A.M. No.

RTJ-96-1349 April 18, 1997

SPOUSES JOSE and TRINIDAD BACAR, complainants,

vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

In this petition by way of complaint, dated 11 April 1994, petitioner-spouses Jose and Trinidad Bacar pray for the dismissal from the service of respondent Judge
Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142, on the grounds of: 1) gross ignorance of the law, and; 2) rendering
an unjust judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 89-1360 and 89-2878 for homicide and attempted homicide respectively, both entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Gerardo Fortaleza Marcial".

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On 30 March 1989, an information for homicide (for the death of one Maximo Bacar, son of herein petitioner-spouses) was filed by 2nd Assistant Fiscal Domingo
A. Israel against Gerardo Fortaleza Marcial before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142, docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1360.

On 7 June 1989, another information (this time for attempted homicide committed against one Edgar Mabuyo) was filed by the aforesaid Fiscal Israel against the
same Gerardo Fortaleza Marcial before the same court, docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-2878.

On 13 May 1992, after trial on the merits, a Joint Judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 89-1360 and 89-2878 was rendered by respondent judge, finding the accused
Gerardo Marcial guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The dispositive part of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Gerardo Marcial guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide in Criminal Case No. 89-1360 and of the offense of Slight Physical Injuries in Criminal Case No. 89-2878. No modifying
circumstances having attended the commission of said crimes, the accused is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal with respect to
Criminal Case No. 89-1360 and to suffer imprisonment of thirty (30) days of arresto menor as regards Criminal Case No. 89-2878.

The accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim Maximo Bacar in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to
pay the amount of P33,572.00 as actual damages and costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Makati, Metro Manila, May 13, 1992.

On 13 August 1992, the accused, Gerardo Marcial, filed a motion for reconsideration of the joint judgment, alleging among others, that the court erred in
imposing the penalties without considering at least two (2) mitigating circumstances, namely: sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
which immediately preceded the act, and; that the accused had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.

On 28 October 1992, herein petitioners filed an opposition to said motion. However, on 13 November 1992, the lower court granted the motion for
reconsideration filed by the accused. After reassessing the facts of the case on the basis of said motion, respondent judge took into account the mitigating
circumstances of want of intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation which immediately preceded the act and accordingly, reduced the penalty
in Criminal Case No. 89-1360 to six (6) years of prision mayor, while retaining the penalty in Criminal Case No. 89-2878, i.e., imprisonment of thirty (30) days of
arresto menor.

The lower court justified its order thus:

It appearing upon a re-examination of the evidence on record that the encounter between the group of the accused Gerardo Marcial and
that of the victims Maximo Bacar and Edgar Mabuyo precipitated a "free for all fight", that in such a melee, confusion broke loose and was
expected to ensue as a matter of course; that the participation in the melee of each of the members of the respective groups of the victims
and the accused was unexpected and unpremeditated; that the victim Edgar Mabuyo admitted that prior to the incident, there was
heckling which came from him directed to the group of the accused Gerardo Marcial and that it was he who started it out, that accused
Gerardo Marcial confined himself to giving a single thrust with an icepick on the right arm of Edgar Mabuyo and at the back of Maximo
Bacar from which it can be safely inferred that the accused had no intention to commit so grave a wrong, for otherwise, he would have
persisted in attacking the victims to the point of finishing them off; the Court resolves to accord the accused Gerardo Marcial the benefit of
the mitigating circumstances of want of intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation which immediately preceded the act
in accordance with Article 13, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby reconsiders the Decision dated May 13, 1992 in
the foregoing respect.1

On 14 December 1992 and 16 April 1993, respectively, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration and an addendum to said motion. On 25 May 1993, the
accused filed his comment and/or opposition to the prosecution's motion for reconsideration. On 9 December 1993, respondent judge issued an order denying
the prosecution's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. On 4 January 1994, the prosecution filed another motion for reconsideration and clarification which
respondent judge denied anew on 21 January 1994.

On 11 April 1994, the spouses Jose and Trinidad Bacar, parents of the deceased — victim Maximo Bacar in Criminal Case No. 89-1360, filed the present petition
praying for the dismissal of respondent judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., presiding judge of the RTC of Makati, Branch 142, for gross ignorance of the law and
for rendering an unjust judgment in said consolidated cases.

On the first issue, petitioners allege that respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law when he accorded the accused the mitigating circumstances of
want of intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation which immediately preceded the act in accordance with Art. 13, pars. 3 and 4 of the Revised
Penal Code because these cited provisions are not applicable in either or both criminal cases. They contend that lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
cannot apply in Criminal Case No. 89-2878 where the accused was found guilty of slight physical injuries because lack of intention to kill is not mitigating in
crimes against persons, citing the case of People v. Dalacgac2 where it was held that in crimes against persons who do not die as a result of the assault, the
absence of the intent to kill reduces the felony to mere physical injuries, but it does not constitute a mitigating circumstance under Art. 13, par. 3.3

Additionally, said mitigating circumstances cannot apply to Criminal Case No. 89-1360 (for Homicide) for when the accused stabbed the unarmed and
defenseless Maximo Bacar at his back with an icepick, it is crystal clear, so petitioners contend, that the intention of the accused Gerardo Marcial at that
particular moment when he executed or committed the stabbing was to kill and finish off Maximo Bacar and not to harm him only. 4 Petitioners cite the case of
People v. Boyles, et al.,5 to wit:

Art. 13, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when he executes or
commits the criminal act; not to his intention during the planning stage. Therefore, when, as in the case under review, the original plan was
only to rob, but which plan, on account of the resistance offered by the victim, was compounded into the more serious crime of robbery
with homicide, the plea of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong cannot be rightly granted. The unforgettable fact remains that when
 they ganged up on their victim, they employed deadly weapons and inflicted on him, mortal wounds in his neck. At that precise moment,
they did intend to kill their victim, and that was the moment to which Art. 13, par. 3 refers.6

As for the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation, petitioners contend that this is not applicable to Criminal Case No. 89-1360 (for Homicide) for while
Edgardo Mabuyo, the victim in Criminal Case No. 89-2878, admitted that prior to the incident, there was heckling which came from him directed at the group of
the accused Gerardo Marcial and that he was the one who started the heckling, and that the heckling triggered the "free for all fight", there was however, no iota
of evidence that the deceased Maximo Bacar made any provocation. It is further argued by petitioners that under said Article 13, par. 4, RPC, the provocation to
be considered mitigating must originate from the offended party. Therefore, said mitigating circumstance cannot be appreciated in the case involving the
deceased Maximo Bacar as it is undisputed that he himself never gave or caused any provocation.

Petitioners contend that instead of according the accused Gerardo Marcial the aforesaid mitigating circumstances, respondent judge should have considered the
aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength under Art. 14, par. 15, of the Revised Penal Code and treachery under Art. 14, par. 16, of the same
Code.7

On rendering an unjust judgment, petitioners allege that in imposing a straight penalty of six (6) years imprisonment for homicide, after taking into consideration
the aforesaid mitigating circumstances, respondent judge has rendered an unjust judgment in Criminal Case No. 89-1360. It is contended that under the
graduation and application of penalties, the penalty that should be imposed can in no case be justified to only six (6) years "flat".8

The present complaint was referred to respondent judge for comment by then Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad in his First (1st) Indorsement dated
27 May 1994. In reply thereto, respondent judge filed a motion, dated 3 June 1994, requesting for an extension of twenty (20) days within which to file his
comment for the reason that he needed to borrow the records of said Criminal Cases Nos. 89-1360 and 89-2878 from the Makati Regional Trial Court so that he
may be able to file an intelligible comment. He also explained that per his recollection, when accused Marcial filed his motion for reconsideration of the joint
judgment, respondent judge, to be sure that he would not commit an error, sought a second opinion from one Judge Nemesio Felix who allegedly opined that the
said accused should have been given the benefit of homicide in a "tumultuous affray" with no intent to commit the crime, and of self-defense, and suggested a
reducted straight penalty of anywhere from two (2) years to six (6) years. Respondent's request for extension was granted by then Deputy Court Administrator
Juanito A. Bernad per his letter dated 20 June 1994.

However, as his comment was not forthcoming, tracer letters, dated 8 November 1994 and 10 October 1995, were sent to respondent judge by the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA, for brevity), reiterating the directive for him to file his comment on the complaint against him.

Meanwhile, complainants filed a letter with the OCA dated 20 October 1995 reiterating the charges against respondent judge and particularly assailing his order
of 13 November 1992 imposing a straight penalty of six (6) years so as to enable the accused to avail of the benefits of probation and prayed that judgment be
imposed by this Court on the accused to vindicate the death of their son. They also took exception to the statement of respondent judge in the assailed order that
their motion for reconsideration dated 10 December 1992 was filed out of time.9

Since respondent judge continually failed to file his comment, this Court issued a Resolution, dated 1 July 1996, requiring respondent judge to 1) show cause
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comment on the complaint, and; 2) file the required comment on the complaint. In
the same Resolution, the complainants were advised that their prayer to impose the correct penalty in the criminal charges cannot be granted since the present
proceedings involve only the administrative liability, if any, of respondent judge.

On 6 August 1996, respondent judge finally filed his comment. He explained therein why he took into consideration the aforesaid mitigating circumstances and
contends that in doing so, he merely exercised his discretion and judgment. As to why he should not be disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt for failure to file
comment, respondent judge set forth the following reasons:

1. In the belief that the complaint for ignorance of the law (for appreciating the two (2) mitigating circumstances) was unquestionably,
obviously and completely baseless because they were acts of judicial discretion in the appreciation of evidence, respondent did not give
the matter the priority that it deserved.

2. The Bacar spouses assured respondent during a visit to him in the Pasay City RTC that they were going to withdraw their complaint.

3. Respondent had been under severe stress since the first week of November 1995 to the present when he discovered that Judge
Salvador Abad Santos, executive judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, . . . initiated an administrative complaint against him . . . 10

On 14 August 1996, respondent judge filed an urgent ex-parte motion for second (2nd) extension of time to file his explanation, and; on 28 August 1996,
respondent finally filed his explanation on why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt of court for his failure to file a comment.

After evaluating the foregoing facts, the Office of the Court Administrator made the following findings:

1. Respondent cannot be held liable for rendering an unjust judgment by considering in favor of the accused the two (2) mitigating
circumstances. Under the Rules of Court, a judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside by the court
rendering it before the judgment has become final or appeal has been perfected. Moreover, errors in the application of the law and the
appreciation of the evidence are judicial in nature. The remedy therefore of the complainants should likewise be judicial.

2. However, respondent may be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for imposing a straight penalty of six (6) years of imprisonment
on the accused in his modified judgment in the case for homicide. The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory where
imprisonment would exceed one (1) year. 11 And in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law for offenses penalized under the Revised
Penal Code, the indeterminate sentence should have a fixed minimum and maximum. 12 In this case, what was imposed was a straight
penalty which is erroneous. 13

We agree with aforesaid findings of the Office of the Court Administrator on both points.

Not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his duties makes him liable therefor. To hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous
ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position unbearable. For no one called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 14

In the case at bar, respondent judge cannot be faulted for modifying his decision after considering the two (2) mitigating circumstances of want of intent to
commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation which immediately preceded the act, set forth in the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused. Under
the law, a judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before the judgment has become final or
appeal has been perfected.

The fact that respondent judge's appreciation of the evidence differed from that of petitioners which could be biased, does not warrant the conclusion that said
judge has rendered an unjust judgment nor that he is ignorant of the law. In the absence of any indication 1) that the trial court's conclusion is based entirely on
speculations; 2) that there is grave abuse of discretion; 3) that the court, in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee, or; that the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, or; that the presiding judge is blatantly biased, the
general rule that the trial court's findings of fact should be given great weight still stands.

However, respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law for imposing a straight penalty of six (6) years imprisonment on the accused in his modified
judgment in the case for homicide. It is basic law that, as stated above, the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory where imprisonment
exceeds one (1) year, 15 except only in the following cases:
 a. Offenses punished by death or life imprisonment.

b. Those convicted of treason (Art. 114), conspiracy or proposal to commit treason (Art. 115).

c. Those convicted of misprision of treason (Art. 116), rebellion (Art. 134), sedition (Art. 139), or espionage (Art. 177).

d. Those convicted of piracy (Art. 122).

e. Habitual delinquents (Art. 62, par. 5).

Recidivists are entitled to an indeterminate sentence. (People v. Jaramilla, L-28547, Feb. 22,
1974). Offender is not disqualified to avail of the benefits of the law even if the crime is
committed while he is on parole. (People v. Clareon, CA 78 O.G. 6701, Nov. 19, 1982).

f. Those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded sentence.

g. Those granted conditional pardon and who violated the terms of the same ( Art. 159).
(People v. Corral, 74 Phil. 359).

h. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one year.

Where the penalty actually imposed does not exceed one year, the accused cannot avail himself of the benefits of the law, the application
of which is based upon the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law and not upon that which may be imposed in the discretion of
the Court. (People v. Hidalgo, [CA] G.R. No. 00452-CR, Jan. 22, 1962).

i. Those who are already serving final judgment upon the approval of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 16

The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and
to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical,
mental, and moral record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by the RPC or by special laws,
with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed
mandatory. 17

In crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty is determined in accordance with the rules and provisions
of the Code exactly as if the Indeterminate Sentence Law had never been enacted. 18

The rules and provisions which must be applied to determine the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty are those provided in Articles 46, 48, 50 to 57, 61,
62 (except paragraph 5), 64, 65, 68, 69, and 71. 19

However, the aforesaid rules and provisions in those articles, particularly Arts. 50 to 57, 62, 64 and 65, are not applicable in fixing the minimum term of the
indeterminate penalty. The Court has unqualified discretion to fix the term of the minimum. 20 The only limitation is that it is within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense committed, without regard to its three (3) periods. 21

Take the present case, for example, of homicide in which two (2) mitigating circumstances attended its commission. The penalty for homicide prescribed by
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Since two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attended the commission
of the offense, said penalty shall be lowered by one degree pursuant to Article 64 paragraph 5 of the same Code, which in this case is prision mayor. This penalty
shall be imposed in its medium period considering that no other modifying circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the two (2) mitigating
circumstances having been already taken into account in reducing the penalty by one (1) degree lower (Basan v. People, L-39483, 29 November 1974, 61 SCRA
275). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree which is prision
correccional and the maximum of which shall be within the range of the medium period of prision mayor. 22

Since respondent judge imposed the straight penalty of six (6) years which is erroneous, he is therefore liable for gross ignorance of the law. This Court has held
that when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 23 Likewise, that unawareness of
and unfamiliarity with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and duration and graduation of penalties merit disciplinary action, from reprimand to
removal. 24

Respondent judge cannot shirk responsibility for imposing said erroneous penalty by saying, as he did in his motion for extension dated 3 June 1994, 25 that he
in fact sought and adopted the opinion of one Judge Nemesio Felix. A judge should have moral and intellectual courage and independence of mind in the
discharge of his duties for only in that way can he merit his judicial position and the support and confidence of the people in him. 26

Respondent judge owes it to the public and to the legal profession to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants will have great faith in the administration of justice if judges cannot
justly be accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp of the legal principles. 27

Finally, this Court takes notice of the fact that respondent judge filed his comment on this present petition more than two (2) years from the time the Office of the
Court Administrator through then Deputy Court Administrator Juanito Bernad, issued a directive for him to do so. As a judge, respondent ought to know that all
directives coming from the Office of the Court Administrator and his deputies are issued in the exercise of administrative supervision of courts and their
personnel, hence, they should be respected. His excuses that the complaint was unquestionably, obviously, and completely baseless; that complainants were
going to withdraw their complaint, and; that he was under severe stress are not enough for him to ignore said Office's directives. It took a resolution of the Court
itself for respondent judge to finally file his comment. Even then, respondent judge had to ask for several extensions before complying with his Court's
orders. 28

WHEREFORE, the Court, resolving to hold respondent Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, imposes on him a
FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) WITH A STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Additionally, he
is hereby ADMONISHED for failure to file promptly his comment as directed by the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 181571 December 16, 2009

JUNO BATISTIS, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On January 23, 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, in Manila convicted Juno Batistis for
violations of Section 155 (infringement of trademark) and Section 168 (unfair competition) of the
Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act No. 8293).1
On September 13, 2007, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction for infringement of
trademark, but reversed the conviction for unfair competition for failure of the State to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.2
Batistis now appeals via petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA’s affirmance of his
conviction for infringement of trademark.
We affirm the conviction, but we modify the penalty by imposing an indeterminate sentence,
conformably with the Indeterminate Sentence Law and pertinent jurisprudence.
Antecedents
The Fundador trademark characterized the brandy products manufactured by Pedro Domecq, S.A. of
Cadiz, Spain.3 It was duly registered in the Principal Register of the Philippines Patent Office on July
12, 1968 under Certificate of Registration No. 15987,4 for a term of 20 years from November 5, 1970.
The registration was renewed for another 20 years effective November 5, 1990.5
Allied Domecq Philippines, Inc., a Philippine corporation exclusively authorized 6 to distribute
Fundador brandy products imported from Spain wholly in finished form, 7 initiated this case against
Batistis. Upon its request, agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted a test-buy in
the premises of Batistis, and thereby confirmed that he was actively engaged in the manufacture, sale
and distribution of counterfeit Fundador brandy products.8 Upon application of the NBI agents based
on the positive results of the test-buy,9 Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr. of the Manila RTC issued on
December 20, 2001 Search Warrant No. 01-2576,10 authorizing the search of the premises of Batistis
located at No.1664 Onyx St., San Andres Bukid, Sta. Ana, Manila. The search yielded 20 empty Carlos
I bottles, 10 empty bottles of Black Label whiskey, two empty bottles of Johnny Walker Swing, an
empty bottle of Remy Martin XO, an empty bottle of Chabot, 241 empty Fundador bottles, 163 boxes
of Fundador, a half sack of Fundador plastic caps, two filled bottles of Fundador brandy, and eight
cartons of empty Jose Cuervo bottles.11
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila formally charged Batistis in the RTC in Manila with two
separate offenses, namely, infringement of trademark and unfair competition, through the following
information, to wit:
That on or about December 20, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then in
possession of two hundred forty one (241) empty Fundador bottles, one hundred sixty three Fundador
boxes, one half (1/2) sack of Fundador plastic caps, and two (2) Fundador bottles with intention of
deceiving and defrauding the public in general and Allied Domecq Spirits and Wines and Allied
Domecq Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty. Leonardo P. Salvador, a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and engaged in manufacturing of Fundador
Brandy under license of Pedro Domecq, S.A. Cadiz, Spain, and/or copyright owner of the said product,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously reproduce, sell and offer for sale, without prior
authority and consent of said manufacturing company, the accused giving their own low quality
product the general appearance and other features of the original Fundador Brandy of the said
manufacturing company which would be likely induce the public to believe that the said fake Fundador
Brandy reproduced and/or sold are the real Fundador Brandy produced or distributed by the Allied
Domecq Spirits and Wines Limited, U.K. and Allied Domecq Philippines, Inc. to the damage and
prejudice of the latter and the public.
Contrary to law.12
With Batistis pleading not guilty on June 3, 2003, 13 the RTC proceeded to trial. On January 23, 2006,
the RTC found Batistis guilty beyond reasonable doubt of infringement of trademark and unfair
competition, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds the accused JUNO BATISTIS Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of
the crime of Violation of Section 155 of the Intellectual Property Code and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS and to pay a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS.
This Court likewise finds accused JUNO BATISTIS Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of the crime of
Violation of Section 168 (sic) penalty of imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS and to pay a fine of FIFTY
THOUSAND (Php50,000.00) PESOS.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the private complainant the sum of TWENTY-FIVE
(Php25,000.00) PESOS as actual damages.
The following items recovered from the premises of the accused and subject of the case are hereby
ordered destroyed, pursuant to existing rules and regulations:
Twenty (20) empty Carlos 1 bottles
Ten (10) Black Label empty bottles
Two (2) empty bottles of Jhonny (sic) Walker Swing
One(1) empty bottle of Remy Martin XO
One (1) empty bottle of Chabot
Two hundred forty-one (241) empty Fundador bottles
One hundred sixty-three (163) Fundador boxes
One half (1/2 sack of Fundador plastic caps, and
Two (2) filled Fundador bottles
Eight (8) boxes of empty Jose Cuervo bottles
WITH COSTS AGAINST ACCUSED
SO ORDERED.14
Batistis appealed to the CA, which, on September 13, 2007, affirmed his conviction for infringement of
trademark, but acquitted him of unfair competition,15 disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal of Appellant JUNO BATISTIS is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The challenged Decision is AFFIRMED in so far as the charge against him for Violation
of Section 155 of the Intellectual Property Code is concerned.
However, for failure of the prosecution to prove to a moral certainty the guilt of the said Appellant, for
violation of Section 168 of the same code a judgment of ACQUITTAL is hereby rendered in his favor.
SO ORDERED.16
After the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, Batistis brought this appeal.
 Issue
Batistis contends that:
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE
BASIS OF THE SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVITS AND TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE
OFFICERS WHO CONDUCTED THE RAID ON THE HOUSE OF THE ACCUSED.

