Suelos
Suelos
TALL BUILDINGS
STUDY
Disclaimer: While the information presented in this report is believed to be correct, the Applied
Technology Council assumes no responsibility for its accuracy or for the opinions expressed herein. The
material presented in this publication should not be used or relied upon for any specific application
without competent examination and verification of its accuracy, suitability, and applicability by qualified
professionals. Users of information from this publication assume all liability arising from such use.
San Francisco Tall Buildings Study
Prepared by
APPLIED TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL
201 Redwood Shores Parkway, Suite 240
Redwood City, California 94065
www.ATCouncil.org
Prepared for
City and County of San Francisco Office of Resilience and Capital Planning
Brian Strong, Chief Resilience Officer and Director
Danielle Mieler, Principal Resilience Analyst
San Francisco, California
December 2018
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO TALL BUILDINGS STAKEHOLDERS
Board of Supervisors Business
District 3 San Francisco Chamber of Commerce
District 6
Real Estate
Private Engineers and Architects Real Estate Advisory Services
DBI Code Advisory Committee
Heller Manus Architects Community and Non-profit Organizations
Building Inspection Commission SPUR
HOK BOMA
Maffei Structural Engineering The East Cut Community Benefit District
BXP
SEAONC AB 82/83 Code Advisory City and County of San Francisco Staff
Committee Department of Building Inspection
Fennie+Mehl Architects Real Estate Division
Department of Emergency Management
Developers Planning Department
San Francisco Apartment Owners Fire Department
Association SFPUC
Tishman Speyer Public Works
Boston Properties Office of Resilience and Capital Planning
Preface
In 2011, the City and County of San Francisco published the CAPSS
Earthquake Safety Implementation Program Workplan 2012-2042 as a result
of the Community Action Plan for Seismic Safety (CAPSS) in response to
Mayor Newsom’s Executive Directive 10-022. Workplan 2012-2042
anticipates programs for broad groups of new and existing buildings
throughout the City. Looking ahead, the City recognized that within each
broad group, some buildings would need special attention through
exemptions, programmatic solutions, or specific technical criteria, to make the
work feasible.
One such subgroup comprises the City’s “tall buildings.” In tall buildings,
difficult exterior access, multiple tenants and uses within a building, and their
sheer size complicate evaluation and retrofit. Their structural systems
preclude generic performance assumptions and prescriptive engineering
solutions. Damage to a tall building can pose risks well beyond its own
footprint. Their high concentration downtown poses an aggregate risk to
neighborhood and citywide recovery not presented by other building groups.
Perhaps most important, San Francisco’s new and existing tall buildings
represent a dominant portion of the City’s business sector, and increasingly
house residents as well.
For these reasons, the City initiated the first project in the nation to consider
the impact of earthquakes on tall buildings. The project conducted
investigations in seven focus areas under separate tasks. This report
documents the complete findings and recommendations of each task, and the
recommendations are summarized below.
An inventory developed for the project identified 156 buildings that are 240
feet or taller, either constructed or permitted for construction, primarily located
in San Francisco’s northeast neighborhoods (Supervisorial Districts 3 and 6).
Approximately 60% of these buildings contain primarily business uses, while
the others are predominantly residential.
Each recommended action identifies one or more City departments to lead its
implementation. However, implementation of any new policy is assumed to
involve appropriate coordination with other City departments, outside experts
(as needed), and other stakeholders. Some recommended actions require
enactment of legislation by the Mayor and Board of Supervisors or action by
the Building Inspection Commission and can only commence after these
approvals.
Sections 1 through 4 below summarize the findings from the study in issue
statements and describe the associated recommendations to address the
issue. Section 5 presents the recommendations in a table format showing
different aspects of each recommendation, including potential implementation
timeframe, relationship to Workplan 2012-2042, City department responsible
for implementation, and the relationship of recommendations to Parts of the
project report for reference.
Issue: The San Francisco Building Code sets minimum requirements for
geotechnical site investigations and foundation design. Because they are
minimum requirements, they do not fully address all of the geotechnical
conditions found in San Francisco. Over the past several decades, the San
Francisco geotechnical community has developed best practices for
Using the resulting Administrative Bulletin, DBI should apply the repair
provisions of the San Francisco Existing Building Code with respect to
possible Loma Prieta damage. Because the enforcement would be taking
place so long after the damaging earthquake, it would likely benefit from a
special program including notification, guidance to owners and tenants,
appropriate deadlines, and consideration of voluntary inspection and repair
work already performed. This Administrative Bulletin can also be used in the
implementation of Workplan 2012-2042 Task C.2.d, evaluation and retrofit of
all pre-1994 welded steel moment frame buildings.
3D. Update and Amend the San Francisco Existing Building Code
Triggers for Repair Projects
Issue: The San Francisco Existing Building Code triggers for seismic
upgrade based on the extent of earthquake damage have fallen out
coordination with the latest state code. In addition, while the latest
requirements are rational for most buildings, for larger structures, they can
become disproportionately expensive and disruptive; if repairs to many large
buildings are triggered, the aggregate impact can affect the City’s overall
recovery. San Francisco’s code amendments might exacerbate the problem
by not allowing use of reduced loads typical for retrofits.
Recommendation: As the 2019 California code becomes effective, DBI
should take the opportunity to update its traditional amendments and
coordinate them with the state code.
Regarding repair-triggered retrofits, ORCP, together with appropriate BIC
committees, should investigate whether San Francisco should relax its code
provisions for certain buildings, especially regarding the “substantial structural
damage” trigger. The study should consider typical San Francisco buildings,
ideally with a scenario that considers the effects of multiple buildings on
downtown recovery.
Issue: Cordons or barricades are often needed to protect the areas around a
damaged building. The cordoned area is generally based on the perceived
level of damage and the risks posed by potential aftershocks, wind loading,
time-dependent creep effects, or other factors. While cordons may be
required around buildings of any height, the disruptive implications of current
generic guidance for cordon distance increase dramatically with building
height, potentially leading to unnecessary closure of neighboring buildings
and infrastructure.
Issue: This project compiled a database with information about all buildings
240 feet or taller either constructed or currently permitted for construction in
San Francisco. The database includes information on building location,
height, occupancy, age, construction material, structural system, year of
retrofit, and foundation type. Prior to the creation of this database, the City
had no centralized, searchable repository with this information about all tall
buildings in its jurisdiction. Following the completion of this project, the City
will need to develop a mechanism for maintaining or expanding the database.
5. Summary Tables
1. Introduction .....................................................................................1-1
1.1 Background..........................................................................1-1
1.2 Inventory Overview ..............................................................1-2
1.3 Data Fields and Sources ......................................................1-4
1.4 Maintaining an Updated Inventory........................................ 1-6
1.5 Organization ........................................................................1-6
A. Tall Building Inventory Data Fields, Definitions, and Notes ............ 1-33
D. References ....................................................................................1-41
1. Introduction......................................................................................2-1
1.1 Background ..........................................................................2-1
1.2 Intended Audience and Use of this Report ...........................2-1
1.3 San Francisco Conditions ....................................................2-2
1.4 Organization.........................................................................2-4
9. Recommendations......................................................................... 2-39
1. Introduction .....................................................................................3-1
1.1 Background..........................................................................3-1
1.2 Seismic Performance Objectives ......................................... 3-1
1.3 Organization ........................................................................3-3
A. References ....................................................................................3-41
1. Introduction .....................................................................................4-1
1.1 Background..........................................................................4-1
1.2 Organization ........................................................................4-1
B. References ....................................................................................4-37
1. Introduction......................................................................................5-1
1.1 Background ..........................................................................5-1
1.2 Acknowledgements ..............................................................5-1
1.3 Organization.........................................................................5-2
A. References ....................................................................................5-39
1. Introduction .....................................................................................6-1
1.1 Background..........................................................................6-1
1.2 Organization ........................................................................6-1
2. Background .....................................................................................6-3
2.1 Current San Francisco Practice ........................................... 6-3
2.2 Safety, Reoccupancy, Functional Recovery, and City
Resilience ............................................................................6-3
2.3 Related Issues .....................................................................6-6
5. ATC-20 ..........................................................................................6-23
5.1 ATC-20 as Criteria for SAP and BORP .............................. 6-23
5.2 Issues and Recommendations Regarding ATC-20............. 6-27
5.2.1 Limits on Exterior-Only Inspection ....................... 6-27
5.2.2 Limits on Rapid Evaluation .................................. 6-27
5.2.3 Damage Estimates .............................................. 6-28
5.2.4 Placard Use and Tracking ................................... 6-29
5.2.5 Placard Text ........................................................ 6-29
A. References ....................................................................................6-41
1. Introduction......................................................................................7-1
1.1 Organization.........................................................................7-1
3. Alternative Approaches....................................................................7-9
3.1 Mandatory Retrofit Ordinances ............................................7-9
3.2 Aggressive Triggers with Focused Targets ........................7-10
3.3 Aggressive Triggers with Reduced Scope ..........................7-14
3.4 Acquisition Triggers............................................................7-17
3.4.1 The PML Market as an Alternative to Public
Policy ...................................................................7-20
3.5 Incentives for Voluntary Evaluation or Retrofit ....................7-21
C. References ....................................................................................7-49
AB administrative bulletin
ATC Applied Technology Council
BIC Building Inspection Commission
CAPSS Community Action Plan for Seismic Safety
CEBC California Existing Building Code
DBI Department of Building Inspection
DD disproportionate damage
DEM Department of Emergency Management
DPW Department of Public Works
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
IEBC International Existing Building Code
ORCP Office of Resilience and Capital Planning
SEAONC Structural Engineers Association of Northern California
SFEBC San Francisco Existing Building Code
SFFD San Francisco Fire Department
SSD substantial structural damage
I.1 Background
In 2017, the City and County of San Francisco initiated the first project in the
nation to consider the impact of earthquakes on a city’s tall buildings. The
project conducted investigations in seven focus areas under separate tasks.
This project supplements the CAPSS Earthquake Safety Implementation
Program Workplan 2012-2042 published by the City in 2011 as a result of the
Community Action Plan for Seismic Safety (CAPSS) in response to Mayor
Newsom’s Executive Directive 10-022. The Workplan 2012-2042 anticipates
programs for broad groups of new and existing buildings throughout the city.
In 2018, the City recognized that tall buildings may need special attention
through exemptions, programmatic solutions, or specific technical criteria, to
make the work described in the Workplan 2012-2042 feasible. This is
because difficult exterior access, multiple tenants and uses within a building,
and their sheer size complicate evaluation and retrofit; their structural
systems preclude generic performance assumptions and prescriptive
engineering solutions; and San Francisco’s new and existing tall buildings
represent a dominant portion of the City’s business sector. In addition, their
high concentration downtown poses an aggregate risk to neighborhood and
citywide recovery not presented by other building groups.
The initial task of the project was to quantify the tall buildings in the City in
terms of height, age, usage, and structural system characteristics. The
building inventory database is developed in a Geographical Information
Systems (GIS) format to facilitate analysis and visualization of the tall building
inventory.
This report presents the project team’s findings and recommendations. While
the Summary Recommendations of this report can be used for big picture
implementation, a thorough review of the discussion presented in this report
is critical for the success of any implementation activity.
Introduction
1.1 Background
San Francisco’s building inventory has grown significantly over the past
century, with much of the current development rooted in the rebuilding
following the 1906 earthquake and fire. This rebuilding included significant
land development along the San Francisco waterfront. Since the late 1950s,
San Francisco’s skyline has changed dramatically with the construction of tall
buildings in the downtown financial district. Significant growth over the past
fifteen years has included high-rise residential and mixed-use buildings
concentrated in the region south of Market Street. Among the multi-faceted
earthquake risks facing the city, the concentration of tall buildings and
infrastructure in the densely populated downtown neighborhoods is raising
questions about the risks to life, property, and recovery from large
earthquakes in San Francisco.
As a first step towards addressing these questions, this report describes the
development of an inventory of tall buildings in San Francisco. The primary
motivation is to quantify the tall buildings in terms of height, age, usage, and
structural system characteristics of the buildings. Although not the only
earthquake risk, tall buildings are of special concern due to their size and
large occupant loads, where earthquake damage to one tall building can have
disproportionate effects on its occupants, its neighbors, and the community at
large. The inventory is intended to help inform policies and practices to
manage risks associated with existing buildings and to improve the planning
and design of future buildings. The inventory can further serve to inform
planning for emergency response and recovery.
For this study, two databases were assembled. The first is a general
database of all buildings in the downtown neighborhoods of San Francisco,
which was compiled from building information available from DataSF
(https://datasf.org/), the San Francisco Property Information Map (CCSF,
2017a), and other sources. Shown in Figure 1-1 is a map of buildings from
this database in downtown San Francisco, including the Financial District and
the South of Market neighborhoods. This map shows the concentration of tall
buildings in the downtown region, distinguished between height groupings
with thresholds of 75 ft (6 to 8 stories), 160 ft (12 to 16 stories) and 240 ft (18
to 24 stories). The 75-foot threshold is based on the fire safety code in
Section 403 of the California Building Code (CBSC, 2016), which requires
special provisions for “high-rises” over 75 ft. The 160-foot and 240-foot limits
are based on building code requirements for seismic design. A subset of
these buildings covering the blocks with the highest concentration of tall
buildings was also produced and is discussed in Part 2 Section 2.2.
The second database is a more detailed inventory of buildings over 240 ft tall
that includes information on building location, height, occupancy, age of
construction, construction material, structural system, foundation type, façade
system, and other relevant design information. This was compiled from the
general data sources listed above, combined with surveys of building permit
drawings for all buildings taller than 240 ft. The locations and schematic
geometries of these tall buildings are shown in Figure 1-2. The locations are
superimposed on a map where beige shading identifies areas that are
susceptible to soil liquefaction during strong earthquakes, which is one of
Damage to tall buildings has the potential to affect a large number of people
and can have significant consequences on surrounding areas. Susceptibility
to earthquake damage is attributed to several factors including: intensity of
ground motion shaking, soil characteristics at the site, age of construction,
building material, structural system, cladding, interior finishes, and
mechanical and electrical components. Many of these features, which are
identified in the database, can help understand the expected seismic
performance of these building under varying intensities of ground motion
shaking.
The data fields contained within the tall building inventory can be classified
into the following broad categories:
• Building name and location
• Height (by feet and number of stories)
• Primary occupancy
• Date (permit or completion, depending on source)
• Retrofit information (if applicable/available)
• Construction material
• Structural system (i.e., lateral force resisting system)
• Foundation system
• Geotechnical information (e.g., soil class, depth to rock)
• Massing (e.g., overall dimensions, square footage)
• Irregularities (e.g., podiums, setbacks)
• Façade composition (e.g., pre-cast concrete panels, glass)
• Fire-suppression information (i.e., system type and rating)
• Presence of strong motion instrumentation
• Other remarks and observations
A detailed list of all the variables included within the database is included in
Appendix A. Although not all parameters are available for all buildings, the
Appendix A identifies the major source of data for each data field included in
the tall building inventory.
In addition to data fields discussed above, the GIS shape file also includes
spatial location polygons representing the footprint of each building. Polygon
footprint data for buildings that existed during a LIDAR flight, conducted on
behalf of the City in 2010, are taken from the LIDAR dataset available on
DataSF. For buildings constructed since 2010, the footprint is approximated.
Note that these polygons are based on the footprints at ground level and
include, for example, podium structures that are not as tall as the main tower
of the building.
1.5 Organization
Characterization of Building
Inventory Features
The tall building inventory includes detailed information on 156 buildings over
240-feet tall, which currently exist or have been permitted for construction in
San Francisco. The specifics of the structural materials and systems for
these buildings were identified by reviewing structural drawings on file in the
building permit and Building Occupancy Resumption Program (BORP) report
databases maintained by San Francisco Department of Building Inspection
(DBI) (more discussion on the BORP program is in Part 6). The tall building
inventory also includes information on an additional 22 buildings between 160
ft to 240-ft tall, which have been collected from other sources. The list of
buildings below 240-feet tall, and details of their structural systems and
materials, are not complete since the first priority for the database was to
focus on buildings above 240 ft.
Summary statistics from the database of buildings 240-ft tall and above are
provided below according to height, occupancy, construction date,
construction material and structural configuration.
• Height: Roughly 10% of the inventory is below 20 stories, 70% of the
inventory is in the 20- to 40-story range, 20% is above 40 stories.
• Occupancy: Approximately 60% of the buildings are commercial and
just under 40% are residential or hotel.
• Construction date: Over 55% of the tall building inventory was
constructed between 1960 and 1990. Tall building construction slowed
down in the 1990s, but has resurged since then, with almost 25% of the
inventory constructed since 2000.
• Construction material: Structural steel systems account for about 65%
of the inventory, reinforced concrete systems account for about 20% of
the buildings, and the remainder either incorporate mixed steel-concrete
systems or, in a few instances, the systems were unidentified.
• Structural configuration: Approximately 50% of the buildings employ
steel moment-resisting frames as the seismic-force-resisting system
Figure 1-3 illustrates the fraction of buildings according to their SFRS, decade
of construction, and number of stories. Superimposed on the figure are notes
indicating two significant earthquake events (San Fernando in 1971 and
Northridge 1994) and the advent of performance-based design procedures
(2007) that relate to significant changes building code requirements and
design practices, which are discussed further in the next section.
