COOPERATION, CONFLICT,

AND CONSENSUS IN THE

ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES

Carolyn M. Shaw
 Cooperation, Conflict, and
Consensus in the Organization
of American States
This page intentionally left blank
Cooperation, Conflict,
and Consensus in
the Organization of
American States

by
Carolyn M. Shaw
COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND CONSENSUS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES
© Carolyn M. Shaw, 2004
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2004 978-1-4039-6221-8
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced
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First published 2004 by
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DOI 10.1057/9781403978837
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Shaw, Carolyn M., 1970–
Cooperation, conflict, and consensus in the Organization of
American States / by Carolyn M. Shaw
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Organization of American States. 2. Latin America–Foreign
relations. 3. United States—Relations—Latin America.
4. Latin America—Relations—United States. 5. Conflict
management—Latin America. 6. Security, International—Latin
America. 7. Pan-Americanism. I. Title.
F1415.S49 2004
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10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
 To my Family
David, Adam, and Delaney
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 C on t e n t s

Tables and Figures ix

Acknowledgments xi

1. U.S. Foreign Policy and Institutional Relationships

in the Western Hemisphere 1
2. Developing Theories of International Organizations 15
3. Cooperation: Historic Hemispheric Relations and the
Formation of the OAS 39
4. The OAS and Conflict Resolution 1948–89 59
5. Conflict: The Ebb and Flow of U.S. Dominance 95
6. Consensus and Compromise: Cooperation Between
Member States 133
7. Change and Continuity: Hemispheric Relations in the
1990s and the New Millennium 151
8. Conclusions and Future Prospects for the OAS 175

Notes 187
Bibliography 193
Index 201
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 Tables and Figures

Tables
2.1 Theories and hypotheses 19
4.1 Cases invoking the Rio Treaty or the OAS
Charter in chronological order (1948–89) 72
5.1 Cases invoking the OAS Charter, Rio Treaty,
or Resolution 1080 (1948–2002) by outcome 96

Figure
4.1 Peaceful settlement procedures 61
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 Acknowledgments

It is my pleasure to recognize those friends and colleagues who have

greatly assisted me in the completion of this book. My thanks to Henry
Dietz at the University of Texas at Austin for his help in conceptualiz-
ing this project and offering me constant encouragement. My apprecia-
tion to G. Pope Atkins at the University of Texas at Austin and Paul F.
Diehl at the University of Illinois at Urbana for their careful reading and
apt suggestions for improvements to the text. Stella E. Villagran,
reference librarian, and René L. Gutiérrez, technical services librarian, at
the Columbus Memorial Library of the OAS in Washington, DC,
greatly aided my research efforts. Dexter Boniface, Susan Henney,
Manuel Orozco, and Mark Setzler provided useful critiques as well as
insights on the case studies and the theoretical framework. David Pervin
at Palgrave Macmillan and Brian Whepley provided excellent editorial
assistance. My colleagues in the Political Science Department at Wichita
State University gave me enthusiastic support in the final stages of the
project. My husband, David, stood by me through all of the research
and writing, and listened to my endless articulation of ideas and
information. My gratitude to all these individuals.
 C h ap t e r 1
U.S. Foreign Policy and
Institutional Relationships
in the Western Hemisphere

Introduction
A look at U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s revealed a dominant global
power in search of a new guiding paradigm for its relations with
countries around the world. Once-impossible relationships were being
cultivated for the first time with former rivals, including Russia. Relation-
ships that had been taken for granted, and even neglected over the years,
were being revived with Latin American neighbors. As the United States
has reassessed its national security concerns in the new millennium and
evaluated the mechanisms at hand to address them, it has reaffirmed its
cooperative relationship with 33 other states in the Western hemisphere
through the Organization of American States (OAS).
Although the OAS and its member states have rarely been the
primary focus of U.S. foreign policy, the organization has served as a
collective security arrangement in the hemisphere for over 50 years. The
United States and Latin American states have a long, rich history of
cooperation and collective actions carried out in the context of the OAS.
The United States has taken advantage of this organization to address
security concerns in the region, such as the border disputes between
Costa Rica and Nicaragua from 1948 to 1955 and the various regional
disturbances instigated by the Castro regime in Cuba in the 1960s.
Despite disagreements between members over unilateral U.S. actions
and many U.S. policy proposals, the organization has striven to reach
consensus before taking actions in the region. This commitment to
consensus has led to considerable cooperation among members on issues
over the years. This was particularly evident in the 1990s as members
rallied to strengthen democracy in the region and to support any regime
that faced challenges to its elected government.
 2 / organization of american states

The traditional concept of regional security based on geopolitical/

strategic threats has gradually been expanded within the OAS to include
a number of concerns that had not previously been considered “security
issues.” The United States and Latin American states have developed a
common agenda of security concerns that includes consideration of
human rights, democracy, the environment, government reform, social
equality, and a free market environment (Wiarda 1995). The 1990s
witnessed strong consensus among members to promote democratic
consolidation and economic development through hemispheric cooper-
ation. Many governments, including the Clinton administration in the
United States, acknowledged the value of the multilateral approach to
resolving transnational problems. The OAS has been revitalized based
on the support of members for the priorities and actions of the organi-
zation. The organization has been able to respond to the needs of its
members in a number of different areas, including security and
economic development.
The OAS demonstrated its capacity to act rapidly in response to a
security threat to a member state following the terrorist attacks on the
United States in September 2001. The Meeting of the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs met within days of the attack and issued several resolu-
tions in strong support of the United States. The Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) for collective security was invoked
and members were called upon to take effective measures to deny terror-
ists the ability to operate in their territories; to render all assistance to
pursue, capture, extradite, and punish anyone found to be connected to
the September 11 attacks; and to convoke as soon as possible the Inter-
American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) to strengthen inter-
American cooperation to combat terrorism. Following this call for a
meeting of the CICTE, the Committee met in special session in
October and November 2001 to identify counterterrorism actions for
OAS members to implement. In 2002, the CICTE designed and
deployed an antiterrorism database and drafted the Convention Against
Terrorism, which was signed by 30 members of the OAS in June. As the
United States further redefines its security concerns in the wake of the
terrorist attacks, and seeks to root out future terrorist plots, the OAS
provides a strong institutionalized framework for working closely with
its Latin American neighbors. In order to assess the capacity of the orga-
nization to address security concerns in the future, it is critical to under-
stand the dynamic relationships between members within the
organization, and the impact of organizational structure and functions
on member states. An historical examination of the OAS reveals some
 u.s. foreign policy / 3

surprises about the strength of the organization and its members, and
their relations with the United States.

Member State Relations Within the OAS

Since the OAS was founded by Latin American states and the United
States in 1948, one of its fundamental tasks has been to promote
regional security through pacific settlement procedures and collective
security arrangements. The OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty are the two
primary instruments that have been used by member states to address
conflicts in the region over the past 50 years. The OAS has not always
been active or effective in all disputes in the region, but it has adapted
to changing international conditions (i.e., the Cold War and the end of
the Cold War) and evolving member priorities over the years to emerge
as a revitalized regional organization in the new millennium.
Part of the strength of the organization derives from the shared inter-
ests of its members. Members have declared that a threat to one is a
threat to all and are thus obligated to respond multilaterally to any
threats to the peace in order to insure regional stability. In many
instances the preferences of Latin American states and the United States
are the same, which allows for a unified response to regional conflicts.
For example, when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev attempted to
install missile bases on Cuban territory, all members of the OAS
responded rapidly in opposition to these actions. In this case, the orga-
nization acted according to U.S. preferences, but it is important to
recognize that these were also the preferences of Latin American
members. In other cases, however, relations among members within the
OAS have been strained, and disputes over proposals have been
contentious. These disputes include not only differences of opinion
between the United States and Latin American states, but also between
Latin American members themselves. For example, at the Meeting of
Foreign Ministers (1962) that banned the participation of Cuba in the
OAS, Mexico opposed such actions while the United States and other
Latin American states strongly advocated such a resolution. The
Dominican case (1965) also saw considerable disagreement between
Latin American states, with Colombia, Haiti, and Paraguay openly
supporting U.S. intervention, while Mexico, Chile, and Uraguay
denounced U.S. actions on the island.
Despite the different preferences of member states on some of the
issues taken up by the OAS, many of the final decisions made within the
organization have been consensual (i.e., supported by all members).
 4 / organization of american states

Consensus is highly valued by member states. They believe that decisions

adopted consensually carry more weight than those with only the requi-
site two-thirds vote. In addition, regional solidarity, which strengthens
regional stability, is maintained if compromises can be reached rather
than passing disputed proposals by a majority vote. Because members
prefer to act consensually, the decisionmaking process within the
organization involves bargaining among members to reach mutually
acceptable agreements on issues where members have divergent
preferences. For example, when the Foreign Ministers met to consider
subversive acts carried out by Fidel Castro’s regime in 1960, the United
States wanted to condemn Cuban actions and other members did not.
The compromise reached was a condemnation of Sino-Soviet attempts
to subvert the legitimate governments of the Western hemisphere without
specific mention of Cuba.
As member states engage in decisionmaking and negotiate compro-
mises to accommodate their different preferences, the United States, as
the most powerful member of the OAS, is often able to use its extensive
resources and influence to gain support from other members for
the proposals that it favors. This is particularly true in cases where
the United States has a strong interest (i.e., concerning security issues). The
United States has considerably more military, financial, and personnel
resources at its disposal than other member states, giving it hegemonic
dominance in the region. It has often used these resources in the past,
both unilaterally and multilaterally, to safeguard its interests in the hemi-
sphere. For example, when the U.S. government feared that a coup in the
Dominican Republic in 1965 might result in “another Cuba” (i.e., a
communist government taking power in the Dominican Republic), the
United States sent in marines to reestablish order in the country. It is
unlikely that any other OAS member would have had the resources to act
so swiftly, or the audacity to intervene in a member state’s affairs in such
a way. U.S. hegemony in the region has given it a unique place within the
OAS and in its relations with other member states.
Surprisingly, however, not all OAS decisions are consistent with the
preferences of the United States despite its overwhelming dominance in
the hemisphere. There are some cases in which the United States has
been unable to gain support for its proposals. Latin American members
have, on a few occasions, rejected proposals made by the United States,
even on security matters in which the United States has had strong pref-
erences and exerted considerable influence. For example, in 1978 during
the Nicaraguan revolution, the United States tried to persuade the
Meeting of Foreign Ministers that a U.S.-led peacekeeping force was
 u.s. foreign policy / 5

necessary to restore stability to the region. The Foreign Ministers refused

to consider such an option and chose instead to encourage the
Nicaraguan people to oust dictator President Anastasio Somoza and
hold elections to establish a representative democracy. Although the
cases in which members reject U.S. preferences outright are not numer-
ous, they are rather striking anomalies within an organization that
largely acts consensually and frequently in the U.S. interest.1
This study seeks to determine what conditions, beyond relative state
power and common interests, affect the level of influence the United
States is able to bring to bear within the OAS. Robert Keohane and Lisa
Martin once noted, “the difference between realism and liberal institu-
tionalism does not lie in whether institutions are independent or depen-
dent variables, it lies in contrasting understandings of why institutions
are created and how they exert their effects” (1995, 48, emphasis added).
This study uses the unexpected decisionmaking outcomes within the
OAS, when the United States does not dominate the organization, to try
to answer the second part of this question. I seek to specify what insti-
tutional conditions allow an international organization (IO) to affect a
hegemonic member state.

Empirical and Theoretical Implications

The ability of Latin American members of the OAS to resist U.S.
hegemonic influence is intriguing not only because it is counterintu-
itive, but also because neither realism nor institutionalism, the two
dominant theories in international relations (IR), can adequately
explain how such independent action occurs. Although realism’s focus
on relative power relations among states explains many of the policy
outcomes of the OAS, it cannot explain why the United States would
fail to dominate the organization when it chose to exert its influence.
The puzzling outcomes are directly contradictory to predictions that
realism makes concerning the behavior of international organizations
(IOs) and the capabilities of a hegemonic power. Realism posits that
given the conditions in the international system (anarchy, no world
government, lack of trust, concerns about relative power) that the most
powerful state will dominate IOs in which it is a member. In addition,
realism assumes that states are the primary actors in the international
system and that IOs play only a marginal role in international relations
(Morgenthau 1948, Waltz 1979, Grieco 1988).
John Mearsheimer (1994) argues that IOs are created and controlled
by the most powerful state(s) and are only effective in the international
 6 / organization of american states

system if they are being used as a tool by a powerful state. If he were to

consider the anomalous cases in which U.S. preferences are not adopted
by the OAS, Mearsheimer might conclude that the United States had
little interest in those particular cases and thus did not choose to exert
its influence. It might also reflect cases in which the United States did
not view the OAS as an optimal tool to pursue its interests, and thus
chose to take unilateral actions instead. Neither of these conditions
apply, however, to the cases in this book in which the United States
failed to dominate the organization. In each of the cases, the United
States had a strong interest and preferred to act multilaterally, but failed
to gain support within the OAS for its proposals. The perception by
realists of IOs as mere tools used by their most powerful members is
oversimplified and mistaken. Realism’s focus on power-based relations
among states explains many of the policy outcomes in the OAS, but
factors other than power are also influential in the OAS.
Institutionalism offers a second perspective on IOs, focusing on the
issue of cooperation among states in the international system and the
roles played by IOs in facilitating cooperation.2 One line of inquiry
within institutionalism addresses the challenge of creating IOs in an
environment of distrust and potentially hostile relations among states.
The focus is on how states overcome distrust and begin to engage in
cooperation through the creation of an IO. Because members of the
OAS have been engaged in cooperative policymaking for 50 years, this
focus on the initial creation of an IO is not directly relevant to address-
ing the research puzzle presented here.
A second body of institutionalist literature examines the rules and
procedures established within organizations that facilitate cooperation.
In the case of the OAS, the anarchy of the international system is some-
what abated by a formal equality among member states, pacific settle-
ment procedures, and a collective security arrangement protecting the
hemisphere from external and internal aggression. One of the key condi-
tions for an IO to be able to promote cooperation is that the states
involved share some common interests. This is indeed the case within
the OAS. Latin American states and the United States have a number of
security interests in common that resulted in the founding of the OAS
and its continued existence.
Several problems that institutions must address to promote coopera-
tion are finding an equilibrium point when several exist, and enforcing
agreements in an anarchic international system. Institutionalism
explains how IOs are able to alter the bargaining calculations of states by
reducing uncertainty and promoting iterative relationships. They can
 u.s. foreign policy / 7

promote transparency, extend the shadow of the future to promote

iterative relationships, shift focus to absolute gains instead of relative
gains, and provide sanctions to punish unacceptable behaviors. Stein
(1983) elaborates on how international regimes can promote coordina-
tion and collaboration within an anarchic system even when states have
divergent interests and preferences by helping them achieve more effi-
cient outcomes than would otherwise occur. The policy debates within
the OAS, however, are not about achieving efficient outcomes. When
the United States and Latin American members disagree about policy
proposals, there are certain structural, procedural, and normative condi-
tions that influence the outcome of the debate that are not accounted
for in these discussions of the benefits of institutions.
All of the functions of IOs described by institutionalists are seen in the
workings of the OAS, and members do work cooperatively in many
policy arenas, including regional security. The level of analysis in institu-
tionalism, however, remains focused on states acting in the international
system and within the context of IOs. Institutionalism does not view IOs
as separate entities capable of affecting member states beyond simply
providing a forum for interstate interactions, or rules for interaction. A
focus on the issue of common interests between the United States and
Latin American states to explain the use of institutions to promote coop-
eration fails to address the processes that occur when there is disagree-
ment between member states. Institutionalism does not address the
actual internal functioning of an organization that produces different
results. Without focusing on the structure and institutions of the OAS
itself, institutionalism cannot explain what conditions lead to enhanced
or reduced U.S. influence in the organization. Neither realism nor insti-
tutionalism are suited to addressing the puzzle at this level of analysis.
Constructivist theory offers a different perspective on the level of
analysis problem. The constructivist approach explores knowledge
dynamics, communications, and identities in international society
(Hasenclever et al. 1997, chapter 1), and thus contrasts with realism and
institutionalism, which focus on power relations and shared interests
between member states. Constructivism provides a distinct view of IOs
in IR. It credits IOs and regimes with a stronger impact on states than
realism allows. Regimes reflect the interests of their creators, but also
develop an autonomy after creation that allows them to impact states in
unanticipated and uncontrollable ways. Some theorists go so far as to
claim that organizations do not merely frustrate attempts at their
manipulation by powerful states, but that they can actually manipulate
states themselves through the establishment of norms and rules and
 8 / organization of american states

their enforcement through a variety of sanctions and diplomatic

coercion (Wendt 1992a).
Based on the arguments made by constructivist theory that highlight
the ability of IOs to affect their members, this book focuses on the inter-
nal dynamics of the organization to determine what potential impacts
such factors have on member states. The theory of organizational soci-
ology provides three different perspectives for examining the internal
processes of organizations (Scott 1998). The rational system approach
views an organization as a formalized structure oriented to the pursuit
of specific goals. The focus is on productivity and efficiency achieved
through formal institutions, procedures, and goals. The natural system
approach views organizations as a collectivity of people with common
interests, who are focused on the survival of the organization. Studies in
this perspective focus on the interaction between the formal structure of
the organization and the individual participants in it. The open system
approach focuses on the interaction of the organization with the
external environment, as opposed to the rational and natural system
approaches in which the environment is largely ignored in favor of
internal dynamics (i.e., a closed system).
The organizational sociology approaches are used to construct an
analytical framework for an international organization. The framework
consists of a synthesis of the three different approaches to organiza-
tional sociology. It is not intended to be a new theory of organization.
It is, rather, an extension of organizational sociology into the interna-
tional context that complements realism and institutionalism. The
framework takes the study of IOs beyond the generalizations made by
realism and institutionalism about IOs. It opens the “black box” and
identifies organizational factors to explain IO behaviors that are not
adequately accounted for by the current dominant theories of IR. The
analytical framework highlights four different organizational perspec-
tives: structural, procedural/normative, internal relational, and envi-
ronmental. Structural and procedural/normative perspectives are similar
to the rational system approach in which formal institutions are the
main explanatory variables for organizational outputs (i.e., decisions).
The internal relational perspective is based on the natural system
approach, and focuses on the internal dynamics between members
within the organization to explain organizational behavior. The envi-
ronmental perspective is derived from the open system approach in
which factors external to the organization impact its functioning and
decisionmaking. The environmental perspective is most closely related
to realism and its focus on the international system as a determinant for
state actions.
 u.s. foreign policy / 9

This work tries to address several of the shortcomings in the study of

U.S.–Latin American relations within the institutional context of the
OAS. It offers explanations for the unexpected outcomes when the
United States is less influential, cases that are not adequately explained
by realism and institutionalism. By looking at organizations from a
different level of analysis and adapting theories of organizational sociol-
ogy to the international context, this research provides new insights into
IR theory and the organizational variables that affect IO decisionmaking.
In addition to understanding the factors that influence U.S. dominance, a
greater understanding of organizational decisionmaking allows for an
assessment of the viability of the OAS in the future as it continues to
address a wide range of issues affecting the Western hemisphere.
This research also provides several empirical contributions. First,
since much of the research on the OAS has been policy-oriented and
frequently focused on a single case study, the extended historical analy-
sis of 31 cases over a 50-year period allows for a much more compre-
hensive comparison of cases than has been possible previously. In
addition, the analytical framework helps to organize the cases in a mean-
ingful fashion that facilitates contrasts and comparisons among cases.
Second, this study provides a good test case for advancing constructivist
arguments by providing empirical test cases for the impact of regional
principles on organizational decisionmaking. Finding an answer to the
puzzling question concerning an IO’s ability to limit the influence of its
hegemonic member can provide evidence to support the arguments of
constructivists concerning the constraining abilities of IOs on states in
the international system. Finally, the discussion of consensus among
member states and hegemonic influence within the OAS corrects a
number of general misperceptions about U.S.–Latin American relations.
Many of the cases emphasize that rather than the United States domi-
nating the organization, members frequently act in unison, with
common interests and goals in mind. The United States does not always
need to exert its hegemonic influence to achieve its goals in the region.
Additionally, the cases illustrate that Latin America is not a single unit.
Different states in the region have different preferences that can lead to
disagreement among Latin American members, not just to confronta-
tions with the United States. These divergent Latin American perspec-
tives are often overlooked.

Implications for U.S. Policy and OAS-Member Relations

By specifying the conditions under which an IO can affect the level of
influence a member state is able to exert, this research can determine
 10 / organization of american states

whether these cases where U.S. dominance has been resisted have been
epiphenomenal or not. If these conditions are not epiphenomenal, then
there are several policy implications to be considered.
The specification of the organizational conditions that can limit U.S.
influence within the OAS will provide empirical evidence that institu-
tions can affect member states, even powerful ones. If the conditions
that limit hegemonic influence are manipulable, then one might expect
other members to take advantage of such conditions in order to resist
hegemonic pressure on occasion. Recognition of this ability may make
powerful states more cautious in their participation in IOs. They could
be reluctant to engage in policymaking within IOs if they are not
assured of dominance. Although a hegemon may recognize that there
are certain benefits to acting multilaterally (efficiency, uniformity of
policies, shared implementation costs, etc.), it may pursue less efficient
and/or less effective unilateral actions, if it is uncertain that its interests
will be served within an IO. Such a choice for unilateral action could
have repercussions for an IO by depriving it of many of the resources
(diplomatic, financial, etc.) provided by a powerful member.
Although this research focuses on security issues and the institutional
conditions that limit hegemonic influence in the security arena, there may
be overlap in other policy areas. Given the increasing use of IOs on global
policy issues, including finance and the environment, evidence of the abil-
ity of IOs to limit hegemonic dominance would give IOs a boost as legit-
imate and influential actors in the international system. Although many
IOs attempt to portray an image of impartiality, when a powerful state
such as the United States is a member, that image may not be upheld
unless there is evidence that the organization does not simply serve the
hegemon’s interests. There is a trade-off involved in this scenario, however.
The boost to an IO’s legitimacy as an independent actor might not be
worth the loss in resources provided by a hegemonic member should it
choose to not to pursue its interests within the context of the IO.
There are also some policy implications concerning the capacity of
the OAS to function effectively and successfully. Given that members
place a strong value on consensus, the organization has developed mech-
anisms to promote conciliation and compromise when there are diver-
gent preferences among members. This ability has resulted in members,
including the United States, remaining active within the organizational
framework at many levels. This engagement strengthens the organiza-
tion and enhances its reputation, promoting its ability to pursue
regional goals multilaterally. There is a downside to the ability of the
OAS to achieve compromise among members, however. Compromises
 u.s. foreign policy / 11

can lead to vague and imprecise resolutions and declarations. When

such resolutions are applied to a particular dispute, they may result in
less successful operations because they can be interpreted in a number of
ways. For example, when the pro-democracy resolutions concerning the
“self coup” by President Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1992) were loosely
interpreted, sanctions were lifted before genuine democratic govern-
ment was restored.

Overview
In order to explore how an IO has been able to affect its most powerful
member, this research focuses specifically on the OAS. The power
imbalance between the United States and other member states provides
an ideal model to examine the dynamic relations between members and
the potential to curb hegemonic domination in an IO. The 26 cases
from 1948 to 1989 and five additional cases following the end of the
Cold War illustrate a full range of outcomes in organizational decision-
making, including U.S. Dominance, Latin American Unity,
Compromise, and Consensus. In the case of the Dominican Republic
(1965), the United States actively intervened without permission from
the OAS, then proceeded to gain OAS approval post hoc for an Inter-
American Peacekeeping Force (IAPF) despite considerable protest from
some members. In Cuba (1964), the United States also dominated deci-
sionmaking in the OAS by expanding the sanctions imposed against the
regime of Fidel Castro. The Caribbean (1959) and Cuba (1960) repre-
sent cases of compromise. In the Cuban case (1960), the United States
and Latin American members reached a compromise on the final word-
ing of a resolution issued by the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers
that condemned international communist intervention in the hemi-
sphere. Members also reached a compromise agreement on democracy
and regional instability in the Caribbean case (1959). The case of the
Dominican Republic–Venezuela (1960) illustrates Latin American unity
and a policy outcome that rejected U.S. preferences. The United States
eventually chose to support the Latin American states once its proposal
to sponsor Dominican elections was vetoed by the membership.
Nicaragua (1978) also represents a case where Latin American members
refused to accept a U.S. policy initiative. Latin American members flatly
rejected the U.S. proposal for a peacekeeping force to be sent in to
promote reconciliation. An example of a consensual outcome can been
seen in the case of Panama (1959) when members were unified to help
remove a small invading force from the Panamanian beaches.
 12 / organization of american states

The examination of membership dynamics within the OAS begins

with a theoretical analysis in chapter 2, where an analytical framework
is laid out for exploring U.S.–Latin American relations within the
context of the OAS. Chapter 2 evaluates both realist and institutional-
ist literature as they apply to the study of IOs. Theoretical analysis of the
OAS using these two approaches suggests that neither approach is able
to fully explain the unexpected policy outcomes of the OAS when the
United States fails to gain support for its proposals within the organiza-
tion. Four different perspectives adapted from organizational sociology
allow for additional insights into the dynamics of member relations
within the OAS. These perspectives identify four factors with the poten-
tial to affect U.S. influence within the OAS: necessary resources, strength
of regional principles, consensus among members, and perceived level of
threat to regional stability. In cases where Latin American members have
successfully resisted U.S. pressure in the OAS, each of these factors has
affected organizational decisionmaking.
Chapter 3 provides a historical examination of the Inter-American
System. It traces relations between the United States and Latin
American states back to the Pan American movement of the early 1800s
through the creation of the OAS in 1948. The evolution of the regional
principles that are embodied in the OAS is evident in numerous regional
conferences and Congresses held throughout the 1800s and early 1900s.
These norms include respect of state sovereignty and territorial integrity,
peaceful settlement of disputes, nonintervention in the domestic affairs
of other states, consultation in the event of a crisis, and representative
democracy.
Chapter 4 explores the changes in conflict resolution efforts by the
OAS from 1948 to 1989 and emphasizes the changes over time in the
types of cases that were addressed and the mechanisms used to resolve
them. Twenty-six cases are examined by looking at the impact of
resources, regional principles, consensus, and threat level on the deci-
sionmaking process. The cases represent each instance in which the Rio
Treaty or the OAS Charter was invoked in order to achieve pacific settle-
ment of a dispute. Both the Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter have provi-
sions for OAS members to convene and take collective security measures
when security is threatened. These measures may include diplomatic
and economic sanctions, or may even involve military action. Some of
the cases handled by the OAS required only brief involvement of the
organization, such as in Panama in 1959 when a small invasion force of
less than 100 men landed on the beach and refused to surrender. A
diplomatic delegation was able to persuade the invaders to surrender.
 u.s. foreign policy / 13

Other cases involved extensive OAS action, such as the creation of the
10,000 man Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) that restored order in
the Dominican Republic in 1965 following a coup. In each case,
members had security concerns and wanted to preserve regional stability
through multilateral action by the OAS.
In order to trace the impact of institutional factors on U.S. influence,
chapters 5 and 6 examine eight different cases in depth based on differ-
ent policy outcomes. Chapter 5 looks at the Dominican Republic
(1965) and Cuba (1964) in which the United States dominated the
OAS, and the cases of the Dominican Republic–Venezuela (1960) and
Nicaragua (1978) when Latin American unity thwarted U.S. policy
preferences. These four cases reveal the two extremes in policy outcomes
in the OAS when member states were not in agreement concerning what
actions should be taken to resolve regional conflict. These extreme
outcomes are less common than those that are either consensual or
based on compromise. Chapter 6 looks at four additional cases where
members were in full agreement on the actions to be taken (Costa
Rica–Nicaragua, 1955; Panama, 1959), and where members reached a
compromise (Caribbean, 1959; Cuba, 1960). An examination of struc-
tural, normative, internal relational, and environmental factors reveals
the decisionmaking process and member dynamics in the OAS.
Chapter 7 explores the changes and continuities in the OAS follow-
ing the end of the Cold War. It defines an expanded concept of regional
security that includes the defense of democracy. Chapter 7 also describes
the new mechanisms that have been put in place to strengthen democ-
ratic governance in the region, including the Unit for the Promotion of
Democracy, Resolution 1080, and the Democratic Charter. The chapter
examines five cases of multilateral action taken to restore democracy,
which reveal both the consensus among members supporting the norm
of representative democracy, and the challenges that members face in
upholding that norm. The institutional factors that affect levels of U.S.
influence within the organization also help to explain U.S. incentives to
take multilateral actions in the hemisphere to address threats to democ-
racy. A discussion of narco-trafficking, with a focus on Colombia, illus-
trates the limits of consensus among members and their desire to pursue
multilateral solutions to regional threats.
Chapter 8 draws conclusions about the decisionmaking processes in
the OAS and its ability to resist U.S. hegemonic pressure. It assesses the
findings from and the value of the analytical framework, and summarizes
the empirical findings. It concludes with an appraisal of the organiza-
tion’s ability to address the security concerns of its members in the future.
 C h ap t e r 2
Developing Theories of
International Organizations

Introduction
In order to assess the capacity of the OAS to serve the collective security
needs of its members, it is important to gain a greater understanding of
the dynamics of the organization itself. By tracing out the factors that
affect U.S. influence and by gaining a greater understanding of the
decisionmaking process, the ability of the organization to address future
concerns can also be assessed. Theories of international relations offer
some insights into the relations among states in the international system,
but do not focus much on how those relationships are affected by inter-
actions in the context of an IO such as the OAS. Not only do member
states influence actions taken by the organization, but the organization
itself also affects member states through its structure and principles. The
United States does not always exercise dominant control of the organiza-
tion. The organization at times rejects U.S. dominance and pursues
alternative policies to U.S. proposals. Organizational factors affect how
much influence the United States is able to exert over member states
within the institutional context. A theoretical examination of the deci-
sionmaking dynamics of the OAS provides insights into member rela-
tions within the organization, and its capacity to resolve conflicts in the
region. This chapter introduces an analytical framework to evaluate U.S.
influence within the OAS. The first section reviews the relevant literature
on IOs that contributes to this project. The second section presents a
framework derived from organizational sociology and advances specific
hypotheses concerning member influence within the OAS. The conclud-
ing section discusses the usefulness of this framework as it applies to the
study of international organizational dynamics and decisionmaking.
The framework derived from organizational sociology provides
scholars of IOs with new insights concerning the significant variables
that influence organizational decisionmaking. The framework as it is
 16 / organization of american states

laid out is not intended to be a new theory of organization. It is, instead,

an extension of organizational sociology into the international context
that complements realism and institutionalism. The framework takes
the study of IOs beyond the generalizations made by realism and
institutionalism about IOs. It identifies organizational variables to
explain IO behaviors that are not adequately accounted for by the
current dominant theories in IR. This research examines the constituent
parts that make up the OAS in order to explain member interactions
and organizational decisions. An understanding of how the OAS is
constituted is essential to explaining how an IO behaves and what causes
particular outcomes. By providing a more complete understanding of
the structures, procedures, and member interactions within the OAS,
this research offers a better explanation of how certain IO behaviors are
possible and why. Not only does the use of this framework expand the
study of IOs in the field of IR, but it also contributes to the field of orga-
nizational sociology from which the framework is derived. By applying
the key characteristics of social organizations to the context of an IO,
this study helps to determine whether these sociological theories have
more generalizable applications than have previously been considered.

Studies of International Organizations

In order to address the question of what conditions facilitate or mitigate
the influence of the United States within the OAS, this study draws on
several bodies of literature, which are presented here. The discussion
begins with an examination of realism and institutionalism. These liter-
atures shape the research question, presenting a puzzle concerning the
impact of an IO on states in the international system. Next, hegemonic
stability theory is discussed, which further problematizes the role of a
hegemon within an international regime. The third section reviews the
constructivist approach to regime theory, which explores the issue of
normative influences on states. Finally, theories of organizational sociol-
ogy are adapted to present a framework that facilitates the examination
of factors affecting member influence and organizational decisionmak-
ing, and the exploration of the case studies in chapters 5 and 6. 3
The debate about the impact of institutions on states has been raised
in a series of articles in International Security (1994, 1995). In these arti-
cles, John Mearsheimer summarizes the debate by stating:

[It] is about whether institutions can have an independent effect on state

behavior, or whether instead institutional outcomes reflect great power
 theories of international organizations / 17

interests, and are essentially tools that great powers employ for their own
selfish purposes. (1995, 82–83)

Mearsheimer argues strongly against the ability of institutions to affect

state behavior. He begins by summarizing the assumptions of realism
about the international system and the effects these conditions have on the
behavior of states. He lays out five conditions in the international system:
anarchy (no central authority), the existence of offensive military capabil-
ities, uncertainty, the survival motive of states, and the strategic thinking
of states. These conditions lead states to fear each other. States must guard
their own survival in this self-help system (Waltz 1979). Furthermore,
states seek to maximize their relative power positions. Mearsheimer argues
that based on these conditions and behavior patterns, cooperation is inhib-
ited by relative gains concerns and concerns about cheating. He does not
believe that institutions successfully overcome these problems. He is criti-
cal of “liberal institutionalists” for not addressing the issue of relative gains,
which he maintains is critically important even if the problem of cheating
is solved by institutional arrangements. Grieco (1988) also emphasizes
that while states are not exclusively focused on relative gains, they are
concerned about them. Advocates of collective security, such as Charles
Kupchan, are criticized for not explaining how states overcome their fears
in order to trust each other and accept three new “anti-realist” norms
(renouncing the use of military force to alter the status quo, thinking in
terms of the broader international interest, and trusting each other)
(Mearsheimer 1994, 28–30). Mearsheimer (1995, 82) argues instead that
institutions largely mirror the distribution of power in the system and are
used by powerful states to maintain or increase their share of world power.
For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was
constructed to deter Soviet aggression in Europe. The United States and its
allies formed this alliance based on balance of power logic, and the United
States used the organization to its advantage in balancing the Soviet threat.
Mearsheimer contends that, based on the argument that organizations
reflect the distribution of power in the system, institutions themselves are
not very influential. They are not able to get states to think beyond short-
term power calculations and thus do not have significant independent
effects on state behavior.
If Mearsheimer were to consider the role of the United States within
the OAS, he would likely emphasize that the OAS frequently adopts
policy proposals presented by the United States that reflect U.S. prefer-
ences. In order to explain those anomalous cases in which U.S. preferences
are not adopted, he might conclude that the United States had little
 18 / organization of american states

interest in those particular cases and thus did not choose to exert its
influence within the organization. Additionally, the anomalies might
reflect cases in which the United States did not view the OAS as an opti-
mal tool to pursue its interests, and thus chose to take unilateral actions
instead. Based on power relations between states, realists would predict
that when addressing security issues, the most powerful state is likely to
dominate organizational decisionmaking and to determine organiza-
tional actions based on its own national preferences (see table 2.1).
Realists and institutionalists have similar views of the international
system, but their beliefs diverge concerning the impact of institutions on
state behavior. Institutionalists accept the idea that states are rational
egoists operating in an anarchic international system. They also
acknowledge that power plays an important role in interstate relations.
Nevertheless, they argue that institutions make a significant difference
in conjunction with power realities (Keohane and Martin 1995, 42,
emphasis added). Keohane and Martin further note that the need for
institutions does not mean that they operate without respect to power
and interests. They have an “interactive” effect that varies according to
interests and power, but impacts state behavior just the same (see also
Martin 1992). When considering the power relations within the OAS,
institutionalists would acknowledge that the OAS pursues numerous
policy proposals that reflect U.S. interests. They would also note,
however, that in many of these cases the policies also reflect the
preferences of Latin American members. Institutions are created and
maintained based on common interests among their members. This
facilitates cooperation and mutually beneficial relationships. For exam-
ple, the OAS was founded in 1948 as a collective security organization
for the Western hemisphere. States in the region wanted to establish an
organization through which security threats to the hemisphere could be
addressed multilaterally. In addition, the organization has served for
over fifty years as a regional forum on a wide range of issues of common
interest to its members.
Institutionalists might describe “U.S. dominance” of the OAS as
“U.S. leadership” in the pursuit of common interests within the region.
On those occasions when the OAS does not adopt a U.S. policy
proposal, it is because U.S. and Latin American interests do not coincide
and cooperation is more difficult. For example, in the case of the
Guatemalan coup in 1954, members were not in agreement concerning
the communist nature of the threat in Guatemala and thus failed to
take effective collective action. In a number of cases where there are
disagreements among members, compromises are seen rather than
policies reflecting solely U.S. or Latin American preferences. This was
 theories of international organizations / 19

Table 2.1 Theories and hypotheses

Variables Hypotheses

Realism/neo-realism
Relative state power When addressing security issues, the most
powerful state is likely to dominate
organizational decisionmaking and to
determine organizational actions based on
its own national preferences
Liberal institutionalism
Shared interests ● If the U.S. has shared interests with other
members in the OAS, it will work
multilaterally through the organization
to accomplish common goals
● If the U.S. does not have shared interests
with other members of the OAS, it will
not work within the context of the
organization to accomplish its goals
Perspective one: structural
1. Resources needed The more resources that are needed to
support the Meeting of Consultation and
carry out the resolutions of the Organ of
Consultation, the more influence the U.S.
has on those resolutions
Perspective two: internal relational
2. Degree of consensus The greater the disagreement among Latin
American members, the greater the
influence the U.S. has in the council/
meeting of Foreign ministers
Perspective three: normative
3. Regional principles Any proposal or unilateral action by the
U.S. (or other member state) that
does not clearly uphold the principles of
the organization will have less support than
a proposal that is based on principled
action, and will face strong opposition in
the Council/Meeting of Foreign Ministers
Perspective four: environmental
4. Type of conflict/threat of regional The greater the risk of regional instability
instability that is perceived by member states, the
greater influence the U.S. has within the
organization

the case in the early 1960s when dealing with Cuban-sponsored

uprisings in the region. Institutionalists would predict that if the United
States has shared interests with other members in the OAS, it will work
multilaterally through the organization to accomplish common goals.
 20 / organization of american states

However, if the United States does not have shared interests with other
member states, it will not work within the context of the organization
to accomplish its goals (see table 2.1). Based on these predictions, the
United States does not need to exercise hegemony within the OAS
because the member states come together with common interests to
promote cooperation. When interests do not coincide, the United States
can use its strength as a hegemon to act unilaterally if it chooses.
Although Mearsheimer is skeptical that institutionalism can lead to
a “genuine peace or a world where states do not compete for power”
(1994, 9), institutionalists do not make such broad claims. Rather, as
Keohane and Martin note in their response to Mearsheimer, “. . . insti-
tutions sometimes matter, and that it is a worthy task of social science
to discover how, and under what conditions this is the case” (1995, 40).
One of the conditions that institutionalists believe is significant for
cooperation to occur is for states to have significant common interests.
Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make
commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and
facilitate reciprocity (Keohane and Martin 1995, 42). The impact of
institutions on state behavior when states share common interests can be
seen when addressing two different problems: concerns with cheating
and problems with coordinating actions around a cooperative outcome.
Institutions can help reassure states that cheating is not occurring,
largely through facilitating transparency. For example, in negotiating an
arms reduction agreement, both parties have a common interest to
reduce their stockpiles of weapons, but fear to do so unilaterally. An
institution can engage in regular inspections of both parties to ensure
compliance. The institution would make any violations known and
could facilitate further dialogue to remedy the situation and reduce
tensions between the competing states. Institutions are also able to coor-
dinate cooperation when dealing with distributional issues. When
multiple equilibria exist, institutions can help states reach cooperative
agreements.
Mearsheimer implies that cooperative ties are easy to forge if states
desire them, but are not when states have diverging interests. Keohane
and Martin point out that institutions can promote cooperation even
under such difficult circumstances, however. For example, Britain had a
difficult time convincing European Union (EU) states to impose an
embargo on Argentina during the Falklands conflict (1982) in support
of Britain. The EU as an institution, however, enabled cooperation by
reducing fears of cheating in the form of taking advantage of the
 theories of international organizations / 21

situation to profit from trade with Argentina while others observed the
embargo. In this case, Britain used the EU to help uphold sanctions
even though not all members desired or actively sought them. Keohane
and Martin further add, “the difference between realism and liberal
institutionalism does not lie in whether institutions are independent or
dependent variables, it lies in contrasting understandings of why insti-
tutions are created and how they exert their effects” (1995, 48, emphasis
added).
This research puts the debate about the impact of IOs on states into
concrete terms by examining the relationship of the United States with
other member states in the OAS. Realism and institutionalism explain
many of the interactions among states within the context of the OAS,
but they are unable to explain the puzzling cases when the United States,
by far the most powerful member of the OAS, does not successfully
manipulate the organization to serve its national interests. Realism
focuses on power relations in order to explain the dominance of one
state over another, or of one state over an IO. Realists would predict
dominance of the OAS, disinterest, or unilateral actions on the part of
the United States when pursuing its interests in Latin America. There
are instances, however, when the United States had a keen interest in the
outcome of an issue under discussion within the OAS and had a desire
to act multilaterally, but did not succeed in dominating the organiza-
tion. For example, in the case of the Nicaraguan Revolution in 1978–79
when the United States wanted to send in peacekeeping troops, the OAS
Meeting of Foreign Ministers refused to take such action. The organiza-
tion was considered a valuable forum for the United States in terms of
pursuing its interests multilaterally since its unilateral efforts had not
been successful. The OAS, however, was not as easily manipulable as one
might have expected.
Institutionalists focus on the issue of common interests between the
United States and Latin American states to explain the creation and
use of the OAS to promote cooperation, but fail to adequately explain
the processes that occur when there is disagreement between member
states and the United States decides to pursue multilateral action. Insti-
tutionalism explores the bargaining dynamics between states within the
institutional context but does not address the actual internal function-
ing of organizations. For example, Axelrod and Keohane (1986) empha-
size how international institutions can affect such factors as the shadow
of the future, the sanctioning problem, and the payoff structure to
promote cooperation between states in an anarchic system. When
 22 / organization of american states

considering the OAS, which has been functioning for over 50 years,
members are well aware of the values of cooperation achieved through
the institution. An examination of the benefits of sanctioning and
lengthening the shadow of the future in iterative relations does not get at
the puzzle of certain policy outcomes based on the unequal distribution
of power in the region.
Studies of international regimes are linked to the institutionalist
discussion in terms of highlighting the contributions regimes make to
promoting cooperation. Stein (1983) elaborates on how international
regimes can promote coordination and collaboration within an anarchic
system even when states have divergent interests and preferences by
helping them achieve more efficient outcomes than would otherwise
occur. Although applicable in describing how the OAS serves as a
regional forum, this literature does not directly address the question of
state influence within the OAS. The policy debates within the OAS are
not primarily about achieving efficient outcomes. When the United
States and Latin American members disagree about policy proposals,
there are certain structural, procedural, and normative conditions that
influence the outcome of the debate that are not accounted for in these
discussions of the benefits of institutions and international regimes.
Neither realism nor institutionalism examines what organizational or
environmental conditions might affect the level of influence that a
member state has within the OAS.
Hegemonic stability theory, stemming from realist theory, offers
some additional insights into member relations within the OAS based
on relative balances of power, but is still limited in its ability to fully
explain organizational decisionmaking.4 Regimes are established and
maintained by actors who hold a preponderance of power. The focus of
hegemonic stability theory is on the effectiveness of regimes and is
closely linked to Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action (1965). Free
rider problems result in the need for a dominant actor to establish a
regime in order for states to cooperate. The hegemon imposes its norms
on the system and all institutions conform to the hegemon’s preferences.
When power becomes more equally distributed among members, these
regimes decline. It may be that hegemons are essential in the creation of
some regimes and successfully maintain their regimes by setting norms
of behavior in the system. This emphasis on the centrality of a hegemon
to a regime, however, does not provide an adequate explanation for the
relationship between the United States and other Latin American states
within the context of the OAS. Despite its overwhelming power, the
United States does not dictate all policies of the OAS, nor establish all
 theories of international organizations / 23

operational and normative principles of the organization. As critics of

hegemonic stability theory point out, the claim that regimes are neither
created nor maintained without a hegemon is not tenable (Snidal 1985).
Chapter 3 discusses the origins of the principles of the Inter-American
System, providing evidence that the United States was not the prime
shaper of the principles that currently structure inter-American relations
within the OAS. Many of the principles that are in the OAS Charter
derive from Pan American agreements reached between Latin American
states in the previous century prior to regular U.S. involvement in the
region. Principles such as nonaggression and the peaceful settlement of
disputes among members were included in the Treaty of Confederation
signed in Lima in 1847. The Treaty of Union and Defensive Alliance
signed in 1864 called for the collective protection of the region against
recolonialization. Latin American states continued to pursue the codifi-
cation of these norms at the First International Conference of American
States (1889) when the United States began to take a greater interest in
such multilateral, regional discussions. Even when the United States was
reluctant to accept such principles as nonintervention, Latin American
states continued to place it on the diplomatic agenda despite U.S. objec-
tions. Thus, the anomalies of when the organization does not act as a
tool of the United States remain to be explained. Variables other than
power and interests must be used to explain the different outcomes
within the OAS when the United States achieves its goals and when its
preferences are not accommodated. There are two additional bodies of
literature that will help to answer this question of the relationship
between the OAS and its most powerful member.
The first body of literature is the constructivist approach to regimes,
which emphasizes the importance of rules and norms within organiza-
tions and the international system. The constructivist approach explores
knowledge dynamics, communications, and identities in international
society (Hasenclever et al. 1997), and thus contrasts with realism and
institutionalism, which focus on power relations and shared interests
between member states. Constructivism credits IOs and regimes with a
stronger impact on states than realism allows. Regimes reflect the inter-
ests of their creators, but also develop an autonomy after creation that
allows them to impact states in unanticipated and uncontrollable ways.
Some theorists go so far as to claim that organizations do not merely
frustrate attempts at their manipulation by powerful states, but that they
can actually manipulate states themselves through the establishment of
norms and rules and their enforcement through a variety of sanctions
and diplomatic coercion (Wendt 1992b).
 24 / organization of american states

Martha Finnemore (1996) elaborates on this idea of organizational

manipulation, arguing that IOs play an even more fundamental role by
shaping the actual interests of states. Realism and institutionalism both
treat interests as given. They do not question how interests are formed.
Finnemore argues that the norms established by IOs influence prefer-
ence formation within states. Thus, according to constructivists, states
are not so much rationalistic as they are sociological in their reasoning,
shaping their interests based on the norms in international society
(Finnemore 1996, 29). For example, although political scientists tend to
think of war as a Hobbesian state of nature, war is actually highly regulated
by rules that have changed over time, such as the Geneva Convention.
Finnemore argues that states have actually been taught by groups such as
the International Committee of the Red Cross that such rules of war are in
their best interest.
Constructivists assert that states follow a “logic of appropriateness”
instead of an instrumental logic of rationality. Rather than asking a
means-end question, “How do I get what I want?” states ask, “What
kind of situation is this? What am I supposed to do now?” (Finnemore
1996, 29). Finnemore offers an example of the emergence of state
bureaucracies to coordinate scientific developments in essentially science-
less states. She contends that the international organization, the United
Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, taught states
that a science bureaucracy was a necessary component of “the modern
state,” resulting in a worldwide creation of a state scientific bureaucracy
(Finnemore 1996, 4). The logic of appropriateness provides the oppor-
tunity for IOs to influence the preferences of states by shaping the
context in which states are making decisions. Finnemore (1996, 35)
further notes that IOs are not “neutral” forums. Organizations often
produce unintended results. The ideas that are input are not necessarily
going to be identical to the output of the organization. Thus, even when
a strong state such as the United States pressures the OAS, the filtering
process that occurs within the organization may not yield the desired
results for the United States. Proposals for action made by member states
are rarely voted on in their original format. Frequently proposals that are
made to the governing Council are sent to a committee for investigation
and recommendation. Within the committee, member states can submit
proposed revisions to the original text, resulting in a significantly altered
text in some cases. Furthermore, once the Council votes on a matter, the
implementation is in the hands of the secretary general or other organi-
zational actors, which may result in a further “shaping” of the resolution
in ways uncontrolled by the United States (or other member states).
 theories of international organizations / 25

The constructivist approach supports the argument made here that

neither power nor shared interests adequately explain the member
relations or their influence within the OAS. The organization itself, as a
body of norms and procedures, has an impact on relations between
member states and on the multilateral decisions that they make.
Constructivism predicts some degree of autonomous function within
organizations, rather than viewing their actions in terms of manipula-
tions by the most powerful member states. Although this research does
not go so far as to claim the OAS is an autonomous or even purposive
actor, it does view the organization as an entity that produces unexpected
and unintended results separate from the desires of its creators/members.
The constructivist approach provides a normative perspective for
examining organizational decisionmaking. Although some norms exist
independent of IOs, the latter frequently include institutionalized prin-
ciples as part of their formal structure. These principles are commonly
established as part of their charters, through multilateral treaties or
declarations, or in other joint agreements. In some cases adherence to
these established principles is weak, but in others the norm is so well
established that violation would likely bring condemnation or other
punitive measures against the violator. An examination of the OAS in a
constructivist/normative context reveals the types of regional principles
that are embodied in the organization, and the impact of these norms
based on the degree to which they are supported by member states.
Chapter 3 traces the evolution of norms in the Inter-American System,
and chapters 4 and 5 examine the way these norms serve to limit the
influence and behavior of states within the OAS.
The second body of literature that contributes strongly to the theo-
retical framework comes from the field of organizational sociology.
Although there are a number of studies that go below the international
level of analysis to examine such factors as bureaucratic politics
(Halperin 1974; Haass 1999), complex organizations (Thompson 1967;
Perrow 1979), and individual bargaining behavior (Cyert and March
1992) to explain organizational behavior, these studies are largely
focused on domestic institutions such as corporations or the govern-
ment bureaucracy, not on international institutions such as the OAS.
These “domestic organizational” perspectives are particularly difficult to
adapt to the context of IOs because of the added level of analysis when
examining IOs, which includes not only individuals and agencies but
also numerous states. Studying the individual ambassadors and the
politics of their corresponding foreign ministries does not fully get at
explanations of how they interact within the larger context of an IO.
 26 / organization of american states

Representatives to the OAS are essentially part of organizations within a

larger organization (the OAS). In order to focus this research on insti-
tutional factors within an international organization, this project adapts
three perspectives from organizational sociology to construct an analyt-
ical framework suited to the study of an international organization.
Although organizational sociology does not examine organizations at
the international level, it does provide a useful categorization of different
aspects of organizations that can apply to domestic or international
organizations. Organizational sociology approaches examine struc-
tural/functional, relational, and environmental factors to explain orga-
nizational decisionmaking. This project adopts these categories and
applies them to the context of the OAS.
The three approaches to organizational sociology focus on different
aspects of an organization and provide different insights into organiza-
tional functions and decisionmaking. The first approach is a rational
system perspective in which an organization is defined as a formalized
structure oriented to the pursuit of specific goals (Scott 1998). The
focus is on productivity and efficiency achieved through formal institu-
tions, procedures, and goals. Individual participants in the organization
and the impact of the environment are considered irrelevant. It is the
role or position that participants fill that is significant, not their indi-
vidual characteristics. This approach has been characterized as “organi-
zations without people” (Scott 1998).
The key explanatory variable in the rational system perspective is
organizational structure. The fundamental argument is that outputs are
shaped by organizational inputs. Productivity and quality of production
can be improved if the optimal structures and procedures are imple-
mented within the organization. For example, when a status structure
among workers emerges within the workplace, tensions are generated
among individuals who entered the workplace with the assumption of
being equals. Status battles are reduced when status in the workplace is
prestructured before any individuals are placed in roles within it. Formal
structuring results in individuals spending less time asserting power and
less resistance to leadership efforts by work leaders. When applied to the
international organizational context, this perspective implies that orga-
nizational outcomes (i.e., OAS decisions and actions) are largely influ-
enced by the structure within the organization. Thus, this perspective
points to structural answers to the puzzle concerning U.S. influence
within the OAS.
The second organizational sociology approach is the natural system
perspective, which emerged as a response to the rational system perspective.
 theories of international organizations / 27

Organizations are viewed as a collectivity of people with common inter-

ests, who are focused on the survival of the organization above all other
goals. Studies in this perspective focus on the “informal structure” of
organizations, which include the interaction between the internal struc-
ture of the organization and the individual participants in it. This
approach has been called “People without organizations” (Scott 1998).
Contrary to the rational system perspective in which individuals are
merely employees fulfilling specified tasks, the natural system perspec-
tive focuses on people’s unique qualities and their impact on the orga-
nization. Interactive dynamics are the key variable to explaining
variations in output. For example, if employees are not inspired by their
supervisor to perform well, they may not produce at their maximum
capacity regardless of the specific procedures they are following or the
structure of the organization. Furthermore, the continued existence of
the organization is not taken as a given. Employees, in order to assure
their own indispensability, place a high priority on the continued
survival of the organization itself, even if this means subverting the
explicit goals of the organization. In the context of the OAS, this
perspective suggests that a greater understanding of membership
dynamics can provide insight into state influence within the organiza-
tion. It also suggests that threats to the organization and its members
should be evaluated as well.
The third organizational sociology approach that has developed most
recently is an open system perspective.5 This perspective focuses on the
interaction of the organization with the external environment, as
opposed to the rational and natural system approaches in which the
environment is largely ignored in favor of internal structure and dynam-
ics (i.e., a closed system). In an open system, there is a close connection
between the condition of the environment and the characteristics of the
systems within it (Scott 1998). The environment is a force in its own
right, a source of resources and constraints that profoundly shape the
structure and functioning of the organization. Subunits monitor
the relevant environment for opportunities and threats, to formulate
strategic responses and adjust organizational structure accordingly
(Scott 1998). Open systems stress the complexity and variability of the
components in organizations and the loose connections between them.
Attention is shifted from structure to process. The emphasis is on the
problems involved with organizing in a dynamic system. Open systems
models stress the reciprocal ties that bind the organization with those
elements that surround and penetrate it. The environment is perceived
as the source of order rather than a hostile force. Organizations are not
 28 / organization of american states

closed, self-contained, self-sufficient entities—they are vitally linked to

other systems. The organization is composed of shifting coalitions that
are adaptive and flexible in response to internal organizational and
external environmental changes.
This third approach comes closest to stressing variables utilized in the
IR literature. The focus in open systems is both internal (on the organi-
zation itself ) and external (on environmental influences). In the inter-
national context, this duality is similar to noting the impact of the
international system on states within it. Realists and institutionalists
contend that state priorities and decisions are shaped by the interna-
tional system. States that are best able to adjust to changes in the system
thrive, while the less flexible ones may not. When considering the case
of the OAS, the open system perspective implies that the environmen-
tal context in which decisions are being made shapes the behavior of the
organization. Thus, the international context should also be kept in
mind when trying to explain U.S. influence in the OAS.
This open systems approach is also useful in that it helps address the
fact that international studies focus on states as actors, whereas the soci-
ological approaches assume actors are individuals. In the international
arena, individuals may function within an organization, but these indi-
viduals also represent the interests of their respective states. This adds an
additional level of analysis to the examination of IOs. If the OAS is
viewed as a closed system (i.e., if the focus is solely on the internal
dynamics of the organization) then the impact of the shared and diver-
gent interests of its member states are not easily accounted for. If the
OAS is viewed as an open system, then it is easier to understand the
impact of states on the organization and to discern the organization’s
response to states’ influences in a context broader than the single state
representative within the organization. This aspect of open system
perspective allows a more complete evaluation of the variables influencing
the actions of IOs.
Taken individually, none of the sociological perspectives nor the
normative perspective offers a complete picture of the OAS. By combin-
ing them to examine OAS decisionmaking, however, one is able to
determine more precisely the conditions necessary for the United States
to have influence within the organization. Each of these approaches
suggests that certain factors are important to consider when explaining
the decisionmaking process within the OAS. The normative perspective
focuses on the impact of regional principles on member influence. The
rational system approach raises questions about what structural features
of the OAS impact U.S. influence. The natural system approach focuses
 theories of international organizations / 29

on internal membership dynamics and organizational maintenance

(i.e., survival). The open system approach raises questions concerning
the impact of the environment on the organization and its ability to
react and adapt to environmental changes. Overall, theories of organi-
zational sociology allow for greater insight into the functioning of the
OAS itself to answer questions that theories of IO and IR are unable to
answer. These sociological theories do not replace realist or institution-
alist explanations of IR, but a synthesis of all three combined with a
normative perspective does offer greater insights into the puzzle of the
impact of IOs by focusing on the organization itself.