He submits that the only direct proofs of his guilt were the self-serving testimonies of the NBI raiding
team; that he was not present during the search; that one of the NBI raiding agents failed to
immediately identify him in court; and that aside from the two bottles of Fundador brandy, the rest of
the confiscated items were not found in his house.
Ruling
The petition for review has no merit.
1.
Appeal confined only to Questions of Law
Pursuant to Section 3,17 Rule 122, and Section 9,18 Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the review on appeal
of a decision in a criminal case, wherein the CA imposes a penalty other than death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, is by petition for review on certiorari.
A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court,
explicitly so provides, viz:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.—A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for
a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law,
which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified
motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
Accordingly, we reject the appeal for the following reasons:
Firstly: The petition for review replicates Batistis’ appellant's brief filed in the CA, 19 a true indication
that the errors he submits for our review and reversal are those he had attributed to the RTC. He thereby
rests his appeal on his rehashed arguments that the CA already discarded. His appeal is, therefore,
improper, considering that his petition for review on certiorari should raise only the errors committed
by the CA as the appellate court, not the errors of the RTC.
Secondly: Batistis’ assigned errors stated in the petition for review on certiorari require a re-
appreciation and re-examination of the trial evidence. As such, they raise issues evidentiary and factual
in nature. The appeal is dismissible on that basis, because, one, the petition for review thereby violates
the limitation of the issues to only legal questions, and, two, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will
not disturb the factual findings of the CA, unless they were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting,
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin.20
Whether a question of law or a question of fact is involved is explained in Belgica v. Belgica:21
xxx [t]here exists a question of law when there is doubt on what the law applicable to a certain set of
facts is. Questions of fact, on the other hand, arise when there is an issue regarding the truth or falsity
of the statement of facts. Questions on whether certain pieces of evidence should be accorded probative
value or whether the proofs presented by one party are clear, convincing and adequate to establish a
proposition are issues of fact. Such questions are not subject to review by this Court. As a general rule,
we review cases decided by the CA only if they involve questions of law raised and distinctly set forth
in the petition.22
Thirdly: The factual findings of the RTC, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its
assessment of their probative weight are given high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless cogent facts
and circumstances of substance, which if considered, would alter the outcome of the case, were
ignored, misconstrued or misinterpreted.23
To accord with the established doctrine of finality and bindingness of the trial court’s findings of fact,
we do not disturb such findings of fact of the RTC, particularly after their affirmance by the CA, for
Batistis, as appellant, did not sufficiently prove any extraordinary circumstance justifying a departure
from such doctrine.
2.
Findings of fact were even correct
A review of the decision of the CA, assuming that the appeal is permissible, even indicates that both the
RTC and the CA correctly appreciated the evidence against the accused, and correctly applied the
pertinent law to their findings of fact.
Article 155 of the Intellectual Property Code identifies the acts constituting infringement of trademark,
viz:
Section 155. Remedies; Infringement. — Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner of
the registered mark:
155.1. Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark
or the same container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, advertising of any goods or services including other preparatory steps necessary to carry
out the sale of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
155.2. Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark or a dominant feature
thereof and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints,
packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be
liable in a civil action for infringement by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter set forth: Provided,
That the infringement takes place at the moment any of the acts stated in Subsection 155.1 or this
subsection are committed regardless of whether there is actual sale of goods or services using the
infringing material.
Harvey Tan, Operations Manager of Pedro Domecq, S.A. whose task involved the detection of
counterfeit products in the Philippines, testified that the seized Fundador brandy, when compared with
the genuine product, revealed several characteristics of counterfeiting, namely: (a) the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) seal label attached to the confiscated products did not reflect the word tunay
when he flashed a black light against the BIR label; (b) the "tamper evident ring" on the confiscated
item did not contain the word Fundador; and (c) the word Fundador on the label was printed flat with
sharper edges, unlike the raised, actually embossed, and finely printed genuine Fundador trademark.24
There is no question, therefore, that Batistis exerted the effort to make the counterfeit products look
genuine to deceive the unwary public into regarding the products as genuine. The buying public would
be easy to fall for the counterfeit products due to their having been given the appearance of the genuine
products, particularly with the difficulty of detecting whether the products were fake or real if the
buyers had no experience and the tools for detection, like black light. He thereby infringed the
registered Fundador trademark by the colorable imitation of it through applying the dominant features
of the trademark on the fake products, particularly the two bottles filled with Fundador brandy. 25 His
acts constituted infringement of trademark as set forth in Section 155, supra.
3.
Penalty Imposed should be an
Indeterminate Penalty and Fine
Section 170 of the Intellectual Property Code provides the penalty for infringement of trademark, to
wit:
Section 170. Penalties. - Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a
criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos(P200,000), shall be imposed on any person
who is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155, Section 168 and
Subsection 169.1. (Arts. 188 and 189, Revised Penal Code).
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC imposing the "the penalty of imprisonment of TWO (2)
YEARS and to pay a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS."
We rule that the penalty thus fixed was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 26 as amended by
Act No. 4225. We modify the penalty.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, provides:
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code,
or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same.
The straight penalty the CA imposed was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, whose Section 1
requires that the penalty of imprisonment should be an indeterminate sentence. According to Spouses
Bacar v. Judge de Guzman,Jr.,27 the imposition of an indeterminate sentence with maximum and
minimum periods in criminal cases not excepted from the coverage of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
pursuant to its Section 228 is mandatory, viz:
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent
the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the
accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and
his physical, mental, and moral record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all
criminal offenses whether punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by special laws, with definite
minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty
specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.
Indeed, the imposition of an indeterminate sentence is mandatory. For instance, in Argoncillo v. Court
of Appeals,29 three persons were prosecuted for and found guilty of illegal fishing (with the use of
explosives) as defined in Section 33, Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1058, for which the prescribed penalty was imprisonment from 20 years to life imprisonment. The
trial court imposed on each of the accused a straight penalty of 20 years imprisonment, and the CA
affirmed the trial court. On appeal, however, this Court declared the straight penalty to be erroneous,
and modified it by imposing imprisonment ranging from 20 years, as minimum, to 25 years, as
maximum.
We are aware that an exception was enunciated in People v. Nang Kay,30 a prosecution for illegal
possession of firearms punished by a special law (that is, Section 2692, Revised Administrative Code,
as amended by Commonwealth Act 56 and Republic Act No. 4) with imprisonment of not less than five
years nor more than ten years. There, the Court sustained the straight penalty of five years and one day
imposed by the trial court (Court of First Instance of Rizal) because the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law would be unfavorable to the accused by lengthening his prison sentence.
Yet, we cannot apply the Nang Kay exception herein, even if this case was a prosecution under a
special law like that in Nang Kay. Firstly, the trial court in Nang Kay could well and lawfully have
given the accused the lowest prison sentence of five years because of the mitigating circumstance of his
voluntary plea of guilty, but, herein, both the trial court and the CA did not have a similar circumstance
to justify the lenity towards the accused. Secondly, the large number of Fundador articles confiscated
from his house (namely, 241 empty bottles of Fundador, 163 Fundador boxes, a half sack full of
Fundador plastic caps, and two filled bottles of Fundador Brandy) clearly demonstrated that Batistis
had been committing a grave economic offense over a period of time, thereby deserving for him the
indeterminate, rather than the straight and lower, penalty.
ACCORDINGLY, we affirm the decision dated September 13, 2007 rendered in C.A.-G.R. CR No.
30392 entitled People of the Philippines v. Juno Batistis, but modify the penalty to imprisonment
ranging from two years, as minimum, to three years, as maximum, and a fine of ₱50,000.00.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92020 October 19, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELISEO MARTINADO y AGUILLON, HERMOGENES MARTINADO y AGUILLON and JOHN DOE, alias "ROLLY", accused-appellants.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision 1 of Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalookan City, in Criminal Case No. C-27858, promulgated on 2
February 1989, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused ELISEO MARTINADO y AGUILLON and HERMOGENES MARTINADO y AGUILLON
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide as defined and penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. There being no appreciable aggravating nor (sic) mitigating circumstances, this Court hereby
sentences each of the accused to suffer imprisonment under the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. The two accused are also directed to
indemnify the heirs of Juan Matias jointly and severally the (sic) amount of P30,000.00; to return the money and the pieces of jewelry,
subject matter of the robbery, and if unable to do so, to pay the entire value thereof in the total amount of P5,100.00 to the legal heirs of
the victim and to pay the costs.

The accused HERMOGENES MARTINADO shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the full time that he has undergone
preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code provided the conditions prescribed thereon have been
complied with.

SO ORDERED.

At the outset, this Court, has to resolve the propriety of the interposed appeal insofar as accused Eliseo Martinado is concerned.

The promulgation of the decision on 22 February 1989 was made in his absence because he had earlier escaped on 6 August 1988, 2 exactly five (5) days after
the defense rested its case, from the Kalookan City Jail. The escape, however, was reported to the trial court only on 8 August 1988. 3 Consequently, the trial
court issued a warrant for his arrest on 10 February 1988 4 which was returned unserved on 28 February 1989 because "per information gathered from the
resident (sic) thereat revealed that accused cannot (sic) be seen for long (sic) period of time." 5

It was only on 10 April 1989 that Eliseo was re-arrested in Palo, Leyte by a Special Action Team of the Kalookan Police Station. 6
On March 1989, Atty. Domingo M. Ballon, counsel of record for Hermogenes and Eliseo, filed a notice of appeal for both accused. It reads:

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Accused, by their undersigned counsel to this Honorable Court hereby gives (sic) notice that they are appealing the decision of this
Honorable Court, dated February 2, 1989, and promulgated on Feb. 22, 1989, convicting the accused to suffer and undergo an
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, to the Supreme Court, for the reason that said decision is contrary to law and evidence. 7

In view of such appeal, the trial court issued on the same date an order directing the transmittal to this Court of the records of the case together with the
transcripts of stenographic notes and exhibits. 8

In promulgating judgment in absentia with respect to Eliseo, and in giving due course to the appeal of both accused, the trial court must have had in mind the
third paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court which reads:

xxx xxx xxx

The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be
present at the promulgation of the decision. In case the accused fails to appear thereat the promulgation shall consist in the recording of
the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused or counsel. If the judgment is for conviction, and
the accused's failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall further order the arrest of the accused, who may appeal within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision to him or his counsel. (6a).

Indeed, no cause for non-appearance during promulgation is more justified than the escape of the accused from the city jail where he was confined during the
trial of the case. However, in the recent case of People vs. Mapalao, 9 decided on 14 may 1991, this Court, applying by analogy Section 8, Rule 124 of the 1985
Rules, of Criminal Procedure, held that an accused who had escaped from confinement during trial on the merits and who merits at large at the time of
promulgation of the judgment of conviction loses his right to appeal therefrom unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested
within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment. The reason therefor is that an accused who escapes from detention, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country loses
his standing in court; unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief therefrom. This Court
then took the opportunity to suggest a modification of the last sentence of the aforequoted third paragraph of Section 6 of Rule 120. Thus:

To this effect a modification is in order of the provision of the last sentence of Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides:

If the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall
further order the arrest of the accused, who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision to him or
his counsel.

It should provide instead that it upon promulgation of the judgment, the accused fails to appear without justifiable cause, despite due
notice to him, his bondsmen or counsel, he is thereby considered to have waived his right to appeal. However, if within the fifteen (15) day
period of appeal he voluntarily surrenders to the court or is otherwise arrested, then he may avail of the right to appeal within said period
of appeal.

By the same token, an accused who, after the filing of an information, is at large and has not been apprehended or otherwise has not
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, cannot apply for bail or be granted any other relief by the courts until he submits himself
to its jurisdiction or is arrested. 10

If We were to apply this ruling to the case of Eliseo, his appeal should not be given due course. Considering, however, that Mapalao announces a new doctrine
by making the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. —

xxx xxx xxx

The Court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement
or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.

apply by analogy to the last sentence of the third paragraph of Section 6 of Rule 120, and that application thereof to Eliseo would be prejudicial to him, this Court,
guided by the rule that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided 11 and judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of our legal system 12 and, further taking into account the principle that once a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view
is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and not retroactively to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof, 13
hereby declares that the rule enunciated in Mapalao should not be applied to Eliseo. Thus, his appeal is hereby given due course.

Having cleared the way for the appeal of both accused, We shall now take up the appeal proper.

Accused Hermogenes Martinado and Eliseo Martinado, together with a certain John Doe alias "Rolly" who remains to be at large, were originally charged with
the crime of murder in an Information prepared and filed by Assistant City Fiscal Arturo A. Rojas on 17 November 1986. 14 The information fails to mention
anything about robbery. Consequently, a motion for reinvestigation was filed by the offended party. On 4 March 1987, an Amended Information 15 was filed by
1st Assistant City Fiscal Rogelio M. de Leon charging the accused with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. This was further amended on 10 March 1987 by a
2nd Amended Information, 16 the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 14th day of November 1986 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with one another, with intent of ( sic) gain and with intent to kill, by means
of violence and intimidation employed upon the person of JUAN MATIAS y REYES that is by attacking and stabbing the latter with a sharp
pointed instrument, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the following articles, to wit:

1. Seiko men's watch (5) worth — P 800.00

2. Men's ring worth — P1,800.00

3. Wallet containing cash in the amount of — P2,500.00

Total — P5,100.00

all belonging to the said Juan Matias y Reyes, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned total amount of P5,100.00;
and as a result thereof, Juan Matias sustained serious physical injuries, which injuries caused his death (DOA) at the Quezon City
General Hospital.

Contrary to Law.

Eliseo and Hermogenes Martinado were arraigned with the assistance of counsel on 22 September 1987; 17 both entered pleas of "Not Guilty". The other
accused, John Doe @ Rolly, has not been formally identified and is still at large. Immediately after arraignment, a motion for bail was heard by the trial court; the
same was eventually denied. 18

Trial subsequently ensued with the prosecution presenting Margarita Padrinao, Elizabeth C. Carillo, Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr. (Medico-Legal Officer), Nicanor
Matias, Angel Nieto, Gerardo Arellano, P/Sgt. Manuel Buenaobra and David Nerza; for the defense, both accused were presented.

On 22 February 1989, the trial court promulgated its decision based on the prosecution's version of the incident summarized as follows:

The following is the version as shown by the evidence adduced by the Prosecution:

At about 6:15 o'clock in the afternoon of November 14, 1986, Margarita Padrinao, a maid, was watching television at the house of her
master, Juan Matias. She then entered the sari-sari store of her master which is three arms' length away from the place where she was
watching television in order to feed the pigs. She saw Juan Matias tending the sari-sari store. She also saw two customers drinking
softdrinks outside the window grills of the store. (TSN-Nov. 10, 1987, M. Padrinao, pp. 6-7). She identified them as Eliseo and
Hermogenes Martinado.

At about this time, Elizabeth Carillo, a neighbor and a government employee (sic), passed by the same sari-sari store on her way to make
a phone call at a house located at nearby Villa Maria Subdivision. She saw Juan Matias attending to three customers drinking softdrinks at
the sari-sari store. She identified them as Eliseo Martinado, Hermogenes Martinado and "Rolly". (TSN-Nov. 19, 1987, E. Carillo, pp. 6-8).

A short while later, Margarita who had just feed the pigs heard a loud snore coming from the store. She hurriedly went back to the store
she saw Eliseo and Hermogenes helping one another in stabbing Juan Matias. (TSN, Nov. 10, 1987, M. Padriano, pp. 8; 32). Each of
these accused was armed with pointed, thin instruments which each used in the stabbing. The stabbing took place inside the store near
the place where rice was being kept. Margarita then shouted in a loud voice, "Tulungan ninyo po kami." The two accused then fled thru the
gate at the fence of the house. After she shouted, some people approached the store but Hermogenes and Eliseo Martinado had already
fled. (TSN-Nov. 19, 1987 M. Padrinao, pp. 9-10). She then approached Juan Matias who lay on the flooring of the store. Mrs. Dominga
Matias, the wife of Juan, likewise approached Juan Matias whom they found to be bloodied with several stab wounds at ( sic) the neck,
breast and abdomen. (TSN-Nov. 19, 1987, M. Padrinao, pp. 11).

In the meantime, Elizabeth Carillo had to pass the said store on her way back to her residence, having failed to contact a friend thru the
phone. She heard somebody shouting "saklolo" and she saw three persons running from the sari-sari store of Juan Matias. These were
the same three persons she previously saw drinking softdrinks. "Rolly" was running ahead of the other two, Eliseo and Hermogenes
Martinado. The she saw Rolly stop and retrace his steps to pick up a watch near the gate of the fence surrounding the house of Juan
Matias before resuming his flight. The two brothers continued to run away. Eliseo was seen holding something in his bloodied hand and
Hermogenes was also seen holding something in his hand which was bloodied. Elizabeth then entered the sari-sari store and she saw
Juan Matias lying down, face upward, inside the sari-sari store and had (sic) stab wounds on (sic) his bloodied neck. He was still snorting,
so Elizabeth called for help to bring Juan to the hospital. (TSN-Nov. 10, 1987, E. Carillo, pp. 8-11). Juan was brought to the Quezon City
General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

At about the same time, Angel Nieto, the Tanod executive officer of the Barangay, was at the house of his brother also at Deparo street
when he heard people shouting "Harangin, harangin." He went out of the house into the street and he was able to see three men coming
from the direction of the house of Juan Matias and being chased by the residents. He was able to observe two of the said three men.
These two men had bloodied hands and bloodied clothes. He then asked the residents why they were chasing the three men and they
replied that these men had just stabbed Juan Matias. (TSN-Dec. 22, 1987, A. Nieto, pp. 4-5)

Gerardo Arellano, a Barangay tanod of the place where the incident occurred, also heard the aforesaid shouting from his house which is
located also at Deparo street. He came to know Elizabeth Carillo and Margarita Padrinao that Juan Matias was stabbed to death. Together
with other tanods and residents of the place, they began looking for Eliseo Martinado, Hermogenes Martinado and Rolly as these were the
suspects mentioned by Elizabeth Carillo and Margarita Padrinao. (TSN-Feb. 9, 1988, G. Arellano, pp. 5-6).

Gerardo Arellano and his companions proceeded to the house of "Rolly" at the Sterling compound and after they were granted permission
by the wife of "Rolly" they enter. They found Hermogenes Martinado under a lavatory trembling. Then they went to the Visayan Motors and
after obtaining permission from the owner thereof, they went inside the premises and found Eliseo Martinado who was packing his clothes
ready to leave. (TSN-Feb. 9, 1988, Arellano, pp. 9-13). Eliseo and Hermogenes Martinado were invited to go to the house of Juan Matias
and both were identified by Elizabeth Carillo and Margarita Padrinao as two of the persons ( sic) who barged into the house of Juan
Matias. (TSN-Feb. 9, 1988, Arellano, p. 14). The two suspects were then brought to the Urduja Police Sub-Station and were then turned
over to Sgt. Manuel Buenaobra of the Caloocan City Police Station. They were later brought to the Caloocan City Police Headquarters by
Sgt. Buenaobra. (TSN-Feb. 15, 1988, M. Buenaobra, p.8).

During the investigation conducted at the house of Juan Matias by the police on November 14, 1986, Margarita Padrinao discovered that
the Seiko V watch worn everyday by Juan Matias was no longer in his wrist. She also found that the wallet which Juan Matias kept at the
back pocket of his pants was missing. (TSN-Nov. 10, 1987, M. Padrinao, pp. 16-17).

This robbery was reported by Dominga Matias, the widow of the victim, to the Caloocan City Police Headquarters on November 16, 1986.
(TSN-Feb. 15, 1988, M. Buenaobra, p. 16). (See Police Blotter, page 188 of the Caloocan City Police Station dated November 16, 1986,
EXHIBIT "J"). Mrs. Dominga Matias listed the articles found missing from their store at Deparo street, Caloocan City, after the death of
Juan Matias, as follows:

Seiko wristwatch –– P 800.00

Gold ring –– P1,800.00
Cash contained in missing wallet –– P2,500.00

Nicolas Matias, a son of Juan Matias, corroborated the loss of the above articles and estimated their value in his testimony of December
21, 1987. He discovered the loss on the night of November 14, 1986, after reaching the Quezon City General Hospital where his mother
told him that these articles could no longer be found in the body of the victim. When he returned to his father's residence at Deparo street,
Caloocan City, also on the evening of November 14, 1986, he verified after a search of the sari-sari store and the house that those articles
were indeed missing. (TSN. Dec. 21, 1987, N. Matias, pp. 4-6). 19

xxx xxx xxx

It is undisputed that Juan Matias, 70 years old, died on November 14, 1986. The cause of death was hemorrhage secondary to stab
wounds, neck and chest. (EXHIBIT "E"). Dr. Mariano Cueva, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, stated that he found contusions on the front portion
of the neck of the victim; 4 incised wounds, one on the left arm and three on the left forearm; four stab wounds, one over left front of the
neck and three at the left front chest. (TSN. Nov. 20, 1987, Dr. Cueva, pp. 7-8). (EXHIBITS "F" and "G"). The most mortal of the wounds
was that found over the left front chest. (TSN. Nov. 20, 1987, pp. 8-9). 20

xxx xxx xxx

 Dr. Cueva narrated that the incised wounds found on the body of the victim could have been brought about by contact with a sharp cutting
edge like the edge of a knife or sharp metal object. He also said that the stab wounds could have been produced by a pointed, single-
edged or single-bladed instrument like a kitchen knife or dagger. He added that the number of wounds inflicted on the victim does not
preclude the fact that there was more than one assailant using similar instruments. (TSN. Nov. 20, 1987, pp. 9-10; 20). 21

The trial court concluded that the prosecution established convincingly that Juan Matias was robbed at about 6:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 November 1986
by the accused Hermogenes and Eliseo Martinado who conspired with each other and with Rolly. Under the circumstances above narrated, the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code was committed. The motive of the accused was to rob
Juan Matias.

As earlier adverted to, the accused through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal on 2 March 1989. Despite the trial court's order to forward the records of the case to
this Court, the clerk of court of the court a quo erroneously transmitted the same to the Court of Appeals on 19 February 1990. 22 The latter subsequently
forwarded the records to this Court on 22 February 1990. 23

In a Resolution dated 12 March 1990, We accepted the appeal interposed by the accused. 24

The accused filed their Appellants' Brief on 20 December 1990 25 while the Office of the Solicitor General filed the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee on 30 January
1991. 26

The appeal is anchored on the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED HERMOGENES MARTINADO AND ELISEO MARTINADO ARE GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS HERMOGENES MARTINADO AND ELISEO MARTINADO
CONSPIRED WITH A CERTAIN "ROLLY" TO COMMIT THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. 27

In discussing the first error, appellants focus on the arguments that proof of robbery is wanting that their guilt for the homicide has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

As to the first, the appellants underscore the fact that it was only two (2) days after the alleged killing that the loss of the victim's personal belongings was
reported to the police authorities. They then suggest that "[t]he wristwatch and the money contained in the wallet could have been stolen when the cadaver was
already in the Hospital or probably in the Morgue;" 28 that Elizabeth Carillo's declaration on the witness stand that she saw a certain "Rolly" return and pick up a
watch as he, together with the accused, were fleeing from the victim's house, is not sufficient to support the conclusion that a robbery was committed as the
watch could have been Rolly's; and that the loss of money was not proven and the witness who claims to have seen the alleged killing, Margarita Padrinao, did
not testify on the actual taking of property.

We have closely perused through the entire records of the case and are convinced that the crime of robbery was not proven to have been committed. No
conclusive evidence proving the physical act of asportation thereof by the accused themselves was presented by the prosecution. 29 This Court takes note of the
fact that the original information filed three (3) days after the incident in question was for Murder and no hint whatsoever of robbery was made therein. The
evidence further discloses that it was only at around 10:30 o'clock in the evening of 16 November 1986 that the widow of Juan Matias reported to the
Investigation Division of the Kalookan City Police Station that "they found out that the Seiko wristwatch worth P800.00; GOLD ring worth P1,800.00 and the
amount of P2,500.00 contained in the wallet of his (sic) slain husband, JUAN MATIAS were missing presumably (sic) taken by suspects (sic)." 30

It is settled that in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is imperative that the robbery itself be proven as conclusively as any
other essential element of a crime. In the absence of such proof, the killing of the victim would only be simple homicide or murder, depending on the absence or
presence of qualifying circumstances. 31

The trial court based its finding of the existence of robbery on Margarita Padrinao's and Elizabeth Carillo's respective testimonies. There is also the testimony of
the victim's son, Nicanor Matias, a substantial part of which is hearsay as he constantly alluded to the information his mother had given him. While Padrinao gave
the following statements during her direct examination:

FISCAL SILVERIO:

xxx xxx xxx

Q And what did the police find out during the investigation, if any?

A Things were missing, sir.

Q Did you come to know what were those missing things?

A Watches (sic), wallet.

Q How did you come to know that?

A Because he was not wearing his wristwatch and his wallet was missing.

Q Whose wallet was missing?

A Juan Matias, sir.

Q Do you know what kind of watch is owned or being worn by Juan Matias?

A Seiko V, sir.

Q How did you come to know that?

A I used to see that watch because I have been staying there for a long time.

Q You said that wallets (sic) was missing, do you know if there are (sic) money contained in that wallet?

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

How did you know that a wallet was missing?

 A Because the wallet was no longer at the back pocket of his pants.32

Carillo declared that:

FISCAL SILVERIO:

Q When you said that you saw Rolly, Eliseo and Hermogenes Martinado running out from the sari-sari store, what
happened next, if nay?

A I saw Rolly returned (sic) and picked (sic) up something, sir.

Q Did you see what Rolly picked up at that time?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was that?

A A watch, sir.

Q Could you describe the watch picked up by Rolly at that time?

A I cannot describe the make, sir, the trademark but it is a watch. 33

It is at once apparent that nobody was able to observe that immediately before the incident, Juan Matias was wearing a wristwatch and a gold ring and had a
wallet in his pocket which contained money; moreover, nobody witnessed the actual taking by the accused of Juan Matias' personal belongings. While Margarita
Padrinao saw Matias being repeatedly stabbed, she failed to notice the latter being actually divested of his personal effects. Further scrutiny of Padrinao's
testimony reveals that at the time she declared that "things were missing," the victim was no longer in front of her for she had likewise testified that latter was
rushed to the hospital soon after the stabbing. The investigation during which she uttered such statements was conducted by police authorities who arrived at the
crime scene long after the victim had been removed. It would thus be highly doubtful that Padrinao could credibly assert right then and there that the said items
were missing as, presumably, she was not able to get a clear glimpse of the victim as he was being brought to the hospital. In fact, if there was any person who
could have testified about the missing items, it would have been Elizabeth Carillo. Together with a neighbor, the victim's wife and brother, she brought Juan
Matias to the hospital where the latter was pronounced dead on arrival. 34

With respect to Carillo's testimony, the fact that Rolly returned and picked up a watch is no proof at all that the watch belonged to the victim for unfortunately, the
prosecution failed to elicit from her any information about the precise place where the watch was picked up in relation to the place where Juan Matias was
stabbed, or the person possessing the same before it was picked up. In short, she did not testify that the said watch belonged to and was taken from the victim.
Absent such proof, it is highly possible that the watch could have been, as suggested by the accused Rolly's.