Three noteworthy trends in the data in Figures 1-3 and 1-4 are: (1) the
predominance of steel moment-resisting frame construction during the 1960s,
70s and 80s; (2) a transition from steel moment-resisting frames to steel
braced frame dual systems in the 1990s; and (3) the emergence of concrete
shear wall systems since 2000. The trend away from steel moment-resisting
frame to braced frames is due to a combination of architectural preferences
towards taller buildings with more irregular geometries, combined with
advancements in computer methods that facilitated their analyses. The post-
2000 emergence of concrete shear walls is in large part due to the
construction of high-rise residential buildings, whose architectural
configurations (smaller floor plate sizes and room layouts, and smaller
occupant densities with lower elevator and HVAC requirements) make them
more amenable to concrete construction.
Performance-Based (2007)
Northridge (1994)
San Fernando (1971)
(b)
(c)
Figure 1-3 Figure showing 156 San Francisco buildings tall than 240 ft by: (a)
percentage of buildings by SFRS type, (b) breakdown of SFRS by
decade, and (c) distribution of SFRS by number of stories.
(b)
(c)
Figure 1-4 Figure showing 156 San Francisco buildings taller than 240 ft by: (a)
percentage of buildings by occupancy type, (b) distribution of
occupancies by decade, and (c) distribution of occupancies by
number of stories.
Figure 1-6 provides a distribution of the foundation systems used, with over
half of the buildings on pile foundations and about a quarter on shallow mat
foundations. The remainder of foundations consist of shallow footings, pile
supported mats, or drilled shafts. Drilled shaft foundation techniques were
introduced relatively recently to San Francisco, and used in several tall
buildings constructed in sites with depth to bedrock greater than about 200 ft.
(a) (b)
Figure 1-6 Figure showing: (a) percentage of buildings by foundation type, and (b) breakdown of
foundation types by depth to bedrock.
The study area contains 243 distinct buildings. The structural system, retrofit
status, use/occupancy, and occupant load of each building are of interest to a
comprehensive resilience-based inventory, but for this context study, only the
most basic building data – height, building area, and age – were compiled.
Figure 1-7b shows the distribution of height and dates of the buildings.
(a) (b)
Figure 1-7 Map showing 243 buildings in a 31-block downtown San Francisco
study area: (a) the study area, focused on the blocks with the highest
concentrations of tall buildings; and (b) the height and dates of
buildings in the study area, with the percent in each height category.
The height, area, and age data were compiled from Datasf.org, San
Francisco Property Information Map (CCSF, 2017a), Sanborn maps, and
satellite and street level imagery. In addition, limited information for the 243
buildings were found or confirmed from online searches by address, with data
coming from websites produced by building owners, leasing agents,
contractors, architects, or building historians. The resulting dataset, while not
perfect, is more complete and reliable than the data from any single source.
Table 1-1 summarizes the data from Figure 1-7 in bins by height and age in
count normalized to the total number of buildings. The height bins are based
While the age bins in Table 1-1 are continuous, Figure 1-7 reveals trends
within each bin:
• The Pre-1915 bin captures the decade of rebuilding that followed the
1906 earthquake and fire, but there is an obvious concentration in the first
few years. Sixty-two of the 98 buildings in this group date from 1906 to
1908.
• The 1915-1950 bin includes the building boom of the 1920s, in which
much of San Francisco’s housing stock was built. Forty-three of the 48
buildings in this group were built before 1930.
• The 1915-1950 bin also shows the gap in development during the Great
Depression and World War II, during which San Francisco added only a
handful of buildings to its downtown.
Table 1-1 and Figure 1-7 show, unsurprisingly, a relationship between height
and age. Very few of San Francisco’s tallest buildings were built before
1960, and most of the shorter buildings (even up to 160 ft) were built before
1930. This trend will become stronger as each new tall building replaces
several older and shorter ones.
Available data did not support a study of building area relative to height or
age. Even so, it is obvious that the taller buildings have much larger areas;
the 51 buildings taller than 240 ft likely contain more total square footage than
the 192 shorter buildings combined. Therefore, a structurally deficient tall
building represents a greater potential loss than a similarly deficient shorter
building.
On the other hand, the total street frontage presented by buildings in different
height categories is likely to include a higher percentage of lower buildings.
Just as the tall buildings have greater volume, the more numerous short
buildings front a larger share of downtown streets and sidewalks. Cladding
failure and other nonstructural falling hazards can be as dangerous from 50
feet as from 250 feet. So where falling hazards or leaning buildings are of
concern, it is possible that the shorter buildings, as a group, may pose
greater risks to more blocks and more public spaces than the tall buildings,
especially considering their age and obsolete materials. San Francisco’s
façade inspection requirements are likely to increase understanding on this
issue.
Changes to the seismic and other design requirements that have been made
to the San Francisco Building Code over the past century offer important
clues to interpreting the building databases. Building codes are living
documents that are revised and updated over time, often in response to
observations from damaging earthquakes, development of new building
technologies, and most recently to advancements in building performance
assessment methods. Building code requirements also evolve as the risk or
the expected performance associated with such requirements is deemed
unacceptable (FEMA, 2006). Therefore, older buildings may include
deficiencies that were unrecognized by the building codes and practices
under which they were designed and constructed but have since been
acknowledged in newer building codes. This section provides a brief review
The Uniform Building Code (UBC) was first published in 1927 to help promote
public safety and standardized construction. The code was updated every
three years until 1997, which was the final version of the code before the
introduction of the International Building Code (IBC) in 2000. One significant
change over the course of the UBC revisions was the inclusion of seismic
design code provisions. From 1927 to 1961, the UBC had a non-mandatory
appendix, until mandatory seismic design requirements were introduced via
recommendations published in 1959 by the Structural Engineers Association
of California (SEAOC) in Recommended Lateral Force Requirements and
Commentary, or the “SEAOC Blue Book.” This established performance
goals that still underlie today’s building codes. The code’s minimum design
provisions were intended to provide earthquake safety. Most were based on
fundamental engineering principles, but many, including height limits and
height-related details, were set by consensus engineering judgment. The
requirements included minimum lateral strength provisions, simplified design
methods and other prescriptive requirements to help avoid deficiencies that
led to severe building damage and collapse in past earthquakes.
Over the course of time, the definitions for seismic requirements have been
updated. In the 1970s, Cornell’s (1968) principles of seismic hazard analysis
were implemented to develop hazard maps that represented the intensity of
earthquake ground shaking with a 10% chance of being exceeded occurring
during the [assumed] 50-year design life of a building. Statistically, this
probability of exceedance is also characterized as a ground motion with a
475-year return period (the average time over which the ground motion is
typically exceeded). For many years, this level of intensity was the basis of
the design basis earthquake (DBE) in building codes. As more data became
available to characterize earthquake ground motion hazard and recognizing
the nonlinear relationship between ground motion risk and intensity, the
Maximum Considered Earthquake (MCE) was introduced into building codes
in the mid-1990s. In downtown San Francisco, the MCE ground motion has
roughly a 2% to 5% chance of being exceeded in 50 years, depending on the
soil conditions (about 2% in rock sites and 5% in soft-soil sites). This level of
ground motion is on the order of what could be expected by a magnitude-8
earthquake on a nearby segment of the San Andreas fault.
The ground motion hazard is one component of design, which defines the
expected ground shaking. The other component involves many assumptions
inherent in building code design and analysis requirements, which vary by
structural materials and systems. The combined risk is based on the
The inventory process also revealed the following about San Francisco’s tall
buildings:
Fire Regulations: Since 1976, San Francisco has required fire sprinklers in
all new buildings 75 feet high or taller. This threshold is based on limitations
of firefighters reaching stories about this height. In 1993, San Francisco
required retrofitting high-rise commercial buildings and hotels with sprinklers,
but the requirement excluded residential buildings. Nevertheless, even many
residential buildings have been retrofitted such that most buildings have at
least some percentage of their interior sprinklered. The database reports the
percentage of sprinklers that are installed in the 135 buildings that could be
cross-referenced with the Fire Department’s database. Of these buildings
with known information, 84% of them are over 95% sprinklered (i.e.,
essentially fully sprinklered), 7% are reported to be less than 30%
sprinklered, and 9% are in between 30% to 95% sprinklered.
Table 1-2 summarizes the height range, occupancy type, construction dates,
construction material and structural system for the three cohorts of interest.
Sections 3.2 to 3.4 describe the rationale for the selection of each cohort
(e.g., high risk, prominent building type, disproportionate consequences
associated with poor performance, or unique design approach) and further
observations.
Approximately 50% of the buildings within the inventory have steel moment-
resisting frame seismic-force-resisting systems (SFRS), and almost 90% of
these were constructed in the 1960s through the 1980s. These are identified
as a building cohort of primary interest owing to: (1) their prominence as the
most common system type in the tall building inventory; and (2) concern
regarding deficiencies in their design, including the potential for fracture
prone welded connections, which came to light following the 1994 Northridge
earthquake.
(a) (b)
Figure 1-8 Joint distribution of pre-1994 steel moment-resisting frame tall
buildings for (a) building date versus number of stories, and (b) date
versus occupancy type (values and color intensity denote the
number of buildings in each category).
When first introduced into construction practice, it was customary for steel
moment-resisting frame systems to be configured as “space frame systems,”
whereby all of the beams and columns in the building are engaged to resist
lateral loads by providing rigid moment-resisting connections at all beam-to-
column intersections. Motivated by improved construction economics and
architectural configurations, this practice later evolved to one where the
moment-resisting frames are concentrated in a subset of building frame. For
example, a common system is to concentrate the seismic-force-resisting
frames at the building perimeter of the building. Both the space frame and
perimeter frame configurations are observed within this building cohort with
roughly a 50-50 split between them.
Damage and collapses observed to concrete buildings during the 1971 San
Fernando earthquake and other earthquakes have raised serious concern
about the safety of older non-ductile reinforced concrete buildings. In
In Southern California, cities such as Los Angeles, Santa Monica and West
Hollywood have recently mandated a retrofit policy for non-ductile reinforced
concrete frame buildings. In San Francisco, there are an estimated 3,300
concrete buildings constructed prior to 1980, which may pose high collapse
risks (http://www.concretecoalition.org).
As indicated in Figure 1-3b, older concrete buildings account for only about
10% of the buildings in the tall building database, the majority of which were
constructed in the 1960s and are in the lower (20-story) height range. Most
of these are either concrete shear wall or dual wall-frame systems. Further
work is needed to better understand the risk and develop appropriate policies
for this tall building cohort in San Francisco, as well as with the vast majority
of low and mid-rise older concrete buildings. New approaches identified by
FEMA can enable screening assessments to identify the most vulnerable
nonductile concrete buildings.
Further study of this cohort will highlight the expected seismic performance of
newer tall buildings and cost implications associated with enhanced seismic
design performance objectives (see Part 3).
In an effort to understand the impact that tall building performance may have
on the recovery of the City after a major earthquake, an inventory of the city’s
tall buildings was developed. The building inventory database is developed
and implemented in a Geographical Information Systems (GIS) format to
facilitate analysis and visualization of the tall building inventory and
identification of locations where building damage is most likely to have
disproportionate impacts on the urban community, and the broader socio-
economic factors that affect resilience (e.g., services provided to the
community by the affected buildings).
o About 10% of the older buildings in the inventory did not have
sufficient documentation to identify a structural system
• 10% of the inventory is below 20 stories, 70% of the inventory is in the 20
to 40 story range, 20% is above 40 stories.
Based on this review of the tall building inventory and considering the impact
of the evolution of seismic design, past earthquake observations, and other
considerations, the following tall building cohorts of special interest are
identified as worthy of further study:
• Older Steel Buildings: Steel-framed buildings constructed in the 1960s
through the early 1990s have many known deficiencies, relative to current
seismic building codes, including welded connection details similar to
those that fractured in buildings subjected to strong shaking during the
1994 Northridge Earthquake. The vulnerability of these buildings
warrants further study of the risks they pose to their occupants and
neighboring buildings.
• Older Concrete Buildings: Concrete buildings constructed prior to 1980
are likely to have non-ductile detailing and other deficiencies that resulted
in building collapses during the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake.
Although the number of older, tall concrete buildings is small relative to
those with other structural systems, the vulnerability of these systems
poses a significant risk. Vulnerable older concrete buildings represent a
much larger percentage of low- and mid-rise buildings and are well
recognized to pose a significant risk. This has prompted mandatory
assessment and retrofit requirements in other jurisdictions in California,
which should be evaluated for implementation in San Francisco.
• Modern Concrete Buildings: Newer concrete shear wall buildings that
meet modern (post-2000) building code requirements are expected to
have low life-safety risks from falling hazards and collapse. However,
modern building codes do not provide minimum requirements for
controlling earthquake damage that may require extensive repair with
extended downtime. Given the emergence of modern high-rise
residential buildings in San Francisco, it is recommended that the
implications of adopting seismic performance objectives beyond the code-
minimum be evaluated.
The appendix to this report summarizes the metadata fields of the digital GIS
database. To help maintain and expand the database, it is recommended to
develop a checklist of information that could be collected from building permit
applications for new and/or retrofitted buildings, façade inspection reports,
and other similar programs managed by the City of San Francisco.
The tall building inventory includes three fields related to the depth of the
bedrock beneath the buildings: the average, maximum, and minimum depth
across the footprint. These values were calculated based on two sources:
one for the elevation at ground level and one for the elevation at bedrock.
The elevation at bedrock also comes from the USGS in the form of a contour
map from 1961 (Figure 1-11). The contours were traced and spatially
interpolated to obtain a smooth surface for comparison with the ground level
data. Using the footprint location of the buildings as a template, the bedrock
elevation was then subtracted from the ground level elevation for the
average, maximum, and minimum depth to bedrock for each building.
References
Almufti, I., Molina Hutt, C., Mieler, M.W., Paul, N.A., and Fusco, C.R., 2018,
The HayWired Earthquake Scenario - Engineering Implications: Case
Studies of Tall-Building Structural Analyses, Downtime and Loss
Assessment for the HayWired Scenario Mainshock, United States
Geological Survey, Menlo Park, California.
ASCE, 2017, Minimum Design Loads and Associated Criteria for Buildings
and Other Structures, ASCE/SEI 7-16, American Society of Civil
Engineers Structural Engineering Institute, Reston, Virginia.
CBSC, 2016, 2016 California Building Code, California Code of Regulations,
Title 24, California Building Standards Commission, Sacramento,
California.
CCSF, 1995, Downtown Area Plan, Planning Department, the City and
County of San Francisco, California.
CCSF, 2008, Requirements and Guidelines for the Seismic Design of Tall
Buildings Using Non-Prescriptive Seismic-Design Procedures,
Administrative Bulletin 083, Department of Building Inspection, the
City and County of San Francisco, California.
CCSF, 2011, CAPSS Earthquake Safety Implementation Program Workplan
2012-2042, the City and County of San Francisco, California.
CCSF, 2014, Procedures for Seismic Instrumentation of New Buildings,
Administrative Bulletin 058, Department of Building Inspection, the
City and County of San Francisco, California.
CCSF, 2016, The San Francisco Building Code, the City and County of San
Francisco, California.
CCSF, 2017a, San Francisco Property Information Map, Planning
Department, the City and County of San Francisco, California.
Available at: http://propertymap.sfplanning.org/, last accessed: August
2018.
CCSF, 2017b, Building Façade Inspection and Maintenance, Administrative
Bulletin 110, Department of Building Inspection, the City and County
of San Francisco, California.
Introduction
1.1 Background
This Part summarizes the state-of-the art and state-of practice for
geotechnical engineering for tall buildings based on experience in San
Francisco and cities with tall buildings built on similar soils (Chicago and
Boston), as well as guidance from New Zealand. The material was
developed for review by persons with advanced geotechnical engineering
knowledge and understanding. References are provided within each section
to allow for further review of technical details.
Geotechnical design of tall buildings was not covered in the ESIP Workplan
(CCSF, 2011).
Figure 2-1 Map showing foundation types of tall buildings superimposed where beige shading
identifies regions that are susceptible to soil liquefaction during strong earthquakes (soil
information from https://datasf.org/).
1.4 Organization
References and full citations are incorporated into each chapter for ease of
use.
The current California Building Code does not provide criteria for maximum
allowable limits for total and differential settlement of foundations supporting
commercial or residential tall buildings. However, many practitioners and
officials with building departments of various cities consider acceptable a total
settlement of less than 4 inches and a differential settlement limited to an
angular distortion of 1/500 for composite steel or concrete core buildings and
1/750 for reinforced concrete towers (rigid structures) acceptable. The
structural system, cladding system, partitions, and other nonstructural
components may also control the acceptable differential settlement.
When ground conditions at a site are not suitable for shallow spread or raft
foundation systems, especially for high-rise buildings where the vertical and
lateral loads imposed on the foundation are significant, it is necessary to
support the building on deep foundation or piles. Drilled shaft, driven pile, or
auger cast pile foundations can be used either as a single unit or in groups
and are generally located beneath columns and load bearing walls.
Due to the presence of liquefiable fill and soft Bay mud, the majority of the
existing tall buildings in downtown San Francisco are supported either on
drilled shafts extending to Franciscan bedrock formation or on driven 12-inch
or 14-inch precast, prestressed concrete piles gaining support through end
bearing within the dense Colma sand layer below Young Bay mud.