Deriving a Framework for Analysis

This section outlines the framework to be applied to the OAS cases of
peaceful settlement of disputes in order to analyze U.S. influence within
the organization. Four different perspectives on the OAS are derived
from the three approaches to organizational sociology and the construc-
tivist approach discussed earlier. By analyzing the structure, internal
relations, and principles of the OAS, and the external environment, this
framework establishes a synthesis of the organizational factors that affect
U.S. influence within the organization (see table 2.1).

Structure
According to the rational system approach, the formal structure of an
organization is deliberately designed to achieve a specific set of goals.
Two apparent goals shaped the structure of the OAS when it was
created: (1) the desire to achieve hemispheric security through collective
action, and (2) the desire to prohibit external intervention in the domes-
tic politics of member states. The implicit purpose of the second goal
was to reduce the level of intervention by the United States in Latin
American politics. The inter-American principles of equality among
states, nonintervention, collective security, and pacific settlement of
disputes that shaped these two goals of the OAS are all reflected in the
formal rules of the organization: (1) all member votes are equal; (2) the
chairmanship of the Council is rotated among members; (3) all members
are represented in the Council and Meetings of Foreign Ministers; and
(4) the Rio Treaty and Charter embody the elements of collective
security, nonintervention, and pacific settlement.6 Thus, the formal
structure of the organization does not provide any inherent structural
advantages to the United States to influence the organization.7
The United States does not have the privilege of an overriding veto as it
 30 / organization of american states

does in the UN Security Council. The United States can use its power
in only a limited way in the OAS, as long as it works within the estab-
lished framework. There is, however, one circumstance that may allow
the United States (or any other member with the necessary resources) to
influence the organization’s actions despite structural limitations: the
need for diplomatic and military expertise, and financial and military
resources.
Although the formal structure of the OAS appears to limit the ability
of the United States to use its overwhelming power to influence the
organization’s decisionmaking directly, the United States does have a
decided advantage when it comes to actual implementation of Council
decisions. Resources are related to structure in that they are a part of the
financial obligations of the organization. The cost of actions taken
under the Rio Treaty and Charter for pacific settlement are not
budgeted items in the OAS. These costs must be covered by voluntary
member contributions. Some actions are costly in monetary and mili-
tary terms, and others require a significant number of personnel and
degree of expertise. Any actions that the Organ of Consultation
(Council or Foreign Ministers) debates must include considerations
about the coverage of costs. Thus, if the Council is considering actions
that are quite costly in terms of finances or personnel, it needs U.S.
support in order to be able to fully implement its resolutions. Even if all
Latin American states were willing to contribute significantly to the
actions determined by the Organ of Consultation, which is unlikely
given the variety of interests and preferences within the organization,
the United States still has considerably more resources to contribute.
Equality can only go so far in terms of finances. Thus, the United States
is able to get around the structural equality established in the formal
institutions in order to influence the organization. This leads to hypothesis
number one:

1. The more resources that are needed to support the Meeting of

Consultation and carry out the resolutions of the Organ of Consultation,
the more influence the United States has on those resolutions.

Internal Relations
The previous section focused on the formal structure of the OAS, which
is shaped by the regional goals of hemispheric security and reduced
internal intervention. The organization, however, has been only partly
successful in achieving these goals, primarily because factors other than
 theories of international organizations / 31

formal institutions have an impact on organizational decisionmaking

and actions. Just as natural system advocates in sociology have empha-
sized the importance of the people within an organization, this section
emphasizes the importance of internal dynamics among member states
within the OAS—the “informal” structures.
Informal structures, including the interactions between actors based
on their personal relations and characteristics, are in contrast to formal
structures discussed earlier, which are associated with the patterns of
behavior that exist regardless of the characteristics of actors. The natural
system approach in sociology suggests that the informal structures in an
organization are not simply idiosyncratic beliefs and behaviors, but are
structured and orderly. Participants within a formal organization gener-
ate informal behavior patterns shaped by such factors as status and
power systems, communication networks, and working arrangements
(Scott 1998). Sociologists further add that there are positive aspects to
this informal structure, including increasing ease of communication,
facilitating trust, and correcting for the inadequacies of the formal
system (Scott 1998).
This section extends natural system analysis to focus on the dynam-
ics between member states in the OAS, rather than relations between
individuals within an organizational environment. Representatives of
member states are more than bodies filling Council positions as the
formal institutional perspective might suggest. They have ideas, expec-
tations, and agendas as well as differing values and abilities that derive
from their own national interests (Scott 1998). These shape the interac-
tions among member states within the context of the OAS.8
The variable to be considered concerning internal relations is the
level of consensus within the organization. There are two different
aspects to consider when examining consensus within the OAS. One
aspect involves the degree of consensus among only the Latin American
member states. The second involves the level of agreement between the
United States and Latin American members. In many cases, no disagree-
ment exists among members as to what actions should be taken to
address regional conflict. When there is disagreement between Latin
American members and the United States, however, there are two differ-
ent outcomes to controversial U.S. proposals based on the level of
consensus among Latin American members. If Latin American states are
unified in opposition to a U.S. proposal, the United States is unlikely to
get its proposal passed. If Latin American states are divided and unable
to present an alternative proposal for action, the United States has the
 32 / organization of american states

opportunity to provide strong leadership and gain support for its own
proposal. Members seem to prefer a U.S. plan of action to no plan.
Latin American members place a high value on consensual, multilateral
action. When an event in the region occurs contrary to the principles of
the organization, OAS members feel compelled to respond in order to
maintain the integrity of the organization. Even if it means accepting a
less than ideal U.S. proposal, Latin American members would rather act
on such a proposal than fail to respond at all. This gives the United
States considerable leverage when there is disagreement among Latin
American members. The formal equality of members that restricts U.S.
influence through formal structures is only useful if Latin Americans can
achieve unity to resist U.S. pressures through a vote of the majority. This
leads to the next hypothesis:

2. The greater the disagreement among Latin American members, the

greater influence the United States has.

Principles
A number of principles are important to the member states of the OAS.
These principles have been developed and strengthened over time, and
are embodied in the OAS Charter and Rio Treaty as well as numerous
other treaties among member states. Not only do these principles repre-
sent the strong beliefs in pacific settlement of disputes in the region,
they also oppose intervention in the domestic affairs of member states.
These principles were first established with the intention of limiting
the risk of warfare in the hemisphere by constraining states’ aggressive
behaviors toward their neighbors. When all the states in the region chose
to adopt these principles as they were laid out in the OAS Charter, the
Pact of Bogotá, and the Rio Treaty, hemispheric security was increased.
Any state violating these principles not only risked sanctioning by other
members, but also bore the stigma of a violator. As constructive theorists
argue, norms create a sense of obligation for states. They must comply
with agreed-upon rules and norms even when they have incentives to
break them and the capacity to do so (Franck 1990). Rules are not easily
broken; to do so risks pulling at the entire fabric of the international
community, not just the single violation of rules (Hasenclever et al. 1997).
Because no predetermined set of responses to handle disputes exists,
all issues of conflict resolution are open for discussion and debate within
the established structure of the organization. Each action taken by the
organization will be crafted by members attempting to uphold their
states’ particular interests on the issue. The options open to the Organ
 theories of international organizations / 33

of Consultation according to the Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter

include (but are not limited to): issuing a series of resolutions calling for
peaceful settlement; providing for negotiation, mediation, and arbitra-
tion; breaking diplomatic ties; and imposing economic sanctions
including arms and munitions. Resolutions can be expanded if neces-
sary, or revised based on updated reports coming from investigating
committees. The options considered by members are shaped by the
organization’s normative principles.
The impact of norms not only limits certain state behavior, but can
also promote other actions (i.e., multilateral actions taken through the
OAS). When the OAS acts in concert, its actions have considerably
more moral authority than any single member acting alone, even if that
member is the United States. Although hegemonic stability theorists
might argue that the leading state establishes the norms in its region,
and changes them as necessary to serve its own interests, such control of
norms has not been possible for the United States in Latin America. The
norms underlying the Inter-American System date back to the late
1890s and the Pan American movement. They were established before
the United States even became an active participant in the system. Latin
Americans have strongly resisted any U.S. pressure to alter these historic
principles in any way. (The closest they have come to altering the
region’s fundamental principles was in 1954 when they agreed to define
international communism as a threat to the hemisphere because of its
extracontinental origins.) Thus, principles play a significant role in
inter-American relations. As the most powerful state in the region, the
United States is one of the few members of the organization that can
take effective unilateral action when its national interests and/or security
is threatened. The United States can (and does) act unilaterally when its
preferred actions do not coincide with OAS principles. It does, however,
risk condemnation from the OAS for such action.9
When the Organ of Consultation is considering how to respond to a
disturbance in the region, it must keep the organization’s guiding prin-
ciples in mind. Proposals that are put forth in the OAS are carefully
phrased to uphold the principles of the Inter-American System. These
principles thus constrain the actions of all members. Although many
different actions can be framed so as to support these principles, there
are certain actions that are not acceptable to members that they will
resist strongly. This leads to the next hypothesis:

3. Any proposal or unilateral action by the United States (or other

member state) that does not clearly uphold the principles of the
 34 / organization of american states

organization will have less support than a proposal that is based on

principled action, and will face strong opposition in the Council/
Meeting of Foreign Ministers.

The Environment
Rather than perceiving the OAS as operating in a vacuum in which only
organizational variables affect its actions, it is important to recognize
that the organization affects and is affected by its external environment,
the international system. The international system is a complex envi-
ronment to describe, with innumerable variables and relations. Two
factors have been chosen to represent the impact of the international
environment on the organization. The type of conflict being handled by
the organization and the perceived level of threat to regional stability
both reflect certain characteristics of the environment that impact the
organization’s decisionmaking in dispute settlement.
The perceived level of threat to regional stability directly influences
the organization’s decision to initiate pacific settlement procedures.
Because one of the principal functions of the organization is to provide
collective security for the hemisphere, any dispute that threatens peace in
the region can be brought before the organization. This includes both
internal and international conflicts. All members have a vested interest
in maintaining the stability of the region and restoring peace when a
dispute occurs. Not only is there pressure for the OAS to resolve a
conflict because it threatens member states, but it must also handle the
dispute because it potentially threatens the survival of the organization
itself. If the OAS does not adequately address the issue, it may risk
becoming obsolete (i.e., no longer of use to its members).10
The type of dispute is also important in assessing the level of threat.
Latin America does not have many significant ethnic conflicts like those
experienced in a number of African countries. Most disputes are ideo-
logical and/or territorial. In terms of escalation and threat level, certain
conflicts lead to greater regional instability than others and thus a higher
level of threat. For example, territorial disputes are less threatening than
ideological disputes on issues of democracy versus dictatorship and on
international communism. Historically, the latter two risked drawing
many more members into a conflict either directly or indirectly than a
territorial dispute did. In addition, disputes over communism inherently
risked the involvement of the (former) Eastern bloc nations and/or the
(former) Soviet Union. Thus, disputes that involve ideological threats
are much more likely to cause regional instability. Furthermore, with the
 theories of international organizations / 35

emergence of the Cold War and U.S. preoccupation with communist

movements in Latin America, the United States made a strong effort in
the OAS to define communism as a threat to the hemisphere, an
extracontinental intervention of the Soviet Union.11
The perceived level of threat to the region also has implications for
the types of actions to be considered by the Organ of Consultation to
address a conflict. Clearly if many members of the OAS feel that their
security is threatened, they will be willing to take significant actions to
restore peace to the region, including taking military action. When the
perceived level of threat is not high, however, a number of diplomatic
options are available to the Council and Foreign Ministers to address
regional disputes.12 Indeed, Latin Americans have historically preferred
to take diplomatic steps before resorting to military measures. This
appears to be a principled preference as well as a practical one. When
members have few military resources to contribute to ending a dispute,
they rely on diplomacy instead. Many skilled Latin American diplomats
have contributed to strengthening peace in the region over the years.
The United States, not facing similar constraints, has frequently resorted
to military maneuvers to achieve its objectives in Latin America. Given
the military power of the United States, Latin American countries have
also resisted military action recognizing that this would result in U.S.
leadership of the force.
When there is a perceived major security threat to the region, and
given that the United States considers the Western hemisphere to be its
own “backyard,” the United States has taken a strong interest in address-
ing such security threats. The United States has often been willing to
provide resources and leadership in many peaceful settlement opera-
tions. Its strong participation has relieved the burden on other members
to provide the resources and leadership when it was necessary to enforce
strong resolutions.
Just as the study of open systems in organizational sociology strug-
gles to specify all of the complex interactions between a bureaucratic
organization and the environment, the relationship between the envi-
ronment and IOs is also quite complex. It is this perspective to which
realism is most applicable because it is a system-level approach. Realism
focuses on states and not organizations, but some of the assumptions
may apply in this context. For example, when considering environmen-
tal influences, power relations seem significant in predicting levels of
influence in the OAS. Formal equality among members does not fully
counter the imbalance of power. In cases of threatened regional stability,
 36 / organization of american states

Latin Americans look to the United States for leadership. This leads to
the final hypothesis:

4. The greater the risk of regional instability that is perceived by member

states, the greater influence the United States has within the organization.

Applying the Analytical Framework

The framework developed here will be used to further examine member
relations and influence within the OAS. The framework is a synthesis of
three different perspectives, combining structure, relations, and the
environment with a normative perspective to offer greater insights into
member relations within IOs. The framework builds on the explana-
tions offered by realism and institutionalism, but goes below the inter-
national level of analysis to explore organizational dynamics and
decisionmaking.
Realism, with its focus on power politics, accurately describes many
of the interactions between member states in the OAS, but not all of
them. The fact that the most powerful state, the United States, has not
gotten its way in several cases over the years indicates that additional
factors beyond political power must be at work. In addition, a number
of actions taken by the OAS have been based on consensual decision-
making where there is little evidence of power politics involved. A more
extensive framework that includes power as well as other factors is neces-
sary to explain member relations and organizational decisionmaking.
Although institutionalist arguments accurately describe some aspects
of member relations in the OAS, they do not paint a complete picture.
Institutionalist explanations for cooperation between states in IOs are
based on shared interests, predicting cooperative multilateral action
when interests coincide, and unilateral action when they do not.
Looking specifically at cases in the Western hemisphere, one can
identify a number of cases where this institutionalist explanation accu-
rately describes regional relations. In some instances, U.S. and Latin
American interests have coincided, resulting in multilateral action taken
through the OAS. One example is when Cuba was sanctioned by the
Twelfth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1967 for repeatedly interven-
ing in Venezuelan politics and trying to overthrow the government.
There are other instances where U.S. and Latin American interests have
not coincided, such as in the Falklands/Malvinas War (1982) between
the United Kingdom and Argentina. In this case the United States had
little interest in acting multilaterally within the OAS because it would
 theories of international organizations / 37

be unable to achieve organizational support for Britain, a long-time

U.S. ally.
Even though institutionalism explains these cases of cooperation or
noncooperation well based on common interests, there are other cases
that are not as easily explained. A number of cases exist where U.S. and
Latin American interests have diverged and yet the United States has still
chosen to address the regional issue within the context of the OAS
rather than unilaterally. The cases addressing Cuban intervention in the
region (1960, 1962, 1964) provide a good example of this desire to
work through the OAS even though members were divided on what
actions to take. These cases indicate that the institution was relevant to
and utilized by member states to deal with regional problems. Despite
conflicting views on how to handle Cuba, members were able to reach
compromise agreements in order to take effective multilateral action.
The United States as well as other members recognized the value of
acting in unison. The resolutions issued by the Foreign Ministers sent a
clear message to the Castro regime and had greater authority than any
declarations made by one or a few states in the region. In addition, by
emphatically addressing the problem, rather than ignoring it or taking
indecisive measures, the organization was strengthened as an effective
regional actor. By focusing particularly on the cases in which states have
differing interests and yet remain multilaterally engaged, the analytical
framework examines decisionmaking in the OAS seeking more
complete explanations than those offered by institutionalism.
The analytical framework serves as a means for examining the cases
in which the Rio Treaty, OAS Charter, Resolution 1080, or the
Democratic Charter have been invoked for pacific settlement in the last
half century.13 It facilitates the discovery of similarities and contrasts
among the cases, and helps to organize them in a meaningful fashion.
Each of the perspectives (structural, relational, normative, and environ-
mental) emphasizes a different set of variables as the key to understand-
ing U.S. influence within the OAS. Each provides insights that have not
been previously examined in the IO context and that complement
existing international theories. For example, hypothesis 1 builds on the
realist argument. By having significant resources, the United States does
have an influential advantage within the OAS. An examination of
member resources in the context of organizational structure, however,
suggests there are limits placed on hegemonic power. Because of the
procedural rules giving every state an equal vote on resolutions, and the
fully inclusive membership of all states in the Council and Meeting of
Foreign Ministers, the United States cannot simply dominate the
 38 / organization of american states

organization because of its hegemonic status. U.S. influence is reduced,

despite its power, when significant resources are not needed to carry out
the resolutions of the Organ of Consultation.
Hypothesis 2 similarly expands on institutionalist theory, which
predicts cooperation when there are common interests between states.
The second hypothesis, however, makes a further distinction, recogniz-
ing that disagreement among Latin American states and disagreements
between the United States and Latin American states can have two
different consequences in terms of organizational decisionmaking and
U.S. dominance. Latin American states have divergent interests from
each other as well as the United States from time to time. When these
disagreements divide members, it reduces the ability of Latin American
states to unite against unpopular U.S. proposals and use their majority
of votes to defeat them. This perspective also emphasizes a point that is
often overlooked when examining Latin America, that is that this region
is not homogenous. Members have a wide variety of interests that they
pursue within the context of the OAS. Member relations are far more
complex than a simple division of the United States versus the rest.
Hypothesis 3 is based on the constructivist literature that norms do
affect state behavior and that the United States will have less influence
if it tries to take action that violates regional principles. Examining this
proposition in the context of a number of case studies illustrates the
impact of regional norms on decisionmaking within the OAS. Although
the United States can and does act outside the OAS, when it pursues
multilateral action its arguments supporting that action are strength-
ened when they are based on regional principles and weakened when
they are not.
Hypothesis 4 is closely linked with hypothesis 1, and is one that
realists would likely agree with. However, this proposition is not based
on relative power per se to explain dominance within the OAS. It is
based on an external factor, the perceived level of threat to the region.
U.S. power does not necessarily give it hegemonic dominance unless
external conditions are right. Because the types of threats the OAS
addresses vary from case to case, there are many instances when Latin
American members may not require or desire U.S. assistance. When
threat levels are low, U.S. influence will likely be reduced.
Together the structural, relational, normative, and environmental
perspectives impart a better understanding of the way IOs function.
When applied to the case studies that follow, the analytical framework
provides new insights into member influence within the OAS and its
decisionmaking processes.
 C h ap t e r 3
Cooperation: Historic
Hemispheric Relations and
the Formation of the OAS

Introduction
Before examining the specific cases of conflict resolution handled by the
OAS between 1948 and 1989, and the interventions in defense of
democracy in the 1990s, it is important to explore the historical rela-
tions between the United States and Latin American states that preceded
the founding of the OAS. These relations reveal that U.S. policies
toward Latin American countries have alternated among benign neglect,
multilateralism, and active unilateral intervention for over one hundred
years. U.S. dominance in the region has often led to policies that Latin
American states have been obliged to accept despite their contrary pref-
erences, resulting in hostility and resentment toward the United States
on many occasions. For example, during the first quarter of the twenti-
eth century, under Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard
Taft, and Woodrow Wilson, U.S. troops actively intervened on many
occasions in Central American and Caribbean states to enforce order
and security in the region and to increase American economic domi-
nance in the area. There have also been times of cooperation and
productive relations, however, when inter-American ties have drawn the
Americas together. For example, the Good Neighbor Policy of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt promoted cooperative, less imperial policies and
led to improved Latin American relations. At the Seventh International
Conference of American States (1933), a mood of cooperation and
goodwill replaced the suspicion, resentment, and rancor that had been
displayed at the previous conference held in 1928 (Atkins 1997, 287).
New principles and agreements were adopted on which diplomats had
not been able to gain consensus prior to the Seventh Conference.
 40 / organization of american states

It took four decades of discussion and work to achieve this new level
of consensus however. At the First International Conference of
American States in 1889, the United States and Latin American states
came together with different goals in mind and achieved only very
limited agreements. At this conference the United States first became
active in the Pan American movement that had been underway since
1826. The First Conference and the ones that followed,14 however,
provided a forum in which a variety of inter-American activities could
be developed and coordinated. They also provided an opportunity for
states to reach agreements on common hemispheric values and princi-
ples. This forum and discussion was beneficial to states in the hemi-
sphere in helping build new relations between them. The OAS, which
evolved out of the Inter-American System, was unable to resolve all the
tensions that existed between the United States and Latin American
states. Neither was it able to balance the asymmetry of power. It did,
however, establish a framework in which the states could discuss their
differences on a somewhat more equal footing.
The framework, which established the formal equality of member
states, was not arrived at quickly or easily, nor were many of the other
principles that the OAS now upholds. The principles of state sovereignty,
nonintervention, territorial integrity, pacific settlement of disputes,
representative democracy, and respect for human rights evolved for over
a century before they were incorporated into the treaties and documents
that are a fundamental part of the current Inter-American System. This
evolutionary process was not a well-defined plan with clear goals in
mind; rather, it was a less purposive process. There were periods of signif-
icant progress when members reached consensus concerning the emerg-
ing principles and structures of the Inter-American System. There were
also periods with little progress, when members discussed but could not
agree on important issues. Even when members were unable to reach
consensus, however, the system continued to evolve as members consid-
ered new and/or controversial ideas that were being proposed. These
inactive periods were also important, however, because until new ideas
were articulated in the public forum, they would stand no chance of
being accepted as international norms. Thus, even though there was little
agreement on the ideas during these periods, there was much discussion
that would eventually lead to consensus.
The process of norm development in the Inter-American System
provides a good illustration of constructivist arguments on the evolution
of international norms. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) discuss the evolu-
tion of norms as a three-stage process. In the first stage, Emergence,
 historic hemispheric relations / 41

organizations can serve as platforms for norm entrepreneurs to advocate

new principles for state behavior. The inter-American conferences held
after 1889 are an example of how an organization can serve in this
manner. Although Latin American states had negotiated agreements on
a number of principles to promote peace and security, the United States
was not a part of this normative consensus. Most of these agreements
took the form of bilateral treaties and included the principles of nonin-
tervention, territorial integrity, arbitration of disputes, and renunciation
of war. Latin American states thus had a common framework of princi-
ples even before the United States began actively participating in the
Inter-American System.
The second stage of norm evolution, Norm Cascades, is an active
process in which norm supporters induce other states to become norm
followers through socialization. This may be accomplished using praise
and/or ridicule, as well as through diplomatic and economic sanctions
and incentives. States comply with norms due to pressure to conform and
to enhance their international legitimacy (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).
Following the establishment of the Pan American Union in 1910,
certain statesmen would work within the inter-American conferences to
persuade the United States to adopt those principles commonly adopted
by many Latin American states. As discussed later, the United States
finally came on board through a process of pressure, persuasion, and
calculation of interests.
The third stage of norm evolution, Internalization, is not an
inevitable end point. In this stage norms are internalized, institutional-
ized, and strengthened through iterated behavior and habit. Some
norms may never reach this stage. It is difficult to identify when this
stage has occurred, although one indicator is when there are no longer
debates about certain norms, they are taken as a given. In the case of the
regional norms in the Western hemisphere, the norms of democracy,
nonaggression, and peaceful settlement of disputes have arguably
reached this stage.
The inter-American conferences held over the past century have
provided the opportunity for participants to advance new principles,
trying to persuade other states that adoption of these norms would
benefit the entire region. In her discussion on the evolutionary model of
norms, Ann Florini (1996) points to the importance of “coherence” in
the spread of norms. New norms are more likely to spread if they fit
coherently with existing norms and existing norms are strengthened
when they are logically linked. For example, the renunciation of war and
the principle of nonaggression are closely linked to the principle of
 42 / organization of american states

peaceful settlement. If a dispute occurs and war has been renounced

except in self-defense, then it logically follows that a state would accept
alternative peaceful methods to resolve disputes including arbitration,
mediation, negotiation, and adjudication. When Latin American diplo-
mats began to discuss new ideas such as consultation on foreign policy
issues, regional solidarity, and collective security, these principles fit well
with existing norms of nonaggression and peaceful settlement. All these
principles promote a more peaceful and secure region. By consulting
with other states during a security crisis and pledging to collectively
come to the defense of others if they are attacked, states could prevent
or deter aggression.
The impact of Latin American and U.S. acceptance and adoption of
these new norms was significant, especially in the creation of processes
to resolve conflicts in the region. This chapter traces how these norms
and member solidarity developed prior to and during the formation of
the OAS. The impact of inter-American principles is examined further
in chapters 4–6, where case studies indicate that in order for an organi-
zation to affect or resist pressure from a powerful member, norms must
be in place and accepted by all, and there must be unity of purpose
among the other members.
This chapter provides historical background about the OAS and its
antecedents, and places U.S.–Latin American relations on the issues of
peace and security in context. In the first section I look at the Inter-
American System leading up to the formation of the OAS. The evolution
of the Inter-American System can be seen by examining the conferences
that were held, the treaties and principles that were adopted, and the
creation and reform of its governing bodies and agencies. This section
reveals the ebb and flow of ideas as the principles of the Inter-American
System developed. It also portrays the struggle between the Latin
American states and the United States over the handling of “political”
issues by the Inter-American System that gave rise to the creation of a
juridically based, multipurpose organization (i.e., the OAS). The evolu-
tion and developing consensus around the norms of nonintervention,
nonaggression, and peaceful settlement of disputes are evident in the four
phases of inter-American development. The second section examines the
Rio Treaty (1947), the OAS Charter (1948), and the American Treaty on
Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá 1948). These documents form the
foundation upon which hemispheric security, cooperation, and pacific
settlement have been based. The evolution and development of consensus
around the norms of pacific settlement and nonintervention are evident
in the four phases of inter-American development. The second section
 historic hemispheric relations / 43

also describes the way that the evolving principles of the Inter-American
System are formally incorporated into these documents and the new orga-
nizational structures that were created. A greater understanding of these
historical relations and the evolution of regional norms for peaceful settle-
ment of disputes in the hemisphere provide a foundation for understand-
ing more recent relationships and regional efforts at conflict resolution.

The Inter-American System

As the Inter-American System developed, it passed through four phases
prior to 1948.15 The priorities and issues of the Inter-American System
as well as the relations between the United States and Latin American
states have differed in each of these periods. The first phase began in the
1820s and lasted until 1889. It was exclusively a Latin American move-
ment. The second phase, which was characterized by U.S. dominance,
lasted from 1889 to 1923. The third phase from 1923 to 1933 was a
brief transition period during which Latin American nations reasserted
themselves. The fourth phase from 1933 to 1948 was a cooperative,
unifying period in which the foundations for the creation of the OAS
were laid, beginning with the cooperative policies of the new adminis-
tration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and concluding with the
formal signing of the OAS Charter.

First Phase
During the first phase of development of the Inter-American System,
the Spanish–American movement, led by Simón Bolívar, was focused on
establishing a confederation of Hispanic–American states to protect
against European (primarily Spanish) aggression. The United States
under the Jackson administration pursued an isolationist policy during
this time that prevented the realization of a system that included all of
the Western hemisphere. The Latin American states of Colombia, Chile,
Peru, Argentina, Mexico, and Central America, however, did sign a
series of treaties with each other in the 1820s. These states convened the
Congress of Panama in 1826 to establish common principles for secu-
rity and peace among the nations of America. They pledged to unite to
protect their independence and prosperity, and to promote greater
harmony between their citizens. They adopted four treaties providing
for broad multilateral cooperation in defense and other matters. The
most important treaty was the “Permanent Alliance, League and
Confederation of the Republics of Colombia, Central America, Peru
and the United States of Mexico.” This treaty established an “alliance
 44 / organization of american states

[between participants] in times of peace and war,” and affirmed an

“inviolable friendship and close union between all contracting parties”
(Glinkin 1990, 25). The introduction of the principles of collective
security and regional solidarity thus date back to the earliest years of the
Pan American movement.
Despite the apparent positive beginning with the conference in 1826,
the Panama Congress was considered a failure because only one partici-
pating state, Colombia, ratified the treaties and the states did not follow
through with a planned meeting to be held in Mexico the next year
(Whitaker 1954, 43). Some attribute this failure to the lack of dynamic
economic connections between the countries that would have helped the
process of unification (Glinkin 1990, 26). A second meeting of these
states was not held until 1847 in Lima. Although the participating states
established the principles of nonaggression and peaceful settlement of
disputes among members in the Treaty of Confederation, none of the
participants ratified the Treaty, rendering the second meeting a limited
success. The United States still chose not to be involved in these diplo-
matic conferences and in fact was on poor terms with Latin American
states as it engaged in a war with Mexico. The states met a third time in
Santiago (1856) and signed the Continental Treaty which included a
number of “nonpolitical” provisions concerning contracts, shipping, and
postal service (Whitaker 1954, 56). A fourth conference was held in
Lima in 1864. It concluded with the signing of four treaties, including a
Treaty of Union and Defensive Alliance, which set an anti-European tone
to protect the region against recolonialization. Each of these Congresses
was an effort to promote regional security since the latter two came at a
time when concern about Spanish reconquest was greatest.16
These early Pan American meetings inspired over fifty bilateral
treaties on peaceful settlement of disputes and promoted solidarity
among Latin Americans. However, no permanent governing bodies
existed at the time to oversee the operation of these treaties, although
some were proposed. Cooperation among states was limited to bilateral
efforts and the agreements reached at the Congresses. Yet the principles
of nonintervention, territorial integrity, arbitration, solidarity, and
renunciation of war became fundamental ones in many treaties during
this time. Throughout this period, the United States watched the grow-
ing number of interactions and agreements, but did not actively partic-
ipate. The main focus of U.S. policy in Latin America was on fostering
trade and avoiding political commitments. The “political” focus (i.e.,
security concerns) of these early Congresses did not appeal to U.S.
administrations. There were mixed opinions among Latin American
 historic hemispheric relations / 45

participants concerning U.S. participation in these conferences. Bolívar

did not want to include the United States, preferring to maintain an
exclusively Latin American focus (as opposed to a truly “Pan American”
one). Other states, including Mexico and Central America, did extend
an invitation to the United States to participate, hoping to induce the
United States to undertake specific obligations of support beyond
the vague statements for hemispheric defense made in the Monroe
Doctrine (Glinkin 1990, 36).

Second Phase
The anti-American sentiment expressed early on changed in the latter
half of the nineteenth century to a more inclusive hemispheric view of
inter-American solidarity. Latin American states were willing to accept
U.S. leadership in order to achieve political effectiveness (Whitaker
1954, 62). The second phase of development of the Inter-American
System began with the First International Conference of American
States held in Washington in 1889. At this conference, the focus of the
Inter-American System shifted away from security matters toward
economic concerns. Unlike the first phase in which the United States
remained uninvolved, the United States took the lead in bringing Latin
American states together to discuss how to keep peace among them-
selves, to avoid European intervention, and most importantly, to
promote trade. United States Secretary of State James Blaine promoted
this new Pan Americanism, arguing that the people of the Western
hemisphere had a “special relationship” with one another. He was also
concerned, however, that current Latin American conflicts would invite
European intervention and thus threaten the Monroe Doctrine
(Mecham 1961, 50). The Monroe Doctrine originated with President
James Monroe in 1823. It warned European powers, specifically Russia,
France, and Spain, that any attempt to control the newly independent
Latin American states would be considered a threat to U.S. peace and
safety. Throughout the 1800s, the declaration did not play a large role
in U.S. policy. However, with the rise of the United States to Great
Power status at the end of the nineteenth century, it became the “corner-
stone” of U.S. foreign policy (Atkins 1997, 341). Secretary of State
Blaine believed active U.S. participation in the hemisphere could
prevent European intervention. The growth of the industrial and agri-
cultural sectors in the United States also provided an incentive for the
government to actively seek greater markets in Latin America as well.
During the 1889 conference, the United States largely confined
discussions to the subjects of economics, education, and scientific and
 46 / organization of american states

social relations, all of which afforded the best prospects for friendly
agreement. The U.S. Congress suggested to the president that the
agenda include setting up an American customs union, introducing a
single silver currency, establishing a single set of customs duties, and
adopting an arbitration plan for the solution of disputes and conflicts
(Glinkin 1990, 53). Some of the “political” questions avoided during
the conference included concerns with juridical equality, territorial
integrity, national independence, international obligations, and rights of
American states (Mecham 1961, 49). Security was not a primary
concern for the United States because it had already assumed responsi-
bility for the security of the hemisphere from external attacks under the
Monroe Doctrine. The United States offered assurances to Latin
American states that it would participate as an equal with them at the
conference, not as a counselor to them. This assurance helped secure
Latin American participation despite disappointment that certain
“political” issues would not be on the agenda.
There were tangible achievements at this first conference. The first
was the creation of the Commercial Bureau for the International Union
of American Republics. This Bureau was limited to collecting and
publishing commercial, economic, and other information (Glinkin
1990, 55). The second achievement was the adoption of an arbitration
convention for settling disputes, which paved the way for the elaborate
inter-American peace system of today. The conference was more success-
ful than its predecessors in terms of achieving greater participation. All
Latin American states took part (whereas only four had attended the
conference in 1826 and seven had participated in 1864). Although
Latin American states raised some political issues at the first conference,
and at the next three conferences (1901, 1906, 1910), there were no
unanimous agreements on any principle other than arbitration. Latin
American states were able to reach agreement on a resolution concern-
ing alien rights at both the first and second conferences, but the United
States refused to sign it.17 This weakened the resolution considerably
since Latin American states were seeking to establish an international
principle to be observed by all states. Despite such disappointments,
U.S. leadership during this early period was virtually unchallenged
(Mecham 1961, 58). The United States continued to exercise extreme
caution in approving the agenda for the Fourth Conference (1910),
sanctioning only two “political” topics concerning the pecuniary-claims
treaty and the reorganization of the International Bureau of American
Republics (discussed later).
 historic hemispheric relations / 47

When World War I began, Latin American states were forced to

address war issues on an ad hoc basis because the United States, prior to
the war, had largely prevented discussion of security issues such as
neutrality. No multilateral efforts to take concerted action were success-
ful, but many states voiced support for “regional solidarity,” thus rein-
forcing the ideal of Latin American unity. The United States briefly
supported a Pan American Pact that provided a guarantee of territorial
integrity and political independence under a republican form of govern-
ment (Whitaker 1954, 123). By 1916, however, Wilson shifted his
support to a universal rather than regional forum. He devoted his ener-
gies to the establishment of the League of Nations. When the League of
Nations formed after the war, 15 out of 20 Latin American states
became charter members and the other five states eventually joined as
well. There was only sporadic attendance, however, because of the exten-
sive focus on European problems within the League. When the United
States chose not to join, many Latin American states viewed this as a
betrayal of their ideal of pacific settlement of disputes through an IO.
The U.S. refusal to join the League, for a number of reasons unrelated
to Latin American relations, was symbolic of its lack of solidarity with
Latin American states. Throughout this period, the United States took the
lead in the Inter-American System without much support or protest from
Latin American states. Latin Americans, however, remained distrustful of
the United States, especially after President Theodore Roosevelt estab-
lished protectorates over Cuba (1898–1902) and Panama (1903), and
intervened in the Dominican Republic (1905) to force it to pay its inter-
national debts. U.S. marines occupied Nicaragua from 1912 to 1913, and
Haiti in 1915. In a survey in 1924, only six of 20 Latin American states
were free from U.S. interference in the form of official direction of finan-
cial policy or the presence of armed forces (Whitaker 1954, 128).
Although U.S.–Latin American relations were not friendly and there
was little agreement on common principles during this period, the Inter-
American System did succeed in creating an administrative organ to
carry out the work of the Conferences. At the First Conference, the first
permanent secretariat was established. This body served as a modest
administrative agency, collecting and distributing commercial informa-
tion. It was located in Washington, D.C., under the supervision of the
U.S. Department of State. At the Second Conference in 1901, the secre-
tariat was transformed into the International Bureau of American
Republics. Its functions were expanded slightly, no longer limiting it to
a commercial role. The International Commission of Jurists was formed
 48 / organization of american states

at the Third Conference (1906) to draft codes on international law and

states’ rights. At the Fourth Conference (1910), the International
Bureau became the Pan American Union (PAU). The PAU expanded
upon the activities of the International Bureau and developed a more
complex administrative structure (see Ball 1969, chapter 1; and Kelchner
1930). It was specifically prohibited, however, from dealing with “politi-
cal” matters (i.e., peace and security issues). The U.S. Secretary of State
became chairman of the Pan American Board, and the United States
refused to consider making the chairmanship an elected position. The
United States thus maintained its control over the administration of the
Inter-American System as well as over Conference agendas. To many Latin
American governments, however, the value of this new Pan Americanism
found in the Inter-American System was too high to be abandoned
because of U.S. dominance (Mecham 1961, 73).
Although the first four conferences did not produce many results in
terms of agreement on new principles, they did lay the foundation for
greater achievements in the future. Adoption of international principles
guiding the behavior of all states could not proceed quickly, but each
discussion that was held brought states closer to consensus on a number
of principles, including nonintervention, sovereignty, nonaggression,
and pacific settlement of disputes.

Third Phase
A third phase in inter-American relations began with the Fifth Inter-
American Conference in 1923. At that conference, Latin American
states became more assertive and brought more political topics to
the agenda. These topics included: (1) the organization of the PAU;
(2) consideration of the work by the Commission of Jurists; (3) considera-
tion of a closer association; (4) consideration of wider application of the
principle of judicial and arbitral settlement of disputes; (5) reduction
and limitation of armaments; (6) consideration of questions arising out
of an encroachment by a non-American power on the rights of an
American state; and (7) consideration of the rights of aliens resident
within an American State (Mecham 1961, 95). Latin American states
were no longer willing to confine their discussions to topics on which
unanimous agreement was assured. This willingness to tackle difficult
questions and struggle toward consensus helped to introduce for discus-
sion many of the principles on which the OAS stands today.
Latin American states expressed concern with many of the U.S.
political and economic policies and mounted an attack on the U.S. view
of Pan Americanism, which resisted multilateral security arrangements.
 historic hemispheric relations / 49

The United States chose to take a “hands off ” approach rather than
directly confronting Latin American states on controversial issues. The
United States was not particularly interested in transforming the organi-
zation as many Latin Americans were. Latin American states were inter-
ested in reducing U.S. preponderance within the PAU, in expanding the
role of the PAU, and in promoting conflict resolution through multilat-
eral instruments. The United States did its best to delay and weaken the
proposals that were put forward along these lines. For example, when
the Uruguayan proposal for an “American League of Nations” based on the
Monroe Doctrine was put forward, the U.S. representative stated that the
Monroe Doctrine would remain a unilateral policy. The United States
was not interested in cooperating to form an international or regional
League of Nations at this time. It was equally uncooperative on the issue
of arbitration, believing that existing peace instruments were adequate.
Eventually, however, some reforms were passed. They included revi-
sions to the Pan American Board. All states were allowed to have a desig-
nated representative, not just their ambassador to the United States, sit on
the Board. This allowed all states to be represented whether they were on
good diplomatic terms with the United States or not.18 The chair and vice-
chair became elected positions weakening U.S. control over the Board.
Four standing committees were created to assist the PAU in handling
issues of economic and commercial relations, international labor, public
health, and intellectual cooperation. This expansion addressed the Latin
American concern that the PAU was simply a bureaucracy for a commer-
cial organization rather than the secretariat for an international, multipur-
pose organization. Thus began the gradual expansion of the organization
into many different areas of regional concern. The Treaty to Avoid or
Prevent Conflicts between the American States (Gondra Pact 1922) was
the most important of several efforts by American states to establish an
inter-American regime for dealing with interstate conflicts. The Pact
provided guidelines for submitting to a commission of inquiry all contro-
versies not settled through diplomatic channels and not submitted to arbi-
tration in accordance with existing treaties. A commission of five members
would investigate the dispute over the period of a year, during which time
the disputants would agree not to make war preparations. After the inves-
tigation, the commission would report its findings in hopes of helping the
parties reach a negotiated settlement (Mecham 1961, 98). This Pact
helped codify in a multilateral agreement the norm of peaceful settlement
that had previously been embodied mostly in bilateral treaties.
When the Sixth Inter-American Conference met in 1928, relations
were more contentious than ever between Latin American countries and
 50 / organization of american states

the United States. U.S. policies were criticized, particularly its armed
interventions in the Caribbean (Glinkin 1990, 79). This lack of solidar-
ity within the Inter-American System stemmed from the Roosevelt
Corollary (1904) to the Monroe Doctrine, which had led to regular
U.S. intervention in Latin America for security purposes. The Roosevelt
Corollary was added to the Monroe Doctrine by President Theodore
Roosevelt, stating that “chronic wrongdoing” within Latin American states
might result in the United States exercising an international police power.
Following in Roosevelt’s footsteps, President Taft intervened in Nicaragua
and Honduras to restore order and stability to the Canal Zone. Latin
American states highly resented these acts of intervention. The United
States, however, simply refused to accept the principle of nonintervention.
This principle, which held that “no state has the right to intervene in the
internal or external affairs of another,” was of crucial importance to Latin
American states. It was a corollary to the principle of juridical equality of
sovereign states on which inter-American relations were based. Latin
American states recognized, however, that a resolution on nonintervention
without the concurrence of the United States would be meaningless. Thus
the topic was postponed until the Seventh Conference.
Latin American states were not as willing to accept U.S. intransigence
on the issue of reforming the Governing Board of the PAU. In order to
further limit U.S. power on the Board, Latin Americans voted to restrict
the Board from having “functions of a political character.” The Latin
American members wanted the Inter-American System to address polit-
ical issues of concern to them, including issues of security, but they did
not want the PAU to have control over these issues. Control was to
remain in the hands of the state representatives to the international
conferences at which these topics were discussed. By using their majority
power, Latin American states could hypothetically control political issues
in this forum, but in reality, the United States maintained a strong influ-
ence over many of the smaller member states and thus still blocked polit-
ical issues from the agenda. U.S. resistance to adopting resolutions
concerning nonintervention and the juridical equality of states prevented
further progress toward establishing these as international principles.