The testimony of Nicanor Matias, on the other hand, merely recounts his own discovery that certain items were missing when he arrived at his parents' house
after the incident; he also described these missing items and estimated their respective values. As earlier observed, much of the information he volunteered was
based on what his mother had told him, thus making the same objectionable on the ground of hearsay.

As basis for the assertion that the crime of homicide has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, both accused emphasize that "the contradiction between the
statement of Ms. Margarita Padrinao in her Affidavit to the effect that "Rolly" was the last person to leave the sari-sari store and was in fact seen by her "INANG"
holding a knife, and that of her testimony in Court to the effect that she did not see "Rolly" anymore for she immediately went outside the store shouting for help,
had created a semblance of falsehood." 35

The suggested flaw, more apparent than real, betrays strained and tenuous reasoning. Padrinao's aforesaid statement does not at all clash with her testimony
during cross-examination. All that she declared during the latter was that:

ATTY. BALLON:

Q I am going to quote your answer: "Oho, ito hong dalawang ito (affiant pointing to the persons inside the
Investigation Office, who gave their names as Eliseo Martinado y Aguillon alias ELISEO, 20 years old, single,
helper, native of Dagami, Leyte, resident of Visayan Auto Repair Shop, Deparo, Caloocan City, and
HERMOGENES MARTINADO y Aguillon, 23 years old, single, laborer, native of Dagami, Leyte, resident of Sterling
Subd., Caloocan City) at isa pa na magbobote ang pangalan ay Rolly", did you give that answer?

A Yes, sir, because they were three but I did not see the third man because I only reached ( sic) inside the store the
two (referring to the two accused).

Q Now, could you say now, Miss Padrinao, that there were three inside the store?

xxx xxx xxx

Q Was this Rolly inside the store when you saw him?

A I did not see him inside the store but the ones I reached (sic) inside the store were Eliseo and Hermogenes
Martinado, because right after I saw it (sic) I immediately went out and shouted.

Q And so it is clear that you did not see the actual stabbing of Mang Juan, during the stabbing of Mang Juan you
did not see this Rolly?

A Yes, sir.

Q And this Rolly was not inside the store before Mang Juan was stabbed?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Why did you mention in your affidavit that the three who killed Juan Matias were Eliseo, Hermogenes and this Rolly
who was magbobote (sic)?

A I did not see that Rolly anymore because as I have said when I saw the two (referring to Eliseo and Hermogenes)
helping one another in stabbing Mang Juan, I ran away and shouted for help.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. BALLON:
 Q While (sic) ago, during your direct testimony and even on the cross examination by this representation you stated
categorically that you only saw two people drinking softdrinks in the store of Mang Juan on November 14, 1986, at
about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon and in your statement Exhibit "A" you stated that also a certain Rolly magbobote
who (sic) was with the two drinking softdrinks, which of them is now correct? There seems to be a conflict.

A I only saw the two of them drinking softdrinks, that is what I saw. 36

Padrinao's failure to notice Rolly inside the store could be explained by the fact that she immediately left upon seeing Juan Matias being stabbed by the two (2)
accused. 37 It is very likely that this third person, Rolly, could have just been hidden or covered by the other two. Thus, it was only when the stabbing was
consummated that she saw all three because they naturally had to leave the scene of the crime. It is to be observed that Rolly's presence was confirmed by two
(2) other witnesses, namely Elizabeth Carillo 38 and Angel Nieto. 39

Besides, such a minor contradiction does not effect the credibility of a witness. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to minor and
insignificant details cannot destroy their credibility. In fact, such minor inconsistencies guarantee sincere and candid evidence of what actually transpired. 40
Discrepancies in minor details do not impair the credibility of a witness. In the course of a prolonged direct examination, more so during cross-examination, the
witness is usually subjected to unfriendly questioning. As a result thereof, it is usually the case that the witness, uncomfortable and fidgety in a courtroom scene,
may often fall into lapses. It is not infrequent for a witness to commit minor mistakes in his narration of the facts. 41 Rather than effect the credibility of the
witnesses, they are badges of truthfulness and candor. 42

Margarita Padrinao's narration of the incident is coherent in its essential parts and intrinsically believable; hence, it must be accorded due deference. 43

In any event, even if We are to give weight to the implication suggested by the said discrepancy, only Rolly's liability would be put in doubt as it is only as to his
participation that there would exist any reservation or question. As to the accused-appellants, Padrinao was firm in her identification of them.

Coming to the second assigned error, this Court is hard put at giving the same any credence. For one, counsel for the accused harps once again on the alleged
inconsistencies that supposedly plague the testimonies of the witnesses; this issue has already been resolved and needs no further elaboration.

Furthermore, the accused capitalize on the Medico-Legal Officer's statement that "the wounds would have been inflicted by one person because of the nature of
the wounds." 44 The accused would attempt to mislead this Court by such conclusion because they deliberately omitted the phrase immediately preceding the
quoted declaration — "It is possible . . ." 45 Thus, all that the said witness did was to suggest that there could have been one (1) assailant. It was only the
accused who made the categorical declaration to that effect.

Finally, the accused suggest that the evidence necessary to prove conspiracy was not established because "at the time the Martinado Brothers were accounted
for, Hermogenes Martinado was at the house of Aling Espie, while Eliseo was at Visayan Auto Repair Shop at Reparo (sic) Street, Kalookan City." 46

We have time and again ruled that alibi is at best a weak defense and easy of fabrication. 47 It cannot prevail over a positive identification made by a prosecution
witness. 48 For such a defense to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed but that he must also
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. 49

As found by the trial court, both accused were apprehended in the vicinity of the crime scene shortly after the felony was committed. While Hermogenes was
found trembling under the lavatory in Rolly's house, Eliseo was accosted in the premises of the Visayan Auto Repair Shop in the act of packing his clothes. Such
deportment on the part of the two accused displays guilty consciences. On the part of Eliseo Martinado, such a conclusion is even bolstered by the fact that the
escape from the Kalookan City Jail on 6 August 1988.50 Flight of the accused is an indication of his guilt or of a guilty mind. 51

As to conspiracy, the trial court correctly declared that:

The conspiracy was shown by the fact that the two accused were seen buying and drinking softdrinks together with "Rolly" at the store of
the victim and by the fact that they fled together. (People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 139). The Prosecution has also established that the same
two accused and "Rolly" helped each other in stabbing the accused (sic), each using a pointed and bladed instrument in stabbing the
same victim to death. 52

This Court hereby adopts the aforequoted exposition. These facts prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had a common purpose and were united in
its execution. There is conspiracy when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 53
Conspiracy to exists does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence; it exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the
accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. 54 Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, 55 or inferred from acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interest. 56 Conspiracy having been adequately established by the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, all the
conspirators — the accused herein — are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective individual participation for in
contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. 57

As We have earlier declared, however, the finding that robbery was committed on the occasion of the killing cannot be sustained. Hence, the accused are liable
only for homicide. This Court, nevertheless, appreciates against both accused the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength 58 which
although not alleged in the second amended information, was duly proven by the prosecution and may therefore be properly taken into consideration. 59 The
victim, Juan Matias, a septuagenarian, was unarmed at the time he was assaulted; Eliseo Martinado was about 21 years old 60 while Hermogenes Martinado
was only 28 years old. 61 They both ganged up on the old man who never had the slightest inkling that the accused, who pretended to be his customers, would
attack him simultaneously with bladed instruments. It is obvious that they took advantage of their individual and collective strength. The penalty then for the crime
of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code must be imposed in its maximum period pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 64 of said Code.

Conformably with the policy of this Court enunciated in several cases, the indemnity for the death of Juan Matias should be increased to P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City in Criminal Case No. C-27858 finding both accused Eliseo Martinado y
Aguillon and Hermogenes Martinado y Aguillon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide defined and penalized under paragraph 1
of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby modified. As modified, the two accused are found guilty of the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. In view of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, and the absence of any mitigating circumstance to offset it, and
applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Hermogenes Martinado y Aguillon is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of prision mayor maximum as minimum to Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal
maximum as maximum.

Accused Eliseo Martinado, however, shall not be entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law as he had escaped from confinement. 62
Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal
maximum.

The indemnity for the death of the deceased Juan Matias is hereby increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.

The Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176317 July 23, 2014
MANOLITO GIL Z. ZAFRA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In convicting an accused of the complex crime of malversation of public fund!: through falsification of
a public document, the courts shall impose the penalty for the graver felony in the maximum period
pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, plus fine in the amount of the funds malversed or the
total value of the property embezzled. In addition, the courts shall order the accused to return to the
Government the funds malversed, or the value of the property embezzled.
The Case
This appeal by petition for review on certiorari is taken from the judgment promulgated on August 16,
2006,1 whereby the Court of Appeals affirmed the consolidated decision rendered on February 17,
2004 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Cases Nos. 4634 to
Nos. 4651, inclusive,2 finding Manolito Gil Z. Zafra, a Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) assigned in Revenue District 3 in San Fernando, La Union guilty of 18 counts
of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents.3
Antecedents
The CA summarized the factual antecedents as follows:
Appellant was the only Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
Revenue District 3, in San Fernando, La Union from 1993-1995. Among his duties was
toreceive tax payments for which BIR Form 25.24 or the revenue official receipts (ROR)
were issued. The original of the ROR was then given to the taxpayer while a copy thereof
was retained by the collection officer.

Every month, appellant submitted BIR Form 12.31 of the Monthly Report of Collections
(MRC) indicating the numbers of the issued RORs, date of collection, name of taxpayer,the
amount collectedand the kind of tax paid. The original copy of the MRC with the attached
triplicate copy of the issued RORs was submitted to the Regional Office of the Commission
on Audit (COA).

The Assessment Division of the BIR Regional Office, likewise, kept a copy of the duplicate
original of the Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR) relating to the real property
transactions, which contained, among other data, the number of the issued ROR, its date,
name of payor, and the amount the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax paid.

On 06 July 1995, an audit team composed of Revenue Officers Helen D. Rosario, Maria
Lourdes G.Morada, Marina B. Magluyan and Norma Duran, all from the central office of
the BIR, was tasked to audit the cash and non-cash accountabilities of the appellant.

Among the documents reviewed by the audit team were the CARs furnished by the
Assessment Division ofthe BIR; triplicate copies of the RORs attached to the MRCs
submitted by appellant to COA; and appellant’s MRCs provided by the Finance Division of
the BIR. The audit team likewise requested and was given copies of the RORs issued to the
 San Fernando, La Union branch of the Philippine National Bank (PNB). A comparison of
the entries in said documents revealed that the data pertaining to 18 RORs with the same
serial number, i.e., (a) 1513716, (b) 1513717, (c) 1513718, (d) 1513719, (e) 1529758, (f)
2016733, (g) 2018017, (h) 2018310, (i) 2023438, (j) 2023837, (k) 2617653, (l) 2617821,
(m) 2627973, (n) 3095194, (o) 3096955, (p) 3097386, (q) 3503336, (r) 4534412, vary with
respect to the name of the taxpayer, the kind of tax paid, the amount of tax and the date of
payment. Of particular concern to the audit team were the lesser amounts of taxes reported
in appellant’s MRCs and the attached RORs compared to the amount reflected in the CARs
and PNB’s RORs.

The CARs showed that documentary stamp tax and capital gains tax for ROR Nos.
1513716, 1513717, 1513718, 1513719, 2018017, and 2023438 totalled Php114,887.78,
while the MRCs and COA’s copies of the RORs submitted by appellant, the sum of the
taxes collected was only Php227.00, or a difference of Php114,660.78. ROR Nos. 2018017
and 2023438, mentioned in CAR as duly issued to taxpayers and for which taxes were paid,
were reported in the MRC as cancelled receipts.

Likewise, PNB’s RORs bearing Serial Nos. 1529758, 2016733, 2018310, 2023837,
2617653. 2617821, 2627973, 3095194, 3096955, 3097386, 3503336, and 4534412, show
that it paid the total sum of Php500,606.15, as documentary stamp tax. Yet, appellant’s
MRCs yielded only the total sum of Php1,115.00, for the same RORs, or a difference of
Php499,491.15.

The subject 18 RORs were the accountability of appellant as shown in his Monthly Reports
of Accountability (MRA) or BIR Form 16 (A). The MRA contains, among others, the serial
numbers of blank RORs received by the collection agent from the BOR as well as those
issued by him for a certain month.

In sum, although the RORs bear the same serial numbers, the total amount reflected in the
CARs and PNB’s 12 copies of RORs is Ph₱615,493.93, while only Php1,342.00 was
reported as tax collections in the RORs’ triplicate copies submittedby appellant to COA and
in his MRCs, or a discrepancy of Php614,151.93, Thus, the audit team sent to appellant a
demand letter requiring him to restitute the total amount of Php614,151.93. Appellant
ignored the letter, thus, prompting the institution of the 18 cases for malversation of public
funds through falsification of public document against him."4

On his part, the petitioner tendered the following version, to wit:

Appellant denied that he committed the crimes charged. He averred that as Revenue
Collection Officer of San Fernando, La Union, he never accepted payments from taxpayers
nor issued the corresponding RORs. It was his subordinates, Andrew Aberin and Rebecca
Supsupin, who collected the taxes and issued the corresponding RORs. To substantiate his
claim, he presented Manuel Meris, who testified that when he paid capital gains tax, at the
district office of BIR in Sam Fernando, La Union, it was a female BIR employee who
received the payment and issued Receipt No. 2023438. Likewise, Arturo Suyat, messenger
of PNB from 1979 to 1994, testified that when he made the payments to the same BIR
office, it was not appellant who received the payments nor issued the corresponding
receipts but another unidentified BIR employee."5
 Decision of the RTC
On February 17, 2004, the RTC rendered its consolidated decision convicting the petitioner of 18
counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents,6 decreeing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime with which he is charged in:
1) Criminal Case No. 4634 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of
₱19,775.00;
2) Criminal Case No. 4635 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 4
months and 1 day of prision correccionalas minimum up to 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱4,869.00;
3) Criminal Case No. 4636 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of
₱13,260.90;
4) Criminal Case No. 4637 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of
₱17,419.00;
5) Criminal Case No. 4638 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 6 years and
1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras maximum; to
suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱11,309.20;
6) Criminal Case No. 4639 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 6 years and
1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras maximum; to
suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱9,736.86;
7) Criminal Case No. 4640 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of
₱39,050.00;
8) Criminal Case No. 4641 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years
and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of
₱38,878.55;
9) Criminal Case No. 4642and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and
one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of
₱20,286.88;
10) Criminal Case No. 4643 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years
and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of
₱42,573.97;
11) Criminal Case No. 4644 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years
 and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of
₱40,598.40;
12) Criminal Case No. 4645 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years
and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of
₱42,140.45;
13) Criminal Case No. 4646 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years
and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of
₱47,902.60;
14) Criminal Case No. 4647 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years
and 1 one day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of
₱52,740.66;
15) Criminal Case No. 4648 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years
and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine ₱75,489.76;
16) Criminal Case No. 4649 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years
and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of
₱54,948.47;
17) Criminal Case No. 4650 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years
and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay fine of
₱45,330.18; 18) Criminal Case No. 4651and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of
₱37,842.05;
And to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.
Judgment of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner asserted that the RTC had erred as follows:
I. x x x IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS
THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BASED ON THE PRESUMPTION
THAT HE WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES.
II. x x x IN TAKING IT AGAINST THE ACCUSED THE FAILURE TO FILE AND
PROSECUTE PERSONS WHO COULD HAVE POSSIBLY COMMITTED THE CRIMES
CHARGED.
III. x x x IN FINDING THAT ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED ARE PRESENTED IN THIS CASE.
IV. x x x WHEN IT DID NOT DECIDE TO ACQUIT THE ACCUSED BASED ON
REASONABLE DOUBT.7
On August 16, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed judgment affirming the conviction of the
petitioner and the penalties imposed by the RTC,8 observing that he had committed falsification
through his submission of copies of falsified MRCs and had tampered revenue receipts to the BIR and
COA;9 that he was presumed to be the forger by virtue of his being in the possession of such public
documents;10 and that he had certified to the MRAs and had actually issued the tampered receipts.11
Anent the malversation, the CA opined:
All the elements of malversation obtain in the present case. Appellant was the Revenue Collection
Agent of the BIR. As such, through designated collection clerks, hecollected taxes and issued the
corresponding receipts for tax payments made by taxpayers. He was accountable for the proper and
authorized use and application of the blank RORs issued by the BIR District Office, not the least for
the tax payments received in the performance of his duties. The unexplained shortage in his remittances
of the taxes collected as reflected in the CARs and PNB’s receipts, even in the absence of direct proof
of misappropriation, made him liable for malversation. The audit team’s demand letter to appellant,
which he failed to rebut, raised a prima facie presumption that he put to his personal use the missing
funds.12
The CA explained that even if it were to subscribe to the petitioner’s insistence that it had been his
assistants, not him, who had collected the taxes and issued the RORs, he was nonetheless liable,13
because his duty as an accountable officer had been to strictly supervise his assistants;14 and that by
failing to strictly supervise them he was responsible for the shortage resulting from the non-remittance
of the actual amounts collected.15
After the CA denied his motion for reconsideration by its resolution16 promulgated on January 11,
2007, the petitioner appeals via petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
The petitioner claims that the CA erred:
I. x x x IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NEGLIGENT YET HE WAS
CONVICTED OF THE CRIME OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THROUGH
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC [DOCUMENTS].
II. x x x IN APPLYING THE RULE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN A COMPLEX
CRIME OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.
III. x x x IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE.17
The petitioner contends that the RTC and the CA erroneously convicted him of several counts of
malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents on the basis of the finding that
he had been negligent in the performance of his duties as Revenue District Officer;18 that the acts
imputed to him did not constitute negligence; and that he could not be convicted of intentional
malversation and malversation through negligence at the same time.19
Ruling
We DENY the petition for review for its lack of merit.
The RTC stated in its decision convicting the petitioner, viz:
The particular pages of the Monthly Reports from which witness Magluyan based her examination to
determine the discrepancies in the Official Receipts listed by the accused therein, bore only the
typewritten name of the accused without any signature. However, prosecution witness Rebecca Rillorta
showed that those individual pages were part of a number of pages of a report submitted for a particular
month, and she showed that the last pages of the related reports were duly signed by the accused.
Witness Rillorta brought to the Court the original pages of the questioned monthly reports and
demonstrated to the Court the sequence of the pagination and the last pages ofthe monthly reports
bearing the signature of accused Zafra x x x. By these the prosecution demonstrated that the individual
pages of the Monthly Collection Report which listed receipts for lesser amounts were part of official
reports regularly submitted by the accused in his capacity as Collection Agent of the BIR in San
Fernando City, La Union. While counsel for accused called attention to the absence of accused (sic)
signatures on Exhibit "A", accused did not deny the monthly report[s] and the exhibits as he chose to
remain silent.
In addition, Maria Domagas, State Auditor of the BIR showed Monthly Report of Accountabilities
(Exhibit "D") which the accused, as Collection Officer submits on the first week of the following
month for a particular month. The testimony of Maria Domagas establishes that the questionable
receipts were within the series of receipts accountability of accused for a particular month. x x x. The
testimony of State Auditor Domagas established the link of accused accountable receipts, with the
receipts numbers reported in his Monthly Collection Report as well as to the receipts issued to the
taxpayers. Thereby prosecution showed that while the receipts issued to the taxpayer were not signed
by the accused, these receipts were his accountable forms. Such that the use thereof is presumed to be
sourced from him. Even the defense witness admitted that the receipts emanated from the office of the
accused.
Notably, there is a big disparity between the amount covered by BIR Form No. 25.24 issued to the
taxpayer, and the amount for the same receipt number appearing in the Monthly Collection Reports
indicating the falsification resorted to by the accused in the official reports he filed, thereby remitting
less than what was collected from taxpayers concerned, resulting tothe loss of revenue for the
government as unearthed by the auditors."20 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The findings of fact of the RTC were affirmed by the CA. Hence, the petitioner was correctly convicted
of the crimes charged because such findings of fact by the trial court, being affirmed by the CA as the
intermediate reviewing tribunal, are now binding and conclusive on the Court. Accordingly, we
conclude that the Prosecution sufficiently established that the petitioner had beenthe forger of the
falsified and tampered public documents, and that the falsifications of the public documents had been
necessary to committhe malversations of the collected taxes.
Anent the petitioner’s defense that it was his subordinates who had dealt with the taxpayers and who
had issued the falsified and tampered receipts, the RTC fittingly ruminated:
x x x If this Court were to believethat the criminal act imputed to the accused were done by the
employees blamed by the accused, the presumption of negligence by the accused with respect to his
duties as such would attach; and under this presumption, accused would still not avoid liability for the
government loss.21 (Italics supplied)
The petitioner relies on this passage of the RTC’s ruling to buttress his contention that he should be
found guilty of malversation through negligence. His reliance is grossly misplaced, however, because
the RTC did not thereby pronounce that he had beenmerely negligent. The passage was nothing but a
brief forensic discourse on the legal consequence if his defense were favorably considered, and was
notthe basis for finding him guilty. To attach any undue significance to such discourse is to divert
attention away from the firmness of the finding of guilt. It cannot be denied, indeed, that the RTC did
not give any weight to his position.
Initially, the CA’s disquisition regarding malversation through negligence had the same tenor as that of
the RTC’s,22 and later on even went to the extent of opining that the petitioner ought to be held guilty
of malversation through negligence.23 But such opinion on the part of the CA would not overturn his
several convictions for the intentional felonies of malversation of public funds through falsification of
public documents. As can be seen, both lower courts unanimously concluded that the State’s evidence
established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for malversation of public funds through falsification of
public documents. Their unanimity rested on findings of fact that are nowbinding on the Court after he
did not bring to our attention any fact or circumstance that either lower court had not properly
appreciated and considered and which, if so considered, could alter the outcome in his favor. At any
rate, even if it were assumed that the findings by the CA warranted his being guilty only of
malversation through negligence, the Court would not be barred from holding him liable for the
intentional crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents because his
appealing the convictions kept the door ajar for an increase in his liability. It is axiomatic that by
appealing he waived the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, leaving him open to being
convicted of whatever crimes the Court would ultimately conclude from the records to have been
actually committed by him within the terms of the allegations in the informations under which he had
been arraigned.
Yet, we see an obvious need to correct the penalties imposed on the petitioner. He was duly convicted
of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents, all complex
crimes. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,24 the penalty for each count is that
prescribed on the more serious offense, to be imposed in its maximum period. Falsification of a public
document by a public officer is penalized with prision mayor and a fine not to exceed ₱5,000.00. 25
Prision mayor has a duration of six years and one day to 12 years of imprisonment.26 In contrast, the
penalty for malversation ranges from prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods to
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua depending on the amount
misappropriated, and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or to the total value of the
property embezzled, to wit:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or
shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayorin its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is
more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayorin its maximum period to reclusion temporalin its minimum
period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand
pesos. 4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is morethan twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the
amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporalin its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal tothe total value of the
property embezzled. x x x x
To determine the maximum periods of the penalties tobe imposed on the petitioner, therefore, we must
be guided by the following rules, namely: (1) the penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code constitute degrees; and (2) considering that the penalties provided under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Codeare not composed of three periods, the time included in the penalty prescribed
should be divided into three equal portions, which each portion forming one period, pursuant to Article
65 of the Revised Penal Code.27
Accordingly, the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code should be divided
into three periods, with the maximum period being the penalty properly imposable on each count,
except in any instance where the penalty for falsification would be greater than such penalties for
malversation. The tabulation of the periods of the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code follows, to wit:
[[reference - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/176317.pdf]]
TABLE 1
Amount Penalty Duration Minimum Periods Maximum
Misappropriated prescribed Medium
Not exceeding Prision 2 years, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years,
₱200.00 correccional 4 months 4 months 6 months 9 months
in its and 1 day and 1 day and and 11 days
medium and to 6 years to 3 years, 21 days to to 6 years.
maximum 6 months 4 years,
periods and 20 days 9 months
and 10
days
More than ₱200 Prision 6 years and 6 years and 7 years, 8 years,
pesos but not mayorin its 1 day to 10 1 day to 4 months 8 months
exceeding minimum years 7 years and and 1 day and 1 day
₱6,000.00 and medium 4 months to 8 years to 10 years
periods and 8
Months
More than Prision 10 years 10 years 11 years, 13 years,
₱6,000.00 but mayor in its and 1 day and 1 day 6 months 1 month
less than maximum to 14 years to 11 years, and 21 and 11 days
₱12,000.00 period to and 6 months days to to 14 years
reclusion 8 months and 20 days 13 years, and
temporal in 1 month 8 months
its minimum and
period 10 days
More than Reclusion 14 years, 14 years, 16 years,
₱12,000.00 temporal in 8 months 8 months 5 months
but less than its medium and 1 day and 1 day and 11 days to
and to 20 years to 16 years, 18 years,
maximum 5 months 2 months
periods. and 10 days and
20 days
18 years,
2 months<
and 21 days
 to 20 years/td>
More than Reclusion 17 years, 17 years, 18 years, Reclusion
₱22,000.00 temporal in 4 months 4 months 8 months perpetua
its maximum and 1 day and 1 day and 1 day
period to to to 18 years to 20 years
reclusion reclusion and
perpetua perpetua 8 months
Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is imposed on the
offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term.28 The maximum term is the penalty
under the Revised Penal Code properly imposed after considering any attending circumstance; while
the minimum term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised
Penal Codefor the offense committed.
The Indeterminate Sentence Lawwas applicable here, save for the counts for which the imposable
penalty was reclusion perpetua. Considering that each count was a complex crime without any
modifying circumstances, the maximum term of the penalty for each count is the maximum period as
shown in Table 1, supra, except for the count dealt with in Criminal Case No. 4635 involving the
misappropriated amount of ₱4,869.00, for which the corresponding penalty for malversation as stated
in Table 1 was prision mayorin its minimum and medium periods. However, because such penalty for
malversation was lower than the penalty of prision mayor imposable on falsification of a public
document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is the penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period that was applicable.
On other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence for each count should come from the
penalty next lower than that prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, except in
Criminal Case No. 4635 where the penalty next lower is prision correccional in its full range, to wit:
TABLE 2
Penalty Penalty next Range of minimum term
prescribed lower in degree
under Art. 217
Prision Arresto mayor in 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and
correccional in its maximum 4 months
its medium and period to prision
maximum periods correccional in
its minimum
period
Prision mayor in Prision 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years
its correccional in
minimum and its medium and
medium maximum
period periods
Prision mayor in Prision mayor in 6 years and 1 day to 10 years
its its minimum and
maximum period medium periods
to
reclusion
 temporal in
its minimum
period
Reclusion Prision mayor in 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and
temporal in its maximum 8 months
its medium and period to
maximum reclusion
periods. temporal in its
minimum period
Reclusion Not applicable in the present case since the proper imposable penalty to
temporal in be imposed upon the accused in already reclusion
its maximum perpetua
period to
reclusion
perpetua
Penalty Penalty next Range of minimum term
prescribed lower in degree
under Art. 171
Prision mayor Prision 6 months and 1 day to 6 years
correccional
To illustrate, the count involving the largest amount misappropriated by the accused totaling
₱75,489.76 merited the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, and
a fine of ₱75,489.76. Obviously, the penalty is that prescribed for malversation of public funds, the
more serious offense.
In its consolidated decision of February 17, 2004, the RTC erred in pegging the maximum terms within
the minimum periods of the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
It committed another error by fixing indeterminate sentences on some counts despite the maximum of
the imposable penalties being reclusion perpetua. There is even one completely incorrect indeterminate
sentence. And, as earlier noted, the penalty for falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code was applicable in Criminal Case No. 4635 involving ₱4,869.00 due to its being the higher
penalty.
The Court now tabulates the corrected indeterminate sentences, to wit:
TABLE 3
Amount Indeterminate sentence
misappropriated
Minimum term Maximum term
₱19,775.00 10 years and 1 day of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days
prision mayor of reclusion temporal
₱4,869.00 2 years of prision 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of
correccional prision mayor29
₱13,260.90 10 years and 1 day prision 18 years, 2 months and 21 days
mayor of reclusion temporal
 ₱17,419.00 10 years and 1 day prision 18 years, 2 months and 21 days
mayor of reclusion temporal
₱11,390.00 6 years and 1 day of prision 13 years, 1 month and 11 days of
mayor prision mayor
₱9,736.86 6 years and 1 day of prision 13 years, 1 month and 11 days of
mayor prision mayor
₱39,050.00 - Reclusion perpetua
₱38,878.55 - Reclusion perpetua
₱20,286.88 10 years and 1 day prision 18 years, 2 months and 21 days
mayor of reclusion temporal
₱42,573.97 - Reclusion perpetua
₱40,598.40 - Reclusion perpetua
₱42,140.45 - Reclusion perpetua
₱47,902.60 - Reclusion perpetua
₱52,740.66 - Reclusion perpetua
₱75,489.76 - Reclusion perpetua
₱54,984.47 - Reclusion perpetua
₱45,330.18 - Reclusion perpetua
₱37,842.05 - Reclusion perpetua
One more omission by the CA and the RTC concerned a matter of law. This refers to their failure to
decree in favor of the Government the return of the amounts criminally misappropriated by the
accused. That he was already sentenced to pay the fine in each count was an element of the penalties
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and was not the same thing as finding him civilly liable for
restitution, which the RTC and the CA should have included in the judgment. Indeed, as the Court
emphasized in Bacolod v. People,30 it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties
when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless
there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery,"
explaining the reason for doing so in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section
2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered
from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a
separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to actas we now do lest
the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not
themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the
Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time
a matter of law and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are
properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy
of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be
otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they betrue to the
judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in
their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties,
which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the
wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil
liability ex delictoof the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always
entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.31
In addition, the amounts to be returned to the Government as civil liability of the accused in each count
shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment by the
accused.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 16, 2006 by the Court of
Appeals subject to the modification of the penalties imposed as stated in this decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the dispositive portion of the consolidated decision rendered on February 17, 2004
by the Regional Trial Court is hereby AMENDED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime with which he is charged
in:

