1

Republic of the Philippines WHEREAS the Commission on Elections, charged under the
SUPREME COURT Constitution with the duty of insuring free, orderly, and honest
Manila elections in the Philippines, reported to the President of the
Philippines on May 23, 1946, that
EN BANC
". . . Reports also reached this Commission to the
G.R. No. L-543 August 31, 1946 effect that in the Provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga,
Tarlac and Nueva Ecija, the secrecy of the ballot was
JOSE O. VERA, ET AL., petitioners, actually violated; the armed bands saw to it that their
vs. candidates were voted for; and that the great majority
JOSE A. AVELINO, ET AL., respondents. of the voters, thus coerced or intimadated, suffered
from a paralysis of judgement in the matter of
Jose W. Diokno and Antonio Barredo for petitioners. exercising the right of suffrage; considering all those
Vicente J. Francisco and Solicitor General Tañada for respondents. acts of terrorism, violence and intimidation in
J. Antonio Araneta of the Lawyers' Guild as amicus curiae. connection with elections which are more or less
general in the Provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan
BENGZON, J.: and Nueva Ecija, this Commission believes that the
election in the provinces aforesaid did not reflect the
true and free expression of the popular will. It should
Pursuant to a constitutional provision (section 4, Article X), the
be stated, however, that the Commission is without
Commission on elections submitted, last May, to the President and
jurisdiction, to determine whether or not the votes cast
the Congress of the Philippines, its report on the national elections
in the said provinces which, according to these reports
held the preceding month, and, among other things, stated that, by
have been cast under the influence of threats or
reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the
violence, are valid or invalid. . . ."
Provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting
in said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the
popular will. WHEREAS, the minority report of the Hon. Vicente de Vera,
member of the Commission on Elections, says among other
things, that "we know that as a result of this chaotic condition,
When the Senate convened on May 25, 1946, it proceeded with the
many residents of the four provinces have voluntarily banished
selection of its officers. Thereafter, in the course of the session, a
themselves from their home towns in order not to be subjected
resolution was approved referring to the report and ordering that,
to the prevailing oppression and to avoid being victimized or
pending the termination of the protest lodged against their election,
losing their lives"; and that after the election dead bodies had
the herein petitioners, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E.
been found with notes attached to their necks, reading,
Romero — who had been included among the sixteen candidates for
"Bomoto kami kay Roxas" (we voted for Roxas);
senator receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the
Commission on Elections — shall not be sworn, nor seated, as
members of the chamber. WHEREAS the same Judge De Vera says in his minority
report that in the four Provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan
and Nueva Ecija, the worst terrorism reigned during and after
Pertinent parts of the resolution — called Pendatun — are these:
the election, and that if the elections held in the aforesaid
provinces were annulled as demanded by the circumstances
2

mentioned in the report of the Commission, Jose O. Vera, NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved by the Senate of the
Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero, would not and could not Philippines in session assembled, as it hereby resolves, to
have been declared elected; defer the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera,
Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero, pending the hearing and
xxx xxx xxx decision on the protests lodged against their elections,
wherein the terrorism averred in the report of the Commission
WHEREAS the terrorism resorted to by the lawless elements on Elections and in the report of the Provost Marshal
in the four provinces mentioned above in order to insure the constitutes the ground of said protests and will therefore be
election of the candidates of the Conservative wing of the the subject of investigation and determination.
Nationalist Party is of public knowledge and that such
terrorism continues to this day; that before the elections Jose Petitioners immediately instituted this action against their colleagues
O. Vera himself declared as campaign Manager of the responsible for the resolution. They pray for an order annulling it, and
Osmeña faction that he was sorry if Presidential Candidate compelling respondents to permit them to occupy their seats, and to
Manuel A. Roxas could not campaign in the Huk provinces exercise their senatorial prerogatives.
because his life would be endangered; and that because of the
constant murders of his candidates and leaders, Presidential In their pleadings, respondents traverse the jurisdiction of this court,
Candidate Roxas found it necessary to appeal to American and assert the validity of the Pendatun Resolution.
High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt for protection, which
appeal American High Commissioner personallyreferred to The issues, few and clear-cut, were thoroughly discussed at the
President Sergio Osme_¤_a for appropriate action, and the extended oral argument and in comprehensive memoranda submitted
Presidentin turn ordered the Secretary of the existence and by both sides.
reign of such terrorism;
A.—NO JURISDICTION
WHEREAS the Philippines, a Republic State, embracing the
principles ofdemocracy, must condem all acts that seek to Way back in 1924, Senator Jose Alejandrino assaulted a fellow-
defeat the popular will; member in the Philippine Senate. That body, after investigation,
adopted a resolution, suspending him from office for one year. He
WHEREAS it is essential, in order to maintain alive the respect applied here for mandamus and injunction to nullify the suspension
fordemocratic institutions among our people, that no man or and to require his colleagues to reinstate him. This court believed the
group of men be permitted to profit from the results of an suspension was legally wrong, because, as senator appointed by the
election held under coercion, in violation of law, and contrary Governor-General, he could not be disciplined by the Philippine
to the principle of freedom of choice which should underlie all Senate; but it denied the prayer for relief, mainly upon the theory of
elections under the Constitution; the separation of the three powers, Executive, Legislative and
Judicial. (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 81.) Said the decision:
WHEREAS protests against the election of Jose O. Vega,
Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero, have been filed with the . . . Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its
electoral Tribunal of the Senate of the Philippines on the basis members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties
of the findings of the Commission on Elections above quoted; purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to
their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive
3

control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without The same hands-off policy had been previously followed in
a gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that where a Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental
member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts Negros (16 Phil., 366) and Abueva vs. Wood (45 Phil., 612)
have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right
or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement. At this point we could pretend to erudition by tracing the origin,
(Code of civil Procedure, section 222, 515; 18 R.C. L., 186, development and various applications of theory of separation of
187; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 190; French vs. powers, transcribing herein whole paragraphs from adjudicated cases
Senate [1905], 146 Cal; Hiss vs. Bartlett [1855], 69 Mass., to swell the pages of judicial output. Yet the temptation must be
468; Ex parte Echols [1886], 39 Ala., 698; State vs. Bolte resisted, and the parties spared a stiff dose of juris prudential lore
[1889], 151 Mo., 362; De Diego vs. House of Delegates about a principle, which, after all, is the first fundamental imparted to
[1904], 5 Porto Rico, 235; Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. vs. every student of Constitutional Law.
Routt [1892], 17 Colo., 156; State ex rel. Crammer vs. Thorson
[1896], 33 L. R. A., ex rel. Bruce vs. Dunne [1913], 258 Ill., Not that a passable excuse would be lacking for such a dissertation.
441; Peopleex rel. La Chicote vs. Best [1907], 187 N. Y., 1; The advent of the Republic, and the consequent finality of our views
Abueva vs. Wood [1924], 45 Phil., 612.) (Supra, pp. 88, 89.) on constitutional issues, may call for a definition of concepts and
attitudes. But surely, there will be time enough, as cases come up for
. . . Under our form of government the judicial department has adjudication.
no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of
the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taken in Returning to the instant litigation, it presents no more than the
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that questions, whether the Alejandro doctrine still obtains, and whether
department by the constitution. (Supra, p. 93) the admitted facts disclose any features justifying departure
therefrom.
No court has ever held and we apprehend no court will ever
hold that it possesses the power to direct the Chief Executive When the Commonwealth Constitution was approved in 1935, the
or the Legislature or a branch thereof to take any particular existence of three coordinate, co-equal and co-important branches of
action. If a court should ever be so rash as to thus trench on the government was ratified and confirmed. That Organic Act
the domain of either of the other departments, it will be the end contained some innovations which established additional exceptions
of popular government as we know it in democracies. (Supra, to the well-known separation of powers; for instance, the creation of
p. 94.) the Electoral Tribunal wherein Justices of the Supreme Court
participate in the decision of congressional election protests, the grant
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its of rule-making power to the Supreme Court, etc.; but in the main, the
members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to independence of one power from the other was maintained. And the
suspend an appointive member from the exercise of his office Convention — composed mostly of lawyers (143 out of a total of 202
for one year, conceding what has been so well stated by the members), fully acquainted with the Abueva, Alejandrino and
learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, Severino precedents — did not choose to modify their constitutional
yet the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive doctrine, even as it altered some fundamental tenets theretofore well
reason that the Supreme Court does not possess the power of established.1
coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular
action. . . . (Supra, p. 97.) However, it is alleged that, in 1936, Angara vs. Electoral Commission
(63 Phil., 139), modified the aforesaid ruling. We do not agree. There
4

