SCIENCE ADVANCES | RESEARCH ARTICLE

ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCE Copyright © 2019

The Authors, some
Rapidly expanding nuclear arsenals in Pakistan rights reserved;
exclusive licensee
and India portend regional and global catastrophe American Association
for the Advancement
of Science. No claim to
Owen B. Toon1*, Charles G. Bardeen2, Alan Robock3, Lili Xia3, Hans Kristensen4, original U.S. Government
Matthew McKinzie5, R. J. Peterson6, Cheryl S. Harrison7,8, Nicole S. Lovenduski9, Richard P. Turco10 Works. Distributed
under a Creative
Pakistan and India may have 400 to 500 nuclear weapons by 2025 with yields from tested 12- to 45-kt values to a Commons Attribution
few hundred kilotons. If India uses 100 strategic weapons to attack urban centers and Pakistan uses 150, fatalities NonCommercial
could reach 50 to 125 million people, and nuclear-ignited fires could release 16 to 36 Tg of black carbon in smoke, License 4.0 (CC BY-NC).
depending on yield. The smoke will rise into the upper troposphere, be self-lofted into the stratosphere, and
spread globally within weeks. Surface sunlight will decline by 20 to 35%, cooling the global surface by 2° to 5°C
and reducing precipitation by 15 to 30%, with larger regional impacts. Recovery takes more than 10 years. Net
primary productivity declines 15 to 30% on land and 5 to 15% in oceans threatening mass starvation and addi-
tional worldwide collateral fatalities.

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INTRODUCTION nations may now hold a total of 1200 warheads. As shown in Fig. 1,
The nuclear arsenals of Britain, France, China, Israel, India, and India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear forces in 2019 each may contain 140 to
Pakistan are thought (1–3) to lie in the range of ~100 to 300 war- 150 warheads, with a possible expansion to 200 to 250 warheads in
heads each (Fig. 1). Although the use of these weapons by any of each country by 2025 (1, 3–5). Britain (~215), France (~300), China
these countries could produce a regional, and likely global, disaster, (~270), and Israel (~80) have a similar number of weapons but have
India and Pakistan are of special concern because of a long history been maintaining relatively constant arsenals (2). Estimates of the
of military clashes including serious recent ones, lack of progress in numbers of warheads possessed by India and Pakistan are based on
resolving territorial issues, densely populated urban areas, and on- the capacity of delivery systems that can be observed from remote
going rapid expansion of their respective nuclear arsenals. Here, we sensing, rather than on the amount of enriched uranium and pluto-
examine the possible repercussions of a nuclear war between India nium fuel that the countries may have produced.
and Pakistan circa 2025 in which cities are one class of target, either Pakistan has nuclear-capable aircraft (F-16A/B and Mirage III/V) with
by direct or collateral targeting. These repercussions have not been ranges up to 2100 km, eight types of land-based ballistic missiles
investigated previously. Because of the near-term regional effects of with possible ranges up to 2750 km, and two types of cruise missiles
nuclear blast, thermal radiation, and prompt nuclear radiation, we with ranges up to 350 km (4, 6). All of India can be reached by the
find that perhaps for the first time in human history, the fatalities in longest-range delivery systems. Since India has about 400 cities with
a regional war could double the yearly natural global death rate. more than 100,000 people (7), Pakistan could potentially attack
Moreover, the environmental stresses related to climate changes caused slightly more than one-third of all moderate- and large-sized cities
by smoke produced from burning cities could lead to widespread in India with its current arsenal and more than two-thirds by 2025.
starvation and ecosystem disruption far outside of the war zone itself. Kristensen (8) provides satellite images and locations for 10 facilities
in Pakistan that may be locations of missile garrisons or nuclear-­
Nuclear arsenals of India and Pakistan capable fighter-bombers. Pakistan is developing capabilities for sea-
The United States and Russia account for around 93% of the world’s based nuclear weapons. According to Pakistani officials, Pakistan’s
estimated 13,900 nuclear weapons. Seven other nuclear-armed nations
are not bound by treaties that require them to divulge information,
such as the number of strategic launchers and the number of warheads
deployed on missiles, allowing estimates of the numbers of nuclear
warheads and yields in their arsenals, but between them, the seven

1
Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, Department of Atmospheric and
Oceanic Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80303, USA. 2Atmospheric
Chemistry Observations and Modeling Laboratory, National Center for Atmospheric
Research, Boulder, CO 80307, USA. 3Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers
University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA. 4Federation of American Scientists, 1112
16th St., N.W. Suite 400, Washington, DC 20036, USA. 5Natural Resources Defense
Council, 40 West 20th St., 11th Floor, New York, NY 10011, USA. 6Department
of Physics, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309-0390, USA. 7School of
Earth, Environmental, and Marine Sciences, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley,
Port Isabel, TX 78597, USA. 8Institute of Arctic and Alpine Research, University of
Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309-0450, USA. 9Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic
Fig. 1. The number of warheads thought to be in the arsenals of Britain (blue),
Sciences, Institute of Arctic and Alpine Research, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO
80309-0450, USA. 10Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, University of France (red dashed), China (yellow dashed), India (purple), Pakistan (green),
California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA. and Israel (orange) (1–3). North Korean weapons are not shown because it is un-
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected] certain whether they have an arsenal of useable weapons.

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weapons are disassembled, and the parts are stored in several separate more than 100,000 inhabitants, so it is possible that India is sizing
locations to reduce the possibility that terrorists might capture a its nuclear forces in case of a nuclear conflict with China.
usable weapon (6). Using satellite images, expert studies, and local
news reports, Kristensen and Norris (2) identify nine locations in Scenario for war
Pakistan where nuclear weapons may be stored. Neither Pakistan nor India is likely to initiate a nuclear conflict
On the basis of the sizes of weapons tested by Pakistan in 1998, it without substantial provocation. India has declared a policy of no first
is estimated that the current weapons have yields of 5 to 12 kt (6, 8). use of nuclear weapons, except in response to an attack with biological
However, much higher yields are theoretically possible, which could or chemical weapons (5). Pakistan has declared that it would only
greatly increase both casualties and global environmental effects. use nuclear weapons if it could not stop an invasion by conventional
Pakistani scientists claim that all the weapons they tested in 1998 were means or if it were attacked by nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the
uranium-based, boosted fission weapons that can have yields of two countries have had four conventional wars (1947, 1965, 1971,
hundreds of kilotons, without the need to develop more complex and 1999) and many skirmishes with substantial loss of life since the
two-stage fission-fusion weapons. The 1998 tests did not demonstrate partition of British India in 1947. Therefore, the possibility of con-
such high yields, and it is unknown whether Pakistan has been able ventional war becoming nuclear is of concern.
to produce and deploy such high-yield warheads. Kristensen et al. Lavoy and Smith (11) discuss three plausible scenarios for a nuclear
(4) discuss the limited evidence of availability of tritium in Pakistan, war between India and Pakistan. India has conventional military
which would be needed to allow boosted weapons to be produced. superiority. India is also geographically much larger than Pakistan.
Advanced states are motivated to use boosted fission and two-stage One possible route to nuclear war involves a conventional conflict