Most common types of deep foundation used in the San Francisco Bay Area
for support of tall buildings are drilled shafts, driven concrete or steel piles,
and auger cast piles. An alternative deep foundation used frequently in
Europe is Barrettes, or known on the east coast of the United States as LBEs
(Load Bearing Elements, which is an isolated slurry vertical diaphragm with
rectangular elements 3 feet to 4 feet wide by 9 feet to 10 feet long. The
application of this foundation in the western United States has been very
limited with only one tall building in San Francisco supported on Barrettes.
However, on the east coast, they have been used on many tall buildings
since the late 1980s.
Depending on the local soil conditions, drilling fluid (slurry) or steel casing is
used to stabilize the drilled hole before placement of rebar cage and tremie
placed structural concrete. High capacity drilled shafts (axial capacity in the
range of 20,000 kips) with rock socket into Franciscan bedrock formation
have been successfully installed and tested in the recent past.
Due to the high groundwater table in the San Francisco Bay Area, drilled
shafts are commonly constructed using the slurry method, and concrete is
placed using the tremie method for concrete mixes having a slump of 7 to 9
inches. Tremie pipes should be at least 10 inches in diameter for pumped
and gravity-fed methods, respectively. If used for stability of the drilled hole,
to avoid contamination of concrete through caving soils, the temporary casing
is pulled out with concrete surface being several feet above the bottom of
casing at all times.
It is not practical to perform pile load test on high capacity (large diameter
and very long) drilled shafts using conventional pile load test conducted from
ground surface. In these cases, pile load tests are performed by placing and
activating hydraulic jacks placed near the bottom of drilled shafts. Osterberg
(O-Cell) or equivalent testing devices have successfully been used to
measure ultimate skin friction and end bearing of high capacity drilled shafts
in soil and rock.
There are various methods for cleaning the bottom of drilled shafts. These
include the use of cleanout bucket or air lifting. Inspection of high capacity
drilled shaft is performed by various methods including measurement of
drilled shaft height immediately before placement of concrete using a
weighted tape measure (least reliable method), a Mini-SID (Shaft Inspection
Device), or DID (Ding Inspection Device). For smaller diameter drilled shafts
For drilled shafts socketed in bedrock, the minimum rock socket length
should generally be 15 feet or twice the shaft diameter, whichever is greater.
The minimum rock socket length requirement could be relaxed for sites
where the depth to bedrock is greater than 25 times the shaft diameter and
hard rock with substantial lateral extension and depth (i.e., the hard rock
boulder is the size of a house and not a compact car) is encountered below
the bottom of drilled shafts.
Typically, for sound rock, 50% of axial capacity of rock socket is due to skin
friction. For softer rocks, the contribution of skin friction increases to 75%.
Until concrete has gained sufficient strength (i.e., set for 48 to 72 hours),
newly installed drilled shafts should be protected against construction related
vibration (e.g., pile driving) or installation of other drilled shafts within six shaft
diameters or 25 feet, whichever is less. The above criteria should be revised
if admixtures (retarders) are used.
When precast, prestressed concrete piles are used, the typical allowable
axial capacity of 12-inch-square and 14-inch-square piles driven to refusal
within Colma sand layer are 100 and 150 tonnes, respectively.
For sites where either Colma sand does not exist, the layer is not thick
enough to prevent punching through while pile driving, or the Franciscan
bedrock formation is within 100 to 200 feet below ground surface, steel H
piles with driving shoes are used. The spatial variation of rock quality and
variation in bedrock surface elevation makes steel H piles an attractive
alternative as the length of pile could be increased through field welding or
adjusted by cutting extra length of pile if refusal occurs before the pile is fully
The main disadvantages of driven concrete piles are human factors, such as
objection to noise and vibration that are problematic in congested and well-
developed areas of the City. In addition, due to presence of debris in the
surficial fill layer, predrilling of pile locations would normally be required. The
main disadvantage of steel pipe or H piles is the potential for corrosion.
The axial capacity of steel piles driven to refusal within Franciscan bedrock
formation is controlled by structural capacity of the pile; however, the ultimate
capacity may be controlled by buckling failure mode if soft Young Bay mud or
liquefiable soils are present.
There are three alternatives for addressing corrosion issues related to steel
piles. These include the following:
• Adding a sacrificial thickness to the pile section (normally 1/8-inch or
1/16-inch, depending on soil corrosivity). This option is the least reliable
as reduction in thickness of pile may not occur uniformly along the pile as
assumed.
• Applying coating material (factory applied epoxy coating) to the top
portion of piles to a depth where there is no potential for oxygen to reach
the pile (this depth is normally taken at 10 feet below the surface of
Young Bay mud). This option is more reliable than adding sacrificial
thickness to pile, but the coating may be damaged during pile driving and
if a section of coating is removed during pile driving resulting in scratches
on the pile, very weak spots vulnerable to corrosion are created.
• Applying a Cathodic protection system. This is the most reliable system
to address corrosion issues related to steel piles, but is also a costly
option and that requires long term maintenance.
Due mainly to their cost effectiveness, auger cast piles are gaining popularity
in recent decades. Typical diameter of auger cast piles range from 18 inches
The most suitable soil classification for installation of auger cast piles is
medium stiff to stiff clays and medium dense to dense sands. The most
challenging soil classification is loose sand (especially below ground water
table) and soft clays, as caving of soil could result in necking in the pile
section.
In addition, installation of long and small diameter auger cast piles in soft
clays requires checking for buckling mode of failure under static and seismic
loading conditions.
Until concrete has gained sufficient strength, newly installed auger cast piles
should be protected against construction related vibration (e.g., pile driving)
or installation of other auger cast piles within six shaft diameters (see
discussion on this topic presented in Section 3.1 under heading of “Drilled
Shafts”).
The most relevant reference for design of auger cast piles is given in the
following reference:
• FHWA, 2007, Design and Construction of Continuous Flight Auger Piles,
FHWA Publication No. FHWA-HIF-07-03, U.S. Department of
Transportation Federal Highway Administration.
Lateral reinforcing of concrete piles normally extends down below the point of
fixity (about 12 pile diameters below the pile top). However, in some cases,
lateral reinforcement should continue well below the interface between soft or
liquefiable soils and the underlying firm, competent soils. This is because
large shear strains are developed at this interface as seismic waves
propagate from competent soils at depth to the ground surface.
Often, sites are raised by placing new fill over existing ground surface. The
added load would cause long term settlement within saturated clayey soils,
imposing downdrag loads on piles. Downdrag loads applied to a pile group
depends on pile geometry and layout, undrained shear strength of soil,
effective vertical stress, and soil plasticity. General information regarding
downdrag loads on piles are presented in the following publications:
• Kuwabara, F., Poulos, H.G., 1989, “Downdrag forces in group of piles,”
Journal of Geotechnical Engineering, Volume 115, No. 6.
• Lee, C.J., and Ng, C.W., 2004, “Development of downdrag on piles and
pile groups in consolidating soil,” Journal of Geotechnical and
Geoenvironmental Engineering, Volume 130, No. 9.
Useful information regarding case histories and methods for evaluation and
mitigation of downdrag loads are presented in the following reference:
• Fellenius, B.H., 1998, “Recent advances in the design of piles for axial
loads, dragloads, downdrag, and settlement,” ASCE and Port of NY&NJ
Seminar, April 22-23, 1998.
In case of San Francisco Young Bay mud, downdrag loads are computed by
multiplying vertical effective stresses by a factor between 0.25 to 0.35 for a
single pile and by a factor between 0.1 to 0.2 for a typical pile group (3 by 3, 4
by 4, or more). The corresponding range of values for sandy fill are 0.3 to
0.55 for a single pile and 0.20 to 0.35 for a typical pile group (3 by 3, 4 by 4,
or more). The smaller values are used for drilled shafts and auger cast piles
and the larger values are used for driven piles.
Integrity testing of high capacity drilled shafts are performed through cross-
hole sonic, gamma-gamma, or thermal tests. Smaller diameter drilled shafts
could be tested through conventional static or dynamic pile load test
conducted from the ground surface.
To check the potential for necking of auger cast piles, field observation of
installation should be performed using a fully automated data acquisition
system. In addition, pile integrity tests should be performed for 5 to 10
percent of production piles and for piles with questionable recorded
installation data. Pile integrity tests could be performed through static or
dynamic pile load tests, cross-hole sonic, gamma-gamma, or thermal tests.
Cross-hole sonic and gamma-gamma tests cannot be performed for piles
with a diameter less than 24 inches (i.e., for 18-inch diameter auger cast
piles, only thermal test could be performed). It is noted that performing cross-
hole sonic, gamma-gamma, and thermal tests would require attachment of
the test instrument to the rebar cage before the cage is inserted into the fully
grouted drilled hole.
Axial pile compression load tests are performed in accordance with the
following ASTM standards:
• ASTM, 2013a, Standard Test Methods for Deep Foundations Under
Static Axial Compressive Load, ASTM International, West
Conshohocken, Pennsylvania.
• ASTM, 2017, Standard Test Method for High-Strain Dynamic Testing of
Deep Foundations, ASTM International, West Conshohocken,
Pennsylvania.
Lateral pile load tests are performed less frequently in practice than axial pile
load test for design of new foundations. Instead, design engineers rely on
interpretation of lateral pile load test results and development of p-y springs
by others as presented in the literature. The following ASTM standard
corresponds to lateral pile load tests of deep foundations:
• ASTM, 2013b, Standard Test Methods for Deep Foundations Under
Lateral Load, ASTM International, West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania.
In the San Francisco Bay Area, where liquefiable fill and Young Bay mud are
present, the contribution of the liquefiable sand layer and Young Bay mud to
axial pile capacity should be carefully evaluated and subtracted from ultimate
pile capacity obtained through conventional pile load tests conducted from
ground surface. In addition, down drag loads should be subtracted from
ultimate axial pile capacity (see discussion related to downdrag loads in
Section 3.3).
Comparison on the same piles show that the ultimate axial pile capacity
obtained from a dynamic load test in clayey soils is normally 1.3 times that
obtained from a static load test. This means that strain rate effects increase
the measured axial capacity of piles by 30 percent in clayey soils present in
the San Francisco Bay Area. However, the ultimate axial capacity of piles in
cohesionless soils are not affected by strain rate effects. Similar results are
obtained from static and dynamic test conducted in sandy soils.
Most practitioners would agree that the effects of soil liquefaction (defined as
pore water pressure ratio of 100 percent) does not need to be considered for
sand with N1(60) greater than 25. This is because sands at this density are
dilative and therefore, soil has limited potential for developing large shear
strains or undergo appreciable loss of shear strength. Accordingly, the
effects of soil liquefaction could be ignored for sands with N1(60) of 25 or
greater.
Soil liquefaction would result in temporary loss of axial support within the
liquefied soil layer. Therefore, no axial support in friction is assigned to this
layer.
According to the California Building Code, sites with liquefiable sand layers or
deep soft clays (Young Bay mud in San Francisco Bay Area) fall into Site
Category F, requiring site response analysis, using such computer programs
as SHAKE 6, DEEPSOIL 7, or FLAC 8, except where soft clays and liquefiable
soil layers are completely removed as part of basement construction (i.e.,
basement mat is supported directly on competent soil / rock).
In the first step of performing site response analysis, ground motion is defined
at the surface of competent soil or rock at depth. Then, a one-dimensional
soil profile is constructed based on conventional geotechnical site
investigation and laboratory test results and site-specific shear wave velocity
measurement. Soil degradation curves that show the variation of shear
modulus and damping with shear strain amplitude are based on either:
(1) site-specific resonant column, cyclic triaxial, cyclic direct simple shear
tests, or a combination of these tests (seldom performed for design of
foundation of tall buildings); or (2) results of tests that have been performed
on similar soil units in the past (in San Francisco Bay Area, a number of high
quality tests were performed as part of design and construction of the new
east span of Bay Bridge and expansion of runways at SFO). Finally, site
response analysis is performed in frequency domain (SHAKE) or in time
domain (DEEPSOIL or FLAC).
Flexible connections should be used at the interface of utility lines and pile
supported structures to safely accommodate differential settlement caused by
liquefaction related ground settlement.
In some cases, bedrock is very deep (>300 feet) and it would not be
economical or practical to extend deep foundations to gain support within
bedrock at depth. In these cases, if required, floating deep foundations are
used to reduce the total and differential settlement to acceptable limits
discussed in Chapter 2 of this Part.
To avoid reduction in axial capacity of a pile in a pile group, piles should have
a minimum center-to-center spacing of three pile diameters. Reduction in
lateral stiffness for pile with center-to-center spacing between 3 and 6 pile
diameters would depend on pile group geometry, pile layout, location of the
pile within pile group, and type / stiffness of soil between piles. Bending
The hybrid method for evaluation of pile group effects has been developed by
the following reference:
• Ooi, P.S.K., and Duncan, J.M., “Lateral load analysis of groups of piles
and drilled shafts,” Journal of Geotechnical Engineering, Vol. 120, No. 6.
The following report presents three methods for inclusion of seismic soil-
structure interaction effects:
• PEER, 2017, Guidelines for Performance-Based Seismic Design of Tall
Buildings, Version 2.03, Report No. 2017/06, Pacific Earthquake
Engineering Research Center, Berkeley, California.
It should be noted that not including the surrounding soil in the numerical
model may be conservative when basement walls are in contact with
relatively soft soils (i.e., passive soil springs are not stiff enough to impact the
magnitude of axial or in-plane forces developed in the basement
diaphragms). However, in cases where basement walls are in contact with
very stiff soil or rock, eliminating passive soil springs may result in
underestimation of axial (in-plane) loads developed in the ground floor
diaphragm through redistribution of shear force in the core between ground
surface and the basement slab.
The next step is to compare the pile head displacements obtained from the
SSI analysis to the assumed pile head displacement used for linearization of
the pile head stiffness. If the assumed and calculated values are different by
more than 5 percent, the process is repeated until the difference between
assumed and calculated pile head lateral displacements obtained from two
consecutive iterations becomes smaller than 5 percent.
If shallow foundation is not directly placed over bedrock, the bearing capacity
and short or long term settlement of soils below the foundation and above the
bedrock should be carefully evaluated. The density of sandy soil should be
evaluated by performing standard penetration tests or cone penetration test
(CPT) soundings. Sample of stiff to hard clayey soils (e.g., Old Bay clay)
below the foundation should be obtained using pitcher barrel sampler or
equivalent and high-quality tests should be performed on undisturbed
samples to measure shear strength and consolidation characteristics of
clayey soil layers. Use of Shelby tube for obtaining soil samples within stiff to
very stiff clayey soil is not desirable due to sample disturbance and uncertain
consolidation and strength characterization.
A very useful test often performed in the East Coast of United States and
other countries is the pressuremeter test. The results of this test provide
insitu soil stress-strain relations that can be used in computer modeling of
The factor of safety (FOS) against bearing failure should be greater than 3.0
for static plus sustained live loads and greater than 2.0 against total loads
including wind and seismic loads. Gain in shear strength within clayey soils
due to consolidation under dead plus sustained live loads may be accounted
for when calculating FOS against total loads.
When shallow foundations are placed directly over or within short distance
from stiff to very stiff clayey soils (e.g., Old Bay clay), in addition to
maintaining a FOS against global bearing failure mechanism, punching shear
failure mechanism should also be considered and FOS against this failure
mechanism should be evaluated. In this case, friction between basement
walls and shoring system may be accounted for provided that the basement
walls are designed to safely resist the resulting tensile forces and reduction in
frictional capacity between basement walls and shoring walls due to presence
of waterproofing membrane is accounted for.
1 Rocscience
2 Plaxis, Delft, the Netherlands
Base rocking increases the structural period, and hence, reduces the seismic
demand (in the long period range where spectral acceleration decreases with
Information regarding the elevation of the interface between soft and firm
soils in combination with knowledge of subsurface conditions and local
geology is very useful in evaluation of the capacity of an existing foundation
and design of new foundation elements.
Foundation Design of
Tall Buildings Near Shoreline
If a tall building is planned near the San Francisco Bay waterfront, foundation
design should consider potential for shoreline instability and its effects on
performance of foundation during a major seismic event.
For sites located within 300 feet from the shoreline, seismic shoreline
instability has to be carefully evaluated through literature survey and review
of available data and reports with information related to seismic seawall and
shoreline stability. If only limited information is available regarding seismic
shoreline stability, performing simplified slope stability calculations alone
would not provide adequate or defensible estimates of variation of lateral
ground displacement with distance away from the shoreline. Thus, detailed,
In case of DSM walls, the soil-cement mix acts as lagging between soldier
beams. The stresses developed in DSM due to apparent earth pressure and
deformation of soldier piles should be checked against design strength of
soil-cement mix (typically 300 psi in unconfined compressive strength).