Fourth Phase
During the fourth phase of development, from 1933 to 1948, relations
between the United States and Latin Americans gradually improved begin-
ning with the Good Neighbor Policy of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
At the Seventh Inter-American Conference held in Montevideo in 1933,
the United States reversed its long-held position and declared that it was
 historic hemispheric relations / 51

open to discuss any topic of general interest to the hemisphere. This rever-
sal was the culmination of a number of changes in U.S. policy that were
initiated shortly after the Sixth Conference. The hostility evident at the
Sixth Conference provided a clear indication that the tensions between the
United States and Latin America could not be resolved except by reorient-
ing U.S. policy. The Coolidge administration had recognized that U.S.
acceptance of the principle of nonintervention would be necessary for
further institutional cooperation with Latin American states. President
Calvin Coolidge had sent diplomats to Mexico and Nicaragua to resolve
tensions over prior U.S. imperial policies. President Herbert Hoover
took even more significant steps toward reconciling the United States
with Latin America by repudiating the Roosevelt Corollary to the
Monroe Doctrine, withdrawing marines from Nicaragua and Haiti, and
notifying American investors in Latin America that they must exhaust
local remedies before appealing for diplomatic protection. President
Roosevelt continued this trend toward more cooperative, less imperial
relations with Latin America with his Good Neighbor Policy. He stated
that the essential qualities of a good neighbor included mutual under-
standing and a sympathetic appreciation of the others’ point of view. In
this way he hoped to build a system in which confidence, friendship, and
goodwill were the cornerstones (Mecham 1961, 114).
Roosevelt’s willingness to expand the discussions at the Seventh
Conference led to significant progress on adopting many of the princi-
ples that Latin Americans had advocated for years. The Convention on
the Rights and Duties of States was drafted at the conference. It
included provisions on the juridical equality of states, nonintervention,
peaceful settlement, nonrecognition of territorial conquest, and subjec-
tion of foreigners to local legal jurisdiction. All the principles that Latin
American states had come to embrace and had pressed the United States
to accept were adopted. A number of procedures were defined as
instruments of pacific settlement, including arbitration, conciliation,
mediation, and negotiation. Although pacific settlement was not linked
to mutual security in the 1930s, by the 1950s it became intertwined
with the concept of hemispheric security. States recognized that a
dispute in one country or between members destabilized and weakened
the system as a whole. Members took an active interest in the disputes
in the hemisphere, encouraging the belligerent parties to pursue peace-
ful settlement of their disputes in order to maintain regional stability. As
long as mechanisms for settlement were engaged and escalation was not
an immediate concern, members did not need to risk intervention in
order to protect their own interests. Thus, peaceful settlement and
 52 / organization of american states

mutual security became closely linked (and still upheld the principle of
nonintervention).
Another component of pacific settlement, the principle of consulta-
tion, was formally integrated into the Inter-American System at the
Eighth Conference (1938). Most of the provisions for the resolution on
consultative procedures had been drawn up at the Inter-American
Conference for the Maintenance of Peace held in 1936. At the confer-
ence, it had been established that any act that disturbed the peace of an
American state affected each and every state and justified the initiation
of consultation between American states. At the Eighth Conference in
Lima, the means to achieve consultation, which had been left unspeci-
fied in 1936, were laid out. The machinery to implement the procedure
of consultation was to be handled by a Meeting of Foreign Ministers.
The Latin American states did not want to entrust such an important
political task to the Governing Board of the PAU at this time, still fear-
ing U.S. dominance of the Board. Thus, the Foreign Ministers were to
handle any requests for consultation concerning threats to the peace.19
As the Inter-American System matured and developed regulations
specifying the actions of the Governing Board and Meetings of Foreign
Ministers, the number of new agencies and functions in several areas
within the Inter-American System were increasing rapidly. For the most
part, there was little regulation or coordination of these agencies and
they operated separately from the authority of the Governing Board.
Some of the issue-areas included technical exchanges in health and
scientific fields, as well as cultural programs.
During World War II, a common enemy united most of the hemi-
sphere.20 Unlike the ad hoc declarations that had been issued during
World War I, World War II led to the development of mutual security
mechanisms that had never been a part of the system before. The Treaty
of Chapultepec (1945) included provisions for enforcement of the prin-
ciples of nonintervention and pacific settlement for the first time. Acts
of aggression were to be met with multilateral sanctions. Activities and
conferences on topics other than juridical and commercial topics began
to increase, thus signaling the increased political focus (i.e., security
focus) of the emerging organization.
With the cooperation between the United States and Latin American
states on issues ranging from trade to mutual security, the Inter-
American System of the 1940s no longer resembled the U.S.-dominated
system of the 1890s, nor the Latin American movement of Simón
Bolívar initiated in the 1820s. During the 50 years following the First
International Conference of American States (1889), the Inter-American
System underwent considerable change. Although the first four
 historic hemispheric relations / 53

conferences were initiated and dominated by the United States, Latin

American determination and assertiveness were slowly able to transform
relations within the Inter-American System. Latin American states and
the United States gradually developed more cooperative relations and
were able to interact on more equal footing. The United States recog-
nized that further progress in building inter-American relations would
require the end of Caribbean imperialism. With the start of the Good
Neighbor Policy, stronger ties were made between the United States and
Latin America. Once greater cooperation was established, many of the
norms that had been evolving in the past decades were formally incor-
porated as principles of the Inter-American System.
The initial focus of the Inter-American System in the early 1800s was
on regional disputes and threats that shaped the principles of noninter-
vention and pacific settlement of disputes. The disengaged United States
displayed little interest in the Pan American movement during this time.
The development of the norm of peaceful settlement stemmed from the
bilateral negotiations between Latin American states in this early era and
continued to develop throughout the next century. The emergence of
the principle of regional solidarity/unity was also evident in this early era.
During the period of U.S. dominance from 1889 to 1923, few
advances were made in establishing regional principles concerning secu-
rity issues. Latin American states reasserted themselves at the Fifth
Conference in 1923 and brought the principles of nonintervention, arbi-
tration, and consultation to the agenda again. Latin American states
pursued the multilateral codification of these principles despite U.S.
reluctance and resistance. The impacts of World Wars I and II on the
hemisphere expanded the focus of the Inter-American System to address
not just regional threats, but extracontinental threats as well. The United
States became a more cooperative partner and formal instruments for
handling mutual security and consultation emerged after World War II.
The United States finally accepted the long-standing regional norms of
nonintervention and the juridical equality of states. Beginning with the
signing of the Rio Treaty in 1947, and followed by the drafting of the
OAS Charter and the Pact of Bogotá in 1948, the Inter-American System
underwent a significant transformation. The next section will follow
these developments in the Inter-American System and their implications
for pacific settlement, hemispheric security, and interstate relations.

The Formation of a Security Regime—The Rio Treaty

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, better known as the
Rio Treaty, was drafted at the Inter-American Conference on
 54 / organization of american states

Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security in Rio de Janeiro in

1947. It was adopted by all 20 Latin American states and the United
States and was designed to provide a permanent treaty for “mutual secu-
rity” after the temporary Act of Chapultepec was dissolved at the end of
World War II. The Act of Chapultepec had been drawn up to protect
both the territorial integrity and political independence of American
states against aggression (regional and extrahemispheric). For the first
time, the Act specifically provided for enforcement, stipulating that acts
of aggression were to be met by sanctions ranging from the recall of
chiefs of diplomatic missions to the use of armed force (Atkins 1997,
12). Following the end of World War II, American states met and
drafted the Rio Treaty. The purpose of the Rio Treaty was twofold: (1) to
deal effectively with armed attacks and threats of aggression against
member states; and (2) to assure peace in the region through improved
pacific settlement procedures. The treaty incorporated many of the
principles embodied in previous inter-American treaties and declara-
tions including formal condemnation of war or the use of force against
other sovereign states, support of nonintervention, and continental
solidarity.
On the issue of armed attacks or threats of aggression, the Rio Treaty
establishes in Article 3 that an attack on one is considered an attack on
all and that all members should undertake to assist the one under attack.
Thus, a collective security regime was established. Article 6 states
that the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately “if the inviola-
bility or the integrity of the territory, or the sovereignty, or the political
independence of any American state should be affected by an aggression
which is not an armed attack, or by an extra-continental or intra-
continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endan-
ger the peace of the Americas.” This article provides for the defense of
the hemisphere from both external and internal threats. Additional acts
of aggression are defined in Article 9 as “unprovoked armed attacks by
a State against the territory, the people, or the land, sea or air forces of
another state; or invasion, by the armed forces of a State, of the territory
of an American state, through the trespassing of boundaries demarcated
in accordance with a treaty, judicial decision or arbitral award.” When
any such act of aggression or attack occurs, the Meeting of Foreign
Ministers is designated to serve as the Organ of Consultation, with the
Governing Board of the PAU to act provisionally until the Foreign
Ministers can meet (Articles 11 and 12). After the founding of the OAS
the next year, the Council of the OAS was given the responsibility of
serving as provisional organ instead of the Governing Board.
 historic hemispheric relations / 55

In terms of promoting pacific settlement of disputes in the region,

the Rio Treaty gives authority to the Meeting of Consultation to “call
upon the contending States to suspend hostilities and restore matters to
the status quo ante bellum [and to take] all other necessary measures to
reestablish or maintain inter-American peace and security for the solu-
tion of the conflict by peaceful means” (Article 7). The measures that
the Meeting of Consultation has available to it include: recall of chiefs
of diplomatic missions, breaking of diplomatic relations, breaking of
consular relations, partial or complete interruption of economic rela-
tions, of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic communications,
and use of armed force (Article 8). Because the signatory states desired
to “consolidat[e] and strengthen their relations of friendship and good
neighborliness” (preamble), they promoted consensual action under the
Treaty in two ways. First, they determined that decisions must be carried
by a two-thirds vote (excluding those states that are directly involved in
the dispute). Second, they established that sanction measures are bind-
ing on all member states, with the exception that no state will be
required to use armed force without its consent. Unlike the UN Security
Council, the United States was not given veto power. All states were
committed to carrying out the decisions made by a two-third majority
of the member states whether they supported the action or not (with the
exception of engaging in military action). An example of the application
of sanctions can be seen in the case of the Dominican Republic, handled
by the Sixth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1960. Dominican dictator
Rafael Trujillo was accused of intervention in the sovereign domestic
affairs of Venezuela. The Organ of Consultation voted to impose sanc-
tions. Member states were to cut diplomatic ties and to interrupt
economic relations with the Dominican Republic, ending trade and
arms shipments (other applications of the Rio Treaty are discussed in
chapters 4–6).

The Charter of the OAS and the Pact of Bogotá

The OAS was created in 1948 at the Ninth Inter-American Conference
of American States held in Bogotá.21 Its creation signaled a new era in
inter-American relations in which states in the Western hemisphere
came together to “achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their
solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sover-
eignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence” (Article 1, OAS
Charter).22 Just as the Rio Treaty included many of the principles
concerning pacific settlement that had evolved within the Inter-American
 56 / organization of american states

System over the years, the OAS Charter embodied these same principles
in a more summary form. Chapter IV of the Charter outlined a number
of procedures to promote pacific settlement of disputes, including:
negotiation, good offices, mediation, investigation and conciliation,
judicial settlement, and arbitration. Chapter V of the Charter reaffirmed
the principle of collective security, stating that an attack on one is
considered an attack on all. In addition to these principles concerning
peace and security, however, the Charter also affirmed that:

1) social justice and social security are bases of lasting peace; 2) economic
cooperation is essential to the common welfare and prosperity for the
peoples of the continent; 3) spiritual unity of the continent is based on
respect for the cultural values of the American countries and requires
their close cooperation for the high purposes of civilization; 4) American
states proclaim the fundamental rights of the individual without distinc-
tion as to race, nationality, creed, or sex; and 5) the education of peoples
should be directed toward justice, freedom and peace. (Article 5)

Despite the affirmation of these principles in the Charter, there was

some debate at the Ninth Conference on whether to incorporate chapters
on economic, social, and cultural cooperation in the Charter. Panama
and Mexico argued strongly to include them. In the end, three brief
chapters were adopted (Chapters VI–VIII).
It was particularly important to Latin American states that the
Charter also include provisions for the juridical equality of states as well
as delineating their fundamental rights and duties. These are included in
Chapter III of the Charter, which specifically guaranteed states’ political
and territorial sovereignty. This chapter also promoted peace in the
hemisphere by reminding states that they had duties as well as rights:
“The right of each State to protect itself and to live its own life does not
authorize it to commit unjust acts against another state” (Article 11).
In order for the OAS to uphold the principles listed earlier, and to
carry out its stated purposes, the Charter established a number of Organs
to oversee peaceful settlement and security, as well as economic, educa-
tional, and cultural functions. The Inter-American Conference was
established as the supreme organ of the OAS, convening every five years
to determine the general actions and policies of the organization.
Chapter XI established that the Meeting of Foreign Ministers would
convene to consider any problem of an urgent nature and of common
interest to the American states, and to serve as the Organ of Consultation.
Although the Charter did not include the Rio Treaty in its entirety,
it did coordinate the two instruments by including provisions such as
 historic hemispheric relations / 57

the one concerning the Organ of Consultation. The Council was respon-
sible for the proper discharge by the PAU (the secretariat) of the duties
assigned to it by the Conference and the Meeting of Foreign Ministers.
There was some debate in Bogotá concerning the amount of political
power the Council should have. In the end, Latin American states
prevailed and limited the scope of political powers the Council possessed.
It simply provided oversight of the activities of other organs within the
organization. The one provision that gave the Council some political
power was the specification that the Council would serve as the provi-
sional organ prior to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers as necessary. Three
additional councils were established to oversee more technical duties: the
Inter-American Economic and Social Council, the Inter-American
Council of Jurists, and the Inter-American Cultural Council. The PAU
was designated as the general secretariat of the OAS, headed by the secre-
tary general who was elected for a ten-year term.23
The Ninth Inter-American Conference also adopted the American
Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá). Unlike the Charter and
the Rio Treaty, the Pact was rarely used or referred to by member states.
The Pact of Bogotá integrated a number of treaties in an effort to
consolidate pacific settlement procedures in the hemisphere. A variety of
peaceful settlement techniques were included in the Pact: adjudication,
arbitration, conciliation, diplomacy, good offices, investigation, and
mediation. Once a state ratified the Pact, all previous treaties on pacific
settlement were no longer binding. Those states that did not ratify it
were still bound by the previous treaties that they had signed. During
the Conference, there were disputes about whether states should be
obligated to submit disputes for settlement or whether submission
should be voluntary. There was also debate about the scope of the
disputes that required submission. Delegates eventually decided that all
disputes of all sizes must be resolved by peaceful procedure and that they
would not be withdrawn until settlement was reached. Only 14 of 21
states ratified the Pact and seven of those did so with reservations. Thus,
it has not been as encompassing or effective as the Charter or Rio Treaty
have been.
The Rio Treaty and OAS Charter created a new regional security
regime unlike any other that existed at the time. The OAS was not
merely a collective security arrangement, although the Rio Treaty and
certain OAS Charter provisions established the defensive military nature
of the organization. Provisions in the Charter also established economic,
cultural, and social development functions for the OAS. The internal
structure was also unlike that of other organizations. In an effort to
 58 / organization of american states

counter U.S. dominance in the organization, member states were given an

equal vote in the governing Council. Unlike the permanent members in
the UN Security Council, no OAS member had veto power. Policies were
to be made by majority rule, preferably by consensus. All the values that
had evolved into regional principles helped shape the OAS, which would
be the new forum for inter-American relations. The Charter and the Rio
Treaty codified the regional norms that had evolved over the past century
and serve as the most comprehensive, multilateral documents to date.

Summary
The creation of the OAS did not fundamentally alter relations between
the United States and Latin America, although it did institutionalize them
in many respects. The periodic episodes of antagonism and cooperation
seen prior to the founding of the OAS are seen after its creation (and are
discussed in chapter 4). The creation of the OAS gave Latin Americans
a forum outside of the United Nations in which they could lodge formal
complaints against U.S. policies that they considered to be contrary to
international law. Latin American states hoped that the OAS would
serve to protect state sovereignty from both U.S. and extra hemispheric
intervention efforts. Whereas prior to 1948, relations had been shaped
by bilateral agreements and other treaties to which not all Latin
American states were parties, the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty
united all of Latin America and the United States under uniform rules
and mechanisms. The principles that had evolved over a 100-year period
beginning with the Pan American movement were included in these
documents, further codifying the norms of state sovereignty, noninter-
vention, peaceful settlement of disputes, territorial integrity, consulta-
tion, and representative democracy. Ironically, although Latin
Americans were more unified than they had been before, the consolida-
tion of previous agreements also resulted in a single organization that
the United States could attempt to use to pursue its policies in Latin
America.
 C h ap t e r 4
The OAS and Conflict
Resolution 1948–89

Introduction
Chapter 3 presented the events leading up to and shaping the formation
of the OAS in Bogotá in 1948. This chapter builds upon that historical
foundation and examines how the organization has used the formal
mechanisms of peaceful settlement and collective security to resolve
disputes in the hemisphere. Between 1948 and 1989, the OAS
addressed 26 cases of dispute settlement among member states. These
disputes took place within the context of the Cold War, with tensions
between Latin American military dictatorships and democracies. The
conflict resolution efforts varied over time in terms of the level of
consensus reached among member states about what principles to
invoke, measures to adopt, the extent of the threat posed to the region,
and which instruments to apply.
The first section of this chapter lays out the general sequence of
events that occur when a dispute arises. The next section briefly
discusses the relevant literature on the OAS. I then define my research
design in the third section, and discuss the implications of each variable
for member relations within the organization. The fourth section exam-
ines the first decade of conflict resolution efforts by the OAS. This
section depicts a relatively consensual period in which the OAS Council
handled consultations under the Rio Treaty. The fifth section explores
the changes to the OAS in the 1960s with an examination of the issues
raised in the organization concerning the communist revolution in
Cuba. The cases during this time indicate a shift in procedure in
handling threats related to international communism. The sixth section
takes a look at the changes in the organization throughout the 1970s as
the OAS went through a period of decline. Although the 50-year period
 60 / organization of american states

is discussed in three different sections, there are no specific characteris-

tics that make these time periods distinct “eras.” Each decade reveals
gradual shifts in the types of conflicts that arose and the means used to
address them. The three sections help to highlight these changes. The
final section applies the hypotheses derived in chapter 2 to the cases
collectively to determine which factors most clearly affect U.S. influence
within the organization.

The OAS as an Organ for Pacific Settlement

Although the principle of pacific settlement predated the principle of
mutual security by nearly three decades, by the end of World War II the
two were inextricably intertwined and became common elements of a
single system of hemispheric peace and security (Atkins 1997, 93). Prior
to World War II, peaceful settlement had emphasized juridical–legal–
diplomatic settlement of inter-American disputes. Mutual security,
formally introduced in 1936, involved political–military defense against
extrahemispheric threats. In the post–World War II era, however, the
mutual security and pacific settlement procedures were applied simulta-
neously to a large number of cases (Atkins 1997, 344). Thus, when
disputes arose among members, they were treated as security issues with
an emphasis on peaceful settlement. The Charter and the Rio Treaty
established coordinated provisions for handling conflicts in the region
that upheld the principles of nonintervention and sovereignty valued by
members. This section traces the provisions and the standard procedures
that were invoked when a dispute arose among members.
When a dispute occurs between or among members, four general
options are available (see figure 4.1). The Charter may be invoked; the
Rio Treaty may be invoked; the Inter-American Peace Committee
(IAPC) may be asked to investigate;24 or no request may be made of the
OAS. Once the Charter or Rio Treaty is invoked, the Council meets to
determine whether the request is justified and votes whether to convene
the Organ of Consultation. The Council has two choices if it decides to
convoke the Organ of Consultation: (1) to choose to establish itself as
the provisional Organ while calling for a Meeting of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs; or (2) to call for an immediate Meeting of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs to serve as the Organ of Consultation.
In practice, once the Organ is convened, the most common action
taken is to form an investigating committee. This committee travels to
the countries involved and then reports back to the Organ. After hearing
the committee’s report, the Organ considers resolutions proposed by
 conflict resolution / 61

EVENT

OAS Charter Rio Treaty IAPC No OAS

invoked invoked investigates action

Council meets Reports to Council

Council convenes as Foreign Ministers No further action

Provisional Organ of convene as Organ
Consultation of Consultation

Investigating Committee sent

Report to Council/Foreign Ministers No further action

Resolution(s) issued

Observation Committee sent

Committee reports to Council/Foreign Ministers No further action

Additional resolutions

Matter concluded

Figure 4.1 Peaceful settlement procedures

various members and then votes on them. Under the Charter and Rio
Treaty, the Organ of Consultation (or Provisional Organ) has the
authority to impose a variety of sanctions, including recalling diplomatic
personnel, breaking diplomatic relations, interrupting economic rela-
tions, and using armed force. At this point, the Organ may decide to
take no further action, assuming that its resolutions address the problem
 62 / organization of american states

at hand. If the dispute is unlikely to be resolved by issuing resolutions

alone, the Organ may choose to send an observation committee to the
scene to report on further incidents and on compliance with the Organ’s
resolutions. In difficult cases, a small military contingent may be put in
place to ensure compliance and report on technical military matters.
Additional resolutions may be declared based on further developments in
the situation. At any point in this process, the conflict may be resolved
and/or the organization may choose not to take any further action.25

Contributing Literature
One body of literature that contributes to this research, but that was not
discussed in chapter 2, is the literature on the OAS itself. The OAS liter-
ature provides an empirical rather than a theoretical context for this
research and is used throughout the rest of the book. These works
provide a wealth of information about the organization and its numer-
ous functions and activities over the years. Some studies are historical,
examining and evaluating the organization’s successes and failures
(Mecham 1961; Ball 1969; Atkins 1997). Others delve into organiza-
tional structure, examining charter principles and decisionmaking
processes (Gosselin and Thérien 1997, Tascan 1998). Still others are
more policy-oriented, studying the organization in its post–Cold War
context and making recommendations for reforms based on changing
international norms and emphasizing its new potential (Vaky and
Muñoz 1993; OAS Annual Report 1995; Villagran de Leon 1992a,b).
Other policy studies review past relations between member states and
make predictions for the future (Pastor 1992). Each of these aspects
sheds light on the working of the OAS, and its relations with the United
States. Most of this literature, however, is descriptive and policy-
oriented, lacking deeper theoretical analysis. By combining this empiri-
cal work with the theories of organizational sociology discussed in
chapter 2, this research establishes a framework to test what institutional
conditions affect state influence within the OAS.
The empirical literature on the OAS is combined with a number of
single case studies and historical summaries to analyze the functioning
of the organization in a more theoretical fashion. Previous studies of the
OAS provide details on the different aspects of the OAS that have the
potential to impact member states. Studies of the evolution of the orga-
nization that emphasize the development of regional principles stress the
importance of normative factors within the organization. The literature
on the OAS Charter and the legal/juridical aspects of the organization
 conflict resolution / 63

emphasize the potential of structural and procedural variables to impact

decisionmaking. The policy literature focuses on the dynamic relations
among member states, and suggests that relational factors also ought to
be included in an analysis of OAS decisionmaking. Each of these bodies
of literature provides a different empirical focus that is incorporated in
the analytical framework.

Research Design
This chapter examines 26 cases handled by the OAS under the Rio
Treaty and Charter from 1948 to 1989, beginning shortly after the OAS
was founded, and ending at the same time as the Cold War drew to a
close. Following the end of the Cold War, regional priorities, security
concerns, and member relations changed considerably and additional
considerations beyond the Cold War analytical framework are necessary
to examine these most recent cases. In the 1990s, several new mecha-
nisms were established to address threats to democracy in the region.
Cases of conflict resolution following the Cold War are addressed sepa-
rately in chapter 7 based on the organizational changes, and because the
Rio Treaty was not invoked from 1989 (when the United States invaded
Panama) to September 2001 (following the terrorist attacks on the
United States).
The 26 cases examined in this chapter reveal varying levels of threat
to the region over a 50-year period. The greatest perceived threats were
seen in the 1960s, with lower-level threats seen in the 1950s and in the
1970s and 1980s. The cases also indicate a gradual shift in the level of
consensus within the organization, in the organ convened to address the
conflict, and in the types of conflicts addressed. Shifts in policy prefer-
ences are evident in the level of consensus members are able to achieve
when issuing resolutions to resolve regional disputes. The greatest
consensus among member states is seen during the 1950s, following the
creation of the OAS, with a gradual decline seen over the next several
decades. Changes in the organizational environment can be seen in the
different way that cases are handled by the Organ of Consultation over
time. Whereas the Council handled all of the earliest cases, by the 1970s
the Foreign Ministers had become the primary organ for addressing
conflict resolution. Finally, changes in the international and regional
environment are reflected in the types of cases handled by the organiza-
tion including struggles between democratic and nondemocratic govern-
ments, and efforts at communist subversion. An exploration of these
cases provides a comparison and contrast of the four organizational
 64 / organization of american states

variables presented in chapter 2 that influence interstate relations within

the OAS. The historical examination also reveals changing trends in
conflict resolution efforts in the region.

Threat Level
The first characteristic of the cases to be evaluated is the level of threat to
regional stability. This variable is difficult to measure since it is the percep-
tion of threat on which member states base their actions. It is important
to be able to characterize the level of threat to the region that arises from
a dispute because it influences not only the level of interest of member
states in the dispute, but also the type of responses to be considered by
the OAS. Disputes that pose a considerable threat to members are much
more likely to provoke a military response, whereas ones that do not
immediately threaten the security of members are more likely to inspire
diplomatic efforts. In addition to considering the threat to individual
members’ security, there is also consideration of how threatening a
conflict is to regional stability. If there is a risk of the conflict escalating
to include other member states, the threat to regional stability is higher.
The perceived level of threat to the region has an indirect impact on the
United States as it considers what proposals to present to the Council or
Foreign Ministers. As noted in chapter 3, the United States has histori-
cally resorted to military options when responding to crises in Latin
America. Latin American states have long expressed a preference for
diplomacy over military force. This creates the potential for disagreement
within the organization whenever a dispute arises, particularly one that is
only mid-level, and not a high threat to the region.
Threats are classified as high, mid, or low based on the number of
countries involved and the potential for escalation. Individual member
states might base their evaluations on such factors as the degree of mili-
tarization and public explanations for the conflict. For example, a
dispute that the combatants claim is territorial would not be viewed as
threatening to a non-border state. However, rather than trying to
measure individual assessments and then aggregate them, threats are
assessed based on a region-wide perspective such as would be taken in
the Council or a Meeting of Foreign Ministers. Such factors as
militarization and justifications for the conflict as well as threats of use
of military force all fall under assessments of the potential for escalation.
Disputes that are considered a high level of threat to the region are those
that include widespread violence (based on military and civilian casual-
ties) and/or the risk of affecting all member states. Violence is consid-
ered widespread when engagement by the military forces with other
 conflict resolution / 65

armed forces, or civilian riots or other violent confrontations result in

over 1,000 casualties. A nuclear threat in the region is one event that
places all members at risk (i.e., the Cuban missile crisis, 1962).
Members would be at risk environmentally if a nuclear weapon(s) were
to be detonated. Such a threat would also risk initiating a military arms
race between competing armed forces and would undermine the
regional nuclear-free zone established in the Tlatelolco Treaty.
Based on the criteria of widespread violence and impact on all
member states, only two Latin American conflicts fall into this category
(both Cuban 1962 cases). A few conflicts have had a high number of
casualties but have not necessarily been conflicts that risk affecting all
members. For example, the Soccer War between El Salvador and
Honduras resulted in over 1,000 dead and at least 6,000 wounded, but
did not risk escalating to include other member states. The dispute was
over immigration issues between the two states that did not involve
other Latin American states.
A mid-level threat is one in which two or more members are involved
and in which members believe regional stability is threatened, but with-
out the widespread violence or the risk to all members seen in cases with
a high level of threat. Conflicts can generate regional instability in a
number of ways. For example, in 1948, the ideological tensions arising
from the border clashes between rebels in Nicaragua and the Costa
Rican military produced a “situation [that was] abnormal and danger-
ous to inter-American peace . . . [causing] an atmosphere of mutual
distrust, constant anxiety, and open hostility [in Central America and
the Caribbean]” (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
Applications vol. 1, 1948). Regional stability can be threatened either by
political/ideological circumstances (as in the example given here) or by
the direct or indirect support of the disputants by other member states.
Thus, if Latin American states are divided over an issue, such as the
democracy versus dictatorship cases throughout the 1950s, there is
considerable potential for member states to become involved indirectly
in supporting the disputants. Conflicts can affect regional stability by
generating floods of refugees, instigating domestic uprisings, and
disrupting trade.
A conflict considered a low-level threat is one where there is little risk
of escalation or regional instability and/or only a single member is
involved (i.e., a civil war). The case of Honduras–Nicaragua (1957) is a
good example. The two states were involved in limited military engage-
ments in a disputed border region. The OAS brokered a cease-fire and
troop withdrawal plan and the case was submitted to the International
 66 / organization of american states

Court of Justice. No other states were threatened by the border clashes,

nor did they feel an ideological affinity to support either Nicaragua or
Honduras in this dispute. Thus, the threat level was low.
The two examples given here also indicate that the type of dispute is
important in assessing the level of threat. Latin America has not had
many significant ethnic conflicts on the scale of those in Africa. Most
disputes are ideological and/or territorial. In terms of escalation and
threat level, certain conflicts can lead to greater regional instability than
others and thus a higher level of threat. For example, territorial disputes
are less threatening than ideological disputes on issues such as democ-
racy versus dictatorship and international communism. The latter two
risk drawing many more members into a conflict either directly or indi-
rectly than a territorial dispute does. When members feel that a certain
ideology threatens their regime then they are compelled to support a
neighbor who shares their ideology and is engaged in a dispute. For
example, in the 1950s, President José Figueres of Costa Rica engaged in
rhetorical challenges to the dictator of Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza, in
an effort to promote democracy and socioeconomic reform in the
region. Figueres’ aggressive campaigns aroused the bitter opposition of
several dictatorial leaders in addition to Somoza, including Pérez
Jiménez of Venezuela and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic
(Mecham 1961, 403). When a military conflict broke out along the
Nicaraguan/Costa Rican border in 1955, the dispute was considered a
threat to regional stability because of the risk of more states becoming
involved. Territorial disputes do not invoke the same kind of sympathy
among member states. Disputes that involve ideological threats are
much more likely to cause regional instability by involving more
members than a territorial dispute would.

Consensus
The second factor to be considered in comparing cases and examining
changes over time is the level of consensus among members. There are
two different aspects to consider when examining consensus within the
OAS. One aspect involves the degree of consensus among only the
Latin American member states. The second involves the level of agree-
ment between the United States and Latin American members. In many
cases, there is no disagreement among members as to what actions
should be taken to address regional conflict. Two different outcomes to
controversial U.S. proposals are possible, however, based on the level of
consensus among Latin American members. If Latin American states are
 conflict resolution / 67

unified in opposition to a U.S. proposal, the United States is unlikely to

get its proposal passed. If Latin American states are divided and unable
to present a proposal for action, the United States has the opportunity
to provide strong leadership and gain support for its own proposal.
Members seem to prefer a U.S. plan of action to no plan. For example,
when a countercoup occurred in the Dominican Republic in 1965, the
Council did not take any action until the United States unilaterally inter-
vened and then proposed a multilateral peace force. Although some
members strongly opposed U.S. actions, their inability to propose appro-
priate alternative measures resulted in the creation of an OAS-approved
peace force dominated by the United States. Although Latin American
states did not favor a U.S.-dominated force, their failure to approve the
multilateral force would have weakened the organization and given
it even less control over the situation than their sanctioning of the
U.S. force. By acting on U.S. plans when there are no other alternatives,
the organization maintains at least nominal multilateral control over
U.S. actions.
Consensus also impacts the ability of the organization to issue strong,
clear resolutions. Member states value consensus within the organiza-
tion and prefer to act in a unified manner whenever possible. In order
to satisfy all members, and thus act consensually, the wording of resolu-
tions sometimes becomes weak and ambiguous. Because the level of
consensus among Latin American members can directly impact the abil-
ity of the United States to influence OAS responses to conflicts, it is
important to have a sense of the level of agreement among member
states in each dispute case. By looking at the degree of consensus
between Latin American members and the United States, one is able to
pinpoint which cases might be of the most interest to evaluate in terms
of examining U.S. influence within the organization (i.e., cases in which
there is considerable disagreement/low consensus between the United
States and Latin American members).
Consensus is classified as “high” when there is general agreement on
the actions to be taken by the organization (i.e., unanimity). This means
that Latin American states are in agreement with each other and that the
United States is also in agreement with Latin American members. When
some Latin American members are in disagreement, and/or the United
States is in mild disagreement with proposed actions, there is mid-level
consensus.26 Mild disagreement generally occurs in cases when members
have shared goals, but prefer differing means to pursue them. For exam-
ple, when the Foreign Ministers imposed sanctions on the Dominican
Republic (1960) for intervention in Venezuela, Brazil opposed coercive
 68 / organization of american states

measures in favor of moral sanctions and persuasion to preserve

inter-American unity. Members most frequently express their dissenting
opinions through the inclusion of Statements (or Reservations) attached
to the end of resolutions with which they are not in full agreement.
These statements allow members to express divergent views while still
upholding consensus by voting in favor of a resolution. Thus, if there are
between one and five statements expressing points of disagreement with
the text of a resolution, I consider the degree of consensus to be mid-
level. An example of mid-level consensus can be seen in the Fifth
Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959 that met to seek solutions to
Caribbean tensions and the extensive revolutionary activity in the
region. Most members, including the United States, favored a strict
nonintervention stance while also condemning unnamed dictatorships
in the region. The Foreign Ministers adopted the Declaration of
Santiago, which supported representative democracy, and created the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). Although
Uruguay and Argentina voted in favor of the Declaration and the
creation of the Commission, they both issued Reservations. Uruguay
had constitutional reservations concerning the Commission. Argentina
was concerned about the structure and power to be invested in such an
international agency.
Finally, an acrimonious debate among Latin Americans, or between
the United States and Latin American states, results in a “low” level of
consensus. Evidence of strong disagreement among members can
include abstentions or votes in opposition to a proposal in addition to
statements or reservations made by members. Within the OAS, where
much value is placed on consensus, an abstention or opposition vote is
a strong statement. In addition, when there is strong debate within the
organization, there are likely to be public statements made concerning
state preferences and defending the governmental positions of members.
There are two main distinctions between mid- and low-levels of consen-
sus based on the kind of disagreements among members, and the
number of divergent opinions. In mid-level cases, the debate is over the
means used to pursue a common goal, and five or fewer members express
their disagreement. In cases with a low level of consensus, members
disagree about the goals and actions being pursued by the organization,
and more than five members register their opposition.
An example of a low level of consensus can be seen at the Tenth
Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1965. When the United States
presented a proposal to send an Inter American Peace Force to the
Dominican Republic, Mexico, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay
 conflict resolution / 69

voted in opposition, and Venezuela abstained. The level of consensus is

assessed both during the debates held by the Council or Foreign
Ministers based on public statements and meeting minutes, and at the
conclusion of the meetings based on votes and official statements
attached to the resolutions. As noted earlier, the strong desire for
consensual action often results in all members reaching a general agree-
ment on the final resolutions that are issued by the Council or Foreign
Ministers. Thus, it is important to assess not only the final outcome as
indicated by voting and member statements, but also the variety of
proposals put forth and the context of the debate on these proposals.

Organ of Consultation/Principles
The third factor to consider when comparing cases of conflict resolution
is which Organ of the OAS is responsible for handling the case (i.e.,
Council or Meeting of Foreign Ministers), and which Treaty/Articles are
invoked (Rio Treaty or Charter). These characteristics are linked to the
hypothesis concerning regional principles. Each article invoked estab-
lishes that certain principles are at stake in a given conflict. The condi-
tions in each case largely determine the organ and instruments that are
used. For example, Article 19 of the Charter, which prohibits coercive
measures against another member state, will only be invoked if there is
evidence of such actions being taken (as in the Ecuador–U.S. case in
1971). These institutional characteristics determine the set of proce-
dures to be followed when a dispute occurs. It is important to identify
which articles are invoked in each case because they specify which
regional principles are at stake, shape organizational responses, and set
the tone for the meeting. The articles that are invoked are also indica-
tive of the level of military (or other) threat to the region. Some articles
are intended to convoke a meeting of consultation when there is a
general threat to the region, while others set more specific justifications
for a meeting, such as when an unprovoked armed attack has occurred.
Four different articles of the Rio Treaty have been invoked histori-
cally (6, 8, 9, 11). Article 6 of the Rio Treaty is the most commonly
invoked article. It states,
If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or
political independence of any American State should be affected by an
aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or
intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might
endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet
immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in
 70 / organization of american states

case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the
measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the
maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent. (Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 1947, Article 6)

Article 9 (Rio Treaty) is invoked far less frequently. It further character-

izes aggression as an unprovoked armed attack by a state against the
territory, the people, or the land, sea, or air forces of another state; or
invasion by the armed forces of a state, of the territory of an American
state, through the trespassing of demarcated boundaries. Article 8 (Rio
Treaty) is occasionally invoked when calling for a Meeting of
Consultation. It lays out the measures that the Organ may apply to
enforce compliance with the Treaty. These measures include: recall of
chiefs of diplomatic missions, breaking diplomatic relations, breaking
consular relations, partial or complete interruption of economic rela-
tions, of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communica-
tions, and use of armed force. Article 11 (Rio Treaty) states, “the
consultation to which the Treaty refers shall be carried out by means of
the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the states which have rati-
fied the treaty, or in the manner or by organ which may be agreed upon
in the future.” It is invoked when a member specifically wants the
Foreign Ministers to handle a case rather than the Council.
Three articles of the OAS Charter have been invoked when calling
for a meeting of an Organ of Consultation (19, 39, 40). Article 39 of
the Charter resembles Article 6 of the Rio Treaty since it lays out the
circumstances for when a Meeting of Consultation may be called. It
states that a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers shall be held
in order to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common inter-
est to the American States. Article 40 of the Charter specifies that any
member may request that a Meeting of Consultation be called. The
request shall be addressed to the Council, which shall decide by an
absolute majority whether a meeting should be held. Article 19 has only
been invoked once (by Ecuador against the United States). It states that
no country may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of
economic or political character to force the sovereign will of another
state to obtain advantages from it. Sanctions can only be applied
multilaterally through a majority vote in the OAS. Although the invoca-
tion of certain principles does not have any direct implications for the
ability of the United States to influence decisions made within the OAS,
the principles do shape the tone of the debates within a Meeting of
Consultation. Certain actions may be considered more or less appropri-
ate based on the principles invoked. For example, when Article 8 (Rio) is
 conflict resolution / 71

invoked, laying out specific provisions to enforce compliance, it is likely

that the Organ will take measures beyond diplomatic mediation to
remedy the dispute. Identification of the principles within the Rio Treaty
and Charter that justify a Meeting of Consultation also indicates what
the threshold is for a matter to be brought before the organization.27
One factor that shows little variation is the level of resources
employed by the organization. It is analyzed in chapters 5 and 6 in the
case studies, but is not included in the historical examination because of
the lack of variation. When looking at the resources employed in carry-
ing out decisions, I found that there was a range of resources utilized,
from diplomatic actions and pressures to military mobilization. In most
cases, however, the instruments of choice were nonmilitary, reflecting a
relatively low investment of resources.28 This diplomatic emphasis
suggests that the organization has few extra resources for military oper-
ations. A high level of resources is indicated by the use of military
resources to carry out the resolutions of the Organ of Consultation. A
mid-level use of resources is measured by one or more committees carry-
ing on activities following the conclusion of the Meeting of
Consultation (i.e., monitoring committees, research committees, etc.).
If no committee work continues after the meeting and no military
resources are used, the level of resources used is considered low.
By assessing the threat level, the type of conflict, the level of consen-
sus within the organization, and the responsive organ and article
invoked, I identify patterns of interaction that reveal organizational
changes over time and help to explain the changing levels of U.S. influ-
ence within the organization in different cases. The following section
will begin this comparison by examining early efforts at conflict resolu-
tion by the OAS.

The Decade of Consensus: Conflict

Resolution from 1948–5929
Six of the seven cases handled by the OAS during this first decade have
a number of characteristics in common including the types of disputes
that were brought to the Council and the way they were handled by the
organization. The conflicts were, for the most part, disputes between
democracies and dictatorships and were perceived as mid- to low-level
threats to the region. There was a relatively high degree of consensus
among members in addressing these conflicts (see table 4.1). All the
disputes were handled by the Council acting as provisional Organ of
Consultation under the Rio Treaty. The one exceptional case is
Table 4.1 Cases invoking the Rio Treaty or the OAS Charter in chronological order (1948–89)

Cases Date Council Resources Threat Consensus Consensus Brief

or FM level U.S.-LA LA-LA description

Costa Rica– 1948 C Mid Mid High High Costa Rica alleges invasion
Nicaragua by Nicaragua; Pact of Amity
signed; troops withdrawn

Caribbean 1949 C Low Mid Mid Mid General instability in the

region; active rebel forces

Guatemala 1954 C NA Mid Mid Mid Coup removes Guatemala

President Arbenz before
Council can act

Costa Rica– 1955 C High Mid High High Each country accuses the
Nicaragua other of intervention; exile
activity; governments sign
conciliation agreement

Honduras– 1957 C Low Low High High Territorial dispute; cease-fire

Nicaragua signed; case to Int’l Court of
Justice

Panama 1959 C High Low High High Small invasion force, mostly
Cuban; persuaded to surrender by
OAS intermediaries

Nicaragua 1959 C Low Mid Mid Mid Anti-Somoza rebels from

Costa Rica/Honduras;
CR/Hon pledge to restrain
exiles
Caribbean 1959 FM 5 Low Mid Mid High DR charges Cuba and Ven
of plotting invasion; general
regional instability

Dominican 1960 FM 6 Mid Mid Mid High DR attempt to assassinate

Republic– Ven President Betancourt;
Venezuela DR condemned, sanctions
imposed

Cuba 1960 FM 7 Low Mid Low High Cuban intervention;

Soviet/Chinese condemnation

Cuba 1962 C High High High High Soviet intervention; missile crisis

Cuba 1962 FM 8 Low High Low Low Cuban activities viewed as

threat to the peace; Cuba
effectively ousted from OAS

Dominican 1963 C Low Low Mid High Each country accuses the
Republic–Haiti other of illegal exile activities;
governments agree to negotiations

Cuba 1964 FM 9 Low Mid Mid Low Sanctions expanded against

Cuba for continued
intervention activities

Panama–U.S. 1964 C Low Low Mid High “Flag Riots” over refusal to fly
Panamanian flag in the
Canal Zone

Dominican 1965 FM 10 High Low Low Low Coup; countercoup; multilateral

Republic peacekeeping; elections

Cuba– 1967 FM 12 Low Mid High High Cuban intervention in

Venezuela Venezuela; sanctions
expanded
Table 4.1 Continued

Cases Date Council Resources Threat Consensus Consensus Brief

or FM level U.S.-LA LA-LA description

El Salvador– 1969 FM 13 High Mid High High “Soccer War”; immigration

Honduras disputes; cease-fire, withdrawal,
dispute settlement procedures

Ecuador–U.S. 1971 FM 14 Low Low Mid High Fishing rights dispute; territorial
waters; negotiations
recommended

Cuba 1974 FM 15 Low Low Low Low Proposal to lift sanctions does not
receive two thirds vote

Cuba 1975 FM 16 Low Low Mid Mid Economic sanctions

no longer enforced

Nicaragua 1978 FM 17 Mid Mid Low High Sandinista revolution; proposed

peacekeeping force rejected

Costa Rica– 1978 FM 18 Low Low Mid Mid Nicaragua invasion of CR

Nicaragua territory; observers
placed on border

Ecuador–Peru 1981 FM 19 Low Low High High Territorial dispute

Argentina–U.K. 1982 C ⬎ FM 20 Mid Low Low High Falklands/Malvinas conflict;

Council supports Argentina and
calls for a cease-fire

Panama–U.S. 1989 FM 21 Low Low Low High U.S. removal of President

Manuel Noriega
 conflict resolution / 75

Guatemala (1954) that least resembles the other cases during this time,
dealing instead with the threat of communism to the region.
Shortly after the OAS was created, it faced its first challenge to
resolve a dispute between members in accordance with the provisions of
the recently signed Rio Treaty. On December 11, 1948, an armed
incursion into Costa Rica from Nicaragua occurred. The Council met
quickly at the request of the Costa Rican ambassador, convoked itself as
the provisional Organ of Consultation, and sent an investigating
committee to the two countries.30 Based on the committee’s reports, the
Council unanimously approved a resolution calling on both govern-
ments to eliminate the conditions that led to the dispute, to abstain
from further hostile acts against each other, and to observe the princi-
ple of nonintervention. A committee of military experts was sent to the
border to ensure the effective fulfillment of the Council’s resolutions.
Another special committee of the provisional Organ of Consultation
helped draft a Pact of Amity, which both sides signed on February 21,
1949. The handling of the Costa Rican–Nicaraguan case (1948) closely
resembles the processes adopted for the latter cases that were handled
during this early period.
The second case raised in the OAS addressed the “Caribbean situa-
tion” in 1949, which involved accusations and counteraccusations of
intervention from the Dominican Republic against Haiti, Cuba, and
Guatemala. In the end, the Council issued a series of resolutions that
severely criticized the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Guatemala.
Only Haiti was not criticized for engaging in subversive activity. The
Council recommended that all the parties engage in mediation and sent
a monitoring committee to report on the progress of such talks.
Sanctions were threatened if the peace was not kept. The next case
brought to the OAS was Guatemala (1954). In this case, President
Jacabo Arbenz of Guatemala, who some feared to be a communist,
faced an invading force and was forced to resign and leave the country
before any substantive actions were taken by the OAS. In 1955 the
tensions between Costa Rica and Nicaragua came to the attention of
the Council a second time when Costa Rican rebels who had trained
within Nicaragua crossed into Costa Rica. The situation was resolved by
a Special Committee of the Council that negotiated two agreements
between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The first one implemented the Pact
of Amity signed in 1949 and the second one agreed to continued
monitoring of the borders by the OAS. The only territorial dispute
handled by the OAS during the 1950s was between Honduras and
Nicaragua in 1957. The OAS investigating committee helped secure a
 76 / organization of american states

cease-fire and troop withdrawal from the disputed region. A second

committee worked with the parties to specify agreeable juridical proce-
dures to conclusively settle the dispute. Both countries agreed to a
ruling by the International Court of Justice.
In 1959 several cases arose. In April, Panama requested a Meeting of
Consultation to deal with 87 armed men who had landed on the
Panamanian coast and refused to surrender to the Panamanian military.
An investigating committee gained the surrender of the soldiers and
further landings were deterred by multilateral air and sea patrols autho-
rized by the Council. In June, Nicaragua invoked the Rio Treaty
requesting that the Council meet to address an invasion by approxi-
mately 400 rebels (many of them Nicaraguan exiles). The Council sent
a special committee to investigate the situation. The neighboring states
of Costa Rica and Honduras agreed to suppress any further insurgen-
cies operating within their territory and the Council issued a final reso-
lution urging members to uphold the principle of nonintervention.