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weapons because they are smaller and lighter weight than fission between India and Pakistan. If Pakistan perceived that India were
weapons of the same yield, making them easier to deliver by missiles about to successfully invade them, that would put pressure on Pakistan
or aircraft. Boosted weapons also require less uranium or plutonium to launch its nuclear weapons before they were overrun by the supe-
for a given yield. rior conventional Indian forces. Another possibility for starting a
Pakistan has produced tactical nuclear weapons for use on battle- nuclear conflict is that India or Pakistan could lose control of its
fields to counter the conventional weapons advantage of an invading command and control structures due to an attack on them by the
Indian army. Their current arsenal probably includes 24 tactical other side or possibly an attack by terrorists from within India or
weapons of unknown yield, but perhaps in the range of 5 to 12 kt Pakistan or from another country. In such a scenario, it is not clear
(6). Tactical and strategic weapons (which are used to attack targets who might be in control of the nuclear forces and what steps they
distant from a battlefield) can overlap in yield. The yields of advanced might take. A third possibility for starting a nuclear conflict is that
boosted fission weapons can be adjusted across a large range from India or Pakistan might mistake an attack by conventional forces,
sub-kilotons to more than 100 kt. Tactical weapons may be less or even military exercises, for an attack by nuclear forces.
secure than strategic ones and may lower the threshold for nuclear To help evaluate the consequences of a nuclear conflict between
weapons use (6). India and Pakistan, table S1 provides a specific scenario for a war
The 2018 arsenal of India is thought to contain 130 to 140 nuclear assumed to take place in 2025. Although this scenario has Pakistan
warheads, which may expand to 200 by 2025 (5). Kristensen and first launching nuclear weapons, we do not mean to imply that they
Norris (2) list five locations in India where nuclear weapons may be are more likely to do this than India. Because large numbers of
stored, but they estimate that there are others whose physical locations weapons are assumed to be used by both sides, we would expect our
have not been identified. results to be similar no matter how the war started. Moreover, we
India has nuclear-capable aircraft including Mirage 2000H and would expect the global outcomes projected here to apply equally
Jaguar IS/IB, with ranges up to 1850 km. It has four types of land- well—with relevant recalibration for weapon sizes and targets and
based ballistic missiles that have been deployed with ranges up to related smoke emissions—to any nuclear conflict between nuclear-­
3200 km and two others that are under development with ranges up armed states that involves a corresponding total yield detonated
to 5200 km. The range of these missiles allows India to reach all of essentially in urban areas.
Pakistan now, as well as all of China when its new missiles are de- Many scenarios of an India-Pakistan conflict in 2025 are possible,
ployed. India also has one deployed ship-based ballistic missile and ranging from no nuclear weapons deployed to as many as 500
two submarine-based missiles in development (9). Since Pakistan nuclear weapons—many with yields above 100 kt—detonated. We
has about 60 cities with more than 100,000 people, India could chose the scenario outlined in table S1 as plausible following advice
potentially attack each moderate- or large-sized city in Pakistan from a number of military and policy experts. In addition, the infor-
with two nuclear warheads using its current arsenal and four war- mation presented in this paper and the Supplementary Materials
heads if its arsenal grows to 250 weapons by 2025. can be used as a basis to compute the results for other scenarios. The
On the basis of the sizes of weapons tested by India in 1998, the main determinants of casualties and climate effects are the number
current weapons may have yields of 12 to 40 kt. However, higher of weapons used, the yield of the weapons, and the targets for the
yields are possible. India claims to have tested a two-stage weapon weapons, each of which is unknown in advance. The discussion in
in 1998, but the recorded yield did not indicate a successful design. the following paragraphs exemplifies scenario factors that have been
Kanwal (10), a retired Brigadier, examines the ideas of many Indian widely considered in the literature concerning conflicts between India
military leaders and suggests an Indian nuclear arsenal in 2011–2020 and Pakistan, which might be varied in alternative scenarios including
with 150 warheads, of which 134 have yields of 200 kt, whereas in the role of the number of potential targets in choosing the sizes of
2021–2030, the arsenal might contain 200 warheads all of 200-kt yield. arsenals; the characteristics, such as failure rates, of available weapons
Although India does not need so many weapons to attack Pakistan, and delivery systems; the events that might lead to an escalating
India is also concerned about China. China has about 360 cities with nuclear conflict; resolution of the Kashmir problem that might lessen

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the likelihood of a dangerous confrontation; the importance of plosions will be over isolated military, nuclear, or industrial areas.
urban targets in contributing to fatalities and climate effects owing The balance, 150 weapons, will thus be used against India’s urban
to high population densities and fuel loadings; the difficulty of pre- countervalue targets and military counterforce targets located within
venting a conflict from going nuclear because of the destabilizing urban areas.
effects of tactical nuclear weapons on both sides; the importance of The yields of modern Indian and Pakistani weapons are unknown
Indian concerns about China in making it difficult for Pakistan and and not easily constrained. India detonated a ~40-kt yield weapon
India to reduce their nuclear stockpiles; and the possible role of the in 1998, which, they claimed, was a two-stage bomb. Kanwal (10)
disproportionate sizes of the countries, militaries, and populations suggests that this design could produce 200-kt yields. Pakistan
of India and Pakistan in motivating the initial use of nuclear weapons. claimed that its weapons tested in 1998 used boosted fission. Possibly,
In the scenario outlined in table S1, we assumed that each country these could also produce yields of 200 kt. Given the lack of reliable
would have 250 nuclear weapons in 2025 (5, 9). We also adopted a information about yield, we will explore the consequences of using
highly simplified scenario in which only urban targets are considered, strategic weapons with yields of 15, 50, and 100 kt.
and these are attacked using airbursts. Many military or strategic Our scenario, as outlined in table S1, begins with a terrorist attack
targets in rural areas are likely to be attacked as well, but these on the Indian government, similar to the one that occurred on
would involve smaller populations and lower fuel loading, which 13 December 2001, but with massive fatalities among members of
would not add significantly to the near-term fatalities or smoke India’s government. As happened in January 2002, we assume that
emissions. Therefore, we do not specifically track them in our scenario. India and Pakistan mobilize their troops within a few weeks of the
Likewise, some targets, such as buried military facilities, might attract terrorist attack. Indian troops would likely be dispersed along the

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ground bursts, which would produce significant radioactive fallout border and in Kashmir. Skirmishes would break out, resulting in
and many additional fatalities—effects that are not explicitly con- deaths on both sides. Similar skirmishes happened in 2002 and now
sidered in this work. occur with regularity, most recently with a conflict in the Kashmir
India has one of the largest conventional militaries in the world, region beginning with a terrorist event on 14 February 2019. In the
with about 1.4 million active duty personnel. India has not deployed 2002 confrontation, the United States, Russia, and other countries
tactical nuclear weapons. Indian nuclear strategy requires that a sig- intervened, eventually convincing India and Pakistan to end the
nificant number of high-yield bombs be held back in case China confrontation, which had continued into the summer of 2002 until
joins a war on the side of Pakistan (10). Because Pakistan is a small Pakistan agreed to control terrorist groups within its borders.
country with only about 60 cities with more than 100,000 people, A crisis simulation exercise in Sri Lanka during 2013 organized
India would not need all of its 250 weapons to destroy Pakistan’s cities. by the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and involving retired senior
We assume that India will keep 100 nuclear weapons in its arsenal military and civilian analysts from India and Pakistan found that “a
to deter China from entering the war. Chinese involvement would limited war in South Asia will escalate rapidly into a full war with a
greatly amplify the destruction discussed below. As China expands high potential for nuclear exchange” (12). In our scenario, with the
its presence in Pakistan as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Indian government having been severely damaged, the Indian Army
Corridor, which is an element of China’s broader “Belt and Road brings a number of tanks to the border and crosses into Pakistan
Initiative,” the odds of a Pakistani-Indian war spreading to China and also crosses the Line of Control in Kashmir. On day 1 of the
would appear to be increasing. nuclear conflict, Pakistan uses 10 tactical atomic bombs with 5-kt
Of India’s 150 weapons that can be used against Pakistan, we yield inside its own borders with low air bursts against the Indian
assume that about 15% will fail. In this case, failure is primarily due tanks (table S1).
to the weapons not being delivered or failing to explode. Most urban The conflict continues on day 2 when Pakistan uses another
targets in Pakistan are so large that precise targeting is not needed 15 tactical weapons with 5-kt yield on the battlefield, whereas India
to hit them. Therefore, our scenario suggests 125 weapons actually detonates two air bursts against the Pakistani garrison in Bahawalpur
exploding. We further assume that there are 25 targets in Pakistan and deploys 18 other weapons to attack Pakistani airfields and
that are isolated military bases or industrial facilities located in regions nuclear weapons depots, partially degrading Pakistani retaliatory
with low populations and little combustible material. We do not capabilities. Nevertheless, on day 3, Pakistan responds with a barrage
include these in computing fatalities or environmental damage. There- of nuclear ballistic and cruise missiles on garrisons, weapon depots,
fore, we assume that India has 100 strategic nuclear weapons to use naval bases, and airfields in 30 locations in Indian cities (30 air
on urban countervalue targets or military counterforce targets that bursts with 15- to 100-kt yield each) plus another 15 tactical bursts
are located within urban areas, such as military bases, industrial with 5-kt yield. India also uses 10 strategic weapons against Pakistani
facilities, oil refineries, nuclear weapons facilities, and airports. military bases on day 3. Because of panic, anger, miscommunica-
Pakistan also has one of the largest militaries in the world, with tion, and protocols, escalation cannot be stopped now. On days 4 to 7,
about half as many active duty personnel as India has. We assume cities in India are hit with 120 strategic weapons, and those in Pakistan
that, in 2025, Pakistan will have 50 tactical weapons with yields of are struck with 70 air bursts with 15- to 100-kt yield. In total, Pakistan’s
5 kt to be used against an invading Indian army. We assume that 20% urban areas are hit with 100 nuclear weapons using airbursts, and
of these will fail or be overrun by the Indian Army. Many of these India’s urban areas are hit with 150 nuclear weapons using airbursts.
tactical weapons might be used in sparsely populated areas with little In addition, Pakistan has used 40 tactical nuclear weapons success-
flammable material. Accordingly, we only consider the remaining fully and 20 strategic weapons successfully on targets not in urban
200 strategic weapons when computing fatalities or smoke created areas, whereas India has used 25 strategic weapons successfully on
from fires. Of these 200 strategic weapons, we assume that 15% will targets not in urban areas.
fail to be delivered to the target but that the remaining 170 will be In previous simulations (13, 14), all of the smoke produced during
detonated over their targets. We further assume that 20 of these ex- the nuclear exchange (as described below) was initially distributed