1) Criminal Case No. 4634 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 18 years, two months
and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱19,775.00;

2) Criminal Case No. 4635 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
from two years of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one day of
prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱5,000.00;

3) Criminal Case No. 4636 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 18 years, two months
and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱13,260.90;

4) Criminal Case No. 4637 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 18 years, two months
and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱17,419.00;

5) Criminal Case No. 4638and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate

penaltyfrom 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 13 years, one
month and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of
₱11,309.20;

6) Criminal Case No. 4639 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 13 years, one month
and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱9,736.86;
 7) Criminal Case No. 4640 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to
pay a fine of ₱39,050.00;

8) Criminal Case No. 4641 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to
pay a fine of ₱38,878.55;

9) Criminal Case No. 4642 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as m inimum, to 18 years, two months
and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱20,286.88;

10) Criminal Case No. 4643 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to
pay a fine of ₱42,573.97;

11) Criminal Case No. 4644 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to
pay a fine of ₱40,598.40;

12) Criminal Case No. 4645 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to
pay a fine of ₱42,140.45;

13) Criminal Case No. 4646 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to
pay a fine of ₱47 ,902.60;

14) Criminal Case No. 4647 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to
pay a fine of ₱52, 7 40.66;

15) Criminal Case No. 4648 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to
pay a fine of ₱75,489. 76;

16) Criminal Case No. 4649 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to
pay a fine of ₱54,948.47;

17) Criminal Case No. 4650 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to
pay a fine of ₱45,330.18;

18) Criminal Case No. 4651 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to
pay a fine of ₱37,842.05;

In addition, the accused shall pay to the Government the total amount of ₱614,268.73, plus
interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment, by
way of his civil liability.

The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186227 July 20, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Decision1 dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment 2 dated September 14, 2005, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No.
10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) 9165.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report
from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, was
selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was organized,
composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided with
two (2) pieces of ₱100 marked bills to be used in the purchase.
Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money,
proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The two
poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling shabu.
PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a
sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The
poseur-buyers went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has been completed.
Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving the
place.
The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials Richard S.
Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon
also pointed to the barangay officials the marked money, two pieces of ₱100 bill, thrown by the
appellant on the ground.
After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police officers made an
inventory of the items recovered from the appellant which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu which they
marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and
(3) two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso (₱50) bill. Thereafter, a letter-
request was prepared by Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo for the laboratory examination of the two (2)
sachets containing a crystalline substance, ultra-violet examination on the person of the appellant as
well as the two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money. The request was brought by PO1 Pajo
and personally received by Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, Forensic Chemical Officer of the
Regional Crime Laboratory Office XII Butuan City, who immediately conducted the examination. The
laboratory examination revealed that the appellant tested positive for the presence of bright orange
ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the crystalline substance contained in two sachets, separately
marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were positively identified as methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against appellant for
violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, stating the following:
Criminal Case No. 10250
That on or about the evening of October 1, 1003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell zero point zero four one
two (0.0412) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu which is a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW : (Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).3
Criminal Case No. 10251
That on or about the evening of October 1, 2003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess zero point six one
three one (0.6131) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, which is a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).4
Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
In its Omnibus Judgment5 dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 10250 for selling shabu, a dangerous drug, as defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. As provided for in Sec. 98 of R.A.
9165, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death shall
be reclusion perpetua to death. As such, Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan is hereby sentenced to
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 10251, the Court likewise finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for illegally possessing shabu, a dangerous drug, weighing 0.6131 gram as
defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and accused being a minor
at the time of the commission of the offense, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
accordingly sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum of
prision mayor and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
SO ORDERED.6
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City dated September 14,
2005 appealed from finding the accused-appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable
doubt with the crime of Violation of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs
against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.7
Thus, the present appeal.
Appellant states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime
charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
According to appellant, there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poseur-buyer. He
also argues that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not established. Finally, he asserts that an
accused should be presumed innocent and that the burden of proof is on the prosecution.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Appellant insists that the prosecution did not present any evidence that an actual sale took place.
However, based on the testimony of PO1 Randy Pajo, there is no doubt that the buy-bust operation was
successfully conducted, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: Will you explain to this Honorable Court why did you conduct and how did you conduct
your buy-bust operation at the time?
A: We conducted a buy-bust operation because of the report from our civilian assets that Allen
Mantalaba was engaged in drug trade and selling shabu. And after we evaluated this
Information we informed Inspector Dacillo that we will operate this accused for possible
apprehension.
Q: Before you conducted your buy-bust operation, what procedure did you take?
A: We prepared the operational plan for buy-bust against the suspect. We prepared a request for
powder dusting for our marked moneys to be used for the operation.
Q: Did you use marked moneys in this case?
xxxx
Q: Then armed with these marked moneys, what steps did you take next?
A: After briefing of our team, we proceeded immediately to the area.
Q: You mentioned of poseur-buyer, what would the poseur-buyer do?
A: We made an arrangement with the poseur-buyer that during the buying of shabu there should
be a pre-arranged signal of the poseur-buyer to the police officer.
Q: What happened when your poseur-buyer who, armed with this marked moneys,
approached the guy who was selling shabu at that time?
A: The poseur-buyer during that time gave the marked moneys to the suspect.
Q: Where were you when this poseur-buyer gave the moneys to the suspect?
A: We positioned ourselves about 10 meters away from the area of the poseur-buyer and the
suspect.
Q: You mentioned of the pre-arranged signal, what would this be?
A: This is a case-to-case basis, your Honor, in the pre-arrangement signal because in the
pre-arranged signal we used a cap and a towel. (sic) In the case, of this suspect, there was
no towel there was no cap at the time of giving the shabu and the marked moneys to the
suspect and considering also that that was about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. The poseur-
buyer immediately proceeded to us and informed us that the shabu was already given by
the suspect.
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white
[crystalline] substance, we immediately approached the suspect.
Q: Who was with a (sic) suspect when you conducted the buy-bust operation[?] Was he alone or
did he had (sic) any companion at that time?
 A: He was alone.
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this constitutional rights
and we immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did not
immediately searched in. We called the attention of the barangay officials to witness the search
of the suspect.
Q: How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the suspect during the buy-bust operation?
A: We took from the possession of the suspect one big sachet of shabu.
xxxx
Q: What was the result of the searched (sic) for him?
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of 100 peso
bills as marked moneys.8
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof
of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.9 From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the
elements have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified.
The subject dangerous drug, as well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily
presented. The testimony was also clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was
conducted.
To corroborate the testimony of PO2 Pajo, the prosecution presented the testimony of Police
Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, a forensic chemical officer, who confirmed that the plastic
containing white crystalline substance was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride and
that the petitioner was in possession of the marked money used in the buy-bust operation, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: What was the result of your examination or what were your findings on the sachets of
suspected shabu?
A: After the preliminary and confirmatory tests were conducted on the stated specimen, the
result was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
xxxx
Q: What were your findings when you examined the living person of the accused, as well as the
marked money mentioned in this report?
A: According to my report, the findings for the living person of Allen Udtojan Mantalaba is
positive to the test for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet flourescent powder. x x x10
The above only confirms that the buy-bust operation really occurred. Once again, this Court stresses
that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for
apprehending drug peddlers and distributors.11 It is often utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of
trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities. 12 In People v. Roa,13
this Court had the opportunity to expound on the nature and importance of a buy-bust operation, ruling
that:
In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police
authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 86 14 of Republic Act No.
9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close
coordination with the PDEA on all drug-related matters," the provision does not, by so saying, make
PDEA's participation a condition sine qua non for every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just
a form of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 15 of the Rules of the Court, which
police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in
support of the PDEA.16 A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the
PDEA.
Neither is the lack of prior surveillance fatal. The case of People v. Lacbanes17 is quite instructive:
In People v. Ganguso,18 it has been held that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of
an entrapment operation, especially when the buy-bust team members were accompanied to the scene
by their informant. In the instant case, the arresting officers were led to the scene by the poseur-buyer.
Granting that there was no surveillance conducted before the buy-bust operation, this Court held in
People v. Tranca,19 that there is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations.
Flexibility is a trait of good police work. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and
dispense with the need for prior surveillance.20
The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect
because trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify. This
is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.21
In connection therewith, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was also correct in finding that the appellant
is equally guilty of violation of Section 11 of RA 9165, or the illegal possession of dangerous drug. As
an incident to the lawful arrest of the appellant after the consummation of the buy-bust operation, the
arresting officers had the authority to search the person of the appellant. In the said search, the
appellant was caught in possession of 0.6131 grams of shabu. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.22
As a defense, appellant denied that he owns the shabu and the marked money confiscated from him.
However, based on his cross-examination, such denial was not convincing enough to merit reasonable
doubt, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: So it is true now that when these police officers passed you by they recovered from
your possession one sachet of shabu?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And it is true that after you were arrested and when you were searched they also found
another sachet of shabu also in your pocket?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you mentioned in your counter-affidavit marked as Exhibit H for the prosecution that no
 money was taken from you because you have none at that time, is it not?
A: None sir, only the ₱250.00 which Jonald Ybanoso left to me.
Q: This ₱250.00 which Jonald left to you was also confiscated from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were not ₱200 of the ₱250.00 was thrown to the ground during the time you were arrested
by the police?
A: No, sir.
Q: It was taken from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when the policemen brought you to the crime laboratory and had your hands tested for
ultra-violet fluorescent powder, your hands tested positively for the presence of the said
powder?
A: Yes, sir.23
Incidentally, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be
proved with strong and convincing evidence.24
Another contention raised by the appellant is the failure of the prosecution to show the chain of custody
of the recovered dangerous drug. According to him, while it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who
signed the request for laboratory examination, only police officers Pajo and Simon were present in the
buy-bust operation.
Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is
justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team.25 Its non-compliance
will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. 26
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 27 In
this particular case, it is undisputed that police officers Pajo and Simon were members of the buy-bust
operation team. The fact that it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the letter-request for
laboratory examination does not in any way affect the integrity of the items confiscated. All the
requirements for the proper chain of custody had been observed. As testified to by PO2 Pajo regarding
the procedure undertaken after the consummation of the buy-bust operation:
Prosecutor
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white
[crystalline] in substance, we immediately approached the suspect.
xxxx
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect, what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this [constitutional] rights
and immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did not
immediately searched in. We called the attention of the barangay officials to witness the search
of the suspect.
xxxx
Q: Now, before you searched the suspect you requested the presence of the barangay officials.
Now, when these barangay officials were present, what did you do on the suspect?
A: We immediately searched the suspect.
Q: What was the result of the searched for him? (sic)
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of ₱100.00
peso bills as marked moneys.
Q: You said the suspect threw the marked moneys when you searched him, where were the
marked moneys?
A: On the ground.
Q: Who picked these marked moneys?
A: I was the one who picked the marked moneys.
Q: And then after you had picked the marked moneys and after you had the 2 pieces of sachets
of shabu; one during the buy-bust and the other one during the search, what did you do [with]
these 2 pieces of sachets of shabu and the marked moneys?
A: I recorded those items recovered, sir, during the search to the Certificate of Inventory.28
As ruled by this Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the marking of the confiscated item
which, in the present case, was complied with, thus:
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking 29 of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link, thus, it is vital that the seized contraband are immediately marked because succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to
separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time
they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating
switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.30
Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it appropriate to discuss the effect
of his minority in his suspension of sentence. The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-
bust operation took place or when the said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the
time of the promulgation of the RTC's Decision.
It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on
this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend
the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code31 and
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, 32 the laws that
were applicable at the time of the promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for
violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under
Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application, thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age
at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court
shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
xxxx
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the
age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted
and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia33 that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides
that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the
same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. The
provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the objective of
the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if
the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition
or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for
execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until
the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the
provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already
moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was
under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed
his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant
was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the
sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same
law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as
opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.34
Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No.
9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:35
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities. - A
child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve
his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD.
In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, the
RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as mandated in Section 9836 of the same law. A
violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death; however, in Section
98, it is provided that, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life
imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this
means that the penalty can now be graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties
provided for in the Revised Penal Code. The said principle was enunciated by this Court in People v.
Simon,37 thus:
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for offenses
under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code
cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals
that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties for
the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in
the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did not
provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to
consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the
penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the
graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary application to special laws, since
the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by
Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided
in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a
prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished
under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical
nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of
penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in
its technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit
otherwise.
xxxx
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the degree of the
penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in
Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the accused.
However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the
presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the
penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should
not apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of
section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been
contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner not
specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy
therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be
imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties
which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex
penalty in this case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, prision correccional,
prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto menor, destierro and
arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which must
each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in
the scale.1avvphi1
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the
periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such
graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for
this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be
considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be
prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est
ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue to
have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which
impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.38
Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority39 can now be appreciated in fixing
the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the
proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium
period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating
circumstance.40 The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been
originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a
divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment dated September 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding
appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should
be imposed on appellant's conviction of violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, is six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
G.R. No. 170192
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
vs.
MARISSA BAYKER, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An illegal recruiter can be liable for the crimes of illegal recruitment committed in large scale and
estafa without risk of being put in double jeopardy, provided that the accused has been so charged
under separate informations.
The Case
The accused-appellant assails the decision promulgated on July 28, 2005, 1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed her conviction for illegal recruitment and estafa, as follows:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED and the Joint Decision dated August 27,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 138 of Makati City is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Case No. 01-1780 for Illegal Recruitment, the fine imposed is hereby
REDUCED to Pl00,000.00 and in Criminal Case No. 01-1781 for Estafa, appellant is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as
minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.2
Antecedents
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Makati the
following amended informations against the accused-appellant and her two co-accused, namely: Nida
Bermudez and Lorenz Langreo, alleging thusly:
Criminal Case No. 01-1780
Illegal Recruitment
That in or about during the month of January, 2001 up to the 23 rd day of July, 2001, in the City of
Makati, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, and who have no
authority to recruit workers for overseas employment, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously promise and recruit complainants, Basilio T. Miparanum, Virgilio T. Caniazares and
Reynaldo E. Dahab, overseas job abroad and in consideration of said promise, said complainants paid
and delivered to accused the amount of P52,000.00, P10,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively as
processing fees of their papers, but on the promise[d] dates of departure, accused failed to send the
complainants abroad and despite demands to reimburse or return the amount of P52,000.00, P10,000.00
and P5,000.00 which complainants paid as processing fees, accused did then and there refuse and fail
to reimburse or return to complainants the aforesaid amounts of P52,000.00, P10,000.00 and
P5,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 01-1781
Estafa
That on or about the 9th day of April, 2001 up to July 23, 2001, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, by means of false pretense and
fraudulent misrepresentations, defrauded Basilio T. Miparanum by previous of [sic] simultaneous act,
that is; By pretending to possess power, influence, qualification authority, transactions or capacity to
recruit and deploy said Basilio T. Miparanum for overseas job, which representations or manifestations
the accused knew to be false and fraudulent as they have no authorities to recruit from the POEA and
they have no principal employer and was merely intended to convince Basilio T. Miparanum to part his
money in the amount of P52,000.00, in consideration thereof, as in fact complainant Basilio T.
Miparanum paid the said amount to the accused relying on such false manifestation and/or
representations to the damage and prejudice of complainant Basilio T. Miparanum in the aforesaid
amount of P52,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Only the accused-appellant and Langreo were arrested because Bermudez, who eluded arrest, continues
to remain at large. However, the trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant because of the lack
of notification of subsequent proceedings to Langreo.5
The State presented four witnesses, namely: Virgilio Caniazares, Reynaldo Dahab, Basilio Miparanum
and PO3 Raul Bolido.
Caniazares testified that he and Dahab had met the accused-appellant at the house of a friend in Makati
City in January 2001, and she had then represented herself to be recruiting workers for overseas
employment, probably as hotel porters in Canada;6 that on January 27, 2001, he had gone to her
residence in Pembo, Makati City to pay P4,000.00 for his medical examination, and she had then
accompanied him to the Medical Center in Ermita, Manila for that purpose;7 that on March 30, 2001,
she had gone to his house to inform him that he would be deployed as a seaman instead but that he had
to pay P6,000.00 more; that he had paid the P6,000.00 to her, for which she had issued a receipt; that
two weeks thereafter, she had called him about his deployment on April 21, 2001; that on the promised
date, he had gone to her office at GNB Marketing in Makati but no one was around; that he had then
proceeded to her house, and she had then told him that his seaman's application would not push
through; that the two of them had then proceeded to her office bringing all his certificates of
employment, and that it was there that she had introduced him to her manager, the accused Bermudez,
who promised his deployment in Hongkong within two weeks; that because he had not been deployed
as promised, he had gone to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), where he
had learned that the accused, Bermudez and Langreo, had not been issued the license to recruit and
place people overseas; and that he had then decided to charge them all with illegal recruitment and
estafa in the Philippine National Police Crime Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) in
Camp Crame, Quezon City.8
Dahab declared that on January 27, 2001, he had met the accused-appellant at the Guadalupe Branch of
Jollibee to pay P2,500.00 for his medical examination; that a week later, he had undergone the three-
day training in Mandaluyong City, for which he paid P2,500.00; that she had then demanded from him
the placement fee of P25,000.00; and that after he had not been able to raise the amount, he never saw
her again; and that Caniazares soon called him to urge that he should complain against the accused in
the PNP-CIDG.9
According to Miparanum, he met the accused-appellant through Caniazares, who was his cousin.
Caniazares arrived at his house with her in tow in order to borrow money for his placement fee. On that
occasion, she told Miparanum that she could help him find work abroad and even leave ahead of
Caniazares if he had the money. Convinced, Miparanum went to her residence on April 11, 2001 to
apply as a seaman. On April 17, 2001, he delivered to her P6,000.00 for his seaman's book. She again
asked an additional P6,000.00 for the seaman's book, and P40,000.00 as the placement fee. On April
20, 2001, Miparanum went to her office where he met Bermudez. There, he handed the P46,000.00 to
the accused-appellant but it was Bermudez who issued the corresponding receipt. The accused-
appellant and Bermudez told him to wait for his deployment to Hongkong as an ordinary seaman
within two weeks. Miparanum followed up on his application after two weeks, but was instead made to
undergo training, and he paid P2,700.00 for his ce1iificate. Sensing that he was being defrauded,
Miparanum later proceeded to file his complaint at the PNP-CIDG.10
PO3 Raul Bo lido of the PNP-CIDG recalled that in July, 2001, the complainants went to Camp Crame
to file their complaints against the accused-appellant, Bermudez and Langreo. PO3 Bolido, along with
SPO4 Pedro Velasco and Team Leader Police Inspector Romualdo Iringan, conducted an entrapment
operation against the accused. They prepared 10 marked Pl00 bills dusted with ultraviolet powder and
gave the same to Miparanum. On July 23, 2001, the entrapment team proceeded with Miparanum to
Jollibee-Guadalupe where Miparanum was to meet the accused-appellant. The team immediately
arrested her upon her receiving the marked bills. The PNP Crime Laboratory conducted its examination
for traces of ultraviolet powder on her person, and the results of the examination were positive for the
presence of ultraviolet powder. 11
In contrast, the accused-appellant pointed to Langreo and Bermudez who had operated GNB Marketing
Agency. She claimed to have met Miparanum at Jollibee-Guadalupe only for the purpose of bringing
him to Bermudez. She refused to receive the money being handed to her by Miparanum because she
did not demand for it, but the four policemen suddenly arrested her, and one of them rubbed his arm
against her forearm. 12
The accused-appellant presented two witnesses, namely: Adelaida Castel and Edith dela Cruz. Castel
testified that she had known the accused-appellant for almost five years; that being then present during
the meeting between the accused-appellant and Caniazares she did not hear the accused-appellant
representing herself as a legitimate recruiter to the latter; that she had been present when Miparanum
delivered the P40,000.00 to Bermudez; and that prior to the entrapment of the accused-appellant,
Caniazares had called their house three times to ask the accused-appellant to accompany him to the
house of Bermudez. 13 On her part, dela Cruz attested that she had known the accused-appellant since
March, 2001 because they had worked together in a handicraft factory; that she did not know if the
accused-appellant had been a recruiter; that it was Langreo who had been the recruiter because he had
recruited her own daughter; and that she did not know anything about the transactions between the
accused-appellant and the complaining witnesses. 14
Subsequently, Dahab recanted his testimony, and stated that he had only requested assistance from the
accused-appellant regarding his medical examination. He insisted that he had voluntarily paid
P5,000.00 to her, and she had then paid the amount to the Medical Center for his medical examination.
15
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2002, the RTC rendered its ruling, disposing:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows –
a) In Criminal Case No. 01-1780 the Court finds the evidence of the Prosecution sufficient to
establish the guilt of Marissa Bayker beyond reasonable doubt for having violated Section 6(m)
 of Republic Act No. 8042 (The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) and
applying Section 7 of the same Act, which directs imposition of the maximum penalty if the
offender is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority, she is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos. She is further ordered to indemnify
Virgilio Caniazares of P6,000.00, Reynaldo Dahab P2,500.00 and Basilio Miparanum of
P12,000.00.
b) In Criminal Case No. 01-1781, the Court finds the evidence of the Prosecution sufficient to
establish the guilt of Marissa Bayker beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of estafa defined
and penalized under Article 315 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and she is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11)
DAYS of prision correccional to NINE (9)YEARS of prision mayor. She is further ordered to
pay Basilio Miparanum P40,000.00.
No pronouncement as to costs.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. 16
Judgment of the CA
On July 28, 2005, the CA affirmed the convictions of the accused-appellant by the RTC, 17 viz.:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED and the Joint decision dated august 27,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 138 of Makati City is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Case No. 01-1780 for Illegal Recruitment, the fine imposed is hereby
REDUCED to Pl00,000.00 and in Criminal Case No. 01-1781 for Estafa, appellant is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as
minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
The CA opined that the Prosecution had established the elements of illegal recruitment in large scale by
proving that the accused-appellant lacked the authority or license to engage in recruitment and
placement, 18 and had promised the complainants employment abroad and had then received money
from them; 19 and that the Prosecution had also established the estafa by showing that she had
misrepresented to Miparanum about her power and authority to deploy him for overseas employment,
thereby inducing him to part with his money.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors to the CA, to wit:
I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE
PATENT WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION'S DEFENSE