is no pronouncement in the latter decision, making specific reference controversy properly before the court, to the determination of
to the Alejandrino incident regarding our power — or lack of it — to which must be brought the test and measure of the law.
interfere with the functions of the Senate. And three years later, in
1939, the same Justice Laurel, who had penned it, cited And the power is now expressly recognized by our Organic Act.
Alejandrino vs. Quezon as a binding authority of the separation of (See sections 2 and 10. Article VIII.)
powers. (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil., 62.) It must be stressed that, in the
Angara controversy, no legislative body or person was a litigant But we must emphasize, the power is to be exercised in proper cases,
before the court, and whatever obiter dicta, or general expressions, with the appropriate parties.
may therein found can not change the ultimate circumstance that no
directive was issued against a branch of the Legislature or any It must be conceded that the acts of the Chief executive
member thereof.2 This Court, in that case, did not require the National performed within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts
Assembly or any assemblyman to do any particular act. It only found it and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive action in
"has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission." (Supra, 63 Phil., such cases. The rule is non-interference. But from this legal
161.) premise, it does not necessarily follow that we are precluded
from making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of
That this court in the Angara litigation made declarations, nullifying a his acts when these are properly challenged in an appropriate
resolution of the National Assembly, is not decisive. In proper cases legal proceeding. . . . In the present case, the President is not
this court may annul any Legislative enactment that fails to observe a party to the proceeding. He is neither compelled nor
the constitutional limitations. That is a power conceded to the judiciary restrained to actin a particular way. . . . This court,
since Chief Justice Marshall penned Marbury vs. Madison in 1803. Its therefore, has jurisdiction over the instant proceedings and will
foundation is explained by Justice Sutherland in the Minimum Wage accordingly proceed to determine the merits of the present
Case (261 U. S., 544).Said the Court: controversy." (Planas vs. Gil., 67 Phil., 62, 73, 74, 76.)
(Emphasis ours.) (See also Lopez vs. De los Reyes, 55 Phil.,
. . . The Constitution, by its own terms, is the supreme law of 170.)
the land, emanating from the people, the repository of ultimate
sovereignty under our form of government. A congressional More about the Angara precedent: The defendant there was only the
statute, on the other hand, is the act of an agency of this Electoral Commission which was "not a separate department of the
sovereign authority, and if it conflicts with the Constitution, Government" (Vol. 63,p. 160), and exercised powers "judicial in
must fall; for that which is not supreme must yield to that which nature." (Supra, p. 184) Hence, against our authority, there was no
is. To hold it invalid (if it be invalid) is a plain exercise of the objection based on the independence and separation of the three co-
judicial power, — that power vested in courts to enable them equal departments of Government. Besides, this court said no more
to administer justice according to law. From the authority to than that, there being a conflict ofjurisdiction between two
ascertain and determine the law in a given case there necessa constitutional bodies, it could not decline to take cognizance of the
ruly results, in case of conflict, the duty to declare and enforce controversy to determine the "character, scope and extent" of their
the rule of the supreme law and reject that of an inferior act of respective constitutional spheres of action. Here, there is actually no
legislation which, transcending the Constitution, is no effect, antagonism between the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate and the
and binding on no one. This is not the exercise of a Senate itself, for it is not suggested has adopted a rule contradicting
substantive power to review and nullify acts of Congress, for the Pendatun Resolution. Consequently, there is no occasion for our
such no substantive power exists. It is simply a necessary intervention. Such conflict of jurisdiction, plus the participation of the
concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a case or
5

Senate Electoral Tribunal are essential ingredients to make the facts are quoted and summarized under this heading in 16 Corpus Juris
of this case fit the mold of the Angara doctrine. Secundum, section 145.

Now, under the principles enunciated in the Alejandrino case, may Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary is
this petition be entertained? The answer must naturally be in the the repository of remedies for all political and social ills. We should not
negative. Granting that the postponement of the administration of the forget that the Constitution had judiciously allocated the powers of
oath amounts to suspension of the petitioners from their office, and government to three distinct and separate compartments; and that
conceding arguendo that such suspension is beyond the power of the judicial interpretation has tended to the preservation of the
respondents, who in effect are and acted as the Philippine Senate dependence of the three, and a zealous regard of the prerogatives of
(Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, 88),this petition should be each, knowing full well that one is not the guardian of the others and
denied. As was explained in the Alejandrino case, we could not order that, for official wrong-doing, each may be brought to account, either
one branch of the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof. To do so by impeachment, trial or by the ballot box.
would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset the classic
pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into our institutional The extreme case has been described wherein a legislative chamber,
setup. without any reason whatsoever, decrees by resolution the
incarceration, for years, of a citizen. And the rhetorical question is
Adherence to established principle should generally be our guiding confidently formulated. Will this man be denied relief by the courts?
criterion, if we are to escape the criticism voiced once by Bryce in
American Commonwealth thus: Of course not: He may successfully apply for habeas corpus, alleging
the nullity of the resolution and claiming for release. But then, the
The Supreme Court has changed its color i. e., its temper and defendant shall be the officer or person, holding him in custody, and
tendencies, from time to time according to the political the question therein will be the validity or invalidity of resolution. That
proclivities of the men who composed it. . . . Their action was done in Lopez vs. De los Reyes, supra. (See also Kilbourn vs.
flowed naturally from the habits of thought they had formed Thompson, 103 U.S. 168; 26 Law. ed., 377, p. 391.) Courts will
before their accession to the bench and from the sympathy interfere, because the question is not a political one, the "liberty of
they could not feel for the doctrine on whose behalf they had citizen" being involved (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra) and the act will
contended. (The Annals of the American Academy of Political clearly beyond the bounds of the legislative power, amounting to
and Social Science, May, 1936, p. 50.) usurpation of the privileges of the courts, the usurpation being clear,
palpable and oppressive and the infringement of the Constitution truly
Needless to add, any order we may issue in this case should, real. (See 16 C.J.S., p. 44.)
according to the rules, be enforceable by contempt proceedings. If the
respondents should disobey our order, can we punish them for Nevertheless, suppose for the moment that we have jurisdiction:
contempt? If we do, are we not thereby destroying the independence,
and the equal importance to which legislative bodies are entitled B.—PROHIBITION DOES NOT LIE
under the Constitution?
Petitioners pray for a writ of prohibition. Under the law, prohibition
Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every wrong there refers only to proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or
is are medy, and that the judiciary should stand ready to afford relief. person, exercising functions judicial or ministerial. (Rule 67, section 2,
There are undoubtedly many wrongs the judicature may not correct, Rules of Court.) As the respondents do not exercise such kind of
for instance, those involving political questions. Numerous decisions
6

functions, theirs being legislative, it is clear the dispute falls beyond against the Electoral Commission. In an attempt to seek this
the scope of such special remedy. clarification, the following interpretations took place:

C.—SENATE HAS NOT EXCEEDED POWERS xxx xxx xxx

Again let us suppose the question lies within the limits of prohibition Delegate Labrador.—Does not the gentleman from Capiz
and of our jurisdiction. believe that unless this power is granted to the assembly, the
assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest
Before the organization of the Commonwealth and the promulgation the election and qualification of its members?
of the Constitution, each House of the Philippine Legislature exercised
the power to defer oath-taking of any member against whom a protest Delegate Roxas.—I have no doubt that the gentleman is
had been lodged, whenever in its discretion such suspension was right. If this right is retained, as it is, even if two-thirds of the
necessary, before the final decision of the contest. The cases of assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications
Senator Fuentebella and Representative Rafols are known instances provided by law, they cannot remove him from that reason.
of such suspension. The discussions in the constitutional Convention
showed that instead of transferring to the Electoral Commission all xxx xxx xxx
thepowers of the House or Senate as "the sole judge of the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly," In the course of the heated debates, with the growing
it was given only jurisdiction over "all contests" relating to the election, restlessness on the part of the Convention, President Recto
etc. (Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, p. suspended the session in order to find out if it was possible to
271.) The proceedings in the Constitutional Convention on this subject arrive at a compromise plan to meet the objection.
are illuminating:
When the session was resumed, a compromise plan was
It became gradually apparent in the course of the debates that submitted in the form of an amendment presented by
the Convention was evenly divided on the proposition of Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Lim, Vinzons, Rafols, Mumar,
creating the Electoral Commission with the membership and and others, limiting the power of the Electoral Commission to
powers set forth in the draft. It was growing evident, too, that the judging of all cases contesting elections, returns, and
the opposition to the Electoral Commission was due to rather qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
inclusive power of that body to judge not only of cases Explaining the difference between the amendment thus
contesting the election of the members of the National proposed and the provision of the draft, Delegate Roxas, upon
Assembly, but also of their elections, returns, and the request of President Recto, said:
qualifications.
The difference, Mr. President, consists only in obviating the
Many of the delegates wanted to be definitely informed of the scope of objection pointed out by various delegates to the effect that the
the powers of the Electoral Commission as defined in the draft before first clause of the draft which states "The election, returns, and
determining their final decision; for if the draft meant to confer upon qualifications of members of the National Assembly" seems to
the Electoral Commission the inclusive power to pass upon the give to the Electoral commission the power to determine also
elections, returns, and qualifications — contested or not — of the the election of the members who have not been protested.
members of the National Assembly, they were more inclined to vote And in order to obviate that difficulty, we believe that the
7

amendment is right in that sense . . . that is, if we amend the by the party having the largest number of votes, and
draft so that it should read as follows: "All cases contesting the three by the party having the second largest number of
election, etc.", so that the judges of the Electoral Commission votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission
will limit themselves only to cases in which there has been a shall be its Chairman.The Electoral Commission shall
protest against the returns. be the sole judge of the election, returns, and
qualifications of the Members of the National
The limitation to the powers of the Electoral Commission Assembly."
proposed in the compromise amendment did much to win in
favor of the Electoral Commission many of its opponents; so The report of the special committee on style on the power of
that when the amendment presented by Delegate Labrador the Commission was opposed on the floor of the Convention
and others to retain in the Constitution the power of the by Delegate Confesor, who insisted that the Electoral
lawmaking body to be the sole judge of the elections, returns, Commission should limit itself to judging only of all contests
and qualifications of its members was put to a nominal vote, it relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the
was defeated by 98 negative votes against 56 affirmative members of the National Assembly. The draft was amended
votes. accordingly by the Convention.