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SCIENCE ADVANCES | RESEARCH ARTICLE

uniformly over a broad area of India and Pakistan in January 1. Casualties include fatalities, severe injuries, and lesser injuries that
Here, the smoke is injected above individual targeted urban regions can develop into more serious conditions, especially in the aftermath
(at the grid scale of the climate model) on the day of the detonations. of a nuclear attack. At that time, it was assumed (16) that India had
Hence, the smoke injection varies in location and time in accordance 85 (65 to 110) nuclear weapons and Pakistan had 52 (44 to 62), all
with the evolution of the specific war scenario (e.g., as illustrated in with 15-kt yields. These casualty and fatality estimates were made
fig. S1 for the scenario with 50-kt weapons). Further, in the present using the LandScan2003 (18) population database together with the
climate simulations, the smoke injection is assumed to start on 15 May Gaussian probability distribution for fatalities and total casualties
and extend over the duration of the exchange (e.g., 6 days for the versus distance from ground zero shown in fig. S3 (16).
case in fig. S1). We did not evaluate the sensitivity of the results to However, the urban populations of India and Pakistan are growing
the time of year the war begins. In (14), it was found that a war ini- rapidly. The total urban populations of India and Pakistan are pro-
tiated on 1 January or 15 May made little difference to the ultimate jected to increase by about 90% between 2000 and 2025, as shown in
climatic effects. On the other hand, a war occurring in Northern fig. S4 (19). The number of weapons possessed by the two countries
Hemisphere summer might lead to enhanced impacts initially, as is also thought to be increasing rapidly. By 2025, India and Pakistan
implied by earlier nuclear winter studies. could have three and five times, respectively, the number of weapons
estimated by Toon et al. (16), and these would likely have higher
yields than previously estimated (16).
RESULTS We have recomputed the fatalities and casualties for the most
Near-term fatalities and casualties from nuclear recent Indian and Pakistani urban population counts using the

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explosions in India and Pakistan: Regional catastrophe approach discussed in Methods (see below) and in Toon et al. (16).
World War II experience Figure 2 illustrates the cumulative fatalities and cumulative total
A considerable amount of information about the direct effects of casualties as a function of the number of explosions and their yield
nuclear explosions was gained from the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima derived using the LandScan2016 (20) population database. The cor-
and Nagasaki during World War II (WWII) and through the responding fatalities calculated for individual targets are given in
approximately 520 above-ground nuclear test explosions conducted the Supplementary Materials (fig. S2). Cumulative fatalities (as well
before the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmo- as overall casualties) are higher in India because it has a greater urban
sphere, in outer space, and under water. Much of this information is population. Fatalities are not linear with respect to the number, or
summarized by Glasstone and Dolan (15) for generic topographical yield, of the weapons used, because smaller cities (of which there are
situations. Of course, the nuclear weapons tests took place in areas greater numbers) have lower populations, whereas higher-yield
with little combustible material to prevent large-scale fires, so the tests weapons on these targets would encounter low-density suburban or
provide little information about ignition of fires and fire behavior in rural areas away from the city centers where lower-yield weapons
urban areas. The area destroyed in the nuclear explosions over Japanese concentrate most of their damage. Compared with India, Pakistani
cities in WWII was greater in Hiroshima (yield, ~15 kt) than in fatalities (fig. S2B) vary less with weapon yield above 15 kt, especially
Nagasaki (yield, ~20 kt), probably due to differences in topography after the most densely populated 100 targets have been attacked, due
(15). The bombed portion of Nagasaki is located in a valley, whereas to the relatively low populations of the remaining targets. India has
Hiroshima is located in a flat terrain. Therefore, in reality, not all many more moderate-sized cities than Pakistan, and fatalities continue
nuclear explosions follow the simple equations relating yields to de- to grow rapidly with yield above 15 kt, even for the 250th target (fig. S2A).
struction derived for flat terrain. For 50 weapons of 15-kt yield exploding on both India and Pakistan,
About 20 min after the Hiroshima nuclear explosion, a firestorm we find that the casualty estimates have risen relative to Toon et al.
grew from the many small fires ignited directly or indirectly by the (16) from 22 to 27 million fatalities and from 44 to 45 million to-
explosion. On the basis of the inflowing winds, the mass fire fully tal casualties (Fig. 2) due to the expanded urban populations in
developed 2 to 3 hours after the explosion and died down around LandScan2016 (20) compared to LandScan2003 (18). These increases
6 hours after the explosion (15). The energy released in this mass fire in fatalities and casualties are much less than the ~50% increase in
may have been more than 1000 times greater than the energy re- urban population between 2000 and 2015 (fig. S4), suggesting that
leased in the nuclear bomb blast (16). The area burned was about the size of the area that is urban increases more than the population
11.4 km2 according to Glasstone and Dolan (15) and 13 km2 according density within the urban region.
to Ishikawa and Swain (17). An even more marked increase in fatalities and casualties shown in
Regional nuclear war casualty estimates Fig. 2 is due to increasing numbers of weapons and increasing yields.
Even one nuclear weapon explosion in a city can do a great deal of In Fig. 2, the targets are graphed in decreasing order of the population
damage. For example, in the most densely populated urban area in density within the target area [refer to Methods and (16)]. In the
Pakistan, a 15-kt airburst at the optimum height to maximize blast scenario outlined in table S1, Pakistan is assumed to use 150 strategic
damage could kill about 700,000 people (fig. S2B) and injure another weapons on Indian urban targets and India is assumed to use
300,000. With a 100-kt airburst over the same region, roughly 2 million 100 weapons on Pakistani urban targets. The calculations use the
fatalities and an additional 1.5 million nonfatal casualties could occur. current population of India and Pakistan, not those for 2025, because it is
Similar numbers would result for nuclear explosions over large Indian not possible to forecast changing populations in individual target areas.
cities (fig. S2A). Targets that are not in urban areas are not considered, but they would
Toon et al. (16) estimated that a war between India and Pakistan lead to additional fatalities and casualties. Table S2 lists the fatalities
involving 50 nuclear weapons with 15-kt yield detonated as airbursts and casualties from the scenario given in table S1. About 50 million
over the most densely populated cities of each nation would lead to people would die if 15-kt weapons are used, almost 100 million if 50-kt
about 22 million immediate fatalities and 44 million total casualties. weapons are used, and about 125 million if 100-kt weapons are used.

