitations should not take its toll upon constitutionally enshrined liberties of the people,
including the candidates. To prohibit access to mass media, except only through Comelec
time — which has been indubitably shorn to be sorely insubstantial, insignificant and inutile
— is not, and is far from being, a solution to the problems faced by poor candidates. The
simple remedy is to lift the media ban.

Epilogue

The ad ban is a blatant violation of the candidates' constitutional right to free speech 27 and
the people's right to information.28 Being the last refuge of the people and the guardian of the
Constitution, this Court should then, with alacrity, view the ban with suspicion, if not with
outright rejection.29 To repeat, the alleged limitations are in reality nonexistent; and the "pro-
poor" justification, without logic.

To say that the prohibition levels the playing field for the rich and the poor is to indulge in a
theoretical assumption totally devoid of factual basis. On the contrary, media advertising may
be — depending on a contender's propaganda strategy — the cheapest, most practical and
most effective campaign medium, especially for national candidates. By completely denying
this medium to both the rich and the poor, this Court has not leveled the playing field. It has
effectively abolished it! Far from equalizing campaign opportunities, the ban on media
advertising actually favors the rich (and the popular) who can afford the more expensive and
burdensome forms of propaganda, against the poor (and the unknown) who cannot.

The allegation that the prohibition is reasonable because it is limited in duration and scope is
itself most unreasonable, bereft as it is of logic and basis. Even more shallow is the argument
that the Comelec-given media time and space compensate for such abridgment. In fact, the
Comelec is not even procuring any newspaper space. In any event, the fact that not even the
poorest candidates have applied for available opportunities is the best testament to its
dubiousness. That petitioners who are seasoned political leaders prefer to pay for their own
media ads rather than to avail themselves of the Comelec freebies refutes the majority's
thesis of compensation. Indeed, the free things in life are not always the best.30 They mat just
be a bureaucratic waste of resources.

Before I close, a word about stare decisis. In the present case, the Court is maintaining the ad
ban to be consistent with its previous holding in NPC vs. Comelec. Thus, respondent urges
reverence for the stability of judicial doctrines. I submit, however, that more important than
consistency and stability are the verity, integrity and correctness of jurisprudence. As Dean
Roscoe Pound explains, "Law must be stable but it cannot stand still." Verily, it must correct
itself and move in cadence with the march of the electronic age. Error and illogic should not
be perpetuated. After all, the Supreme Court, in many cases,31 has deviated from stare
decisis and reversed previous doctrines and decisions. It should do no less in the present
case.

Elections can he free, honest and credible not only because of the absence of the three
execrable "G's" or "guns, goons and gold." Beyond this, the integrity and effectivity of
electoral democracy depend upon the availability of information and education touching on
three good "P's" — principles, platforms and programs of the candidates. Indeed, an
intelligent vote presupposes a well-informed voter. If elections must be rid of patronage,
personalities and popularity as the main criteria of the people's choice, we must allow
candidates every opportunity to educate the voters. And corollarily, the people must be
accorded every access to such information without much effort and expense on their part.

With all due respect, I submit that the ad ban is regressive, repressive and deceptive. It has
no place in our constitutional democracy.

WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition and to CONDEMN Section 11(b) of RA 6646 as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and VOID.