Characteristics of Conflict Resolution from 1948 to 1959

In terms of relations between the United States and Latin American
countries, the 1950s was a decade of consensus. In all seven cases there
was a high- to mid-level degree of consensus among members in
handling these conflicts. An example of a dispute where there was a high
level of consensus is the case of Panama (1959). When Panama faced a
force of largely Cuban invaders on its coast with the threat of additional
invading forces, it requested a Meeting of Consultation. (Panama did
not accuse Cuba because it believed the government had not aided the
invaders.) The Council voted unanimously to invoke the Rio Treaty. Air
and sea patrols were mounted quickly. The Cuban government even
sent a representative to help negotiate with the invaders and secure their
surrender. The Council was able to respond quickly and effectively, and
members were in agreement on the actions to be taken to aid the victim
of aggression (i.e., Panama). In two of the cases in which there was mid-
level consensus (Caribbean, 1949 and Guatemala, 1954) the disagree-
ment among members was based mostly on the juridical competence of
the OAS and its governing bodies to handle the cases. There was not
disagreement on the actions to be taken once the cases were addressed
by the Council. In the Caribbean case (1949), Mexico and Argentina
argued that the IAPC did not have juridical competence to deal with
issues of a “general nature.” Other members however, including the
United States, wanted the IAPC to be involved in studying the unrest
 conflict resolution / 77

in the region. The IAPC did investigate and report back to the Council
before the Council issued its final resolutions admonishing all sides in
the conflict to observe their commitments to end their hostile propa-
ganda and reestablish good relations.
Consensus was high during the 1950s because members agreed on
the actions that should be taken to restore peace when conflicts broke
out. L. Ronald Scheman (1988, 5) notes, “the machinery of the OAS
functioned over the early years because of the underlying consensus
among the member nations as to the values and kind of world they
[wanted] for their people.” Members believed that using the mecha-
nisms established in the Rio Treaty and Charter for peaceful settlement
was important for maintaining regional stability. The biggest point of
contention among members during this period concerning application
of the Rio Treaty was the degree to which the OAS should defend or
condemn dictatorships when they were threatened by armed forces. For
example, in 1959 many members were ambivalent about defending the
Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua when it faced a military uprising, but
they were adamant about upholding the principle of nonintervention if
these forces actually originated from outside Nicaraguan territory. This
struggle was evident in the Nicaraguan case (1959) when the investigat-
ing committee delayed its departure for two weeks after being
appointed. There was a reluctance to help Somoza defend his regime. In
most cases, the committee is on the scene within a few days. By the time
they had arrived in Nicaragua, Somoza had already arrested the rebels
and no longer needed assistance from the OAS, thus negating their
uncomfortable situation. Members continually struggled to determine
the degree to which the OAS should be involved when dictatorships
were threatened by rebel groups (either internal or external). This diffi-
cult issue would continue to be a problem for members into the next
decade. Despite the tensions raised between democracies and dictator-
ships, however, relations among OAS members were remarkably
consensual during this period.
The level of threat to the region from the conflicts during this first
decade was mid- to low-level. Most cases involved disputes between
dictators and democracies in the Central American and Caribbean
regions. There was one territorial dispute between Honduras and
Nicaragua in 1957, which was ultimately settled in the International
Court of Justice. This case posed little threat to the region as a whole
since only two members were involved on a very limited military scale.
The other exceptional case was Guatemala in 1954, which was the first
case in which the threat of international communism was raised. The
 78 / organization of american states

Guatemalan case was merely a hint at what was to come in the 1960s.
Although most of the disputes during this period involved minor border
incidents, the threats to the region were not incidental because the rebel
groups involved were often sponsored by other governments in the
region, thus violating the principle of nonintervention. Failure to
respond to these violations would likely increase regional instability.
Thus, the Council viewed these disputes as threats to the peace and
security of the region.31 In the Costa Rican–Nicaraguan case (1948), the
Council stated that the “situation, which is abnormal and dangerous to
inter-American peace, explains why the majority of the Central
American and Caribbean Republics have, for some time, been living in
an atmosphere of mutual distrust, constant anxiety, and open hostility”
(Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance vol. 1, 1948, 41). The
situation in the Caribbean in 1949 was similarly characterized. The
Council felt that solidarity had been seriously disturbed in the region
(Council of the Organization of American States, Actas, April 8, 1950).
Another indication that the Council viewed these conflicts as a threat
to regional peace is that in all of the cases Article 6 (Rio) was invoked.
Article 6 states that if the integrity, the territory, the sovereignty, or the
political independence of a state is affected by an aggression or situation
that might endanger the peace of the Americas, the Organ of
Consultation shall meet immediately to consider measures of common
defense for the security of the continent.
Although the Council would eventually defer to the Meetings of
Foreign Ministers to serve as the Organ of Consultation in later years,
during the 1950s the Council chose to serve as the provisional Organ of
Consultation in all the cases. The standard pattern of response during
this time can be seen in the Costa Rican–Nicaraguan case (1955).
Following the initial incident that provoked the request for a Meeting of
Consultation, the Council met and formed itself into the provisional
Organ. A call for a Meeting of Foreign Ministers was issued, but no date
was set. An investigating committee was formed and sent to the scene to
evaluate the situation and report back to the Council. The Council then
issued its resolutions based on the recommendations of the committee.
In this case, a special committee was established to monitor the situa-
tion and ensure that the Council’s resolutions were carried out. Finally,
the Council canceled its call for a Meeting of Foreign Ministers when
the crisis was resolved.
The exception to this standard response to serve as Provisional Organ
is the case of Guatemala. When Rio was invoked in the case of
Guatemala, the ten members who called for a meeting raised Article 11,
 conflict resolution / 79

which states, “the consultation to which the Treaty refers shall be carried
out by means of the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the states
which have ratified the treaty …”32 Thus, the Council met to set a
specific date for a Meeting of Foreign Ministers (which never actually
met), but chose not to constitute itself as the provisional organ. This
decision resulted in the organization reacting too slowly to have any
impact on the coup that ousted Guatemalan President Jacabo Arbenz.
In the other cases, the Council responded rapidly, convoking the Organ
of Consultation within one to three days of the member’s request.
As is clear from the aforementioned discussion, the case of the
Guatemalan coup in 1954 was unlike the other cases handled by the
OAS during this period and consequently provoked a unique response
from the OAS. It was the only case in which the threat of communism
was raised, which contributed to an increased perception of a regional
threat because of international communist connections. President
Arbenz had been carrying out a series of land reforms that many
U.S. companies opposed. The U.S. State Department had been
concerned for several years that Arbenz was controlled by communists
in the country and wanted him out of office.
Because of the supposed communist threat in the case of Guatemala,
there was less consensus on this case than any of the others addressed in
the 1950s. One of the biggest debates on the case, however, took place
outside the context of OAS, in the UN Security Council. Guatemala,
convinced that it would not receive a favorable hearing in the OAS, peti-
tioned the UN Security Council.33 The United States, supported by
Brazil and Colombia on the UN Security Council, argued that the issue
should be handled by the OAS, not the United Nations. The United
States succeeded in getting the UN Security Council to reject the
request of Guatemala. Guatemala then agreed to cooperate with the
IAPC and the OAS. There was too little time at this point, however, for
the IAPC to investigate or for the Foreign Ministers to meet before
Arbenz was forced to resign two days later. The OAS Council did not
move quickly, nor act decisively in this case as it did in the others. The
Council instead moved cautiously, not only because of strong U.S.
interest in the case, but also because of a desire to achieve consensus
before acting. Its actions were further limited by the invocation of
Article 11 (Rio) calling specifically for a Meeting of Foreign Ministers,
and by the fact that Guatemala did not seek resolution through the OAS
first, preferring the UN forum. These unique conditions resulted in a
response from the OAS that was unlike its responses to other cases
during this decade. The concern with international communism unique
 80 / organization of american states

to the case of Guatemala in the 1950s would become much more

pronounced in the next decade as the Cold War deepened.

The Impact of International Communism:

Conflict Resolution in the 1960s
The international environment and organizational environment under-
went notable change in the early 1960s following the Cuban Revolution
and the rise of Fidel Castro. The 1960s witnessed a shift from the
Council handling cases of conflict resolution to the use of the Meeting
of Foreign Ministers. The OAS Charter was used for the first time as an
instrument for settlement instead of the Rio Treaty. In addition to the
changes in the instruments and organ used to handle cases, the 1960s
saw a shift in principles as well. Although members still voiced strong
support for the principle of nonintervention, they also began to
condemn dictatorships. At the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in
1959 addressing tensions in the Caribbean, the United States had
argued strongly against any kind of intervention, fearing that it would
cause further instability in the region. The United States notably shifted
its position on this issue at the Sixth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in
1960 when it put forth a proposal for the OAS to monitor elections in
the Dominican Republic. Although most Latin American members did
not embrace this switch to intervention in order to promote democracy,
they were willing to condemn dictatorships and even to sanction them
for violations of the principle of nonintervention. For example, the
Dominican Republic faced sanctions for over a year for intervening in
the domestic affairs of Venezuela (1960). Cuba lost its right to partici-
pate in the OAS because members determined that Marxist–Leninist
ideology of the Soviet type was not compatible with the principles of
the Inter-American System. One other change during this decade was
that consensus was not as strong as it had been during the first decade,
facing considerable strain from the increasing number of cases dealing
with communist intervention in the hemisphere.
The 11 cases handled in the 1960s were the Caribbean (1959)—
consideration of the general tensions in the region; Dominican
Republic–Venezuela (1960)—response to attacks by the Dominican
Republic on Venezuelan sovereignty; Cuba (1960)—consideration of
the international communist threat to the hemisphere; Cuba (1962)—
exclusion of Cuba from OAS participation; Cuba (1962)—cooperation
with United States on the missile crisis; Dominican Republic–Haiti
(1963)—response to tensions between the two states; Panama–United
 conflict resolution / 81

States (1964)—response to the “Flag Riots” in Panama in which U.S.

high school students refused to fly the Panamanian flag in the Canal
Zone; Cuba (1964)—extension of sanctions imposed in 1962 due to
intervention in Venezuela; Dominican Republic (1965)—response to
civil war; Cuba–Venezuela (1967)—further extension of sanctions on
Cuba for intervention; and El Salvador–Honduras (1969)—response to
border dispute (see table 4.1).

Characteristics of Conflict Resolution from 1959 to 1969

The Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers (1959) is illustrative of some of
the changes in both the conflict environment and the way the OAS
handled conflicts in the region throughout the 1960s. In August 1959,
the Fifth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was held in Santiago,
Chile. It was convened to consider the “situation in the Caribbean,”
which included charges by the Dominican Republic that invasion forces
had originated in Venezuela and Cuba, as well as other member
concerns about extensive revolutionary activity in the region. Haiti and
Ecuador had originally proposed a meeting to consider specific charges
by the Dominican Republic against Venezuela and Cuba, but this
request was withdrawn in favor of a broader agenda covering the
Caribbean region as a whole. The Council called for a Meeting of
Foreign Ministers, invoking Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter, which
justified the meeting based on the urgent nature and common interest
in the problems of the Caribbean. U.S. Secretary of State Christian
Herter accurately stated that the central issue of the meeting was to
reconcile the growing demand for democratic progress and social change
in Latin America with the inter-American principles of peaceful rela-
tions and nonintervention in the internal affairs of others (Atkins 1997,
329). This agenda led to extensive debates in the plenary sessions of the
meeting, which lasted six days.
After the debates ended, the meeting concluded with the Declaration
of Santiago, which upheld the fundamental importance of free elections,
freedom of the press, respect for human rights, and effective judicial
procedures. The meeting also established the Inter American
Commission for Human Rights. Despite these strides toward support-
ing democratic governance, however, most Latin American members
were still reluctant to compromise on the principle of nonintervention.
The United States also opposed intervention to overthrow oppressive
regimes, fearing it would produce disorder and tension, and provide
opportunities to communists.
Organs and instruments that had not been used during the first
decade of conflict resolution were used for the first time in the
 82 / organization of american states

Caribbean case (1959). Although the Foreign Ministers had met in

1951 to address U.S. concerns during the Korean War, the Fifth
Meeting was the first time the Foreign Ministers met in consultation to
consider inter-American tensions since the founding of the OAS.34 The
Foreign Ministers handled eight of the 11 cases of conflict resolution
during this period, leaving the Council to serve as the provisional organ
of consultation in three cases (see table 4.1).
The invocation of the OAS Charter in the Caribbean case (1959),
instead of the Rio Treaty, was also a first for resolving regional
tensions.35 The invocation of Article 39 of the Charter affected the tone
of the meeting to be held, since the article states that a Meeting of
Consultation may be held in order to consider problems of an urgent
nature and of common interest to the American States. This provision
contrasts to Article 6 of the Rio Treaty, which allows members to call for
a Meeting of Consultation in cases of an armed attack or other threats
to regional peace and security. The respective provisions in each docu-
ment set a different tone for the subsequent proceedings. If the Charter
is invoked, there is an apparent attitude among members that the
stricter sanctions specified in the Rio Treaty will not be proposed at the
meeting, although members are not technically restricted from calling
for such sanctions under the Charter. An invocation of the Rio Treaty
generally signals that the members are prepared to “get tough” on
disputants by imposing various sanctions, possibly even militarized
action. Furthermore, the overlapping, but different, membership of the
OAS and Rio Treaty regime also means participants will differ based on
which instrument is invoked. After many Caribbean states joined the
OAS in the 1960s and 1970s, the voting membership was much broader
on Charter issues than when the Rio Treaty was invoked since few of
these new members signed the Rio Treaty. (By 2003, 23 of the 35
member states had ratified the Rio Treaty.) After the Cuban Revolution
in 1959, the United States tended to argue for the application of the Rio
Treaty, whereas most of the Latin American states preferred application
of the “milder” Charter (Atkins 1997, 322).
The Charter was also invoked in the Cuban case (1960), the
Dominican case (1965), and the Cuban–Venezuelan case (1967). In
1960, since Cuba was not directly involved in any military attacks on
other members, there was no reason to invoke the Rio Treaty. The
Foreign Ministers met under the Charter to consider the “strengthening
of continental solidarity and the Inter-American System especially in
face of threats of extracontinental intervention that might affect them”
and to promote “inter-American cooperation . . . for the defense of
 conflict resolution / 83

democratic institutions against the subversive activities of any organization,

government, or its agents” (Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Final
Act, 2–3). There was no armed attack in the Cuban–Venezuelan case
(1967) either. Venezuela accused Cuba of intervention by fostering
subversion and terrorist activities with the deliberate aim of destroying
the principles of the Inter-American System (Council of the Organization
of American States, Actas, June 5, 1967). Thus, the Foreign Ministers
met to consider a “problem of urgent nature and common interest to
the American states” (OAS Charter, Article 39). The civil war in the
Dominican Republic also resulted in action being taken under the
Charter rather than the Rio Treaty.
The use of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers and the OAS Charter to
resolve conflict were not the only changes seen during this era. During
the turbulent 1960s, consensus among OAS members was not as high as
it had been previously. Three cases had a low level of consensus between
the United States and Latin American states, five were mid- level, and
three were high based on the level of agreement on the actions to be
taken by the OAS. When members faced a considerable threat to the
hemisphere, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), consensus was
high, supporting U.S. demands to have the missiles removed. Members
could not appear to be divided on the issue of removal, even if they were
not in agreement over the status of regional relations with Cuba, or else
the Soviet Union might have gained negotiating leverage in its talks with
the United States. Consensus was also high when ideology did not play
a prominent role, such as in the “Soccer War” between El Salvador and
Honduras in 1969. When violence at a World Cup Soccer tournament
sparked border incidents between the two countries, the Foreign
Ministers (Thirteenth Meeting) unanimously adopted resolutions to
promote settlement of the dispute.36 The dispute over immigration issues
between the two countries did not produce any ideological sympathy
from other member states. Whereas Latin American democracies were
united in the form of the Caribbean Legion during the 1950s to oppose
dictatorships, and anticommunists rallied against Cuban-inspired revolu-
tions in the 1960s, the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras
produced no such common support for either state.
During the 1960s, however, members were most often faced with
challenging decisions concerning international communism and were
divided on the issue of intervention. For example, consensus was low at
the Seventh Foreign Ministers Meeting on Cuba (1960), when members
debated whether to condemn Cuba explicitly for allowing Sino-Soviet
influence in the region, or whether to condemn such intervention
 84 / organization of american states

without naming names. The United States was at one extreme, wanting
to identify Fidel Castro as a guilty party. Mexico chose to take the oppo-
site position, stating its strong support for Cuba and refusing to
condemn it. In the end, the Foreign Ministers did not name Cuba
specifically in their condemnation of international communism.
Consensus was also low in 1962 when the debate turned to whether
Cuba could be excluded from participation in the OAS. There was sharp
debate among all the members, again with Mexico being the strongest
dissenter against Cuba’s ouster. In the end, the Foreign Ministers deter-
mined that due to the nature of its current government, Cuba would not
be allowed to participate in the OAS, although it would officially remain
a member of the organization. The third case in which there was a low
level of consensus concerned the Dominican Republic in 1965. This case
raised some of the issues debated in the 1950s, since members were
concerned about the overthrow of the democratically elected Dominican
government. The intervention that occurred, however, with U.S. marines
entering the Dominican Republic, reached a whole new level and
sparked heated debates about the role of the OAS in restoring democracy.
(The cases of Cuba [1960] and the Dominican Republic [1965] are
discussed in greater detail in chapters 5 and 6). It is worth noting that
consensus among members on the issue of Cuba during this era went
from low (1960 when the Foreign Ministers condemned international
communist intervention), to moderate (1964 when sanctions were
increased), to high (1967 when Cuba meddled in Venezuelan affairs),
then went to low again in the next era (1974 when members discussed
ending sanctions).
Just as the level of consensus within the organization varied consid-
erably during this time, so too did the perceived level of threat to the
region. Two cases were considered to be a high level of threat, six were
mid-level threats, and three posed only a low level of threat to the
region. Some of the least-threatening situations included the “Flag
Riots” in Panama (1964), a dispute between the Dominican Republic
and Haiti (1963), and the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic
(1965). In the Panamanian case, U.S. students in the zone refused to fly
the Panamanian flag, provoking violence from Panamanians. The
incident was isolated and posed no threat to other Latin American
states. Similarly, the dispute between the Dominican Republic and Haiti
over asylum issues did not threaten other member states. It is ironic that
the incident that provoked the most militarized response from the OAS,
in the Dominican Republic (1965), was not a great threat to the region.
The conflict did not threaten other states, nor risk increasing regional
 conflict resolution / 85

instability. When the allegedly communist “Constitutionalists” tried to

oust the military government, the United States quickly intervened
unilaterally to prevent “another Cuba.” The Constitutionalists, however,
did not have a revolutionary agenda in mind that would have threatened
regional stability. They wanted to restore democratically elected
President Juan Bosch to power. Bosch had been ousted by a military
coup in 1963. Consequently, most Latin American states did not find
the justification by the United States of its action based on the presence
of a communist threat convincing.
The majority of the cases posing high- or mid-level threats involved
the Cuban government. Cuba’s relations with the Soviet Union seriously
threatened the peace and security of the region, with the Cuban Missile
Crisis (1962) being the greatest threat during this time. Cuba’s involve-
ment in the domestic affairs of other Latin American states also threat-
ened continental unity and placed democratic institutions in danger.
Cuba was behind an assassination attempt on President Rómulo
Betancourt of Venezuela in 1964. Bolivia and Uruguay repeatedly
charged Cuba with intervention into the 1970s.
As is evident from the discussion mentioned earlier, the types of
conflicts handled by the organization in the 1960s changed from
tensions between democracies and dictatorships to issues of interna-
tional communist intervention. At the center of over half the disputes
was the Cuban government. Fidel Castro’s efforts to export Cuba’s revo-
lution, along with U.S. fears of Soviet influence in the hemisphere, led
to numerous clashes to be resolved by the OAS.37

The OAS in Decline: Conflict Resolution

from 1970 to 1989
The next two decades (1970–89) saw the OAS become less active in the
region on security issues. Several conflicts in the region could have been
addressed by the OAS, particularly those in Central America through-
out the 1980s, but these states preferred the Contadora and Esquipulas
forums to the direct use of the OAS. The OAS had been unable to
secure cooperation from the United States on the Falklands/Malvinas
case in 1982, so Central American states believed that in 1983
Contadora was a more viable option for gaining cooperation from all
actors involved in the conflicts, including the United States. The
Contadora Group was organized by the presidents of Colombia,
Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela in January 1983 to serve as mediator to
the Central American conflicts. It was designed to facilitate discussions
 86 / organization of american states

between the United States and Nicaragua, and in El Salvador between

the government and insurgents (Atkins 1997, 59). Some states believed
that the OAS was more likely to be influenced by the United States through
its direct pressures and lobbying of other members to act on its pro-
posals. In addition, the availability of other multilateral forums outside
the OAS meant negotiations could occur without the formal binding of
any legal protocols (such as the Rio Treaty or OAS Charter).38 The lack
of formal protocol would allow more flexibility in negotiations. The
United States was also reluctant to use the OAS as a forum for negotia-
tions because, ironically, it feared an anti-American response from other
members, and the inability to gain support for its preferred policies in
the region. Discussions proceeded through the Contadora Group until
the parties reached an impasse in February 1987. A new formula was
put forward by Oscar Arias Sanchez, president of Costa Rica, which
became known as the Esquipulas II Accords. This formula was based on
the concept of symmetry, simultaneity, and chronology and was regarded
as innovative in the region. It provided for Central Americans to take the
lead in bringing peace to their own region. Although the OAS as an
institution was not actively involved in negotiating a settlement, its
functionaries, including the Secretary General Joao Baeña Soares, were
engaged in the peace process. In part due to the work and reputation of
Soares, the OAS took a more active role in the implementation of the
accords through the management of observation and verification
forces.39 Thus, the settlement of the largest conflicts in the region during
this period were handled outside the OAS.
Because the Central American conflicts were handled by the
Contadora Group and more multilateral forums were emerging in the
region, only eight cases were raised in Meetings of Consultation from
1970 to 1989. During this time, several of the trends of the 1960s
continued, while some of them shifted again to resemble the character-
istics of cases handled during the first decade of conflict resolution by
the OAS. Consensus, which had declined in the 1960s, continued its
downward trend, reaching a low point during this period. Just as the
Meeting of Foreign Ministers increasingly handled cases in the 1960s,
all the meetings of the Organ of Consultation from 1970 to 1989 were
Foreign Minister meetings. The level of threat posed by the cases from
1970 to 1989 was lower, just as it had been in the 1950s. Finally, the
types of conflicts handled during this period were so diverse that they do
not fall into any simple categorization and thus do not collectively
resemble the cases of the 1950s or 1960s. The cases include such
conflicts as a dispute between the United States and Ecuador (1971)
 conflict resolution / 87

over territorial fishing rights, an armed conflict between Argentina and

the United Kingdom over the Falkland/Malvinas islands (1982), and a
unilateral U.S. intervention in Panama to capture President (and drug
lord) Manuel Noriega (1989). Because no single case can serve as an
example of the way that the OAS handled conflict resolution during this
time, the characteristics of the period are described later by referring to
various representative cases rather than one specific case.
Like most of the cases handled in previous decades, none of the cases
during this period presented a high-level threat to the region. The only
mid-level threat was the Nicaraguan Revolution (1978) in which many
Central American states were actively involved. The other seven disputes
covered a wide range of issues, but posed only a low-level threat to the
region as a whole. Although the dispute between Argentina and the
United Kingdom involved military action (Argentina lost one of its
naval vessels), the dispute was territorial and limited geographically.
Likewise, the U.S. military action against Manuel Noriega (1989) was
a strategic action that did not directly threaten other member states.
The other disputes were clearly no threat to other member states. For
example, the dispute over fishing rights between Ecuador and the
United States did not threaten the peace and security of the region. In
fact, the case was brought before the Fourteenth Meeting of Foreign
Ministers under Article 19 of the OAS Charter that prohibits the use
of coercion in relations between member states, rather than under the
Rio Treaty.
Another indicator that the disputes during this period were not
major threats to the peace and security of the hemisphere is that the
Charter was invoked as often as the Rio Treaty. Articles 59 and 60
(revised, formerly Articles 39 and 40) are invoked to call a meeting to
consider a matter that is urgent and of common interest to the American
States. Article 6 (Rio), however, is only invoked when a matter of aggres-
sion is involved that threatens the sovereignty, territory, or independence
of another member. Thus, the Rio Treaty is invoked when a more threat-
ening attack is imminent or has been launched. To put the use of the
Charter into context, the Charter was invoked in four of eight cases
from 1970 to 1989, but in only four of 11 cases during the 1960s.
This relatively frequent use of the Charter during this period also
suggests that Latin American members exerted greater influence in the
organization because in most cases Latin American states preferred to
invoke the Charter instead of the Rio Treaty. As noted earlier, this
preference is due to the “milder” nature of the Charter. The Rio Treaty
is applied to more threatening situations when stricter sanctions or
 88 / organization of american states

multilateral intervention is necessary. The lack of invocation of the

Charter in the 1950s suggests that Latin American states did not have as
much influence during this time. Cases were handled under the Rio
Treaty even when threats were perceived as low level. In addition, two of
the Rio cases handled during the 1970s (Cuba, 1974; Cuba, 1975) were
actually held to reconsider (and possibly reverse) actions originally taken
under Article 6. The passage of the Freedom of Action Resolution
(1975) at the Sixteenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers suggested that a
two-third majority of members no longer considered Cuba to be a threat
to the region. The resolution allowed member states to determine indi-
vidually whether they would continue to uphold the sanctions imposed
against Cuba in 1964 and 1967 for its interference in the internal affairs
of member states. Thus, the 1970s and 1980s had lower-level threats to
the region compared to the previous period.
All the cases from 1970 to 1989 were handled by a Meeting of
Foreign Ministers rather than the Permanent Council. The Council
acted briefly as the provisional Organ of Consultation in 1982 with the
Falklands/Malvinas crisis, but quickly convoked the Twentieth Meeting
of Foreign Ministers to follow up on its initial efforts. This shift in the
organ responsible for handling conflict resolution is indicative of larger
institutional changes in the OAS, with the Permanent Council facing
new responsibilities. After the revisions to the OAS Charter in 1967, the
Permanent Council began serving as the preparatory committee for the
new General Assembly. The Permanent Council prepared draft agendas
and resolutions for meetings of the General Assembly. Although the
Permanent Council inherited all the previous functions of the Council
to serve as provisional organ of consultation, it is likely that its new
responsibilities led to regular reliance on the Meeting of Foreign
Ministers to serve as the Organ of Consultation (Ball 1969, 211). In
addition, as the different organs of the OAS expanded in the 1980s, the
Permanent Council’s oversight of these organs took a considerable
amount of time and expertise.
Just as the 1960s saw a decline in consensus among members on
OAS reactions to regional conflicts, the 1970s and 1980s were also an
era of disagreement. The only case that saw a high level of consensus
among members concerned a flare-up in the long-term border dispute
between Ecuador and Peru (1981). The Nineteenth Meeting of Foreign
Ministers readily agreed to turn the matter over to the Guarantor States
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, United States) that had been arbitrating the
dispute for several decades and to ask the parties to refrain from further
violence. Other cases such as the war between Argentina and the United
 conflict resolution / 89

Kingdom over the Falkland/Malvinas islands (1982), and the Nicaraguan

Revolution (1978), saw the members strongly divided, with the United
States taking a position at odds with that of most Latin American states.
Consensus was also affected by the fact that there were two cases deal-
ing with the Castro regime during this period that provoked consider-
able debate within the organization, just as Cuban issues had during the
1960s. The two meetings addressing Cuba (1974 and 1975) indicated
that Latin American views were changing on the issue of sanctions while
U.S. views remained unaltered. The United States resisted relaxing the
isolationist sanctions against Cuba. Eventually, however, when faced
with a clear two-thirds majority, the United States voted to release OAS
members from their obligation to enforce sanctions against Cuba
(1975). The United States was also party to two disputes (Ecuador–United
States, 1971; Panama–United States, 1989) which, by definition, weak-
ened consensus within the organization. As noted earlier, in terms of
consensus between Latin American states and the United States, a dispute
between the United States and any other member that comes before the
organization will result in a low level of overall consensus.
In sum, the OAS played a less active role in conflict resolution from
1970 to 1989. This was a period of decline when compared with the
1960s. Some of the characteristics observed in the 1960s continued
during this period, including the predominant handling of cases by the
Foreign Ministers and the decline in consensus within the organization.
The level of threats to the region was lower, more closely resembling the
cases of the 1950s. The variety of cases handled during this period did
not resemble either of the previous eras.

Application of Hypotheses
The exploration of the historical cases of peaceful settlement efforts in
Latin America provides the necessary background knowledge to explore
in more detail the impact of a variety of institutional factors on power
relations within the OAS. The previous sections have looked at trends
over time and at individual cases. A look at the cases as a whole will now
be used to test the hypotheses derived in chapter 2. Chapters 5 and 6
apply these hypotheses in a detailed analysis of eight case studies that
illustrate the decisionmaking processes and member dynamics within
the OAS.
Organizational sociology provides three different approaches for
explaining organizational activities and outcomes (see chapter 2).
Adaptation of these approaches along with a constructivist approach
 90 / organization of american states

provide a theoretical framework to explain the behavior of the OAS (see

table 2.1). This framework includes the structural perspective, which
examines the resources necessary to carry out the resolutions of the orga-
nization; the normative perspective, which explores the impact of
regional principles; the internal relational perspective, which focuses on
the degree of consensus among members; and the environmental
perspective, which considers the type of conflict and the perceived threat
to regional stability.
Not all these variables are significant in every case. By applying each
of them, it is possible to determine which ones offer the best explana-
tion for the apparent autonomy of the OAS from U.S. pressure in some
cases. Some of the variables are most influential when paired with
others, but do not have enough independent impact to result in organi-
zational autonomy.
The first hypothesis is based on a structural factor, organizational
resources. I hypothesize that the more resources that are needed to
support the Meeting of Consultation and carry out the resolutions of
the Organ of Consultation, the more influence the United States has on
those resolutions. There are five cases where a high level of resources
have been used to carry out the resolutions of the Organ of
Consultation. These cases are Costa Rica–Nicaragua (1955), Panama
(1959), Cuba (1962 missile crisis), Dominican Republic (1965), and El
Salvador–Honduras (1969). In each of these cases military equipment
was needed. The Dominican case was by far the most militarized, with
several thousand U.S. marines participating in a multilateral peacekeep-
ing force. The missile crisis also involved significant U.S. naval power in
the blockade of Cuba. In both these cases the United States wielded a
considerable amount of influence within the OAS even when it was
facing Latin American opposition in the Dominican case. Half of the
cases handled by the OAS, however, used only a low level of resources.
The United States did not dominate the organization in any of these
cases where a low level of resources was used. This is not to say that the
United States did not gain support for its preferred policies; in many
cases the United States and Latin American members were in agreement
on the actions to be taken. There is support for the hypothesis on
resources.
On the issue of consensus, I hypothesize that the greater the disagree-
ment among Latin American members, the greater influence the United
States has. In the 18 cases where there is mid- or low-level of consensus
in the organization overall, I have examined the degree of unity among
Latin American members only. In eight of the cases Latin American
 conflict resolution / 91

members were in disagreement with each other (in the other ten cases, the
Latin American members were unified in their opposition to the U.S.
policy position). In all except one of the cases when Latin Americans were
divided in their preferences, the actions taken by the OAS were those
preferred by the United States. In other words, when there was not a
common Latin American policy preference, the policy preferences of the
United States were adopted by the organization. Two examples are the
cases of Cuba: 1962 when it was excluded from participation in the OAS,
and 1964 when sanctions were tightened against it. In both cases there
were Latin American members who were opposed to the U.S. proposals
(particularly Mexico, Chile, and Bolivia), but the U.S. proposals were the
ones that passed by a two-thirds majority. In the cases where the Latin
American majority was united against the United States (Cuba, 1960;
Nicaragua, 1978; Argentina–United Kingdom, 1982; and Panama–United
States, 1989), the U.S. proposal was either rejected or revised to be accept-
able to the Latin American members. When Latin Americans are unified,
the United States wields less influence within the organization. Thus, the
hypothesis is supported on the factor of consensus.
When considering the impact of regional principles, I hypothesize
that any proposal or unilateral action by the United States (or other
member state) that does not clearly uphold the principles of the organi-
zation will have less support than a proposal that is based on principled
action, and will face strong opposition in the Council/Meeting of
Foreign Ministers. Evaluation of this hypothesis is difficult at a macro-
level. In every case different principles were raised and different justifi-
cations made for action. As noted in chapter 3, some of the principles
of the Inter-American System can be contradictory. When one member
advocates intervention based on the principle of supporting representa-
tive democracy or human rights, it must also address the violation of the
principles of nonintervention and state sovereignty. A detailed evalua-
tion of the hypothesis on regional principles is made in each of the case
studies in chapters 5 and 6. The evaluation helps to trace the impact of
regional principles on OAS action, as well as how priorities have shifted
within the OAS membership over the years, with support for democracy
and human rights gradually starting to outweigh nonintervention.
Finally, considering the factor of regional instability, I hypothesize
that the greater the threat to regional stability, the greater influence the
United States has within the OAS. Since this is a challenging factor to
measure and almost half of the cases fall into the middle range on the
perceived level of threat, conclusions are difficult to draw. There are,
however, some trends and specific cases that support the hypothesis.
 92 / organization of american states

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the level of U.S. influence was declin-
ing in the OAS. Several resolutions passed during this time by Meetings
of Foreign Ministers were contrary to U.S. policy preferences. In 1975,
the Foreign Ministers voted to give members the freedom to determine
individually whether sanctions would continue to be imposed against
Cuba. In 1978, the Foreign Ministers rejected a U.S. proposal for a multi-
lateral peace force to restore order in Nicaragua. The Foreign Ministers
even went so far as to condemn U.S. actions in Panama in 1989 when
U.S. military forces arrested President Manuel Noriega. Throughout
these two decades, the perceived level of threat to the region posed by the
cases brought to the OAS was also lower than at any other time. Such a
low level of risk to regional stability gave Latin American members more
leeway in accepting or rejecting U.S. proposals during this time since
they were not dependent on the United States to protect the region in these
cases. Looking at the two cases in which there was a high level of threat
to the region also supports the hypothesis (Cuba, 1962; Cuba, 1962
missile crisis). In both cases the United States had considerable influence
within the organization as it sought to defend the hemisphere from exter-
nal threats (international communist subversion and nuclear missiles).

Summary
This chapter has traced the conflict resolution activities of the OAS over
four decades in an effort to illustrate the changing nature of organiza-
tional relations and responses to handling regional disputes. The inter-
national environment, organizational environment, and member
preferences have shifted over time, as reflected in the level of threat
perceived, the organ and instrument invoked, and the level of consensus
attained. In the first decade, threats were mid- to low-level stemming
from struggles between democrats and dictators. The Council handled
every case under the Rio Treaty achieving a high- to mid-level of consen-
sus. This was a period in which Latin American states and the United
States were largely in agreement with each other in terms of resolving
regional conflicts. Members struggled with the contradiction between
supporting the principle of democracy while upholding the principle of
nonintervention. The United States sided with Latin American members
in support of nonintervention until the Cuban Revolution in 1959 when
it reversed its policy at the Sixth Meeting of Foreign Ministers.
Throughout the 1960s, the level of threats varied considerably, but
were mostly linked to communist threats to the region. The Foreign
Ministers took on the responsibility of handling more cases and the
 conflict resolution / 93

OAS Charter was invoked for the first time. There was a lower level of
consensus during this period, reflecting disagreements between Latin
American members as well as with the United States over responses to
regional disputes. In most cases the United States achieved its desired
policy preferences, but not without protests from some Latin American
states (Mexico in particular). This period marked an era of increased
tensions, but few open challenges to the United States.
From 1969 to 1989 the region faced mainly low-level threats of a
varied nature. The Foreign Ministers handled all the cases, which
included a relatively large percentage of Charter invocations, suggesting
a weaker U.S. influence within the organization. Consensus reached an
historic low during this period. Latin American members challenged
U.S. proposals on numerous occasions, reversing the embargo on Cuba
(1975), refusing to get actively involved in Nicaragua (1978), denounc-
ing the actions of the United Kingdom in the Falklands Malvinas
(1982), and condemning U.S. intervention in Panama (1989).
A testing of the hypotheses over all 26 cases indicates that some are
more strongly supported that others. There is limited support for the
hypothesis on the perceived level of threat to the region. When the
threat level was high, Latin American members tended to support U.S.
leadership on the issue, as in the Cuban missile crisis. The characteriza-
tion of many disputes as mid-level threats to the region, however, makes
it difficult to draw strong conclusions. The variable of regional threat is
traced in detail in the case studies in chapters 5 and 6. Support is
strongest for the hypotheses on consensus among Latin American
members and on organizational resources. In cases where Latin
American members were unified in opposition to the United States, the
United States was unable to exert much influence within the OAS.
When the organization required extensive resources (i.e., military
resources) to carry out its resolutions, the United States had more influ-
ence within the organization.
Now that these factors have been examined broadly for all the cases,
a more detailed analysis of how these factors specifically affect U.S.
influence and how they interact is needed. This is taken up in the case
studies in the next two chapters that examine the decisionmaking
process and member dynamics within the organization.
 C h ap t e r 5
Conflict: The Ebb and Flow of
U.S. Dominance

Introduction
Chapter 4 provided an overview of the 26 cases of conflict resolution
handled by the OAS from 1948 to 1989, and emphasized the changes
over time in the types of cases that were addressed and the mechanisms
used to resolve them. It is evident from the examination of the resources
needed, the perceived level of threat, and the level of consensus that a
number of factors potentially affect the level of influence the United
States is able to exert within the OAS. An examination of all these cases
reveals some interesting patterns of decisionmaking in the organization.
By focusing on the degree of consensus among member states and the
actions taken by the organization, four different decisionmaking
outcomes can be identified. First, there were ten cases where all member
states were in agreement concerning the means to address the conflict
and acted in a united fashion.40 Second, there were five cases in which
compromises were reached despite disagreements between the United
States and Latin American members over what actions should be taken
by the organization. Third, there were five cases in which the United
States played a dominant role and strongly influenced the decisions that
were made, despite opposition by some Latin American states. Finally,
and perhaps most unexpectedly, in five cases, Latin American members
successfully rejected controversial U.S. proposals or ignored U.S. policy
preferences (see table 5.1).41 Two of these outcomes are particularly
interesting in terms of membership dynamics because the most power-
ful member state was forced to compromise or see its proposal rejected
by the Latin American members. Classifying outcomes by U.S. domi-
nance, Latin American unity, consensus, or compromise is useful for
comparing the 26 cases and for further testing the four hypotheses to see
which ones best explain these varying outcomes.
Table 5.1 Cases invoking the OAS Charter, Rio Treaty, or Resolution 1080 (1948–2002) by outcome

Case Date Council or Resources Threat Consensus Consensus Outcome Brief

FM level U.S.-LA LA-LA description

Costa Rica– 1948 C Mid Mid High High Consensus Costa Rica alleges
Nicaragua invasion by Nicaragua;
Pact of Amity signed;
troops withdrawn

Costa Rica– 1955 C High Mid High High Consensus Each country accuses
Nicaragua the other of
intervention; exile
activity; governments
sign conciliation
agreement

Honduras– 1957 C Low Low High High Consensus Territorial dispute; cease-
Nicaragua fire signed; case to Int’l
Court of Justice

Panama 1959 C High Low High High Consensus Small invasion force,
mostly Cuban;
persuaded to surrender
by OAS intermediaries

Cuba 1962 C High High High High Consensus Soviet intervention;

missile crisis

Dominican 1963 C Low Low Mid High Consensus Each country accuses
Republic– achieved the other of illegal exile
Haiti activities; governments
agree to negotiations
Cuba– 1967 FM 12 Low Mid High High Consensus Cuban intervention in
Venezuela Venezuela; sanctions
expanded

El Salvador– 1969 FM 13 High Mid High High Consensus “Soccer War”;

Honduras immigration disputes;
cease-fire, withdrawal,
dispute settlement
procedures

Costa Rica– 1978 FM 18 Low Low Mid High Consensus Nicaragua invasion of
Nicaragua CR territory; observers
placed on border

Ecuador– 1981 FM 19 Low Low High High Consensus Territorial dispute

Peru

Haiti 1991 FM High Low High High Consensus Coup overthrows

President Aristide;
returned to power in
1994

Peru 1992 FM Low Low High High Consensus “Self-coup” by

President Fujimori

Guatemala 1993 FM Low Low High High Consensus “Self-coup” by

President Serrano

Paraguay 1996 FM Low Low High High Consensus President Wasmosy

challenged by
General Oviedo
Table 5.1 Continued

Case Date Council or Resources Threat Consensus Consensus Outcome Brief

FM level U.S.-LA LA-LA description

Venezuela 2002 C Mid Low Mid Mid Consensus Brief removal of

President Chavez
from power

Caribbean 1949 C Low Mid Mid Mid Compromise General instability in

the region; active rebel
forces

Nicaragua 1959 C Low Mid Mid Mid Compromise Anti-Somoza rebels

from Costa
Rica/Honduras;
CR/Hon pledge to
restrain exiles

Caribbean 1959 FM 5 Low Mid Mid High Compromise DR charges Cuba and
Venezuela with plotting
invasion; general
regional instability

Cuba 1960 FM 7 Low Mid Low High Compromise Cuban intervention;

Soviet/Chinese
condemnation

Argentina– 1982 C ⬎ FM 20 Mid Low Low High Compromise Falklands/

U.K. Malvinas conflict;
Council supports Arg
and calls for a cease-fire
Guatemala 1954 C NA Mid Mid Mid U.S. Coup removes Guat
dominance President Arbenz
before Council can act

Cuba 1962 FM 8 Low High Low Low U.S. Cuban activities viewed
dominance as threat to the peace;
Cuba effectively
ousted from OAS

Cuba 1964 FM 9 Low Mid Mid Low U.S. Sanctions expanded

dominance against Cuba for
continued intervention
activities

Dominican 1965 FM 10 High Low Low Low U.S. Coup; countercoup;

Republic dominance multilateral
peacekeeping; elections

Cuba 1974 FM 15 Low Low Low Low U.S. Proposal to lift

dominance sanctions does not
receive two third vote

Dominican 1960 FM 6 Mid Mid Mid High Latin DR attempt to

Republic– American assassinate Ven
Venezuela Unity President Betancourt;
DR condemned,
sanctions imposed

Panama–U.S. 1964 C Low Low Mid High Latin “Flag Riots” over refusal
American to fly Panamanian flag
Unity in the Canal Zone
Table 5.1 Continued

Case Date Council or Resources Threat Consensus Consensus Outcome Brief

FM level U.S.-LA LA-LA description

Cuba 1975 FM 16 Low Low Mid Mid Latin Economic sanctions

American no longer enforced
Unity

Nicaragua 1978 FM 17 Mid Mid Low High Latin Sandinista revolution;

American Unity proposed peacekeeping
force rejected

Panama–U.S. 1989 FM 21 Low Low Low High Latin American U.S. removal of
Unity/ President
Unilateral U.S. Manuel Noriega
action

Ecuador–U.S. 1971 FM 14 Low Low Mid High No win; Fishing rights dispute;
unresolved territorial waters;
negotiations
recommended
 the ebb and flow of u.s. dominance / 101

The cases when the OAS Charter or Rio Treaty have been invoked
are categorized in this chapter and chapter 6 based on OAS policy
outcomes. In addition, these two chapters focus particularly on the level
of consensus within the organization. Because one of the primary
purposes of the research is to determine under what conditions the OAS
is able to exhibit some degree of autonomy from U.S. influence, it is
important to contrast those cases in which the United States was not in
agreement with Latin American members with those where they were in
agreement on policy options. This chapter explores two cases in which
the United States dominated the organization, and two cases where
Latin American unity led to the rejection of U.S. policy preferences.
Chapter 6 examines cases of consensus and compromise among
members that provide additional insights into the member dynamics
within the organization.
Examination of cases where there is disagreement among member
states is crucial because assessing U.S. influence within the OAS when
there is general agreement on policies is almost impossible. There are no
indications of the United States using pressure to gain passage of the
proposals that the United States favors when others support similar poli-
cies. Evidence of U.S. preferences can also be more difficult when the
United States has another member make proposals for it so that the
United States does not appear to be dominating the policymaking arena.
Thus, only when the United States must present a proposal on its own
in contrast to those presented by other members is there evidence of
U.S. exertion of influence to gain its passage. In chapter 4, the exami-
nation of the level of consensus indicated that although members are
not often in full agreement, neither are they frequently in strong
disagreement.42 Only seven of the 26 cases under examination have a
low level of overall consensus (see table 5.1). By examining the cases in
which U.S. and Latin American preferences diverge, the conditions
under which the United States does—or does not—get its way can be
identified. Only in the cases where the United States faces opposition
from other members is there evidence of U.S. efforts to influence the
organization.
In five cases, the United States has successfully dominated the orga-
nization despite opposition, resulting in actions based on its own policy
preferences. These cases are: Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1962), Cuba
(1964), Dominican Republic (1965), and Cuba (1974). These cases
most closely resemble the stereotypes of the United States using the
OAS to pursue its own policies (as realism would predict). In the
Guatemalan case (1954), the United States successfully delayed OAS
 102 / organization of american states

action in response to a coup against the leftist President Jacobo Arbenz

Guzmán. The United States won support for the effective ouster of
Cuba from the OAS in 1962.43 Two years later (Cuba, 1964), the
United States pressured Latin American members to increase the sanc-
tions that had previously been imposed on Cuba at the Eighth Meeting
of Consultation held in 1962. In the Dominican Republic, the United
States actively intervened without permission from the OAS, then
proceeded to gain OAS approval post hoc for an Inter-American
Peacekeeping Force despite considerable protest from some members.
When a proposal came before the Foreign Ministers in 1974 to lift the
sanctions against Cuba, the United States achieved the rejection of the
proposal (only to face its passage when raised again in 1975). This chap-
ter examines the cases of Cuba (1964) and the Dominican Republic
(1965) in detail.
The case of the Dominican Republic (1965) is a “most likely” case in
which the factors that give the United States influence within the orga-
nization are most evident (Eckstein 1992). It provides a model case for
the way the United States occasionally dominated the organization to
achieve its goals. The cases of Latin American resistance (discussed in a
later section) are anomalies and are selected based on the “most differ-
ent” system design that promotes a comparison between dissimilar cases
to find commonalities (Przeworski and Teune 1970, 34). The cases of
Latin American unity do not follow the pattern of behavior predicted by
realism where the most powerful state dominates the organization.
These cases differ in terms of outcome from the Dominican and Cuban
cases, and have several factors in common with each other that explain
the divergent outcomes and that are illustrated by comparing them to
cases of U.S. dominance. Specifically, this comparison tests whether an
institutional analysis offers a better explanation for why the United
States was unable to dominate the organization than realism does.

Evolving Member Relations

Before examining the cases of U.S. dominance and Latin American
unity, some contextual background of U.S.–Latin American relations
following the creation of the OAS is useful. In the 1950s, there was
considerable consensus among OAS members in dealing with security
concerns in the hemisphere (as discussed in chapter 4). Throughout the
1960s, there was a growing divide between the United States and Latin
American states over the effect of economic development on regional
security and a traditional political security focus. In the early 1960s the
 the ebb and flow of u.s. dominance / 103

efforts to reform the Charter began, culminating with the Protocol of

Buenos Aires in 1967, which made some basic organizational changes to
the OAS. The reforms also included making economic development an
integrated part of the Inter-American System. In 1973, the General
Assembly of the OAS created a special committee to draft amendments
to the Rio Treaty. These amendments were approved in 1975 at a
Conference of Plenipotentiaries, but never received enough ratifications
from member states to come into effect. Nevertheless, the amendments
indicated general Latin American dissent from the anticommunist
alliance. The Latin American perception of U.S. coercion and intransi-
gence over issues relating to Cuba led to most of the amendment
proposals (Atkins 1997, 273). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, there
was a gradual reduction of U.S. influence in the organization that was
especially evident in the Nicaraguan case (1978) (Wilson 1977). There
was a growing power of Latin American consensus. When the United
States faced a majority in opposition to its proposals, it would
often back down to vote with the majority. For example, in 1975, when
Latin American states wanted to release OAS members from their oblig-
ation to enforce the sanctions against Cuba, the United States chose to
vote in favor of the resolution when it became clear that there was the
necessary two-thirds votes for it to pass.
The cases of the Dominican Republic (1965) and Cuba (1964) are
examples of U.S. dominance prior to its waning influence in the organi-
zation in the 1970s. A detailed examination of these cases reveals that
certain institutional factors proved essential to the United States being
able to dominate the organization and achieve favorable policy outcomes.

United States Dominance

The Dominican Republic (1965)
Summary of Events. The context of the diplomatic crisis in the
Dominican Republic in 1965 dates back to 1961 and the assassination
of President Trujillo. Trujillo was replaced by democratically elected
President Juan Bosch. In 1963, Bosch was overthrown in a military
coup. On April 24, 1965, a pro-Bosch army faction (the “Constitu-
tionalists”) deposed the existing military government. A “Loyalist” anti-
Bosch faction attempted a countercoup, thereby precipitating an armed
conflict. The United States sent in over 500 marines on April 28, osten-
sibly to protect U.S. and foreign nationals. The justification of the
mission, however, rapidly shifted to include establishing a neutral zone,
and then to guarding against communism in the Western hemisphere.
 104 / organization of american states

The United States contended that the Constitutionalists were influenced

by international communist agents and would thus pose a threat to the
region if they gained power in Santo Domingo. On April 29, Chile
requested a Meeting of Foreign Ministers. The Tenth Meeting of Foreign
Ministers was held on May 1 and dispatched a Special Committee to
reestablish peace and normal conditions, to secure a cease-fire, and to
evacuate those wishing to leave (Tenth Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, May 1, 1965, 9). These goals were nominally
accomplished with the signing of the Act of Santo Domingo on May 5.
The United States, however, continued to push for greater OAS involve-
ment and succeeded in creating the IAPF on May 6. The IAPF was to act
under the general supervision of the newly created Ad Hoc committee,
which was established June 2. The OAS secretary general, José Mora,
began negotiating a settlement with the two factions in June. Negotiations
continued through the summer and concluded with the signing of the
Institutional Act and the Act of Dominican Reconciliation. A provisional
government was established in September 1965, headed by Hector
Garcia-Godoy. The IAPF remained in the Dominican Republic to stabi-
lize the provisional government until elections could be held in June
1966, sponsored by the OAS. The IAPF was finally withdrawn when
Joaquin Balaguer, who had defeated Juan Bosch in the election, was
inaugurated in September 1966.