With the defeat of the Labrador amendment, the provision of As it was finally adopted by the Convention, the provision
the draft creating the Electoral Commission, as modified by the read:
compromise amendment, was consequently approved.
There shall be an Electoral Commission . . . The Electoral
"All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications Commission shall be the sole judge of all contestsrelating to
of the members of the National Assembly shall be judged by the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the
an electoral commission, composed of three members elected National Assembly. (Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 267, 269, 270, 271 and 272.).
Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having
the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Delegate Roxas rightly opined that "if this draft is retained" the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief, the Commission to be Assembly would have no power over election and qualifications of its
presided over by one of said justices." members; because all the powers are by the draft vested in the
Commission.
In the special committee on style, the provision was amended
so that the Chairman of the Commission should be the senior The Convention, however, bent on circumscribing the latter's authority
Justice in the Commission, and so that the Commission was to to "contests" relating to the election, etc. altered the draft. The
be the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of Convention did not intend to give it all the functions of the Assembly
the members of the National Assembly. As it was then on the subject of election and qualifications of its members. The
amended, the provision read: distinction is not without a difference. "As used in constitutional
provisions", election contest "relates only to statutory contests in
"There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also to
three Justices of the Supreme court designated by the have himself inducted into the office."(Laurel on Elections, Second
Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the Edition, p. 250; 20 C.J., 58.)
National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated
8

One concrete example will serve to illustrate the remaining power in Therefore, independently of constitutional or statutory grant, the
either House of Congress: A man is elected by a congressional district Senate has, under parliamentary practice, the power to inquire into
who had previously served ten years in Bilibid Prison for estafa. As he the credentials of any member and the latter's right to participate in its
had no opponent, no protest is filed. And the Electoral Tribunal has no deliberations. As we have seen, the assignment by the constitution of
jurisdiction, because there is no election contest. (20 C.J., 58,supra.) the Electoral Tribunal does not actually negative that power —
When informed of the fact, may not the House, motu propio postpone provided the Senate does not cross the boundary line, deciding an
his induction? May not the House suspend, investigate and thereafter election contest against the member. Which the respondents at bar
exclude him?3 It must be observed that when a member of the House never attempted to do. Precisely, their resolution recognized, and did
raises a question as to the qualifications of another, an "election not impair, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal to decide the
contest" does not thereby ensue, because the former does not seek contest. To test whether the resolution trenched on the territory of the
to be substituted for the latter. last named agency let ask the question: May the Electoral Tribunal of
the Senate order that Body to defer the admission of any member
So that, if not all the powers regarding the election, returns, and whose election has been contested? Obviously not. Then it must be
qualifications of members was withdrawn by the Constitution from the conceded that the passage of the disputed resolution meant no
Congress; and if, as admitted by petitioners themselves at the oral invasion of the former's realm.
argument, the power to defer the oath-taking, until the contests is
adjudged, does not belong to the corresponding Electoral Tribunal, At this juncture the error will be shown of the contention that the
then it must be held that the House or Senate still retains such Senate has not this privilege "as a residuary power". Such contention
authority, for it has not been transferred to, nor assumed by, the is premised on the proposition that the Houses of the Philippine
Electoral Tribunal. And this result flows, whether we believe that such Congress possess only such powers as are expressly or impliedly
power (to delay induction) stemmed from the (former) privilege of granted by the Constitution. And an American decision is quoted on
either House to be judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the powers of the United States Congress. The mistake is due to the
the members thereof, or whether we hold it to be inherent to every failure to differentiate between the nature of legislative power under
legislative body as a measure of self-preservation. the Constitution of the United States, and legislative power under the
State Constitutions and the Constitution of the Commonwealth (now
It is customary that when a number of persons come together to form the Republic). It must be observed that the Constitution of the United
a legislative body, ". . . the first organization must be temporary, and if States contains only a grant or delegation of legislative powers to the
the law does not designate the person who shall preside over such Federal Government, whereas, the other Constitutions, like the
temporary organization, the persons assembled and claiming to be Constitution of the Commonwealth (now the Republic), are limits upon
members may select one of their number for that purpose. The next the plenary powers of legislation of the Government. The legislative
step is to ascertain in some convenient way the names of the person power of the United States Congress is confined to the subject on
who are, by reason of holding the proper credentials, prima which it is permitted to act by the Federal constitution. (Dorr vs. United
facie entitled to seats, and therefore entitled to take part in permanent States, 195 U. S., 140; Martin vs. Hunter, 1 Wheat., 326;
organization of the body. In the absence of any statutory or other McCullock vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 405; United States vs. Cruikshank,
regulation upon this subject, a committee on credentials is usually 92 U.S., 551.) The legislative power of the Philippine Congress is
appointed, to whom all credentials to be entitled to seats. . . . (Laurel plenary, subject only to such limitations, as are found in the Republic's
on Elections, Second Edition, pp. 356, 357, quoting McCrary on Constitution. So that any power, deemed to be legislative by usage
Elections.) and tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress,
unless the Organic Act has lodged it elsewhere.
9

Another line of approach. The Senate, as a branch of the legislative wherein protests connected with the Central Luzon polls await
department, had the constitutional power to adopt rules for its investigation. Mulling over this, we experience no qualmish feelings
proceedings(section 10 [3], Article VI of the Constitution), and by about the coincidence. Their designation to the electoral tribunals
legislative practice it is conceded the power to promulgate such deducted not a whit from their functions as members of this Supreme
orders as may be necessary to maintain its prestige and to preserve Court, and did not disqualify them in this litigation. Nor will their
its dignity.4 We are advised by the respondents that, after weighing deliverances here at on a given question operate to prevent them
the propriety or impropriety of the step, the Senate, in the exercise of from voting in the electoral forum on identical questions; because the
its authority and discretion and of its inherent power of self- Constitution, establishing no incompatibility between the two roles,
preservation, resolved to defer the administration of oath and the naturally did not contemplate, nor want, justices opining one way
sitting of the petitioners pending determination of the contest. It is not here, and thereafter holding otherwise, pari materia, in the electoral
clear that the measure had no reasonable connection with the ends in tribunals, or vice-versa.
view, and neither does it palpably transcend the powers of the public
deliverative body. On the contrary, there are reasons to believe it was Anyhow, these should be no diversity of thought in a democratic
prompted by the dictates of ordinary caution, or of public policy. For, country, at least, on the legal effects of the alleged rampant
if, as reported by the corresponding constitutional agency, concededly lawlessness, root and basis of the Pendatun Resolution.
well-posted on the matter by reason of its official duties, the elections
held in the Provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija However, it must be observed and emphasized, herein is no definite
were so tainted with acts of violence and intimidation, that the result pronouncement that terrorism and violenceactually prevailed in the
was not the legitimate expression of the voters' choice, the Senate district to such extent that the result was not the expression of the free
made no grievous mistake in foreseeing the probability that, upon will of the electorate. Such issue was not tendered in these
proof of such widespread lawlessness, the Electoral Tribunal would proceedings. It hinges upon proof to be produced by protestants and
annull the returns in that region (see Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil., protestees at the hearing of the respective contests.
521; Laurel, Elections [2d ed.], p. 488 et seq.), and declare herein
petitioners not entitled to seats in the Senate. Consequently, to avoid b. Doubt and presumption.
the undesirable result flowing from the participation of disqualified
members in its deliberations, it was prudent for it to defer the sitting of After all is said or written, the most that may be conceded to the
the respondents. True, they may have no direct connection with the industry of petitioners' counsel is that the Senate power, or lack of
acts of intimidation; yet the votes may be annulled just the same, and power, to approve the resolution is not entirely clear. We should,
if that happens, petitioners would not among the sixteen senators therefore, indulge the presumption that official duty has been
elected. Nor was it far-fetched for the Senate to consider that "in order performed regularly, (Rule 123, section 69, Rule of Court), and in the
to maintain alive the respect for democratic institutions among our right manner:
people, no man or group of men (should) be permitted to profit from
the results of an election held under coercion, in violation of law and
It is a general principle to presume that public officers act
contrary to the principle of freedom of choice which should underlie all
correctly until the contrary is shown. United States vs. Weed, 5
elections under the Constitution." (Exhibit A of petitioners' complaint.)
Wall., 62.
a. Justices in the Electoral Tribunals
It will be presumed, unless the contrary be shown, that a
public officer acted in accordance with the law and his
During our deliberations, it was remarked that several justices
subscribing the majority opinion, belong to the electoral tribunals
10

instructions. Moral y Gonzales vs. Ross (Gonzales vs. Ross), Their writings (of the delegates) commenting or explaining that
120 U.S., 605; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep., 705. instrument, published shortly thereafter, may, like those of Hamilton,
Madison and Jayin The Federalist — here in the Philippines, the book
Officers charged with the performance of a public duty are of Delegate Aruego,supra, and of others — have persuasive force.
presumed to perform it correctly. Quinlan vs. Greene Country, (Op. cit., p. 55.)
205 U.S., 410; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 505. (United State Supreme
Court Reports Digest, Vol. 5, p. 3188.) But their personal opinion on the matter at issue expressed during our
deliberations stand on a different footing: If based on a "fact" known to
It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its them, but not duly established or judicially cognizable, it is immaterial,
constitutional powers. (See cases cited at p. 257, 16 C.J.S., and their brethren are not expected to take their word for it, to the
note 1.) prejudice of the party adversely affected, who had no chance of
rebuttal. If on a matter of legal hermeneutics, their conclusions may
And should there be further doubt, by all the maxims of prudence, left not, simply on account of membership in the Convention, be a shade
alone comity, we should heed the off-limits sign at the Congressional better, in the eyes of the law. There is the word "deference" to be
Hall, and check the impulse to rush in to set matters aright — firm in sure. But deference is a compliment spontaneously to be paid —
the belief that if a political fraud has been accomplished, as petitioners never a tribute to be demanded.
aver, the sovereign people, ultimately the offended party, will render
the fitting verdict — at the polling precints. And if we should (without intending any disparagement) compare the
Constitution's enactment to a drama on the stage or in actual life, we
c. Membership in the Constitutional Convention would realize that intelligent spectators or readres often know as
much, if not more, about the real meanings, effects or tendency is of
The theory has been proposed — modesty aside — that the the event, or incidents thereof, as some of the actors themselves, who
dissenting members of this Court who were delegates to the sometimes become so absorbed in fulfilling their emotional roles that
Constitutional Convention and were "co-authors of the Constitution" they fail to watch the other scenes or to meditate on the larger
"are in a better position to interpret" that same Constitution in this aspects of the whole performance, or what is worse, become so
particular litigation. infatuated with their lines as to construe the entire story according to
their prejudices or frustrations. Perspective and disinterestedness
There is no doubt that their properly recorded utterances during the help certainly a lot in examining actions and occurrences.
debates and proceedings of the Convention deserve weight, like
those of any other delegate therein. Note, however, that the Come to think of it, under the theory thus proposed, Marshall and
proceedings of the Convention "are less conclusive of the power Holmes (names venerated by those who have devoted a sizable
construction of the instrument than are legislative proceedings of the portion of their professionals lives to analyzing or solving
proper construction of a statute; since in the latter case it is the intent constitutional problems and developments) were not so authoritative
of the legislature we seek, while in the former we are endeavoring to after all in expounding the United States Constitution — because they
arrive at the intent of the people through the discussions and were not members of the Federal Convention that framed it!
deliberations of their representatives. (Willoughby on the Constitution,
Vol. I, pp. 54, 55.) D.—ALLEGED DUTY OF RESPONDENTS