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Fig. 2. The fatalities (solid lines) and total casualties (dashed lines) in millions, immediately following nuclear attacks, versus the number of targets. Results
for India (A) and Pakistan (B). Colors corespond to the yield assumed.

The population density in the target area affects the casualties, as that mass fires were started in each city, as occurred in Hiroshima.
well as the estimated fuel load. Table S3 lists the population and It is likely that some of the 45 strategic weapons assumed to be used

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population densities for the densest urban areas attacked and the least against isolated military targets, and some of the 40 tactical weapons,
dense. The population density in the target area usually declines as will be exploded as ground bursts. The direct casualties and fatalities
the yield increases because more suburban areas are included in the from ground bursts may be relatively small. However, ground bursts
larger areas that are damaged by higher-yield weapons. In some cases, carry soil into the fireball, where very small radioactive particles can
especially for low-population regions in Pakistan, the population may attach themselves to the dust particles. The relatively large dust par-
decrease with yield because different urban areas are chosen as the ticles are likely to fall out of the atmosphere within a few days, when
last target for differing yields. The highest population densities in the radioactive particles are still very dangerous. Large numbers of
table S3 are in the range of 37,000 to 80,000 people/km2. The popu- fatalities and casualties, potentially larger than the values given in
lation density in the area of the mass fire in Hamburg during WWII table S2 and Fig. 2, can be caused by exposure to this radioactive
is estimated to have been about 20,000 people/km2 (21). Similarly, material within a few days of the explosions.
the population density for the 150th weapon used on India is between Other considerations
17,000 and 4900 people/km2 and that for the 100th weapon used on Although the probability curves used here to determine fatalities and
Pakistan is between 8500 and 1600 people/km2. For reference, the total casualties caused by airbursts have been crudely “calibrated”
population density of 1980s San Jose, California, a suburban city, by the experience during WWII, the current estimates for a modern
was estimated to be about 1300 people/km2 (16). regional conflict involves a number of uncertainties that are difficult
During WWII, it is estimated that about 50 million people were to reduce. Among the principal unknowns are the target points and
killed, not considering those who died from disease and starvation the number and size of weapons used. There are many possible
over 6 years [e.g., (22)]. Because of the dense populations of cities in scenarios for a war, which can only be speculated upon in advance.
Pakistan and India, table S2 shows that even a war with 15-kt weapons Moreover, local environmental conditions—winds, humidity, pre-
could lead to fatalities approximately equal to those worldwide in cipitation, and so on—must be assumed from a wide range of possi-
WWII and a war with 100-kt weapons could directly kill about bilities. However, the core factual basis for the present estimates has
2.5 times as many as died worldwide in WWII, and in this nuclear been established through independent studies cited above. One can
war, the fatalities could occur in a single week. The world’s annual also question the use of probability curves based on data from Hiroshima
death rate from all causes is about 56 million people per year (23). in determining the ability of people in 21st-century cities to survive
Therefore, a war between India and Pakistan in our scenario with a nearby nuclear explosion. The probability curves adopted here
15-kt weapons could kill the same number of people in a week as correspond to physical processes triggered by nuclear detonations
would die naturally worldwide in a year, effectively increasing the (principally thermal radiation and blast) that are likely to be lethal
immediate global death rate by a factor of 50. A regional catastrophe even in modern buildings and settings (fig. S3). We do not differentiate
would occur if India and Pakistan were to engage in a full-scale nuclear casualties between mass fires in high winds, where conflagrations
war with their expanding arsenals. occur and fire spread is likely (24, 25), and mass fires in low winds,
India would suffer two to three times more fatalities and casualties where firestorms develop and limited spreading is expected, as there
than Pakistan (table S2) because, in our scenario, Pakistan uses more is insufficient information available to make such a distinction
weapons than India and because India has a much larger population quantitatively. Fire spread is likely to increase the ultimate casualty
and more densely populated cities. However, as a percentage of the number, but it may also allow more people to flee from the fire.
urban population, Pakistan’s losses would be about twice those of
India. In general, as shown in Fig. 2, the fatalities and casualties Global climate perturbations due to nuclear conflict
increase rapidly even up to the 250th explosion due to the high popu- between India and Pakistan: Global catastrophe
lation in India, whereas the rate of increase for Pakistan is much Turco et al. (26, 27) showed that smoke from fires started in cities
lower even for the 50th explosion. by nuclear explosions could cool Earth’s climate so much that agri-
The fatalities and casualties outlined in table S2, Fig. 2, and fig. S2 culture would fail globally, leading to mass starvation. These early
are computed, assuming airbursts used against urban targets, and studies are supported by current climate model simulations (28, 29).

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Following a full-scale nuclear war involving the United States, Europe, currently available, we conclude that there is a general, if some-
Russia, and China using current arsenals, Toon et al. (30) estimated what tentative, consistency among the various studies mentioned
that 180 Tg (1 Tg = 1 Mt = 1012 g) of black carbon (BC) could be above.
generated by a total of 4400 explosions of 100-kt weapons in urban 3. With regard to fire behavior, we assume that either (i) a firestorm
areas, about half the arsenals of Russia, China, Britain, France, and would develop following a nuclear detonation in some number of
the United States, assuming a yield that is lower than the average cities, as happened at Hiroshima (and following the conventional
yield. Robock et al. (28), using a modern global climate model and bombing of Hamburg during WWII, for example), or (ii) a large-
assuming 150 Tg of smoke emitted in a superpower nuclear war scale spreading conflagration would evolve in other urban areas, as
[consistent with (30)], predicted a full-blown nuclear winter, with happened with the conventional bombing of Tokyo and other cities
temperatures in mid-latitude grain-growing regions held below during WWII. Further, in either case (i) or (ii), we assume that
freezing for several years, destroying much of the world’s agricultural similar total quantities of fuel would eventually be consumed, and
productivity. similar amounts of smoke would be lofted, after taking into account
Robock et al. (31) and Toon et al. (16) showed that a conflict fire behavior (see the discussion below and also item 4). One charac-
between India and Pakistan with 50 weapons of 15-kt yield used by teristic that is not explicitly factored into our calculations is the
each side that generated 5 Tg of BC would produce large climate difference in the period of time each type of fire would last, in general
changes as supported by additional studies with other models being longer for a conflagration as compared to a firestorm. This
(13, 14, 32, 33). Mills et al. (13, 14) also found large ozone losses. factor is not significant for the present global climate analysis.
These climate changes are large enough to significantly damage Following Glasstone and Dolan (15), firestorms result when