Installation of soldier pile and lagging system in areas with high groundwater
table would result in lowering of groundwater table and settlement of ground
outside of excavation which would be problematic when used in well-
developed and congested areas. Overlapping secant piles and DSM shoring
system would minimize (if not eliminate) lowering of groundwater table
outside of the excavation. Therefore, overlapping secant piles and DSM
shoring systems are often used in case of a high groundwater table and when
excavation could have an adverse effect on the foundation of adjacent
structures. It is noted that lowering of the groundwater table outside of
excavation to historical low groundwater table would be acceptable as the soil
has already experienced the higher effective vertical stresses associated with
the lower historical groundwater table. Due to the cycles of drought in the
San Francisco Bay Area, a drop of 5 feet in groundwater table when
measured in rainy years is judged to be acceptable.
A common failure mode during installation of soldier pile and lagging system
is flow of saturated loose sands into the excavation from areas below the
lowest installed lagging board, creating a cavity behind the wall that could
extend upwards to the ground surface. If this occurs, dewatering of soils
behind shoring wall could mitigate this failure mode.
This study developed the following equations to estimate mid- and high-range
sea level rise (SLR):
• SLR (inches) = 0.0024 × t 2 + 0.12 × t, where t = years from 2000
SLR (inches) = 0.00366 × t + 0.2936 × t, where t = years from 2000
2
•
Accordingly, the mid-range estimate for sea level rise in San Francisco
County in the years 2050 and 2100 are 12 inches and 36 inches,
respectively. The high-range estimate for SLR in the years 2050 and 2100
are 24 inches and 66 inches, respectively. Groundwater table elevation at
sites close to the Bay will rise with sea level rise. However, the effect of sea
level rise on groundwater table elevation for sites away from the shoreline
(especially for site at higher elevations) diminishes as the distance from the
shoreline increases. This is relevant to geotechnical engineering because
sea level rise will increase the thickness of saturated sandy fills, and will
increase the potential for soil liquefaction related lateral spreading. Other
effects of sea level rise include an increase in hydrostatic pressure on
basement walls, an increase in hydrostatic uplift pressure, which would
impact design of ground anchors (tiedowns), and an increase in uplift
demand on deep foundations.
Recommendations
Best practices are not fully codified and implementation of best practices
varies considerably between practitioners. AB083 set the bar for structural
design of tall buildings; need to develop a companion AB for foundation
design. It is essential to bring consistency and uniformity to geotechnical
practice for foundation design of tall Buildings by establishing guidelines for
best practices w/o adversely impacting the construction cost or project
schedule. It is recommended that SFDBI develop an Administrative Bulletin
(AB) or Guidelines to address the following:
1. Acceptable limits of total and differential settlement
2. Evaluation / mitigation of geologic hazards including soil liquefaction and
lateral spreading
3. Site characterization (field investigation and laboratory testing)
4. Foundation analysis and design
5. Numerical modeling, especially those dealing with bearing capacity
calculation and evaluation of foundation settlement
6. Design of shoring / dewatering systems
7. Development of design ground motions and incorporation of soil-structure
interaction effects
8. Design consideration related to sea level rise
The proposed AB / Guidelines will strengthen SFDBI in assessing the
appropriateness / completeness of foundation design recommendations
presented in geotechnical reports for tall buildings
Lessons learned from the Incheon 151 Tower with subsurface conditions
similar to the San Francisco Bay Area indicate that commercially available
computer programs could accurately predict foundation settlements
Introduction
1.1 Background
The primary objective of modern seismic codes is to ensure life safety under
extreme earthquake events. Building code requirements for seismic design
are primarily aimed at limiting the risk of structural collapse under severe
earthquake ground motions and damage to structural and nonstructural
components that can pose life-safety risks (e.g., falling hazards and blocked
egress). Even when the code is satisfied, damage to structural, architectural,
or mechanical components can still require extensive and costly repairs and
impact building functionality after a large earthquake.
In San Francisco and other West Coast cities with high seismic hazards,
most tall buildings constructed since about 2008 have been designed using a
performance-based seismic design approach, which helps ensure reliability of
building response under strong earthquakes. This is in contrast to
conventional seismic design methods, which rely on prescriptive procedures
and criteria that are less transparent in terms of the expected building
performance. Although the performance-based procedures provide a greater
About 10% of the San Francisco tall building inventory (see Part 1) has been
constructed or permitted since 2000, including a significant number of
residential buildings. The continuing high demand and prices for both
residential and commercial office space is likely to fuel continued
development of tall buildings in San Francisco for the foreseeable future. In
addition to the overall amount of new building construction, the increasing
density of residential and commercial occupancies raises concerns that
building damage and downtime due to earthquakes can have
disproportionate effects on building residents and urban communities (see
Part 5).
1.3 Organization
The MCE evaluation is intended to verify that the structure has an acceptably
low probability of collapse under severe earthquake ground motions. The
evaluation uses nonlinear response-history analysis to demonstrate an
The reinforced concrete shear wall (RCSW) structure evaluated in this study
is a core wall residential building designed to comply with the requirements
(a) (b)
Figure 3-1 Reinforced concrete shear wall residential building (a) isometric view
and (b) superstructure plan view. Adapted from Almufti et al. (2018).
(a) (b)
Figure 3-2 Buckling-restrained braced frame office building (a) isometric view
and (b) superstructure plan view.
The RCSW residential building (Section 2.2) and steel BRBF office building
(Section 2.3) comply with seismic design requirements for two locations in
San Francisco with Site Classes D and B. The Site Class is a classification
assigned to a site based on the soils present and their engineering properties
to a depth of 100 feet. Site Class D is representative of a site with stiff soil
(with shear wave velocities in the top 100 feet of soil in the range of 600 to
1,200 ft/s), and Site Class B is representative of a rock site (with shear wave
velocities in the top 100 feet of soil in the range of 2,500 to 5,000 ft/s). Figure
3-3 illustrates the archetype building site locations superimposed with the
City’s existing tall building inventory (See Part 1). While the majority of the
Since soft soils tend to amplify earthquake ground motion shaking, the
location with Site Class D has significantly higher shaking intensity than the
location with Site Class B. In spite of their distinct seismic hazard, the
designs of the archetype RCSW and BRBF buildings, introduced in Sections
2.2 and 2.3 respectively, are similar for both site classes due to minimum
code-prescribed base shear requirements and other design constraints (i.e.,
wind loads that control the design of the BRBF system). To the extent that
the designs could be further optimized, the archetype buildings are slightly
overdesigned for the ground motions at Site Class B. Nevertheless, the
performance assessment for the buildings at the two sites (B and D) are
considered to be representative of what could be expected from new code-
conforming buildings at each site. In addition, for the purpose of evaluating
(a)
(b)
Figure 3-4 Maximum Considered Earthquake (MCE) target spectrum
superimposed with the average and individual ground motion spectra
for (a) Site Class B; and (b) Site Class D locations.
The parameters required to define fragility functions for the curtain wall
system are based on those outlined in Almufti et al. (2018), since the
standard curtain wall functions of FEMA P-58 where developed for low- and
mid-rise construction. While damage state definitions and consequence data
are consistent with that provided by FEMA, the drift values associated with
each damage state are defined in accordance with the performance-based
building design requirements.
The following EDPs are used to evaluate performance in the BRBF office
building: transient story drift, residual story drift, and floor acceleration. Table
3-7 summarizes the maximum value (throughout the building height) of the
average set of results (from the eleven ground motions) for each of the EDPs
for the two sites (Site Class B and D) and earthquake intensities (DE and
MCE). As with the RCSW, there is a subtle difference in the way the residual
drifts are computed. The residual drifts noted in Table 3-7 are calculated by
obtaining the maximum residual drift (throughout the building height) in a
single ground motion simulation and then taking the average from the eleven
ground motions (a single residual drift parameter is input into the loss model
for each ground motion in each building direction). Figure 3-6 illustrates the
responses of the BRBF for the DE.
(b)
(c)
Figure 3-5 Earthquake demands from non-linear response history
analysis of the reinforced concrete shear wall residential
building under the design earthquake: (a) transient story
drifts; (b) racking story drifts; and (c) floor accelerations.
(a)
(b)
Figure 3-6 Earthquake demands from non-linear response history analysis of
the steel buckling-restrained braced frame building under the design
earthquake: (a) transient story drifts and (b) floor accelerations.
Engineering Contractor
Consequence Repair Repair Financing
Mobilization Mobilization
Function Time Class
Repair
Cost Impeding Factors Post-earthquake Inspection
Utility Disruption
Façade MEP Egress Office
DOWNTIME
DOWNTIME Fitouts
DOWNTIME
FUCTIONAL
FUNCTIONAL
RE-OCCUPANCY
RECOVERY
RECOVERY
Figure 3-7 Loss and downtime assessment methodology. Adapted from Molina
Hutt et al. (2016).
Table 3-8 Median Impeding Factor Delay Estimates for the Baseline Case and
with Recovery-Planning Measures in Place
Impeding Factor Delays Baseline Case Recovery Planning
Inspection 5 days 1 day
Engineering Mobilization
[6/12] weeks [2/4] weeks
weighted by [cosmetic/significant] damage
Contractor Mobilization
[28/40] weeks [3/7] weeks
weighted by [cosmetic/significant] damage
Permitting
[1/8] weeks [0.5/4] weeks
binary for [cosmetic/significant] damage
Financing
15 weeks 1 week
[only triggered for >10% costs]
Because there are many factors that can affect performance, such as
intensity of ground shaking, building construction quality, building response,
or vulnerability of contents, there is significant uncertainty in the predicted
performance of the building. This uncertainty can be accounted for by means
of a Monte Carlo simulation by conducting thousands of realizations.
Following this process, results can be expressed as a performance function
(i.e., probability of losses or downtime being less than or equal to a specified
value as a result of an earthquake). The results presented in Section 2.5
focus on mean, median, and 90th percentile estimates of response.
The methods discussed in Section 2.4 to estimate building losses were used
to evaluate the expected performance of the RCSW residential and steel
BRBF office buildings across the two sites, Site Class B and D, and two
ground motion shaking intensities, DE and MCE. Table 3-9 provides a
summary of the median loss results associated with each archetype building,
Site Class and intensity level. The maximum story drift value (throughout the
building height) of the average set of results (from the eleven ground
motions) is also shown to gage the relationship between drift demands and
Figure 3-8 Summary of median and 90th percentile loss results (loss ratio and
absolute losses) under DE shaking.
Figure 3-9 shows that residual drift contributes to the overall losses in the
RCSW, but not in the steel BRBF. While the probability of residual drift
rendering the building irreparable for the RCSW building in Site Class D
under DE is less than 1%, because such a realization results in total building
replacement cost, the contribution to the mean loss statistics, as seen in
Figure 3-9, is significant.
The repair costs represented in Figures 3-8 and 3-9 are one type of direct
loss, downtime is another. The time needed to achieve reoccupancy and
make the repairs needed for functional recovery is good measure of the
impact of tall buildings on the recovery of San Francisco and its downtown
neighborhoods. The median repair times (for components that inhibit
As evident from Table 3-10, in spite of moderate economic loss (repair cost)
levels, the associated repair and downtimes are extensive. For instance, at
Site Class D under DE shaking, the median losses in the RCSW residential
building of 8.1% result in repair times of 1.5 months, with functional recovery
extending to 6.5 months. Similarly, at Site Class D under DE shaking, the
expected losses in the BRBF office building of 2.8% corresponds to a repair
time of 1 month and a time to functional recovery of 4.5 months.
For the RCSW building subjected to DE ground motions at Site Class D, the
major controlling contributors to functional repairs and downtime are:
elevators, structural repairs, and mechanical equipment. For the BRBF
building subjected to DE ground motions at Site Class D, the major
controlling contributors to the repair and functional recovery times are:
elevators, curtain wall, and mechanical equipment.
Figures 3-11 and 3-12 summarize median and 90th percentile estimates of
functional recovery time, which includes the impeding factor estimates
previously discussed in Section 2.4, such as post-earthquake inspection,
engineering mobilization, contractor mobilization, permitting and financing for
the RCSW and BRBF buildings. The figures also illustrate the different
Figure 3-11 RCSW functional recovery time deaggregation at Site Class D under
DE: baseline (top) and with recovery planning (bottom).
Figure 3-12 Steel BRB functional recovery time deaggregation at Site Class D
under DE: baseline (top) and with recovery planning (bottom).
All three recovery paths begin with the time for inspection. Beyond this, the
engineering path includes time for mobilizing engineering services and
permitting of the proposed repairs; the contractor path includes contractor
mobilization and procurement of replacement items with long lead times; and
the financing path includes time to arrange financing of repairs. The total
downtime estimate is essentially the combination of the longest of these three
Note that the functional recovery time estimates in Figure 3-11 do not include
realizations where residual drifts render the building irreparable, which have a
0.9% probability of occurrence at Site Class D under DE. Note that the
functional recovery time estimates in Figure 3-12 do not include realizations
where residual drifts render the building irreparable, which have a 0.0%
probability of occurrence at Site Class D under DE.
To evaluate how story drift demands can affect the damage, repair cost loss,
and downtimes, sensitivity analyses were conducted for varying story drift
demands. This was done by scaling the story drifts from NLRHA, as
illustrated in Section 2.4, based on maximum of mean story drift ratios
ranging from 1% to 3% in 0.5% increments, and re-running the SP3 loss
analyses. In the re-evaluation of loss and downtime, the distributions of peak
ground accelerations and floor accelerations are assumed to remain
consistent with the baseline case, since the accelerations are assumed to be
less sensitive to changes in the building stiffness. Thus, only repair costs and
repair time associated with drift sensitive components varied, whereas those
associated with acceleration sensitive components remained unchanged.
The smaller limit for the RCSW system is due to two factors. First, due to
wall elongation associated with flexural cracking, shear wall structures
experience racking drifts that can double the damaging effects of story drifts,
and thus, the RCSW story drifts of 1% can impose damaging racking drifts on
the order of 2%. Second, structural damage tends to be experienced sooner
in RCSW structures due to the larger localized deformation in coupling
beams and wall-floor slab connections.
Figure 3-13 Mean story drift demand versus repair cost losses.
Figure 3-16 Mean MCE-level story drift demands from recently completed tall buildings
designed using performance-based methods.
These results suggest that despite the 3% drift limit at MCE, currently
prescribed by PEER TBI guidelines, about two-thirds of the buildings have
maximum drifts less than 2% and half have drifts less than 1.5%. These data
indicate that the two archetype buildings are fairly representative of the
average stock of buildings, and further, that limiting MCE drifts to values less
than the current 3% limit is not inconsistent with current design practice.
A literature review was carried out to compare the performance results from
this study against those of similar tall building research projects. Data were
collected primarily from the following studies: PEER (2011), Tipler (2014),
and Jayaram et al. (2012), including loss results for buildings consistent with
the steel buckling-restrained braced frame (BRBF) and reinforced concrete
(a)
(b)
Figure 3-17 Loss versus drift data for different structural systems
at (a) DE and (b) MCE ground motion intensities.
The data shown in Figure 3-17 indicate that the loss estimates for the
archetype buildings in the current study, while at the lower range of estimates
from the other studies, are generally consistent with those from past studies.
Loss and downtime results of the FEMA P-58 PET analyses are summarized
for the 12-story BRBF and RCSW systems in Figures 3-18 and 3-19,
respectively. In these analyses, losses and downtime are calculated for
alternate building designs that were designed to have DE drift demands of
0.5% to 2%. Therefore, in contrast to the plots from the archetype study
(Section 2.6), in these plots, the horizontal axes correspond to the DE drift
limits used in the design, rather than the calculated drift demands. To the
extent that the drift demands are consistent with the drift limits, then the loss
results for the DE shaking (blue lines in the figures) should be roughly
consistent with the drift limits. On the other hand, the larger losses for MCE
drifts would presumably be related to larger drift demands, as compared to
the DE design drift limit.
In the FEMA P-58 PET analyses, the repair cost losses and downtimes seem
remarkably low for the 12-story RCSW building, as compared to both the
BRBF building and the 42-story RCSW archetype building presented in
Chapter 2. On the other hand, the results for the 12-story BRBF building are
comparable to those shown previously for the 40-story BRBF archetype of
Chapter 2.
Similar to the trends observed previously with the 40-story BRBF, the
12-story FEMA P-58 PET BRBF design shows a distinct increase in losses
for buildings with design drift limits above about 1.3%. This is about two-
thirds of the 2% DE limit specified in current building codes. Assuming a
linear relationship between DE and MCE drifts, the two-thirds reduction would
correspond to an MCE drift limit of 2%, instead of the 3% permitted by current
Figure 3-18 FEMA P-58 PET drift versus loss sensitivity results.
Figure 3-19 FEMA P-58 PET drift versus repair time sensitivity results.
4.1 Summary
Current design requirements for tall buildings in San Francisco are primarily
intended to protect life safety by minimizing the risk of collapse or significant
structural or façade damage under extreme (i.e., Maximum Considered
Earthquake) ground motions. While the requirements also include
serviceability requirements to limit damage to the building structural system,
this check is made under frequent earthquake ground shaking (with a 50%
chance of exceedance in 30 years), whose intensity is much lower than that
of the Design Earthquake (DE) ground motions (with roughly a 10% chance
of exceedance in 50 years).