Quoting section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 725, counsel for

petitioners assert that it was respondents' duty legally inescapable, to
11

permit petitioners to assume office and take part in the current regular no phrase or sentence in the Constitution expressly or impliedly
session. The section reads partly: outlawing the step taken by that legislative body, we should be, and
we are, reluctant to intervene.
The candidates for Member of the House of Representatives
and those for Senators who have been proclaimed elected by Indeed, had the Senate been officially informed that the inclusion of
the respective Board of Canvassers and the Commission on petitioners' name in the Commission's certificate had been made at
Elections shall assume office and shall hold regular session for the point of a gangster's automatic, none will deny the appositeness
the year nineteen hundred and forty-six on May twenty-five, of the postponement of their induction, pending an inquiry by the
nineteen hundred and forty-six. (Section 12, Commonwealth corresponding authorities. Yet the difference between such situation
Act. No. 725.) and the instant litigation is one of degree, broad and wide perhaps,
but not altering the dominant legal principle.
We have carefully considered the argument. We opine that, as
contended by the Solicitor-General, this provision is addressed to the In answer to the suggestions as to abuse of the power it should be
individual member of Congress, imposing on him the obligation to stated that the mere possibility of abuse is no conclusive argument
come to Manila, and join his colleagues in regular session. However, against the existence of the power, of the power, for the simple
it does not imply that if, for any reason, he is disqualified, the House is reason that every official authority is susceptible of misuse. And
powerless to postpone his admission. Suppose that after elections a everybody knows that when any people will discover the methods to
member is finally convicted of treason. May not the House refuse him curb it.
outright admission, pending an investigation (by it or the Electoral
Tribunal as the case may be) as to his privilege to sit there? Granting Perhaps it is necessary to explain that this decision goes no further
the right to admission as the counterpart of the duty to assume office than to recognize the existence of Congressional power. It is settled
by virtue of said section 12; we must nevertheless allow that such that the point whether such power has been wisely or correctly
rights would not be peremptory whenever it contacts other rights of exercised, is usually beyond the ken of judicial determination.
equal or superior force. To illustrate: if the law provided that all
children, seven years or more "shall go to school", it can not E.—PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES
reasonably be inferred that school authorities are bound to accept
every seven-year boy, even if he refuses to pay fees, or to present the One final consideration.
certificates required by school regulations.
The Constitution provides (Article VI, section 15) that "for any speech
Furthermore, it would not be erroneous to maintain that any right or debate" in congress, Senators and congressmen "shall not be
spelled out of section 12 must logically be limited to those candidates questioned in any other place." The Supreme Court of the United
whose proclamation is clear, unconditional and unclouded, and that States has interpreted this privilege to include the giving of a vote or
such standard is not met by the petitioners, because in the very the presentation of a resolution.
document attesting to their election one member of the Commission
on Elections demurred to the non-exclusion of the votes in Central . . . It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to
Luzon, calling attention to the reported reign of terror and violence in limit it towards spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as
that region, and virtually objecting to the certification of herein forcible in its application to written reports presented in that
petitioners. To be sure, it was the beclouded condition of petitioner's body by its committees, to resolutions offered, which, though
credential (certificate of canvass) that partly prompted the Senate to in writing, must be reproduced in speech, and to the act of
enact the precautionary measure herein complained of. And finding
12

voting, . . . (Kilbourn vs. thompson, 103 U.S., 204; 26 Law. ed., Respondents are, by this proceeding, called to account for their votes
377, p. 391.) in approving the Pendatum Resolution. Having sworn to uphold the
Constitution, we must enforce the constitutional directive. We must
In the above case, Kilbourn, for refusing to answer questions put to not question, nor permit respondents to be questioned here in
him by the House of Representatives of the United States Congress, connection with their votes. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra.)
concerning the business of a real estate partnership, was imprisoned
for contempt by resolution of the house. He sued to recover damages Case dismissed. No costs.
from the sergeant at arms and the congressional members of the
committee, who had caused him to be brought before the house, Moran, C J., Paras, Pablo, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
where he was adjudged to be in contempt. The Supreme Court of the
United States found that the resolution of the House was void for want
of jurisdiction in that body, but the action was dismissed as to the
members of the committee upon the strength of the herein above-
mentioned congressional immunity. The court cited with approval the Separate Opinions
following excerpts from an earlier decision of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts:
HILADO, J., concurring:
These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of
I concur.
protecting the members against prosecutions for their own
benefit, but to support the rights of the people, by enabling
their representatives to execute the functions of their Petitioners, alleging that they have been elected Senators in the last
office without fear of prosecutions, civil or criminal. I, therefore, national elections, have filed this proceeding against respondents
think that the article ought not to be construed strictly, but who, according to the complaint, have been likewise elected Senators
liberally, that the full design of it may be answered. . . (103 in the same elections. In paragraph III of the complaint it is alleged
U.S., 203.) (Emphasis ours.) that respondent Hon. Jose A. Avelino is joined in this proceeding as
member and President of the Senate. Two kinds of remedies are
sought by petitioners, one ancillary and the other principal. The
Commenting on this Congressional privilege, Willoughby relates
ancillary they would have consist in a preliminary injunction addressed
apparently as controlling, the following incident:
to "respondents, their officials, employees, agents and other persons
acting under them, ordering them", until the order is remanded by the
In 1910, several Members of Congress having been served court, "to desist and to abstain from carrying out" the so-called
with a writ of mandamus in a civil action brought against them Pendatun Resolution complained of. (Exhibit A attached to complaint.)
as members of the Joint Committee on Printing and growing The principal remedy, if the suit is to prosper, would be as follows: a
out a refusal of a bid of the Valley Paper Company, for the judicial declaration that the said resolution is entirely null and void, a
furnishing of paper, the Senate resolved that the Justice definite order of this court prohibiting respondents, and each of them,
issuing the writ had "unlawfully invaded the constitutional from preventing petitioners from "continuing in their seats in the
privileges and prerogatives of the Senate of the United States Senate of the Philippines and freely exercising their office as
and of three Senators; and was without jurisdiction to grant the Senators, and likewise prohibiting them from adopting any other
rule, and Senators are directed to make no appearance in ulterior procedure to execute the said resolution."
response thereto." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the
United States, Vol. I, Second Edition, p. 616.)
13

1. Has this court power to issue the writ of preliminary injunction xxx xxx xxx
sought by petitioners under the facts alleged in their complaint?
. . . The prayer of the bill is that, upon the hearing of the cause,
The power of this court to issue auxiliary writs and process is defined both acts be declared unconstitutional and void, and held to be
in, and conferred by, section 19 of Act No. 136, as follows: of no effect; and that a writ of injunction issue to Walter C.
Tuttle, county clerk of Vermilion county, restraining him from
Sec. 19. Power to issue all necessary auxiliary writs.—The issuing, or causing to be posted, notices of election calling an
Supreme Court shall have power to issue writs ofcertiorari and election for the house of representatives for the eighteenth
all other auxiliary writs and process necessary to the complete senatorial district; and that such injunction be made perpetual;
exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction. and that the court grant to the petitioner and to the people all
such other and further relief as the case demands.
Under this provision, such auxiliary writ or process as the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by petitioners in the instant case, is xxx xxx xxx
only issuable by this court is engaged in the exercise of its original (or
appellate) jurisdiction in a main case, and secondly, when such writ or From the foregoing statement of these two bills, it seems to be
process is necessary to a complete exercise of that jurisdiction. This perfectly plain that the entire scope and object of both is the
principle is ingrained in and underlies the pertinent provisions of the assertion and protection of political, as contradistinguished
present Rules of Court (Rule 60). Indeed, it is elementary that an from civil, personal or property rights. In both the complainant
independent action cannot be maintained merely to procure a is a legal voter, and a candidate for a particular elective office;
preliminary injunction as its sole objective. (Panay Municipal and by his bill he is seeking the protection and enforcement of
Cadastre vs. Garduño and Soncuya, 55 Phil., 574.) his right to cast his own ballot in a legal and effective manner,
and also his right to be such candidate, to have the election
Besides, there are other grounds for holding that this court lacks called and held under the provisions of a valid law, and to
jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by have his name printed upon the ballots to be used at such
petitioners. It is clear that the rights sought to be exercised or election, so that he may be voted for in a legal manner. The
protected by petitioner through this proceeding are political rights and rights thus asserted are all purely political; nor, so far as this
the questions raised are political questions, and it is well settled that question is concerned, is the matter aided in the least by the
the equitable remedy of injunction is not available for such a purpose. attempt made by the complainant in each bill to litigate on
The principle has also been incorporated in the rule that a court of behalf of other voters or of the people of the state generally.
chancery will not entertain a suit calling for a judgement upon a The claims thus attempted to be set up are all of the same
political question, and of course this court has been resorted to in the nature, and are none the less political.
instant case as a court of equity in so far as injunctive relief is being
sought. In the case of Flethcer vs. Tuttle (151 Ill., 41; 25 L.R.A., As defined by Anderson, a civil right is "a right accorded to
143,146), the definitions of a political right by Anderson defines a every member of a district community, or nation," while a
political right as a "right exercisable in the administration of political right is a "right exercible in the administration of
government" (Anderson Law Dictionary, 905). And Bouvier says: government." Anderson, Law Dictionary, 995. Says bouvier:
"Political rights consist in the power to participate, directly or indirectly, "Political rights consist in the power to participate, directly or
in the establishment or management of the government." (2 Bouvier's indirectly, in the establishment or management of the
Law Dictionary, 597.) government. These political rights are fixed by the constitution.
Every citizen has the right of voting for public officers, and of
14