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agriculture worldwide (34–36). Here, we compute the smoke-generated “many fires merge to form a single convective column ... rising from
and climate changes for the scenario outlined in table S1 for possible the burning area” and with “strong, fire-induced radial (inwardly
Pakistani and Indian nuclear arsenals of 2025. directed) winds … virtually everything combustible within the
Smoke and BC (soot) emission estimates firestorm area is eventually destroyed.” On the basis of WWII expe-
As discussed by Toon et al. (16, 30), we compute the amount and rience with 69 mass fires in Japan and others in Germany, Glasstone
properties of smoke lofted to the upper troposphere in a sequence and Dolan (15) conclude that firestorms can occur under the following
of steps, which are outlined below. conditions: a fuel loading of at least 4 g/cm2, half the structures in an
1. We first assume that the area subject to fire ignition for a 15-kt area aflame simultaneously, ambient winds less than 3.6 m/s, and a
nuclear explosion is the same as that observed in Hiroshima (13 km2). minimum burning area of about 1.3 km2. For a 15-kt explosion, the
For different yields, we take the area subject to fire as proportional minimum required fire ignition area is exceeded by roughly an
to the yield (15). order of magnitude. Table S3 also indicates that fuel loads needed to
2. The fuel loading in the fire zone is determined using a recent establish firestorms are generally exceeded, except in the case of
population database (20) by allocating to each person in the area burned large-yield weapons detonated over smaller Pakistani cities, where
11,000 kg of flammable material consisting of construction materials, the requisite fuel load may be exceeded only within the city center.
furnishings, clothing, asphalt roofs, plastics, fuels, and other flam- Moreover, it is clear that wind speeds may exceed the threshold for
mables in their homes, places of work, schools, stores, gas stations, firestorm formation in some places at certain times. The WWII
and so on. This fuel allocation is based on studies of the quantities mass fires were generally much smaller than those that would be
of combustible materials present in the developed world in the started by nuclear weapons considered here, so these firestorm con-
1980s (27), as well as limited specific assessments of actual fuel ditions may not be applicable.
availability in the relatively densely populated urban area of WWII Mass fires, consisting of numerous fires burning simultaneously
Hamburg, Germany (various estimates yielding 12 to 47 g/cm2), and over a large area, may grow into massive conflagrations instead of
more sparsely populated 1990 residential San Jose, California firestorms when winds are high. Conflagrations have moving fire
(1.34 g/cm2) (14, 37). fronts and can continue to spread as long as there is sufficient fuel.
Reisner et al. (38) introduced a new technique to determine fuel High winds can drive and intensify such fires. Conflagrations,
loads in the United States using census data for urban fuels. Our unlike firestorms, may be started at a single ignition point and are
estimated fuel load for their sparsely populated target location near commonly associated with large forest fires burning along a widening
Atlanta (0.87 g/cm2) is within about 20% of their value. We have frontal line. Conflagrations in forests generally consume readily
also used urban data from Washington, DC, to project a fuel load of ignitable fuels, such as the crowns of the trees and forest under-
4 g/cm2, which agrees within a few percentage with the mass per growth, but not living tree trunks [for example, see (41, 42)]. How-
person estimated in (27). Larson and Small (39) suggested that, ever, nuclear conflagrations in urban areas would likely be much
within the inner 2-km radius of urban cores in three classes of more intense—owing to the many simultaneous starting points and
American cities circa 1980, fuel loadings were 23, 41, and 63 g/cm2. heavy, highly flammable fuel loading. Moreover, given their pro-
Fuel loads in the major cities of Pakistan and India—summarized in pensity to spread outside of the initial ignition zone, conflagrations
table S3—are generally predicted to be in that same range. Unfortu- in urban settings could eventually consume as much fuel as a
nately, less information is available to test these fuel values for Pakistan stationary firestorm, and perhaps more. Intense conflagrations are
and India. Although Toon et al. (16) suggest that fuel burdens might also observed to deposit smoke in the upper troposphere, and even
be only half as large in the less developed world as in the developed the lower stratosphere, presumably by inducing strong pyroconvection
world, this result is skewed by the inclusion of rural areas in the at the fire front (41–44). Accordingly, both firestorms and confla-
overall estimate. More directly, fuel loadings in Indian office build- grations ignited by nuclear fireballs may ultimately have similar
ings were found to be similar to those in British office buildings (40). impacts on fuel consumption and, depending on fire intensity, smoke
In summary, considering the urban fuel loading models and data injection heights.

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4. An important assumption in the present work is that all of the altitude range (46). Therefore, we do not inject any smoke directly
available fuel in the initial target-area fire zone is consumed when a into the stratosphere. However, any smoke that might stabilize in
firestorm develops. Although it is clear that this would be an upper the lower troposphere may be lofted too high.
limit, several factors mitigate toward this result. For example, accounts 7. On the basis of limited observations of pyrocumulus clouds
from WWII urban firestorms, such as those in Hiroshima and (16), we assume that 20% of the BC is removed by rainfall during
Hamburg, are consistent with nearly complete fuel consumption. injection into the upper troposphere. Further smoke is rained out
Firefighting and suppression in nuclear attack zones would be effec- by the climate model before the smoke is lofted into the stratosphere
tively impossible, allowing fires to burn to completion. In addition, by solar heating of the smoke. The fraction of the injected mass that
blast waves would release and disperse highly flammable fuels from is present in the model over 15 years is shown in fig. S5. In the first
storage tanks of all sizes, as well as piping and pipelines, and shatter few days after the injection, 10 to 15% of the smoke is removed in
and expose otherwise shielded fuels such as framing and building the climate model before reaching the stratosphere. Therefore, in
contents, leading to a more violent conflagration. Accordingly, the total, 30 to 35% of the smoke is removed by rainfall before it enters
massive size and intensity of nuclear urban fires would most likely the stratosphere.
incinerate or pyrolyze a much larger fraction of available fuel than Uncertainty in smoke parameters
with smaller-scale localized combustion. It is clear that imprecise knowledge regarding fire ignition and growth,
On the other hand, it is also likely that in blast-damaged regions and smoke composition, emission, and lofting, which are closely
of a city center, some otherwise available fuel would be covered by related to fuel loading and consumption, introduces significant un-
rubble and would not completely burn. In a nuclear airburst, reinforced certainty into all nuclear war climatic scenarios. Although all of these

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concrete structures within the 140-kPa (20 psi) blast overpressure uncertain factors have been discussed extensively in the literature
region can be destroyed. However, if the height of burst is optimized [e.g., (16, 26, 27, 47)], some of the key parameters have not yet been
to produce such a blast pressure, the area of such destruction for a 15-kt sufficiently constrained to provide final assurance in climate pre-
airburst represents roughly 14% of the area within the 400,000 J m−2 dictions. Moreover, the parameterization of nuclear-initiated fires
(~10 cal cm−2) fire ignition zone, and for a 100-kt blast, roughly 8%. used in this work is, by necessity, highly simplified and not specific
Since, in most cases, the fuel density would be greater in the high to any particular potential target. Nevertheless, there has been sufficient
overpressure zone, a larger fraction of the total fuel in the fire zone vetting of the physics and chemistry of potential nuclear warfare—
would be effectively buried—perhaps 20% or more, depending on including actual experience with nuclear attacks on cities in addition
the precise targets and weapons used. Owing to other sources of to large-scale testing, studies of basic processes under laboratory and
uncertainty in the fuel consumption estimation and the difficulty in field conditions, and theoretical modeling and analysis at all relevant
determining a reasonable fuel sequestration factor due to rubble, we spatial and temporal scales—that we consider the results presented
have ignored this effect in the current analysis until more information here to be the most realistic currently possible.
is available. There have been contrary assessments of the possible impacts of
In the case of conflagrations, we allow that 50% of the fuel within nuclear attacks on the global climate and environment. For example,
the initial ignition zone would be burned, but that fire spread outside most recently, a high-resolution modeling study (38) purported to
the area affected by thermal pulse would effectively double the fuel demonstrate that a nuclear fire initiated by a 15-kt explosion in India
eventually consumed (24, 25). These assumptions are not inconsistent or Pakistan would not loft enough smoke into the upper troposphere
with a significant impact on fuel consumption due to rubble formation to contribute to widespread effects. However, that conclusion was
in the blast zone. based on a single simulation of such a detonation over a sparsely
5. We use an average BC (or soot) emission factor for burned populated area about 8 km from the city center of Atlanta, Georgia.
fuel based on studies summarized by Turco et al. (26), yielding 0.02 g Significantly, the adopted fuel loading in the affected area (1.07 g/cm2
BC/g fuel burned. The less-absorbing organic carbon fraction of in the ignition zone) was about one order of magnitude smaller than
smoke that is typically mixed with the BC is ignored here. Other that in the most sparsely populated urban area considered in the
independent estimates of the total mass of emitted smoke may or present study, i.e., the 100th city attacked in Pakistan (refer to table S3).
may not include the mass of organic carbon in addition to BC. Accordingly, the preliminary findings in (38) are not representative
Accordingly, some care must be taken in comparing smoke estimates of the fires that need to be considered in assessing the potential impacts
from different sources, as well as those quoted in assessments of of a conceivable nuclear conflict having regional or global extent.
impacts. The measured BC fraction of smoke can range widely from Smoke emission scenarios
close to 90% to less than a few percentage, depending on the material Because our global climate model has limited spatial and temporal
burned and the flaming conditions that apply. For example, flaming resolutions compared to the scales of individual nuclear blast zones
combustion in forest fires may have a modest BC component, and fires, the smoke emissions determined for various attack scenarios
whereas the smoldering smoke has very little BC. On the other have been inserted into the climate model, consistent with model
hand, burning fossil fuels have very high BC content. Our adopted resolution and the smoke parameterization described earlier.
average BC emission factor above has been derived by considering Figure 3 shows the cumulative mass of BC that is inserted into
the range of fuel types and combustion conditions expected under the 300- to 150-hPa region (after rainout), with targets number-­
nuclear attack scenarios (16, 26, 27, 45). ordered by population. The BC emitted by individual targets is
6. Considering several studies summarized in (16, 27), we assume illustrated in fig. S2, which shows that, depending on yield, 10 to
that smoke generated by all nuclear bomb fires is initially injected 25 targets in Pakistan and 15 to 125 cities in India could each produce
into the 300- to 150-hPa pressure region of the upper troposphere more than 0.1 Tg of BC. Nuclear explosions in Pakistan generate far
(~9 to ~13.5 km). For latitudes from the equator to 35°N in the area less BC than those in India for the same yield owing to the lower
of India and Pakistan, the cold point tropopause is in the 16- to 19-km populations in Pakistan and the less dense urban areas after approximately