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING EXCULPATORY WEIGHT TO THE

DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
 III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
RETRACTIONS MADE BY COMPLAINANT REYNALDO DAHAB20

The accused-appellant insists on her innocence, and points to Langreo and Bermudez as the persons
who had directly engaged in illegal recruitment. She argues that her participation had been limited to
signing the receipts as a witness, and to receiving payments for the medical examinations;21 that the
CA and the RTC had disregarded the recantation by Dahab; and that had the evidence been limited to
the testimonies of Caniazares and Miparanum, she would have only been liable for simple illegal
recruitment.22
Did the CA correctly affirm the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crimes of illegal recruitment
in large scale and estafa?
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the assailed judgment of the CA.
I
Illegal Recruitment Committed in Large Scale
Illegal recruitment is committed by a person who: (a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined under
Article l 3(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 and Article 38 of the Labor Code;
and (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers.23 It is committed in large scale when it is committed against three or more persons
individually or as a group.24
The CA properly affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant by the RTC for illegal recruitment
committed in large scale because she had committed acts of recruitment against at least three persons
(namely: Canizares, Dahab, and Miparanum) despite her not having been duly licensed or authorized
by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for that purpose.
The accused-appellant's insistence on her very limited participation in the recruitment of the
complainants did not advance or help her cause any because the State established her having personally
promised foreign employment either as hotel porters or seafarers to the complainants despite her having
no license or authority to recruit from the POEA. The records made it clear enough that her
participation was anything but limited, for she herself had accompanied them to their respective
medical examinations at their own expense. In addition, she herself brought them to GNB Marketing
and introduced them to her co-accused. In this regard, the CA pointedly observed:
The evidence established that without any license or authority to do so, appellant promised private
complainants overseas employment in regard to which she required them to undergo medical
examination and training and collected fees or payments from them, while repeatedly assuring that they
would be deployed abroad. On appellant's contention that it was Nida Bermudez and Lorenz Langreo
who received money from the complainants, even assuming arguendo that appellant never received any
payment from the complainants, actual receipt of a fee is not an essential element of the crime of Illegal
Recruitment, but is only one of the modes for the commission thereof. Besides, all the private
complainants positively identified appellant as the person who recruited them and exacted money from
them. Appellant's bare denials and self-serving assertions cannot prevail over the positive testimonies
of the complainants who had no ill motive to testify falsely against her.25
The accused-appellant's denial of her participation in the illegal recruitment activities of Bermudez and
Langreo did not gain traction from her charging her co-accused with the sole responsibility for the
illegal recruitment of the complainants.1âwphi1 Based on the testimonial narration of the complainants
regarding their recruitment, she was unqualifiedly depicted as having the primary and instrumental role
in recruiting them for overseas placement from the inception. Also, her claim of having been only
casually associated with GNB Marketing did not preclude her criminal liability for the crimes charged
and proved. Even the mere employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment could
be held liable, along with the employer, as a principal in illegal recruitment once it was shown that he
had actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment.26 This is because recruitment and
placement include any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, as well as referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.
The accused-appellant protests that the RTC and the CA unreasonably disregarded Dahab' s
recantation; and that the recantation would render her liable only for simple illegal recruitment instead
of illegal recruitment committed in large scale.
The protest of the accused-appellant is untenable.
Dahab's supposed recantation to the effect that he had only sought the assistance of the accused-
appellant for his medical examination by no means weakened or diminished the Prosecution's case
against her. Its being made after he had lodged his complaint against her with the PNP-CIDG (in which
he supplied the details of his transactions with her) and after he had testified against her in court
directly incriminating her rendered it immediately suspect. It should not be more weighty than his first
testimony against her which that was replete with details. Its being the later testimony of the Dahab did
not necessarily cancel his first testimony on account of the possibility of its being obtained by coercion,
intimidation, fraud, or other means to distmi or bend the truth.
Recantation by a witness is nothing new, for it is a frequent occurrence in criminal proceedings. As a
general rule, it is not well regarded by the courts due to its nature as the mere afte1ihought of the
witness. To be given any value or weight, it should still be subjected to the same tests for credibility in
addition to its being subject of the rule that it be received with caution. 27 The criminal proceedings in
which sworn testimony has been given by the recanting witness would be rendered a mockery, and put
at the mercy of the unscrupulous witness if such testimony could be easily negated by the witness's
subsequent inconsistent declaration. The result is to leave without value not only the sanctity of the
oath taken but also the solemn rituals and safeguards of the judicial trial. If only for emphasis, we
reiterate that it is "a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply
because the witness who has given it later on changed his mind for one reason or another, for such a
rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses. "28
II
Estafa
The conviction of the accused-appellant for illegal recruitment committed in large scale did not
preclude her personal liability for estafa under Article 3l5(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code on the
ground of subjecting her to double jeopardy. The elements of estafa as charged are, namely: (1) the
accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party, or
a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.29 In contrast, the crime of
illegal recruitment committed in large scale, as indicated earlier, requires different elements. Double
jeopardy could not result from prosecuting and convicting the accused-appellant for both crimes
considering that they were entirely distinct from each other not only from their being punished under
different statutes but also from their elements being different.
The active representation by the accused-appellant of having the capacity to deploy Miparanum abroad
despite not having the authority or license to do so from the POEA constituted deceit as the first
element of estafa. Her representation induced the victim to part with his money, resulting in damage
that is the second element of the estafa. Considering that the damage resulted from the deceit, the CA's
affirmance of her guilt for estafa as charged was in order.
III
Penalties
The penalty for illegal recruitment committed in large scale, pursuant to Section 7(b)30 of Republic Act
No. 8042 (Migrant Workers' Act), is life imprisonment and a fine of not less than P500,000.00 nor more
than Pl,000,000.00. In light of the provision of the law, the CA patently erred in reducing the fine to
P100,000.00. Hence, we hereby increase the fine to P500,000.00.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period,
if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding
one year for each additional l0,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
xxxx
Inasmuch as the prescribed penalty is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in
its minimum period, plus one year for each additional Pl0,000.00 over P22,000.00, provided that the
total penalty shall not exceed 20 years, the penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant should
depend on the amount defrauded. We note that the RTC took into consideration only the sum of
P40,000.00, and the CA concurred with the RTC thereon. Yet, the records reveal that Miparanum paid
to the accused-appellant and her co-accused not only P40,000.00 but the aggregate sum of P54,700.00
(i.e., the P6,000.00 for the seaman's book, the additional P6,000.00 for the seaman's book, the
P40,000.00 for placement fee, and P2,700 for his training certificate). The amount of P54, 700.00 is the
determinant of the penalty to be imposed.
Pursuant to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed for estafa in which the
amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00 is prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period (i.e., four years, two months and one day to
eight years); if the amount of the fraud exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty thus prescribed shall be
imposed in its maximum period, and one year shall be added for each additional Pl0,000.00 provided
the total penalty imposed shall not exceed 20 years. Considering that the penalty does not consist of
three periods, the prescribed penalty is divided into three equal portions, and each portion shall form a
period,31 with the maximum period being then imposed.32 However, the floor of the maximum period
– six years, eight months and 21 days - is fixed in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, or of
any showing of the greater extent of the evil produced by the crime,33 to which is then added the
incremental penalty of one year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, or three years in all. 34
The resulting total penalty is nine years, eight months and 21 days of prision mayor, which shall be the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence.
The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is taken from prision correccional in its minimum period
to prision correccional in its medium period (i.e., six months and one day to four years and two
months), the penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. We note
that the CA correctly fixed the minimum of the indeterminate sentence at four years and two months of
prision correccional.
In view of the foregoing, the indeterminate sentence for the accused-appellant is from four years and
two months of prision correccional, as the minimum, to nine years, eight months and 21 days of
prision mayor.
IV
Civil Liabilities
The civil liabilities as decreed by the RTC and upheld by the CA are also corrected to reflect the actual
aggregate amount to be restituted to Miparanum at P54,700.00. In addition, the accused-appellant shall
be obliged to pay interest of 6% per annum on the respective sums due to each of the complainants, to
be reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment considering that the amount to be
restituted became determinate only through this adjudication.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 28, 2005 subject to the
following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
1. In Criminal Case No. 01-1780, for illegal recruitment committed in large scale, the penalty of
life imprisonment and fine of P500,000.00 is imposed on the accused-appellant;
2. In Criminal Case No. 01-1781, for estafa, the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four years and two months of prision correccional, as the minimum, to
nine years, eight months and 21 days of prision mayor, as the maximum;
3. The accused-appellant shall indemnify complainants Virigilio Caniazares, Reynaldo Dahab
and Basilio Miparanum in the respective amounts of P6,000.00, P2,500.00, and P54,700.00 plus
interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision until full payment; and
4. The accused-appellant shall pay the costs of suit.
G.R. No. 108747 April 6, 1995
PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It
essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit
his liability and save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law
expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail
of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused — to wager
on the result of his appeal — that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the
moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies
for probation as an "escape hatch" thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of
his conviction. Consequently, probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by
convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, who manifest spontaneity, contrition
and remorse.
As conceptualized, is petitioner entitled to probation within the purview of P.D. 968, as
amended by P.D. 1257 and P.D. 1990?
Petitioner's woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans.
Company he failed to control his outburst and blurted —
You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic), bullshit. Puro
kayo walang utak . . . . Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn
you all.
Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five
(5) separate Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each Information charging
him with gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61,
found petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against
him, i.e., Crim. Cases Nos. 105206, 105207, 105209 and 105210, sentenced him to a prison
term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional "in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleqed in the
information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian,
Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.1 He was however acquitted in Crim.
Case No. 105208 for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and
testify.
Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence, petitioner
elevated his case to the Regional Trial Court.
On 5 August 1991 the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 59, affirmed his conviction but
appreciated in his favor a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or obfuscation. Thus
—
. . . (he) was angry and shouting when he uttered the defamatory words
complained of . . . . he must have been angry and worried "about some missing
documents . . . as well as the letter of the Department of Tourism advising
ASPAC about its delinquent tax of P1.2 million . . . . " the said defamatory words
must have been uttered in the heat of anger which is a mitigating circumstance
analogous to passion or obfuscation.2
Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8)
MONTHS imprisonment . . . . "3 After he failed to interpose an appeal therefrom the
decision.of the RTC became final. The case was then set for execution of judgment by the
MeTC which, as a consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. But·before he could be arrested
petitioner filed an application for probation which the MeTC denied "in the light of the ruling of
the Supreme Court in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No, 84850, 29 June 1989, 174
SCRA 566 . . . ."4
Forthwith he went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which on 2 July 1992 dismissed his
petition on the following grounds —
Initially, the Court notes that the petitioner has failed to comply with the
provisions of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 of September 4, 1991. Violation
of the circular is sufficient cause for dismissal of the petition.
Secondly, the petitioner does not allege anywhere in the petition that he had
asked the respondent court to reconsider its above order; in fact, he had failed
to give the court an.opportunity to correct itself if it had, in fact, committed any
 error on the matter. He is, however, required to move for reconsideration of the
questioned order before filing a petition for certiorari (Sy It v. Tiangco, 4 SCRA
436). This failure is fatal to his cause. It is a ground for dismissal of his petition
(Santos v. Vda. de Cerdenola, 5 SCRA 823; Acquiao v. Estenso, 14 SCRA 18;
Del Pilar Transit, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 31-SCRA 372).
Thirdly, it is obvious that respondent court did not commit any capricious,
arbitrary, despotic or whimsical exercise of power in denying the petitioner's
application for probation . . . .
Fourthly, the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time . . . .
Fifthly, the Court notes that Section 4 of PD 968 allows the trial court to grant probation after
conviction, upon an application by the defendant within the period of appeal, upon terms and
conditions and period appropriate to each case, but expressly rules out probation where an
appeal has been taken . . . . 5
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
In the present recourse, petitioner squirms out of each ground and seeks this Court's
compassion in dispensing with the minor technicalities which may militate against his petition
as he now argues before us that he has not yet lost his right to avail of probation
notwithstanding his appeal from the MeTC to the RTC since "[t]he reason for his appeal was
precisely to enable him to avail himself of the benefits of the Probation Law because the
original Decision of the (Metropolitan) Trial Court was such that he would not then be entitled
to probation." 6 He contends that "he appealed from the judgment of the trial court precisely
for the purpose of reducing the penalties imposed upon him by the said court to enable him to
qualify for probation." 7
The central issue therefore is whether petitioneris still qualified to avail of probation even after
appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the
duration of the penalties imposed.
Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.
First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. 8 Its benefits cannot extend to those not
expressly included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and
clemency or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted by the court to a
seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty
imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted. 9 It is a special prerogative
granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly,
the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be exercised
primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused.10 The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its
government of any of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the
legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the
law who is not clearly within them.
Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates that "no application
for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from
the judgment of conviction," nor Llamado v. Court of Appeals 11 which interprets the quoted
provision, offers any ambiguity or qualification. As such, the application of the law should not
be subjected to any to suit the case of petitioner. While the proposition that an appeal should
not bar the accused from applying for probation if the appealis solely to reduce the penalty to
within the probationable limit may be equitable, we are not yet prepared to accept this
interpretation under existing law and jurisprudence. Accordingly, we quote Mr. Justice
Feliciano speaking for the Court en banc in Llamado v. Court of Appeals—
. . . we note at the outset that Probation Law is not a penal statute. We,
however, understand petitioner's argument to be really that any statutory
language that appears to favor the accused in acriminal case should be given.a
"liberal interpretation." Courts . . . have no authority to invoke "liberal
interpretation" or "the spirit of the law" where the words of the statute
themselves, and·as illuminated by the history of that statute, leave no room for
doubt or interpretation. We do not believe that "the spirit of·the law" may
legitimately be invoked to set at naught words which have a clear and definite
meaning imparted to them by our procedural law. The "true legislative intent"
must obviously be given effect by judges and all others who are charged with
the application and implementation of a statute. It is absolutely essential to bear
in mind, however, that the spirit of the law and the intent that is to be given effect
are derived from the words actually used by the law-maker, and not from some
external, mystical or metajuridical source independent of and transcending the
words of the legislature.
The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict interpretation" rather
than a "liberal" one to Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 as amended by
P.D. No. 1990. "Strict" and "liberal" are adjectives which too frequently impede a
disciplined and principled search for the meaning which the law-making authority
projected when it promulgated the language which we must apply. That meaning
is clearly visible in the text of Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as the nose
on a man's face. The Courtis simply·reading Section 4 as it is in fact written.
There is no need for the involved process of construction that petitioner invites
us to engage in, a process made necessary only because petitioner rejects the
conclusion or meaning which shines through the words of the statute. The first
duty of the judge is to take and apply a statute as he finds it, not as he would
like·it to be. Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco v. Court of First Instance warned,
confusion and uncertainty will surely follow, making, we might add, stability and
continuity in the law much more difficult to achieve:
. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words
as to give them the color of a particular judicial theory are not only
unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has caused so
much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the
public to understand and know what the law is with respect to a
given matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted
interference by judicial tribunals with the English language as
found in statutes and contracts, cutting the words here and
inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of what the
legislature ought to have done or what parties should have agreed
upon, giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily have
cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers
themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning of
a given statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court
for its interpretation and construction.
 The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as our people's
grasp of English is steadily attenuated. 12
Therefore, that an appeal should not·bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal
is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express mandate of
Sec, 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which opens with a negativeclause, "no application
for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from
the judgment of conviction." In Bersabal v. Salvador, 13 we said —
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory
construction. negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory
while those in the affirmative are merely directory. . . . the use of the term "shall"
further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative,
operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.
And where the law does not distinguish the courts should not distinguish; where the law does
not make exception the court should not except.
Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable.
Hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the probationable
period. Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty of several offenses in
one decision are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the multiple prison terms
imposed against an applicant should not be determinative of his eligibility for, nay his
disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if
none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law,i.e., not more than six (6)
years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified. The
number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are
within the probationable period. For, Sec. 9, par. (a), P.D. 968, as amended, uses the word
maximum not total when it says that "[t]he benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to
those . . . . sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years."
Evidently, the law does not intend to sum up the penalties imposed but to take each penalty
separately and distinctly with the others. Consequently, even if petitioner was supposed to
have served his prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8)
months of prision correccional sixteen (16) times as he was sentenced to serve the prison
term for "each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s),"
and in each of the four (4) informations, he was charged with.having defamed the four (4)
private complainants on four (4) different, separate days, he was still·eligible for probation, as
each prison term imposed on petitioner was probationable.
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is
based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to
society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because
of the gravity and serious consequences of the offense they might further commit. 14 The
Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been convicted of grave
felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of The Revised Penal Code, 15 and not
necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who
are deemed to be less perverse. Hence, the basis of the disqualification is principally the
gravity of the offense committed and the concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those
sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are not generally considered
callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of probation.
To demonstrate the point, let ustake for instance one who is convicted in a single decision of,
say, thirteen (13) counts of grave oral defamation (for having defamed thirteen [13] individuals
in one outburst) and sentenced to a total prison term of thirteen (13) years, and another who
has been found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to six (6) years and one (l) day of prision
mayor minimum as minimum to twelve (l2) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
minimum as maximuin. Obviously, the latter offender is more perverse and is disqualified from
availing of probation.
Petitioner thus proceeds on an erroneous assumption that under the MeTC Decision he could
not have availed of the benefits of probation. Since he could have, although he did not, his
appeal now precludes him from applying for probation.
And, even if we go along with the premise of petitioner, however erroneous it may be, that the
penalties imposed against him should be summed up, still he would not have qualified under
the Decision rendered by the RTC since if the "STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
imprisonment" imposed by the RTC is multiplied sixteen (16) times, the total imposable
penalty would be ten (10) years and eight (8) months, which is still way beyond the limit of not
more than six (6) years provided for in the Probation Law, as amended. To illustrate: 8 months
multiplied by 16 cases = 128 months; 128 months divided by 12 months (in a year) = 10 years
and 8 months, hence, following his argument, petitioner cannot still be eligible for probation as
the total of his penalties exceeds six (6) years.
The assertion that the Decision of the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times since there
are only four (4) Informations thereby allowing petitioner to qualify for probation, instead of
sixteen (16) times, is quite difficult to understand. The penalties imposed by the MeTC cannot
be any clearer — "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of
prision correccional, in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the
information(s). "Hence, petitioner should suffer the imposed penalties sixteen (16) times. On
the other hand, the RTC affirmed, the judgment of conviction and merely reduced the duration
of each penalty imposed by the MeTC "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8)
MONTHS imprisonment" on account of a mitigating circumstance for each case, count or
incident of grave oral defamation·There is no valid reason therefore why the penalties
imposed by the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times, and not sixteen (16) times,
considering that the RTC merely affirmed the MeTC as regards the culpability of petitioner in
each of the sixteen (16) cases and reducing only the duration of the penalties imposed
therein. Thus —
Premises considered, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is
AFFIRMED with modification, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt in each of the above entitled cases and appreciating
in his favor the mitigating circumstance which is analogous to passion or
obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said accused in each case to a
straight penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law; and to pay the costs. 16
Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted at that the accused was acquitted or
absolved in any of the four (4) counts under each of the four (4) Informatfons, or that any part
of thejudgment of conviction was reversed, or that any of the cases, counts or incidents was
dismissed. Otherwise, we will have to account for the twelve (12) other penalties imposed by
the MeTC. Can we? What is clear is that the judgment of conviction rendered by the was
affirmed with the sole modification on the duration of the penalties.
In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken
separately as the totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should have immediately
filed an application for probation as he was already qualified after being convicted by the
MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of
the court and admit his liability. Consequently, in appealing the Decision of the MeTC to the
RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation. For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation
mutually exclusive remedies. 17
Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the penalties imposed by
the MeTC, but to assert his innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is that petitioner appealed
his conviction to the RTC not for the sole purpose of reducing his penalties to make him
eligible for probation — since he was already qualified under the MeTC Decision — but rather
to insist on his innocence. The appeal record is wanting of any other purpose. Thus, in his
Memorandum before the RTC, he raised only three (3) statements of error purportedly
committed by the MeTC all aimed at his acquittal: (a) in finding that the guilt of the accused
has been established because of his positive identification by the witness for the prosecution;
(b) in giving full faith and credence to the bare statements of the private complainants despite
the absence of corroborating testimonies; and, (c)in not acquitting him in all the cases," 18
Consequently, petitioner insisted that the trial court committed an error in relying on his
positive identification considering that private complainants could not have missed identifying
him who was their President and General Manager with whom they worked for a good
number of years. Petitioner further argued that although the alleged defamatory words were
uttered in the presence of other persons, mostly private complainants, co-employees and
clients, not one of them was presented as a witness. Hence, according to petitioner, the trial
court could not have convicted him on the basis of the uncorroborative testimony of private
complainants. 19
Certainly, the protestations of petitioner connote profession of guiltlessness, if not complete
innocence, and do not simply put in issue the propriety of the penalties imposed. For sure,
the accused never manifested that he was appealing only for the purpose of correcting a
wrong penalty — to reduce it to within the probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an
appeal, more so after asserting his innocence therein, petitioner should be precluded from
seeking probation. By perfecting his appeal, petitioner ipso facto relinquished his alternative
remedy of availing of the Probation Law the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation
or opportunism on the part of an accused who although already eligible does not at once
apply for probation, but doing so only after failing in his appeal.
The fact that petitioner did not elevate the affirmance of his conviction by the RTC to the Court
of Appeals does not necessarily mean that his appeal to the RTC was solely to reduce his
penalties. Conversely, he was afraid that the Court of Appeals would increase his penalties,
which could be worse for him. Besides, the RTC Decision had already become final and
executory because of the negligence, according to him, of his former counsel who failed to
seek possible remedies within the period allowed by law.
Perhaps it should be mentioned that at the outset petitioner, in accordance with Sec 3, par.
(e), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, 20 should have moved to quash as each of the four (4)
Informations filed against him charged four (4) separate crimes of grave oral defamation,
committed on four (4) separate days. His failure to do so however may now be deemed a
waiver under Sec. 8 of the same Rule 21 and he can be validly convicted, as in the instant
case, of as many crimes charged in the Information.
Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law. This is
vital way beyond the period allowed by law and crucial. From the records it is clear that the
application for probation was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had been
issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his) receipt of the Decision" 22 of the RTC. This is
a significant fact which militates against the instant petition. We quote with affirmance the
well-written, albeit assailed, ponencia of now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals
Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr., on the specific issue —
. . . the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time. The law in
point, Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended, provides thus:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant
within the period for perfecting an appeal. . . . place the defendant
on probation . . . .
Going to the extreme, and assuming that an application for probation from one
who had appealed the trial court's judgment is allowed by law, the petitioner's
plea for probation was filed out of time. In the petition is a clear statement that
the petitioner was up for execution of judgment before he filed his application for
probation. P.D. No. 968 says that the application for probation must be filed
"within the period for perfecting an appeal;" but in this case, such period for
appeal had passed, meaning to say that the Regional Trial Court's decision had
attained finality, and no appeal therefrom was possible under the law. Even
granting that an appeal from the appellate court's judgment is contemplated by
P.D. 968, in addition to the judgment rendered by the trial court, that appellate
judgment had become final and was, in fact, up for actual execution before the
application for probation was attempted by the petitioner. The petitioner did not
file his application for probation before the finality of the said judgment;
therefore, the petitioner's attempt at probation was filed too late.
Our minds cannot simply rest easy on. the proposition that an application for probation may
yet be granted even if it was filed only after judgment has become final, the conviction already
set for execution and a warrant of arrest issued for service of sentence.
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which
necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the
application for probation with the trial court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension. The
law, simply, does not allow probation after an appeal has been perfected.
Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually
exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC although the
imposed penalties were already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his
innocence and did not even raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed on him,
and finally, he filed an application for probation outside the period for perfecting an appeal
granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant petition for review should be as it
is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin and Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 168546 July 23, 2008
MICHAEL PADUA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision 1 dated April 19, 2005 and Resolution2 dated June 14,
2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 which had respectively dismissed Michael
Padua’s petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration. Padua’s petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11, 2004 3 and July 28, 20044 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his petition for probation.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged before the RTC,
Branch 168, Pasig City of violating Section 5,5 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,6 otherwise known
as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," for selling dangerous drugs. 7 The Information
reads:
The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez
a.k.a. "Allan" and Michael Padua y Tordel a.k.a. "Mike", with the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art.
II, Republic Act No. 9165 in relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i), committed as follows:
On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17) years old,
conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not
being lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) folded
newsprint containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was found positive to the tests
for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
Contrary to law.8
When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not
guilty.9
During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Padua’s counsel manifested that his
client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits
granted to first-time offenders under Section 70 10 of Rep. Act No. 9165. The prosecutor interposed no
objection.11 Thus, the RTC on the same date issued an Order 12 stating that the former plea of Padua of
not guilty was considered withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty. Hence, in a
Decision13 dated February 6, 2004, the RTC found Padua guilty of the crime charged:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel guilty of [v]iolation of Sec. 5
Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and therefore,
sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).
No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the] accused fail to pay the fine
pursuant to Art. 39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.14
Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation 15 dated February 10, 2004 alleging that he is a minor
and a first-time offender who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No.
96816 (P.D. No. 968), otherwise known as "The Probation Law of 1976" and Section 70 of Rep. Act
No. 9165. He further alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
under the said laws.
The RTC in an Order17 dated February 10, 2004 directed the Probation Officer of Pasig City to conduct
a Post-Sentence Investigation and submit a report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of
the order. The City Prosecutor was also directed to submit his comment on the said petition within five
days from receipt of the order.
On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana submitted a Post-Sentence
Investigation Report to the RTC recommending that Padua be placed on probation.18
However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order
denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that under Section 24 19 of Rep. Act No. 9165, any
person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law. The
court ruled thus:
Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on minor Michael Padua y
Tordel prepared by Senior Parole and Probation Officer Teodoro Villaverde and submitted by the Chief
of the Pasig City Parole and Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana.
In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that minor Michael Padua y
Tordel be placed on probation, anchoring his recommendation on Articles 189 and 192 of P.D. 603,
otherwise known as the Child and Welfare Code, as amended, which deal with the suspension of
sentence and commitment of youthful offender. Such articles, therefore, do not find application in this
case, the matter before the Court being an application for probation by minor Michael Padua y Tordel
and not the suspension of his sentence.
On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which deals with the Program for
Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents. Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII of R.A.
9165 specifically refer to violations of either Section 15 or Section 11. Nowhere in Article VIII was
[v]iolation of Section 5 ever mentioned.
More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section 70 thereof deals with
Probation or Community Service for First- Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment, the Court is
of the view and so holds that minor Michael Padua y Tordel who was charged and convicted of
violating Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, cannot avail of probation under said section in view of the
provision of Section 24 which is hereunder quoted:
"Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the
Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended." (underlining supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by Michael Padua y Tord[e]l
should be, as it is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.20
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on July 28, 2004. He
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals assailing the order, but the Court
of Appeals, in a Decision dated April 19, 2005, dismissed his petition. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and
ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.21
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this
petition where he raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL
OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATION WHICH DEPRIVED PETITIONER’S RIGHT AS A
MINOR UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. [02-1-18-SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
[THE] RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[’S] RIGHT [TO BE RELEASED UNDER
RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN THE LIGHT OF R.A. 9344
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND OTHER PURPOSES.22
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent, opted to adopt its
Comment23 as its Memorandum. In its Comment, the OSG countered that
I.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals have legal basis in applying Section 24, Article II of
R.A. 9165 instead of Section 70, Article VIII of the same law.
II.
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with
the Law" has no application to the instant case.24
Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Padua’s petition for certiorari
assailing the trial court’s order denying his petition for probation? (2) Was Padua’s right under Rep. Act
No. 9344,25 the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," violated? and (3) Does Section 32 26 of
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" have
application in this case?
As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Padua’s petition for
certiorari.
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal,
a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.27
"Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is "excess of
jurisdiction" when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. "Grave abuse
of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.28
A review of the orders of the RTC denying Padua’s petition for probation shows that the RTC neither
acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion because it merely applied the law and
adhered to principles of statutory construction in denying Padua’s petition for probation.
Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling
dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug
trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to wit:
SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the
Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968,
as amended. (Emphasis supplied.)
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or
pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law
or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and
the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.29 If a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is
what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi
sermo, or speech is the index of intention. 30 Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.31
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators in Section 24
of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug
trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug
dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections 11 32 and 1533 of the Act. The law considers
the users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators.
Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from availing the
law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given the chance to mend
their ways.34 The Court of Appeals also correctly stated that had it been the intention of the legislators
to exempt from the application of Section 24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and first
time offenders, the law could have easily declared so.35
The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers while protective of
drug users. To illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty
of six months rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for the first offense under Section 15
of Rep. Act No. 9165, while a person charged and convicted of selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten
Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00) under Section 5, Rep. Act No. 9165.
As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the
"Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006" was violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No.
02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" has application in
this case. Section 6836 of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to
suspension of sentence and not probation.
Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 3837 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be
retroactively applied for petitioner’s benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a
child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment
of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Section
4038 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court
shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended
sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years.
Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child 39
for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and
academic as far as his case is concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 19, 2005 and the
Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 188191 March 12, 2014
ENRIQUE ALMERO y ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MIRASOL BARTOLOME, CLARITA P. MATIAS,
ROSENDO P. MATIAS, and ANTONIO P. MATIAS, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by Enrique Almero y
Alcantara from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 26 September 2008 and Resolution
dated 29 May 2009 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 103030.1
THE MTC RULING IN CRIMINAL CASE No. 96-6531
Petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-6531 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and multiple physical injuries. After private respondents reserved the right to institute a separate action
for damages, trial ensued. On 8 January 2007, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Labo, Camarines
Norte found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
Petitioner filed an Application for Probation on 7 September 2007, reasoning that he was informed of
his conviction only upon being served the warrant for his arrest.2 Prosecutor Analie Velarde opposed
his application on the ground that he was known to be uncooperative, habitually absent, and had even
neglected to inform the court of his change of address. On 22 February 2007, the MTC denied his
application, prompting petitioner to file a special civil action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
While his first Petition raised the sole issue of the denial of his application for probation, he filed a
Supplemental Petition,3 which a) assailed the validity of the promulgation of the 8 January 2007
judgment; and b) impleaded private complainants Mirasol Bartolome, Clarita P. Matias, Rosendo P.
Matias and Antonio P. Matias.
THE RTC RULING IN SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 07-0012
In his supplemental Petition, petitioner stated that upon close scrutiny, he discovered that the judgment
itself was premature and flawed, because the MTC never ruled upon his Formal Offer of Exhibits.4 The
RTC found that the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering judgment without first
ruling on his Formal Offer of Exhibits since, technically, petitioner had not yet rested his case. It also
ruled that the promulgation of judgment was similarly tainted with grave abuse of discretion, because
petitioner was not present at the time, in violation of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Without
addressing the issue of probation, the dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
judgment promulgated on 22 February, 2007 is hereby SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED and the case is
remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Labo, Camarines Norte for further proceedings.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City or any person acting in his behalf to
release immediately petitioner ENRIQUE ALMERO Y ALCANTARA from detention by virtue of the
property bond posted by him for his provisional liberty in Criminal Case No. 96-6531, unless he is
being detained for some other lawful cause or causes.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.5
THE CA RULING
The CA ruled that the RTC should have confined itself to determining whether or not the MTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for probation. Since no appeal
or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available against the denial
of probation, a Rule 65 petition is clearly the appropriate remedy. However, the trial court erred in
taking cognizance of supplemental grounds assailing the judgment of conviction, because an
application for probation is a waiver of the right to appeal from the judgment of conviction and
effectively renders the same final. The CA ruled that even assuming petitioner failed to be present at
the promulgation of judgment, he had no one but himself to blame for failing to inform the MTC of his
change of address.6
On the argument that private respondents possessed no legal personality to represent the State in a
criminal case, the CA held that petitioner himself impleaded them in the certiorari petition before the
RTC. The CA also found that petitioner filed his application for probation only on 7 September 2007,
or more than one month after he received notice of the judgment of conviction. Inasmuch as the grant
of probation rests solely on the discretion of the court, the denial thereof cannot be considered grave
abuse, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the trial court’s appealed January 28, 2008 Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered ordering the DISMISSAL of
appellee’s petition for certiorari.7
Petitioner comes before this Court, assigning the following errors:
I. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ruling that private complainants have
personality to appeal the 28 January 2008 Decision of the RTC.
II. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ruling that the RTC reversibly erred in
nullifying petitioner’s judgment of conviction.
III. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ruling that petitioner is not entitled to
probation.8
OUR RULING
The Petition lacks merit.
Anent the first issue, petitioner argues that in criminal cases, the offended party is the State, and that
private complainants’ interest is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Petitioner's application
for probation purportedly did not involve the civil aspect of the case. Heirs of the Late Francisco Abueg
v. Court of Appeals cited by the CA allegedly cannot apply, since it does not even discuss the right of
private complainants to interpose an appeal.
In the Comment9 it filed, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) reiterated that what petitioner filed
with the RTC was a petition for certiorari, which is a special civil action. It cannot be considered an
appeal in a criminal case over which only the State has an interest, but an appeal in a civil action from
which private persons can appeal in the event of an adverse outcome. Private respondents, in their
Comment,10 argued that the CA correctly applied Abueg, which is on all fours with the present case. In
Abueg, the accused was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
property for crashing against and killing Francisco Abueg. Instead of filing an appeal, the accused