Structural Perspective. In chapter 2, I identified one structural aspect that

provided the United States with the potential to influence the decisions
made by the Organ of Consultation when considering how to handle a
regional conflict: level of resources needed to carry out the resolutions
of the Organ of Consultation. I predict that the more resources that are
needed to carry out the resolutions of the Organ of Consultation, the
more influence the United States has on those resolutions. It is impor-
tant to note that this predicted impact on resolutions includes not only
the initial commitment to engage in pacific settlement procedures, but
also those subsequent resolutions made by the Organ of Consultation
until the dispute is settled. The use of military forces and the duration
of the operation classify the case of the Dominican Republic as one of
only a handful of cases that have used a high level of resources. In the
case of the Dominican Republic, the initial decision to commit
the amount of resources necessary to implement the IAPF was made by
the United States and later approved by the Organ of Consultation.
After the United States committed itself to providing the bulk of the
 the ebb and flow of u.s. dominance / 105

resources for the OAS operation, it still maintained a strong influence

within the organization over decisions on how those resources were used.
When the Organ of Consultation met shortly after U.S. marines
entered the Dominican Republic, the Foreign Ministers struggled to
determine what role the OAS should play in restoring democracy to the
Dominican Republic. Since the United States had acted unilaterally, the
Foreign Ministers were faced with the decision of whether to legitimize
U.S. actions by creating a multilateral force, or to find alternative solu-
tions to the Dominican crisis (and the presence of over 10,000 U.S.
troops). The Foreign Ministers decided to utilize both military and
diplomatic resources in an effort to restore normal conditions in the
country. Once the decision was made to create the IAPF, Latin
American members were requested to contribute troops to the multilat-
eral effort. Since there had been disagreement among members in creat-
ing the IAPF, it was difficult to recruit troops to the force (the
disagreement among member states is discussed in greater detail later).
In the end, Brazilian General Hugo Panasco Alvim was named
commander of the force, with United States General Bruce Palmer Jr.
serving as his second in command. Troops from Brazil, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay participated in the IAPF
(Palmer 1989, chapter 4). Even though the IAPF was a multinational
force with a Brazilian commander, the United States dominated it.
General Palmer writes, “as the international deputy and US commander,
I had sufficient leverage to get IAPF decisions that were compatible with
US desires” (Palmer 1989, 73).
In addition to using many military assets in this operation, the OAS
also used diplomatic channels to promote settlement. It empowered
Secretary General José Mora to act decisively to gain the cooperation of
the factions and restore peace. The use of the secretary general in this
role was unprecedented. It is possible that this power was bestowed in
order to counter the overwhelming presence of the United States mili-
tary forces in the Dominican Republic.
The implication from the hypothesis concerning resources and U.S.
influence is that the OAS will turn to the United States in order to gain
resources for large operations, thereby giving the United States more
influence over the organization. In this case, however, the link between
OAS resolutions and the level of resources necessary to carry them out
is distorted. The commitment of significant resources by the United
States was made before the OAS even considered its options in the case
of the Dominican Republic and what resources might be necessary.
Thus, the United States did not gain additional influence based on OAS
 106 / organization of american states

recognition that a high level of resources would be needed to carry out

a particular resolution. The fact that the United States had already
contributed significant resources, however, gave it de facto influence
over the IAPF throughout its operations even though it was nominally
an OAS force. The Foreign Ministers apparently tried to use a second
resource available to them, the diplomatic services of the secretary
general, to counter the influence of the United States stemming from its
military contributions. Even with his augmented authority, however, the
secretary general did not wield enough influence to counter U.S. domi-
nance of the operation through its military command.

Internal Relational Perspective. The variable considered by this perspec-

tive is the degree of consensus among members within the organization.
I predict that the greater disagreement among Latin American members,
the greater influence the United States has within the organization. It is
evident in this examination of the Dominican case that there was
considerable disagreement among Latin American members concerning
U.S. intervention and subsequent organizational responses. When the
United States acted unilaterally, the Foreign Ministers were faced with
the decision of whether to legitimize U.S. actions by creating a multi-
lateral force, or to find alternative solutions to the Dominican crisis.
Several members were strongly opposed to the presence of U.S. troops
and denounced U.S. actions (Chile, Uruguay, and Mexico). These
members as well as Ecuador and Peru voted against creating the IAPF.
(Chile, Uruguay, and Mexico were also opposed to the creation of the
Ad Hoc Committee whose role it was to provide the IAPF with the
directives necessary to carry out the resolutions of the Organ of
Consultation and to restore normal conditions to the Dominican
Republic.) A number of members simply wanted to resolve the crisis as
quickly as possible and did not criticize U.S. actions. Colombia, Haiti,
and Paraguay were openly supportive of U.S. actions and denounced
international communism. Thus, preferences ranged across the board in
terms of support for the U.S. actions in the Dominican Republic.
Additional tensions among members were evident in the composition of
the IAPF. Argentina did not contribute troops because it refused to have
its troops serve under a Brazilian commander. Since there was no
consensus on any alternative plan of action, the United States was able
to gain the necessary two-thirds majority to pass its proposal to create
the IAPF. Those that disapproved of U.S. intervention, but wanted
action to be taken, supported the proposal. The lack of unity among
 the ebb and flow of u.s. dominance / 107

Latin American members gave the United States greater influence in the
organization.

Normative Perspective. The normative perspective considers the influ-

ence of regional principles on member state relations. From the histori-
cal development of the OAS discussed in chapter 3, it is evident that
regional principles have had a profound effect on states in the Western
hemisphere. I hypothesize that any proposal or unilateral action that
does not clearly uphold the principles of the organization will face
strong opposition in the Organ of Consultation. At first glance, it
appears that the case of the Dominican Republic does not support this
hypothesis since a valued principle of the Inter-American System,
nonintervention, was violated by the United States without repercus-
sions. A closer look, however, reveals that the principles of the Inter-
American System still played a role in the case of the Dominican
Republic, shaping the actions and responses of member states, just not
to a large enough degree to prevent or reverse the U.S. violation of the
principle of nonintervention.
When the United States first intervened in the Dominican Republic,
U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson declared that the U.S. troops were
there to protect foreign nationals. He later stated that the troops were
there to establish a neutral zone in Santo Domingo, acting on a resolu-
tion by the OAS Council. The Council, however, noted that it had not
specifically asked the United States to establish a neutral zone, it had
merely called for one. As Johnson sent in more troops, he again changed
the justification for their presence. U.S. troops were guarding the
Western hemisphere against communist subversion. The United States
contended that the Constitutionalists were influenced by communists
and thus posed a threat to the region if they obtained power in Santo
Domingo. Recognizing that it had clearly violated the principle of
nonintervention, and that its justifications for doing so were weak, the
United States rapidly pushed for the creation of an IAPF. The United
States was thus influenced by the norms of the Inter-American System
to try to legitimize the presence of its troops by the creation of such a
multilateral force for which OAS Charter provisions allow, but not
influenced enough to resist intervention at the outset.
Although the unilateral intervention by the United States blatantly
violated the principle of nonintervention, the process by which the
IAPF was created did adhere to the legal guidelines laid out in the OAS
Charter. The United States invoked the Charter, Articles 39 and 40,
calling the situation a problem of an urgent nature and of common
 108 / organization of american states

interest to the American states. The United States was quick to base its
justification for intervention on regional principles, stating that the
conflict posed a threat to the region because of international communist
involvement, and that the democratic government must be restored.
Not all members, however, found U.S. justifications compelling.
Regional principles also influenced the mission of the force as seen in
the wording of the resolution creating the IAPF. The resolution of the
Foreign Ministers established that the IAPF’s “sole purpose, in a spirit of
democratic impartiality, [was] . . . cooperating in the restoration of
normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the secu-
rity of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and in the
establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that [would]
permit the functioning of democratic institutions” (Tenth Meeting of
Consultation of Foreign Ministers, May 6, 1965, 11).
Even if the United States were simply espousing the principles of the
Inter-American System to suit its own purposes, the principles still had an
impact on the actions the United States took and the responses of the
OAS. The hypothesis, however, also predicts strong opposition by
member states to proposals or unilateral actions that do not clearly uphold
OAS principles. Several states readily condemned U.S. actions, but did
not have enough support within the Council to issue a formal condem-
nation by the OAS. The lack of enough opposition to condemn U.S.
actions and block the U.S. proposal stems from the tensions within the
organization over the issue of communist threat and the appropriate
response of the organization. As noted in chapter 4, the potential threat of
communist subversion in the region divided members of the OAS as early
as 1954 and throughout the 1960s. The threat posed by international
communism to the region had been officially established at the Tenth
Inter-American Conference in 1954 where most members signed the
Declaration of Caracas. At the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers
(1962), members had voted to suspend Cuba’s participation in the OAS
because its communist practices were antithetical to regional principles.
These actions, however, had not been taken without reservations and
objections by some members. Mexico and Argentina, in particular,
had been in opposition, based on the implications such declarations
would have for the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention. Con-
sequently, in the case of the Dominican Republic, members were not
in agreement that a potential communist threat merited the creation
of an intervention force. Based on a report from the investigating commit-
tee and on the proposal presented by the United States, the Foreign
Ministers established the IAPF with barely the two-thirds votes required.
 the ebb and flow of u.s. dominance / 109

Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, and Uruguay voted against the proposal
and Venezuela abstained. In the Dominican case there was a majority to
pass resolutions, including creation of the IAPF, but the dissension among
members weakened their ability to oppose the most obvious violation of
principles, namely U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic.

Environmental Perspective. The environmental perspective focuses on

the impact of the type of conflict being handled and the level of
perceived threat to regional stability. I hypothesize that the greater the
risk of regional instability that is perceived by member states, the greater
influence the United States has within the organization. This argument
is based both on the Latin American recognition that the United States
has the necessary resources to protect the region when threatened, and
that the United States frequently takes a leadership role in such situa-
tions because it views a threat to the region as a threat to itself. The
perceived level of threat is closely linked to the different options that are
available to member states to respond to a crisis. The OAS has both
military and diplomatic mechanisms available should it choose to
invoke them. If a situation involves a mid- or low-level threat, Latin
American members prefer diplomatic efforts to the use of military force.
Although the OAS ultimately decided to establish the IAPF in the
Dominican Republic, Latin American members were actually reluctant
to pursue the military option. The conflict in the Dominican Republic
is classified in this study as a low-level threat based on the fact that only
one state was involved (i.e., it was a civil war), and there was little risk
of the conflict provoking regional instability. In fact, member states only
became concerned with the conflict after the U.S. military chose to
intervene to restore order. Because military actions were taken prior to
any decisions being made by the Organ of Consultation, however, the
policy options available to the Council were limited once it met.
The OAS had no ready alternatives to replacing U.S. troops and resolv-
ing the conflict, even if the United States could be persuaded to
withdraw its forces. In the hope of establishing some influence over the
military forces in the Dominican Republic, Latin American members
agreed to create the IAPF. A few other nonmilitary options were briefly
considered, but the IAPF soon became the preferred instrument to
resolve the conflict. The day after U.S. troops entered the country, the
Dominican representative in the OAS requested a special meeting to ask
the Papal Nuncio to help establish a cease-fire. The secretary general was
sent to help him. The secretary general ended up playing a prominent
role in the diplomatic efforts to reestablish a democratic government in
 110 / organization of american states

the Dominican Republic. In this case, by acting unilaterally, the United

States preempted Latin American members’ consideration of the level of
conflict when determining the appropriate organizational response.
Latin American states were forced to accept the existing militarized
response and manage it as best they could.
Because the Dominican case did not pose a significant threat to the
region in the eyes of most Latin American members (the Organ was not
even convened to address the conflict until after the United States inter-
vened), one would not expect the Latin American states to turn to the
United States, and in fact they did not seek U.S. leadership in this case.
The United States, however, took the matter into its own hands because
of its exaggerated concern with an international communist threat.
Thus, in the case of the Dominican Republic, Latin American percep-
tions of a threat to the region were not linked to the level of influence
the United States wielded within the organization.

Results. The case of the Dominican Republic (1965) provides several

good examples of the ways the United States is able to exert its influence
within the OAS. The hypothesis that is most strongly supported is
the one concerning consensus among members. It is clearly evident that
the degree of disunity among Latin American members allowed the
United States greater influence within the organization. Additionally,
although the hypothesis concerning resources is not supported in the
initial phase because U.S. actions preceded OAS decisionmaking, it is
supported later through the duration of the mission in the Dominican
Republic. The need for extensive resources, especially military, led to
strong U.S. influence of the latter resolutions affecting the use of those
resources.
The hypothesis on regional principles provides less conclusive expla-
nations concerning U.S. influence within the OAS. On the issue of
regional principles, there is limited support for the hypothesis that
proposals or actions that do not uphold regional principles will face
strong opposition. U.S. unilateral actions and its IAPF proposal did face
opposition, but as noted earlier, it was not unified and thus not strong.
Regional principles had their most notable impact on structuring
U.S. justifications and proposals to conform nominally with regional
norms.
The one hypothesis for which the Dominican case showed no
support was the one concerning the threat to regional stability. Even
though the conflict was perceived to be a low-level threat, Latin
American members had little opportunity to oppose the militarized
 the ebb and flow of u.s. dominance / 111

response because the United States chose to act unilaterally before

consulting the organization. The question of turning to the United
States for leadership based on the level of threat was not relevant in this
case since the United States was already actively involved. This final
hypothesis emphasizes one highly influential factor over which the OAS
has little control: unilateral U.S. action. In the Dominican case, the
organization was forced to respond to, rather than to initiate, action.
The United States dominated within the OAS initially and throughout
the operation. The OAS simply could not force the United States to take
back actions to which it had already committed.

Cuba (1964)
Summary of Events. In the case of Cuba (1964), the issue before the
Ninth Meeting of Foreign Ministers was whether the sanctions imposed
on Cuba in 1962 ought to be expanded based on Cuba’s continued acts
of aggression and intervention in the region. An investigating committee
verified the charges brought by Venezuela against Cuba and reported
back to the Foreign Ministers. In their final resolutions, the Foreign
Ministers warned Cuba that any continued acts of aggression could invite
armed force against it, and called on member states to end their diplo-
matic relations with Cuba, to suspend all trade except food and medi-
cine, and to suspend all sea transport. Mexico and Chile were the most
outspoken in their opposition to these resolutions. Both argued that such
sanctions were neither appropriate to the case, nor justified in the provi-
sions of the Rio Treaty. The United States and Venezuela, however, were
adamant that the sanctions be expanded to punish and prevent future
Cuban intervention. Between the evidence gathered by the investigating
committee indicting Cuba for intervention, and the pressure put on
member states by the United States, the majority of member states voted
to expand the sanctions. Thus, the United States was able to achieve one
of its prime foreign policy objectives in the hemisphere by isolating Cuba
through the multilateral actions of the OAS.

Structural Perspective. In the Cuban case, the level of resources needed

to carry out the resolutions of the Foreign Ministers was low, thus
one would not expect evidence of strong U.S. influence based on this
factor. The Investigating Committee sent to verify the charges made by
Venezuela against Cuba required few resources. In addition, the proposal
to increase sanctions did not require many resources because it was a
passive response to Cuba’s revolutionary actions, not an active one.
Member states were called upon to end their diplomatic relations with
 112 / organization of american states

Cuba, to suspend all trade except food and medicine, and to suspend all
sea transport with Cuba. The final part of the resolution, however,
suggested the potential for greater U.S. influence if Cuba did not cease its
interventionary activities. Cuba was warned that any continued acts of
aggression would invite the use of armed force against it in unilateral or
collective self-defense. If the OAS was to credibly threaten to use armed
force against continued aggressions, U.S. support would be needed. Thus,
although only a low level of resources was needed to carry out the resolu-
tions of the Ninth Meeting of Foreign Ministers, the threat of future mili-
tarized action unexpectedly gave the United States greater influence in
shaping the organization’s response to Cuban aggressions.

Internal Relational Perspective. When considering the degree of consensus

among OAS members, there was little unity among Latin American
states, and disagreement as well with the U.S. position. Mexico and Chile
were the two Latin American members with the strongest reservations
about the actions taken at the meeting. Other Latin American states also
expressed concerns about the strong anticommunist position of the
United States, but wanted to restore stability to the region by restraining
the Castro government. The meeting produced two final documents: the
Application of Measures to the Present Government of Cuba and the
Declaration to the People of Cuba. The first document was in response
to the report of the investigating committee. The Foreign Ministers
resolved in paragraphs 1 and 2 to condemn emphatically the Government
of Cuba for its acts of aggression and of intervention against Venezuela.
Paragraph 3 laid out sanctions to be imposed according to the provisions
of Articles 6 and 8 in the Rio Treaty. Paragraph 4 authorized the Council
to discontinue the sanctions by two-thirds vote when Cuba no longer
constituted a danger to regional peace and security. Paragraph 5 warned
the Government of Cuba that further acts of aggression might provoke a
militarized response by members in self-defense. Mexico and Chile both
took exception to these resolutions. Chile abstained from voting on para-
graphs 1 and 2, and voted against paragraph 3 because it did not believe
the sanctions were consistent with the Rio Treaty. Finally, Chile voted
against paragraph 5 because it believed there were discrepancies between
that paragraph and Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations
concerning states’ rights to self-defense until actions could be taken by the
UN Security Council. Mexico had similar reservations and voted against
paragraph 3 because it did not believe the Rio Treaty provisions were
applicable to the current situation in Cuba.
 the ebb and flow of u.s. dominance / 113

The second document adopted by the Foreign Ministers, the

Declaration to the People of Cuba, was directed at Cuban citizens and
expressed sympathy for their loss of liberty. In the Declaration member
states expressed their “deepest hope that the Cuban people . . . [would]
be able . . . very soon to liberate themselves from the tyranny of the
communist regime that oppresse[d] them.” This essential call to action
by the Cuban people was based on the support for democracy expressed
in the Declaration of Santiago (1959) that “the exercise of representative
democracy is the best vehicle for the promotion of . . . social and politi-
cal progress.” There were, however, also differing opinions among
members about this second declaration. Not all members shared the
same view of communism although it had been a topic of discussion for
over a decade. Previous discussions within the OAS on the impact of
communism in the hemisphere had led to a declaration at the Ninth
International Conference of American States (1948) that condemned
“international communism or any other totalitarian doctrine.” Further
anticommunist resolutions were adopted in 1954 in addressing the coup
in Guatemala. The Declaration of Caracas (1954) linked communism to
the issue of regional security, noting that “the domination or control of
the political institutions of any American State by the international
communist movement . . . would constitute a threat to the sovereignty
and political independence of the American states, endangering the peace
of America.” The Declaration in 1954 was quite controversial, but as
Cuba intervened in the 1960s in the affairs of other states to spark revo-
lutions, more Latin American states came to support this anticommunist
position. Chile and Mexico were the exceptions. Chile chose to abstain
from voting on the Declaration to the People of Cuba because it believed
the Declaration violated the principle of nonintervention. Mexico, like-
wise, expressed its disagreement with this strong anticommunist position
on the basis of its interference with the domestic politics of Cuba.
The United States was able to exploit disagreements among Latin
American members to eventually rally support for its policy proposals.
The sanctions imposed at this time held for a decade. A proposal put
forward in 1974 to end the sanctions failed to receive the two-thirds
vote required. Only in 1975, at the Sixteenth Meeting of Foreign
Ministers, did Latin American members gain enough support to end the
enforcement of sanctions against Cuba as perceptions about the threat
posed by communism declined.

Normative Perspective. The United States was able to justify its proposal
for increased sanctions against Cuba by invoking Articles 6 and 8 of the
 114 / organization of american states

Rio Treaty. Article 6 establishes provisions for the Organ of Consultation

to meet if the territory, sovereignty, or political independence of any state
is threatened by an aggression that is not an armed attack, or by any situ-
ation that endangers the peace of the Americas. Article 8 establishes the
measures that the Organ can take to sanction states and uphold the
treaty. These include severing diplomatic and economic relations, inter-
rupting communications and transportation, and the use of armed force.
The proposed sanctions were within the scope of the Rio Treaty, despite
the disagreement of Mexico and Chile on this point. The United States
thus did not face strong opposition because its policy preferences were
not contrary to the principles of the organization.
In addition to the resolutions being clearly based on provisions
within the Rio Treaty, the two documents adopted by the Foreign
Ministers also made reference to the norm of representative democracy
and the incompatibility of communism with the principles of the Inter-
American System. In the Declaration to the People of Cuba, members
invoked the Charter—noting the fundamental rights of individuals; the
Declaration of Santiago (1959)—advocating representative democracy;
and the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948)—
condemning international communism.
The opposition to the proposed sanctions, voiced by Mexico and
Chile, was based on concerns about sovereignty and nonintervention.
The support among member states for these arguments, however, was
not as strong because the investigating committee had reported that
Cuba was clearly behind the subversive attacks on the Venezuelan
government. Cuba was thus already guilty of intervention and subject to
punishment for its violations. Sanctions were also favored because they
were viewed as less interventionary than direct military action, which
was an alternative response to Cuban activities in the region. The U.S.
position was based on regional principles and eventually won the
support of a majority of Latin American members.

Environmental Perspective. By invoking Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and

declaring the acts of Cuba against Venezuela to be acts of aggression and
intervention, the Foreign Ministers indicated that they believed there
was a serious threat to the peace and security of the region. The threat
was not a high-level one because it did not involve widespread violence
or place all members at risk. It was greater than a low level of threat,
however, because Cuban actions were directed at destabilizing several
regimes, particularly that of Venezuela. Despite the initial sanctions
 the ebb and flow of u.s. dominance / 115

imposed on Cuba in 1962 by the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers,

the Castro government was still interfering in the affairs of other states.
Members believed that further actions needed to be taken to reestablish
regional stability. The United States was thus able to promote its
proposal for increased sanctions in a favorable light. Not all Latin
American states felt as strongly as the United States that communism
was a major threat to the region, but most perceived Cuba’s specific
activities as destabilizing and were willing to support increased sanc-
tions. In this case, the United States did not gain additional leverage
because of the perceived level of threat, but did have support because
many member states agreed with the U.S. position about the means to
be used to restore stability.

Results. In this case, the United States succeeded in getting the OAS to
adopt its preferred policy proposals despite opposition by some
members. This case differs from the Dominican Republic (1965),
however, because there was considerable support among many Latin
American members for the U.S. proposals. The case cannot be classified
as a case of compromise or consensus because there was no compromise
with the positions of Mexico and Chile, nor was there consensus. The
label of “U.S. leadership” rather than “U.S. dominance” might best fit
this Cuban example. The factors of consensus and regional norms had
the greatest impact on the level of influence the United States was able
to exert in its “leadership” efforts in this case. A majority of Latin
American states favored the U.S. position and did not need to be
persuaded to expand sanctions against Cuba. Only a few states expressed
disagreement with the U.S. proposal. The United States was able to
provide leadership because there was no strong unified opposition.
Although opponents to the U.S. proposal invoked the norms of sover-
eignty and nonintervention, the call for sanctions had stronger support
because Cuba had already violated the principle of nonintervention and
was thus subject to punishment.
Resources and the perceived threat to the region had little impact on
the level of influence the United States was able to exert. The United
States did not gain extra leverage based on the resources needed because
the need was not significant. It did have the potential for greater influ-
ence, however, based on the possible need for military force in the future
if Cuban aggressions continued. The Cuban situation was perceived as
a mid-level threat and states were largely in agreement about means to
address the threat. Members preferred sanctions to military action at the
 116 / organization of american states

time. The United States used anticommunist rhetoric to try to raise

security concerns, but didn’t need to do too much to convince Latin
American states of the threat and need for action.

Latin American Unity

In clear contrast to the cases of U.S. dominance discussed earlier, there
are five cases in which the United States failed to dominate the organi-
zation despite efforts to do so. Successful Latin American resistance to
U.S. pressure is evident in the cases of the Dominican Republic–
Venezuela (1960), Panama–United States (1964), Cuba (1975),
Nicaragua (1978), and Panama–United States (1989) (see table 5.1). In
the Dominican Republic–Venezuelan case (1960), the Dominican
government was accused of and condemned for trying to incite a coup
in Venezuela. The case of the “Flag Riots” in Panama (1964) arose when
American students refused to permit the flying of the Panamanian flag
in the Canal Zone causing civil unrest between American and
Panamanian citizens. The Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1975 to
consider lifting the sanctions against Cuba resulted in the release of
members from their obligation to enforce the sanctions imposed in
1964. The Nicaraguan case (1978) dealt with the overthrow of the
dictatorship of President Anastasio Somoza and subsequent rise of the
Sandinistas to power. Finally, the case of Panama–United States (1989)
addressed the U.S. military invasion of Panama to arrest President
Manuel Noriega for drug trafficking. A closer look at the cases of
Dominican Republic–Venezuela (1960) and Nicaragua (1978) reveals
how the structural, internal relational, normative, and environmental
factors resulted in reduced levels of U.S. influence in contrast to the
cases above.

The Dominican Republic–Venezuela (1960)

Summary of Events. The Sixth Meeting of Foreign Ministers met in
August 1960 to consider a conflict between the Dominican Republic
and Venezuela. The meeting was preceded by three inflammatory
events, each of which prompted Venezuela to request inter-American
assistance. In November 1959, when a plane accidentally dropped
pamphlets to incite rebellion among the Venezuelan armed forces on the
nearby island of Curaçao, Venezuela requested that the IAPC investi-
gate. In February 1960, Venezuela requested an IAPC investigation of
the flagrant violations of human rights in the Dominican Republic that
were aggravating tensions in the Caribbean. An assassination attempt on
 the ebb and flow of u.s. dominance / 117

President Betancourt of Venezuela in June 1960 led to a request for a

Meeting of Consultation under the Rio Treaty. The Council called for a
Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, which convened in August. The deci-
sion of the Foreign Ministers to condemn the Dominican Republic and
impose sanctions was based on the reports from the IAPC and the
Investigating Committee. The two IAPC reports on the leaflets and
human rights violations indicated that the Dominican government
under Rafael Trujillo was guilty of complicity and of human rights viola-
tions. Similarly, the Investigating Committee reported that the attack on
Betancourt could not have been carried out without “the moral and
material assistance of high officials in the government of the Dominican
Republic” (Rio Treaty Application vol. II, July 8, 1960, 26).
Based on these reports the Foreign Ministers determined that
Dominican actions justified collective action under Article 6 of the
Rio Treaty. They did not, however, determine that further intervention
was merited in this case. Latin American members believed sanctions
were an adequate response based on Dominican aggression and inter-
vention. The Foreign Ministers briefly considered a proposal by the
United States to force the Dominican Republic to hold elections under
the supervision of the OAS. This proposal was rejected by Latin
American members, however, based on their concern about noninter-
vention. The United States then chose to abandon the proposal and
supported the final resolution issued by the Foreign Ministers. The
Foreign Ministers, by a vote of 19-0, condemned the Dominican
government and declared it guilty of intervention and aggression. They
imposed sanctions on the Dominican Republic by breaking diplomatic
relations and suspending trade in arms. After a later report from the
Special Committee sent to observe the effects of the sanctions, addi-
tional sanctions were imposed on petroleum and petroleum products,
trucks, and spare parts. Sanctions were not lifted until January 1962,
after Trujillo was assassinated.
In this case, the United States failed to significantly influence the
actions of the OAS. The U.S. proposal for an electoral supervision
mission was rejected by Latin American members, resulting in U.S.
support for the Latin American proposal for sanctions alone.

Structural Perspective. The resources expended on this case were moder-

ate, based on the number of committees involved and the extent and
duration of their activities. The committee that investigated most exten-
sively was the IAPC. The IAPC first investigated the dropping of antigov-
ernment leaflets over Curaçao. It next looked into alleged violations of
 118 / organization of american states

human rights in the Dominican Republic. Because the IAPC carried out
its investigations prior to the Sixth Meeting, however, the decisions
made by the Council (acting as provisional Organ of Consultation) and
by the Foreign Ministers, did not reflect a consideration of the resources
used by the IAPC.
Once the Organ of Consultation met, a third investigation was
undertaken by the Investigating Committee, to examine the assassina-
tion attempt on President Betancourt. In addition to the investigating
committee, the Organ also created the Special Committee, which visited
the Dominican Republic three times ( June, September, and November
1961) to determine the impact of sanctions on the island and whether
the government still posed a danger to the peace and security of the
region. After each visit, the committee reported back to the Council
acting under the directive of the Foreign Ministers. The Council deter-
mined, based on the reports of the Special Committee, whether to
impose new sanctions or to cancel them pending a change of behavior
by the Dominican government. The U.S. proposal to monitor elections
would have called for considerably more resources. Although this was
not the main reason the U.S. proposal was rejected, it may have had an
impact on the decisionmaking of the Foreign Ministers. The hypothesis
on resources is supported in this case. There was no need for significant
resources to be used to carry out the sanctions, and thus the United
States was unable to wield significant influence by offering to provide
extensive resources.

Internal Relational Perspective. On the issue of consensus, the United

States faced a unified Latin American membership in opposition to its
proposal for electoral monitoring and was unable to exert significant
influence in the OAS. There was no dissension among Latin American
members for the United States to exploit. There was a viable proposal
for sanctions to be imposed, thus there was no need for U.S. leadership
to provide a plan of action. Faced with a united opposition, the United
States quickly abandoned its proposal and supported the imposition of
sanctions against the Dominican Republic. Mecham (1961) notes that
the United States had hoped to convince Latin American members that
it disapproved of both right and leftist dictatorships by supporting
the sanctions against Trujillo. In addition, the United States hoped that
by supporting the Latin American proposal for sanctions, it would gain
Latin American support against Castro at the Seventh Meeting of
Consultation to follow. The United States, however, did not gain the
support it had hoped for at the Seventh Meeting, settling instead for a
 the ebb and flow of u.s. dominance / 119

compromise agreement (Wilson 1977, 14). (This case is discussed in

detail in chapter 6.)
After the initial imposition of sanctions, there was some disagree-
ment among Latin American members, as expressed by Brazil, on the
value of the sanctions. When the Special Committee reported back to
the Council on the effects of the sanctions and recommended an expan-
sion of sanctions to include suspension of trade on petroleum products,
trucks, and spare parts, the Brazilian representative wrote a dissenting
opinion. He stated, “the real solution in such cases does not lie in the
progressive application of coercive measures, but at the higher, more
constructive, long-range level of moral sanctions and persuasion, which
will not endanger inter-American solidarity but preserve the unity of the
system …” (Rio Treaty Application vol. II, Dissenting Vote of Brazil, 13).
A majority of Council members, however, rejected this argument and
voted to increase the sanctions as the committee had recommended.

Normative Perspective. On the issue of regional principles, the hypothe-

sis states that any proposal or unilateral action by the United States that
does not clearly uphold the principles of the organization will face
strong opposition. In this case, the United States did face opposition
based on regional principles to its proposal for electoral monitoring.
Initially, the issue of nonintervention was not raised because the Trujillo
dictatorship was universally detested and because the Dominican
Republic was already guilty of intervention and thus subject to the conse-
quences under the Rio Treaty. As the Foreign Ministers began to discuss
the specific consequences for the Dominican actions, however, disagree-
ments became evident. Latin American members saw a clear distinction
between imposing sanctions based on violation of the Rio Treaty, and
actively intervening in the government of the Dominican Republic in
order to correct human rights violations and antidemocratic behavior
(Rio Treaty Application vol. II, Dissenting Vote of Brazil, 13). In addition
to their normative concerns about upholding the principle of noninter-
vention, Mecham (1961, 420) notes that Latin American members
wanted to punish Trujillo and believed that sanctions would do so more
decisively than promoting a transition to a representative democracy.
The United States attempted to use the IAPC report to rally support
for its proposal. The IAPC reported that the international tensions in
the Caribbean region had been aggravated by flagrant and widespread
violation of human rights that had been and continued to be commit-
ted in the Dominican Republic (Report of the Inter-American Peace
 120 / organization of american states

Committee to the Seventh Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,

August 5, 1960). It noted that the international tensions would
continue as long as violations in the Dominican Republic continued.
The United States interpreted this to be a strong reason to remove the
existing government in order to end the violations and reduce interna-
tional tensions. Latin American members, however, could not be
persuaded that such measures would be appropriate for the OAS to take
based on inter-American principles. The United States was unable to
wield its considerable influence due to united Latin American opposi-
tion to its proposal, which was interpreted to contradict the principle of
nonintervention and was seen as being “soft on Trujillo.”

Environmental Perspective. I hypothesize that the greater the threat to

regional instability, the greater influence the United States has within
the OAS. In this case there was a moderate-level threat to the region
given that two states were involved, and that several episodes of aggres-
sion and intervention had occurred. Regional tensions were high over
the issue of Trujillo’s disregard for human rights within the Dominican
Republic, and his violations of other states’ sovereignty in the region.
The debates that occurred within the Meeting of Consultation would
resemble those of the Cuban case (1960) (discussed in chapter 6) over
the appropriate means to address the given threat. Latin American
members favored sanctions as a justified response to Dominican inter-
vention based on provisions in the Rio Treaty. They believed they could
reduce the threat posed by the Dominican Republic by isolating it and
cutting off its access to armaments. The United States, however, wanted
a longer-term solution. Secretary of State Herter argued that the transi-
tion to representative democracy could best be achieved by resorting to
orderly and peaceful processes (i.e., elections, not sanctions). This
proposal, however, involved a degree of intervention that was unaccept-
able to Latin American members. The United States wanted to end the
threat by removing the source. Latin Americans simply wanted to
reduce the occurrence of Dominican interventions in the region
through isolation. In this case, the threat level was moderate, but not
high enough to merit a military solution. Thus, based on the perceived
level of threat to the region, the United States did not have considerable
influence on the final resolutions of the Meeting of Consultation. Both
Latin American members and the United States wanted diplomatic
solutions, but the U.S. proposal was more extensive than Latin
Americans were willing to support.
 the ebb and flow of u.s. dominance / 121

Results. In the case of Venezuela–Dominican Republic (1960), three

variables played an important role in reducing the level of U.S. influence
within the OAS. The hypotheses on regional principles, consensus, and
threat to regional stability were supported by the evidence in the case.
When considering regional principles, Latin American members deter-
mined that sanctions were justified based on the acts of aggression
committed by the Dominican Republic, but that intervention in the
form of electoral monitoring was not. Thus, the U.S. proposal for elec-
tions ran counter to the regional principles of state sovereignty and
nonintervention, and faced strong opposition from Latin American
members. The United States was also unable to exert influence by divid-
ing Latin American members over the issue of elections. Latin American
states remained united in their support for sanctions over elections. On
the issue of threat, Latin American members clearly did not feel that the
Dominican situation posed enough of a threat that they needed to rely
on U.S. leadership or military forces to counter it. Thus, Latin American
states pursued the issue of sanctions and gained U.S. support for the
measure rather than yielding to U.S. pressure.
The hypothesis on resources affecting influence was supported by the
evidence in the case, but did not appear to be as significant in terms of
affecting U.S. influence within the organization. Moderate resources
were needed to carry out the extensive investigations, but several of these
were completed before the Foreign Ministers even met on the issue. The
resources used by the Special Committee to monitor the effects of
the sanctions in the Dominican Republic were minimal. Thus, the United
States could not offer to provide extensive resources in order to gain
greater influence over their use. The U.S. proposal for an electoral moni-
toring team would have used more resources and likely given the United
States more influence, but it was rejected by the Foreign Ministers.

Nicaragua (1978)
Before presenting the specifics concerning the revolution in Nicaragua
in 1978, some general background on reforms within the OAS is neces-
sary. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Latin American members of the
OAS began to push strongly for changes within the organization.
Specifically, the members wanted to strengthen the economic and social
mission of the OAS and its machinery to serve better the needs of
economic development. The goal was to incorporate the Alliance for
Progress commitments and then expand the multilateral activities of the
OAS by committing the United States to specific long-term pledges
supporting economic development and additional financial obligations.
 122 / organization of american states

Cognizant of U.S. preeminence in the OAS, Latin American members

also wanted to limit the expanding political role of the Council (Wilson
1977, 14). The United States was resistant to such proposals, and
remained preoccupied instead with Cuba and regional security issues.
Despite U.S. reluctance to reform, however, the Protocol of Buenos
Aires was passed in 1967 and resulted in an amended charter taking
effect in 1970. The amended charter addressed Latin American
members’ concerns about fostering economic development in the
region, and expanding the economic and social mechanisms of the orga-
nization by creating several new bodies, including the Inter-American
Economic and Social Council. This reorganized economic Council
promoted and coordinated OAS economic and social activities, as well
as cooperated with other IOs to facilitate technical assistance.
In addition to passing economic reforms in the OAS (despite U.S.
resistance), Latin American members also disregarded U.S. preferences
concerning sanctions on Cuba. In 1974, the Foreign Ministers consid-
ered lifting sanctions, but just fell short of the necessary two-thirds votes
to do so. In 1975, at the Sixteenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers, the
Freedom of Action resolution was passed that allowed individual member
states to resume relations with Cuba as they saw fit. Thus, following the
Dominican case (1965), Latin American members asserted themselves in
a variety of ways. They did not let U.S. preoccupation with security
concerns thwart their efforts to either expand the economic focus the
OAS, or to effectively lift the sanctions imposed on Cuba. This new Latin
American assertiveness, along with diminishing concern about commu-
nist threats to the region, is quite evident in the Nicaraguan case.

Summary of Events. In September 1978, fighting in Nicaragua between

the Sandinistas (FSLN) and the Somoza dictatorship increased dramat-
ically, provoking Venezuela to call for a Meeting of Foreign Ministers
under Articles 59 and 60 of the Charter (an issue of an urgent nature
and common concern to all American states). The developing popular
revolution initially had garnered support from Costa Rica, Honduras,
Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela, and thus had significant regional
repercussions. Violations of Costa Rican borders and attacks on civilians
resulted in the Costa Rican representative requesting an Ad Hoc
Committee to observe its borders with Nicaragua. The Council sent a
committee to Costa Rica and, after two weeks of deliberations, called for
the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation by the Foreign Ministers. The
Foreign Ministers issued a resolution on September 23, 1978 that urged
the various governments to refrain from any actions that might
 the ebb and flow of u.s. dominance / 123

aggravate the situation. They also sent the Inter-American Commission

on Human Rights (at the invitation of Nicaraguan President Anastasio
Somoza) to investigate alleged human rights violations. No further
action was taken until June 1979 when the United States requested that
the Foreign Ministers reconvene to consider the “critical situation” in
Nicaragua. The United States presented a proposal to establish a govern-
ment of national reconciliation with the presence of an inter-American
peacekeeping force to support the process. Latin American members
rejected the proposal, fearing it would serve as a justification for direct
U.S. intervention. The final resolution passed by the Foreign Ministers
was unprecedented. Based on the critical report of the human rights
commission, the Foreign Ministers essentially called on the people of
Nicaragua to replace the Somoza government and establish a represen-
tative democracy through elections:
The Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
declares that the solution of the serious problem is exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the people of Nicaragua. That in view of the [ministers]
this solution should be arrived at on the basis of the following:
1. Immediate and definitive replacement of the Somoza regime.
2. Installation in Nicaraguan territory of a democratic government . . .
3. Guarantee of the respect for human rights of all Nicaraguans . . .
4. The holding of free elections as soon as possible that will lead to the
establishment of a truly democratic government that guarantees peace,
freedom and justice. (Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs, June 23, 1979)

In July 1979, Somoza fled Nicaragua and the provisional government

pledged to the OAS secretary general to install a representative democ-
ratic government. This was the end of the Seventeenth Meeting of
Consultation’s involvement in Nicaragua (Walker 1985).
The ability of the United States to influence the decisions made by
the Organ of Consultation in this case was surprisingly ineffective.
Thomas Walker (1982) has noted that the reaction to U.S. Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance’s proposals “may well have marked the nadir of US
influence in the OAS.” Anatoly Glinkin (1990, 141) also remarks,
“United States had lost its control . . . it was no longer able to use [the
OAS] for pursuit of its own interests, or to bring pressure to bear via [the
organization] on the foreign policies of the Latin American countries or
to carry out armed intervention in the region under the OAS flag.” This
case provides an excellent example of how institutional factors explain
why the United States was unable to exert its influence and Latin
American members were able to prevail within the OAS.
 124 / organization of american states

Structural Perspective. On the matter of resources needed to carry out

the resolutions of the Organ of Consultation, the Foreign Ministers
chose an option that would require few resources from the organization.
By stating specifically that the “solution of the serious problem is exclu-
sively within the jurisdiction of the people of Nicaragua,” the Foreign
Ministers made the Nicaraguan people responsible for taking action
against Somoza, rather than undertaking multilateral actions as the
United States had proposed (Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, June 23, 1979, 1). By rejecting the proposal
by the United States that would have required a considerable contribu-
tion from the United States, the Foreign Ministers denied the United
States the ability to influence the actions of the OAS in this case through
its contribution of resources.

Internal Relational Perspective. On the issue of consensus, Latin American

members were unified in their opposition to the U.S. proposal for an
inter-American force to be sent to Nicaragua. Most Latin American
states were actively supporting the Sandinistas, although Argentina
was selling arms to Somoza. These members were in agreement in their
call for the overthrow of Somoza. The United States had little to no
opportunity to exploit divisions among Latin Americans to gain support
for its position.
Recognizing that the United States would not have much influence
with Latin American members on this issue, President Jimmy Carter was
not committed to using the OAS to address the conflict in Nicaragua.
Rather than working to persuade Latin American members to support
the U.S. position on Nicaragua, Carter worked unilaterally to try to
achieve a negotiated settlement between the Sandinistas and Somoza.
The United States no longer wanted to support the Somoza government
with its numerous human rights abuses, but had few other alternatives
available. Carter’s negotiation efforts sought to create a government of
national reconciliation that would include elements of the Somoza
government as well as other opposition factions. The United States did
not support Sandinista participation, however, because of their links to
Cuba and their communist tenets. President Carter hoped that by
including opposition factions other than the Sandinistas in a government
of national reconciliation, they could minimize the influence of the
Sandinistas and still remove Somoza from power. Carter’s efforts were
met with a lack of cooperation from and rejection by Somoza.
A lull in the fighting in early 1979 falsely reassured the United States
that the Somoza regime would be able to remain in power until the
 the ebb and flow of u.s. dominance / 125

scheduled elections in 1981 when a new, non-Somoza regime could

come to power. The United States proceeded in its negotiations with
Somoza to accommodate his timetable for leaving office (Morley 1994,
309). In May 1979 the Sandinistas initiated their second revolutionary
wave that would topple Somoza in July. On June 11, at an interagency
Policy Review meeting in Washington, State Department representa-
tives suggested that the proposal for an IAPF should be quietly discussed
with Latin American governments (Lake 1989, 220). By a second meet-
ing on June 19, members of the State Department reported that initial
soundings suggested that the chances of gaining support for a peace
force were slim. No further efforts were made to gain support from
Latin American members because memories of earlier U.S. interven-
tions were still vivid among Latin Americans and further efforts would
likely backfire (Lake 1989, 220). Alternative plans were made to form a
government of National Reconciliation that could request the support
of the United States. Based on the victories attained by the Sandinistas,
however, the State Department determined that calling for an inter-
American peace “presence” was their best chance to maintain some
control over events in Nicaragua (Lake 1989, 223). When the United
States put forth its proposal on June 23, Latin American members
rejected it outright, believing it to be the last effort of the United States
to gain control over the situation in Nicaragua before the Sandinistas
came to power.
Because President Carter had chosen to pursue negotiations bilater-
ally and had not been active in OAS efforts at resolution, the United
States was in no position to assert itself when it finally chose to partici-
pate through the forum of the OAS. In the Nicaraguan case, the
hypothesis on consensus is supported. The United States was unable to
gain influence within the organization because of the unified rejection
of its proposal by Latin American states.

Normative Perspective. On the issue of principles, the Nicaraguan case

proves to be anomalous. In this case, the U.S. proposal was based on the
precedent of the Dominican case (1965) and the resolution of the
Foreign Ministers was unprecedented in terms of advocating the over-
throw of a sovereign head of state. The Foreign Ministers based their
decisions on the reports of two committees. The Ad Hoc Committee
investigated the border violations reported by Costa Rica at the request
of the Permanent Council. They found the Nicaraguan National Guard
guilty of attacking civilian villages in Costa Rica. The Foreign Ministers
chose to keep the Committee intact to continue its duties and provide
 126 / organization of american states

updates on the situation. Shortly thereafter, the Foreign Ministers sent

the IACHR to investigate violations of human rights within Nicaragua.
Its highly critical report was issued in October and found that the
Somoza government had been responsible for “serious, persistent and
generalized violations of human rights” (IACHR Report, October 1978,
77). The resolutions issued by the Foreign Ministers in June 1979 reflect
the conclusions of these reports. Whereas the “inhumane conduct of the
dictatorial regime governing the country, as evidenced by the report of
the IACHR, is the fundamental cause of the dramatic situation faced by
the Nicaraguan people,” the Foreign Ministers declared that the people
of Nicaragua should install a democratic government that reflects the
free will of the Nicaraguan people. Acknowledging the involvement of
other member states in the conflict, the Foreign Ministers resolved to
urge member states to facilitate an enduring and peaceful solution of the
Nicaraguan problem by scrupulously respecting the principle of nonin-
tervention and abstaining from any action that might by incompatible
with a peaceful solution (Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, June 23, 1979, 2).
Although such a proposal was unprecedented, and appeared to
contradict regional principles, the resolution reflected larger changes in
the organization as a whole and among member states shifting toward
domestic democratic regimes. It could even be argued that principles
were upheld in the Nicaraguan case. Nonintervention was still a key
principle and was raised in reference to the U.S. proposal for an inter-
vention force. The inclusion of democracy was a new priority, however,
and the means recommended by the Organ of Consultation to the
Nicaraguan people were unprecedented.
The decisions of the Foreign Ministers resemble decisions made more
recently in the 1990s in support of democratic government in the region
than any case preceding the Nicaraguan crisis. The Nicaraguan case is
perhaps a turning point in the organization, with members choosing to
support the principle of democratic government even to the point of
overlooking issues of sovereignty. This shift illustrates that priorities and
principles do evolve over time. Although the principle of representative
democracy had been a part of the OAS since it was founded, it had not
received such primacy prior to the Nicaraguan crisis.
The hypothesis that any proposal or unilateral action by the United
States that does not clearly uphold the principles of the organization will
face strong opposition is not supported in this case. The U.S. proposal
did not violate any principles of the organization, and in fact offered the
least radical response of the proposals presented in terms of principled
 the ebb and flow of u.s. dominance / 127

actions. Given that the U.S. proposal was not contradictory to regional
principles, it should not have faced such strong opposition. As noted
earlier, however, this was a low point in U.S.–Latin American relations.
Latin American assertiveness combined with American disinterest in
OAS multilateralism may well have meant that any proposal by the
United States, whether upholding the principles or not, likely would
have been rejected by Latin American members. Although the U.S.
proposal did not oppose regional principles, Latin American members
clearly viewed the U.S. proposal for a peacekeeping force, which would
consist of mostly U.S. troops, as a regionally sanctioned unilateral
action. In other words, it would be very much like the force that entered
the Dominican Republic, consisting of mostly U.S. troops with an OAS
approval of their presence. Such action, in this case, was not supported
by Latin American members.

Environmental Perspective. The level of influence that the United States

was able to exert based on the perceived threat to regional stability was
not strong in the case of Nicaragua. The perceived threat level in the
Nicaraguan case was moderate because of the number of neighboring
governments involved in the civil war. There was some regional insta-
bility stemming from incursions into Nicaragua from across the Costa
Rican border. There was not a large risk of escalation, however, because
the situation was an internal conflict, and all neighboring countries
opposed the Somoza dictatorship. Because there was no support for
Somoza, there was little risk of escalation among Latin American states
that supported opposing sides in the civil war. Latin American members
did not feel that they needed to depend on the U.S. military to ensure
security in the region. Despite U.S. efforts to arouse the fears of member
states by linking the Sandinistas to Castro, members did not perceive
the Sandinistas as a regional threat. The Sandinistas did not have a revo-
lutionary agenda in terms of spreading the revolution to their neighbors
as Cuba had had when the OAS acted against it in 1960. Latin
American members did not believe the Nicaraguan situation called for a
militarized OAS response.
The United States had made several diplomatic efforts to resolve the
conflict before they proposed the multilateral peacekeeping force, but
failed to gain Somoza’s cooperation. The United States had participated
with Guatemala and the Dominican Republic on a tri-national commis-
sion authorized by the OAS to mediate with Nicaraguan elites and
Somoza (but which excluded the Sandinistas). The goal of the mediators
was to help establish an interim government before the 1981 elections
 128 / organization of american states

were held and to keep the National Guard in place. The Nicaraguan
elites refused to accept keeping the National Guard in power and left the
negotiations, leaving only Somoza with whom to negotiate (Walker
1982). Carter tried, unsuccessfully, to use economic and political pres-
sure to get Somoza to reach reconciliation. As it became more evident
that the Sandinistas were gaining the upper hand, the United States
made its peacekeeping proposal in an effort to establish a multiparty
government of reconciliation that would bring non-Sandinistas to
power and yet remove Somoza. The U.S. representative to the OAS
made a persuasive argument (particularly in retrospect) that in order for
a democratic government to take root in Nicaragua, greater interna-
tional help would be needed in the form of a peacekeeping force, in
addition to economic and humanitarian aid.
Despite U.S. arguments, however, Latin American members were
not persuaded of the necessity for a military response. By the time the
Foreign Ministers issued their unprecedented call for the ouster of
Somoza by the Nicaraguan people, the Sandinistas were close to claim-
ing victory and thus no extensive multilateral action was necessary to
secure Somoza’s ouster. The United States was unable to gain greater
influence within the organization by portraying the situation as a seri-
ous regional threat that would require greater intervention on the part
of the OAS with U.S. leadership.