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A B

Fig. 4. Changes in amount of atmospheric aerosol and of solar energy at Earth’s sur-
Fig. 3. Mass of black carbon (BC) injected into the atmosphere after prompt face after nuclear exchange. Visible wavelength aerosol optical depth versus time (A) and
rainout (300- to 150-hPa region) for a given number of targets ordered by the the change in shortwave surface energy relative to normal as a function of time (B) for varying
population. Indian targets are given as dotted lines, whereas Pakistan targets are amounts of BC emitted in the nuclear exchange. Color coding designates the BC injection.
given as solid lines. Color coding designates yield.

mass and injecting about 15,000 Tg of BC into the upper atmosphere.

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the 10 most populated cities are considered. The total BC emitted A brief outline of this model is given in Methods.
from a war in which 50 weapons with a 15-kt yield are used to attack Figure 4 shows the visible wavelength aerosol optical depth and
each country is about 8.7 Tg. Toon et al. (16) estimated that 6.6 Tg the changes in solar energy at Earth’s surface. There are results for
would be generated using the LandScan2003 database. The 30% six BC injections including the three scenarios defined in table S1
increase in predicted BC emissions between 2003 and 2016 is due to using possible yields of 15-, 50-, or 100-kt weapons, resulting in BC
the growing urban populations over this period, as shown in fig. S4 injections of 16.1, 27.3, and 36.6 Tg, respectively. The 5-Tg case is
(by ~50% between 2000 and 2016). based on estimates made in 2008 for Indian and Pakistan arsenals at
For the scenario in table S1 with 100 nuclear weapons used by that time (13, 14, 16, 31–36). The 46.8-Tg case would result from
India on Pakistan and 150 nuclear weapons used by Pakistan on India, 250 weapons of 100-kt yield used against urban areas in India and
there are (Fig. 3) 16.1 Tg of BC injected into the upper troposphere Pakistan, which is likely an upper limit for a conflict between India
(11 from India and 5.1 from Pakistan) for yields of 15 kt, 27.3 Tg and Pakistan, unless they have weapons with yields that are higher
(19.8 from India and 7.5 from Pakistan) for 50-kt weapons, and 36.6 Tg than 100 kt. By way of contrast with earlier nuclear winter scenarios,
(27.5 from India and 9.1 from Pakistan) for 100-kt weapons. These the green curves in Fig. 4 correspond to an injection of 150 Tg of BC
injection amounts are after considering the 20% removal of smoke over Russia and the United States, based on a scenario for a major
by precipitation in the rising pyrocumulus. nuclear war between these two superpowers (28–30).
These BC injections are of considerable concern for the climate. The primary mechanism leading to climate changes after a
The greatest known natural injection of BC into the stratosphere of nuclear conflict is absorption of solar radiation by smoke from
~6 × 10−3 Tg occurred during August 2017 from forest fires in British burning cities. The direct solar beam is diminished in proportion to
Columbia (42, 43). These fires led to radiatively forced rise of the the inverse of the exponential of the aerosol optical depth. The initial
smoke from 12 to above 23 km in about 2 months, radiatively driven global average aerosol optical depths range from less than 0.1 to
hemispheric distribution of the smoke in the stratosphere, as well as greater than 2 for the cases considered in Fig. 4A. After 9 years, the
temperature changes in the smoky layer due to heating by smoke, 150-Tg optical depth is about equal to the initial optical depth of the
and ozone changes in the smoke due to vertical transport of low ozone 5-Tg case. The optical depth in the 150-Tg case is lower than some
air from the troposphere. The amount of BC in our 15-kt scenario is of the other cases after 10 years because the larger BC emission has
almost 3000 times more than in this forest fire injection. led to the formation of larger particles via coagulation, and these
In forest fires, only a small fraction of the fuel is consumed. The have been more rapidly removed by sedimentation. The downward
values for fuel burned in the British Columbia forest fire (42) are 10 solar energy (Fig. 4B) reaching the surface declines in proportion to
to 25% of the fuel load expected in boreal forests. In addition, the the increase of optical depth. The solar energy reaching the surface
accessible fuel loading is substantially lower in forests than in urban before the war is about 160 W m−2. The fractional energy losses in
areas. In total, the fuel burned in the urban areas in our 15-kt scenario Fig. 4B range from ~20 to 40% (~32 to ~64 W m−2) for our conflict
is about 60 times greater than estimated for typical forest fires. Our scenario (table S1) over the range of possible yields of 15-, 50-, or
BC emission fractions are also about 50 times greater than in the 100-kt weapons. For reference, the maximum average solar radiative
forest fire case because the materials burned in urban mass fires pro- loss following the Mt. Pinatubo volcanic eruption in 1991 was about
duce more BC than does burning organic forest material in line fires. 4 W m−2 (49), whereas the radiative reductions proposed for climate
Climate simulations geoengineering schemes to offset global warming due to green-
We have conducted a series of simulations using a configuration of house gas emissions are of a similar magnitude. In addition, by
the National Science Foundation/Department of Energy (DOE) comparison, a full-scale nuclear war between Russia and the United
Community Earth System Model (CESM) that is similar to that used States might produce a peak solar radiation loss at the surface of
in (48) to simulate the climate and atmospheric chemistry after the ~75% (120 W m−2) (28).
asteroid impact that killed the nonavian dinosaurs and many other With a loss of solar radiation at the surface, the surface cools and
species 66 million years ago by igniting most of Earth’s land bio- evaporation, convection, and precipitation are reduced. Figure 5A