applied for probation. After the CA affirmed the grant of probation, the Supreme Court entertained and
acted upon the petition for certiorari filed by the victims’ heirs.11
We agree with the submission of the respondents. While the present petition originated from a criminal
proceeding, what petitioner filed with the RTC was a special civil action, in which he himself
impleaded private respondents. He cannot now belatedly change his stance to the prejudice of private
respondents, who would otherwise be deprived of recourse in a civil action they did not initiate. In any
case, this Court has consistently ruled that private parties may be clothed with sufficient personality if
the facts show that the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and if the issues in the action
could be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner.
In Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz,12 citing People v. Calo, Jr.,13 the Supreme Court ruled:
While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General may bring or defend
actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the State in criminal
proceeding pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals, the ends of substantial justice would be
better served, and the issues in this action could be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive
manner, by entertaining the petition at bar. As an offended party in a criminal case, private petitioner
has sufficient personality and a valid grievance against Judge Adao’s order granting bail to the alleged
murderers of his (private petitioner’s) father.14 (Citations omitted.)
Furthermore, in Paredes v. Gopengco, it was held that parties in criminal cases have sufficient
personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the rules, to
wit:
Furthermore, as offended parties in the pending criminal case before petitioner judge, it cannot be
gainsaid that respondents have sufficient interest and personality as ‘person(s) aggrieved’ by petitioner
judge’s ruling on his non-disqualification to file the special civil action under sections 1 and 2 of Rule
65. Recently in line with the underlying spirit of a liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to
promote their object, as against the literal application of Rule 110, section 2, we held, overruling the
implication of an earlier case, that a widow possesses the right as an offended party to file a criminal
complaint for the murder of her deceased husband.15
Petitioner’s second and third arguments are brought by an erroneous understanding of the nature of
probation and shall be discussed jointly.
Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred by the State, and
may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely
upon the discretion of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and
only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.16
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects
appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the
state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an accused must
not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that when his
conviction is finally affirmed on appeal… he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus
rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction.17
Aside from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused, the rationale for the
treatment of appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies is that they rest on diametrically
opposed legal positions. An accused applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the judgment.
The application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led
to the judgment of conviction.18 This was the reason why the Probation Law was amended: precisely
to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction – even if the sentence is
probationable – for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for the probation only if the
accused fails in his bid.19
Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment, or
apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal.20 While he did not
file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a
petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No.
968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
The assignment of errors in the Petition before us reflects the diametrically opposed positions taken by
accused petitioner. On the one hand, he bewails the defects committed by the trial court during the
promulgation of the judgment, thus casting doubt on the judgment itself. Yet in the same breath, he
persists in his application for probation, despite the waiver and admission of guilt implicit in any
procedure for probation – precisely the unhealthy wager the law seeks to prevent.
Petitioner applied for probation beyond the reglementary period, yet the trial court still allowed the
filing before ultimately denying it for lack of merit. Regarding this delay and the other defects imputed
by petitioner to the RTC, we concur with the findings of the CA:
(W)e find that public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying appellee’s
application for probation. Granted that appellee had not received the notice of the January 8, 2007
decision rendered in Criminal Case No. 06-6531, it appears from the record that appellee had no one
but himself to blame for the procedural quagmire he subsequently found himself in. In denying
appellee’s motion for reconsideration of the September 18, 2007 denial of the application for probation,
public respondent distinctly ruled as follows:
x x x. (T)he application has been filed out of time as accused himself admitted in the motion.1âwphi1
He blames Atty. Evan D. Dizon, his former counsel, for not notifying the court of his change of address
but Atty. Dizon himself had been trying to contact accused since 2001 even before he filed his formal
offer of evidence since all notices sent to the accused’s given address have been returned to this court
since 2001. If it is true that he moved to Cavite only in 2003, why were said notices returned with
notations ‘unknown,’ ‘unclaimed,’ or ‘moved’?21
This Court will not countenance pleas for liberality in adverse outcomes caused by the negligence and
evasiveness of the parties themselves.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 103030 dated 26 September 2008 and 29 May 2
G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 154954
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO
LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON,
ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA
FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE
GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN,
PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO
BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 155101
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO
CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa due to
fraternity hazing. While there is nothing new in the arguments raised by the parties in their respective
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, we find a few remaining matters needing to be clarified
and resobed. Sorne oJ' these matters include the effect of our Decision on the finality of the Court of
Appeals judgments insofar as respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda (Almeda), June] Anthony D. Arna
(Arna), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are concerned; the question of who
are eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the validity of the probation proceedings and the
concomitant orders of a court that allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.
Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed by petitioners
People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa
(Villa); and by respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.) concerning
the Decision of this Court dated 1 February 2012.1 The Court modified the assailed judgments2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520 and found respondents Fidelito Dizon (Dizon),
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering the criminal liability of Dizon from
the crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al. from slight physical injuries.
The CA Decision itself had modified the Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Branch 121 finding all of the accused therein guilty of the crime of homicide.3
Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but related case docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. Nos.
89060 & 90153 and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the
criminal case against Manuel Escalona II (Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr.
(Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) on the ground that their right to speedy trial was violated.
Reproduced below is the dispositive portion of our Decision:5
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of
homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No.
154954 – finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART.
Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In
addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity
ex delicto in the amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000, plus legal interest
on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until
satisfaction. Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The
appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of
the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case
against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the
fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present case:6
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar
"Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert"
Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity
(Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to have
dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the
neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be
physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for
three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the
commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the
Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the
Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then
subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which
required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to
the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs
against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs;
the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the
Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the
latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or withknee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans;
and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict
physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the
fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to present comic
plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila
Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or
legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment
them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that
they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio
Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino
(Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the
initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
"paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of
which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of
intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no
longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was
officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent
mumblings.1avvphi1 Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was
just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans
started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him
warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced
dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
 10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried. On the other
hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance
due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the
26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or
on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced
anew.
On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial
court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused
according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following
Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants– Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De
Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima,
Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were acquitted,as their individual guilt was not
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuriesand sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly
pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizonand Artemio Villareal– were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They
were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of
₱50,000 and to pay the additional amount of ₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused
Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates
between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 &
90153 reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought
before this Court. (Citations omitted)
Motion for Partial Reconsideration
filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration7 in connection with G.R. Nos.
178057 & 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when
it dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano (collectively, Escalona et
al.) in its assailed Decision and Resolution.8 Villa reiterates her previous arguments that the right to
speedy trial of the accused was not violated, since they had failed to assert that right within a
reasonable period of time. She stresses that, unlike their co-accused Reynaldo Concepcion, respondents
Escalona et al.did not timely invoke their right to speedy trial during the time that the original records
and pieces of evidence were unavailable. She again emphasizes that the prosecution cannot be faulted
entirely for the lapse of 12 years from the arraignment until the initial trial, as there were a number of
incidents attributable to the accused themselves that caused the delay of the proceedings. She then
insists that we apply the balancing test in determining whether the right to speedy trial of the accused
was violated.
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954
(People v. Court of Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that accused Dizon and Tecson et
al. had neither the felonious intent to kill (animus interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure
(animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it concedes that the mode in which the accused committed the
crime was through fault (culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed should have been
equivalent to that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. It
argues that the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the accused was so
gross that it shattered the fine distinction between dolo and culpaby considering the act as one
committed with malicious intent. It maintains that the accused conducted the initiation rites in such a
malevolent and merciless manner that it clearly endangered the lives of the initiates and was thus
equivalent to malice aforethought.
With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their acquittal may also be
reversed despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No. 15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al. should have
been similarly convicted like their other co-accused Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since
the former also participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions contributed to his death.
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.
Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No. 154954 (People v.
Court of Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the effect of our Decision insofar as their
criminal liability and service of sentence are concerned. According to respondents, they immediately
applied for probation after the CA rendered its Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal
liability from the crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical
injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend that, as a result, they have already
been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against them closed and terminated. This
outcome was supposedly by virtue of their Applications for Probation on various dates in January
200211 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as the Probation Law.
They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already granted their
respective Applications for Probation on 11 October 200212 and, upon their completion of the terms
and conditions thereof, discharged them from probation and declared the criminal case against them
terminated on various dates in April 2003.13
To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true copies of their respective Applications for
Probation and the RTC Orders granting these applications, discharging them from probation, and
declaring the criminal case against them terminated. Thus, they maintain that the Decision in CA-G.R.
No. 15520 had already lapsed into finality, insofar as they were concerned, whenthey waived their right
to appeal and applied for probation.
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of their right to speedy trial
II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to that for
intentional felonies
III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation
discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against them
DISCUSSION
Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal assertions raised by
petitioner Villa in her Motion for Partial Reconsideration concerning G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 have
already been thoroughly considered and passed uponin our deliberations, which led to our Decision
dated 1 February 2012. We emphasize that in light of the finding of violation of the right of Escalona et
al. to speedy trial, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to an acquittal,15 and
that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a violation of their right against double
jeopardy.16 Though we have recognized that the acquittal of the accused may be challenged where
there has been a grave abuse of discretion,17 certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that
the CA’s Decision dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed judgment constitutes "a patent and
gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty imposed by law or toact in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so
severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice."18 Thus, grave abuse of discretion
cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.19
We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioner’s arguments and
found no basis to rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in concluding that the right to speedy
trial of the accused was violated. Its findings were sufficiently supported by the records of the case and
grounded in law. Thus, we deny the motion of petitioner Villa with finality.
Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with respect to G.R.
Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). Many of the arguments raised
therein are essentially a mere rehash of the earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition for Certiorari.
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s theory that even if the act complained of was born of
imprudence or negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on account of the gravity of the
actions of the accused. We emphasize that the finding of a felony committed by means of culpa is
legally inconsistent with that committed by means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs
done as a result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. The Revised Penal Code
expresses thusly:
ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayorin its maximum period toprisión correccional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall
be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its medium and maximum periods;
if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period
shall be imposed.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform suchact, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. (Emphases supplied)
On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate malicious intent to
do an unlawful act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion on the matter:20 Our Revised Penal
Code belongs tothe classical school of thought. x x x The identity of mens rea– defined as a guilty
mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent – is the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not
enough to do what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the
act be committed by means of doloor "malice."
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and
intent. x x x x The element of intent – on which this Court shall focus – is described as the state of
mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the
resolve with which a person proceeds.It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act,
while intentconcerns the result of the act. While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action
for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result. On the
other hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil
heart or purpose.With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony
must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a
forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus– that the act or
omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice
aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea– a crime is not committed if the
mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. As is required of the other elements
of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
xxxx
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing
the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires
the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.
Intent to kill – or animus interficendi– cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been the product of
accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal
intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the act must be qualified as reckless or
simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.
xxxx
In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal
Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in
se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be
found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, incase of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code,
there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical
integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily
functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of
inflicting physical injuries per semerely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an
intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions
are.
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries,
absentmalicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony.x x x.
xxxx
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity
members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that
are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an
immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and
consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act
done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of
foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a
prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the
doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous resultsof the act. Failure to do so constitutes
negligence.
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of
precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved. If, on account of a
certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who
chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, inorder to prevent or
avoid damage or injury. In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus possible
that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, "from
a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort." The duty of the person to employ more or less
degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. (Emphases supplied,
citations omitted)
We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious
intent or dolus malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for committing an intentional felony.
Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we cannot agree with the
argument of the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for intentional felony can also be applied
to the present case on the ground that the nature of the imprudence or negligence of the accused was so
gross that the felony already amounted to malice. The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the
imposable penalties as regards felonies committed by means of culpaon the one hand and felonies
committed by means of doloon the other in the context of the distinctions it has drawn between them.
The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are mandatorily applied if the
death of a person occurs as a result of the imprudence or negligence of another. Alternatively, the
penalties outlined in Articles 246 to 261 (Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the death
was a result of the commission of a forbidden act accompanied by a malicious intent. These imposable
penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the discretion of the court. We have already
resolved – and the OSG agrees – that the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither animus
interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the
imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide as
defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration
filed by Tecson et al.
We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents Tecson et al. vis-
à-vis G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).
The finality of a CA decision will not
bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.
In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA finding them guilty
of slight physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result of their respective availments of the
probation program and their ultimate discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can no longer be
convicted of the heavier offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.22 Respondents allude to
our Decision in Tan v. People23 to support their contention that the CA judgment can no longer be
reversed or annulled even by this Court.
The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the former had timely
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65 petition is analogous to an appeal,
or a motion for new trial or reconsideration, in that a petition for certiorarialso prevents the case from
becoming final and executory until after the matter is ultimately resolved.
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once the accused
applies for probation, viz:
SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of convictionmay, upon motion of the accused,
be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death
penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes finalafter the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or
whenthe sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accusedhas waived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of Rule 122,26 it can be culled from the foregoing
provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the
relief being sought is the correction or review of the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order
to give life to the constitutional edict27 against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. It is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy if the
state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an acquittal or even to increase criminal liability.
Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as when applying for probation – makes the criminal
judgment immediately final and executory. Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth
reiterating:28
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the
government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s
culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying
reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The
reason is not only the defendant’s already established innocence at the first trial where he had been
placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial
initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State.
Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed another
opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that
had attended the first trial, all in a process where the government’s power and resources are once again
employed against the defendant’s individual means. That the second opportunity comesvia an appeal
does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience.
(Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not
confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in our Decision that the
rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state
assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal judgment.29 The reasoning behind the
exception is articulated in Nazareno, from which we quote:30
In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in an appeal,
actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per sevoid on jurisdictional
grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court
has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of whether there has been a validly
rendered decision, not on the question of the decision’s error or correctness. Under the exceptional
nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden — a very heavy one — is on the shoulders of the party asking
for the review to show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; or to an
exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. (Emphases
supplied, citations omitted) While this Court’s Decision in Tan may have created an impression of the
unassailability of a criminal judgment as soon as the accused applies for probation, we point out that
what the state filed therein was a mere motion for the modification of the penalty, and not a Rule 65
petition. A petition for certiorari is a special civil action that is distinct and separate from the main case.
While in the main case, the core issue is whether the accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged,
the crux of a Rule 65 petition is whether the court acted (a) without or in excess of its jurisdiction; or
(b) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly speaking,
there is nomodification of judgment in a petition for certiorari, whose resolution does not call for a re-
evaluation of the merits of the case in order to determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the
accused. In a Rule 65 petition, any resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence of
the finding of lack of jurisdiction.
In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must be that it is
inapplicable and irrelevant where the court’s jurisdiction is being assailed through a Rule 65 petition.
Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of a criminal judgment only if the appeal brought before
the court is in the nature of a regular appeal under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45,
and if that appeal would put the accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no irregularity in the
partial annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its finality, as the judgment
therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The orders of Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part and parcel of our
criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate and decide the case
before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity of the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a
particular case or matter before it.31 That power and capacity includes the competence to pronounce a
judgment, impose a punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33 the execution of a sentencein accordance
with law.
The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of Tecson et al.
before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not have competence to take
cognizance of the applications, considering that it was not the court of origin of the criminal case. The
OSG points out that the trial court that originally rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91) was Branch 121 of the Caloocan City RTC.
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for
such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)
It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for probation be
filed withthe trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin. Here,
the trial court that originally convicted and sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime of homicide was Branch
121 – not Branch 130 – of the Caloocan City RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor
Tecson et al.in their pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any special authority that
would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been filed with or taken cognizance of by
Caloocan City RTC Branch 121. While we take note that in a previous case, the CA issued a Decision
ordering the inhibition of Branch 121 Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from hearing and deciding Criminal
Case No. C-38340(91), the ruling was made specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners therein, i.e.
accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez.36
Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications with Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that applicants are not at liberty to choose
the forum in which they may seek probation, as the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation law is
substantive and not merely procedural. Considering, therefore, that the probation proceedings were
premised on an unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 never
acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 granted the
probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in which the criminal action has
been properly instituted.37 If a party appeals the trial court’s judgment or final order,38 jurisdiction is
transferred to the appellate court. The execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing
party is concerned.39 The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the entire case the moment the
other party’s time to appeal has expired.40 Any residual jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease –
including the authority to order execution pending appeal – the moment the complete records of the
case are transmitted to the appellate court.41 Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have the
authority to wield the power to hear, try, and decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its decisions
and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and authority shall remain with the appellate court
until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any subsequent event, even if the
nature of the incident would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.
According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed except by virtue of
a final judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the accused of the offense charged
becomes final under any of the following conditions among others:42 after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal; when the accused waives the right to appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal ofan
appeal; when the sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or served; or when the accused
applies for probation. When the decision attains finality, the judgment or final order is entered in the
book of entries of judgments.43 If the case was previously appealed to the CA, a certified true copy of
the judgment or final order must be attached to the original record, which shall then be remanded to the
clerk of the court from which the appeal was taken.44 The court of origin then reacquires jurisdiction
over the case for appropriate action. It is during this time that the court of origin may settle the matter
of the execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution thereof,45 including the convicts’
applications for probation.46
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction over the case
when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for Probation of Tecson et
al. It shows that the accused filed their respective applications47 while a motion for reconsideration
was still pending before the CA48 and the records were still with that court.49 The CA settled the
motion only upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven months after
Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the trial court.50 In September 2002, or almost a month
before the promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October 2002 granting the probation
applications,51 the OSG had filed Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with the CA52
and this Court.53 Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA judgments by filing before this Court a Petition
for Certiorari on 25 November 2002.54 We noted the petition and then required respondents to file a
comment thereon.55 After their submission of further pleadings and motions, we eventually required
all parties to file their consolidated memoranda.56 The records of the case remained with the CA until
they were elevated to this Court in 2008.57
For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the probation
applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to suspend their sentence, place
them on probation, order their final discharge, and eventually declare the case against them terminated.
This glaring jurisdictional faux pasis a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law oran
underhanded one-upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or both – to which this
Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for it. Probation 58
is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who immediately admit their
liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate and willingness
to be reformed, the state affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of an incarceration recordby making
them undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major purposes of the law are to help
offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self respecting individuals, as well as
to assist them in their reintegration with the community.
It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act of grace
orclemency conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,59 this Court explained thus:
It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by
all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused. The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of
any of the latter’s prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is
clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within
them. (Emphases supplied)
The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et al.60 It points
out that when they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the RTC, they thereby made
themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the
Probation Law).
We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as follows:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for
such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed
a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied)
Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have appealed the
conviction.61 In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,62 this Court was faced with the issue of
whether a convict may still apply for probation even after the trial court has imposed a non
probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers the original penalty to a sentence within the
probationable limit. In that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to a maximum term of eight years
of prisión mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only became eligible for
probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1 year, 8 months and 21
days of prisión correccional.
In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the accused was
ineligiblefor probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In Francisco, we emphasized that
Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no ambiguity and does not provide for any distinction,
qualification, or exception. What is clearis that all offenders who previously appealed their cases,
regardless of their reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation.
Accordingly, this Court enunciated in Lagrosathat the accused are disallowed from availing themselves
of the benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation only on appeal
as a result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable to probationable.
While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 issued its various
Orders discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in Lagrosa, however, was a mere reiteration
of the reasoning of this Court since the 1989 case Llamado v. Court of Appeals63 and Francisco. The
Applications for Probation of Tecson et al., therefore, should not have been granted by RTC Branch
130, as they had appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents were originally found
guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded their conviction to slight physical injuries and
sentenced them to 20 days of arresto menor, which made the sentence fall within probationable limits
for the first time, the RTC should have nonetheless found them ineligible for probation at the time.
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use of authority, so
gross that it divested the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a consequence, the RTC Orders
granting the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. and thereafter discharging them from their
criminal liability must be deemed to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, we declare all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in
relation to the probation applications of Tecson et al. null and void for having been issued without
jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in Galman v. Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz:
A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights
can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds
nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis
supplied)
The ultimate discharge of Tecson et
al. from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.
Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been extinguished as a
result of their discharge from probation and the eventual termination of the criminal case against them
by Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. To support his argument, he cites the following provision of the
Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code. (Emphasis
supplied)
As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is as
if no judgment had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment of the Orders of Caloocan City
RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits that
technically do not exist.
In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we find it inapplicable
to this case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to "suspend the execution of the
sentence,"66 and not to replace the original sentence with another, as we pointed out in our discussion
in Baclayon v. Mutia:67
An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a suspension of the
imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an "interlocutory judgment"in the nature
of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his
reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are
complied with, or by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied)
Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.
In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.
Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited our ruling in Franciscoand modified our
pronouncements insofar as the eligibility for probation of those who appeal their conviction is
concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En Bancin effect abandoned Lagrosaand settled
the following once and for all:69
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of
conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two
judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the
regional trial court,now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the probation law on
Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation
because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s
judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial
court’s judgment — even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to
pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang
kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is
justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would
dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat the probation law requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a
huge difference between Franciscoand this case.
xxxx
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. Hewas not in a position to say, "By
taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on
him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this
Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those
who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit
their right to apply for that privilege.
xxxx
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of
attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct
offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would
have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his.
The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not
served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege
to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to
disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused
not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.
xxxx
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct
penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would havehad the right to apply for probation. No
one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC doneright by
him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not
probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness.1âwphi1 Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply
for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously
imposed by the trial court, subject to probation? (Emphases supplied)
In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et al.ultimately liable
for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, the offense is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period (from 4 months and 1
day to 6 months) to prisión correccional in its medium period (from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months). Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more favorable to Tecson et al., we
rule that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was convicted of
the same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also eligible for probation.
While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which granted the
Applications for Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have fulfilled the terms and
conditions of their previous probation program and have eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus,
should they reapply for probation, the trial court may, at its discretion, consider their antecedent
probation service in resolving whether to place them under probation at this time and in determining
the terms, conditions, and period thereof.
Final clarificatory matters
We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the minimum term of
the penalty imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While this issue was not raised by any of
the parties before us, this Court deems it proper to discuss the matter ex proprio motuin the interest of
justice. In the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012, the
fourth sentence reads as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum.
As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the "penalty next lower" than that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, in
accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL),70 the phrase "and one (1) day," which had
been inadvertently added, must be removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of the dispositive
portion, the fourth sentence should now read as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum. In this
instance, we further find it important to clarify the accessory penalties inherent to the principal penalty
imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al.
By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding accessory penalty
automatically attaches every time a court lays down a principal penalty outlined in Articles 25 and 27
thereof.71 The applicable accessory penalty is determined by using as reference the principal
penaltyimposed by the court before the prison sentence is computed in accordance with the ISL.72 This
determination is made in spite of the two classes ofpenalties mentioned in an indeterminate sentence. It
must be emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory penalties specifically allude to the
actual "penalty"73 imposed, not to the "prison sentence"74 set by a court. We believe that the ISL did
not intend to have the effect of imposing on the convict two distinct sets of accessory penalties for the
same offense.75 The two penalties are only relevant insofar as setting the minimum imprisonment
period is concerned, after which the convict may apply for parole and eventually seek the shortening of
the prison term.76
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccionalin its
medium period. As this provision grants courts the discretion tolay down a penalty without regard to
the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the imposable penaltymust also be within the
aforementioned range.77 Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed on Dizon and Tecson
et al. the actual (straight) penalty78 of four years and two months of prisión correccional.79 Pursuant to
Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión correccional automatically carries with it80
the following accessory penalties: ARTICLE 43. Prisión Correccional— Its accessory penalties. — The
penalty of prisión correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right
tofollow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage,
if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty sans the ISL; that is,
for four years and two months81 or until they have served their sentence in accordance with law. Their
suspension takes effect immediately, once the judgment of conviction becomes final.82
We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they shall furthermore
suffer a perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. Under Article 32 of the
RevisedPenal Code, if this accessory penalty attaches, it shall forever deprive them of the exercise of
their right (a) to vote in any popular election for any public office; (b) to be elected to that office; and
(c) to hold any public office.83 Any public office that they may be holding becomes vacant upon
finality of the judgment.84 The aforementioned accessory penalties can only be wiped out if expressly
remitted in a pardon.85
Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of probation,
shouldthe trial court find them eligible therefor. As we explained in Baclayon,86 the grant of probation
suspends the execution of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory
penalties. We have reiterated this point in Moreno v. Commission on Elections:87
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence
but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to
petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory
penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that
of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting
probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching
profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office,
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of
probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from
running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on
hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x. During the period of probation, the probationer does not
serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the
conditions prescribed in the probation order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda H.
Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby DENIED. The Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954
is also DENIED.
The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise DENIED. In light of the finding
that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130 acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the aforementioned Applications for Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire
probation proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments issued in connection
thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato
Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to apply or reapply for probation in view of
our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of the Philippines,88 without prejudice to their remaining civil
liability, if any.
Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February
2012 and hereby delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the fourth sentence of the first
paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now read as follows: "They are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prisi6n correccional, as maximum."
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 225695, March 21, 2018 ]