being elected. These are the political rights which the be deprived, such averment not being the substantial ground
humblest citizen possesses. Civil rights are those which have of the relief sought. (Flethcer vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill., 41; 25 L.R.A.,
no relation to the establishment, support, or management of 143, 145-147; (emphasis supplied.)
the government. They consist in the power of acquiring and
enjoying property, or exercising the paternal or marital powers, Section 381. 3. Political Questions.—a. in General.—It is well-
and the like. It will be observed that every one, unless settled doctrine that political questions are not within the
deprived of them by sentence of civil death, is in the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to
enjoyment of the civil rights, which is not the case with political deal with such questions has been conferred on the courts by
rights; for an alien, for example, has no political, although in express constitutional or statutory provisions. It is not easy,
full enjoyment of the civil rights." (2 Bouvier Law Dict., 597.) however, to define the phrase "political question," nor to
determine what matters fall within its scope of the judicial
. . . A preliminary injunction having been awarded, it was power. More properly, however, it means those questions
disregarded by the city officers, who proceeded, which, under the constitution, are to be decided by the people
notwithstanding, to canvass the vote and declare the result. in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
Various of the city officers and their advisers were attached discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
and fined for contempt, it was held that the matter presented executive branch of the government. Among the questions that
by the bill was a matter over which a court of chancery had no have been held to be political, and therefore beyond the
jurisdiction, and that the injunction was void, so that it violation province of the judiciary to decide, are: Questions relating to
was not an act which subjected the violators to proceedings for the existence orlegality of the government under which the
contempt. court is acting; what persons or organizations constitute the
lawful government of a state of the Union, or of a foreign
. . . In Georgia vs. Stanton (73 U. S., 6 Wall., 50; 18 Law. ed., country; . . . the canvass of an election. (12 C.J., 878, 879;
721), a bill was filed by the state of Georgia against the emphasis supplied.)
secretary of war and other officers representing the executive
authority of the United States, to restrain them in the execution SECTION 20. 4. Only Civil Rights Protected.—The subject
of the acts of congress known as the "Reconstruction Acts," on matter of equitable jurisdiction being civil property and the
the ground that the enforcement of those acts would annul and maintenance of civil rights, injunction will issue only in cases
totally abolish the existing state government of the state, and where complainant's civil rights have been invaded. Injunctions
establish another and different one in its place, and would, in do not issue to prevent acts merely because they are immoral,
effect, ovewrthrow and destroy the corporate existence of the illegal, or criminal. Courts of equity have no jurisdiction over
state, by depriving it of all means and instrumentalities matters or questions of a political nature unless civil property
whereby its existence might and otherwise would be rights are involved and will not interfere to enforce or protect
maintained; and it was held that the bill called for a judgement purely political rights, . . . (32 C. J., 41; emphasis supplied.)
upon a politicalquestion, and that it would not therefore be
entertained by a court of chancery; and it was further held that But petitioners seem to proceed upon the theory that there is a main
the character of the bill was not changed by the fact that, in case here to which the preliminary injunction would be merely
setting forth the political rights sought to be protected, it auxiliary — one of prohibition, presumably under Rule 67, sections 2,
averred that the state had real and personal property, such, for 4, and 7. Rule 67, section 2, omitting impertinent parts, says:
example, as public buildings, etc., of the enjoyment of which,
by the destruction of its corporate existence, the state would
15

Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition.—When the proceedings of any these, considering the Commission's report and certificate of canvass
tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising together, the Commission, in final effect, far from proclaiming them
functions judicial or ministerial . . . elected, confesses that it does not really know whether they have
been or not. In the second place, Ido not admit that any such
To begin with, respondents herein cannot in any rational sense be ministerial duty is imposed upon the members of Congress in the
said to constitute a "tribunal, corporation, board, or person . . . sense that its fulfillment may be compelled by mandamus issuing from
exercising functions judicial or ministerial." To be sure, the functions the judiciary. In the third place, if we were to concede that the
of the Senate and of its members in the premises are not judicial. It is intention of the law is as petitioners contend it to be, that is, that it
no less certain, in my opinion, that they are not ministerial. Indeed, imposes upon both Houses of Congress and upon the members
they are not only legislative but discretionary in the highest sense, as thereof who legitimately act for them, the ministerial duty of letting
more at length demonstrated hereafter. even those members, as to whom there exist grounds for suspension,
assume office and participate in the Houses' deliberations, I am of the
It is insisted, however, that the provisions of section 12 of considered opinion that the provisions would be null and void for the
Commonwealth Act No. 725 imposed upon respondents the simple reason that it would be destructive of, and repugnant to, the
ministerial duty of letting petitioners assume office and participate in inherent power of both Houses to suspend members for reasons of
the regular session for the year 1946 on May 25, 1946. But, as in my self-preservation or decorum. I say null and void, because the
opinion correctly contended by the Solicitor General at the argument, principle underlying said inherent power is ingrained in the very
this provision is addressed to the members of both Houses of genius of a republican and democratic government, such as ours,
Congress who are to assume office and hold regular session. Altho to which has been patterned after that of the United States, and
this, some who opine differently from us, may counter with the therefore lies at the very foundation of our constitutional system. It
question: What is the use of imposing upon said members the was admitted at the argument that when both legislative chambers
ministerial duty to assume office and hold the session if either House were the sole judges of the election, returns and qualifications of its
or other members thereof could prevent them from doing so? In the members, each chamber possessed such inherent power of
first place, I would not say that, considering together, as we should, suspension, particularly as against members whose election was the
the report of the Commission on Elections to the President of the subject of contest. When the Commonwealth Constitution transferred
Senate of May 23, 1946 (Exhibit B), and the certificate of canvass of to the Electoral Tribunal for each chamber the jurisdiction as sole
the same date (Exhibit C), said Commission "proclaimed elected" judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
those candidates whose election may be adversely affected by the of its members, without any provision as to said power of suspension,
Commission's own express reservation as to the validity or invalidity the clear inference is that the same was left intact, to remain where it
of the votes cast in the Provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac, and was inherent. And certainly the framers should not be presumed to
Nueva Ecija, in the same sense that they proclaimed elected those have silently intended to abrogate and take away a power so vital and
not so affected — it would seem that the proclamation made in Exhibit so essential.
C was based merely upon a numerical canvass or count of the votes
cast, the Commission considering itself without authority to discount Coming now more fundamentally to the alleged main case presented
the votes cast in said four provinces, leaving that question to the by the complaint. As stated at the outset, the principle remedy
Electoral Tribunal for the Senate; and it would seem further, that pursued by petitioners, if this suit is to prosper, and therefore the main
within the meaning and intent of section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. case which they seem to allege as justifying the ancillary remedy of
725 the phrase "candidates . . . proclaimed elected," rationally preliminary injunction, would be concerned with a judicial declaration
construed, is exclusive of those of whose valid election the by this court that the so-called Pendatun Resolution is entirely null
Commission is the first, in effect, to express very grave doubts. As to and void, with a definite order of this court prohibiting respondents,
16