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A B rainfall on average. Of greater significance to surviving populations

are the large decreases in rainfall predicted over densely populated
regions such as India and central China where precipitation almost
ceases. The U.S. Northeast and Midwest lose more than 50% of
their rainfall.
Although not illustrated here, and contrary to the response of
temperatures at the surface, stratospheric air temperatures increase
sharply because of sunlight absorption by injected BC (31–33). Such
heating has previously been shown to cause large depletions of
stratospheric ozone (13, 14). It might be worth noting at this point
that climate geoengineering proposals are based on reducing solar
Fig. 5. Temporal variation in global precipitation and temperature following insolation by injecting stratospheric particles—such as sulfuric acid
a nuclear conflict. (A) Global average precipitation and (B) global average temperature, aerosol—that mainly scatter sunlight rather than absorbing it specifi-
expressed as a percentage of control run values. Color coding designates the amount cally to avoid the heating and ozone loss problem. However, sulfuric
of BC emitted. The vertical purple bar represents the range of temperatures during the acid particles may still lead to ozone depletion through surface-­
height of the Last Glacial Maximum about 20,000 years ago.
catalyzed chemical reactions [e.g., (13, 14)].
Impact on net primary productivity
indicates simulated global average precipitation losses from 15 to 30% One measure of the impact of these climate changes on life on Earth

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for our scenario over the range of possible yields of 15-kt (16.1 Tg of BC), is the change in net primary productivity (NPP). NPP represents
50-kt (27.3 Tg), or 100-kt (36.6 Tg) weapons. A war between the the net amount of inorganic carbon (mainly in the form of carbon
United States and Russia could reduce precipitation by nearly 60%. dioxide) converted into organic plant matter through photosynthesis
Figure 5B shows that the global average surface temperature drops after accounting for plant respiration. NPP is typically expressed as
between 1.25° and 6.5°C over several years for our scenario. These grams of carbon per square meter per year (gC m−2 year−1), where
perturbations reach their peak about 3 years after the conflict and instantaneous rates of NPP may be scaled to equivalent annual values
are near the peak value for about 4 years. It takes more than a (51). Like the climate simulations, NPP is calculated here using the
decade for temperatures and precipitation to return to normal. The CESM, which includes both a land component [Community Land
Last Glacial Maximum, 20,000 years ago, had a global temperature Model (CLM)] and ocean biogeochemistry module [Biogeochemical
decline of about 3° to 8°C relative to preindustrial temperatures, but Elemental Cycling (BEC)]. These various models are more fully de-
these temperature decreases persisted for thousands of years (50). scribed in Methods. In CESM, NPP can be reduced on land through
Illustrations of postconflict temperature and precipitation anoma- reductions in solar radiation, temperature, and precipitation. In the
lies over the major landmasses and oceans are presented in figs. S6 oceans, NPP can decrease in response to declines in solar radiation
and S7. The average global land temperature (fig. S6B) declines by and temperature and may be further modified through associated
as much as ~4° to ~8°C for the present war scenario over the range changes in circulation and vertical mixing, which affect nutrient de-
of yields between 15 and 100 kt (BC emissions between 16 and 36 Tg). livery and effective light availability.
In contrast, annual average temperature decreases over land had been Figure 6 (A and B) shows global ocean and land NPP variations,
predicted to reach ~18°C for a full-scale nuclear winter. In the current respectively, for a range of war scenarios. Globally integrated ocean
scenario, globally averaged ocean surface temperatures (fig. S6A) NPP declines by a maximum of 10 to 20%, whereas terrestrial NPP
decline by ~1 to almost 3°C for the range of yields assumed, whereas can drop by 15 to 30% for several years for the range of yields between
predicted anomalies reached ~6°C in the case of a superpower nu- 15 and 100 kt (Fig. 6). NPP recovers after about 10 years. Imhoff et al.
clear conflict. The ocean temperatures are expected to decrease in a (51) estimated that the global annual land NPP is about 56.8 PgC/year
layer extending roughly to the average thermocline depth [for ex- (1 Pg = 1015 g). They further estimated that humans use 8.00 to
ample, as discussed in (48) for even larger smoke injections inferred 14.81 PgC/year or about 14 to 26% of NPP. Therefore, the projected
at the geologic boundary marking the extinction of the dinosaurs]. loss of NPP is comparable to the total amount people use each year.
Although cooling and precipitation reduction are global in scale, these In some regions, large fractions of local land NPP are appropriated
changes vary regionally to a large extent. Postconflict temperature by humans (51). For example, Western Europe uses 72%, south
anomalies over land and ocean surfaces for the 50-kt (27.3 Tg) scenario central Asia uses 80%, and East Asia uses 63% of NPP. Most of India,
are illustrated in fig. S6C, showing that cooling of the Northern eastern China, parts of the Middle East, and areas of equatorial Africa
Hemisphere continents is stronger than that of the Southern Hemisphere; consume more than 100% of local NPP. Hence, in these places, there
temperature drops greater than 10°C occur across North America is little or no margin for the loss of potential NPP following a re-
and Europe north of about 30° latitude, with cooling up to 5°C over gional nuclear conflict as described here.
all continents; ocean temperatures decrease in many regions by an For an India-Pakistan nuclear scenario using 50-kt weapons, ter-
average of 5°C, with greater reductions in the Northwest Atlantic. restrial NPP reductions are much higher in the Northern Hemisphere than
Similar spatial patterns of temperature anomalies were found for larger in the global average (Fig. 6, C and D), reaching 100% at latitudes
and smaller soot injections. Postconflict precipitation anomalies over north of about 60°N, averaged over the first 3 years after war. Major
land and oceans for the 50-kt (27.3 Tg) scenario are illustrated in crop-growing regions of North America and Eurasia experience
fig. S7. Increased precipitation occurs in some areas, mainly because declines of NPP averaging 25 to 50% over this time. Very large reduc-
these regions are currently under the descending branches of the tions in NPP occur in India, China, Southeast Asia, and Indonesia, as
Hadley circulation. The descending air normally suppresses rainfall, well as in tropical South America and Africa. Ocean reductions in
but global cooling weakens the Hadley circulation, leading to more NPP are highest in the Arctic, where production is almost entirely

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A B

C D

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Fig. 6. Net primary productivity after nuclear war. Globally integrated monthly averaged NPP as a percentage of the baseline (control run) values as a function of time: over
the oceans (A) and landmasses (B). Results are shown for each of the war scenarios described in the text. Color coding designates the corresponding BC injection amounts. As in
Fig. 5, the full nuclear winter injection case (150 Tg, green line) is shown for contrast. (C) Global distribution of annual average NPP for the baseline control run. (D) Change from
the baseline averaged over the second calendar year following a nuclear conflict, which starts in May of year 1 for the scenario with 50-kt weapons and a 27-Tg injection of BC.

extinguished. In addition, in many regions where major fisheries exist, from the detonation point, or “ground zero,” using the probability
production is significantly reduced, including the North Atlantic distribution curves defined in fig. S3. Total fatalities and casualties
and North Pacific, where NPP decreases by 25 to 50%. Together, the for particular war scenarios were then determined by summing up
reductions in temperature, primary productivity, and precipitation the results from individual bursts. For a 15-kt weapon, we chose
suggest major disruptions to human and natural systems worldwide. target sites by first calculating the total population within a 2-km
radius around each grid cell in the LandScan2016 population database
(20), where LandScan provides the 24-hour average population
DISCUSSION aggregated into cells that are 30 arc sec on a side—an area less than
India and Pakistan may be repeating the unfortunate example set by 1 km2 at the latitudes of interest. Subsequently, we selected the most
the United States and Russia during the “cold war” era: that is, populated of these 2-km-radius regions as target points. However,
building destructive nuclear forces far out of proportion to their role we did not permit any of the 2-km zones to overlap, so that bursts are
in deterrence. Should a war between India and Pakistan ever occur, spatially well separated. Moreover, we did not consider the accumulated
as assumed here, these countries alone could suffer 50 to 125 million casualties from multiple bursts in overlapping damage zones. In practice,
fatalities, a regional catastrophe. In addition, severe short-term climate for the most densely populated regions, fatalities from the blast and
perturbations, with temperatures declining to values not seen on thermal radiation of a 15-kt explosion did not occur beyond about
Earth since the middle of the last Ice Age, would be triggered by 5 km from ground zero, and minor injuries did not occur beyond
smoke from burning cities, a global disaster threatening food pro- about 9 km (fig. S3). For yields greater than 15 kt, we took the affected
duction worldwide and mass starvation, as well as severe disruption area to scale linearly with yield and, thus, the population density target
to natural ecosystems. Compounding the devastation brought upon search radius scales as the nominal 2-km radius times the square root
their own countries, decisions by Indian and Pakistani military of the alternative yield divided by 15 kt [e.g., the 50-kt target population
leaders and politicians to use nuclear weapons could severely affect density was calculated over an area of 2 × (50/15)1/2 ~3.7-km radius].
every other nation on Earth. Further discussion of the target selection criteria and application to
nuclear war scenarios can be found in our earlier work [e.g., (16)].
We used the CESM (52–54), a fully coupled climate model that
METHODS includes atmosphere, ocean, land, and sea-ice components. We used
To compute the number of fatalities and casualties from a nuclear the Whole Atmosphere Community Climate Model (WACCM),
detonation in a specific location, we numerically integrated the version 4, as the atmospheric component (55). WACCM is a “high-
product of the spatially varying population density in that region top” chemistry-climate model, with an upper boundary located near
and the probability of fatality or casualty as a function of distance 140-km geometric altitude; it has a horizontal resolution of 1.9° × 2.5°