Results. The Nicaraguan case provides a stark contrast to the actions and
events surrounding the Dominican case in 1965. There are a number of
similarities between the conflicts, but the reaction of the OAS and of
individual member states was quite distinct. Both cases constituted civil
wars with communist elements among the factions. Both were fought in
an effort to overthrow authoritarian leaders in power. Both caused
regional instability and raised security concerns for other OAS
members. Whereas as many states were almost disinterested in the
Dominican case until the United States intervened, in the Nicaraguan
case, neighboring states were actively involved in the conflict itself.
Furthermore, the ability of the United States to influence the decisions
made by the Organ of Consultation was surprisingly ineffective.
Three of the four variables had a significant impact on the level of
influence the United States was able to exert in the Nicaraguan case. Just
as in the Dominican/Venezuelan case (1960), consensus among Latin
American members played an important role in reducing the level of
influence of the United States within the organization. Members were
 the ebb and flow of u.s. dominance / 129

united in their opposition to the U.S. proposal for an inter-American

force in Nicaragua. The perceived level of threat to the region also
played an important role in reducing U.S. influence. Without a signifi-
cant threat to the region, the United States was unable to justify a mili-
tarized response to the Nicaraguan conflict, nor to exercise any kind of
leadership stemming from such a response. The third variable, resources,
was linked to the policy choices of the organization. Because the Foreign
Ministers chose not to send in a multilateral peacekeeping force to
establish democratic government in Nicaragua, they did not need to
request the extensive resources of the United States. This gave the
United States little opportunity to exert its influence through the provi-
sion or control of resources.
Surprisingly, the hypothesis on regional principles was not clearly
supported. The significant role that regional principles played in the
Dominican/Venezuelan case (1960) is not seen in this case. Latin
American members chose to uphold the principle of democratic govern-
ment while essentially disregarding the principle of sovereignty by call-
ing for the replacement of Somoza. The U.S. proposal was not in
opposition to regional principles, and was in fact, based on the prece-
dent of the Dominican case (1965).

Summary
An examination of two cases in which the United States dominated the
OAS, and two cases where Latin American unity led to the rejection of
U.S. preferences, reveals the impact of four different institutional factors
on the level of influence the United States is able to exert within the
organization. Consensus among members, or the lack thereof, was a key
factor in each of the organizational decisionmaking outcomes. Unity
among Latin American members gave them the strength they needed to
resist U.S. pressure when they were opposed to U.S. proposals. In the
Dominican case (1965), the United States wielded considerable influ-
ence within the OAS because of the inability of Latin American
members to agree on an alternative response to the IAPF proposal. In
the Dominican–Venezuelan and Nicaraguan cases, where the United
States was faced with a unified Latin American membership with a
preferred plan of its own, the Latin American states rejected the U.S.
proposals. The need for significant resources gave the United States
greater influence in the Dominican case (1965), while the lower level of
resources needed in the Dominican/Venezuelan (1960) and Nicaraguan
(1978) cases reduced U.S. influence.
 130 / organization of american states

The impact of regional principles on U.S. influence was evident, but

less predictable than with the other factors because of the contradictions
between some of these norms, and the changing priorities given to them
by member states. Whereas support for nonintervention and sovereignty
led to the rejection of electoral intervention in the Dominican Republic
in 1960, these principles were downplayed in the case of Nicaragua in
deference to promoting representative democracy. At times the United
States was able to rally support for its position based on normative argu-
ments, at other times it failed in such endeavors. Even when principles
did not significantly restrict U.S. actions, however, as in the Dominican
case (1965), they did influence the United States enough that it
attempted to justify its actions and proposals based on regional princi-
ples in order to gain Latin American support. Norms thus affected U.S.
influence by pressuring the United States to adhere to regional princi-
ples in order to gain Latin American support for its policies. Uncertainty
arose, however, when it was unclear which norms would be given top
priority within the OAS when the norms conflicted with each other.
Regional principles were crucial to providing Latin American members
with justifications to resist U.S. proposals in the Dominican Republic–
Venezuela (1960) case. By presenting U.S. proposals as inattentive to or
contrary to certain regional principles, Latin American members were
able to strengthen their position in opposition to the United States
around a unifying factor.
The threat level, when linked to consideration of diplomatic versus
military options, also affected the U.S. ability to gain support for its
proposals. None of the cases provided the United States with the oppor-
tunity to exert its influence based on a high level of threat to the region.
The United States attempted to portray the situations in each case as a
serious threat to the region in an effort to gain support for its proposals.
But in both cases with reduced U.S. influence in the organization, Latin
American members were unconvinced by such arguments and rejected
U.S. interventionist proposals. When Latin American members did not
feel greatly threatened by the security issue under consideration, they
maintained greater flexibility in their response options and did not have
to rely on U.S. military might to secure the region. Latin Americans
preferred to use other available means to restore order to the region.
Consideration of the perceived level of threat offers an additional
insight. In cases where there is a mid-level threat, it is important to make
a distinction between an overt military threat and a less obvious ideo-
logical one when considering the level of influence the United States
is able to exert. Latin American members often rejected the U.S.
 the ebb and flow of u.s. dominance / 131

interpretation of level of threat posed by communism and its proposed

militarized responses. Overt military threats are more likely to result in
increased U.S. influence than more subtle ideological ones.
It is evident that these structural, internal relational, normative, and
environmental factors each affect decisionmaking and U.S. influence
within the OAS, but it is also important to determine how these vari-
ables interact with each other. Overall, in comparing the four cases in
this chapter, the variable that directly resulted in the United States not
gaining passage of its proposals was consensus among Latin American
members. Unity among Latin American states resulted in a majority
vote that overruled U.S. policy proposals. The ability of Latin American
members to achieve a unified consensus, however, is linked to resources
and the level of threat to the region (and the military/diplomatic options
available). In order for Latin American states to be able to reject a U.S.
proposal, an alternative plan must be presented if actions are to be
taken. In the Dominican/Venezuelan case (1960), Latin American
members proposed sanctions as opposed to electoral monitoring. Latin
American members encouraged an internal solution rather than a multi-
lateral response in the case of Nicaragua (1978). Alternative policy
options involve consideration of both military and diplomatic options
and the available resources. By having an alternative to a U.S. proposal,
and one that did not require extensive resources, nor rely on the United
States for military support, Latin American members were able to resist
U.S. pressure to pursue U.S. proposals.
Formulating an alternative response to crises also requires an evalua-
tion of the conflict and an assessment of options based on the type of
conflict and its threat to the region. A variety of diplomatic options are
available to members when a threat does not necessitate a militarized
response. These options resulted in a reduced level of U.S. influence
when threats were low or moderate in three of the four cases. The
Dominican case (1965) was the exception. Although the threat was low,
the United States essentially overreacted militarily, but still succeeded in
gaining OAS justification for its continued presence.
In order to present their policy alternatives to a crisis, Latin American
members need to justify them in terms of OAS principles. Reference to
principles is also useful in justifying a rejection of U.S. proposals. For
example, Latin American members rejected electoral monitoring in the
Dominican Republic in 1960 based on the principles of sovereignty and
nonintervention. By being able to argue against the U.S. position based
on principle, Latin American members weaken U.S. influence in the
organization. These variables can work together to produce outcomes
 132 / organization of american states

that are not those preferred by the United States. Norms are used to
justify opposition to the United States, or to support alternative plans.
Alternative plans, often requiring fewer resources, can be formulated to
unite Latin American members and to resist U.S. proposals.
Chapter 6 continues exploring the impact of these institutional
factors on U.S. influence, and further examines the organizational deci-
sionmaking process by looking at cases that resulted in compromise or
consensus.
 C h ap t e r 6
Consensus and Compromise:
Cooperation Between
Member States

Introduction
In contrast to chapter 5, which examined organizational outcomes when
there was disagreement among OAS member states that resulted in one
side or the other dominating the policymaking process, this chapter looks
at those less extreme cases where there was consensus or compromise
among members. As noted earlier, relations between the United States
and Latin American members have often been cooperative rather than
conflictual. Between 1948 and 1989 there have been ten cases where all
member states were in agreement concerning the means to address the
conflict and acted in a united fashion, and five cases in which compromises
were reached despite disagreements between the United States and Latin
American members over what actions should be taken by the organization
(see table 5.1). Although the cases where there are significant disagreements
among members provide strong test cases for the hypotheses, an examina-
tion of the cases where there is consensus or compromise among members
provides important insights into the member dynamics within the organi-
zation. This chapter explores two cases where there was consensus among
OAS members, and two cases where the member states reached a compro-
mise on the actions to be taken. The cases of Costa Rica–Nicaragua (1955)
dealing with anti-Somoza rebels, and Panama (1959) removing a small
invasion force from the country, serve as examples of consensus within the
organization. The Cuban (1960) and Caribbean (1959) cases reveal an
outcome of compromise between members. In the Cuban case (1960), the
United States and Latin American members come to a compromise
agreement on the final wording of the resolution issued by the Seventh
Meeting of Foreign Ministers that condemns international communist
 134 / organization of american states

intervention in the hemisphere. The Caribbean case (1959), dealing with

extensive revolutionary activities in the region, is representative of many
cases in which there is a moderate level of disagreement among members.
The differences of opinion in these cases are not as stark as some of the
cases with a low level of consensus (discussed earlier in chapter 5). Many of
the mid-level consensus cases result in a compromise agreement that incor-
porates the preferences of all members, including the United States, so that
there is full support for the final resolution.

Organizational Consensus
Although the cases where there is considerable disagreement among
member states (particularly when the United States is challenged by Latin
American members) receive the most attention, the most common
outcome is a consensual agreement on the actions to be taken by the
OAS. In ten of the 26 cases under consideration, the outcome has been
consensual with high levels of agreement among member states on how
to address the security concern. States in the hemisphere have long valued
consensus when taking multilateral actions. Not only does agreement of
all member states strengthen the influence of the organization, but also
reinforces solidarity among members. Consensus is understood in this
study to mean that members are in agreement about the interests of the
organization in a particular case, and the means used to achieve them. In
cases where “compromise” is the decisionmaking outcome, members
frequently achieve a consensual agreement after debate and discussion of
their different preferences on an issue. In those cases where there is a
difference of opinion, it is usually over the means to an agreed-upon end.
In these cases the difference of opinion usually results in a compromise
in which some of the concerns of each party are addressed. The follow-
ing examples illustrate two cases of consensus in which members were
united in their response to security threats to the region. Because there
are no indications of the United States using pressure to gain passage of
the proposals when there was general agreement on policies, there is no
way to test the individual hypotheses. The United States had no need to
exert pressure to achieve its policy objectives in these cases. Thus, the
cases in this section are discussed without specific reference to the
hypotheses concerning the level of U.S. influence in the organization.

Costa Rica–Nicaragua (1955)

In early 1955 President José Figueres of Costa Rica and Anastasio
Somoza of Nicaragua were openly feuding. In January, an invasion of
 consensus and compromise / 135

Costa Rica took place from Nicaraguan territory. The OAS Council
quickly convened as the provisional Organ of Consultation under the
Rio Treaty and sent an investigating committee to the border to deter-
mine the conditions there. The conflict escalated when three
Nicaraguan planes strafed Costa Rica. The Council authorized an air
observation patrol and the sale of four U.S. aircraft to Costa Rica for its
self-defense. The Council also issued a series of resolutions: (1)
condemning the acts of intervention in Costa Rica; (2) requesting the
Nicaraguan government (and all American governments) take the neces-
sary measures to prevent the use of their territories for any military
action against the government of another state; and (3) appealing to
both Costa Rica and Nicaragua to sign the bilateral agreement in the
Pact of Amity that had been negotiated in 1948 after a series of earlier
border clashes. Negotiations eventually produced the implementation of
the Pact of Amity in 1956.
Consensus among member states is evident in this case in several ways.
When the case was brought before the Council, there was no disagree-
ment that the Rio Treaty ought to be invoked. Members recognized the
need to take action based on the violation of the principles of sovereignty
and nonintervention. Members were united in their resolve to take action
quickly to maintain the solidarity (and security) of member states. The
Council helped provide the means for Costa Rica to defend itself, but
upheld the principle of pacific settlement by encouraging both sides to
negotiate and implement the Pact of Amity already agreed upon.

Panama (1959)
The case of Panama (1959) produced a similarly consensual response
from OAS member states. In April 1959, 87 armed men, mostly
Cubans, landed in Panama. The Panamanian military surrounded them
but they refused to surrender. The Panamanian government invoked the
Rio Treaty, but did not specifically bring charges against Cuba for inter-
vention. The Council, acting as provisional Organ of Consultation, sent
out an investigating committee, followed by air and sea observers to
make sure no further invasion forces were in the area. Castro denied any
connections to the invasion force and Panama believed that the Cuban
government had not assisted the expedition. The Cuban government
sent a representative to Panama to help negotiate a surrender by the
invaders. By being united in their resolve to address this threat to
Panama, the Council was able to respond quickly and cooperatively. In
both these cases, member states were in agreement concerning the
actions to be taken by the organization.
 136 / organization of american states

The hypotheses concerning institutional factors that affect U.S.

influence are not applicable in these cases where there was consensus
among member states. The hypotheses are based on the assumption
that, given a difference of opinion about the actions the organization
should take, the United States or Latin American states will attempt to
influence members to adopt policies supporting their preferences.
Because there is no disagreement among members in these cases, there
is no need for (nor evidence of ) any member state exerting itself to
persuade others to support its position. Members agreed that a threat to
the region existed and also agreed on how to address that threat. This
level of cooperation was achieved most frequently during the 1950s
prior to increased Cold War tensions.

Member State Compromises

Although member states in the OAS value consensus, it is no surprise
that from time to time members do not agree about the degree of threat
facing the region, or the appropriate means to respond to that threat. In
most cases when there has been disagreement, the United States has put
forth a proposal for which it has only partial support among Latin
American states. It is up to member states to determine whether to
support the U.S. proposal, to put forth their own counterproposal, or to
negotiate a compromise between the different positions on the issue. In
five cases, OAS member states have negotiated a compromise with the
United States in order to address security concerns in the region. The
cases of the Caribbean (1959) and Cuba (1960) serve as examples of
how compromises have been reached between member states. An exam-
ination of each hypothesis in these cases helps to determine how much
influence the United States was able to wield and to what effect.

Caribbean (1959)
Summary of Events. When the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers
convened in August 1959, it met to consider a broad range of events
causing instability in the Caribbean. Tensions between dictatorial
regimes and democracies had been on the rise, with both sides engaged
in covert acts of intervention. There was considerable debate about how
to address these tensions. Venezuela and Cuba both favored assertive
OAS action to promote democracy and protect human rights, even if
this meant compromising the principle of nonintervention. The United
States and a majority of other Latin American states were reluctant to
 consensus and compromise / 137

sacrifice nonintervention even in support of democracy. The United

States argued that overthrowing oppressive regimes would produce more
disorder and tension in the region than already existed, and would
provide an opportunity for communists to move into the region.44 Cuba
and Venezuela argued that more democratic governments would result
in improved relations among member states. The concerns of both sides
were addressed in the meeting. No interventionary actions were
approved by the Foreign Ministers to promote democracy, but they did
adopt the Declaration of Santiago, which addressed many of the priori-
ties of those states that advocated greater democracy. The Declaration
laid out specific principles that characterized representative democracy.
The Foreign Ministers also created the IACHR, and strengthened
the IAPC, which investigated disputes among members. The compro-
mise reached addressed both the concerns of those promoting democ-
racy, and those that did not want to compromise the principles of
nonintervention and state sovereignty.

Structural Perspective. In order to carry out the policies adopted by the

Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers, the OAS did not need a high level of
financial resources, and had no need for military resources. The IAPC
had already been established in 1956 when its temporary statute was
adopted as permanent by the OAS Council. The Fifth Meeting expanded
the authority of the IAPC to act at the request of governments or on its
own initiative rather than only with the prior consent of the parties
involved. Because the financial support and staffing for the IAPC was
already established and did not require additional resources from
member states, the United States could not use the need for resources to
influence the policy decisions concerning the situation in the Caribbean.
The Foreign Ministers also adopted Resolution VI that created the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The Commission was
to “promote respect for such rights” as enumerated in the 1948
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. It was given
authority to prepare studies and reports, and to organize lectures and
seminars on human rights. Its powers did not extend, however, to inves-
tigating human rights violations or making policy recommendations
directly to governments. The seven-member Commission did not
require significant resources to carry out its limited mandate at this
time. The United States thus did not gain significant leverage at the
meeting with the decision to create the IACHR.
 138 / organization of american states

Internal Relational Perspective. Although member states placed different

priorities on potential solutions to the tensions in the Caribbean, with
some preferring active intervention and others resisting such proposals,
relations between members remained relatively agreeable. In this case,
the mid-level of consensus stemmed from a disagreement between a few
Latin American states and the rest of the OAS membership, including
the United States. The majority of Latin American members were
unified in their support of the principle of nonintervention, and were in
agreement with the position of the United States. Venezuela and Cuba
wanted to actively promote democracy and human rights and sacrifice (to
some extent) the principle of nonintervention. Although the majority
could have adopted a final resolution without taking the preferences of
Venezuela and Cuba into consideration, the compromise agreement that
they reached strengthened the resolutions issued by the Foreign
Ministers and succeeded in upholding the core principles of the organi-
zation. Because the United States was in agreement with a majority of
members on how to deal with Caribbean instability, the United States
did not have to exert significant influence to achieve its policy prefer-
ences. In this case, because a majority of states agreed with the U.S. posi-
tion, the issue of consensus was less of a factor in explaining OAS
actions than the consideration of regional principles.

Normative Perspective. The maintenance of regional principles is a

consideration in each of the conflict resolution cases the OAS handles.
OAS member states, including the United States, take particular care to
frame their policy proposals in terms of support for the regional princi-
ples that have evolved over the past century. There are times, however,
when these principles can be contradictory. The Caribbean case (1959)
provides a good example of how the principles enshrined in the OAS
Charter can lead to conflicting justifications. The United States and
many other Latin American states wanted to stabilize relations in the
Caribbean, but did not want to actively intervene in the sovereignty of
other member states. They argued that such interventions would
increase the risk of instability and might allow subversive communist
elements to gain a foothold in the region. Venezuela and Cuba argued
that the OAS ought to intervene in order to promote democracy and
human rights in the region because it would lead to greater stability.
Both sides justified their proposals based on regional norms.
State sovereignty is clearly established in Article 3 of the OAS
Charter, which states, “every state has the right to choose, without
 consensus and compromise / 139

external interference, its political economic and social system . . . and

has the duty to abstain from intervening in the affairs of another State.”
The Charter upholds both the principle of democracy and noninter-
vention in Article 2: “The Organization of American States . . .
proclaims the following essential purposes . . . to promote and consoli-
date representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of
nonintervention.” In Article 3 the organization further affirms, “the
solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought
through it require the political organization of those States on the basis
of the effective exercise of representative democracy.” Article 3 also
establishes the “fundamental rights of the individual without distinction
as to race, nationality, creed, or sex.” These individual human rights are
further elaborated in Article 33 in which members agree that “equality
of opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth and income, and the
full participation of their peoples in decisions relating to their own
development are . . . basic objectives to integral development.”
In this case, because contradictory norms were raised to justify
proposals for both action and inaction, members needed to reconcile the
contradictions so that none of the principles were devalued. This was
essentially accomplished in the Declaration of Santiago that reaffirmed
the value of representative democracy, but did not go so far as to inter-
vene in members’ domestic affairs to achieve democratic government.
The Declaration noted, “the existence of anti-democratic regimes
constitutes a violation of the principles on which the Organization of
American States is founded, and a danger to united and peaceful rela-
tionships in the hemisphere” (Final Act 1960). The Declaration
furthered specified that governments should be the result of free elec-
tions, and that there should be a separation of powers to ensure rule of
law. The Declaration of Santiago also upheld human rights principles by
declaring that governments should maintain a system of social justice
based on respect for human rights, and that human rights should be
protected by effective judicial procedures. The actions to be taken with
regard to these declarations involved the commissioning of the IAPC to
study the relationship between respect for human rights and the effec-
tive exercise of representative democracy, and the relationship between
economic underdevelopment and political instability.
The policy outcome in this case was clearly affected by the existence of
regional norms. Even though only a minority of states advocated actions
based on the principles of democracy and human rights, the United States
and the majority of Latin American states could not afford to ignore the
invocation of these principles. The actions taken by the organization were
thus a compromise based on the policy preferences of each group of states.
 140 / organization of american states

Environmental Perspective. The Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers was

convoked pursuant to Articles 39 and 40 of the OAS to consider the
“serious situation in the Caribbean area.” Tensions between democracies
and dictatorships, and revolutionary activities in the region, had led to
instability and ongoing conflicts between member states. Growing
demands for democratic progress and social change within oppressive
regimes needed to be addressed. Although, in June 1959, Haiti and
Ecuador proposed that a Meeting of Consultation be held to consider
the Dominican allegation that invading forces had been organized in
Cuba and Venezuela against it, the Meeting of Consultation was even-
tually convoked to consider a broader series of events causing regional
instability. Because the Foreign Ministers were considering the general
situation, not specific grievances, their policy response was also general-
ized. They sought diplomatic, not militarized, actions to promote
regional security. Although there was a mid-level threat to security,
members were largely in agreement that military actions would lead to
greater instability, not increased security. There was no need for the
United States to take a leading role based on the perceived threat to the
region because members believed security could be strengthened
through the diplomatic actions laid out in the Declaration of Santiago.

Results. In the Caribbean case (1959) the factor of consensus played a

lesser role than in other cases where Latin American interests have been
pitted against U.S. preferences. This is due, in part, to the fact that the
disagreement among members was with a minority of Latin American
states, with the majority agreeing with the U.S. position. The factor of
regional norms was much more influential in shaping the policy outcome
in this case. The need to consider sovereignty and nonintervention, as
well as democracy and human rights, led to the inclusion of the positions
of the majority as well as the minority (Venezuela and Cuba). Resources
and perceived threat level had less of an impact on decisionmaking and
policy outcome. The empowerment of the IAPC and the creation of the
Commission on Human Rights did not require significant resources.
Furthermore, members felt that the threat could best be addressed
through diplomatic actions rather than a militarized response.

Cuba (1960)
Summary of Events. The Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers was
convoked on August 22, 1960, immediately following the Sixth Meeting
 consensus and compromise / 141

of Foreign Ministers held in San José, Costa Rica. The Sixth Meeting
had dealt solely with the Dominican Republic–Venezuela (1960)
conflict (discussed in chapter 5). The Seventh Meeting was to focus
entirely on Cuba and the question of external communist influence in
the hemisphere. The Castro government was actively trying to export its
communist revolution to other states in the circum-Caribbean and thus
provoking violent unrest in several countries. Peru requested the meet-
ing under Article 39 of the Charter, considering the effects of Cuban
actions to be of “an urgent nature and common concern to the
American states.” After receiving a report of the IAPC and engaging in
much discussion, the Foreign Ministers unanimously (19-0) adopted
the Declaration of San José. The Declaration: (1) condemned all forms
of “extracontinental intervention” that could endanger inter-American
solidarity; (2) rejected Sino-Soviet efforts to destroy hemispheric unity;
(3) reaffirmed nonintervention, including ideological intervention;
(4) reaffirmed the incapability of totalitarianism with the Inter-American
System; (5) requested members to submit to OAS discipline and
principles; and (6) declared that all controversies between members
should be resolved by peaceful measures (Seventh Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, August 22–29, 1960, 4–5).
In this case, Latin American members did not support the proposal
presented by the United States that explicitly condemned Cuba for
intervention in the region. The U.S. proposal read as follows:

[The Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs]

Condemns the efforts of the Sino-Soviet powers to extend their political
influence over the sovereign American states through political and
economic subversion, and that exploit, for their ends, the determination
and dreams of the American people to succeed in reaching higher
economic and cultural standards of living;
Manifests its profound concern for the declarations of high govern-
ment officials in Cuba to admit the possibility of intervention by powers
within the Sino-Soviet block in Inter-American affairs;
Declares that the encouragement and acceptance on Cuba’s part of the
intervention by Sino-Soviet powers in Inter-American affairs constitutes
a direct break with the basic principles of the Inter-American system and
a threat to the peace and security of the American States; and
Exhorts the Republic of Cuba
1) to repudiate and reject every effort of the Soviet Union, of the
People’s Republic of China and all other powers associated with
them, to interfere in Cuban affairs or those of other countries in
this hemisphere; and
 142 / organization of american states

2) that it pursue its goals of political, economic and social develop-

ment according to the democratic principles of the Inter-American
system; and
3) that it conform, in its international relationships, to the purposes
and principles outlined in the Charter of The Organization of
American States and in other Inter-American treaties and conven-
tions. (Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, Documents, August 25, 1960)

The wording of the final resolution constituted a compromise between

the United States and Latin American members in which the Soviet
Union and China were mentioned, but Cuba was not. An examination
of the four institutional variables offers insight into why Latin American
members resisted U.S. pressures to the point that the United States was
forced to compromise on its preferred wording of the resolution.

Structural Perspective. The resources necessary to carry out the final resolu-
tions of the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers were of a low level. Most
of the resolutions were condemnations of the intervention in the hemi-
sphere of the Soviet Union and China, and requests of members to observe
inter-American principles. These resolutions were based on the findings of
the IAPC, which effectively served as the investigating committee in this
case. The IAPC report presented at the Seventh Meeting stated that inter-
national tensions in the Caribbean had been “considerably heightened as a
result of increasing desire during recent months on the part of the Soviet
Union and other extracontinental powers to intervene more actively in
inter-American affairs” (Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, 1960). It also highlighted the importance of continental
solidarity and support for democracy and human rights. Furthermore, it
stated that collaboration for socioeconomic development was significant
for regional security. Although the report supported U.S. claims concern-
ing the threat the Soviet Union posed to the hemisphere, the inclusion of
democracy, human rights, and socioeconomic development raised issues
that greatly concerned many Latin American members. Consequently, the
report helped serve as a foundation for the compromise reached between
the United States and Latin American members in the Declaration of
San José.
The one resolution requiring organizational resources was the provi-
sion establishing an Ad Hoc Committee. The Committee was created to
clarify facts and to offer its good offices to facilitate settlement of bilateral
 consensus and compromise / 143

controversies between the United States and Cuba. These bilateral issues
included violations of the rights (personal and property) of United States
citizens. Latin Americans did not see these as issues of serious concern to
themselves, but recognized the need to reduce tensions between the
United States and Cuba (Ball 1969, 461). The resources necessary for
such action were minimal, involving only the travel expenses of the diplo-
mats. (The expenses were, in fact, non-existent since the committee never
met.) There was no need for military resources, nor was the United States
asked to provide any special resources. Thus, the United States was not
able to gain any leverage within the organization, in this case, through the
provision of resources. This case is quite a contrast to the Dominican case
(1965) (discussed earlier), in which extensive military, diplomatic, and
logistic resources were necessary for an extended period.

Internal Relational Perspective. In the case of Cuba (1960), unity among

Latin American members weakened the influence the United States had
within the organization. From the beginning of the meeting, there was
general agreement among Latin American members to condemn
communist intervention but not on whether to name those states
involved in provoking regional instability (i.e., Cuba, Soviet Union, and
China) (Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, August 22–29, 1960, 4). Latin American states did not want to
specifically condemn Cuba. Some had not even wanted to mention the
Soviet Union specifically. These members soon recognized, however,
that the United States would never agree to such a resolution, and the
lack of agreement would weaken, and possibly endanger, the Inter-
American System. Yet the unity among Latin American members in
opposing specific condemnation of Cuba left the United States with
little influence (Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, August 22–29, 1960, 4). There was no division among
the majority for the United States to exploit, nor the lack of a plan for
which the United States could provide leadership. Because the United
States felt so strongly about Cuba, and because the Latin American
members recognized the need for complete consensus on the resolution,
they reached a compromise on wording. The final resolution, passed by
a vote of 19-0, clearly implicated Cuba through its deeds even though it
only specifically rejected Sino-Soviet powers:
The Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
condemns energetically the intervention or the threat of intervention . . .
 144 / organization of american states

by an extracontinental power in the affairs of the American republics . . .

[The meeting of foreign ministers] rejects, also, the attempt of the Sino-
Soviet powers to make use of the political, economic, or social situation
of any American state, inasmuch as that attempt is capable of destroying
hemispheric unity and endangering the peace and security
of the hemisphere. (Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, August 22–29, 1960, 4)

The resolution also reaffirmed the principle of nonintervention by any

American state in the internal or external affairs of another, and reaffirmed
the incompatibility of totalitarianism with the Inter-American System.
Although Latin American members showed a united front in their
resistance to U.S. preferences at the meeting, there is some evidence that
not all members were in complete agreement. Two statements issued by
Mexico and Guatemala in response to the Declaration of San José reflect
the range of different opinions held by Latin American states on the
issue of Cuba. Mexico stated that the resolution was in no way a
condemnation or a threat against Cuba, whose aspiration for economic
improvement and social justice had the fullest support of the people of
Mexico (Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, August 22–29, 1960, 13). Mexico’s statement also reaffirmed
the principles of sovereignty and self-determination. Guatemala, on the
other hand, stated that it was convinced that the actions of Cuba, by
adopting a policy favoring the Soviet Union, threatened the hemisphere
and that the American states would have been justified in assuming a
stronger attitude (Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, August 22–29, 1960, 13). Despite these starkly differ-
ent attitudes toward Cuba, the Latin American members were unified in
their resistance to accept the U.S. proposal condemning Cuba. Since
most Latin American members agreed with the United States, however,
that intervention in the hemisphere by the Soviet Union and China was
detrimental to regional security and unity, they were able to reach a
compromise on the final wording of the resolution.

Normative Perspective. The principles raised in the Cuban case (1960)

largely resemble those advanced in Caracas in 1954, when most
members reluctantly signed the Declaration of Caracas dealing with the
Guatemalan coup. The Declaration defined international communism
as a threat to the region:

The domination or control of the political institutions of any American

State by the international communist movement extending to this
 consensus and compromise / 145

Hemisphere the political system of an extracontinental power, would

constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the
American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for a
Meeting of Consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action
in accordance with existing treaties. (Cited in Atkins 1997, 201–202)

At the Seventh Meeting of Consultation, Latin American members

continued to uphold the principles of self-determination and noninter-
vention despite efforts by the United States to condemn Cuba specifi-
cally based on an extracontinental communist threat. Mexico, in
particular, defended the Cuban regime as an indigenous communist
movement and argued it was thus not subject to inter-American inter-
vention (i.e., condemnation or additional actions). Although many
Latin Americans had been enthusiastic about the Cuban Revolution
shortly after Fidel Castro took power, his expropriation of private prop-
erty, suppression of civil rights, and postponement of constitutional
government eventually had led to distrust of the new regime. When
Castro sought closer ties with the Soviet Union, including trade rela-
tions, the United States canceled its Cuban sugar imports. U.S. actions
brought the charge of economic aggression from Cuba and Mexico,
which was very supportive of the Cuban Revolution. After Soviet
President Nikita Khrushchev declared Cuba a communist protectorate,
many Latin American states viewed this increasingly extracontinental
involvement in the hemisphere as a threat to the peace of the Americas
and called for a Meeting of Consultation. Based on Castro’s increasingly
threatening attitude toward other Latin American regimes, the United
States believed that Latin American members would not hesitate to
condemn Cuba in addition to the Soviet Union and China. The United
States did not anticipate that Latin American members would view its
dispute with Castro as a bilateral issue to be solved by the two countries,
not the OAS (Mecham 1961, 461).
When the Foreign Ministers met, the debates essentially pitted the
principles of democracy and regional security against nonintervention
and self-determination, with most Latin American states supporting
the latter. Latin American members largely considered the dispute the
United States had with the Cuban regime over sugar exports and the
expropriation of private property to be a bilateral issue, to be resolved
through negotiations. The dispute did not merit multilateral interven-
tion on the part of the OAS. The one issue on which the United States
and most Latin American states agreed was the threat of Sino-Soviet
intervention in the hemisphere. Latin American members, however, did
not want to make an explicit link between Sino-Soviet influence in the
 146 / organization of american states

hemisphere and the Cuban regime. The U.S. proposal went beyond
what Latin American members believed was necessary and thus threat-
ened other fundamental principles of the Inter-American System on
which they were unwilling to compromise given the existing situation.
All members were worried about the security of the circum-Caribbean,
but did not agree on the means to resolve the problems in the region. In
this case the United States was largely alone in its desire to condemn
Cuba, the Soviet Union, and China explicitly. The United States faced
determined opposition to its proposal because many members were
concerned about its disregard of other regional principles.

Environmental Perspective. As with the Caribbean case (1959), the

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in the Cuban case (1960) was not
called to address a specific conflict in the hemisphere, but to remedy
certain conditions of regional instability. Sanctions were not an issue,
nor was establishing or observing a cease-fire. There was no need for
military options to be considered at this time (although the United
States would have been interested in unilateral actions to protect its citi-
zens and their property in Cuba). Although there was no need for U.S.
leadership in a militarized operation, the United States did attempt to
exert its influence concerning the perceived level of threat to the region.
By emphasizing the ideological threat from Cuba, the United States
attempted to gain support for a harsh diplomatic response to Cuban
actions. U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter made a strong case that
the installation of a communist regime in any American republic would
automatically involve the loss of the country’s independence (Mecham
1961, 460). He pointed to the obvious loss of independence by Eastern
European countries to support this contention. He stated that subver-
sion was as much of an intervention as an armed attack and thus was a
grave security concern for all in the hemisphere (Ball 1969, 459). The
U.S. argument was persuasive in so far as all members believed Cuba’s
acts of intervention were threatening to the region. Despite this
portrayal of the great risk to the region by Cuba and the Soviet Union,
the United States was unable to gain enough support for its proposed
condemnation of Cuba. Although the Foreign Ministers were holding a
Meeting of Consultation, signifying a threat to the region, Latin
American members disagreed with the United States on the appropriate
response to Cuba’s actions because of their concerns about regional prin-
ciples. Specific condemnation of Cuba raised issues of sovereignty and
 consensus and compromise / 147

self-determination. By attempting to present the situation as highly

threatening, the United States hoped to exert enough influence to
support specific condemnation of Cuba. Because the situation was only
a mid-level threat and did not present a direct military threat to any
member, however, the United States was forced to compromise on its
proposal.

Results. In the case of Cuba (1960), the United States was forced to
compromise with Latin American members over the wording of the final
resolution at the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers. The level of
influence the United States was able to exert was considerably lower than
in the Dominican case (1965). The two variables that most obviously
reduced the U.S. level of influence were the level of consensus among
Latin American members, and Latin American support of regional
principles. A unified Latin American membership on the issue of not
condemning Cuba specifically led to a compromise solution that only
condemned the Soviet Union and China. Latin American members were
also united in upholding the principles of nonintervention and self-
determination. Although the United States based its arguments on the
principles of regional security and democracy, Latin American members
believed the United States was disregarding other fundamental principles
of the Inter-American System and opposed the U.S. proposal.
The hypothesis based on the perceived threat to regional stability was
generally supported by the Cuban case, although it pointed to some
additional factors to consider. The moderate level of threat corre-
sponded with a moderate level of U.S. influence. The United States was
able to make a persuasive case that Cuban actions were threatening to
regional security, but its proposed response did not meet with the
approval of Latin American members. Even though Latin American
states agreed that Cuba posed a threat to the region, this did not result
in an increase in U.S. influence in this case. The United States retained
sufficient influence to produce a compromise rather than a rejection of
its proposal, but proved unable to dominate the organization as it had
in the Dominican case (1965). Although members were convinced that
Cuba did pose a threat to the region, they did not turn to the United
States to provide leadership in the face of this threat. In addition, the
United States was unable to use its extensive resources to gain influence
within the organization because no special resources were needed in this
case to carry out the resolutions of the Foreign Ministers.
 148 / organization of american states

In the cases where the outcome was a compromise between the

United States and Latin American states, Latin American members were
able to exert enough leverage to resist U.S. dominance. These cases
are the most difficult to explain since no member state was dominant in
the debates where a number of different policy preferences were being
put forward. Several factors, however, apparently contributed to the
compromise outcomes in the OAS. In the case of Cuba (1960), most
Latin American members were unified in their desire not to condemn
Cuba specifically.45 They had the majority of votes necessary to reject
the U.S. proposal. They also had an alternative proposal available on
which to vote. An alternative proposal is important if the U.S. proposal
is objectionable to member states. If no alternative actions are proposed,
then there is a greater likelihood that the U.S. proposal will be
supported rather than facing the option of taking no action at all. Latin
American members were able to unite behind the alternative resolution
because it did not require considerable resources to be carried out and
thus they were not dependent on the United States to provide such
resources. The United States maintained some influence based on the
fact that the Cuban case presented a mid-level threat to the region with
the potential for continued regional instability. Member states recog-
nized the need to address the actions of Cuba and did not want to alien-
ate the United States on this issue. Agreement on normative issues
brought member states together in this case. Members reaffirmed the
principle of nonintervention and reaffirmed that the Inter-American
System was incompatible with any form of totalitarianism.
In the Caribbean case (1959), similar factors had an influence on the
outcome. There was no need for a high level of resources to carry out
the resolutions, thus giving member states some freedom from U.S.
influence. The threat was only mid-level, providing some space for
members to address the problem without resorting to a militarized U.S.
response to guarantee regional security. The effect of regional principles
also played a role in helping Venezuela and Cuba persuade the United
States and other members to support the Declaration of Santiago. The
United States would not have wanted to oppose supporting representa-
tive democracy as long as the proposal did not advocate intervention.
The different positions of member states were thus able to be accom-
modated in these compromise cases based on less dependence on the
United States for resources, on only a mid-level threat to the region, and
on a normative culture supporting regional principles including represen-
tative democracy, nonintervention, and sovereignty.
 consensus and compromise / 149

Summary
Because the majority of decisionmaking outcomes are either consensual,
or are compromises when the Rio Treaty or OAS Charter have been
invoked for conflict resolution, it is important to examine these cases in
order to better understand the decisionmaking dynamics within the
OAS. Cases of consensus and compromise illustrate the impact of struc-
tural, internal relational, normative, and environmental factors on the
decisionmaking process and outcome. In cases of consensus, members
were in agreement on the desired means and ends to address the security
issue confronting the organization. Members were able to act quickly and
effectively to resolve the problem peacefully. In the Panamanian case
(1959), the invading force was persuaded to surrender. In 1956, both
Nicaragua and Costa Rica were pressured into implementing the Pact of
Amity. In a number of cases when there was some disagreement among
members about how to peacefully resolve the tensions in the region, the
need for resources and the threat level were not high enough to allow
U.S. dominance. Instead, members worked out a compromise that
addressed the preferences of each side. In the Cuban case (1960),
members agreed on an alternative wording that did not explicitly
condemn Cuba, only external communist interventions in the region.
Members also compromised on the Caribbean case (1959) by addressing
member concerns about democracy, not just restoring political stability.
These compromise agreements strengthened regional solidarity and the
legitimacy of the actions taken by the organization. Members were able
to come together to present a unified front that addressed the concerns
of all, and to take action that promoted regional security.
 C h ap t e r 7
Change and Continuity:
Hemispheric Relations in the
1990s and the New Millennium

Introduction
The cases in chapters 5 and 6 illustrated the ways that structural,
internal relational, normative, and environmental factors can affect deci-
sionmaking within the OAS and the level of influence exerted within
the organization by a dominant member. The 26 cases dating from the
Cold War era depict not only the changing relationships between
member states, but also the evolutionary changes of the organization.
Chapter 4 outlined three different periods of OAS history (from 1948
to 1989) that illustrated changes in the international environment, the
organizational environment, and the policy preferences of members over
time. These shifts were evident in changes in the type of conflict being
handled, the organ and instrument being invoked, and the level of
consensus within the organization. The end of the Cold War resulted in
both changes and continuities within the organization.
One change witnessed in the 1990s was the redefinition of and
response to security threats in the region. In contrast to the 1960s when
the organization was largely concerned with communist threats, OAS
members have been focused on threats to democratic governance since the
1990s. Whereas the organization was less active in responding to regional
security threats in the 1970s and 1980s, the OAS actively responded on a
number of occasions when democratic government was at risk in the
1990s. The revitalized organization has been able to address these threats
using several new mechanisms put in place in the early 1990s including
Resolution 1080 and the Democratic Charter (both discussed later).
Another change that is evident is the shift in the priority given to the
principle of representative democracy vis-à-vis the principle of nonin-
tervention. The 1978 case of Nicaragua signaled the beginning of a
 152 / organization of american states

normative shift within the OAS promoting the value of democratic

government. The end of the Cold War brought this concern for democ-
racy to the forefront as member states revised their perceptions of
regional threats and revitalized the organization. A third change seen in
the 1990s is the renewal of cooperation and consensus among members.
The impact of Resolution 1080 and the Democratic Charter in restor-
ing democracy has been notable based on the high level of consensus
among member states. Members have been unified in their defense of
democracy, and have responded rapidly when governments in the region
have been threatened. The consensus achieved in the 1990s is quite a
contrast to relations in the 1970s and 1980s, when consensus was low
and threats did not invoke a unified regional response.
Rather than marking a distinct break from the past, however, the
changes in normative priorities and member consensus can actually be
viewed as part of a greater continuity seen in the organization. Although
the priorities given to regional principles have shifted in favor of democ-
racy over nonintervention, the impact of norms on organizational deci-
sionmaking continues to play a significant role. The consensus seen in
the 1990s is also not new, but closely resembles the relations between
members in the 1950s prior to the intensification of the Cold War. As
noted in chapter 6, the majority of decisions made historically by
member states have been either consensual, or based on compromises to
achieve consensus. This remained true throughout the 1990s with
members striving to promote regional unity based on support for repre-
sentative democracy. Despite this common goal and high level of
consensus within the organization, some disagreements between
members are still evident. In the cases where democracy has been threat-
ened, members have been united on the desired end (restoration of
democracy) but have sometimes been at odds concerning the means to
achieve that end. For example, when Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted
as president of Haiti in 1991, Argentina and Venezuela wanted the OAS
to approve military action to restore him to power. Initially, however,
the majority of members did not approve of military force and chose
instead to impose sanctions to try to force General Raoul Cedras from
power. Despite these different proposed means, members were in agree-
ment on the desired end: the restoration of democracy in Haiti.
This chapter examines the changing nature and definition of security
threats to the region and the structural adaptations in the OAS to
address these redefined threats. The chapter then explores the actions
taken by the OAS in the 1990s and the new millennium, and examines
 change and continuity / 153

the cooperative relations between Latin American members and the

United States in this “new” era.

Redefining Regional Security

One of the changes seen in the post–Cold War era is the redefinition of
hemispheric “security” issues. The traditional concept of regional secu-
rity based on geopolitical/strategic threats has gradually been expanded
to include a number of concerns that had not previously been consid-
ered “security issues.” The United States and Latin American states have
developed a common agenda of security concerns that includes consid-
eration of human rights, democracy, the environment, government
reform, social equality, and a free-market environment (Wiarda 1995).
These issues have been of nominal concern to Latin American states for
many years, but until the collapse of the Soviet Union they were not
considered genuine security issues. After a decade of discussion and
redefinition, in the new millennium regional order and security have
increasingly come to be defined in terms of collective defense of democ-
racy, and the promotion of liberal economic reform and regional inte-
gration. As the number of democratic countries in the hemisphere has
increased, a growing consensus supporting democratic government has
emerged. Taking into consideration the broader definition of regional
security issues, current concerns include not only traditional threats
such as boundary disputes, but also threats to democracy (i.e., coups or
other disruptions of the democratic process), and threats related to
narco-trafficking.

New Normative Priorities and Institutional Structures

In addition to a broader concept of regional security, the end of the
Cold War has led to a new prioritization of regional norms. The Western
hemisphere has had a long history of support for norms such as state
sovereignty, nonintervention, pacific settlement of disputes, consulta-
tion between states during crises, and representative democracy. All
these principles are in the OAS Charter dating back to 1948. The prior-
ities placed on these principles, however, have shifted over time. State
sovereignty and nonintervention largely dominated security discussions
from the 1940s to the 1990s. Recently, however, states have placed
less emphasis on the principle of state sovereignty in conflicts in
which democracy is threatened, thus allowing for greater multilateral
 154 / organization of american states

intervention to address this concern. This new attitude toward inter-

vention in support of democracy, combined with the broader definition
of security concerns, has altered the security arena in the new century. It
has allowed for a more active response from member states when
regional security is threatened.
The redefinition of regional security has taken place at many levels
and in many forums in the Western hemisphere, but has been largely
institutionalized within the OAS. The OAS has been an ideal forum for
the discussions that have resulted in the broader definition of security
issues because it is the only regional organization in which all states of
the hemisphere are members.46 In addition, the organization has been
revitalized in the 1990s after several decades of decline. Members have
expressed renewed interest in acting multilaterally to address a number
regional concerns including the promotion and protection of democ-
racy. The first step taken regionally to promote democracy in the hemi-
sphere was taken in 1990 when the OAS General Assembly established
the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD). It was created to
provide advisory services and technical assistance to member states
on issues of democratic government. Its main objective has been to
provide an effective and immediate response to OAS member states
requesting advice or assistance in modernizing or strengthening their
political institutions and democratic processes (www.oas.org). The UPD
has strengthened democracy in two ways: (1) by helping members to
develop solid, transparent, and efficient political institutions and (2) by
promoting a democratic political culture in the societies of the
Americas.
In its first five years the UPD was most active in the area of electoral
observations. Early efforts usually included a few high-level observers
who were present on election day. Later missions expanded considerably
to include monitoring of the registration process, the campaign, the
voting process, and the verification of results by electoral officials.
Following the First Summit of the Americas (1994), the UPD was
strengthened and restructured to carry out special programs in support
of peace processes on the continent. One example of the work it has
carried out can be seen in Guatemala where the UPD supported the
reintegration of ex-combatants, promoted peaceful resolution of
conflicts, and supported legislative and electoral reforms laid out in the
Peace Accords (1996). In Nicaragua, the UPD has provided support to
government agencies concerned with human rights, and to the peace
commissions (www.upd.oas.org). In the 1990s, the Unit monitored over
50 elections in more than 20 member states. In its efforts to promote a
 change and continuity / 155

democratic political culture, the UPD has developed a regional program

to train young political leaders about the workings of democratic
government. As an organization dedicated to the collection and
management of information relevant to democracy and good govern-
ment, the UPD has supported research, seminars, publications, and a
database on democracy in the hemisphere.
A second step by the OAS to promote democracy was taken in June
1991 in Santiago Chile, when the General Assembly passed Resolution
1080 creating automatic procedures for convening an OAS Meeting of
Foreign Ministers in the event of a coup or other disruption of consti-
tutional order. Resolution 1080 has been invoked on four occasions:
Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), Guatemala (1993), and Paraguay (1996).
Under Resolution 1080, members have the authority to impose
economic and diplomatic sanctions on states where the constitutional
order has been disrupted, but are not able to take military action. Some
members are more susceptible to such pressures than others. For exam-
ple, when Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted by
General Raoul Cedras in 1991, the economic sanctions imposed by the
OAS were ineffective in restoring Aristide. In the case of Peru in 1992,
however, the threat of economic sanctions brought swift cooperation
from President Alberto Fujimori to restore the constitutional order after
a “self-coup.” If economic and diplomatic sanctions are ineffective in
restoring democracy after a coup, OAS members now have an additional
option at their disposal to promote democratic governance. In
September 1997, the Washington Protocol, an amendment of the OAS
Charter, came into effect. The Protocol allows the organization to
suspend membership of any state whose democratically elected govern-
ment has been overthrown by force.
A third mechanism to promote democracy developed out of the
Summits of the Americas where heads of state met in 1994, 1998, and
2001. At these Summits, members not only redefined the security
agenda by placing new items such as drug trafficking, terrorism, corrup-
tion, and economic integration on the agenda, but they also gave
democracy a high priority. They “reaffirmed hemispheric commitment
to preserve and strengthen [the] democratic systems for the benefit of all
people of the hemisphere . . . to strengthen democratic institutions and
promote and defend constitutional democratic rule in accordance with
the OAS Charter” (First Summit of the Americas, Declaration of
Principles [1994]). Members strongly believed that regional security
was closely linked to the maintenance of democracy and wanted to
establish additional mechanisms for preserving democratic rule. The
 156 / organization of american states

2001 Summit held in Quebec, Canada, directed the OAS to further study
ways in which the organization could strengthen democracy and respond
when it was under threat. The Inter-American Democratic Charter was
the organization’s response to the directive given by the heads of state at
the Summit. A draft of the Charter was presented and approved at the
regular annual session of the General Assembly in June 2001. The
Permanent Council then made suggested revisions and presented a final
draft to a special session of the General Assembly. The General Assembly
adopted the Democratic Charter on September 11, 2001.
The Democratic Charter is a comprehensive document that lays out
the links between democracy and a variety of related topics including
economic development, human rights, institutional development, and
political culture. Section I of the Charter discusses democracy and the
Inter-American System, establishing the rights of the people to democ-
ratic rule and the obligation of governments to promote and defend it.
Democracy and human rights are linked in Section II, which states,
“democracy is indispensable for the effective exercise of fundamental
freedoms and human rights” (Inter-American Democratic Charter,
Article 7). Section III declares, “democracy and social and economic
development are interdependent and are mutually reinforcing” and that
“poverty, illiteracy, and low levels of human development are factors that
adversely affect the consolidation of democracy” (Articles 11 and 12).
The Democratic Charter establishes procedures to respond not only
when there is a formal disruption to democracy (as in a coup), but also
when democracy is seriously altered and at risk (Section IV ). Section V
provides for electoral observer missions to ensure free and fair elections.
Promotion of democratic culture is included in the final section that
advocates programs for “good governance, sound administration, demo-
cratic values, and the strengthening of political institutions and civil
society organizations” (Article 26). The Democratic Charter was first
formally applied in April 2002 shortly after its adoption when President
Hugo Chavez of Venezuela was temporarily forced out of office. It has
also been used to guide the organization’s actions in Haiti as that coun-
try continues to struggle to democratize.