and each of them, from preventing petitioners "from continuing in their 2. Has this court jurisdiction of the subject matter of the alleged main
seats in the Senate of the Philippines and freely exercising their case and, consequently, to grant the alleged principal remedy?
functions as Senators, and likewise prohibiting them form adopting
any other ulterior procedure to execute the said resolution." The judicial declaration of nullity sought by petitioners, severed from
the writ of prohibition prayed for by them, would become, if at all,
This immediately brings to the fore the vital and serious question of nothing more nor less than a declaratory relief. Thus divorced from a
whether this court has jurisdiction to grant the remedy thus prayed for remedy of prohibition, it will be a mere abstract pronouncement of an
by giving final judgment making the said judicial declaration of nullity opinion of this court regarding the constitutionality or
and granting the writ prohibition definitely prohibiting the respondent unconstitutionality of the Pendatun Resolution, giving rise to no
President of the Senate and respondent senators from executing the substantial relief or positive remedy of any kind. It will order nothing
above specified acts. Such fundamental principle as the separation of and will prohibit nothing to be done by one party or the other. But not
powers, as well as the exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal even as such declaratory relief can said judicial declaration be
for the Senate of all contests relating to the election, returns and considered under Rule 66, nor its antecedents, Act No. 3736
qualifications of its members, are involved. Commonwealth Act No. 55, since the Pendatun Resolution is neither
a "deed, will, contract or other written instrument . or a statue or
Our Constitution and laws will be scanned and searched in vain for ordinance," within the plain and natural meaning of said rule and said
the slightest hint of an intention to confer upon the courts, including acts, aside from the reason that pursuant to the same acts the action
the Supreme Court, the power to issue coercive process addressed for a declaratory judgment should be brought in a Court of First
to, or calculated to control the action of, either of the other two Instance, without any express provision conferring original jurisdiction
coordinate departments of the government — the legislative whose upon this court in such cases, which provision is necessary before this
power is vested in the Congress, consisting of the Senate and the court can possess such original jurisdiction (Act No. 136, section 17),
House of Representatives (Constitution, Article VII, section 1), and the final consideration that alike under said Act No. 3736 and
concerning matters within the sphere of their respective functions. Rule 66, section 6, the court has a discretion to refuse to exercise the
Besides, if we had jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary power to construe instruments, among other cases, where the
injunction, it must be upon the ground that prima facie the facts construction is not necessary and proper at the time under all
alleged in the complaint are sufficient to justify the writ. In that case, circumstances. In the case of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil.,
we must have the power to make said injunction final if upon a trial on 83,95), this court, referring to a case ofmandamus, said:
the merits we find those facts proven. (Rule 60, section 10.)But since
such a permanent or perpetual writ would have to be premised upon . . . On the one hand, no consideration of policy or
the determination that petitioners have been legally and validly convenience should induce this court to exercise a power that
elected, which question is beyond our power to decide, it is clear that does not belong to it. On the other hand, no consideration of
we lack jurisdiction to issue even the preliminary process. And be it policy or convenience should induce this court to surrender a
not contended that our preliminary writ is simply to serve while the power which it is its duty to exercise. But
contest has not been decided by the Electoral Tribunal, because certainly mandamus should never issue from this court where
under Act No. 136, section 19, and Rule 60, sections 2 and 3, this it will not prove to be effectual and beneficial. It should not be
court can issue such a process in aid only of its own jurisdiction of awarded where it will create discord and confusion. It should
another tribunal — and it is unthinkable that the Supreme Court not be awarded where mischievous consequences are likely to
should be made to serve as a sort of auxiliary court to the Electoral follow. Judgment should not be pronounced which might
tribunal. possibly lead to unseemly conflicts or which might
be disregarded with impunity. This court offer no means by a
17

decision for any possible collision between it as the highest question, presently contested before the Electoral Tribunal for the
court in the Philippines and the Philippine Senate as a branch Senate, as sole judge under the Constitution, of whether or not said
of coordinate department, or between the court and the Chief petitioners have been duly and validly elected as Senators. This
Executive or the Chief Executive Legislature. (Emphasis clearly would be an unconstitutional invasion of the sphere allotted by
supplied.) the fundamental law to said Electoral Tribunal as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
It is true that the Alejandrino case was one of mandamus. But under members of the Senate. All of which means that this court cannot
the principle of separation of powers, the rule is equally applicable to constitutionally possess jurisdiction over the alleged main case of
cases of injunction--in fact, to all cases where it is desired to have the prohibition. This is another way of saying that petitioners are not
judiciary directly control the action of either the executive or legislative entitled to the principal remedy thus sought by them from this Court.
department, or either branch of the latter, concerning matters within
their respective province. Moreover, not much scrutiny is required to Sec. 17 (2). Prima Facie Case.—While it is not a ground for
see that what is here pursued is, in practical effect, an order of this refusing a preliminary injunction that is not absolutely certain
tribunal commanding the Senate or respondents, who represent it, to that complainant has the right to relief, yet to authorize a
allow the petitioners to remain seated in the Senate and freely temporary injunction, complain must make out at least a prima
exercise their alleged functions and rights as Senators: for no other is facie showing the right to the final relief. (32 C. J.,38 ;
the effect of an order prohibiting the Senate or said respondents from emphasis supplied.)
preventing petitioner's from remaining thus seated and exercising said
functions and rights. Looking thru the form to the substance, the Reason for rule.—The injunction pendente lite can be justified
petition is really one of mandamus. only upon theory that it is necessary incident to the granting of
such final relief as complainants appear to be entitled to. The
As the writ of prohibition, the complaint asks this court, after trial on right to such final relief must appear; if not, the allowance of an
the merits, to enjoin respondents and each of them from preventing injunction is erroneous. Amelia Milling Co. vs. Tennessee
petitioners from continuing seated in the Senate and freely exercising Coal, etc., R. Co. (123 Fed., 811, and other cases cited.) (32
the functions of Senators, and likewise, from adopting any other C. J., 39 under note 76 beginning on p. 38; emphasis
ulterior proceeding in execution of the resolution in question. The writ supplied.)
thus sought would, if granted, be definite and final in its effects. (Rule
67, sections 2, 8, and 9.) Such a writ of prohibition would necessarily Finally, we come to the great principle of separation of powers. In the
be perpetual or permanent in character and operation, in the same case of Alejandrino vs. Quezon, supra, this court said (pp. 88, 89):
way that a final injunction under Rule 60, section 10, would
permanently enjoin the act complained of and perpetually restrain the There are certain basic principles which lie at the foundation of
defendant from the commission or continuance of such act. It would the Government of the Philippine Islands, which are familiar to
enjoin respondents from preventing petitioners from acting as students of public law. It is here only necessary to recall that
members of the Senate in exactly the same way and with exactly the under our system of government, each of the three
same rights and privileges as the other members whose election is departments is distinct and not directly subject to the control of
unchallenged and uncontested, not only temporarily but for the entire another department. The power to control is the power to
term of the office. But for this court to so order, it would necessarily abrogate and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp. . .
have to base its judgment and decree upon the premise that
petitioners have been duly and validly elected as members of the xxx xxx xxx
Senate. This would inevitably involve a determination of precisely the
18

. . . Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its The Congress is the Legislative Department of the
members, or its officers, to compel the perfromance of duties government; the President is the Executive
purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to Department.Neither can be restrained in its action by the
their legislative functions And over which they have exclusive Judicial Department; though the acts of both, when performed,
control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance.
a gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that where a
member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts The impropriety of such interference will be clearly seen upon
have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right consideration of its possible consequences.
or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.
Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for allowed. If
If mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of purely the President refuse obedience, it is needless to observe that
legislative duties by the legislature, its members, or its officers, how the court is without power to enforce its process. If, on the
can, under the same principle, injunction or prohibition lie to enjoin or other hand, the President complies with the order of the court
prohibit action of the Legislature, its members, or its officers, in regard and refuses to execute the acts of the Congress, is it not clear
to matters pertaining to their legislative functions and over which they that a collision may occur between the Executive and
have exclusive control? And if the courts are powerless to compel Legislative Departments of the Government? May not the
reinstatement of an expelled member of the legislative body, it seems House of Representatives impeach the President for such
inconceivable that under the same system of government the courts refusal? And in that case could this court interfere in behalf of
should possess jurisdiction to prohibit the expulsion in the first the President, thus endangered by compliance with its
instance. And if the courts cannot interfere to prevent such expulsion, mandate, and restrain by injunction the Senate of the United
a fortiori they should lack authority to intervene to prevent a mere States from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would the
suspension, which is a less drastic measure against the member. If strange spectacle be offered to the public wonder of an
the expulsion of a member of the Senate is purely a legislative attempt by this court to arrest proceedings in that court?
question, as clearly decided in the Alejandrino case, the supension of
a member of the same body must equally be of the same nature. These questions answer themselves.

In the same case this court, in remarking that some of the cases cited xxx xxx xxx
therein related to the chief executive rather than to the legislature,
said that the rules which govern the relations of the courts to the chief . . . we are fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction of a
executive likewise govern the relations of the courts to the legislature. bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties; and that such bill ought to be received by us.
In Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord (4 Wall., 475), a bill was filed
praying the United States Supreme Court to enjoin Andrew Johnson, It has been suggested that the bill contains a prayer that, if the
President of the United States, and E. O. C. Ord, General relief sought cannot be had against Andrew Johnson, as
Commanding in the District of Mississipi and Arkansas from executing President, as President, it may be granted against Andrew
certain acts of Congress. The court, per chief Chief Justice Chase, Johnson as a citizen of Tennessee. But it is plain that relief as
said that the single point for consideration was: Can the President be against the execution of an act of Congress by Andrew
restrained by injunction from carrying into effect an Act of Congress Johnson, if relief against its execution by the President. . .
alleged to the be unconstitutional? It continued:
19

In the case of Sutherland vs. Governor of Michigan (29 Mich., 320), conceded that no court can compel the Legislature to make or
Justice Cooley, speaking for the Supreme Court of Michigan, had the to refrain from making laws, or to meet or adjourn at its
following to say: command, or to take any action whatsoever, though the duty
to take it be made ever so clear by the constitution or the laws.
. . . Our government is one whose powers have been carefully In these cases the exemption of the one department from the
apportioned between three distinct departments, which control of the other is not only implied in the framework of
emanate alike from the people, have their powers alike limited government, but is indispensably necessary if any useful
and defined by the constitution, are of equal dignity, and within apportionment of power is to exist.
their respective spheres of action equally independent.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
It is not attempted to be disguised on the part of the relators
It is true that neither of the departments can operate in all that any other course than that which leaves the head of the
respects independently of the others, and that what are called executive department to act independently in the discharge of
the checks and balances of government constitute each a his duties might possibly lead to unseemly conflicts, if not
restraint upon the rest. . . . But in each of these cases the something worse, should the courts undertake to enforce their
action of the department which controls, modifies, or in any mandates and the executive refuse to obey. . . . And while we
manner influences that of another, is had strictly within its own should concede, if jurisdiction was plainly vested in us, the
sphere, and for that reason gives no occassion for conflict, inability to enforce our judgment would be no sufficient reason
controversy or jealousy. The Legislative in prescribing rules for for failing to pronounce it, especially against an officer who
the courts, is acting within its proper province in making laws, would be presumed ready and anxious in all cases to render
while the courts, in declining to enforce an unconstitutional obedience to the law, yet in a case where jurisdiction is
law, are in like manner acting within their proper province, involved in doubt it is not consistent with the dignity of the
because they are only applying that which is law to the court to pronounce judgments which may be disregarded with
controversies in which they are called upon to give judgment. impunity, nor with that of the executive to place him in position
It is mainly by means of these checks and balances that the where, in a matter within his own province, he must act
officers of the several departments are kept within their contrary to his judgment, or stand convicted of a disregard of
jurisdiction, and if they are disregarded in any case, and power the laws.
is usurped or abused, the remedy is by impeachment, and not
by another department of the government attempting to correct In the same case of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (supra), we find the
the wrong by asserting a superior authority over that which by following quotation from French vs. Senate of the State of California
the constitution is its equal. (146 Cal., 604):