One of the key design criteria that controls the level of building damage under
earthquake ground motions is the story drift ratio. Current building codes limit
the maximum story drift ratios to 3% under MCE ground motions, which is
roughly equivalent to story drift ratios of 2% under DE ground motions. While
these are the maximum story drifts permitted by the building code, the drift
ratios of many new tall buildings are significantly less than this limit due to
other design constraints and considerations. For example, a survey of
recently constructed buildings in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle and
San Diego reveals their MCE-level drift ratios to range from 1% to 3%, with
typical values between 1.5% to 2% (see Figure 3-16). For comparison, the
drift levels under DE ground motions would typically be about two-thirds of
the MCE level drifts; hence the surveyed MCE drift ratios of 1% to 3% would
relate to DE drift ratios of 0.7% to 2%.
Studies of these same two buildings for sites with lower ground motions and
lower drifts indicate that the repair and recovery times would significantly
reduce with tighter story drift limits. For example, for the residential building,
the repair and functional recovery times would reduce to about 3/4 month and
2.5 months, respectively, by limiting the building story drifts to 0.4% (about
20% of the code limit) and employing measures to reduce impeding factors.
For the office building, the repair and functional recovery times would reduce
to about 1/2 month and 3/4 month, respectively, by limiting the building story
drifts to 0.6% (about 30% of the code limit). These are approaching San
Francisco’s tentative recommended recovery goals, although the economics
and practicality of achieving these tight drift limits is unclear for sites with high
ground motions (e.g., sites with Site Class D).
Available evidence indicates that tall buildings designed per current minimum
building code requirements may experience earthquake damage that will
result in functional recovery times significantly in excess of San Francisco’s
tentative recommended recovery goals under DE ground motions.
Although there are cost premiums associated with the different strategies
proposed in this study to achieve enhanced seismic performance, in the long
term, these initial costs result in long term savings associated with the
reduction in economic losses and downtime. Studies such as Tipler (2014)
suggest benefit-to-cost ratios on the order of two to three when considering
direct losses only, and five to twenty when considering both direct losses and
downtime.
While not many, there are examples of modern tall buildings that have
adopted some of the strategies presented in this study. For instance, the 181
Fremont Building, located in downtown San Francisco next to the Transbay
Transit Center, was reportedly designed to exceed the minimum seismic
performance objectives of the San Francisco Building Code at “little-to-no
cost premium” (Almufti et al., 2016). The building was designed to achieve
References
Almeter, E., Wade, K.F., Haselton, C.B., Saxey, B., 2018, “Rapid risk
assessment of buckling restrained braced frames, with focus on
residual drifts,” Proceedings, 11th National Conference on Earthquake
Engineering, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Los
Angeles, California.
Almufti, I., Krolicki, J., and Crowther, A., 2016, “The resilience-based design
of 181 Fremont Tower,” Structure Magazine, June, pp. 42-46.
Almufti, I., Molina Hutt, C., Mieler, M. W., Paul, N.A., and Fusco, C.R., 2018,
The HayWired Earthquake Scenario—Engineering Implications: Case
Studies of Tall-Building Structural Analyses, Downtime and Loss
Assessment for the HayWired Scenario Mainshock, US Geological
Survey, Menlo Park, California.
Arup, 2013, Resilience-based Earthquake Design Initiative (REDi) for the
Next Generation of Buildings, Arup, San Francisco, California.
ASCE, 2010, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures,
ASCE/SEI 7-10, American Society of Civil Engineers Structural
Engineering Institute, Reston, Virgina.
ATC, 2018, Recommended Earthquake Performance Goals for San
Francisco's Buildings (ESIP Task A.6.h), final report submitted to the
City and County of San Francisco prepared by the Applied
Technology Council, Redwood City, California.
Bonowitz D., 2011, Resilience Criteria for Seismic Evaluation of Existing
Buildings, a 2008 Special Projects Initiative Report to the Structural
Engineers Association of Northern California, San Francisco,
California.
CCSF, 2008a, Requirements and Guidelines for the Seismic Design of New
Tall Buildings using Non-Prescriptive Seismic-Design Procedures,
Administrative Bulletin 083, Department of Building Inspections, San
Francisco, California.
Introduction
1.1 Background
This Part reviews and explains current San Francisco policy for post-
earthquake structural evaluation, especially as it relates to the City’s existing
tall buildings. It recommends modifications to the current policy and
proposes additional study or development of new regulations to address
identified issues. This Part corresponds to Recommendations 2A, 3D, 3E,
and 3F presented in the Summary Recommendations.
The three triggers represent policy judgments about when retrofit, which adds
cost and recovery time, is nevertheless viewed as beneficial to the
community and reasonable for owners and tenants. This judgment, which
applies to all San Francisco buildings except one- and two-family dwellings,
should be reviewed as it relates to tall buildings, for which recovery time can
be critical and retrofit costs impractical.
This Part addresses aspects of the following tasks described in the CAPSS
Earthquake Safety Implementation Program Workplan 2012-2042 (CCSF,
2011):
• Task A.4.d: Adopt disproportionate damage trigger
• Task B.4.b: Develop post-earthquake repair and retrofit standards
1.2 Organization
Current Policy
The San Francisco Existing Building Code (SFEBC) (CCSF, 2016a) regulates
most aspects of post-earthquake structural evaluation of buildings. SFEBC
provisions combine the California Existing Building Code (CEBC) (CBSC,
2016), itself an amended version of the International Existing Building Code
(IEBC) (ICC, 2018), and San Francisco amendments.
These four codified ideas comprise three repair-based retrofit triggers and
one set of evaluation and design criteria. The triggers represent policy
judgments about when retrofit, which adds cost and recovery time, is
nevertheless viewed as beneficial to the community and reasonable for
owners and tenants. These policy judgments should be reviewed as they
relate to building groups for which recovery time is critical or retrofit costs are
impractical.
The question, then, is whether the additional time and expense needed to
make these evaluations—which, for complex or tall structures, can be
significant—are worth the benefit. The question is amplified when applied to
dozens of tall buildings (and possibly hundreds more non-tall buildings) at the
same time. On one hand, there is clear value in bringing dozens of tall office
buildings back into service more quickly by eschewing triggered evaluations
and retrofits. On the other hand, if dozens of tall buildings have already
sustained substantial structural damage, just making repairs will not be quick
either; downtime is likely to be on the order of months even in the more
permissive case.
First, there is nothing technically special about a 10% or 33% capacity loss;
that is, a building with a 30% loss is not clearly in a different category than a
building with a 35% loss. Rather, SSD and DD should be understood to have
conceptual meanings despite their quantitative definitions.
• The 10% figure in the DD definition is meant to convey a small but not
insignificant level of damage. The intent of the DD provisions is to identify
structural damage in cases where a properly designed and constructed
building would have none, so the 10% level is meant as “something
noticeable,” as opposed to “practically nothing.”
• The 33% figure in the lateral SSD definition is meant to convey a level of
damage that is serious but still well short of collapse. When this figure
AB-099 uses two methods to categorize damage as meeting the lateral SSD
or DD thresholds:
• A quantitative method, involving structural analysis, based on the
guideline document FEMA 306, Evaluation of Earthquake Damaged
Concrete and Masonry Wall Buildings (FEMA, 1998), and
• A mostly qualitative method based on observed damage patterns, crack
orientation, and crack width.
AB-099 also allows for nonstructural or cosmetic damage that need not be
repaired at all.
Currently, there are no ABs for other structural systems common to San
Francisco’s tall buildings. The San Francisco Department of Building
Inspection’s guidelines for its Building Occupancy Resumption Program refer
to FEMA 352, Recommended Postearthquake Evaluation and Repair Criteria
for Welded Steel Moment-Frame Buildings (FEMA, 2000), which addresses
some of the same questions for steel structures that FEMA 306 does for
concrete, but FEMA 352 is not required and is not written into enforceable
provisions through an AB.
The structural evaluations that guide repairs are different from post-
earthquake safety inspections. Repairs are planned, even if the damage
being repaired was not. The applicable code provisions are concerned with
regulating the building stock over the long term. Repairs therefore are
regulated by the code as defined projects, along with administrative
provisions for documentation, permitting, fees, and quality assurance.
The intersection of the SFEBC with safety inspection is limited to the code’s
general provisions regarding dangerous conditions. Whether a building is
identified as dangerous will often be related to the findings made during post-
earthquake safety inspection. Immediate measures to stabilize the structure
might be made to eliminate dangerous conditions and to allow further
assessment or reoccupancy. This is all SFEBC Section 401.3 contemplates;
the code still requires permits for these “emergency repairs” but allows the
paperwork to be completed after the fact. Those immediate measures are
likely to be different from the code-required repairs, however. How structural
damage will be repaired, and specifically whether a seismic upgrade will be
required, is unrelated to the building’s status as dangerous.
Indeed, by the time planned repairs are able to begin, the structure will have
been stabilized and any Red or Yellow placards will have been removed or
modified. In cases of light damage, it is even likely that general reoccupancy
Repairs (and the structural evaluations that guide them) are distinct from
maintenance, alteration, and retrofit projects, as noted in SFEBC Section
404.1.
To address these questions, San Francisco could study the recovery impacts
of the lateral SSD trigger through neighborhood-level simulation. A more
limited (less costly) study would estimate the recovery impacts on individual
buildings of different types. Informed by the findings, the City could decide to
waive the lateral SSD trigger for certain buildings when the damage is due to
an event, like an earthquake, that affects thousands of buildings
simultaneously.
If the policy adjustment is made after the event, the process would be able to
adjust to facts on the ground and grant waivers only as needed. Although
flexibility is valuable, however, making a general policy under emergency
conditions is administratively and politically fraught. Doing so would take
attention away from more pressing issues, would make preparations more
difficult, could lead to confusion or inconsistency, and is likely to be subject to
pressure from building owners, jeopardizing the trust of other stakeholders.
For these reasons, advance policy making is recommended.
Reduced loads for triggered evaluation and retrofit are meant to mitigate
some of the concerns about repair-triggered retrofit. However, by amending
the criteria to include the building’s original design loads, San Francisco
negates that mitigating measure, especially for younger buildings. To
preserve the allowance intended by the CEBC, San Francisco should amend
the SFEBC to allow reduced loads in the event of repair-triggered retrofit.
(The question of which loads to use is related to the currently unclear
application of the SFEBC table of benchmark dates, discussed in Appendix A
of this Part under SFEBC Section 301.2.1.)
Relaxing the current policy for repair-triggered retrofit of tall buildings might
raise concerns about favoring recovery over safety. In fact, relaxing a repair
trigger does not make any building less safe, but any perceived loss of safety
can be made up through other programs. Indeed, there are more effective
ways to address both safety and recovery than tinkering with the code’s
repair triggers. Pre-earthquake mandates and incentives, together with
recovery planning, are likely to be more effective at risk reduction or risk
transfer than changes to the evaluation rules that only get applied after losses
have occurred. These alternatives are discussed in Part 6 and Part 7.
AB-099 will help implement SFEBC repair provisions after the next damaging
earthquake. Even so, AB-099 has not been used since its adoption by DBI in
2012. Most important, AB-099 references and relies on FEMA 306,
published in 1998 yet still unfamiliar to most engineers, plan checkers, and
potential peer reviewers. Simply put, there have not been enough
opportunities to apply and vet FEMA 306 with actual earthquake damage. In
addition, parts of AB-099 and FEMA 306 have fallen out of coordination with
the CEBC and SFEBC and with their reference standards. Therefore, an
update of AB-099 and a review of FEMA 306 with respect to San Francisco
tall building types is recommended.
It is possible that some welded steel moment frames in San Francisco have
damage from the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake that has still not been
repaired. An AB implementing FEMA 352 will be needed as the City
develops a policy or program to find and repair, or rule out, that damage, as
discussed in Part 6.
CHAPTER 1
SCOPE AND ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER 3
PROVISIONS FOR ALL COMPLIANCE METHODS
Commentary: In the 2018 IEBC, Section 301.1.4 has been edited for
clarity and to coordinate with ASCE/SEI 41-17 instead of ASCE/SEI
41-13. The entire section has also been relocated and renumbered
as Section 303.3.
The 2016 CEBC adopts only three of the 2015 IEBC’s five Appendix A
chapters. None of the three adopted chapters applies to tall buildings
(or to steel or concrete structural systems of any size).
1. The California Building Code using 75% of the prescribed forces. Values of
R, Ω0 and Cd used for analysis shall be as specified in Section 301.1.4.1 of
this code.
3. ASCE 41, using the performance objective in Table 301.1.4.2 for the
applicable risk category.
301.2.3 Seismic forces. Buildings and structures shall comply with the
reduced International Building Code-level seismic forces, as defined in
Section 301.1.4.2. The building separation limitations of Section ASCE
7-10 Section 12.12.3 need not be considered. ...
401.3 Dangerous conditions. The building official shall have the authority to
require the elimination of conditions deemed dangerous.
SECTION 404
REPAIRS
404.1 General. Buildings and structures, and parts thereof, shall be repaired
in compliance with Sections 401.2 and 404. Work on nondamaged
components that is necessary for the required repair of damaged
components shall be considered part of the repair and shall not be subject to
the requirements for alterations in this chapter. Routine maintenance required
Exceptions:
1. Buildings assigned to Seismic Design Category A, B or C whose
substantial structural damage was not caused by earthquake need not be
evaluated or rehabilitated for load combinations that include earthquake
effects.
2. One- and two-family dwellings ....
Commentary: In the 2018 IEBC, this provision is edited for clarity and
renumbered:
405.2.3.2 Extent of repair for compliant buildings. If the evaluation
establishes that the building in its predamage condition complies with
the provisions of Section 405.2.3.1, then the damaged elements shall
be permitted to be restored to their predamage condition.
Commentary: In the 2018 IEBC, this provision is edited for clarity and
renumbered:
405.2.3.3 Extent of repair for noncompliant buildings. If the
evaluation does not establish that the building in its predamage
condition complies with the provisions of Section 405.2.3.1, then the
building shall be retrofitted to comply with the provisions of this
section. The wind loads for the repair and retrofit shall be those
required by the building code in effect at the time of original
construction, unless the damage was caused by wind, in which case
the wind loads shall be in accordance with the International Building
Code. The seismic loads for this retrofit design shall be those required
by the building code in effect at the time of original construction, but
not less than the reduced seismic forces.
Exceptions:
1. One- and two-family dwellings ....
2. Buildings assigned to Seismic Design Category A, B, or C whose
substantial structural damage was not caused by earthquake need not be
evaluated or rehabilitated for load combinations that include earthquake
effects.
404.4 Less than substantial structural damage. For damage less than
substantial structural damage, repairs shall be allowed that restore the
building to its predamage state. New structural members and connections
used for this repair shall comply with the detailing provisions of the California
Building Code for new buildings of similar structure, purpose and location.
Commentary: In the 2018 IEBC, this provision is edited for clarity and
renumbered:
405.2.1 Repairs for less than substantial structural damage.
Unless otherwise required by this section, for damage less than
substantial structural damage, the damaged elements shall be
permitted to be restored to their predamage condition.
References
Introduction
1.1 Background
In an effort to understand the impact that tall building performance may have
on the recovery of the City of San Francisco after a major earthquake, this
Part provides an overview of seismic risks that are disproportionately
associated with tall buildings (i.e., tall building effects), with recommendations
for new policy considerations and further research. This Part corresponds to
Recommendations 2C, 2D, 3A, 3C, and 3G presented in the Summary
Recommendations.
1.2 Acknowledgements
2.1 Overview
Roughly 75% of the existing tall buildings in San Francisco were constructed
before 2000, following what are now considered outdated code prescriptive
design requirements that do not necessarily provide consistent levels of
safety from major earthquakes. Tall buildings designed since about 2008,
when San Francisco introduced Administrative Bulletin (AB) 083 (CCSF,
2008), typically follow a performance-based seismic design approach where
building’s structural response under strong earthquakes is explicitly evaluated
using advanced structural analysis. While the design approach is called
“performance-based,” the provisions of AB-083 are generally intended only to
demonstrate compliance with minimum code requirements to ensure life
safety under extreme earthquakes. Thus, while more recently designed
buildings are more reliable in terms of life safety, both older existing and
newly designed tall buildings are susceptible to damage from strong
In an effort to understand the impact that tall building performance may have
on the recovery of the City of San Francisco after a major earthquake, this
Part provides an overview of seismic risk factors that are disproportionately
present with tall buildings (in contrast with the entire building stock), with
recommendations for new policy considerations and further research to better
understand and control the risks.
Higher mode effects cover building lateral drifts and accelerations and
response properties associated with building vibrational modes with higher
frequencies (shorter periods) than the fundamental vibration mode. Through
the equivalent lateral force method, Current Code implicitly considers higher
mode effects for every building. In past codes, higher mode effects were
captured by modifying the vertical distribution of lateral design forces for
certain buildings.
At the time of the downtown development boom of the 1970s and 80s, the
UBC required consideration of high mode effects only where the building’s
fundamental period exceeded 0.7 seconds. Using1985 UBC’s formulas for
period, this corresponds to a structure height of about 7 stories (80 ft) for a
ductile moment frame structure and up to about 12 stories (130 ft) for stiffer
systems.
This is the ratio of the building height to the plan view dimension at ground
level. Because of its formula for estimating period, the critical heights listed in
1985 UBC for considering higher mode effects were related to the building’s
aspect ratio. In earlier codes from the 1970s, the higher mode effect was
ignored for any building with an aspect ratio less than 3:1. In the 1964 UBC,
higher mode effect was ignored for any building with an aspect ratio up to 5:1.