Member Relations and Multilateral Actions

Given that relations between member states in the 1990s were largely
consensual, an analysis of relations between member states based on
different preferences is not particularly valuable. During the Cold War,
the cases handled by the OAS under the Rio Treaty and OAS Charter
 change and continuity / 157

illustrated the impact of organizational factors on the level of influence

the United States was able to wield in the OAS, particularly those cases
in which U.S. preferences differed from those of Latin American
members. In the 1990s, however, there was little need for United States
to take the lead or exert undue influence within the organization.
Members were largely united in their perceptions and definitions of
threats to regional security. The puzzle concerning whether the United
States successfully dominated the organization was not an issue in the
1990s. In addition, the Rio Treaty was not invoked at all between 1989
and 2001 to address regional security concerns. The focus in this
chapter thus shifts to disruptions to democracy and the use of the
new mechanisms discussed earlier to protect and strengthen democratic
governments. The organizational factors that provided insights into
levels of influence exerted by members during the Cold War still provide
useful insights into member relations during the period of consensus
seen in the 1990s.
One aspect of member relations that is evident with the high level of
consensus in the 1990s is the willingness of the United States to support
OAS actions and, in many cases, to act multilaterally to achieve hemi-
spheric goals (and security). Although the United States had participated
in hemispheric deliberations in the OAS in the past, under the Clinton
administration the United States demonstrated a new level of commit-
ment to multilateralism not previously seen. President Clinton personally
participated in the Summits of the Americas (1994, 1998) and reiterated
U.S. support for a Free Trade Area of the Americas. This commitment to
multilateralism was remarkable since the United States was in the privi-
leged position, unlike many states in the region, to take effective unilat-
eral action if it chose to do so. In the past, the United States has taken
unilateral action on a number of occasions, the most notable recent case
being the invasion of Panama and capture of its president, Manuel
Noriega, in 1989 based on drug trafficking allegations. U.S. responses to
disruptions to democratic rule in the hemisphere, however, have been
largely multilateral, in cooperation with other OAS members.
A look at the factors of consensus, norms, resources, and perceived
threat levels, offers insights into incentives for the United States to act
multilaterally on many of the current challenges facing the organization.
The same organizational factors that help explain the dynamic deci-
sionmaking process in which the United States does not always domi-
nate the OAS, also help explain why the United States might choose to
work multilaterally rather than unilaterally in most situations when
regional stability is threatened.
 158 / organization of american states

Strong consensus among member states provides several incentives

for multilateral action. Consensus among members strengthens
the legitimacy of the organization’s resolutions and may weaken the
leadership of a member state that faces hemispheric condemnation.
Consensus also helps the organization respond rapidly to a crisis rather
than engaging in a time-consuming debate about how to respond. In the
context of threats to democracy, there is considerable agreement among
member states embodied in the OAS Charter, Resolution 1080, and the
Democratic Charter to protect and strengthen democratic government
in the region. Consensus on this issue allows the organization to issue
strong condemnations regarding disruptions to democracy. Unity
against coup leaders weakens their position and helps convince them to
restore democracy or face additional sanctions. Consensus promotes a
swift response that can be critical when trying to support a fragile demo-
cratic regime that is facing a challenger.
A strong normative regime can also provide incentives similar to
those of consensus among members for multilateral action on the part
of the United States. Members are motivated when norm violations
occur to take action to uphold the norm. Thus, violators face a strong
prospect of sanctions in response to their actions. Members strengthen
the norm if they all act together in opposition to violations, rather than
responding haphazardly, or not at all. Multilateral action presents the
strongest type of response inspired by united support of regional princi-
ples. An added benefit for the United States is that the United States is
able to avoid the appearance of “imperialism” by engaging in multilat-
eral instead of unilateral actions. The strength of the democratic norm
in the region has led to unified multilateral responses from all member
states when democracy has been threatened in the last decade. In each
of the four cases when Resolution 1080 was invoked, the Foreign
Ministers responded decisively to the threats to democracy.
The factor of resources needed to carry out the resolutions of the
Foreign Ministers has also provided incentives for the United States to
support multilateral actions. The OAS mechanisms that are in place to
respond to threats to democracy are largely diplomatic and economic
sanctions, and do not require significant resources. Thus, the United
States does not have to contribute considerable resources in response to
these threats. This low level of resources needed has allowed the United
States to support multilateral action without much domestic contro-
versy. An examination of the four cases in which Resolution 1080 has
been invoked illustrates how these factors of consensus, norms, and
 change and continuity / 159

resources have provided some incentives for the United States to take
multilateral action.
The threats posed to the region by antidemocratic forces were not
perceived as a direct threat to U.S. security in the 1990s. There was no
longer the underlying ideological concern with communist subversion
that once pervaded U.S. concerns in the region. Coups affected regional
stability and perhaps had economic spillover effects that impeded
regional trade, but did not directly threaten the United States. Thus the
United States was willing to address these problems multilaterally based
on the potential incentives described earlier. Given the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001 and the American global antiterrorist campaign,
it is possible that greater priority might be given to antidemocratic
forces in the new millennium if they are relabeled as terrorist forces.
With such a designation, the United States would likely consider them
a greater threat to the United States and the region. It is uncertain
whether the United States would continue to address such a security
threat multilaterally as it has in the past, or if this higher security prior-
ity would lead the United States to take unilateral actions against threats
to democracy. Recent events in Venezuela and Colombia provide
unclear indications about the U.S. attitude toward multilateral action in
the region. On the one hand, the long-running war against narco-
traffickers and guerilla forces in Colombia has largely been addressed by
the United States through bilateral cooperation with the Colombian
government (although the United States continues to discuss the drug
trafficking problems within the context of the Inter-American Drug
Abuse Control Commission [CICAD]). On the other hand, the events
in Venezuela following the temporary removal of President Hugo
Chavez from office in 2002 indicate a continued willingness to work
multilaterally, but also illustrate that the degree of unity and consensus
among OAS members has declined in recent years.
Throughout the 1990s, however, the consensus that prevailed led to
preferences for multilateral versus bilateral (or unilateral) action by the
United States. There have been a number of incentives for OAS
members, including the United States to take multilateral actions in
response to threats to democracy. The unity behind these multilateral
actions resulted in fairly successful outcomes in restoring democracy
that might not have been possible if member states had been less
unified. This unity and successful restoration of democracy is evident in
the four cases when Resolution 1080 was invoked (Haiti, 1991; Peru,
1992; Guatemala, 1993; and Paraguay, 1996). The first invocation of
 160 / organization of american states

the Democratic Charter (Venezuela, 2002) shows continued support for

democratic norms and multilateral action, but also a weakening of unity
among OAS members. Anti-narcotics operations carried out in
Colombia reveal the limits of U.S. willingness to address security threats
multilaterally.

Defending Democracy
Given the changing nature of security threats to the region, neither the
OAS Charter nor the Rio Treaty was invoked for conflict management
from 1989 (United States–Panama case) to 2001 (attacks on World
Trade Center and Pentagon). The region’s new commitment to defend
democracy led to Resolution 1080 being invoked four times since it was
adopted by the General Assembly in 1991. The steps taken to restore
democracy in these cases closely resemble those taken in earlier decades
under the Rio Treaty or the OAS Charter to resolve conflicts in the
region. Immediately following the crisis, emergency meetings of the
Permanent Council or the Foreign Ministers were called, then special
committees were sent out to investigate and report on the situation,
finally resolutions were issued condemning the disruption of democra-
tic rule and calling for its restoration. Resolution 1080 established these
procedures to help OAS members maintain and strengthen democratic
regimes in the hemisphere. In each case, OAS members worked cooper-
atively through the organization to restore democratic government in
the member state. The cases reveal several challenges facing the OAS
even when there is consensus among members that action must be
taken. In the case of Haiti (1991), economic and diplomatic sanctions
were not enough to restore democracy. The organization had to work
with the United Nations and eventually rely on the threat of military
action to return Aristide to power. In the Peruvian case (1992),
members were faced with a trade-off between reducing the threat of
regional guerilla forces and strengthening democratic institutions.

Haiti (1991)
Resolution 1080 was first invoked following the Haitian coup in
September 1991, a few short months after Resolution 1080 was adopted
by the General Assembly. President Jean-Bertrand Aristide had been
elected in December 1990 in an election deemed free and fair by inter-
national observers. A coup against him occurred on September 30,
1991, led by dissatisfied elements of the army and supported by many
 change and continuity / 161

of the country’s economic elites. Aristide fled into exile. The OAS secre-
tary general, João Baena Soares, called for an emergency meeting of the
Permanent Council on that same day. The Council condemned the events
in Haiti and called for an ad hoc meeting of the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs. The Foreign Ministers, meeting on October 3, also condemned
the coup and refused to recognize the ruling military junta led by General
Raoul Cedras. They called for diplomatic and economic sanctions
against Haiti. Following an unsuccessful diplomatic mission by the OAS
secretary general to restore democracy to Haiti, the Foreign Ministers
recommended freezing Haitian assets. Sanctions were implemented
in November 1991 with all trade embargoed except for humanitarian
purposes. Although military intervention was proposed by Argentina and
Venezuela, members opted instead to send another mediation team to
negotiate with Cedras to return Aristide to power. The OAS also sent an
IACHR team to investigate charges of human rights violations.
The Foreign Ministers met again in May 1992 to tighten the
embargo and urge member states to “adopt whatever actions may be
necessary for the greater effectiveness [of the measures]” (as cited in
Atkins 1997, 208). When further negotiation efforts met with failure,
the OAS decided to request assistance from the United Nations. The
UN Security Council met in November 1992 and issued its own call for
an economic embargo. The UN secretary general appointed a special
representative to begin negotiations with the Haitian de facto govern-
ment and worked closely with the OAS to try to restore Aristide to
power. Progress toward restoring democracy was slow as Cedras refused
to implement the Governors Island Agreement reached in July 1993.
This agreement would have returned Aristide to power, promoted
administrative and judicial reforms, modernized the army, and created a
new police force. UN sanctions were to be lifted and Cedras would step
down. UN and OAS human rights monitors would be allowed to enter
the country and international forces would train new police forces, help
rebuild infrastructure, and retrain the military for professional (i.e.,
non-political) roles. When the United Nations Mission in Haiti
(UNMIH) arrived in Port-au-Prince in October 1993, they were met by
violent crowds and were unable to dock. They left port the next day and
sanctions were reimposed.
The situation was essentially an impasse for the next nine months.
When no further progress was made in negotiations, the UN Security
Council imposed a total trade embargo and authorized a naval blockade
to enforce it in May 1994. In July the Security Council authorized the
United States to put together a multinational force to restore democracy.
 162 / organization of american states

Finally, in September 1994, pending the imminent arrival of 20,000

U.S. troops acting under UN authority, Cedras capitulated and Aristide
was restored to power. U.S. troops were replaced in March 1995, after a
secure and stable environment was established, by a UN force of 6,000
troops who worked to restore law and order in the country. The demo-
cratic crisis ended following legislative and presidential elections in
1995. During both elections the OAS and the United Nations provided
Electoral Assistance Teams to monitor the process. Although the legisla-
tive elections, held in June, were disorganized and disorderly, the presi-
dential election in December was more efficient and resulted in the first
peaceful transfer of power to a democratically elected successor (Atkins
1997, 214).
In this early effort by the OAS to restore democracy in Haiti, OAS
members were united in their determination to see democratically
elected President Aristide returned to power. OAS actions reflect this
determination and unity throughout the struggle. Because of the
high level of consensus, members were able to respond quickly to
the crisis. The Permanent Council met the same day of the coup to call
the Foreign Ministers into session just four days later. Both meetings
invoked Resolution 1080 and condemned the coup. Members solidly
affirmed the norm of representative democracy and used the resources
at their disposal to restore democracy in Haiti by imposing diplomatic
and economic sanctions, and eventually threatening the use of military
force. With an estimated 40,000 refugees fleeing by boat to the United
States, the United States had a strong interest in seeing the situation
stabilized. Rather than acting unilaterally, however, it chose to act in
cooperation with OAS members and the United Nations to resolve the
crisis. Unlike previous cases such as the Dominican Republic (1965), in
the Haitian case OAS members supported U.S. involvement because the
United States was upholding a democratically elected government and
following the procedures established by the OAS General Assembly in
Resolution 1080. The United States was able to safeguard its own secu-
rity interests and maintain the legitimacy of its actions because of its
multilateral approach.

Peru (1992 and 2000)

Resolution 1080 was invoked a second time when Peruvian President
Alberto Fujimori engaged in a “self-coup” in April 1992. The relatively
unknown Fujimori had been elected in a surprise victory over the
 change and continuity / 163

center–right coalition candidate, Mario Vargas Llosa, in 1990.

Fujimori had introduced “shock therapy” measures to reduce hyperin-
flation from 7,650 to 139 percent in one year (www.state.gov). He also
took a hard-line against the guerilla movement, Sendero Luminoso, that
had wracked the country with violence. When Fujimori began to face
opposition to his reform efforts, he engaged in a “self-coup” with the
support of the military to strengthen the position of the president vis-à-vis
the other branches of government. He suspended the constitution and
most civil rights, and ruled by decree. He closed Congress, intervened
in the judiciary, established martial law, arrested several members of
Congress, and censored the media (Atkins 1997, 410). He justified
these measures by arguing that the legislature and judiciary had been
hindering the security forces in their fight against the guerrillas (http://
news.bbc.co.uk).
One week after the coup, the OAS Foreign Ministers convened and
issued a resolution “deeply deploring” Fujimori’s actions and calling for
the restoration of democratic institutions in Peru. The resolution also
urged members to suspend financial assistance to Peru. Several states in
the hemisphere, including the United States, withheld aid contributions
until democracy was restored. The ministers appointed a special mission
to initiate negotiations between the Fujimori government and the oppo-
sition to restore the democratic order. Although Fujimori initially
proposed holding a plebiscite to validate his seizure of power (drawing
on his popular support to legitimize his actions), he eventually yielded
to pressure from the international community and presented an election
plan to the OAS Foreign Ministers when they met in the Bahamas in
May 1992. The election would be for a Democratic Constituent Congress
(CCD) that would draft a new constitution and serve as an interim
national legislature. The OAS provided technical electoral assistance and
observation for the election of the CCD in November 1992 and for the
election of municipal officials. A number of major political parties
abstained from participating in the election claiming the process was not
free and fair (Atkins 1997, 410).
Despite the protests of the opposition parties, at the Meeting of
Foreign Ministers in December 1992, a majority of OAS members
declared the elections free and fair, and viewed them as a step toward
restoring democracy. Canada, Venezuela, and the United States disagreed
with this endorsement, but because Fujimori maintained strong public
support and was still faced with the threat of the Sendero Luminoso
guerrillas, they did not take further actions against Fujimori. Despite the
 164 / organization of american states

fact that OAS members had recently redefined security threats to

include the disruption of democracy, members were faced with the diffi-
cult decision in this case. They had to consider whether the guerilla
forces or Fujimori’s self-coup posed a greater security threat to the
region. The majority decided in favor of Fujimori, contingent on his
plan to restore democratic institutions, and Peru was returned to good
standing within the OAS in early 1993.
Had Fujimori not faced a united front in the hemisphere opposing
his “self-coup,” it is unlikely he would have acceded to the Foreign
Ministers’ call for the restoration of democratic institutions. The
consensus among OAS members led to a swift response and consider-
able international pressure on Fujimori for violating the norm of repre-
sentative democracy. The Peruvian case is somewhat unusual, however,
because Fujimori actually faced more international condemnation than
domestic opposition to his coup. This gave him some leverage in nego-
tiating with the Foreign Ministers to restore democratic processes in
Peru. In addition, his success in combating Sendero Luminoso guerril-
las also gained him some room for compromise with OAS members.
The outcome in the Peruvian case, however, was not entirely satisfac-
tory in terms of strengthening the democratic institutions in Peru.
Fujimori made some concessions and held elections, but still maintained
much autocratic authority. It became obvious throughout the rest of the
1990s that he was less committed to democracy than many OAS
members had hoped. The actions Fujimori took in 1992 and 1993 were
not the first steps toward greater democratization, but were essentially the
only steps he took. In hindsight, those members who had reservations
about Fujimori’s commitment to democracy were justified in their suspi-
cions. As the presidential elections of 2000 approached, Fujimori asserted
that he had the right to run for a third term even though this was prohib-
ited by the new constitution adopted in 1993. He justified his position
by arguing that his first term was served under the old constitution, thus
he had only served one term under the new one that limited him to two
terms. Several judges were fired when they ruled against this interpreta-
tion of the constitution. In addition to this term-limit scandal, criticisms
had been growing that Fujimori had been using his authoritarian power
against his democratic political opponents, not just the guerilla forces.
His security advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, was accused of intimidating
and spying on political opponents. Fujimori was accused of exerting
unfair control on the mass media and the judiciary, and using govern-
ment resources to support his own political campaign. Following the
 change and continuity / 165

June 2000 election, the OAS expressed concerns over irregularities in the
electoral campaign (although it did not invoke Resolution 1080).
Eventually domestic opponents and OAS members put enough pressure
on Fujimori that he resigned and left the country in November 2000.
President Alejandro Toledo took office in July 2001 following a new pres-
idential election in April, which was monitored by the UPD.
The OAS was more successful in strengthening democracy in Peru in
2000 than it had been in 1992. Many of the institutional factors were
the same at both times: members were still unified in their support for
representative democracy and had the mechanisms and resources in
place to promote democratic government. One factor that was different
in 2000, however, was the reduced level of threat posed by Sendero
Luminoso. Fujimori had captured the Sendero leader, Abimael
Guzman, in 1992 and weakened the guerillas considerably. Although
some OAS members had been willing to compromise with Fujimori in
1992 as he attempted to retain his autocratic position to deal with the
guerillas, in 2000, states were not willing to tolerate continued authori-
tarianism because it was no longer justifiable based on security concerns.
Members no longer felt like they had to make a trade-off between
democracy and security. OAS members had not had to make this kind
of trade-off in the Haitian case (1991) because democracy and security
were clearly linked. The disruption to democracy in Haiti had caused a
security problem in the region with a large flow of refugees heading to
the United States. In Peru in 1992, there had not been an exodus of
refugees, but there had been a continued guerilla threat. Fujimori thus
retained many of his powers because members perceived the guerilla
threat as greater than the threat to democracy and were satisfied with the
changes Fujimori proposed to make. The situation was reversed by
2000, and OAS members were determined to see democracy fully restored.
The situation in Peru illustrates another challenge that the organiza-
tion faces as it redefines security threats and seeks to uphold regional
principles. Just as the concerns about sovereignty and nonintervention
sometimes made it difficult for members to give priority to the norm of
democracy in earlier decades, so do current security concerns when they
run counter to promoting democracy.

Guatemala (1993)
In May 1993, a similar “self-coup” to that of President Fujimori was
attempted by President Jorge Serrano of Guatemala. Serrano had faced
difficult circumstances following his election in November 1990. When
 166 / organization of american states

he was inaugurated in January 1991, he had pledged to improve

Guatemala’s human rights record and to reach a final peace agreement
with the Guatemalan United Revolutionary Front (URNG) that had
been engaged in guerilla activities since the 1960s. Talks began in April
1991, then became deadlocked at the end of the year. Negotiations were
resumed in May 1992 and once again broke down. On May 24, 1993,
President Serrano, supported by the military high command, suspended
civil rights and other constitutional guarantees, discontinued the judi-
cial system, dissolved congress, and censored the media (Atkins 1997,
198). Serrano had hoped to gain the power necessary to force a final
peace settlement, but faced considerable opposition to his “self-coup”
both at home and abroad.
The Permanent Council of the OAS met the day of the coup in
accordance with Resolution 1080 and officially deplored the events in
Guatemala. They convoked an ad hoc Meeting of the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs who also condemned Serrano’s actions and called for a
constitutional resolution to the situation. The Foreign Ministers sent
Secretary General João Baena Soares to meet with Serrano and threat-
ened to impose economic sanctions if Serrano did not resign. Serrano
initially refused. In the next few days, however, the United States and
the European Community (EC) suspended all aid to Guatemala, and
the United States threatened to suspend its trade relations as well. On
June 1, the Guatemalan military withdrew their support for Serrano and
forced him to resign. President Serrano fled into exile. Additional inter-
national pressure prevented the formation of a governing military junta.
The Guatemalan Congress convened to elect Attorney General Ramiro
de Léon Carpio as president to serve out Serrano’s term until the next
presidential elections in January 1996.47
Rapid international action as well as strong domestic opposition led
to a quick restoration of democracy. Actions were much more harsh
than with Peru in 1992. Domestic opposition made a big difference and
left Serrano with little leverage to use against the demands of the
OAS Foreign Ministers. The Foreign Ministers were determined to see
democracy restored and acted in a united fashion to achieve that end.
The United States fully supported the OAS call for imposing sanctions
against Guatemala and did not need to take further unilateral actions for
the successful restoration of democracy.

Paraguay (1996)
The most recent case when Resolution 1080 was invoked was in
Paraguay in 1996 when the country’s first civilian president in 40 years
 change and continuity / 167

was challenged by Army Chief General Lino Oviedo. President Juan

Carlos Wasmosy had been elected in May 1993 under a new democra-
tic constitution (established in June 1992). This election was monitored
by international observers, including OAS members, and was deemed
free and fair. In April 1996, General Oviedo attempted to oust President
Wasmosy. With the support of the international community and the
Paraguayan people, Wasmosy stood up against Oviedo and called for the
resignation of the General. Oviedo refused to comply and threatened to
invade the presidential palace. The OAS Foreign Ministers met in an
emergency session and unanimously condemned Oviedo’s behavior
and offered their support to President Wasmosy. Wasmosy successfully
asserted his authority and Oviedo was arrested and imprisoned. He
remained imprisoned until President Raul Cubas Grau (elected in 1998)
commuted his sentence and released him, but was forced into exile
when Cubas resigned in scandal in 1999.
In each of these four cases when democracy was threatened in the
hemisphere, the OAS responded rapidly and took unified multilateral
actions to successfully restore democracy (with strong U.S. actions and
help from the United Nations in the case of Haiti). Involvement in
Haiti has been the most prolonged and extensive, but the UPD has
continued to monitor the situations in each of these countries and to
help strengthen their democratic institutions. The OAS was revitalized
in the 1990s because members agreed on their definitions of and
responses to regional threats, particularly threats to democracy. The
United States was a team player in these cases, choosing to act multilat-
erally through the OAS to pursue its regional policy preferences.

Venezuela (2002)
The constitutional order in Venezuela was threatened on April 11, 2002
when President Hugo Chavez briefly lost power in a 48-hour coup by top
military officials. He was removed from the capital and held incommu-
nicado at several different military bases. Although some media sources
reported that he had given his resignation, others challenged this report.
On April 12, Pedro Carmona, a former oil executive, was sworn in as
interim president. He quickly moved to repeal dozens of controversial
economic laws, and dissolved the Supreme Court and the National
Assembly. He promised to hold a presidential election in one year
(http://news.bbc.co.uk). The next day, the lower ranks of the army came
to Chavez’s rescue and crowds of supporters marched in the streets. He
returned to office and promised not to seek revenge against those who
overthrew him, acknowledging that both sides had made mistakes.
 168 / organization of american states

After returning to power, it was clear that the Chavez government

would only achieve stability by engaging in dialogue with the opposi-
tion groups that had been protesting for months prior to the coup. He
began bargaining with these groups with the OAS secretary general,
César Gaviria, the UN Development Program, and the Carter Center
facilitating the discussions. Negotiations between the Venezuelan
government and opposition groups continued through the rest of
2002, with strikes in the oil industry occurring in late November and
a number of street protests taking place. In January 2003, Jimmy
Carter offered two proposals to the negotiating parties. One would be
the adoption of a constitutional amendment that would cut the
president’s term to four years from six, ending Chavez’s term in
office in 2003 to be followed by new elections. The second
option would be for a recall referendum to be held in August 2003 that
would ask the people whether Chavez should be removed from office
(www.nytimes.com; January 25, 2003). Chavez said that he would
support the referendum and the opposition slowly came to support this
option as well, but still made demands concerning protection for those
oil executives who had shut down the state oil company in protest. In
February, both sides signed the “Declaration Against Violence and in
Favor of Peace and Democracy” and continued to work out a final
settlement to the crisis. On May 23, 2003, the parties signed an
Agreement that called for a referendum with the date to be determined
as soon as all the legal and constitutional requirements had been met.
The Agreement specifically expressed adherence to the Inter-American
Democratic Charter, the OAS Charter, and the American Convention
on Human Rights. It urged the National Assembly to form a Truth
Commission to examine the events surrounding April 11, 2002. The
parties also acknowledged the willingness of the OAS, Carter Center,
and the United Nations to provide technical assistance for the upcom-
ing referendum. After a tumultuous year, Venezuela was finally on track
to return to a stable constitutional order.
Although the OAS was actively involved in helping to restore democ-
racy in Venezuela, the crisis revealed a weakening of consensus in the
region. The reactions of Latin American leaders to the coup spanned the
spectrum from support for Chavez to condemnation of the Chavez
government and implicit support for the coup leaders. On the one
hand, President Vicente Fox stated that Mexico would abstain from
recognizing the new government in Venezuela. The presidents of
Paraguay and Argentina also called the new government illegitimate. On
the other hand, President Francisco Flores of El Salvador stated, “we
 change and continuity / 169

consider President Chavez’s resignation as the culmination of a process

of polarization, confrontation and abuses of democratic principles”
(http://news.bbc.co.uk). The U.S. position closely resembled that of
President Flores, with U.S. officials blaming the crisis on Chavez and
accusing him of ordering his supporters to open fire on antigovernment
demonstrators just prior to the coup. Some leaders, rather than offering
support of Chavez or the coup leaders, stressed the importance of
upholding the democratic process. Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo
stated, “I wasn’t the greatest fan of the Chavez government and I recog-
nize that the people have the right to remove their government, but they
have to do so through democratic channels in adherence to the rule of
law” (http://news.bbc.co.uk). OAS Secretary General César Gaviria also
urged Venezuelans to express their dissent constitutionally and not
through coups.
This emphasis on the democratic process became the focus of OAS
members as the Permanent Council met on April 13, 2002 to discuss
the situation in Venezuela. The General Assembly met in a special
session several days later on April 18 and issued a resolution in support
for democracy in Venezuela. At a regular meeting in June 2002, the
General Assembly issued a Declaration on democracy in Venezuela that
invoked the Democratic Charter and reiterated the OAS’s willingness to
provide support to the Venezuelan government to consolidate the demo-
cratic process. It also encouraged the government to continue the
national dialogue that had begun and to work toward national reconcil-
iation (AG/Dec 28). The Permanent Council continued to support the
process of dialogue between opposition groups and the government,
issuing a resolution of “Support for the Process of Dialogue in
Venezuela” in August 2002 (CP/Res 821). At a meeting in December
2002, the Council strongly stood behind the secretary general’s efforts
to negotiate a settlement. The members urged the Venezuelan govern-
ment to promote a constitutional, democratic, peaceful, and electoral
solution, and reiterated “the determination of the member states to
continue applying, without distinction, and in strict accordance with
the letter and spirit of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the
mechanisms provided therein for the preservation and defense of repre-
sentative democracy, and the rejection of the use of violence to replace
any democratic government in the hemisphere” (CP/Res 833;
December 16, 2002).
Although OAS members eventually came together in their call for a
democratic solution to the tensions in Venezuela, when democracy was
first threatened, the response by OAS members was not as united as it
 170 / organization of american states

had been during the 1990s. Members faced a difficult situation in which
the democratically elected president, himself, had not been upholding
democratic principles, so when he was removed from power through a
coup, it was difficult to determine what the best course of action would
be to fully restore democracy. These circumstances led to varied initial
responses from member states. Although the United States joined with
other members in the Permanent Council and General Assembly in
condemning the coup, it did so only after issuing several statements that
implied its support for the removal of Chavez. These statements cast
considerable doubt on its commitment to democratic government in
the eyes of many Latin Americans (Hakim 2002). The United States was
initially unsympathetic toward Chavez, noting that his government had
tried to suppress peaceful demonstrations. Secretary of State Colin
Powell spoke before the special session of the General Assembly on April
18, 2002 and chastised the Chavez administration as well as the coup
leaders. He remarked, “there is no justification for any government to
prevent its citizens from exercising their fundamental rights . . . [and]
democracies do not remain democracies for long if elected leaders use
undemocratic methods” (www.oas.org/speeches).
Powell’s speech to the General Assembly, however, also emphasized
that “all elements of society [should] seek resolution of grievances
through democratic means” and must come together to resolve
their problems constructively and constitutionally. He invoked the
Democratic Charter and declared, “the democratic principles that it
enshrines must be our guide.” This invocation of the Democratic
Charter was what eventually drew OAS members together to promote
the restoration of democracy in Venezuela. All members recognized that
changes needed to be negotiated within the constitutional framework to
restore stability and democracy, and they worked together to achieve
these ends.
The United States chose to support the multilateral mechanisms for
protecting and restoring democracy in Venezuela rather than seeking a
unilateral solution that was most compatible with its own policy prefer-
ences. OAS members agreed upon the desired end, return to a constitu-
tional order, even though initial reactions to the coup were quite
different. It is difficult to predict whether future disruptions to democ-
racy will have similar outcomes, or if the consensus of the 1990s has
come to an end. It seems likely, however, based on the continued
support for the norm of democracy that members will remain united in
their efforts to consolidate democratic government in the region.
The Venezuelan case indicates that members still face challenges to
 change and continuity / 171

upholding this principle, however. Although there are a number of

mechanisms in place to strengthen democracy, their effectiveness is by
no means guaranteed. As Colin Powell noted in his speech to the
General Assembly in April 2002, the Democratic Charter should have
been invoked sooner in the case of Venezuela to prevent the coup from
ever occurring. There were indications that the Chavez administration
was violating democratic norms before he was removed from office, but
the OAS did not respond to these violations. The OAS only got
involved after the coup had occurred. Members acknowledge that there
is still much work to be done to strengthen democracy, but also note
that Venezuela was a successful case in the end.

Narco-Trafficking
The one security issue on which member states have not taken effective
multilateral action is the issue of narco-trafficking. The drug trade
affects every state in the hemisphere in numerous ways ranging from
money laundering and government corruption, to cartel violence and
drug-related crimes. On the issue of the drug trade, however, the United
States has taken bilateral actions in cooperation with Colombia, rather
than relying on the OAS to take multilateral action. Thus far the OAS
has taken only a few small steps toward addressing this threat to the
hemisphere. Members have been working through the Inter-American
Drug Abuse Control Commission to design and implement a new
Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism to measure national progress against
narco-trafficking (“Strengthening Cooperation …,” March–April
1999). Progress has been slow, however, and successes have been limited.
Given the swift, successful, and unified multilateral actions taken in
response to threats to democracy, what explains the lack of dynamic
multilateral action on narco-trafficking concerns? On this issue, the
United States has chosen to move ahead bilaterally, working closely with
Colombia. On the issue of drug trafficking, the United States does not
face the same incentives that promote multilateral actions when democ-
racy is threatened.
In contrast to the cases where consensus was strong and the United
States was motivated to support multilateral action when democracy
was threatened, consensus among members is not as strong on the issue
of narco-trafficking. Although many member states are negatively
affected by the drug trade, Latin American states and the United States
cannot agree whether the problems are supply- or demand-induced, or
what the most effective strategies to address them might be. Without a
 172 / organization of american states

strong consensus on a response to the threat, OAS actions have been

limited and less timely. The lack of regional unity on the drug issue has
limited the usefulness of the OAS and has led the United States to act bilat-
erally in cooperation with Colombia and other key states on this issue.
The violation of norms with regard to the drug war does not present
members with a clear-cut decision as the cases of threats to democracy
have. Arguably there is a need to respond to the violations of human
rights norms. There are numerous reports and documentation of human
rights abuses, but these are not limited to the guerilla forces or narco-
traffickers (Robinson 1998). Paramilitary forces are also guilty of such
abuses. OAS members are thus faced with a difficult decision to
condemn not just the guerrilla forces (Sendero Luminoso and FARC),
but also the state forces fighting them (thus undermining the legitimate
state government). Support of human rights norms in this situation
contradicts the norms of nonintervention and state sovereignty.
Although members have indicated a willingness to override issues of
nonintervention and sovereignty when democracy is threatened, states
have not yet made this same level of commitment to human rights
norms. This has reduced the willingness of OAS to act with regard to
such violations in Colombia and other states challenged by narco-
traffickers. This lack of regional commitment has led the United States
to opt for bilateral solutions. Even within the United States, however,
there is disagreement among policymakers on the importance of
protecting human rights in the midst of the drug war. For example,
Congress attempted to limit funding of the Colombian military until
progress on human rights issues was evident. President Bill Clinton
overrode this effort, however, declaring that the war on drugs was a
national emergency and that the Colombian military needed the fund-
ing right away.
An effective regional response to narco-trafficking (if one is in fact
possible) would require considerable resources, including military
resources. Such a contribution on the part of the United States would
require consensus among OAS members (particularly between Latin
American states and the United States) on the type of resolutions issued
and operations to be conducted. Since there is no agreement on how to
best address the threat the drug war poses to the region, the United
States has chosen to act on its own, responding to the requests of the
Colombian government in particular. A multilateral approach to this
transnational problem might ultimately be more efficient and effective,
but only if there is agreement about the means to address the problem.
 change and continuity / 173

The contrast between OAS responses to interruptions to democracy

and to the drug war illustrates a Cold War pattern that has continued in
the post–Cold War era. The United States continues to play a leading
role in those situations that pose the greatest threat to the region. The fact
that the United States considers narco-trafficking to be a national threat
increases the likelihood that the United States will continue to act bilat-
erally rather than multilaterally on the issue. Threats to democracy gener-
ally have less direct impact on the United States than narcotics-related
problems. Since OAS members have not been in complete agreement
about responses to the crisis in Colombia, however, the United States has
chosen to act unilaterally rather than multilaterally through the OAS.
The issue of narco-trafficking reveals the limits of U.S. willingness to
work multilaterally, and also shows some of the weakening of the orga-
nization that occurs when there is not consensus among members.
The regional response to drug trafficking may serve as an indicator
for what relations between the United States and the OAS will look like
in the future if consensus is not maintained, or relations may continue
to be more cooperative as they were in addressing the Venezuelan coup.
Much depends on how the United States chooses to define threats in the
region. Antidemocratic forces may be labeled as “terrorists,” which
would likely invoke a stronger unilateral U.S. response than was seen in
the 1990s. The incentives remain, however, for the United States to
pursue multilateral action even in responding to such “terrorist” threats.
Multilateral responses provide added legitimacy to the actions; they
allow for sharing the financial and personnel burden; and they uphold
regional principles through the use of the security mechanisms that are
already in place.

Summary
The end of the Cold War has led to some changes as well as continuities
within the OAS. Security concerns have expanded beyond traditional
geopolitical/strategic concerns to include protection of democracy and
expansion of the liberal economic order. The OAS has adapted its struc-
tures and priorities to this changing security environment, creating the
UPD, passing Resolution 1080, and signing the Democratic Charter to
address threats to democracy. These new mechanisms reveal the chang-
ing priorities given to regional norms with greater emphasis on repre-
sentative democracy than has been seen in the past. The strong
consensus among member states concerning support for democracy has
 174 / organization of american states

led to the OAS being fairly effective in responding to threats to democ-

ratic regimes in the region. The four invocations of Resolution 1080 in
Haiti, Peru, Guatemala, and Paraguay eventually led to a restoration of
democracy in all four cases. The first invocation of the Democratic
Charter in Venezuela was also successful.
One aspect of the OAS that reflected a change from the 1980s, but
resembled relations in the 1950s, was the high degree of consensus
among members. As members sought to strengthen democracy, there
were disagreements concerning the specific actions to be taken, but not
on the end to be achieved. Members, including the United States, had
incentives to act multilaterally on most issues with the exception of the
threat posed by narco-trafficking. Despite the changes in the region
toward supporting democratization, the issue of narco-trafficking has
remained a more traditional security concern. The consensus among
member states is much lower on this issue. The negative impact of
narco-trafficking on states in the region remains high, with the United
States strongly motivated to address the issue from the perspective of
reducing drug supplies.
Examining the workings of the OAS in the post–Cold War era
provides additional insights into member relations. High levels of
consensus supporting the norm of democracy, and benefits to pooling
resources provide incentives for members, including the United States,
to work multilaterally to promote regional security. On the issue of
narco-trafficking, however, these same incentives are absent, leading the
United States to take bilateral action in cooperation with Colombia and
other states to address this threat to U.S. security. Despite the lack of
consensus and effective multilateral action on the threats posed by
narco-trafficking, the OAS has performed well following the end of the
Cold War. The ability of the OAS to redefine regional security concerns
and adapt its institutional structure to address these concerns bodes well
for the future of the organization. The value of the organization for
member states and its future prospects are addressed in chapter 8.
 C h ap t e r 8
Conclusions and Future
Prospects for the OAS

As the United States seeks to strengthen its alliances around the world
following the attacks of September 11, 2001, it has turned to its formal
alliance partners, including the members of the OAS, for support. The
OAS, founded as a collective security organization, is structured to
respond to security threats to its members. Historically, it has engaged
in conflict resolution efforts through the invocation of its Charter or the
Rio Treaty. More recently Resolution 1080 and the Democratic Charter
have been invoked to defend democracy in the region. The OAS has
served as a regional forum for dialogue between the United States and
Latin American states on these security issues and has responded to over
thirty regional crises in the past 50 years. A close examination of these
responses reveals that some have been in line with policy preferences of
the United States, others have not, and many have been based on
regional consensus. An exploration of the unexpected outcomes when
the organization does not simply adopt the policy proposals of its most
powerful member reveals a number of interesting aspects about organi-
zational processes and member relations. The analytical framework laid
out in chapter 2 facilitates examination of relations within an IO, high-
lighting previously unexplored organizational factors and their impact
on the influence member states exert within the organization. These
factors also provide insights into members’ motivations to pursue multi-
lateral or unilateral actions in the post–Cold War era. The in-depth case
studies in the latter half of the book illustrate the interactions between
institutional factors and the ways that they affect organizational deci-
sionmaking. This study of the OAS reveals some unexpected outcomes,
including a surprising amount of cooperation among members when
addressing security issues, and the inability of the United States to domi-
nate the organization at all times. It is important to recognize and
understand the relational dynamics within such an IO in order to assess
 176 / organization of american states

its ability to respond to member requests and needs in the future. This
chapter evaluates the usefulness of the analytical framework and the
empirical findings of the case studies, and concludes with an assessment
of the organization’s future prospects and its ability to respond to the
security needs of its members.

Analytical Framework
This book explores the decisionmaking process within the OAS as it is
affected by structural, internal relational, normative, and environmental
factors. These four perspectives help determine the conditions in which
a hegemonic member exerts, or is unable to exert, its influence within
the organization. A study of the OAS at the organizational level rather
than the system level of analysis expands upon the realist and neoliberal
institutionalist understandings of IOs. These theories provide useful,
but incomplete, explanations for decisionmaking in IOs.
Realist theory portrays IOs as the tools of their most powerful
members. Its focus is primarily on power relations between states. This
perspective would anticipate that decisionmaking outcomes would
frequently be categorized as “U.S. dominance” because of the hegemonic
power of the United States, but cannot explain the anomalous cases in
which the United States fails to dominate the OAS, nor the cases where
members work consensually or achieve compromises. Realism might
argue that cases where the United States is not dominant are explained
by a lack of hegemonic interest, or by the hegemon choosing to act
unilaterally, but in many of the cases examined here, the United States
displayed a strong interest in acting multilaterally through the OAS. For
example, in the Cuban case (1960), in which the United States and Latin
Americans reached a compromise on the final wording of the Foreign
Ministers’ resolution, the United States was keenly interested in
condemning the subversive behavior of the Sino-Soviet powers as well as
Cuba. Furthermore, the United States recognized that a region-wide
condemnation of Soviet subversion in the hemisphere would have more
weight than a statement made solely by the United States. It was impor-
tant for the United States to work within the OAS and compromise with
Latin American members in order to achieve its goals.
The United States did initially attempt a unilateral solution to the
Nicaraguan case (1978). When U.S. attempts at a negotiated settlement
with Somoza and the non-FSLN rebels failed, however, the United
States was forced to seek multilateral support for an Inter-American
peace force. In each case, the multilateral forum of the OAS was the
 future prospects for the oas / 177

most effective and legitimate means for the United States to use to
address regional concerns and to try to find support for its policy pref-
erences. The significance of the regional organization for the hegemonic
member, and the hegemon’s inability to dominate the organization in
every case are unexpected and unexplainable outcomes for realist theory.
The realist explanation for decisionmaking in the organization based on
power relations is oversimplified. The impact of additional factors must
be examined.
Neoliberal institutionalism is equally unable to explain the inability
of the United States to dominate the OAS. Neoliberal institutionalism
helps to explain cases of compromise and consensus, but doesn’t fully
capture the impact of organizational factors on decision outcomes. In an
effort to explain cooperative relations among states within an institu-
tional context, neoliberalism focuses on bargaining and state interests.
The key to achieving cooperation is for states to have some shared inter-
ests. An IO facilitates cooperation by helping states reach an equilibrium
point when several exist. In the context of the OAS, Latin American
members and the United States have had a number of shared interests
that they have pursued within the organization. The point of contention
in some instances was the means used to pursue a shared goal, rather
than differing goals. For example, in the Cuban case (1960), Latin
American members and the United States both wanted to reduce the
influences of China and the Soviet Union in the region. The United
States viewed Cuba as a conspirator in terms of allowing international
communism to intervene in hemispheric affairs. The United States
wanted to specifically condemn Cuba for its role in increasing regional
instability. Latin American states believed that it was not necessary to
condemn Cuba specifically in order to reduce Sino-Soviet intervention,
so they chose only to condemn the Soviet Union and China. The situa-
tion was similar in the Dominican–Venezuelan case (1960) where Latin
American members and the United States both wanted to establish a
more democratic government in the Dominican Republic. They were
divided, however, over the means of promoting democracy within the
Dominican Republic. The United States preferred holding and moni-
toring elections. Latin American members, preferring a less interven-
tionist option, chose to impose sanctions.
Although neoliberal institutionalism recognizes that an IO helps
states reach compromise agreements when multiple equilibrium points
exist, such as when members are divided over the means to pursue their
common goals, it does not consider the impact of structural and norma-
tive factors on the diplomatic exchanges that occur in this bargaining
 178 / organization of american states

process. (Internal relational and environmental factors are taken into

account to some degree when considering the shared interests that bring
members together within an IO in the first place.) What institutional
mechanisms affect the choice of means adopted when states have
common interests? An answer to this question requires a different level
of analysis. The analytical framework developed in chapter 2 helps
define and categorize previously unspecified organizational factors with
the potential to impact the influence wielded by the United States
within the OAS. The synthesis of these perspectives provides insights
into relations among member states within the context of the OAS. The
four organizational factors give more detail into the decisionmaking
process than realism or neoliberalism alone can do. The next section on
case comparisons shows the impact of each factor on the level of U.S.
influence in the organization. The following two sections on regional
principles and on consensus, resources, and threats to the region discuss
the interaction of four factors and the way that they affect organizational
decisionmaking.

Case Comparisons
The impact of resources, principles, consensus, and the perceived level
of threat on decisionmaking within the OAS is evident in the case stud-
ies. The more resources that were needed to carry out the resolutions of
the Organ of Consultation, the more influence the United States
wielded. This was most evident in the case of the Dominican Republic
(1965). U.S. military forces were the core of the IAPF created by the
Foreign Ministers. The mandates and operations of the IAPF coincided
with the policy preferences of the United States as it sought to manage
the restoration of democracy in the Dominican Republic. In other cases,
the OAS did not need such extensive resources to carry out its resolu-
tions, and the United States had less influence in the organization. For
example, in the Dominican–Venezuelan case (1960), a Special
Committee was established by the Foreign Ministers to monitor the
impact of sanctions and to recommend whether they should be
increased or terminated. The Committee required few resources
compared to the IAPF in the Dominican Republic.
The Dominican case (1965) also illustrated that the greater the
disagreement among Latin American members, the greater influence the
United States had. Consensus and unity among Latin American
members were low in the Dominican case, and the United States was
 future prospects for the oas / 179

able to gain support for its proposals even though there was opposition
to them from some members. In other cases such as the Dominican
Republic–Venezuela (1960) and Nicaragua (1978) in which U.S. influ-
ence was reduced, there was a high degree of Latin American unity.
Latin American members were in agreement on alternative plans to U.S.
policy proposals.
Latin American members and the United States have regularly
referred to regional principles to support their positions and justify
their actions. Although the priorities given to these norms have shifted
over time, they have remained a central factor affecting OAS decision-
making during security crises. Any proposal that is not rooted in
regional norms, or that is contrary to them, receives little support from
OAS members.
The cases in which the United States failed to gain the support of
Latin American members, or was forced to compromise with them, also
support the contention that if there is a low- or mid-level threat, the
United States has less influence. For example, in the Cuban case (1960)
there was recognition among Latin American members that Sino-Soviet
influence in the region was having a destabilizing effect in some member
states, thus members were willing to compromise with the United States
on condemning such intervention. There was not a great enough fear for
regional security, however, that Latin American states would condemn a
fellow member. The Dominican–Venezuelan case (1960) also did not
pose enough of a threat to Latin American members that they felt
compelled to turn to the United States for leadership. The imposition of
sanctions was determined to be sufficient to reduce Dominican inter-
vention in the region without resorting to other means. In the Nicaraguan
case (1978), the conflict was not seen as threatening enough to request
U.S. intervention for security purposes. Latin American members were
resistant to the proposal for an IAPF, recognizing that such a force
would lead to strong U.S. influence within the organization and in
Nicaragua. In addition, Latin American members did not want to risk
Somoza remaining in power if the United States took an active role in
the conflict, so they rejected the U.S. peace force proposal.
None of the four factors alone is determinant. Each factor interacts
with the others. The ability of Latin American members to achieve
consensus is linked to their ability to formulate alternative proposals to
those of the United States based on regional principles, with the use of
limited resources. When there is a low-level threat, there are a number
of diplomatic options available to the organization. A high-level threat
 180 / organization of american states

may necessitate a militarized response, which leaves Latin American

members more dependent on the United States for leadership and
resources. The lack of an alternative proposal weakens Latin American
members’ unity and their ability to resist U.S. pressure. In each case of
Latin American unity, there was an alternative plan that Latin American
members supported, giving the United States less influence through
policy leadership. For example, the Latin American proposal for a
Nicaraguan solution to oust Somoza was based on the principles of
representative democracy and self-determination. Furthermore, this
proposed solution did not require extensive OAS resources.

Regional Principles
The significance of regional principles such as respect of state sovereignty
and territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes, nonintervention
in the domestic affairs of other states, consultation in the event of a crisis,
and representative democracy is introduced in chapter 3. The exploration
of the origins of the Inter-American System and the OAS indicate that
all these principles emerged before the United States took a more active
role in the region and continued to evolve despite U.S. resistance
throughout the 1920s and early 1930s. After a period of cooperation
throughout World War II, the United States and Latin American states
incorporated the evolving regional principles into the two instruments
that have defined regional security responses for 50 years: the Rio Treaty
and OAS Charter. The evolutionary history of regional principles
supports the constructivist literature in IR that asserts that IOs can play
a more significant role in IR than has previously been acknowledged by
realism and institutionalism. Institutions can take on a life of their own
following their creation. Through normative influences, IOs affect the
preferences of member states as well as limit their policy options through
threats of sanctions and diplomatic coercion (Finnemore 1996, Wendt
1992). Within the OAS, principles serve to place some constraints on
U.S. actions in that the United States frequently feels obliged to justify
its proposals (multilateral) and actions (unilateral) in terms of regional
norms. Norms also serve to unite Latin American members when they
are opposed to U.S. proposals. By making reference to regional princi-
ples, Latin American members are able to justify their opposition.
The cases of conflict resolution examined in chapters 4–7 provide
further evidence that regional principles have been a fundamental part
of the Inter-American System and have consistently shaped interstate
relations in the region on security issues. The principles of pacific settle-
ment and consultation have been the norms at the center of each case
 future prospects for the oas / 181

brought before the Council or Foreign Ministers. Members of the OAS

have taken their responsibilities seriously to promote peaceful settlement
of disputes in the region. They have been committed to promoting
regional security through diplomacy rather than force of arms.
The principles of sovereignty and nonintervention have also been
invoked often in an effort by Latin American states to resist U.S. hege-
monic intervention. In the Cuban case (1960), Latin American members
resisted U.S. pressures to include specific condemnation of Cuba in the
Foreign Ministers’ final resolution because they felt such condemnation
was a violation of the principle of sovereignty and self-determination. In
the cases of the Dominican Republic–Venezuela (1960) and Nicaragua
(1978), Latin American members maintained that the actions proposed
by the United States would violate the principle of nonintervention and
thus justified their opposition on these grounds.
The frequent reference to these inter-American principles in such
forums as the OAS, however, does not mean that they are unambiguous
or unchallenged. In fact, several principles are essentially contradictory
when taken to the extreme. Support for human rights and representative
democracy in the form of condemnation of a regime (or other punitive
actions) could be interpreted as an act of intervention, which violates the
principles of sovereignty and nonintervention. Thus, regular debates
occur among members about which principles ought to take precedence
and how OAS actions might be interpreted juridically. These debates
about principles are evident in the meetings of the Organ of Consultation
when member states attempt to justify their policy proposals based on
regional principles. In some cases, such as the Dominican–Venezuelan
(1960) and Nicaraguan (1978) cases, members showed considerable
disagreement concerning interpretations. The United States defended its
proposals for intervention based on the principles of establishing and
supporting democracy. Latin American members preferred options that
did not result in a physical intervention in the countries (i.e., sanctions
against the Dominican Republic, and action by the Nicaraguan people).
In the Dominican–Venezuelan case (1960), Latin American members
were able to unify and to give precedence to the principle of noninter-
vention over democracy. In the Nicaraguan case (1978), Latin American
members supported the principle of democracy and nonintervention by
calling for a Nicaraguan-based solution to the problem and thus reject-
ing the U.S. proposal for an intervention force. The principle of repre-
sentative democracy has also been a key factor affecting actions taken in
the 1990s to restore the constitutional order in Haiti, Peru, Guatemala,
Paraguay, and Venezuela.
 182 / organization of american states

Latin American members have not been the only ones to use princi-
pled arguments to support their policy positions. The United States has
also justified its actions (even those taken unilaterally) and its policy
proposals by referring to inter-American principles. In sum, principles
are highly valued in the region, and have a long history of evolution and
formal incorporation into regional institutions. Despite their ambiguity
that gives rise to debate, they are used by both the United States and
Latin American members to justify policy proposals in the OAS. They
have also served occasionally as a unifying factor for Latin American
members to oppose U.S. proposals.