IRENEO CAHULOGAN, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Ireneo Cahulogan
(petitioner) assailing the Decision[2] dated November 6, 2015 and the Resolution[3] dated June 8, 2016
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 01126-MIN, which affirmed the Judgment[4] dated
October 4, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan De Oro City, Misamis Oriental, Branch 41
(RTC) in Crim. Case No. 2011-507, convicting petitioner of the crime of Fencing, defined and
penalized under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1612, otherwise known as the "Anti-Fencing Law of
1979."[5]
The Facts

On April 18, 2011, an Information[6] was filed before the RTC charging petitioner with the crime of
Fencing, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about January 14, 2011 [,] at about 4:00 o'clock [sic] in the afternoon, at Bugo,
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal,
sell or dispose of, or in any manner deal, Two Hundred Ten (210) cases of Coca Cola
products worth Php52,476.00 owned by and belonging to the offended party Johnson Tan
which accused know, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of Theft, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid sum of
Php52,476.00.

Contrary to Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as Anti-Fencing Law of 1979.
[7]

The prosecution alleged that private complainant Johnson Tan (Tan), a businessman engaged in
transporting Coca-Cola products, instructed his truck driver and helper, Braulio Lopez (Lopez) and
Loreto Lariosa (Lariosa), to deliver 210 cases of Coca-Cola products (subject items) worth P52,476.00
to Demins Store. The next day, Tan discovered that contrary to his instructions, Lopez and Lariosa
delivered the subject items to petitioner's store. Tan then went to petitioner and informed him that the
delivery to his store was a mistake and that he was pulling out the subject items. However, petitioner
refused, claiming that he bought the same from Lariosa for P50,000.00, but could not present any
receipt evidencing such transaction. Tan insisted that he had the right to pull out the subject items as
Lariosa had no authority to sell the same to petitioner, but the latter was adamant in retaining such
items. Fearing that his contract with Coca-Cola will be terminated as a result of the wrongful delivery,
and in order to minimize losses, Tan negotiated with petitioner to instead deliver to him P20,000.00
worth of empty bottles with cases, as evidenced by their Agreement[8] dated January 18, 2011.
Nonetheless, Tan felt aggrieved over the foregoing events, thus, prompting him to secure an
authorization to file cases from Coca-Cola and charge petitioner with the crime of Fencing. He also
claimed to have charged Lariosa with the crime of Theft but he had no update as to the status thereof.
[9]

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty,[10] but chose not to present any evidence in his
defense. Rather, he merely submitted his memorandum,[11] maintaining that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[12]
The RTC Ruling

In a Judgment[13] dated October 4, 2013, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the
indeterminate period often (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fifteen (15)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.[14]

The RTC found that the prosecution had successfully established the presence of all the elements of the
crime of Fencing, considering that Lariosa stole the subject items from his employer, Tan, and that
petitioner was found to be in possession of the same. The RTC noted that under the circumstances of
the case, petitioner would have been forewarned that the subject items came from an illegal source
since Lariosa: (a) sold to him the subject items at a discount and without any corresponding delivery
and official receipts; and (b) did not demand that such items be replaced by empty bottles, a common
practice in purchases of soft drink products.[15]

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed[16] to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[17] dated November 6, 2015, the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction.[18] It held that
Lariosa's act of selling the subject items to petitioner without the authority and consent from Tan
clearly constituted theft. As such, petitioner's possession of the stolen items constituted prima facie
evidence of Fencing - a presumption which he failed to rebut.[19]

Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration[20] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[21]
dated June 8, 2016; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction for
the crime of Fencing.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.

"Time and again, it has been held that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and
it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment
whether they are assigned or unassigned. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over
the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law."[22]

Guided by this consideration, the Court finds no reason to overturn petitioner's conviction for the crime
of Fencing.

Section 2 of PD 1612 defines Fencing as "the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or
for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell,
or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should
be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."[23] The
same Section also states that a Fence "includes any person, firm, association, corporation or partnership
or other organization who/which commits the act of fencing."[24]

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (a) a crime of robbery or theft has been
committed; (b) the accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and
sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (c) the accused knew or should have known that the
said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; and (d) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.
[25] Notably, Fencing is a malum prohibitum, and PD 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of
Fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of
value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the
value of the property.[26]

In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that the prosecution was able to establish beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime of Fencing, as it was shown that: (a) Lariosa sold to
petitioner the subject items without authority and consent from his employer, Tan, for his own personal
gain, and abusing the trust and confidence reposed upon him as a truck helper;[27] (b) petitioner
bought the subject items from Lariosa and was in possession of the same; (c) under the circumstances,
petitioner should have been forewarned that the subject items came from an illegal source, as his
transaction with Lariosa did not have any accompanying delivery and official receipts, and that the
latter did not demand that such items be replaced with empty bottles, contrary to common practice
among dealers of soft drinks;[28] and (d) petitioner's intent to gain was made evident by the fact that he
bought the subject items for just P50,000.00, lower than their value in the amount of P52,476.00.
"[T]he Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the
CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the case. In fact, the trial court was in the best position to assess and determine the
credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties, and hence, due deference should be accorded to
the same."[29]

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on petitioner, pertinent portions of Section 3 of PD 1612 read:
 Section 3. Penalties. - Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder
indicated:

a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000
pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the
accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be
imposed.

xxxx

Notably, while the crime of Fencing is defined and penalized by a special penal law, the penalty
provided therein is taken from the nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In Peralta v.
People,[30] the Court discussed the proper treatment of penalties found in special penal laws vis-a-vis
Act No. 4103,[31] otherwise known as the "Indeterminate Sentence Law," viz.:
Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(ISL), provides that if the offense is ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum
and maximum prison term of the indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond what the
special law prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the landmark ruling of
People v. Simon that the situation is different where although the offense is defined in a
special law, the penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC.
Under such circumstance, the legal effects under the system of penalties native to the Code
would also necessarily apply to the special law.[32]

Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the penalties under the RPC, the
ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules applied for those crimes
punishable under the RPC.[33]

Applying the foregoing and considering that there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances
present in this case, the Court finds it proper to sentence petitioner to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

At this point, the Court notes that as may be gleaned from its whereas clauses, PD 1612 was enacted in
order to provide harsher penalties to those who would acquire properties which are proceeds of the
crimes of Robbery or Theft, who prior to the enactment of said law, were punished merely as
accessories after the fact of the said crimes.[34] This rationale was echoed in Dizon-Pamintuan v.
People[35] where the Court held that while a Fence may be prosecuted either as an accessory of
Robbery/Theft or a principal for Fencing, there is a preference for the prosecution of the latter as it
provides for harsher penalties:
Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable as an accessory,
as the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty applicable to an
accessory is obviously light under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55, and 57 of the
Revised Penal Code, subject to the qualification set forth in Article 60 thereof. Noting,
however, the reports from law enforcement agencies that "there is rampant robbery and
thievery of government and private properties" and that "such robbery and thievery have
 become profitable on the part of the lawless elements because of the existence of ready
buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen properties," P.D. No. 1612 was enacted to
"impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and
theft." Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as
such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, he
ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of fencing. Elsewise
stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are
separate and distinct offenses. The state may thus choose to prosecute him either under the
Revised Penal Code or P.D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem
inevitable considering that fencing is a malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a
presumption of fencing and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.
[36]

While PD 1612 penalizes those who acquire properties which are proceeds of Robbery or Theft, its
prescribed penalties are similar to the latter crime in that they are largely dependent on the value of the
said properties. In fact, a reading of Section 3 of PD 1612 and Article 309 of the RPC (which provides
for the prescribed penalties for the crime of Theft) reveals that both provisions use the same
graduations of property value to determine the prescribed penalty; in particular, if the value: (a)
exceeds P22,000.00, with additional penalties for each additional P10,000.00; (b) is more than
P12,000.00 but not exceeding P22,000.00; (c) is more than P6,000.00 but not exceeding P12,000.00;
(d) is more than P200.00 but not exceeding P6,000.00; (e) is more than P50.00 but not exceeding
P200.00; and (f) does not exceed P5.00. However, with the recent enactment of Republic Act No.
10951,[37] which adjusted the values of the property and damage on which various penalties are based,
taking into consideration the present value of money, as opposed to its archaic values when the RPC
was enacted in 1932,[38] the graduation of values in Article 309 was substantially amended, without
any concomitant adjustment for PD 1612. This development would then result in instances where a
Fence, which is theoretically a mere accessory to the crime of Robbery/Theft, will be punished more
severely than the principal of such latter crimes. This incongruence in penalties therefore, impels an
adjustment of penalties.