Some of San Francisco’s oldest buildings still show a typical lot width of
about 25 ft, suggesting a critical height of 125 ft in the 1960s or 75 ft in the
1970s. But the taller buildings from the 1960s and later do not have a typical
width, thus the critical height by contemporary codes would have been
significantly greater, but highly varied.
These are building code requirements that limit the applicability of structural
systems and materials, based on their ability to deform and absorb energy
during a large earthquake. Aside from the criteria suggested by the PEER
San Francisco has three programs that mandate retrofit of existing buildings.
SFEBC Chapters 4A and 4B cover the mandatory retrofit of unreinforced
masonry bearing wall buildings, but their requirements are independent of
building height. Similarly, SFEBC Section 329 mandates seismic evaluation
of private schools, but it makes no distinctions based on building height.
Per San Francisco Property Information Map (CCSF, 2017a), only eight
buildings within the inventory presented in Part 1 are office buildings with
building areas of at least 750,000 square feet, and all of them are over 400
feet tall. Thus, it can be assumed that in San Francisco, the building code
envisions office buildings taller than about 400 feet to be candidates for
assignment to Risk Category III. Per Current Code, such a building would
then be subject to the same additional requirements of other Risk Category III
facilities, including restaurants or assembly halls with seating for 300. Due to
lower occupant density, tall residential buildings would rarely, if ever, trigger
the Risk Category III criteria.
Current Code (2016 CBC Section 1615) has special provisions for structural
integrity meant to provide additional resistance to collapse, usually
associated with blast or other unanticipated loads. They apply only to “high-
rise buildings that are assigned to Risk Category III or IV.”
As noted above, Current Code (2016 CBC Section 403) imposes special fire
safety and egress requirements for high-rise buildings, defined as those taller
than about 75 feet. Within Section 403, the code sets another line at 420 ft;
buildings taller than that are limited in the types of fire-resistive construction
they may use. The 1985 UBC (Sec 1807(a)) made a similar requirement for
office and general use buildings (Group B, Division 2) and for hotels and
apartment houses (Group R, Division 1).
Also related to fire resistance, but in the building code chapter on allowable
building heights and areas, 2016 CBC Table 504.3 makes height distinctions
for different types of construction with and without sprinkler systems. For
most occupancies:
• 160 to 180 ft, for Type I.B construction, non-sprinklered and sprinklered,
respectively
• 65 to 85 ft, for Type II, III, or IV construction, non-sprinklered and
sprinklered, respectively
• 50 to 70 ft, for Type V construction (woodframe, generally), non-
sprinklered and sprinklered, respectively
1985 UBC Table 5-D sets similar limits for office buildings (Occupancy Group
B) and hotels (Occupancy Group R-1):
• 160 ft or 12 stories, for Type II fire resistive construction
• 65 ft or 4 stories, for Type II, III, or IV one-hour construction
• 50 ft or 3 stories, for Type V one-hour construction
1964 UBC Table 5-D height limits for office buildings (Occupancy Group F-2)
and hotels or apartment houses (Occupancy Group H) were slightly more
restrictive:
• 95 ft or 6 stories (5 stories for H occupancy), for Type II construction
• 65 ft or 4 stories, for Type III or IV one-hour construction
• 50 ft or 3 stories, for Type V one-hour construction
In addition to building code requirements, San Francisco sets height and bulk
limits for purposes of planning and zoning. In the northeast portion of the
city, which includes the downtown and adjacent residential neighborhoods,
these are shown on San Francisco Zoning Map Sheet HT01 (CCSF, 2017b).
The map includes special block-size zones for specific projects, and in most
downtown neighborhoods the limits vary from block to block. Some
neighborhood have consistent limits:
• 40 ft: Russian Hill, North Beach
• 50 ft: Chinatown
• 65 ft: Nob Hill
• 80 ft: Union Square
• 150 ft: Second Street
Table 5-1 Height Precedents in Past and Current Codes and Policies
Critical
Height Issue Source and Description
420 ft Fire Safety Current Code (2016 CBC Section 403): Taller buildings must meet all fire-resistance
requirements for Type I.A construction, as well as additional egress requirements
~400 ft Risk Category Current Code: Approximate height at which an office building would be assigned to Risk
Category III based on occupant load of 5,000
240 ft Risk Category, Current Code: Height limit for shear wall and braced frame systems in normal occupancy
seismic, structural without torsion-prone configuration
160 – 180 ft Fire Safety Current Code (2016 CBC Table 504.3): Maximum height for Type I.B construction*, non-
sprinklered or sprinklered, respectively
160 ft Seismic, structural 1985 UBC: Taller buildings must have a ductile moment-resisting frame
160 ft Risk Category, Current Code: Height limit for shear wall and braced frame systems in normal occupancy
seismic, structural with torsion-prone configuration
Current Code: Height limit for shear wall and braced frame systems in essential facilities*
without torsion-prone configuration
13 stories Seismic, structural 1964 UBC: Taller buildings must have a ductile moment-resisting frame
12 stories or Fire Safety 1985 UBC (Table 5-D): Maximum height for Type II construction
160 ft
150 ft Planning and SF Zoning Map Sheet HT01 (CCSF, 2017b): Height limit in Second Street neighborhood
Zoning
80 – 130 ft Seismic, structural 1985 UBC: Structure subject to provision for higher mode effects
100 ft Risk Category, Current Code: Height limit for shear wall and braced frame systems in essential facilities*
seismic, structural with torsion-prone configuration
95 ft or Fire Safety 1964 UBC (Table 5-D): Maximum height for Type II construction (6-story limit for office
5 – 6 stories buildings; 5-story limit for hotels and apartment houses)
65 – 85 ft Fire Safety Current Code (2016 CBC Table 504.3): Maximum height for Type II, III, or IV construction,
non-sprinklered or sprinklered, respectively
80 ft Planning and SF Zoning Map Sheet HT01 (CCSF, 2017b): Height limit in Union Square neighborhood
Zoning
75 ft Fire Safety Current Code (2016 CBC Section 403): “High-rise buildings” must comply with special fire
safety and egress provisions.
1985 UBC (Section 1807a): Taller office buildings, hotels, and apartment houses must
comply with special fire safety and egress provisions
75 ft Risk Category; Current Code: “High-rise buildings” assigned to Risk Category III or IV must comply with
Structural Integrity structural integrity provisions
7 stories Seismic, structural 1985 UBC: Moment frame structure subject to provision for higher mode effects
3.1 Cordoning
Safe distances for initial barricades, as illustrated in Figure 5-1, are generally
conservatively set at 1.5 times the height of falling hazards to allow for the
possibility that falling items could bounce and shatter (NIOSH, 2009). Once
the nature and extent of building damage is further investigated, shorter safe
distances may be justified. While these safe distances for initial barricading
have limited implication on surrounding areas when applied to low to mid-rise
buildings, they could imply closing off entire city blocks when applied to tall
buildings, as illustrated in Figure 5-2. Cordons around tall buildings are more
likely to interfere with San Francisco’s emergency priority routes.
Furthermore, if cordons around multiple tall buildings are required, this could
lead to large areas within the Financial District being closed off, where most
of the city’s tall buildings are clustered together.
It is important that the City establish a lead agency, as well as clear roles and
responsibilities associated with post-earthquake evaluations and the ensuing
cordons around damaged buildings. Furthermore, guidelines for cordoning
around tall buildings should be developed prior to the earthquake, in
coordination with relevant groups, including building department, lifelines, fire,
Most high-rise buildings have relatively small floor plan areas with travel
distances to exit stairways that are well within the code requirements for
evacuation time. However, emergency egress for high-rise buildings
presents special challenges for vertical evacuation, including the cumulative
occupant load leading to stairway congestion and the physical ability for
people to descend many flights of stairs. Current design standards require
buildings to be designed such that occupants are able to evacuate the
building without outside assistance in a time not exceeding half of the
required fire resistance time of the primary structural frame. This equates to
evacuation times of 1 to 1.5 hours based on fire resistance ratings of 2 to 3
hours for Type IB or IA construction (Bukowski, 2009).
The Current Code requires local water storage in buildings that is sufficient to
operate automatic suppression systems for 30 minutes. The rationale behind
this is that the responding fire department is expected to be able to access a
fire on any floor and begin suppression operations within 30 minutes of the
transmission of the original fire alarm (Bukowski, 2009). The expected 30-
minute fire department response time has an expectation of travel time to the
building and building access through a fire service elevator that has
emergency power backup. In the event of a fire following an earthquake in a
high-rise building, there are reasons to question the assumed 30-minute
response time, due to: (1) competing demands for fire department services
in the City; (2) travel time delays due to road blockages; and (3) building
damage that may affect access through the fire service elevator and
stairwells. Therefore, to the extent that the automatic building fire
suppression systems may become a primary line of fire defense following an
earthquake, the minimum local water supply requirement to provide 30
minutes service should be re-evaluated to: (1) control fire spread; and
(2) ensure safe building evacuation following a large earthquake.
A related topic concerns recent changes in building codes that permit the use
of specially equipped passenger elevators for evacuation of tall building
occupants for during a fire emergency (Kinateder et al., 2014). The seismic
risk in San Francisco (and other west coast cities) raises questions as to
whether elevators will function as intended after earthquakes. While ASME
A17.1 (2014) provides earthquake design requirements for elevators,
including seismic and counterweight displacement switches, and additional
visual and audible information systems, without period testing, these systems
While it is generally assumed that the actual collapse risk in tall buildings is
less than the maximum permitted risk, there is very little information to
validate the collapse risk of buildings. For example, studies such as Haselton
and Deierlein (2007) have shown that buildings designed for the same site,
using the same code, materials, and structural system can have different
collapse risks due to differences in design decisions, such as structural layout
or the distribution of strength and stiffness over the height. This means that
without a detailed analysis, the collapse risk of a particular structure remains
largely unknown (Eads, 2013).
USAR personnel and equipment required for any collapsed building depends
mainly on the construction and the damage type of the building, the building
size, the degree of the collapse and the number of casualties (Schweier and
Markus, 2004). One of the key factors in allocating search and rescue
resources is knowledge about the location, the extent, and the damage
characteristics of the totally or partially collapsed building. Different damage
types require different resources, as inferred by the damage types illustrated
in Figure 5-3. At large building collapses, the required number of rescue
personnel is generally dependent on the probable number of trapped
persons. Prior knowledge of expected occupancies of potentially vulnerable
tall buildings could help an effective mobilization of USAR resources.
Direct losses from earthquake damage include the financial costs of post-
earthquake repair, demolition, and reconstruction work. Given that the
primary objective of seismic building codes is to ensure life-safety under
extreme earthquake events, significant damage to structural and
nonstructural building components is likely to occur under moderate to
extreme earthquakes. While new buildings are expected to perform better
than older buildings, damage is likely to occur in both.
While seismic loss estimates associated with direct economic losses enable
discussions with building owners and investors about how individual retrofit
interventions can move buildings in the direction of becoming more resilient,
they do not provide a quantitative measure of resilience. In addition to direct
economic losses, there is great vulnerability to indirect economic losses due
to downtime, defined as the time required to achieve a recovery state after an
earthquake. Bonowitz (2011) defines three recovery states as follows: (1) re-
occupancy of the building; (2) functional recovery; and (3) full recovery. Re-
occupancy occurs when the building is deemed safe enough to be used for
shelter, although functionality may not be restored. Functional recovery
occurs when the building regains its primary function, i.e., it is operational but
perhaps with some limitations or inconveniences. Full recovery occurs when
the building is fully restored to its pre-earthquake condition.
Both direct and indirect losses, as identified in Sections 4.1 and 4.2
respectively, can lead to long-term impacts including loss of jobs, housing or
human migration due to a re-alignment of economic activity. In addition to
the loss of population and income, other evidence of long-term impact in the
economic fortune of an affected region includes fluctuations in real estate
values. These higher-order impacts can have long-term and far-reaching
consequences, and therefore, they should be considered in post-disaster
analysis and policy formulation (Nov and DuPont, 2016).
Accelerating Recovery
Even though ATC-20 guidance includes barricades within its scope, the
evaluation may not be possible until a few days after the earthquake,
depending on the extent of local damage and the number of available
qualified inspectors and engineers. To prevent potential injuries that may
occur due to collapse or other falling hazard conditions in tall buildings, which
could occur unexpectedly or as a result of earthquake aftershocks, these
evaluations can be expedited through the Building Occupancy Resumption
Program (BORP), also discussed in Part 6.
5.3 Insurance
Timely repair and recovery following earthquakes requires that tall building
owners (and possibly tenants) have access to financial capital to pay for
inspections, repairs, and other costs. Funds for repair and reconstruction
can come from a variety of sources, including: bank accounts (either general
accounts or reserve funds), insurance, or loans. The availability and access
to funds for tall building repairs can vary significantly depending on the
building ownership and stakeholders. In particular, the financial options are
dramatically different for a single-owner commercial building versus a multi-
For commercial buildings, a recent NY Times article (Fuller, 2018) and other
sources suggest that insurance penetration rates for commercial buildings is
similarly low, on the order of 10%. This is contrasted by other anecdotal
evidence from commercial tall building owners and insurance companies,
which suggests that most tall building owners in San Francisco have some
earthquake insurance. Based on these discussions, buildings owned by
large developers as part of a larger building portfolio are more likely to be
insured. For buildings with outstanding loans, the lending institution may
require earthquake insurance, but even if required at the time when a loan is
taken, the earthquake insurance may not remain over the life of the loan or
building. Thus, without any formal procedure to report insurance information,
the actual situation is difficult to verify.
References
Introduction
1.1 Background
This Part reviews and explains current San Francisco policy and practices for
post-earthquake safety inspection of buildings, especially as they relate to the
City’s existing tall buildings. The recommendations presented correspond to
Recommendations 3A, 3B, 3C, 3F, and 4B presented in Summary
Recommendations.
This Part addresses aspects of the following Tasks described in the CAPSS
Earthquake Safety Implementation Program Workplan 2012-2042 (CCSF,
2011):
• Task A.4.a: Develop and adopt shelter-in-place policies and procedures
• Task A.4.d: Adopt disproportionate damage trigger
• Task A.4.f: Update post-earthquake inspection policies and procedures
• Task B.1.b: Develop non-structural upgrade program for businesses
• Task B.2.b: Mandatory evaluation of 5+ dwelling unit residential buildings
and hotels/motels
• Task B.4.b: Develop post-earthquake repair and retrofit standards
• Tack C.2.b: Mandatory evaluation and retrofit of critical stores, suppliers,
and service providers
• Task C.2.c: Mandatory evaluation and retrofit of larger assembly
buildings
1.2 Organization
Background
As part of this process, the City relies on the state-run Safety Assessment
Program (SAP), which implements the evaluation procedures presented in
ATC-20-1, Field Manual: Procedures for Postearthquake Safety Evaluation
(CCSF, 2008, Section 6.5.1; ATC, 2005). For a tall building, this process can
be complicated and delayed by the sheer size of the structure, to say nothing
of its architectural complexity and variety of tenant spaces. To help address
these challenges, San Francisco developed the Building Occupancy
Resumption Program (BORP) as a way of outsourcing the inspection process
to building owners themselves (CCSF, 2011). BORP also uses ATC-20
procedures, but for certain steel frame structures, it allows an alternative
guideline developed after the 1994 Northridge earthquake, known as FEMA
352 (FEMA, 2000).
SAP and BORP are both focused on safety, in the service of reoccupancy
and functional recovery. These three measures of building performance are
related, as each is a function of building damage. In general, the lower the
damage, the higher the safety, and the lower the damage, the faster the
reoccupancy and functional recovery (Bonowitz, 2016). Yet they are not
identical.
San Francisco’s priorities are consistent with SAP’s intent. The San
Francisco Emergency Response Plan (CCSF, 2008) states in Section 6.5.1:
Most of the following can apply to non-tall buildings as well as tall ones.
3.2.1 Activation
The primary focus of SAP is safe reoccupancy, but SAP has a secondary
goal regarding functional recovery, especially with respect to infrastructure
(SEAONC, 2013, p.131): “Rapidly clearing for use vital services and
infrastructure that will impact the public at large.” To the extent that San
Francisco’s tall buildings (or any other particular building cohort) represent a
recovery-critical function or service, their recovery should also be prioritized,
or at least emphasized together with basic reoccupancy. Christchurch
officials recognized the benefit of classifying and inspecting buildings based
in part on their use and occupancy and in part on height, and they used the
post-earthquake safety inspections also to consider habitability and security
(ATC, 2014). BORP is a promising vehicle by which to introduce these ideas,
but to be effective for an entire functional sector, they will need to be
implemented more aggressively than through that voluntary program.
3.2.4 Consistency
4.1 Background
After the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, the San Francisco Department of
Building Inspection (DBI) developed the Building Occupancy Resumption
Program (BORP) to offer an optional “precertified emergency inspection
program” that helps address this challenge (CCSF, 2011).
In the decades since it was developed after the Loma Prieta earthquake,
BORP has never been implemented after a significant damaging event. Each
BORP plan is updated every two years, but the simultaneous execution of
dozens of BORP plans has not been tested.