Consensus, Resources, Threats to the Region

A second significant characteristic brought to light by a focus on orga-
nizational factors is the issue of consensus among member states. The
cases in chapters 4–6, reveal that when there was disagreement with the
United States, ultimately it was consensus among Latin American
members that resulted in reduced U.S. influence. By voting together as
a unified block, Latin American members used their majority of votes to
reject any proposal put forward by the United States to which they
objected. This unity in opposition to the United States was not needed
in many instances because Latin American members shared common
interests with the United States. When Latin American members did
oppose a U.S. policy position, however, a number of conditions appeared
to facilitate such unity among Latin American members. These factors
included a perceived low level of threat to the region and a nonresource-
intense policy alternative. When there was not a high level of threat to
the region, Latin American members felt less compelled to depend on
the United States for protection. This finding was borne out in each case
in which the United States did not get its way, including the
Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982 between Britain and Argentina, and
the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989. In these two cases, Latin
American members disagreed with the U.S. position taken and did not
feel greatly threatened by the conflicts. Thus they condemned the U.K.
and U.S. actions respectively. Although the causality is certainly more
complicated than a simple link between threat level and consensus, over-
all, if Latin American members did not feel highly threatened by the
dispute in question, then they felt less constrained to agree with U.S.
preferences. In addition, if few resources were needed, Latin American
members could provide them with or without U.S. support.
Although it is significant to note that Latin American members were
able, on occasion, to resist U.S. hegemonic pressures by remaining unified,
 future prospects for the oas / 183

what is remarkable is that there were few circumstances in which they felt
it necessary to try. Chapter 4 examined all 26 cases in which the OAS
engaged in pacific settlement (from 1948 to 1989) and in only seven was
there a low level of consensus between the United States and Latin
American members. The cases discussed in chapter 6 provide examples of
the consensus and compromise agreements often reached within the OAS.
The cases portray an organization in which members are largely in agree-
ment with each other in decisionmaking, rather than one in which the
most powerful member always wields its hegemonic influence.48

Post–Cold War Insights

Although the analytical framework was initially developed to explore
organizational decisionmaking that was contrary to the preferences of
the United States, the four variables also offer some explanations for
OAS decisionmaking in the post–Cold War era. The 1990s witnessed an
era of remarkable consensus among OAS members supporting the norm
of representative democracy. In the five cases when Resolution 1080 or
the Democratic Charter were invoked, all members supported the
actions taken by the organization to restore democracy in the region.
The United States, as well as other members, recognized the strength of
unified action based on regional principles. Multilateral actions gave
greater legitimacy to the sanctions imposed to restore constitutional
order and strengthened the norm of democracy in the region. Because
members redefined security interests to include threats to democracy,
support for democratic government also helped to promote regional
security and stability. Consensus in support for the norm of democracy
resulted in swift action because members did not have to negotiate
compromises between different positions. In addition, the resolutions
adopted in the cases of Peru (1992), Guatemala (1993), Paraguay
(1996), and Venezuela (2002) did not require extensive resources,
making it easier for states to reach an agreement on the actions to be
taken. The one security issue that has not produced such a unified
response is narco-trafficking. Disagreements over the best way to reduce
this threat have led the United States to respond bilaterally in coopera-
tion with Colombia and other states heavily affected by the drug trade.

Limitations to the Analytical Framework

Just as the analytical framework offers some unique, comparative insights
into member interactions within the organization, the application of the
framework to the case studies also yields important theoretical feedback
about the value of the framework itself. Although each perspective helps
 184 / organization of american states

to explain how the United States fails on occasion to dominate the OAS,
they do not offer consistent predictions. For example, in all 26 cases of
pacific settlement during the Cold War, regional principles were invoked
in response to events and in justification of OAS actions. It is evident
from the examination of cases over time, however, that different princi-
ples gained precedence in different eras. Therefore, recognizing that a
U.S. proposal is based on one principle while Latin American members
espouse another does not help predict which side will win based on prin-
cipled arguments alone. In addition, the four perspectives laid out in
chapter 2 do not offer much leverage in determining which of the factors
has the greatest substantive impact. As is evident from the case studies,
consensus, resources, perceived threat level, and regional principles have
had an impact on U.S. influence, but not a predictable one. Although
patterns can be seen when looking at the cases as a whole, the singular
conditions of each case can lead to unique responses by members of the
organization. The factors raised in the analytical framework do affect
members, but may swing one way or the other depending on the context.
This is particularly true for factors assessed to be mid-level. For example,
a mid-level threat may or may not be significant enough to give
the United States greater influence within the OAS. In the case of
the Dominican Republic–Venezuela (1960), the United States had
enough influence to force a compromise from Latin American members.
In the Nicaraguan case (1978), the United States had no leverage based on
the mid-level threat to the region. The framework is useful for highlight-
ing the potential impacts of organizational factors, but offers only limited
ability to predict decisionmaking outcomes based on the four factors.
Although the analytical framework has limited predictive power, its
unique level of analysis and the emphasis on how the four factors inter-
act is useful not only for studying the OAS, but also for examining other
IOs. Neither relative power nor shared interests paint a complete picture
of organizational decisionmaking dynamics. The framework highlights
that structural, normative, internal relations, and environmental factors
have an impact on organizational outcomes, and that these outcomes
may be more diverse than many anticipate when a hegemon is involved.
Using these four organizational factors to compare the decisions made
in other IOs, may shed light on other unexpected outcomes when the
most powerful member failed to dominate the organization.

Empirical Findings
In addition to the value of the analytical framework for highlighting
previously unexamined aspects of organizational decisionmaking, the
 future prospects for the oas / 185

examination of 31 cases of conflict resolution by the OAS provides

considerable empirical comparisons that are unlikely to be found in any
other single volume. A broad comparison of the cases in chapter 4 reveals
historical trends and evolutionary changes in the organization’s response
to security threats. The first decade following the founding of the OAS
witnessed a uniquely high level of consensus among members as the
Council handled cases of pacific settlement. Threats to the region were
mid- to low-level and involved clashes between democracies and dictator-
ships. The decade of the 1960s saw less consensus among Council
members and Foreign Ministers and a more varied level of threats stem-
ming largely from the international spread of communism. The period
from 1969 to 1989 was characterized by a relatively low level of consen-
sus among members. Cases tended to be low-level threats to the region
and varied in their origins. The most recent post–Cold War era witnessed
a renewed level of consensus and cooperation among members in pursuit
of strengthening democracy.
A comparison of the 31 cases reveals four different decisionmaking
outcomes based on the level of consensus among member states: U.S.
dominance, Latin American unity, compromise, and consensus. Despite
the presence of the United States as a hegemonic member, less than a
third of the cases resulted in U.S. dominance. Surprisingly, Latin
American members succeeded in passing their preferred proposals
despite U.S. opposition in five cases. Compromises between members
with differing views were also seen in a number of cases. Perhaps the
most unexpected outcome, however, was that consensus among
members on the nature of the threat and the appropriate response to it
was the most common outcome. Members of the OAS have long been
influenced by the desire to act consensually and multilaterally when
possible to address security concerns. This is the foundation of a collec-
tive security regime. The actions taken by the organization in each case
have been aimed at promoting security and stability in the Western
hemisphere according to the Rio Treaty, the OAS Charter, Resolution
1080, and the Democratic Charter.

Future of the OAS

One additional empirical finding that is evident in the comparison of
cases across five decades is that the OAS has continued to evolve since
its founding. The Council has taken on new tasks; new organs have been
established to help with these tasks; the Charter has been revised to
include a stronger focus on economic and social development concerns;
and regional security concerns have shifted and been redefined over
 186 / organization of american states

time. The end of the Cold War in 1989 signaled the beginning of yet
another new era within the OAS. Anticommunism is no longer a guid-
ing principle to assure regional security. Member states have placed new
emphasis on the principle of representative democracy, even at the
expense of nonintervention and state sovereignty. This new priority was
embodied in the creation of the UPD in 1990, the adoption of
Resolution 1080 in 1991, and the Democratic Charter in 2001. The
end of the Cold War has allowed the OAS to take up new causes in order
to insure regional security, including the promotion of democracy.
The ability of the OAS to shift its focus over time and to respond to
changes in the international environment bodes well for its relevance in
the future. Although the organization faced a period of decline through-
out the 1980s, it has rebounded following the end of the Cold War and
addressed the new security concerns of member states. In addition, the
organization and its members have displayed a remarkable ability to inter-
act with the regional hegemon in a consensual fashion and yet not become
subservient to U.S. interests. This ability to balance the interests of all its
member states in order to pursue regional goals has given the organization
a strong reputation. The solid reputation of the OAS is evident in the high
demand for the organization to monitor elections in member states since
the creation of the UPD. This role further reflects the new emphasis on
democracy within the organization and the hemisphere.
As the United States restructures its foreign policy in the new millen-
nium, it would be wise to continue to build on the multilateral rela-
tionships with Latin American states within the OAS. The common
security interests the United States shares with other states in the region
and the advantages of acting multilaterally, such as greater international
legitimacy, burden sharing, and supporting regional principles, make
the OAS a valuable forum for the United States. The 1990s witnessed a
high level of consensus within the organization in support of democracy
that is likely to continue in the future. Steady efforts are being made to
bridge the differences between members on the issue of narco-trafficking
to produce a more effective multilateral response. The organization has
also rallied in support of the United States following the attacks of
September 11, 2001 and has worked through the Inter-American
Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) to strengthen regional cooper-
ation to “prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism.” The OAS has
proven itself to be a resilient international organization, coming through
eras of cooperation, conflict, and consensus to emerge as a relevant actor
in international politics today.
 Notes

1. Other cases in which the United States was unable to exert its hegemonic
influence include: Cuba (1960), Dominican Republic–Venezuela (1960),
Panama–United States (1964), Cuba (1975), and Panama–United States
(1989). Details in chapter 4.
2. “Institutionalism” has been an approach to IR for over 40 years, extending
back to studies by Functionalists and Neo-functionalists such as Ernst B.
Haas (1960); David Mitrany (1966) and Donald J. Puchala (1971). As
realism has taken a dominant position in the field of IR, scholars such as
Robert Axelrod (1984), and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1972) have
continued to work to expand our understanding of the role of institutions in
IR. Some of the most recent scholars that challenge the realist conception of
IR include Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin (1995), Charles Kupchan
(1995), and John Gerard Ruggie (1995).
3. Specific studies of the OAS itself provide significant details of the workings
of the organization and contribute most to the examination of the case
studies in chapters 4–6 rather than to the theoretical foundations of the
study discussed in this chapter.
4. See e.g., Charles P. Kindleberger, 1981, “Dominance and Leadership in the
International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides,”
International Studies Quarterly 25:242–254. Kindleberger, 1986, “Hierarchy
Versus Inertial Cooperation,” International Organization 40:841–847.
David A. Lake, 1993, “Leadership, Hegemony, and the International
Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?”
International Studies Quarterly 37:459–489.
5. Many of the ideas in this approach were first developed in the natural
sciences and later adopted by organizational sociology.
6. These documents are discussed in detail in chapter 3.
7. There are several structural variables that are not included in this analysis: the
size and composition of the governing body, the hierarchy within it, and the
number of authoritative bodies addressing the issue. These variables appear
to have little explanatory power because they do not vary across cases with
differing outcomes in the OAS. Although one might anticipate that the
United States would have more influence if the size of the governing body
were limited, the size of the Council and the Meeting of Foreign Ministers
does not vary so it is impossible to determine what impact a smaller or larger
 188 / notes for pp. 31–37

body might have. All members are represented and are free to participate in
all decisionmaking. Whereas the United States once held an advantage over
other members by retaining the chairmanship of the Pan American Union
Board, it no longer has this hierarchical advantage. Following the Fifth
International Conference of American States in 1923, the position of
Council chair became an elected position. The OAS Charter established the
chairmanship on a rotating basis among all members. Furthermore, all
member states are equal and have one vote in Council. Just as there is not
variation in the size of the governing body, similarly there is not significant
variation in the number of bodies addressing issues brought before the
Organ of Consultation. There are few committees or other bureaucratic
departments that handle disputes raised under the Rio Treaty or the OAS
Charter. The two types of committees that are seen most often are an inves-
tigating committee and an observation committee. There is little evidence
to indicate that members are able to exert undue influence within these
committees to influence the decisions made by the Organ of Consultation.
8. “Individuals” can be studied at several different levels in this context. This
study focuses on the representatives of each state as representatives of the
members’ interests, not as individual diplomats. Although there is no doubt
that the psychological impact of individual leaders and representatives can
play a role in the decisions made by the OAS, there are not sufficient data
to pursue this particular aspect in this study. Furthermore, it is likely that
these individual characteristics are subservient to the state interests that they
serve as representatives in the OAS.
9. For example, when the United States sent military forces into Panama in
1989 to seize president and accused drug trafficker, Manuel Noriega, the
Twenty-First Meeting of Foreign Ministers condemned the actions of the
United States. The ministers passed a resolution that deplored the U.S.
invasion, declared the United States to be in violation of international law,
called for the immediate cessation of hostilities, and demanded the with-
drawal of American forces.
10. The organization did in fact face a decline throughout the 1970s and 1980s
due to member dissatisfaction with its handling of security and economic
issues.
11. The exclusion of Cuba from participation in the OAS in 1962 is just one
example of U.S. pressure to combat communism in the hemisphere.
12. A low-level dispute is one where a single member is involved (i.e, a civil
war) and/or there is little risk of escalation or regional instability. A mid-
level threat is one in which two more members are involved but with low
levels of violence, and in which members believe regional stability is threat-
ened. A high-level threat is rare in the region. It involves considerable
violence and/or the risk of affecting all member states (i.e., the Cuban
missile crisis). See chapter 4 for a full discussion.
13. The pacific settlement provisions of the Rio Treaty or OAS Charter have
been invoked in 29 cases. The Council determined that three of these cases
did not require an Organ of Consultation to be convoked and were handled
through alternative channels. A dispute between the Dominican Republic
 notes for pp. 40–55 / 189

and Haiti (1949) was taken up as part of the overall discussion of

“Caribbean problems” by the Council in 1950. The border dispute between
Ecuador and Peru (1955) was handled by the Guarantor states. A dispute
over the Lauca River between Bolivia and Chile was arbitrated by the
International Court of Justice. In addition to the remaining 26 cases,
Resolution 1080 has been invoked four times since it was established in
1991 by the OAS General Assembly, and the Democratic Charter invoked
once as of this writing.
14. First International Conference of American States 1889 (Washington,
D.C.), Second Conference 1901 (Mexico City), Third Conference 1906
(Rio de Janeiro), Fourth Conference 1910 (Buenos Aires), Fifth Conference
1923 (Santiago), Sixth Conference 1928 (Havana), Seventh Conference
1933 (Montevideo), Eighth Conference 1938 (Lima).
15. There are a number of ways to characterize these early phases of
development. See also Mecham (1961, chapter 2) and Atkins (1997,
Introduction).
16. Latin American states were most concerned with Spanish aggression, but
also faced occasional threats from France, Great Britain, and the United
States.
17. The resolution basically claimed that states owe to foreigners no special
rights other than those of their own citizens. The United States did not
want to give up any extra protections it might be able to secure for its citi-
zens abroad.
18. Mexico was not represented at this Conference due to disagreements with
the United States that resulted in it pulling its ambassador out of
Washington.
19. It is important to note that although the provision for Foreign Ministers to
handle the consultation meetings did not allow for any organizational
autonomy within the bureaucracy of the Inter-American System at this
time, the Charter of the OAS and the Rio Treaty both provided for the
Council to serve as provisional Organ of Consultation, which it did regu-
larly for the first decade of the OAS’ existence.
20. The two exceptions were Argentina and Chile. Argentina and Chile did not
follow through on their commitments in the Act of Chapultepec and only
declared war on Japan and Germany in March 1945. This created some
hard feelings on the part of the United States and led to the United States
wanting to exclude Argentina from the negotiations of the Rio Treaty (to be
discussed later). The United States did not want Argentina to be included
in any permanent arrangement after the war. Latin Americans, however, felt
that regional unity was too important to leave Argentina out of the negoti-
ations. The United States finally decided that in light of growing tensions
with the Soviet Union a treaty that included Argentina was better than no
treaty at all (Mecham 1961, 280).
21. It is important to note that the creation of the OAS did not result in the
dissolution of the Inter-American System. The OAS is merely one aspect of
the Inter-American System, which includes numerous other institutions
within the Western hemisphere including the Inter-American Development
 190 / notes for pp. 55–78

Bank and other special agencies and commissions such as the Inter-
American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC) and the Inter-American
Telecommunication Commission (CITEL).
22. Note that references to the numbered articles of the OAS Charter in this
section refer to the original charter signed in 1948, not to the revised
charters of 1967 or 1993.
23. The secretary general’s term was reduced to five years in the 1967 revisions
to the Charter.
24. The IAPC was frequently sent to investigate the incident under discussion
within the Organ of Consultation. The IAPC had no authority to negoti-
ate agreements. Its purpose was to investigate and to recommend steps
conducive for dispute settlement. It was designated as one of the Special
Agencies and Commissions by the Council and provided reports to the
Council or Foreign Ministers when it was investigating a dispute.
In 1967 the IAPC became the Inter-American Committee on Peaceful
Settlement (IACPS). In 1985, amendments to the Charter eliminated the
IACPS, which had become highly controversial.
25. For further discussion of settlement instruments see L. Ronald Scheman,
1988, chapter 3.
26. In table 4.1 consensus is evaluated in two different categories, among Latin
American members, and between the United States and Latin American
members.
27. Although the record is easiest to trace for those cases in which the Rio
Treaty was successfully invoked, I note here one instance in which the
Council rejected such a request from a member state. In 1962, Bolivia
requested application of the Rio Treaty and a Meeting of Consultation to
consider the imminent threat of aggression from Chile against its territor-
ial integrity. Chile’s plan to divert Lauca River waters for agricultural
purposes without the consent of Bolivia constituted a threat to the peace.
The Council met for six sessions and eventually rejected the request, asking
both parties to find another means of pacific settlement to reach an agree-
ment. Neither country could agree to a procedure (Chile preferred the
International Court of Justice while Bolivia preferred mediation), and the
matter remained unresolved.
28. Military resources were used in only the following five cases. Costa
Rica–Nicaragua (1955); Panama (1959); Cuba (1962); Dominican
Republic (1965); and El Salvador–Honduras (1969).
29. Much of the information in this section and the two that follow is taken
from the Annual Reports of the Secretary General, the Applications of the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and the Actas (acts and
proceedings) of the Council on each case. Later cases include information
from the proceedings and Final Acts of the Meetings of Consultation of the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
30. At this time 13 member states had ratified the Rio Treaty. Costa Rica and
Nicaragua were excluded from voting since they were parties to the dispute.
31. It is worth noting in retrospect that these incidents were far narrower in
geographic scope than those that followed in the 1960s, provoked for the
 notes for pp. 79–102 / 191

most part by the Cuban Revolution. However, members did feel that with-
out an organizational response, these disputes would continue to cause
regional instability and thus threaten the security of other member states.
32. The only other case in which Article 11 has been specifically invoked is
Cuba (1962) when the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers effectively
removed Cuba from participation in the OAS. More on this case is
presented in chapter 4.
33. Arbenz’s decision to turn to the United Nations was based on the recently
issued Declaration of Caracas. This Declaration, issued at the Tenth Inter-
American Conference held in March 1954, took a strong anticommunist
stance in the hemisphere and was aimed indirectly at regimes such as that
of Arbenz in Guatemala. Although Argentina and Mexico strongly sided
with Guatemala in opposition to the Declaration because it weakened the
principle of nonintervention, most members reluctantly supported it.
34. The first three Meetings of Consultation had been held in the context of
World War II, prior to the formation of the OAS in 1948.
35. The Fourth Meeting of Consultation (concerning Korea) had met under
the Charter, but this was an extracontinental concern. The Fifth Meeting
was the first time the Charter was invoked to address regional tensions.
36. The actual roots of the conflict stemmed from long-standing tensions on
issues of immigration. The soccer championship sparked the underlying
tensions.
37. The cases that did not involve Cuba and debates about communism
included: the Caribbean (1959), Dominican Republic–Venezuela (1960),
Dominican Republic–Haiti (1963), Panama–United States (1964), and
El Salvador–Honduras (1969). The two cases involving the Dominican
Republic closely resemble the types of cases handled in the previous decade.
Both are cases of disputes between a dictator and democratic leader that led
to tensions between the two countries. The other three cases have already
been discussed.
38. From personal correspondence with Dr. Manuel Orozco, Inter-American
Dialogue.
39. In 1989, the United Nations and OAS established CIAV (International
Commission of Support and Verification) to assist in voluntary demobi-
lization, repatriation, and settlement of the Contras. It also operated in
Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica (Atkins 1997, 63).
40. Five additional consensual outcomes were seen following the end of the
Cold War and are discussed in chapter 7.
41. One case, Ecuador–United States (1971), has never been resolved so it
cannot be categorized by outcome.
42. It is important to note that the high degree of consensus is not equivalent
to Latin American subservience to U.S. policy preferences. In many cases
the United States did not use its power to force agreement within the orga-
nization on issues. Furthermore, the security interests of Latin American
countries and the United States were often the same.
43. Cuba was not officially removed as a member state, but has been inactive in
the organization since 1962 when the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers
 192 / notes for pp. 137–183

declared that Marxism–Leninism was incompatible with the Inter-

American System.
44. It is ironic to note that the United States fully reversed its position on
nonintervention a year later when confronted with the Castro regime’s
attempts to export its revolution.
45. The one exception was Guatemala, which added its own Statement to the
Declaration stating that it believed the OAS would have been justified in
dealing with Cuba more harshly because its relations with the Soviet Union
endangered the peace and security of the hemisphere.
46. Membership has continued to grow over the past several decades as states
throughout the Western hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean basin,
have joined the organization’s original 21 members. With membership
extended to Canada in 1990, all countries in the Western hemisphere
participate in the OAS with the exception of Cuba, which has remained
inactive since 1962.
47. Peace negotiations resumed in January 1994 with President Jorge de León
Carpio, and resulted in both sides signing a Comprehensive Agreement
on Human Rights in March 1994. The UN Mission for the Verification of
Human Rights (MINUGUA) arrived in November and negotiations
on social and economic problems and land reform proceeded throughout
1995. It was not until President Alvaro Arzú took office in January 1996
and replaced hard-line military officers with those willing to compromise
with the Guatemalan United Revolutionary Front (URNG) that a final
settlement was reached after 36 years of war (Atkins 1997, 200).
48. This level of consensus applies only to the topic of pacific settlement being
examined in this study. There may be other issue-areas in which consensus
is far less evident. For example, Latin American members have placed
a strong emphasis on trade relations as they pertain to economic develop-
ment for many years. The United States has not always supported the
development plans advocated by Latin American members, thus making
multilateral trade negotiations difficult.
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 Index
Italics indicate table

Ad Hoc committees, 104, 106, Caribbean, 11, 13, 39, 50, 53, 65,
125, 142 68, 72–73, 75–78, 80–83, 98,
American Convention on Human 116, 119, 133–134, 136–138,
Rights, 168 140–142, 146, 148–149, 189,
anarchy, 5–7, 17–18, 21–22 191–192
anticommunists, 83, 103, 112–113, Carter, Jimmy, 124–125, 128, 168
116, 191 Castro, Fidel, 1, 4, 11, 37, 80,
antiterrorist campaigns, 2, 159 84–85, 89, 112, 115, 118, 127,
Arbenz, Jacabo, 72, 75, 79, 99, 135, 141, 145, 192
102, 191 Cedras, Raoul, 152, 155, 161–162
arbitration, 33, 41–42, 44, 46, 49, Chavez, Hugo, 97, 156, 159,
51, 53, 56–57 167–171
Argentina, 20–21, 36, 43, 68, 74, Chile, 3, 43, 68, 81, 88, 91, 104,
76, 87–88, 91, 98, 106, 108, 106, 108, 111–115, 155,
124, 152, 161, 168, 182, 189–190
189, 191 Clinton, Bill, 2, 157, 172
Aristide, Jean Bertrand, 97, 152, Cold War era, 3, 13, 35, 59, 63, 80,
155, 160–162 151–152, 156–157, 173,
Atkins, G. Pope, 39, 45, 54, 60, 184, 186
62, 81–82, 86, 103, 145, post-Cold War era, 62, 153,
161–163, 166, 189, 173–175, 183, 185
191–192 collective action, 1, 18, 22, 117
Axelrod, Robert M., 21, 187 collective security, 1–2, 6, 12, 15,
17–18, 29, 34, 42, 54, 56–57,
Balaguer, Joaquin, 104 59, 175
Betancourt, Rómulo, 73, 85, 99, Colombia, 3, 13, 43–44, 79, 85,
117–118 106, 159–160, 171–174, 183
bilateral issues, 143, 145 Commercial Bureau for the
Bolívar, Simón, 43 International Union of
border disputes, 1, 81, 88, 189 American Republics, 46
Bosch, Juan, 85, 103–104 common interests, 5–7, 9, 18,
Brazil, 67, 79, 88, 105–106, 119 20–21, 27, 37–38, 70, 81–83,
Britain, 20–21, 37, 182, 189 87, 178
 202 / index

communication, 7, 23, 31, 55, 70, Costa Rica, 1, 66, 72, 74, 75–76,
114, 190 78, 86, 90, 96–97, 105, 122,
Communism, 4, 11, 18, 33–35, 59, 125, 133–135, 141, 149,
63, 66, 75, 77, 79–81, 83–85, 190–191
92, 103–104, 106–108, 110, Cuba, 1, 3–4, 11, 13, 19, 36–37, 47,
112–116, 122, 124, 128, 131, 59, 65, 72–74, 75–76, 80–85,
133, 137–138, 141, 143–146, 88–93, 96–99, 101–103, 108,
149, 151, 159, 177, 185–186, 111–116, 120, 122, 124, 127,
188, 191 133, 135–138, 140–149, 167,
international spread of 176–177, 179, 181, 187–188,
Communism, 33–34, 59, 66, 190–192
77, 79–80, 83–84, 106, Cuban Missile Crisis, 65, 73, 80,
113–114, 144 83, 90, 92–93, 96, 188
compromise, 4, 10–11, 13, 18, Cuban Revolution, 80, 82, 92,
37, 81, 95, 98, 101, 115, 145, 191
119, 132–134, 136–139,
142–144, 146–149, 152, decision making, 4–5, 8–9, 11–13,
164–165, 176–177, 179, 15–16, 18–19, 22, 25–26, 28,
183–185, 192 30–31, 34, 36–38, 62–63, 89,
conflict resolution, 12, 32, 39, 43, 93, 95, 110, 118, 129,
49, 59, 61, 63–64, 69, 71, 76, 131–132, 134, 140, 149,
80–82, 85–89, 92, 95, 138, 151–152, 157, 175–179,
149, 175, 180, 185 183–185, 188
consensus, 1–2, 4, 9–13, 19, 31, Declaration of Caracas, 108, 113,
39–42, 48, 58–59, 63, 66–69, 144, 191
71, 72, 74, 76–77, 79–80, Declaration of Santiago, 113–114,
83–84, 86, 88–93, 95–98, 137, 139–140, 148
100–103, 106, 110, 112, 115, Declaration to the People of Cuba,
118, 121, 124–125, 128–129, 112–114
131–136, 138, 140, 143, 147, democracy, 1–2, 5, 11–13, 34,
149, 151–153, 157–160, 162, 39–41, 58, 63, 65–66, 68, 80,
164, 168, 170–175, 177–179, 84, 91–92, 105, 113–114,
182–186, 190–192 119–120, 123, 126, 130,
constructivist theory, 7–9, 16, 136–140, 142, 145, 147–149,
23–25, 29, 38, 40, 89, 180 151–175, 177–178, 180–181,
Contadora Group, 85–86 183, 185–186
cooperation, 1–2, 6–7, 17–18, electoral assistance, 162–163
20–22, 36–39, 42–44, 49, promotion of, 66, 80, 136–138,
51–53, 56, 58, 80, 82, 85, 105, 154–155
124, 127, 133, 136, 152, 155, Democratic Charter, 13, 37,
157, 159, 162, 171–172, 151–152, 156, 158, 160,
174–175, 177, 180, 183, 168–170, 173, 175, 183,
185–187 185–186, 189
 index/ 203

dictatorships, 34, 59, 65–66, 68, 71, Ecuador, 68–70, 74, 81, 86–89,
77, 80, 83, 85, 116, 118–119, 97, 100, 106, 108, 140,
122, 127, 140, 185 189, 191
diplomacy, 8, 10, 12, 23, 30, 33, 35, education, 24, 45, 56
39, 41–42, 44, 49, 51, 54–55, El Salvador, 65, 74, 81, 83, 86, 97,
57, 60–61, 64, 70–71, 103, 168, 190–191
105–106, 109, 111, 114, 117, environmental perspective, 8, 109,
120, 127, 130–131, 140, 143, 114, 120, 127, 140, 146
146, 155, 158, 160–162, 177, equality, 2, 6, 29–30, 32, 35, 40, 46,
179–181, 188 50–51, 53, 56, 139, 153
disputes, 1, 3, 12, 23, 29, 32, 34–35, European Union (EU), 20–21
40–44, 46–48, 51, 53, 55–60,
63–64, 66, 71, 74, 77–78, 85, Falkland/Malvinas War, 20, 36, 74,
87, 89, 92–93, 97, 137, 153, 85, 87–89, 98, 182
180–181, 188, 191 Figueres, José, 66, 134
pacific settlement of, 3, 6, 12, Finnemore, Martha, 24, 40–41,
29–30, 32, 34, 37, 40, 42, 180
47–48, 51–57, 60, 104, 135, freedom of action, 88, 122
153, 180, 183–185, 188, FSLN, 122, 176
190, 192 see also Sandinistas
settlement of, 12, 29, 32, 40–42, Fujimori, Alberto, 11, 97, 155,
44, 47–48, 53, 55–56, 58, 162–165
153, 180
Dominican Republic, 4, 11, 13, 47, Geneva Convention, 24
55, 66–68, 75, 80–81, 83–84, Grieco, Joseph M., 5, 17
90, 101–111, 115–122, 125, Guatemala, 18, 72, 75–80, 97, 99,
127–129, 130–131, 141, 143, 101, 113, 127, 144, 154–155,
147, 162, 177–178, 181, 184, 159, 165–166, 174, 181, 183,
187–188, 191 191–192
drug trafficking, 116, 155, 157, 159, Guatemalan coup, 18, 79, 144
171, 173, 188 guerrilla groups, 159–160, 163–166,
see also narcotics 172
FARC, 172
economic issues, 2, 12, 33, 39, 41, Sendero Luminoso, 163–164, 172
44–46, 48–49, 55–57, 61, 66,
70, 102–103, 114, 121–122, Haiti, 3, 47, 51, 73, 75, 80–81, 84,
128, 139, 141–142, 144–145, 96–97, 106, 140, 152,
153, 155–156, 158–162, 155–156, 159–162, 165, 167,
166–167, 173, 185, 188, 192 174, 181, 189, 191
economic development, 2, hegemony, 4, 20, 187
102–103, 121–122, 142, hegemonic influence, 5,
156, 192 9–10, 183
economic reform, 66, 122, 153 hegemonic power, 5, 37
 204 / index

Honduras, 50, 65–66, 72, 74, Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF),

75–77, 81, 83, 90, 96–98, 105, 13, 68, 104–110, 125, 129,
122, 190–191 178–179
human rights, 2, 40, 68, 81, 91, Inter-American principles, 9, 12, 15,
108, 116–120, 123–124, 19, 23, 25, 28–29, 32–33,
126, 136–140, 142, 38–44, 47–48, 50–56, 58–60,
153–154, 156, 161, 166, 62, 69–71, 80–81, 83, 90–91,
168, 172, 181, 192 107–110, 114, 119–121,
human rights violations, 117, 119, 125–127, 129–131, 135,
123, 137, 161 137–139, 141–142, 144–148,
152–153, 155, 158, 165,
imperialism, 53, 158 169–170, 173, 178–184, 186
institutionalism, 1–2, 5–10, 12–13, Inter-American System (IAS), 25, 33,
15–26, 28–29, 31, 36–38, 41, 40–43, 45, 47–48, 50, 52–53,
51, 58, 62, 69, 88–89, 80, 82–83, 91, 103, 107–108,
102–104, 123, 129, 132, 136, 141, 144, 146–147, 156, 180,
142, 153–154, 156, 165, 189
174–178, 180, 187 internal relational perspective, 8, 13,
Inter-American Commission on 19, 90, 106, 112, 116, 118,
Human Rights (IACHR), 68, 124, 131, 138, 143, 149, 151,
81, 126, 137, 161 176, 178
Inter-American Committee Against International Bureau of American
Terrorism (CICTE), 2, 186 Republics, 46–48, 144
Inter-American Conference of International Commission of Jurists,
American States 47–48
1st Conference, 23, 40, 45, 189 International Conference of
2nd Conference, 46–47, 189 American States, 39, 52,
3rd Conference, 48, 189 113–114, 188–189
4th Conference, 44, 46, 48, 189 international law, 48, 58, 188
5th Conference, 48, 189 international organizations (IOs),
6th Conference, 49, 51, 189 5–10, 12, 15–16, 21, 23–25,
7th Conference, 39, 50, 189 26, 28–29, 35–36, 38, 122,
8th Conference, 52, 189 176, 180, 184, 186–187
9th Conference, 55–57 international relations (IR), 5, 15,
10th Conference, 108, 191 29, 142, 180, 187
Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission (CICAD), Johnson, Lyndon B., 107
159, 171
Inter-American Economic and Social Keohane, Robert O., 5, 18, 20–21,
Council, 57, 122 187
Inter-American Peace Committee Khrushchev, Nikita, 3, 145
(IAPC), 60–61, 76–77, 79, Korean War, 82
116–119, 137, 139–142, 190 Kupchan, Charles, 17, 187
 index/ 205

Latin America, 1–7, 9, 11–13, 18, 7th Meeting, 11, 73, 83, 118,
21–23, 30–54, 56–59, 64–68, 120, 140–145, 147; see also
76, 80–85, 87–93, 95, Cuba; Soviet Union
100–103, 106–107, 109–110, 8th Meeting, 102, 108, 115, 191;
112–114, 116–125, 127–133, see also Cuba
136, 138–148, 153, 157, 168, 9th Meeting, 73, 111–112; see also
170–171, 175–182, 184–186, Cuba
189–192 10th Meeting, 104, 108; see also
Latin American resistance to U.S. Dominican Republic
influence, 102, 116 12th Meeting, 36, 73; see also
Latin American unity, 11, 13, 47, Cuba; Venezuela
95, 101–102, 116, 129, 13th Meeting, 74, 83; see also
179–180, 185 El Salvador; Honduras
League of Nations, 47, 49 14th Meeting, 74; see also
Ecuador; United States
Martin, Lisa L., 5, 18, 20–21, 187 15th Meeting, 74; see also Cuba
Mearsheimer, John J., 5–6, 16–17, 20 16th Meeting, 74, 88, 113, 122;
Mecham, J. Lloyd, 45–46, 48–49, see also Cuba
51, 62, 66, 118–119, 145–146, 17th Meeting, 74, 122–124, 126;
189 see also Nicaragua; Sandinistas
Meetings of Consultation, 18th Meeting, 74; see also Costa
see Meeting of Foreign Ministers Rica; Nicaragua
Meeting of Foreign Ministers, 3–5, 19th Meeting, 74, 88; see also
11, 19, 21, 29–30, 34–37, 52, Ecuador; Peru
55–57, 61, 63–64, 67–70, 20th Meeting, 74, 88; see also
78–84, 86–89, 91–93, 102, Argentina; Britain;
104–106, 108, 111–119, Falklands/Malvinas War
121–126, 128, 133, 136–137, 21st Meeting, 74, 188; see also
140–142, 144–147, 155, 158, Noriega, Manuel; Panama;
160–164, 166–167, 178, 181, United States
185, 187–191 Mexico, 3, 43–45, 51, 56, 68, 76,
1st Meeting, 191 84–85, 91, 93, 106, 108,
2nd Meeting, 44, 125, 191 111–115, 122, 144–145, 168,
3rd Meeting, 191 189, 191
4th Meeting, 191 military dictatorships, 59
5th Meeting, 80–81, 136–137, Monroe Doctrine, 45–46, 49–51
140, 191; see also Cuba; Roosevelt Corollary, 50–51
Dominican Republic; Morganthau, Hans, 5
Venezuela multilateral action, 2–4, 6, 10, 13,
6th Meeting, 55, 73, 80, 92, 116, 18–19, 21, 23, 25, 32–33,
118, 140–141; see also 36–39, 43, 47–49, 52–53, 58,
Dominican Republic; 67, 70, 73, 76, 86, 88, 90, 92,
Venezuela 99, 105–107, 111, 121, 124,
 206 / index

multilateral action—continued norm development, 40

127–129, 131, 134, 145, Nye, J.S., 187
153–154, 156–160, 162,
167, 170–176, 180, 183, Organization of American States
185–186, 192 (OAS), 1–6, 9–13, 15–18,
Muñoz, Heraldo, 62 21–23, 25–26, 28–30, 32–38,
40, 42–43, 48, 54–60, 62–63,
narcotics, 13, 153, 159–160, 65, 67, 69–71, 72, 75–77,
171–174, 183, 186 79–80, 82–92, 95, 96,
see also drug trafficking 101–113, 115, 120–131, 133,
NATO, 8, 17, 26, 55, 123, 187 135–138, 140–141, 145, 149,
natural system perspective, 8, 151–176, 178–181, 183–192
26–28, 31 OAS Charter, 3, 12, 23, 32–33, 37,
neutrality, 24, 47, 103, 107 42–43, 53, 56–58, 61–62,
Nicaragua, 1, 4–5, 11, 13, 21, 47, 70, 72, 80, 82–83, 86–88, 93,
50–51, 65–66, 72, 74, 75–78, 96, 101, 107, 149, 153,
86–87, 89–93, 96–98, 100, 155–156, 158, 160, 168, 180,
103, 105, 116, 121–131, 185, 188, 190
133–135, 149, 151, 154, 176, Article 39, 70, 81–83, 141
179–181, 184, 190 OAS member states, 1–4, 6–11, 13,
Nicaraguan revolution, 4, 21, 87 15, 19–21, 23–25, 28–29,
nonaggression, 23, 41–42, 44, 48 31–32, 34, 36–37, 50, 54–55,
nonintervention, 12, 23, 29, 40–42, 57–59, 62–67, 82–84, 87–88,
44, 48, 50–54, 58, 60, 68, 95, 103, 105, 107–109, 111,
75–78, 80–81, 91–92, 114–115, 126, 128, 130,
107–108, 113–115, 117, 133–138, 140, 148, 151–152,
119–121, 126, 130–131, 154, 156, 158–159, 161,
135–141, 144–145, 147–148, 169–171, 173–175, 178,
151–153, 165, 172, 180–181, 180–182, 185–186, 188,
186, 191–192 190–191
Noriega, Manuel, 87, 92, 116, 157, open system perspective, 8, 27–29, 35
188 Organ of Consultation, 30, 33, 35,
normative principle, 7–8, 13, 16, 19, 38, 54–57, 60–61, 63, 69–71,
22–23, 25, 28–29, 33, 36–38, 75, 78, 86, 88, 90, 104–105,
41, 62, 90, 107, 113, 116, 119, 107, 109, 114, 118, 123–124,
125, 130–131, 138, 144, 126, 128, 135, 178, 181,
148–149, 151–153, 158, 188–190
176–177, 180, 184 organizational sociology, 8–9, 12,
norms, 7, 12, 17, 22–25, 32–33, 38, 15–16, 25–27, 29, 35, 62, 89,
40–43, 53, 58, 62, 107, 110, 187
115, 130, 132, 138–140,
152–153, 157–158, 160, Pan American movement, 12, 33, 40,
171–173, 179–180 44, 53, 58
 index/ 207

Pan American Union (PAU), 41, distribution of, 17

48–50, 52, 54, 57, 188 imbalance of, 35
Pan Americanism, 45, 48 Protocol of Buenos Aires, 122
Panama, 11–13, 43–44, 47, 56, 63,
72–74, 76, 80–81, 84–85, 87, rational system perspective, 8, 26–29
89–93, 96, 99–100, 116, 122, realism, 5–9, 12, 16–19, 21–24,
133, 135, 149, 157, 160, 182, 28–29, 35–38, 101–102,
187–188, 190–191 176–178, 180, 187
“flag riots,” 81, 116 reciprocal assistance, 2, 20, 53, 65,
Panama Canal, 50, 73, 81, 99, 70, 78, 190
116 reform, 2, 42, 49–50, 62, 66, 79,
Panama Congress, 44 103, 121–122, 153–154, 161,
Papal Nuncio, 109 163, 192
Paraguay, 3, 97, 105–106, 155, 159, regional conflict, 3, 13, 31, 66, 88,
166–168, 174, 181, 183 92, 104
peace, 3–4, 11–13, 20–21, 23, 29, regional security, 2–3, 7, 44, 57, 113,
33–35, 41–46, 48–49, 51–61, 122, 140, 142, 144–145,
65, 67, 69–70, 73–75, 77–78, 147–149, 153–155, 157, 174,
81–82, 85–87, 89–90, 92, 179–181, 185–186
99–100, 102, 104–105, 108, regional solidarity, 4, 42, 44, 47, 53,
112–114, 118–120, 123, 149
125–129, 139, 141, 144–145, regional stability, 3–4, 12–13, 34–35,
149, 154, 162, 166, 168–170, 51, 64–66, 77, 85, 90–92,
176, 179–181, 190, 192 109–110, 115, 121, 127, 147,
peacekeeping, 4, 11, 21, 73–74, 90, 157, 188
99–100, 102, 123, 127–129 Resolution 1080, 13, 37, 96,
Permanent Council, 88, 125, 156, 151–152, 155, 158–160, 162,
160–162, 166, 169–170 165–166, 173–175, 183,
Peru, 11, 43, 68, 74, 88, 97, 106, 108, 185–186, 189
141, 155, 159–160, 162–166, revolution, 4, 21, 59, 68, 74, 80–83,
169, 174, 181, 183, 189 85, 87, 89, 92, 100, 111, 113,
Democratic Constituent Congress 121–122, 125, 127, 134,
(CCD), 163 140–141, 145, 166, 191–192
Powell, Colin, 170–171 Rio Treaty, 2–3, 12, 29–30, 32–33,
power, 1, 4–7, 10–11, 16–23, 37, 42, 53–61, 63, 69–71, 72,
25–26, 30–31, 33, 35–38, 40, 75–77, 80, 82–83, 86–87, 92,
42, 45, 48, 50, 55, 57–58, 68, 96, 101, 103, 111–112, 114,
85, 89–90, 95, 97, 102–105, 117, 119–120, 135, 149,
107, 116, 124–125, 128, 137, 156–157, 160, 175, 180, 185,
139–145, 152, 160–168, 188–190
170, 175–177, 179, 183–184, Article 6, 54, 69–70, 78, 82,
187, 191 87–88, 114, 117
balance of, 17, 35 invocation of, 72
 208 / index

riots, 65, 73, 81, 99, 116 Stein, Arthur A., 22

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 50–51 Summit of the Americas, 154–155
Good Neighbor policy, 39, 50–51
Roosevelt, Theodore, 39, 47 Taft, William Howard, 39, 50
Russia, 1, 45 territorial integrity, 12, 40–41, 44,
54–55, 58, 180
Sanchez, Oscar Arias, 86 terrorism, 2, 63, 83, 155, 159, 173,
sanctions, 7–8, 11–12, 21–23, 186
32–33, 36, 41, 46, 52, 54–55, threat levels, 12, 34–35, 38, 64–66,
61, 67–68, 70, 73–75, 80–82, 71, 77, 84, 86, 89, 91–93, 95,
84, 87–89, 91–92, 97, 99, 109, 111, 114–115, 120, 127,
102–103, 111–122, 127, 131, 129–131, 140, 146–147, 149,
146, 152, 155, 158, 160–162, 157, 165, 182, 184–185
166, 177–181, 183 high-level, 64, 87, 179, 188
Sandinistas, 116, 122, 124–125, low-level, 65, 87, 93, 109–110,
127–128 179
see also FSLN mid-level, 65, 84–85, 87, 93,
security concerns, 1–2, 13, 44, 116, 115, 130, 140, 147–148,
128, 134, 136, 146, 153–154, 179, 184
157, 165, 173–174, 185–186 totalitarianism, 113, 141, 144, 148
September 11, 2, 156, 159, 175, 186 trade, 10, 21, 44–45, 52, 55, 65,
Serrano, Jorge, 97, 165–166 111–112, 117, 119, 145, 157,
shared interests, 3, 7, 19–20, 23, 25, 159–161, 165–166, 171, 183,
36, 177–178, 184 192
Soares, João, 161, 166 treaties
socioeconomic reform, 66 Inter-American Treaty of
Somoza, Anastasio, 5, 66, 72, 77, 98, Reciprocal Assistance (Rio
116, 122–129, 133–134, 176, Treaty), 2, 53, 65, 78, 190
179–180 Pact of Amity, 72, 75, 96, 135
Soviet Union, 3–4, 17, 34–35, Pact of Bogotá, 32, 42, 53, 55, 57
73, 80, 83, 85, 96, 98, Tlatelolco Treaty, 65
141–147, 153, 176–177, Treaty of Chapultepec, 52, 54, 189
179, 189, 192 Treaty of Confederation, 23, 44
stability, 3–5, 11–13, 16, 19, 22–23, Treaty of Union and Defensive
33–36, 50–51, 64–66, 72–73, Alliance, 23, 44
77–78, 80, 85, 90–92, 98, Treaty on Pacific Settlement, 57;
109–110, 112, 115, 120–121, see also Pact of Bogotá
127–128, 136, 138–140, 143, Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts
146–149, 157, 159, 168, 170, Between the American States
177, 183, 185, 188, 191 (Gondra Pact), 49
state behavior, 17–18, 20, 33, 38, 41 see also Rio Treaty
state sovereignty, 12, 40, 58, 91, 121, Trujillo, Rafael, 55, 66, 103,
137–138, 153, 172, 180, 186 117–120
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unilateral actions, 1, 4, 6, 10, 18–21, unity, 11, 13, 24, 32, 40–42, 47, 53,
33, 36–37, 39, 49, 67, 85, 87, 56, 67–68, 85, 90, 95, 99–102,
91, 100, 105–108, 110–112, 106, 110, 112, 116, 119, 124,
119, 124, 126–127, 146, 129–131, 135, 137, 139, 141,
157–159, 162, 166, 170, 173, 143–144, 152, 158–160,
175–176, 180, 182 162–163, 166–167, 172,
Unit for the Promotion of 178–180, 182, 185, 189
Democracy (UPD), 33, 126, Uruguay, 49, 68, 85, 106, 108
154–155, 165, 167, 173, 186
United Nations (UN), 58, 79, 112, Vaky, Viron P., 62
160–162, 167–168, 191 Venezuela, 11, 13, 36, 55, 66–67,
UN Security Council, 30, 58, 79, 69, 73, 80–85, 97, 99, 109,
112, 161 111–112, 114, 116–117,
United Nations Mission in Haiti 121–122, 128–131, 136–138,
(UNMIH), 161 140–141, 148, 152, 156,
United States, 1–7, 9–13, 15–24, 159–161, 163, 167–171,
28–33, 35–53, 55, 58, 63–64, 173–174, 177–179, 181,
66–68, 70, 76, 79–93, 101–125, 183–184, 187, 191
127–134, 136–148, 153, Villagran de Leon, Francisco, 62
157–163, 165–167, 170–192
dominance, 9–11, 15, 18, 39, 43, Waltz, Kenneth, 5, 17
48, 52–53, 58, 95, 102–103, war, 3, 11, 24, 35–36, 41–42, 44,
106, 115–116, 148–149, 47, 49, 52–54, 60, 63, 65, 80,
176, 185 83, 88, 151–153, 157, 159,
foreign policy, 1, 42, 45, 111, 186 172–175, 180, 182–183,
interests, 5, 18, 186 185–186, 189, 191–192
intervention, 3, 50, 84, 87, 93, renunciation of, 41, 44
106, 109, 123, 125, 130, 179 Wiarda, Howard J., 2, 153
leadership, 18, 45–46, 110, 115, Wilson, Woodrow, 39, 47, 103,
118, 121, 128 119, 122
occupation of Latin American World War I, 47
states, 35, 47, 122 World War II, 52–54, 60, 180, 191