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(latitude × longitude) and a variable vertical resolution averaging included in simulations of regional nuclear war by Pausata et al. (33)
1.25 km from the boundary layer to near 1 hPa, 2.5 km in the mesosphere, who found that the added organics increase the surface cooling but
and 3.5 km in the lower thermosphere, above about 0.01 hPa. that the larger particle size reduces the lifetime of the aerosols and,
WACCM was used as the atmospheric model to be able to simulate thus, the duration of the climate effects, from ~20 to ~10 years. Although it
the physical and chemical consequences of injection and lofting of would be desirable to treat the smoke as an internal mixture of BC and
BC to great heights in the atmosphere. To represent the evolution of organics, the emission factors for all of the smoke components and
a massive injection of smoke accurately, we coupled WACCM with the oxidation pathways for the many organic components are poorly
the Community Aerosol and Radiation Model for Atmospheres defined and beyond the current capabilities of our model. The op-
(CARMA) (56). CARMA is a sectional aerosol parameterization that tical depth of organic and/or water-coated soot particles can be about
resolves the aerosol size distribution and allows the size distribution 1.5 times larger than for pure soot particles (63). Thus, our simula-
of the aerosols to evolve freely, which is necessary when simulating tions may underestimate the total absorption of the soot particles;
large aerosol injections, as in this study. CARMA aerosols are ad- on the other hand, these particles would also be larger, with reduced
vected by WACCM, are subject to wet and dry deposition, affect the lifetimes (33).
surface albedo when they are incorporated into snow, and are in- CESM version 1.3 is coupled with the ocean component known
cluded in the WACCM radiative transfer calculation. as the Parallel Ocean Program (POP) version 2 (64), with ocean bio-
Soot was treated as a fractal aggregate for both microphysics and geochemistry simulated by the BEC model (65), and the land com-
radiative transfer (57), and coagulation of soot particles was considered. ponent CLM version 4 (CLM4) with carbon-nitrogen cycle (CLM4CN)
The fractal particles have a monomer size of 30 nm, a fractal dimen- on (66). BEC includes three explicit phytoplankton functional groups

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sion varying between 1.5 and 3.0, and a packing coefficient of 1 (57). (diatoms, diazotrophs, and picophytoplankton) and one implicit
The shortwave optical properties of the fractal soot particles are de- group (calcifiers) subject to multiple nutrient limitation (N, P, Si,
pendent on monomer size, which is fixed at emission, but as observed and Fe) (65). Ocean net primary production is calculated as the sum
(58) are largely independent of particle size, which does increase of the carbon fixation by the three groups of phytoplankton over the
due to coagulation caused by the large soot emissions used in our top 150 m of the water column (67). CLM4CN specifies 15 plant
simulations. The Rapid Radiative Transfer Model for General Circula- functional types over vegetated land units and simulates vegetation
tion Models (RRTMG) (59), a radiation package within CESM, was changes with a fully prognostic treatment of the terrestrial carbon
used to include the radiative effects of the impact-generated aerosols. and nitrogen cycle, including interactions with biological mechanisms
Optical properties for the soot aggregates were calculated using a of plants and soil heterotrophs.
mean field approximation (60) assuming a real refractive index of Our previous modeling of a nuclear conflict between India and
1.95 and an imaginary refractive index of 0.79. Pakistan (13, 14) differs in major alterations in the war scenarios
The burdens of soot aerosol considered here cause large tem- and significantly in the mass of BC injected, as well as in the treatment
perature changes in the stratosphere and mesosphere, which required of particle physics and optics. The scenario in table S1, for example,
changes to WACCM to improve the numerical stability of the model considers the projected arsenals in 2025, which are about five times
as discussed by Bardeen et al. (48). We reported seven simulations larger than those of 2007 assumed in (13, 14). We also treated a range
for this study, a 20-year control simulation, and six experiments of of possible yields from 15 to 100 kt, whereas before, only 15-kt
15-year duration each with varying amounts of soot injection. yields were used. Previously, smoke particles were assumed to be
Smoke is a complex mixture of BC (or soot) and a variety of spherical with a fixed size of 50 nm; here, we allowed the size to vary,
organic compounds. In general, the organic material has a very low as particles coagulate to larger sizes and sediment with size-dependent
absorptivity at visible wavelengths. However, in addition to BC, fall velocities. We also allowed the particles to be fractal in structure
some light-absorbing organic carbon in the form of “brown” carbon with 30-nm monomers, as is observed in sooty smoke plumes. We,
can be emitted by fires. The loss rates and mechanisms for brown moreover, modified particle refractive indices to reflect currently
carbon are poorly known, but lifetimes observed in the atmosphere accepted values for BC.
are on the order of 1 day (61). Thus, although brown carbon would
likely contribute to the short-term properties of smoke aerosol, it is SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
not clear that it would be a significant long-term component of the Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/5/10/eaay5478/DC1
smoke lofted into the stratosphere. Highly absorbing BC may compose
Fig. S1. Urban targets in table S1 scenario for 50-kt weapons.
only a few percentage of smoke from forest fires, even for smoke Fig. S2. Fatalities and BC emissions from individual targets.
injected into the stratosphere (43, 62). The remainder is composed Fig. S3. Probability of fatalities or casualties as a function of distance from ground zero.
of various forms of organic carbon. Much of the material consumed Fig. S4. Estimated urban populations of India, Pakistan, and total for both nations.
in urban fires is not composed of wood, and the wood that is consumed Fig. S5. Fraction of the injected smoke remaining in the atmosphere as a function of time.
Fig. S6. Decline in ocean surface temperature and land surface temperature as a function of
is dry and lacking much of the organic material in living wood. In time.
addition, mass fires are much hotter than normal forest fires and Fig. S7. Global precipitation patterns and changes following a regional nuclear war.
may consume the organics in the fire. Organics are also subsequently Table S1. One scenario for a war between India and Pakistan.
oxidized by reaction with OH and ozone [for example, see (43)]. Table S2. Fatalities and casualties and the percentage of the urban population killed or injured.
Table S3. Population densities within the area ignited and estimated fuel loads.
Recent observations of forest fire smoke in the stratosphere suggest
that the organics are removed by chemical reactions with a lifetime of
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Rapidly expanding nuclear arsenals in Pakistan and India portend regional and global
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Owen B. Toon, Charles G. Bardeen, Alan Robock, Lili Xia, Hans Kristensen, Matthew McKinzie, R. J. Peterson, Cheryl S.
Harrison, Nicole S. Lovenduski and Richard P. Turco

Sci Adv 5 (10), eaay5478.

DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.aay5478

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