In general, BORP engineers are deputized by the City and are thus
authorized to post ATC-20 placards (CCSF, 2011, Section III). However,
they are not eligible for the liability protection afforded to SAP volunteers
under Business and Professions Code Section 5536.27 because they are
engaged and compensated by the building owners. It is unclear whether
BORP engineers are eligible for state-funded workers compensation as SAP
volunteers are. Administrative aspects of BORP are discussed further in
Part 5.
The BORP guidelines (CCSF, 2011) serve two purposes: (1) they describe
what the final BORP plan, kept at the building with copies held by the
retained engineers, should include; and (2) they describe what the BORP
engineer must submit to the City for certification. The latter purpose tends to
determine each BORP report’s organization, and the result is that most
reports look more like submittals to the City than practical tools to be used
with urgency in the hours after a damaging earthquake. The following
recommendations are based on a review of selected BORP reports made
available by DBI during this study.
A review of selected BORP reports made available by DBI during this study
show that content and completeness varies within the program. More
uniform content requirements, together with the more pragmatic report
organization recommended above, should improve reliability and could
reduce costs by eliminating unnecessary or vague requirements. As
recommended above, BORP report content related to specific building
components or conditions should be organized to correspond to the ATC-20
Detailed Evaluation Safety Assessment Form.
BORP guidelines explicitly allow the use of ground motion records to assist
damage finding and posting, and even to reduce the amount of inspection
(CCSF, 2011, Section IV.D.5 and Appendix A). The guidelines do not,
however, provide any technical procedures or criteria to follow. In particular,
they do not require a pre-earthquake structural analysis to calibrate the
instruments and establish baselines. See also the discussion of inspection
techniques in Chapter 7 of this Part.
BORP instructions (CCSF, 2011, Sections VII.B and VII.C) give unclear
guidance on barricading, suggesting that the BORP team should “arrange for
barricading of all unsafe areas” but should also “contact DBI immediately” so
that City staff can erect barricades or establish cordons for the public areas.
Meanwhile, ATC-20 procedures suggest that volunteer SAP inspectors can
undertake this work in public areas as well.
Recommendation: Clarify and update both BORP instructions and any San
Francisco-specific SAP procedures regarding the division of responsibility for
establishing cordons and barricades.
• DBI, together with the Department of Public Works (DPW), should clarify
and distinguish the roles of City staff and deputized inspectors.
• BORP instructions should also distinguish the roles of SAP volunteers
and BORP inspectors, as the latter also have contractual responsibilities
on behalf of their individual clients.
• The instructions, which currently discuss only the barricading of public
areas, should also recommend or instruct appropriate practices for cases
where an adjacent building threatens the building being inspected (both of
which are private spaces), and where the building being inspected
threatens its neighbors.
BORP instructions (CCSF, 2011, Section IV.D.1) allow and “recommend” the
use of FEMA 352, Recommended Postearthquake Evaluation and Repair
Criteria for Welded Steel Moment-Frame Buildings (FEMA, 2000), but “BORP
does not require connection inspection.” Inspection of individual connections
is fundamental to FEMA 352 and is the main difference between that system-
specific document and the more generic ATC-20. Thus, BORP instructions
appear to conflict with ATC-20, which references FEMA 352 for the Detailed
evaluation that BORP anticipates, and with FEMA 352 itself. Further, Section
IV.D.5 of BORP instructions allows instrument recordings to be used “as a
means of reducing the percentage of joints required to be inspected after an
earthquake,” and Appendix A makes a similar allowance. This instruction is
confusing because if inspection of the welded connections is not required,
there would be no need for instrument recordings to reduce the scope.
BORP guidelines reference FEMA 352 for welded steel structures but do not
reference similar technical documents for other structure types. For
Engineering evaluations, however, ATC-20 does reference FEMA 306,
Evaluation of Earthquake Damaged Concrete and Masonry Wall Buildings
(FEMA, 1998). For BORP projects, where engineers have the opportunity to
use recorded motions, review plans, perform destructive investigations, and
run structural analyses, use of FEMA 306 would be appropriate.
ATC-20
For a tall building, such an evaluation would no doubt take more than the
typical 20 minutes expected for high-volume Rapid evaluations. Even a
Detailed evaluation of a relatively modern tall building might be inconclusive if
the structural elements are hidden and the details are unknown in advance.
San Francisco’s Building Occupancy Resumption Program (BORP) has been
motivated to resolve these issues. Even though BORP inspections are based
on ATC-20 and are permitted to use the Rapid method, the advanced
planning makes a BORP inspection more like the Detailed method by default.
If analysis is performed in advance (and because the BORP engineer is
selected and compensated by the building owner), BORP can even achieve
some of the benefits of the Engineering method even if only a Rapid or
Detailed evaluation form is submitted.
The RESTRICTED USE placard has multiple uses. The Yellow placard is
typically used for an inconclusive Rapid or Detailed evaluation, as might be
expected for a tall building outside BORP. The same Yellow placard might
be used to indicate a partial restriction, by time or location, to allow as much
use as is deemed safe even while the further evaluation is being planned.
Each of the six categories is possible in a tall building, and most are easily
discerned. For a tall building, however, assessment of “severe damage to
primary structural members” can require some expertise and ideally access
to the building’s structural plans (both of which BORP would provide). Even
so, ATC-20 outlines the most common damage patterns for engineered
concrete and steel structures. Table 6-2 summarizes those most applicable
to tall buildings.
ATC-20 has its own development and update process; an update is currently
underway. Further, SAP trainings are produced for broad audiences and
must cover more than San Francisco’s particular conditions. Therefore, it
might be difficult for the City to implement its own customization of ATC-20.
Nevertheless, DBI should establish its own understanding of how it will
interpret and implement ATC-20 guidance, especially through BORP, which
is a San Francisco program. Thus, the following interpretations and
suggested edits of ATC-20 materials might be developed for BORP
guidelines.
Most of the following can apply to non-tall buildings as well as tall ones, and
to implementation of ATC-20 through either SAP or BORP.
Recommendation: DBI should clearly list the structure and building types
that may be posted INSPECTED only after an interior inspection.
• For these buildings, unless the building is posted UNSAFE, the posting
must be RESTRICTED USE, and the placard must call for interior
inspection. ATC-20 already recognizes that tilt-up structures are in this
group and that steel braced frames might be.
• DBI should consider defining this group by structural system (with
consideration for cases where the system type is unknown), height or
size, use or occupancy that would be sensitive to interior nonstructural
damage, or other attributes.
Recommendation: DBI should clearly list the structure and building types
that may be posted INSPECTED only after a Detailed evaluation.
• For these buildings, unless the building is posted UNSAFE, the posting
must be RESTRICTED USE, and the placard must call for Detailed
evaluation.
• DBI should consider defining this group by structural system (with
consideration for cases where the system type is unknown), height or
size, or other attributes.
• The Detailed evaluation should involve conditions throughout the building
that are similar to any found damaged in an initial inspection.
• For tall and large buildings, DBI should consider supplementing ATC-20
guidance regarding its limits on UNSAFE postings for severe but local
damage. Local damage might include partial collapse at one end or wing,
floor or floor framing damage at only a small number of the building’s
floors, or connection damage that changes the system characteristics but
does not indicate a distinct collapse mode.
For both Rapid and Detailed evaluations, ATC-20 asks for an estimate of
damage as a percentage of the building’s replacement cost. In its SAP
training materials, SEAONC (2013, p66) has noted, “This is a matter of
personal judgment; there is no set formula to calculate this information.” Cal
OES (p3), advises each jurisdiction to have “a system of cost estimation
developed prior to the disaster.”
FEMA 352
6.1 Background
FEMA 352 is premised on two Northridge lessons learned after the original
publication of ATC-20 in 1989. First, pre-Northridge welded steel moment
frames are prone to connection fracture, especially at welded joints. The
1989 version of ATC-20 had acknowledged the possibility of connection
damage, particularly for “semirigid moment connections made with angles,
tees, and plates in bolted or riveted joints,” which it characterized as
“nonductile.” It called for the evaluator to “spot-check several beam-column
joints,” but only those deemed “nonrigid.” For the welded connection
common at the time, ATC-20 noted that “ductile moment frames are expected
to sustain yielding in beams while columns remain elastic.”
FEMA 352 thus differs conceptually from ATC-20 in its fundamental attitude
toward non-visible damage. This leads to two pragmatic differences: FEMA
352 uses different terminology for its inspection protocols and sets a higher
minimum scope of inspection both before the building is posted and after it
receives a green INSPECTED placard.
Table 6-3 compares the different evaluation methods of ATC-20 and FEMA
352. The key differences:
• Terminology: What ATC-20 calls a Detailed evaluation, FEMA 352 calls
Preliminary evaluation Step 4, involving inspection of a specified number
of beam-column connections. What ATC-20 calls an Engineering
evaluation, FEMA 352 calls a Detailed evaluation. Thus, simplistic
reference to “Detailed” evaluation can be confusing.
• Required scope prior to initial posting: ATC-20 allows a Rapid evaluation,
even an exterior-only evaluation. In many cases the ATC-20 evaluator
will recognize that the unknown conditions merit a Yellow RESTRICTED
USE placard, but ATC-20 does not require it. ATC-20-2, Addendum to
the ATC-20 Postearthquake Building Safety Evaluation Procedures (ATC,
1995, Section 4.4.1) acknowledged that “Rapid Evaluations can be
inconclusive,” but still allowed that “[Inspectors] may choose to post the
structures UNSAFE or RESTRICTED USE until more detailed inspection
is performed.” By contrast, compliance with FEMA 352 requires actual
connection inspection prior to any posting. Thus, by FEMA 352, an
ATC-20 Rapid evaluation is always incomplete and should always yield a
Yellow placard, unless a Red placard is already justified from the quick
review (Bonowitz, 2013).
• Required scope after initial posting: If an ATC-20 Rapid evaluation
results in a Green INSPECTED posting, the ATC-20 scope is complete.
However, ATC-20-3 presents a case study that suggests, but does not
require, connection inspection: “[S]teel frame buildings that have
experienced severe seismic motions [should] be inspected for possible
connection ... failures, even if the building is apparently not structurally
damaged and has been posted INSPECTED.” FEMA 352 would adopt
this more thorough approach. Using FEMA 352, the inspection scope is
not complete until the FEMA 352 Detailed evaluation assesses the
significance of the inspection findings. Reoccupancy is allowed by
inspector judgment after the initial Yellow placard is posted, but the FEMA
352 Detailed inspection must still be completed.
Table 6-4 Comparison of Minimum Scope of ATC-20 Rapid and FEMA 352
Preliminary Methods
ATC-20 FEMA 352
Evaluation Scope Rapid Evaluation Preliminary Evaluation
Exterior visual inspection Required Required (Step 1)
Interior visual inspection Not required Required (Step 2)
Hazardous materials review required
Elevator inspection required
Permanent drift Required, visual only Required (Step 3)
measurement
Connection visual Not required Required (Step 4)
inspection Removal of fireproofing required only if
damage is indicated
Ultrasonic or other testing not required
Because FEMA 352 is not a standard, DBI can develop its own
implementation procedures. Specific recommendations for applying FEMA
352 within BORP are provided in Section 4.2.8 of this Part.
Although not an official standard, FEMA 352 is the only guideline specifically
addressing inspection and evaluation of pre-Northridge welded steel moment
frames. Nevertheless, it lacks a track record of actual implementation and
has not been condensed into practical and enforceable provisions. Further,
use of FEMA 352 as written requires some choices and discretion by the
engineer. As discussed above, inspection of individual connections is
fundamental to FEMA 352 and is the main difference between this system-
specific document and the more generic ATC-20. Without the connection
inspection protocol, FEMA 352 adds very little to ATC-20 except for modestly
different inspection triggers. DBI, together with the Structural Subcommittee
of the Code Advisory Committee (and perhaps with the SEAONC Existing
Buildings Committee) should study the feasibility, benefits, and costs of
requiring some form of FEMA 352 compliance for welded steel moment frame
structures.
About 30 Bay Area steel moment frame buildings are known to have been
inspected for possible Loma Prieta damage in the few years following the
Northridge earthquake. At least five buildings, all between 30 and 60 miles
from the Loma Prieta epicenter, but none in San Francisco proper, were
found to have weld fractures. Four of these damaged buildings were 12
stories or taller. Although details from these voluntary inspections are
incomplete, the heaviest reported damage appears to have been in buildings
on soft soil where available information on peak ground accelerations (PGA)
exceeded 0.25g. For two of the damaged buildings, however, the closest
recorded ground motion had a PGA of only 0.18g (FEMA 355E, 2000b,
Section 5.9).
FEMA 352 itself addresses this question. FEMA 352 Section 3.2
recommends seven inspection triggers for a given building based on
estimated ground motion at the site and known damage nearby. Specifically,
for a city with high seismicity like San Francisco, FEMA 352 recommends a
protocol of joint inspections where the PGA exceeds 0.25g, where nearby
unreinforced masonry buildings show “prevalent” full or partial collapse,
where nearby nonstructural damage is at “high levels,” or where other nearby
buildings show “considerable” damage.
Except for the PGA trigger, these conditions allow for ample judgment.
Considering Loma Prieta building performance in or near downtown San
Francisco, examples of FEMA 352 indicators of potential damage were
observed in different parts of the city. Whether or not similar levels of
damage would trigger FEMA 352 inspections for downtown buildings after a
future earthquake would be a matter of building official judgment.
The PGA trigger in FEMA 352 is more quantitative, but it was based on
sound (but still incomplete) data from just one event (Northridge) and on
relatively sparse data, described above, from Loma Prieta. The majority of
Northridge steel frame damage occurred in Los Angeles neighborhoods with
PGA values of 0.50g or higher (USGS, 1994). In downtown Los Angeles,
PGA values were under 0.30g, with some under 0.20g, and very little damage
was found in buildings of any height. However, post-Northridge inspection
there, especially among tall buildings, was relatively rare, and it effectively
stopped when the scope of the city’s mandatory inspection ordinance
excluded most of downtown. “[I]t is possible that no damage was found in
Loma Prieta ground motion records in San Francisco are limited. Available
information includes data from recording stations and data inferred from
Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) and Did You Feel It (DYFI) observations
contained in Loma Prieta reconnaissance reports (USGS, 1989). Stations
recorded PGA values between 0.06g and 0.16g, which are below FEMA 352
triggers for inspection, but observational data at several downtown locations
suggest inferred PGA values of 0.24g, which is approaching the threshold
value of 0.25g in FEMA 352 for areas of high seismicity. Additional
observational data include 0.45g near the intersection of Market Street and
Van Ness Avenue and more than 0.8g at locations in the Marina and near the
Ferry Terminal. Although these data are outliers, they indicate a potential for
more significant shaking in selected areas.
Inspection Technologies
In addition to the policies and programs discussed in this part, the tools and
methods of inspection, damage-finding, and documentation, while outside the
scope of this report, are worthy of review as well. Some of these are new or
emerging technologies, while others are merely common sense applications
of existing ideas that might be required, funded, or encouraged by a building
code, a program such as the City’s Building Occupancy and Resumption
Program (BORP) or a City initiative to develop standards and best practices.
As City policy, some of these might benefit from (or be subject to) review by
the City’s Committee on Information Technology.
• Access openings built into the structure and architecture
• Building-specific social media data recorded or posted by tenants (who
will not be present during the safety inspection)
• Satellite or GPS imagery, for overhead or birdseye views, especially for
comparison of pre- and post-earthquake conditions
• Building instrumentation to record earthquake motions. This is more
feasible than ever, and BORP guidelines already allow (but do not
require) the use of motion records to assist damage-finding and posting.
However, standards for processing, interpreting, and applying recorded
motion data by non-experts do not yet exist. Also of interest are
questions about ownership and publication of data, which might be
private or privileged but have public benefit.
• Measurable building data, especially for comparison of post-earthquake
values with pre-earthquake baseline values. These might include:
o Three-dimensional laser scanning, as used to monitor cliff movements
and selected buildings in Christchurch (ATC, 2014)
o Laser measurements in elevator shafts, for gauging permanent lateral
deformations
o Ambient vibration testing to establish structural periods and mode
shapes
o Strain gauges on steel members
References
Introduction
This Part reviews and explains current San Francisco policy for pre-
earthquake seismic evaluation, especially as it relates to the City’s existing
tall buildings. It recommends modifications to the current policy and
proposes additional study or development of new regulations to address
identified issues. The recommendations presented correspond to
Recommendations 2B and 3H presented in the Summary Recommendations.
This Part addresses aspects of the following Tasks described in the CAPSS
Earthquake Safety Implementation Program Workplan 2012-2042 (CCSF,
2011):
• Task C.1.a: Mandatory evaluation on sale or by deadline of building
types not otherwise covered by the Workplan
• Task C.1.b: Evaluation of buildings retrofitted prior to 1994 or built to
non-conforming performance standards
• Task C.2.a: Mandatory retrofit of older non-ductile concrete residential
buildings
• Task C.2.d: Mandatory evaluation and retrofit of pre-1994 welded steel
moment frame buildings
• Task C.2.e: Mandatory evaluation and retrofit of other low-performance
buildings
1.1 Organization
The San Francisco Existing Building Code (SFEBC) regulates most aspects
of pre-earthquake structural evaluation and retrofit. SFEBC provisions
combine the California Existing Building Code (CEBC, which itself is an
amended version of the International Existing Building Code (IEBC), and San
Francisco amendments.