However, while it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous
proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.[39] As the Court remains
mindful of the fact that the determination of penalties is a policy matter that belongs to the legislative
branch of the government, it finds it prudent to instead, furnish both Houses of Congress, as well as the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice, pursuant to Article
5[40] of the RPC, copies of this ruling in order to alert them on the aforestated incongruence of
penalties, all with the hope of arriving at the proper solution to this predicament.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 6, 2015 and the Resolution
dated June 8, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 01126-MIN finding petitioner
Ireneo Cahulogan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Fencing defined and penalized
under Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the "Anti-Fencing Law," are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate
period of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President
of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice, the President of the Senate, and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BULU CHOWDURY, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
In November 1995, Bulu Chowduly and Josephine Ong were charged before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale committed as follows:
That sometime between the period from August 1994 to October 1994 in the City of Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport workers for
employment abroad, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit the herein complainants: Estrella B. Calleja,
Melvin C. Miranda and Aser S. Sasis, individually or as a group for employment in Korea
without first obtaining the required license and/or authority from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration.1
They were likewise charged with three counts of estafa committed against private complainants. 2 The
State Prosecutor, however, later dismissed the estafa charges against Chowdury 3 and filed an amended
information indicting only Ong for the offense.4
Chowdury was arraigned on April 16, 1996 while Ong remained at large. He pleaded "not guilty" to the
charge of illegal recruitment in large scale.5
Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented four witnesses: private complainants Aser Sasis, Estrella Calleja and Melvin
Miranda, and Labor Employment Officer Abbelyn Caguitla.
Sasis testified that he first met Chowdury in August 1994 when he applied with Craftrade Overseas
Developers (Craftrade) for employment as factory worker in South Korea. Chowdury, a consultant of
Craftrade, conducted the interview. During the interview, Chowdury informed him about the
requirements for employment. He told him to submit his passport, NBI clearance, passport size picture
and medical certificate. He also required him to undergo a seminar. He advised him that placement
would be on a first-come-first-serve basis and urged him to complete the requirements immediately.
Sasis was also charged a processing fee of P25,000.00. Sasis completed all the requirements in
September 1994. He also paid a total amount of P16,000.00 to Craftrade as processing fee. All
payments were received by Ong for which she issued three receipts. 6 Chowdury then processed his
papers and convinced him to complete his payment.7
Sasis further said that he went to the office of Craftrade three times to follow up his application but he
was always told to return some other day. In one of his visits to Craftrade's office, he was informed that
he would no longer be deployed for employment abroad. This prompted him to withdraw his payment
but he could no longer find Chowdury. After two unsuccessful attempts to contact him, he decided to
file with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) a case for illegal recruitment
against Chowdury. Upon verification with the POEA, he learned that Craftrade's license had already
expired and has not been renewed and that Chowdury, in his personal capacity, was not a licensed
recruiter.8
Calleja testified that in June 1994, she applied with Craftrade for employment as factory worker in
South Korea. She was interviewed by Chowdury. During the interview, he asked questions regarding
her marital status, her age and her province. Toward the end of the interview, Chowdury told her that
she would be working in a factory in Korea. He required her to submit her passport, NBI clearance, ID
pictures, medical certificate and birth certificate. He also obliged her to attend a seminar on overseas
employment. After she submitted all the documentary requirements, Chowdury required her to pay
P20,000.00 as placement fee. Calleja made the payment on August 11, 1994 to Ong for which she was
issued a receipt.9 Chowdury assured her that she would be able to leave on the first week of September
but it proved to be an empty promise. Calleja was not able to leave despite several follow-ups. Thus,
she went to the POEA where she discovered that Craftrade's license had already expired. She tried to
withdraw her money from Craftrade to no avail. Calleja filed a complaint for illegal recruitment against
Chowdury upon advice of POEA's legal counsel.10
Miranda testified that in September 1994, his cousin accompanied him to the office of Craftrade in
Ermita, Manila and introduced him to Chowdury who presented himself as consultant and interviewer.
Chowdury required him to fill out a bio-data sheet before conducting the interview. Chowdury told
Miranda during the interview that he would send him to Korea for employment as factory worker. Then
he asked him to submit the following documents: passport, passport size picture, NBI clearance and
medical certificate. After he complied with the requirements, he was advised to wait for his visa and to
pay P25,000.00 as processing fee. He paid the amount of P25,000.00 to Ong who issued receipts
therefor.11 Craftrade, however, failed to deploy him. Hence, Miranda filed or complaint with the POEA
against Chowdury for illegal recruitment.12
Labor Employment Officer Abbelyn Caguitla of the Licensing Branch of the POEA testified that she
prepared a certification on June 9, 1996 that Chowdury and his co-accused, Ong, were not, in their
personal capacities, licensed recruiters nor were they connected with any licensed agency. She
nonetheless stated that Craftrade was previously licensed to recruit workers for abroad which expired
on December 15, 1993. It applied for renewal of its license but was only granted a temporary license
effective December 16, 1993 until September 11, 1994. From September 11, 1994, the POEA granted
Craftrade another temporary authority to process the expiring visas of overseas workers who have
already been deployed. The POEA suspended Craftrade's temporary license on December 6, 1994.13
For his defense, Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer at Craftrade from 1990 until 1994.
His primary duty was to interview job applicants for abroad. As a mere employee, he only followed the
instructions given by his superiors, Mr. Emmanuel Geslani, the agency's President and General
Manager, and Mr. Utkal Chowdury, the agency's Managing Director. Chowdury admitted that he
interviewed private complainants on different dates. Their office secretary handed him their bio-data
and thereafter he led them to his room where he conducted the interviews. During the interviews, he
had with him a form containing the qualifications for the job and he filled out this form based on the
applicant's responses to his questions. He then submitted them to Mr. Utkal Chowdury who in turn
evaluated his findings. He never received money from the applicants. He resigned from Craftrade on
November 12, 1994.14
Another defense witness, Emelita Masangkay who worked at the Accreditation Branch of the POEA
presented a list of the accredited principals of Craftrade Overseas Developers15 and a list of processed
workers of Craftrade Overseas Developers from 1988 to 1994.16
The trial court found Chowdury guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale. It sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00. It further ordered
him to pay Aser Sasis the amount of P16,000.00, Estrella Calleja, P20,000.00 and Melvin Miranda,
P25,000.00. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the prosecution having proved the guilt
of the accused Bulu Chowdury beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in
 large scale, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
P100,000.00 under Art. 39 (b) of the New Labor Code of the Philippines. The accused is
ordered to pay the complainants Aser Sasis the amount of P16,000.00; Estrella Calleja the
amount of P20,000.00; Melvin Miranda the amount of P25,000.00.17
Chowdury appealed.
The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are:
(1) The accused undertook any recruitment activity defined under Article 13 (b) or any
prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) He did not have the license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement
of workers; and
(3) He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.18
The last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act (RA) 8042 19 states who shall be held liable for the
offense, thus:
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and
accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction
of their business shall be liable.
The Revised Penal Code which supplements the law on illegal recruitment 20 defines who are the
principals, accomplices and accessories. The principals are: (1) those who take a direct part in the
execution of the act; (2) those who directly force or induce others to commit it; and (3) those who
cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.21 The accomplices are those persons who may not be considered as principal as defined
in Section 17 of the Revised Penal Code but cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous act.22 The accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime,
and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its
commission in any of the following manner: (1) by profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to
profit by the effects of the crime; (2) by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects
or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) by harboring, concealing, or assisting
in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public
functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt at
the life of the chief executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.23
Citing the second sentence of the last paragraph of Section 6 of RA 8042, accused-appellant contends
that he may not be held liable for the offense as he was merely an employee of Craftrade and he only
performed the tasks assigned to him by his superiors. He argues that the ones who should be held liable
for the offense are the officers having control, management and direction of the agency.
As stated in the first sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons who may be held liable for illegal
recruitment are the principals, accomplices and accessories. An employee of a company or corporation
engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, 24 if it is
shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment.25 It has been held that the
existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly
and intentionally causes the corporation to commit a crime. The corporation obviously acts, and can
act, only by and through its human agents, and it is their conduct which the law must deter, The
employee or agent of a corporation engaged in unlawful business naturally aids and abets in the
carrying on of such business and will be prosecuted as principal if with knowledge of the business, its
purpose and effect, he consciously contributes his efforts to its conduct and promotion, however slight
his contribution may be.26 The law of agency, as applied in civil cases, has no application in criminal
cases, and no man can escape punishment when he participates in the commission of a crime upon the
ground that he simply acted as an agent of any party. 27 The culpability of the employee therefore
hinges on his knowledge of the offense and his active participation in its commission. Where it is
shown that the employee was merely acting under the direction of his superiors and was unaware that
his acts constituted a crime, he may not be held criminally liable for an act done for and in behalf of his
employer.28
The fundamental issue in this case, therefore, is whether accused-appellant knowingly and intentionally
participated in the commission of the crime charged.
We find that he did not.
Evidence shows that accused-appellant interviewed private complainants in the months of June, August
and September in 1994 at Craftrade's office. At that time, he was employed as interviewer of Craftrade
which was then operating under a temporary authority given by the POEA pending renewal of its
license.29 The temporary license included the authority to recruit workers. 30 He was convicted based
on the fact that he was not registered with the POEA as employee of Craftrade. Neither was he, in his
personal capacity, licensed to recruit overseas workers. Section 10 Rule II Book II of the Rules and
Regulation Governing Overseas Employment (1991) requires that every change, termination or
appointment of officers, representatives and personnel of licensed agencies be registered with the
POEA. Agents or representatives appointed by a licensed recruitment agency whose appointments are
not previously approved by the POEA are considered "non-licensee" or "non-holder of authority" and
therefore not authorized to engage in recruitment activity.31
Upon examination of the records, however, we find that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-
appellant was aware of Craftrade's failure to register his name with the POEA and that he actively
engaged in recruitment despite this knowledge. The obligation to register its personnel with the POEA
belongs to the officers of the agency. 32 A mere employee of the agency cannot be expected to know the
legal requirements for its operation. The evidence at hand shows that accused-appellant carried out his
duties as interviewer of Craftrade believing that the agency was duly licensed by the POEA and he, in
turn, was duly authorized by his agency to deal with the applicants in its behalf. Accused-appellant in
fact confined his actions to his job description. He merely interviewed the applicants and informed
them of the requirements for deployment but he never received money from them. Their payments
were received by the agency's cashier, Josephine Ong. Furthermore, he performed his tasks under the
supervision of its president and managing director. Hence, we hold that the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellant's conscious and active participation in the commission of
the crime of illegal recruitment. His conviction, therefore, is without basis.
This is not to say that private complainants are left with no remedy for the wrong committed against
them. The Department of Justice may still file a complaint against the officers having control,
management or direction of the business of Craftrade Overseas Developers (Craftrade), so long as the
offense has not yet prescribed. Illegal recruitment is a crime of economic sabotage which need to be
curbed by the strong arm of the law. It is important, however, to stress that the government's action
must be directed to the real offenders, those who perpetrate the crime and benefit from it.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
ordered to RELEASE accused-appellant unless he is being held for some other cause, and to REPORT
to this Court compliance with this order within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision. Let a copy of
this Decision be furnished the Secretary of the Department of Justice for his information and
appropriate action.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141066 February 17, 2005
EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision,1 dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the RTC, docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 7068 - 7070. The Information in Criminal Case No. 7068 alleges as follows:
That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping
with one another, knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Tagbilaran Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, draw and issue UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE
THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS ( ₱9,075.55), payable to
Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that they did not have sufficient funds
deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check to Alfredo Oculam by way of
rediscounting of the aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation of the check to the drawee
bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account of the accused with the
United Coconut Planters Bank, Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.2
The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7069 and 7070 are similarly
worded, except for the allegations concerning the number, date and amount of each check, that is:
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of
₱12,730.00;3
(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 – UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of
₱8,496.55.4
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on June 26, 1991, the two accused
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.5
The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam. He testified that: in 1989,
spouses Adronico6 and Evangeline Ladonga became his regular customers in his pawnshop business in
Tagbilaran City, Bohol;7 sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a ₱9,075.55 loan from
him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to dated July
7, 1990 issued by Adronico;8 sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May
1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of ₱12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No.
284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico;9 between May and June 1990, the
Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of ₱8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No.
106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico;10 the three checks bounced upon presentment
for the reason "CLOSED ACCOUNT";11 when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check,
despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.12
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or
the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the
obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature;13 and, that
petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.14
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment finding accused Adronico Ladonga, alias
Ronie, and Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the aforesaid three (3) criminal
cases, for which they stand charged before this Court, and accordingly, sentences them to imprisonment
and fine, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of one (1) year for each of them, and a
fine in the amount of ₱9,075.55, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 284743;
2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for each of them to one (1) year and a
fine of ₱12, 730.00, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 284744; and,
3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of one year for each of them and a
fine of ₱8,496.55 equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 106136;
4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay and reimburse the
complainant, Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the sum of ₱15,000.00 representing actual expenses incurred
in prosecuting the instant cases; ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fee; and the amount of ₱30,302.10
which is the total value of the three (3) subject checks which bounced; but without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
With Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.15
Adronico applied for probation which was granted.16 On the other hand, petitioner brought the case to
the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her
husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover,
she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.17
On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner.18 It held that the
provisions of the penal code were made applicable to special penal laws in the decisions of this Court
in People vs. Parel, 19 U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 and U.S. vs. Bruhez.21 It noted that Article 10 of the Revised
Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall be supplementary to special laws unless the latter
provide the contrary. The Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P. Blg. 22 does not prohibit the
applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the principle
of conspiracy may be applied to cases involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Lastly, it ruled that the fact
that petitioner did not make and issue or sign the checks did not exculpate her from criminal liability as
it is not indispensable that a co-conspirator takes a direct part in every act and knows the part which
everyone performed. The Court of Appeals underscored that in conspiracy the act of one conspirator
could be held to be the act of the other.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied the same in a
Resolution dated November 16, 1999.22
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT THE DRAWER OR ISSUER
OF THE THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED BUT HER CO-ACCUSED HUSBAND
UNDER THE LATTER’S ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF
BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 AS CONSPIRATOR.
2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:
A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA
BILANG 22 BY INVOKING THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE WHICH STATES:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may
be punished under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN
AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER AS CONSPIRATOR APPLYING
THE SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS LIKE
B.P. BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.23
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
because she had no participation in the drawing and issuance of the three checks subject of the three
criminal cases, a fact proven by the checks themselves. She contends that the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
She posits that the application of the principle of conspiracy would enlarge the scope of the statute and
include situations not provided for or intended by the lawmakers, such as penalizing a person, like
petitioner, who had no participation in the drawing or issuance of checks.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the declaration of the Court of
Appeals that some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of the second
sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any
prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may
be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are made
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the
RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are contradictory, a sensible
interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling with
regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory
construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones.24 Lex specialis derogant generali.
In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could have been eliminated altogether. The
second clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in
the provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should
specifically provide the contrary.
The appellate court’s reliance on the cases of People vs. Parel,25 U.S. vs. Ponte,26 and U.S. vs.
Bruhez27 rests on a firm basis. These cases involved the suppletory application of principles under the
then Penal Code to special laws. People vs. Parel is concerned with the application of Article 2228 of
the Code to violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law, with reference to the retroactive effect of
penal laws if they favor the accused. U.S. vs. Ponte involved the application of Article 1729 of the same
Penal Code, with reference to the participation of principals in the commission of the crime of
misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by Act No. 1740. U.S. vs. Bruhez covered
Article 4530 of the same Code, with reference to the confiscation of the instruments used in violation
of Act No. 1461, the Opium Law.
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus,
in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their
nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs.
People,31 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 3932
of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application of
the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert
to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise
extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals.33
All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." To be held guilty as a co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.34 The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.35
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution witness, complainant
Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present when her husband, Adronico, signed the check subject
of Criminal Case No. 7068.36 With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also did not
describe the details of petitioner’s participation. He did not specify the nature of petitioner’s
involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a direct act of participation, a direct inducement
of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act without which it
would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed
to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be
stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence.37
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in
itself amount to conspiracy.38 Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not
enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of
the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.39
As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent vintage, People vs. Mandao:40
To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a
legal concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances; as such, it must be established as
clearly as any element of the crime. Evidence to prove it must be positive and convincing, considering
that it is a convenient and simplistic device by which the accused may be ensnared and kept within the
penal fold.
Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a judgment of conviction
must always be founded on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. The Court ruled thus in People
v. Legaspi, from which we quote:
At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidence against accused-appellant Franco,
merely relied and pegged the latter’s criminal liability on its sweeping theory of conspiracy, which to
us, was not attendant in the commission of the crime.
The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be predicated on the strength of the
evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The proof against
him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.
The conscience must be satisfied that on the defense could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is
moral certainty.
Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt in
order to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. In criminal cases, moral certainty -- not mere possibility -- determines the
guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the evidence for the defense is weak, the accused
must be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven guilt with the requisite quantum of proof
required in all criminal cases. (Citations omitted)41
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner with moral certainty. Its evidence
falls short of the quantum of proof required for conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption
of the petitioner’s innocence must be upheld and she must be acquitted.1a\^/phi1.net
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443 affirming the Decision, dated August 24, 1996, of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting the
petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline
Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 190475 April 10, 2013

JAIME ONG y ONG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated 18 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
which affirmed the Decision2 dated 06 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37,
Manila. The RTC had convicted accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong) of the crime of violation of
Presidential Decree No. (P.O.) 1612, otherwise known as. the Anti-Fencing Law.
Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as follows:
That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said accused, with intent of
gain for himself or for another. did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and
acquire from unknown person involving thirteen (13) truck tires worth ₱65, 975.00, belonging to
FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y LEE, and thereafter selling One (1) truck tire knowing the same to have
been derived from the crime of robbery.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued, and the RTC found
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. The dispositive portion of its Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the prosecution has established the guilt of
the accused JAIME ONG y ONG beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1612 also known as Anti-Fencing Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
10 years and 1 day to 16 years with accessory penalty of temporary disqualification.
SO ORDERED.4
Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the records, the RTC’s
finding of guilt was affirmed by the appellate court in a Decision dated 18 August 2009.
Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.
The Facts
The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as follows:
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described as T494 1100 by
20 by 14. He acquired the same for the total amount of ₱223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber
Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of Firestone tires.
Private complainant's acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated November 10, 1994
and an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically described by their serial numbers.
Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the warehouse in
720 San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Barangay San Antonio Valley 1, Sucat, Parañaque, owned by
his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the warehouse, was in charge of the tires.
After appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the
warehouse.
On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all thirty-eight (38)
truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened. Private
complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort
Bonifacio.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous business
establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24, 1995, private complainant
chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by appellant.
Private complainant inquired if appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone
tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the description,
which private complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk
marking and the serial number thereon. Private complainant asked appellant if he had any more of such
tires in stock, which was again answered in the affirmative. Private complainant then left the store and
reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the Southern Police District.
On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation on
appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team was composed of six (6) members, led by SPO3 Oscar
Guerrero and supervised by Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private complainant's companion Tito Atienza
was appointed as the poseur-buyer.
On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with the Western Police
District, proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in the
afternoon. Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted
themselves across the street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone
truck tires available. The latter immediately produced one tire from his display, which Atienza bought
for ₱5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if he had any more in stock.
Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his warehouse, which
was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires were brought in, private complainant
entered the store, inspected them and found that they were the same tires which were stolen from him,
based on their serial numbers. Private complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the buy-bust
team confirming that the tires in appellant's shop were the same tires stolen from the warehouse.
After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team went inside
appellant's store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the confiscation of the stolen truck tires
be witnessed by representatives from the barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it was already past
10:00 in the evening when appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the police station for
investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-bust team was able to confiscate thirteen (13) tires,
including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires were confirmed by private
complainant as stolen from his warehouse.5
For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged in the
business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he had any knowledge
that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He further averred that on 18 February 1995, a
certain Ramon Go (Go) offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires allegedly from Dagat-dagatan,
Caloocan City, for ₱3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for ₱45,500, for which he was issued a Sales
Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and with the letterhead Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise
(Gold Link).6
Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his bodega. The
poseur-buyer bought the displayed tire in his store and came back to ask for more tires. Ten minutes
later, policemen went inside the store, confiscated the tires, arrested Ong and told him that those items
were stolen tires.7
The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires found in the
possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed to overcome the
presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612.8
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s findings with modification by reducing the minimum penalty
from ten (10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correcional.9
OUR RULING
The Petition has no merit.
Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall
buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or
should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been
committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and
sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the
said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.10
We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of evidence in
proving that all the elements of fencing are present in this case.
First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose testimony was
corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were
stolen – testified that the crime of robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was able
to prove ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 4565 11 dated 10 November 1994 and an
Inventory List.12 Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that robbery was reported as
evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysay13 taken at the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.14
The report led to the conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong Markerting, Paco, Manila on 27 February
1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never denied
the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not establish that
Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-
eight (38) missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial numbers of stolen
tires corresponds to those found in Ong’s possession. 15 Ong likewise admitted that he bought the said
tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of ₱45,500 where he was issued Sales Invoice No.
980.16
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should know" denote
the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance
of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. 17 Ong, who
was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four (24) years, 18 ought to have known
the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong
and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for proof of ownership of the tires. 19
The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the delivery of tires happened in just one day. 20
His experience from the business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the
tires considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was
just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.
In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated that:
Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of
the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such circumstances include the
time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with the usual practices of commerce.
The nature and condition of the goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly engaged in the
business of selling goods may likewise suggest the illegality of their source, and therefore should
caution the buyer. This justifies the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that "mere
possession of any goods, . . ., object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing" — a presumption that is, according to the Court,
"reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of . . .
possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." xxx.22
Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires.1âwphi1 Section 6 of P.D.
1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article,
item, object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure
the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the
town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the
public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from the police station for
some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a
diligent businessman who should have exercised prudence.
In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go.1âwphi1 Logically, and for
all practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction and
may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is disputable. 23 In this case,
the validity of the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove that Gold
Link and its address were fictitious.24 Ong failed to overcome the evidence presented by the
prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie
presumption under Section 5 of P.D. 1612.
Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust operation,
Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of fencing from
evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the 25
property.
The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on ₱5,075 for each tire
recovered, or in the total amount of ₱65,975. Records show that Azajar had purchased forty-four (44)
tires from Philtread in the total amount of ₱223,40 1.81. 26 Section 3 (p) of Rule 131 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides a disputable presumption that private transactions have been fair and regular.
Thus, the presumption of regularity in the ordinary course of business is not overturned in the absence
of the evidence challenging the regularity of the transaction between Azajar ,and Phil tread.
In tine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence adduced by the parties, we do not find
sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the CA affirming the trial court's conviction of Ong for violation
of P.D. 1612 and modifying the minimum penalty imposed by reducing it to six ( 6) years of prision
correccional.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 3021