Codes used throughout California have veered back and forth on the issue.
Until the mid-1970s, model codes used a cost trigger: if the value of the
alteration exceeded 50% of the value of the existing building, a full-building
upgrade was required. When it was recognized that the cost trigger
Meanwhile, during the “do no harm” era, some California cities, including San
Francisco, adopted their own alteration triggers or continued to enforce local
interpretations of the earlier ones. While this preserved a policy of well-
intended, “passive” seismic improvements, it led to inconsistent rules and
enforcement across the state (Hoover, 1992). San Francisco retains its own
triggers, developed in the mid-1970s, as amendments to the CEBC, in
SFEBC Sections 403.12.1 and 403.12.2 (CCSF, 2016). They are
summarized as follows:
• For nonstructural alterations, the SFEBC requires a full-structure seismic
retrofit when the intended work would add, remove, or modify
architectural elements in two-thirds or more of the building’s stories within
any two-year period. Thus, a typical tenant improvement on a single floor
would never trigger seismic upgrade in a multi-story building. In a tall
building, a dozen or more floors would all have to undergo significant
renovation within two years for the trigger to apply.
• For structural alterations, the SFEBC requires a full-structure seismic
retrofit when a significant portion of the floor framing, columns, and
bearing walls are altered by the intended project. This sort of structural
Each of these San Francisco triggers is more aggressive than the CEBC,
because the “10%” exception that tends to limit triggered work is not offered.
For tall buildings, however, neither is more effective at prompting seismic
improvements, since each trigger applies only in rare cases and can almost
always be avoided by carefully scoping the intended project. Further, even
where the provision might apply, it triggers only structural review, ignoring
any nonstructural deficiencies.
On the other hand, the CEBC alteration trigger and the additional San
Francisco alteration triggers do apply in some cases (particularly in smaller
buildings), and they can be effective as part of a suite of policy tools that
includes mandates and incentives (Bonowitz et al., 2014). However, it should
be recognized that the purpose of the building code’s alteration triggers is not
to find seismically risky buildings and force their retrofit. Rather, the current
purpose of the code’s alteration triggers is to find a balance that encourages
modernization and adaptive reuse of the building stock while leveraging
reasonable opportunities to reduce risk. Further discussion is provided in
Appendix B.
This balancing approach makes sense especially for tall buildings where
retrofit can be extremely costly and disruptive. If the current policy is too
lenient or too slow, the challenge is to adjust the code and to consider
alternative risk reduction measures without necessarily mandating retrofit, as
discussed in Chapter 3 of this Part.
San Francisco’s amendments are due for update and coordination as the
CEBC adopts two new provisions in the 2018 International Existing Building
Code (IEBC, ICC, 2018). First, the 2018 IEBC will allow the use of reduced
loads for alteration-triggered seismic work, much like the reduced seismic
loads already allowed in the SFEBC. Second, the 2018 IEBC will have a new
trigger for “substantial structural alteration,” much like the one already in the
SFEBC. These two changes will bring the CEBC closer to the SFEBC, but
the new versions are not identical to the SFEBC versions, so some
San Francisco supplements this basic provision with a more likely trigger that
does not require a change of Risk Category. If a change of use involves an
increase in occupant load of more than 10% and more than 100 people, a
retrofit using San Francisco’s reduced seismic loads is triggered. With this
two-part trigger, the creation of a public assembly space or the conversion
from residential to office could actually lead to retrofit. It seems likely that for
San Francisco’s tall buildings, this supplemental change of occupancy trigger
Alternative Approaches
One alternative is to set the building code and its triggers aside and work
toward mandatory retrofit ordinances instead. After all, if a community is at
risk from an identifiable group of buildings, that risk is not likely to go down by
waiting for each building, one by one, to propose a substantial voluntary
alteration that happens to pull an arbitrary trigger. To address persistent
community-wide risk, it has always been more effective to mandate retrofit,
whether the concern is public safety, as in the case of unreinforced masonry,
or essential functions, as in the case of California hospitals. San Francisco
has been a leader in developing mandatory programs for specific building
groups that pose risks to the city, such as “soft-story” apartment buildings
(San Francisco Existing Building Code, SFEBC Chapter 4D) and private
schools not regulated by the state (SFEBC Section 329). Indeed, CAPSS
Earthquake Safety Implementation Program Workplan 2012-2042 (CCSF,
2011) already contemplates broad mandatory programs for most buildings
designed before 1994, including non-ductile concrete and welded steel
moment frame structures of any height.
Although San Francisco’s alteration trigger, “2/3”, is more aggressive than the
California Existing Building Code’s (CEBC) basic provision, it is found that for
a tall building it has practically no effect. Similarly, San Francisco’s “10% and
100 persons” change of occupancy trigger is rarely pulled. This section
presents the idea of triggering seismic work more frequently, but only for the
most critical buildings.
That said, these triggers are judgmental and largely arbitrary, so any such
alternative values merely reset the line for an owner seeking to avoid an
upgrade. More important, the concern for any aggressive upgrade trigger is
that it can backfire, discouraging otherwise beneficial renovations or even
prompting work to be done without permits (Bonowitz et al., 2014). If
necessary, the more aggressive triggers can be tempered by the following:
• Continuing to allow reduced seismic loads and age benchmarks, as the
SFEBC currently does.
• Allowing a “10% rule” or similar exception to ensure that only substantial
deficiencies need to be addressed.
• Revising the triggers to apply only to certain alterations or changes of use
that truly extend the life of the building. Building-wide mechanical
upgrades, information technology upgrades, and the addition of
amenities, more so than basic improvements to a single tenant space,
indicate a long-term investment that merits a seismic review. (Typical
tenant improvement projects often come when a space is newly leased,
so this alteration trigger could be replaced, or should at least be
coordinated with, a potential acquisition trigger discussed in Section 2.3
of this Part.)
• Revising the triggers to apply only (or more aggressively) to problematic
conditions identified in advance, such as vulnerable structure types or
geologic conditions.
• Revising the triggers to apply only to certain uses or occupancies critical
to city or neighborhood recovery. Of the uses typically found in tall
buildings, ATC (2018) has identified multi-family housing, hotels, and
major employers as deserving of “better than code” recovery goals.
The concept of “extended useful life” has precedents from other cities, from
institutional policies, and even from the CEBC itself. In high seismic areas
like San Francisco, the Federal Government requires seismic evaluation and
potential retrofit when an alteration “significantly extends the building’s useful
life through alterations ... that total more than 30 percent of the replacement
value of the building” (BSSC, 2011). The wording of the provision is meant to
give discretion to each Federal agency, but in practice, most agencies rely on
the quantitative replacement cost trigger. California retains a similar cost
Cost triggers were once common in California building codes (see Section
2.1 of this Part), but they are now mostly used where the authority having
jurisdiction is also the owner, or at least has a financial stake, as is the case
for public buildings. For private buildings regulated by a City, cost triggers
are hard to implement, and they have been removed from model codes.
Building officials prefer not to review financial calculations or replacement
cost estimates. Owners dislike the uncertainty of cost triggers; a complete
design and cost estimate is needed before one can know whether the trigger
will be pulled.
The Seattle Existing Building Code (City of Seattle, 2015a) applies the
concept of “extended useful life” with a subjective trigger for “substantial
alteration” and defines the term to include “remodeling ... that substantially
extends the useful physical or economic life of the building or a significant
portion of the building, other than typical tenant remodeling” as well as “a
significant increase in the occupant load of an unreinforced masonry building”
(Section 304.1.1). With this provision, the City of Seattle has replaced a strict
measure of cost or work area with ample building official judgment. In
practice, the provision typically requires a conference with the building official,
and the designation considers project cost, project scope, the vacancy rate,
building age, and other building-specific conditions (City of Seattle, 2015b).
What is unique about this Seattle provision is the desire to consider all of
these factors together and in context and the emphasis on building official
judgment. On one hand, this allows policy flexibility to accommodate special
circumstances; on the other, it introduces subjectivity and uncertainty.
Table 7-1 Tabular Format for Identifying Mitigation Priorities Triggered by Alterations*
Seismic Original
Risk Design Structural Permit
Priority Type Occupancy Cat. Cat. Size Location Attribute Date Other
Emergency — IV F — — — — —
Soft story R — — 2+ st, — Wood frame pre-1978 —
3+ units target story
Private school E — — — — — — 26+ students
Welded steel — — — 3+ st — WSMF pre-1996 —
moment frame
Non-ductile R — — 3+ st — Concrete pre-1980 —
concrete
Central business — — — 8+ st CBD — pre-1996 —
district
(downtown)
Tall B — — 12+ st — — pre-1996 Recovery-
critical
* (Based on ICC, 2016. See text for explanation.)
In its simplest form, the code change would be nothing but a change in
format, from code text to a table. In Table 7-1, for example, the first row,
priority type “Emergency,” reflects a requirement already in the IEBC, CEBC,
and SFEBC: Section 403.4.2 already requires seismic retrofit when a near-
fault Risk Category IV facility undergoes a major alteration. By the NCSEA
proposal, a jurisdiction could keep that row and leave the rest of the table
blank.
This approach can still face feasibility hurdles. Even in a seismically deficient
and recovery-critical building, if the triggered work is simply unaffordable, the
owner can always choose to scale back or cancel the intended project, and in
the end, the City gets neither risk reduction nor building renovation.
The current Los Angeles program for non-ductile concrete structures offers a
related precedent. The program mandates retrofit, but the retrofit deadline is
25 years after notification by the building department. In the near term, only
evaluation is required, so the program functions as a mandatory evaluation
only (City of Los Angeles, 2015, Chapter IX, Division 95).
Other recommendations presented in this report can also work with codified
triggers. San Francisco can write an alteration or change of use trigger to
require development of a recovery plan or participation in the City’s Building
Occupancy Resumption Program (BORP,discussed further in Part 6). Either
of these triggers would represent a recovery-focused extension of the
triggered seismic evaluation. At the very least, the City can use a code
trigger to require the building owner to file basic information to enhance the
building database described in Part 1 and to inform the City’s own response
and recovery plans as discussed in Part 6.
Acquisition (by lease or sale) is not a project type within the CEBC or SFEBC
for private buildings. Many government agencies and institutions, however,
have internal policies for “seismic due diligence” that could be adopted to
supplement the codes. Private lenders and insurers also rely on seismic
evaluations at the time of sale, though their interests are different from those
of the City as a regulator and recovery planner.
If San Francisco were to create an acquisition trigger for private buildings, the
process would probably require legislation, as opposed to just an
administrative bulletin or building code amendment. In addition,
implementation would require new coordination between the Department of
Building Inspection, which would set criteria and approve the triggered
evaluation reports, and the Office of Assessor-Controller, which would have
to initiate the process based on recorded title transfers. It is not clear which
City department would be responsible for triggering evaluations based on
new leases. Possibly, as with the California statutes for residential and tilt-up
transfers, compliance would be left to the private stakeholders themselves,
and would be initiated by their realtors and attorneys without much City
oversight.
If the City could compel building owners to submit or make public their PML
reports, or perhaps just to disclose them to tenants, that might meet some of
the goals of a legislated acquisition trigger. Owners might even prefer this
approach if it would mean they can preserve some confidentiality of the
findings and keep the transaction process free of City approvals.
But there are also reasons why current PML practices might not serve the
City’s interests, at least not as a replacement for broader public policy.
These include:
• Two ASTM standards (2007a; 2007b) define terminology and procedures
but the practice is largely unregulated. Because PML analyses are
Thus, even if San Francisco would want to take advantage of the analyses
already being performed in the PML market, it would have to establish its own
standards that might interfere with current private sector practices.
That said, dozens of San Francisco tall buildings already participate in the
City’s post-earthquake reoccupancy program, BORP, discussed in detail in
Part 6. BORP can be considered an incentivized voluntary program that
benefits both the City and the building’s owner and tenants. In exchange for
San Francisco supplements the CEBC with its own provisions that trigger
seismic upgrade when a major alteration or a change of occupancy is
proposed. Because of their size and typical uses, however, tall buildings are
almost never affected by these San Francisco amendments. Therefore, even
the most collapse-prone tall buildings only rarely receive the scrutiny intended
by the code. That said, since the retrofit of an occupied tall building is
especially expensive and disruptive, a more aggressive trigger provision
could discourage modernization or tenant improvement. Thus, the San
Francisco Existing Building Code’s generic provisions are problematic for tall
and similarly large or complex facilities. Still, these provisions can be
effective if they are made more aggressive, so that they apply to more
alteration and change of occupancy projects, but if they are also made more
focused, so they address the conditions of greatest concern in ways that
building owners can afford.
CHAPTER 1
SCOPE AND ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER 2
DEFINITIONS
Commentary: The 2018 IEBC will revise this definition, but the change
should have no substantive effect.
CHAPTER 3
PROVISIONS FOR ALL COMPLIANCE METHODS
With this change, the 2018 IEBC (and presumably, the 2019 CEBC
and SFEBC) remove a discretionary waiver that might have applied to
typical alteration projects. The code official will retain discretion to
waive alteration-triggered requirements related to heights and areas,
Commentary: In the 2018 IEBC, Section 301.1.4 has been edited for
clarity and to coordinate with ASCE 41-17 instead of ASCE 41-13.
The entire section has also been relocated and renumbered as
Section 303.3.
The 2016 CEBC adopts only three of the 2015 IEBC’s five Appendix A
chapters. None of the three adopted chapters applies to tall buildings
(or to steel or concrete structural systems of any size).
3. ASCE 41, using the performance objective in Table 301.1.4.2 for the
applicable risk category.
CHAPTER 4
PRESCRIPTIVE COMPLIANCE METHOD
SECTION 403
ALTERATIONS
1. The altered structure and the altered nonstructural elements are no less
conforming to the provisions of the California Building Code with respect to
earthquake design than they were prior to the alteration.
SECTION 407
CHANGE OF OCCUPANCY
Exception: The building need not be made to comply with the seismic
requirements for a new structure unless required by Section 407.4.
Exceptions:
1. Specific seismic detailing requirements of Section 1613 of the California
Building Code for a new structure shall not be required to be met where the
seismic performance is shown to be equivalent to that of a new structure. A
demonstration of equivalence shall consider the regularity, overstrength,
redundancy and ductility of the structure.
Exceptions:
Seismic retrofit is a type of alteration project, but it is not the intent of the
code that any retrofit should trigger a different or additional retrofit.
Nevertheless, a recent survey by the Structural Engineers Association of
California has revealed that the provisions of the California Existing Building
Code (CEBC; CBSC, 2016) are still commonly misunderstood and misapplied
in ways that affect retrofit projects (Zepeda et al., 2018). Partly the
misunderstanding is due to a typo in the CEBC (see the commentary to
Section 403.4 in Appendix A of this Part), but partly it is due to the history of
inconsistent local practices around the state. In any case, it is useful to clarify
the code’s intent as part of this review of current San Francisco policy.
References
Anagnos, T., Comerio, M., and Stewart, J., 2016, “Earthquake loss estimates
and policy implications for nonductile concrete buildings in Los
Angeles,” Earthquake Spectra, Vol. 32, No. 4.
ASCE, 2017, Seismic Evaluation and Retrofit of Existing Buildings, ASCE/SEI
41-17, American Society of Civil Engineers Structural Engineering
Institute, Reston, Virginia.
ASTM, 2007a, Standard Guide for Seismic Risk Assessment of Buildings,
ASTM E2026-07, ASTM International, West Conshohocken,
Pennsylvania.
ASTM, 2007b, Standard Practice for Probable Maximum Loss (PML)
Evaluations for Earthquake Due-Diligence Assessments, ASTM
E2557-07, ASTM International, West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania.
ATC, 2018, Recommended Earthquake Performance Goals for San
Francisco's Buildings (ESIP Task A.6.h), final report submitted to the
City and County of San Francisco prepared by the Applied
Technology Council, Redwood City, California.
Bonowitz, D., 2018, “Theories of owner liability for earthquake losses: A
debate by lawyers for non-lawyers,” Eleventh U.S. National
Conference on Earthquake Engineering: Integrating Science,
Engineering & Policy, June 25-29, Los Angeles, California.
Bonowitz, D., McCormick, D., Somers, P., 2014. “Alterations and seismic
upgrade: The building code as mitigation policy,” Earthquake
Engineering Research Institute, November 19, Oakland, California.
CBSC, 2016, 2016 California Existing Building Code, California Code of
Regulations, Title 24, Part 10, California Building Standards
Commission, Sacramento, California.
CCSF, 2011, CAPSS Earthquake Safety Implementation Program Workplan
2012-2042, the City and County of San Francisco, California.
CCSF, 2016, The San Francisco Existing Building Code, the City and County
of San Francisco, California.
City and County of San Francisco Office of Resilience and Capital Planning
Brian Strong Danielle Mieler (Project Manager)
Chief Resilience Officer and Director Principal Resilience Analyst
Office Resilience and Capital Planning Office Resilience and Capital Planning
1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place 1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place
City Hall, Room 347 City Hall, Room 347
San Francisco, California 94102 San Francisco, California 94102
Kathryn How
Chief Engineer, Assistant General Manager of
Infrastructure
Public Utilities Commission
525 Golden Gate Avenue
San Francisco, California 94102