It has long been a maxim in this country that the Legislature Even if we should give these allegations their fullest force in
cannot dictate to the courts what their judgments shall be, or favor of the pleader, they do not make a case justifying the
set aside or alter such judgments after they have been interposition of the court. Under our form of government the
rendered. If it could, constitutional liberty would cease to exist; judicial department has no power to revise even the most
and if the Legislature could in like manner override executive arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of
action also, the government would become only a despotism either house thereof, taken in pursuance of the power
under popular forms. On the other hand it would be readily
20

committed exclusively to that department by the constitution. . In the case of Masachusetts vs. Mellon (supra), the Supreme Court of
.. the United States concluded its decision in these words:

From the case of Masachusetts vs. Mellon (262 U.S., 447; 67 Law. . . . Looking through forms of words to the substance of their
ed., 1078, 1084), we quote the following passage: complaint, it is merely that officials of the executive department
of the government are executing and will execute an act of
. . . If an alleged attempt by congressional action to annul and Congress asserted to be unconstitutional; and this we are
abolish an existing state government, "with all its constitutional asked to prevent. To do so would be not to decide a judicial
powers and privileges," presents no justifiable issue, as was controversy, but to assume a position of authority over the
ruled in Geogia vs. Stanton, supra, no reason can be governmental acts of another and co-equal department — an
suggested why it should be otherwise where the attempt goes authority which plainly we do not possess.
farther, as it is here alleged, than to propose to share with the
state the field of state power. Strikingly similar, our case is one wherein the substance of the
complaint is merely that respondents President and Members of the
In our case the Senate action through the Pendatun Resolution and Philippine Senate have executed and will execute a resolution of the
the acts alleged to have been performed thereunder, are still less body asserted to be unconstitutional; and this we are asked to
transcendental in comparison to those involved in Georgia vs. Stanton prevent, to paraphrase the Federal Supreme Court. I could not do
(supra), and Massachusetts vs. Mellon (supra), as should be obvious better than make mine the conclusion of that High Tribunal that rather
to every one. than a judicial controversy which we are asked to decide, it is a
position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-
In the case of Barry vs. United States ex rel. Cunningham (279 U.S., equal department which we are asked to assume — an authority
597; 73 Law ed., 867, 872), the Federal Supreme Court was which plainly we do not possess.
concerned with a case where the United States Senate, pending the
adjudication of the validity or nullity of the election of William S. Vare In the adjudicated cases, it has often been said that in actual and
as Senator, refused acceptance of his credentials consisting of the appropriate controversies submitted to the courts the judiciary has the
returns, upon the face of which he had been elected, and a certificate constitutional power to declare unconstitutional any legislative or
form the Governor of the State to that effect, and refused to executive act which violates the Constitution; thus, in the case of
administer the oath of office to him, and to accord the full right to Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139, 182), the fourth
participate in the business of the Senate. It was held that all this "was conclusion established by this court was as follows:
a matter within the discretion of the Senate." This is strikingly similar
to the instant case where the Senate of the Philippines, which I xxx xxx xxx
maintain retained it inherent power of suspension after the transfer to
the Electoral Tribunal for the Senate for its exclusive jurisdiction to (d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review
judge contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the
members, deemed it to be necessary or convenient to suspend the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
administration of oath to petitioners, their seating in the Senate and government transcends the Constitution, which is the source
their participation in its deliberations, pending final decision by said of all authority. (Emphasis supplied.)
Electoral Tribunal of the contest concerning their election, which
matters were in my opinion within the discretion of said Senate.
21

But I am of the considered opinion that, aside from such writs, as that examination of the facts of that case will readily reveal that the
of habeas corpus, as may be guaranteed in the Constitution, all others question of whether or not Cunningham should have been released
of a purely statutory origin and coersive in their operation are not on habeas corpus arose from his arrest by order of the United States
issuable by the judiciary against either of the other coordinate and co- Senate in the course of certain proceedings before that body, sitting
equal departments. In the latter cases, I think the function of the as a tribunal to judge of the election, returns and qualifications of
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, does not go William S. Vare for Senator. It was held that:
beyond the declaration of constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the
legislative or executive act assailed. But some would ask how such a In exercising the power to judge the elections, returns and
judgment could be enforced as against the other two departments or qualifications of its members, the Senate acts as a judicial
either of them. I believe that in a democratic system of government, tribunal, and the authority to require the attendance of
built as it is upon the principle of separation of powers, with the witnesses is a necessary incident of the power to adjudge, in
consequent freedom of each department from direct control by the no wise inferior under like circumstances to that exercised by a
others, the effectiveness of the adjudications of the courts, in cases court of justice. (P. 873.)
properly coming under their jurisdiction, has perforce to depend upon
the conscience of those at the head of, or representing, the other two In the last sentence of the same paragraph the court speaks of the
departments, and their loyalty to the Constitution. I for one am power of the Senate "to compel a witness to appear to give testimony
persuaded that when the officers in whom at the time are vested the necessary to enable that body efficiently to exercise a legislative
executive and legislative power should see that the highest court of function; "and the court proceeds: "but the principle is equally, if not
the land, at the head of the judicial power, as, in a case properly a fortiori applicable where the Senate is exercising a judicial function."
brought before it and within its legitimate jurisdiction, decided that an (Emphasis supplied.)It will thus appear that the powers of the Senate
act of the executive or legislative department is unconstitutional, their there involved were not legislative but judicial in character which fact
conscience and loyalty to the Constitution can safely be relied upon to differentiates the case from those here cited, wherein purely
make them, with good grace, respect such final adjudication. As was legislative powers or functions of the Legislature or any branch thereof
said in Angara vs. Electoral Commission (supra), our Constitution is, were in question. There is no wonder, therefore, that the Federal
of course, lacking perfection and perfectibility; but it has been deemed Supreme Court, in the Barry case, by what really amounts to an
by the framers of this and similar antecedent organic laws preferable obiter, made the remark at the conclusion of its opinion that "if judicial
to leave the three coordinate departments without power of coercion, interference can be successfully invoked it can only be upon a clear
one against the other, with the exceptions which may have been showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will
therein established, to open the door to mutual invasion of jurisdiction, constitute a denial of due process of law," the power referred to being
with the consequent usurpation of powers of the invaded department. the judicial power to which the court refers in the paragraph which I
And it is here where appeal will have to be made to the conscience of have quoted above. In such a case, the Senate being permitted by the
the department concerned. If the executive or legislative department, Constitution to exercise, for a special purpose, a portion of the powers
in such cases, should abuse its powers against good conscience, or which primarily belong to the judiciary, it is but proper that any abuse
in a manner disloyal to the Constitution, ignoring the judgment of the of such limited and special power, constituting a denial of the due
courts, the aggrieved party will have to seek his remedy through the process of law, should have its redress in the judicial department, with
ordinary processes of democracy. the Supreme Court as the final arbiter; not so in cases where any
branch of the legislative department is exercising powers or functions
During our consideration of this case reference has been made to the purely legislative in nature and, therefore, within its alloted province
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Barry vs. United under the Constitution, as in the case at the bar. The Federal
States ex rel. Cunningham (279 U.S. 597; 73 Law. ed. 867). But an Supreme Court speaks of "judicial interference" without specifying its
22

kind or nature. Much less does it say that such interference will matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
necessarily be coercive in character. But even if it had in mind the writ independent and impartial tribunal," which, though constituted by
of habeas corpus there applied for, this being a high prerogative writ majority members of the legislature, "is a body separate from and
(29 C. J., 6, 7) the privilege of which is guaranteed by the Bill of independent of the legislature." It was said that "the grant of power to
Rights in our Constitution (Article III, section 1, paragraph [14]), it is in the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
a class apart from the coercive writs or process spoken of elsewhere returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
in this opinion — it is not merely a statutory remedy, such as intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
injunction, prohibition, etc., but a constitutional remedy which by its originally in the legislature"; that "the express lodging of that power by
very nature should be binding, in proper cases, upon any department the National Assembly," and that "this is as effective a restriction upon
or agency of the Government to which it may be lawfully addressed. the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution." In
other parts of the decision, this court characterized as exclusive the
TUASON, J., concurring and dissenting: jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission over protests against the
election of members of the National Assembly and "determination
I concur in the result. On the authority of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 thereof."
Phil., 83), "the writ prayed for cannot issue for the whole simple
reason that the Supreme Court does not possess the power of No stronger language than this can be found to emphasize the
coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action." completeness of the inhibition of the National Assembly from
interference in any matter pertaining to an election protest filed with
With regret I have to dissent from the majority opinion upholding the the Electoral Commission.
constitutionality of the Pendatum Resolution.
The resolution in question destroys the exclusive character of the
That the National Assembly, now Congress, retains the power it Electoral Tribunal's power. It encroaches upon the Electoral Tribunal's
possessed prior to the approval of the Constitution over the prerogative as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
uncontested election, returns and qualifications of its members, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress. In seeking
cannot successfully be disputed. This power remains intact, the suspension of the petitioners on the strenght of the reported
unaffected by section 11, Article VI of the Constitution, which limits the election irregularities in Central Luzon, irregularities which constitute
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal to election, returns and the sole basis of the main protest, to that extent the resolution passed
qualifications of members of Congress that are the subject of protest. judgment on the truth or probabilities of the charges, although the
judgment may not have been intended as final. At the very least, the
But within this limited sphere of its jurisdiction, the authority of the resolution touches directly on a matter which involves a senatorial
Electoral Tribunal is supreme, absolute, exclusive. In the language of election contest. From whatever stand pointone may look at the
section 11, Article VI of the Constitution (supra), "the Electoral Pendatun Resolution, it is hard to escape the conclusion that it
Tribunal shall be thesole judge of all contests relating to the elections, oversteps the bounds of the Senate's authority and trespasses on a
returns and qualifications of their respective members." territory entirely reserved for the Electoral Tribunal.

In Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139), it was held, in the Viewed from another angle, the legality of petitioners' suspension is
light of the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention, that the open to attack. This suspension was resorted to as an auxiliary and
purpose of the creation of the Electoral Commission "was to transfer interlocutory step subordinated to the final outcome of the election
in its totality all the power previously exercised by the legislature in protest filed against them. Only a few will disagree with the
proposition that the power of the Senate or the House of
23

Representatives to suspend its members as a subsidiary measure for immediately after assuming their respective positions, were deprived
causes connected with their election, returns and qualifications, is, if of their seats in the Senate through the unscrupulous, irresponsible,
such power exists, an implied power derived from the power to and subversive action of a tyrannical and ruthless majority who would
remove or exclude, or what is the same thing in this connection, the not stop even to a downright trampling of the fundamental law. The
power to invalidate an election. It follows that where the political victims come to us clamoring for relief and justice. Shall we meet the
power has been taken away, as in the case of protested elections, the clamor with deaf ears? Shall we remain aloof with callous indifference
accessory power to suspend vanishes. The fact that the power to to a flagrant violation of the Constitution? Shall we leave the victims at
suspend may not have been transferred, as is contended, to the the mercy of a despotic oligarchy and allow the latter to supplant
Electoral Commission does not argue in favor of the contention that it democracy? Shall we leave them instead to pin their hopes on
still resides in the Congress. popular justice, if they be patient enough not to seek justice by their
hands or by the people who exalted them by suffrage to be their
PERFECTO, J., dissenting: spokesmen in the Senate and in Congress?

Within the remaining span of our life, never shall we be more

conscious of the great privilege of performing our duties as the
ultimate guardians of the fundamental source of vitality of our nation
I.—TO MEET OR NOT TO MEET THE CHALLENGE as an organic whole, whether normality prevails or the people boil in
the cauldron of ex surging partisan passions. The very essence of
The challenge has been flung. Shall we evade it by an unmanly and constitutional government is under our trust and the momentous
shameful retreat? question is whether we shall betray that trust and keep unblemished
our judicial escutcheon. The blinding grandeur of the unprecedented
opportunity challenging us cannot fail to move our whole being, from
By this case the highest tribunal of the land in undergoing a crucial
ender on to the inner recesses of heart and brains, in the effort to be
test. Shall it do honor to its constitutional role as the last bastion of the
equal to the high duty.
"regime of justice" proclaimed by the Constitution in its preamble, as
one of the fundamental goals of the government established?
II.—CONFLICT OF PHILOSOPHIES
The Constitution itself is on the balance. Fundamental principles of
good government, basic human rights, prime rules for the existence of Under the admitted lack of perfection and perfectability of our
an orderly society have been trampled upon. The victims come to the Constitution, it being the work of men, still we can not subscribe to the
Supreme Court where the last line of democracy lies. Shall we allow nihilistic theory that there are flagrant violations of its provisions,
that line to give under the onslaught? Shall we betray the faith of our committed in utter oppression of a minority, to whom our government
people? is incapable of giving redress, and when a judicial controversy arising
from them is submitted for our decision we must allow ourselves to be
petrified in buddhistic nirvana and declare ourselves impotent, like the
Shall we refuse to do our part, our duty, our mission, to maintain in
bystander who can not lift a finger to save people crying for help
our country a government of laws, only because we have to face a
inside a burning house or a little child inclosed in a cage full of hungry
powerful group of senators?
tigers.
Three senators of the Philippines, duly proclaimed as elected by
Here, three senators of the Philippines are wantonly deprived of their
1,736,407 combined votes cast by qualified Filipino electors,
seats in the Senate as constitutional representatives of the people.
24

Here, chosen, spokesmen of many hundreds of thousands of qualified accepted our position in this court fully cognizant of the grave
voters, are silenced and muzzled, and their constitutional rights responsibilities it entails and aware that it will exact from us all the
trampled upon. The transgression of the fundamental law is evident. best that nature has bestowed on us. We must not give less. We must
But it is alleged that the Supreme Court is powerless to protect the not betray popular trust. We should not disappoint the people.
victims, to revindicate their constitutional rights and those of the
qualified voters who elevated them to office, and to restore law. It is IV.—FACTS IN THE CASE
alleged that within our system of government there is absolutely no
remedy for such an oppression. The theory is an unmistakable upshot The Commission on Elections, pursuant to the provisions of section
of a philosophy of frustration, defeatism, and despair. We can not 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 725, made the canvass of the votes
subscribe to such an effete philosophy, afflicted with moral asthenia, cast for senators in the election held on April 23, 1946, and on May
unable to see but an horizon of failure. We refuse to adopt the 23, 1946, proclaimed petitioners as elected. (See accompanying
despairing and fatalistic attitude of decrepit and impotent senility. Appendix A.)
Philosophical eunuchry is incompatible with enemy. Gelded
intellectual virility or a dynamic moral effeminacy has no place within Of the 16 senators proclaimed elected, 9 belong to the Liberal Party,
the system of Philippine constitutional democracy. respondents Jose A. Avelino, Vicente Francisco, Vicente Sotto,
Melecio Arranz, Ramon Torres, Mariano J. Cuenco, Olegario Clarin,
The framing of our Constitution is based on a philosophy of faith and Enrique Magalona, and Salipada Pendatun; and 7 to the Nacionalista
hope, the philosophy of healthy, vigorous and courageous youth, full Party, the 3 petitioners and Tomas Confesor, Carlos P. Garcia,
of the zest of life, brimming with sturdy and exalted ideas, drunk with Tomas Cabili, and Alejo Mabanag.
the wine of inspired ambition and filled with enthusiasm for all good
and beautiful things, always dreaming of a nobler and more glorious Of the senators elected in 1941, 8 remain in office, 4 belonging to the
future. Within that strenuous philosophy there is no place for the Liberal Party, Domingo Imperial, Proceso Sebastian, Sa Ramain
theory of impotency of our system of government in redressing Alonto, and Emiliano Tria Tirona; and 4 to the Nacionalista Party,
constitutional transgressions and of the incapability of the courts of Eulogio Rodriguez, Nicolas Buendia, Pedro Hernaez, and Vicente
justice in giving protection and redress to the victims. Rama.

III.—QUALITIES REQUIRED IN JUDICIAL FUNCTION The Senate therefore, is actually composed of 13 Liberals, with a
precarious majority of 2, and a minority of 11 Nacionalistas.
We cannot accept the invitation to bury our heads in ostrich-like
fashion in the sands of indifference and inaction because, in having to On May 25, 1946, in accordance with the Commonwealth Act No.
exercise the constitutional function of administering justice, we will be 725, the Senate convened to inaugurate the regular legislative
constrained to face and take action against powerful, defiant or session for this year.
arrogant parties. It is precisely in cases like this where we should
never show the least hesitancy in the performance of our official The session, with all senators present, except Senators Sa Ramain
duties and in the exercise of the loftiest function of humanity: the Alonto and Vicente Rama, began by the reading of the proclamation
administration of justice. made by the Commission on Elections, as copied in the
accompanying Appendix A. No objection having been raised against
The judicial function calls for those qualities which, for lack of better the proclamation, there being no question as to its legality and
words, are described as manliness, moral courage, intellectual regularity, with all the 22 members present, including petitioners,
decision, firmness of character, and steadfastness of convictions. We
25

recognized and accepted as full-fledged senators of the Philippines, continuation of the debate on the Pendatun Resolution to May 27,
the Senate proceeded to elect its President, a vacant position 1946, or to consider and approve said resolution.
previously held by President Manuel A. Roxas. The result was: 3
absent; 2 abstained; for respondent Senator Jose A. Avelino, 10 At the time the petition has been filed, May 27, 1946, respondent
votes, including his own; for petitioner Senator Jose O. Vera, 8 votes; Senator Jose Avelino, President of the Senate, had already begun to
and for Senator Carlos P. Garcia, 1 vote. put into effect the Pendatun Resolution by ordering the Secretary of
the Senate to erase from the roll of the same the names of the three
After respondent Senator Avelino assumed his office as President of petitioners.
the Senate, it was moved that he receive the collective oath of office
of the newly elected senators, and, at that juncture, Senator Salipada Among the three petitioners who are complaining of being deprived of
Pendatun proposed the adoption of a resolution herein attached as their constitutional and legal right to continue sitting in the Senate of
Appendix B, as a historical exhibit of the scurviest dealing a minority the Philippines is the minority Floor Leader Jose O. Vera, who lost the
has ever endured, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: election for President of the Senate by the bare difference of two
votes. All the three petitioners, by the high positions they formerly
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved by the Senate of the occupied in the Government of which we may take judicial notice, are
Philippines, in session assembled, as it hereby resolves, to recognized as political leaders of national stature, whose presence
defer the administration of oath and the sitting of JOSE O. will do honor to any legislative chamber of any country in the world.
VERA, RAMON DIOKNO, and JOSE ROMERO, pending the
hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their V.—PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
elections, wherein the terrorism averred in the report of the
Commission on Elections and in the report of the Provost Upon the facts above related and the allegations made in the petition
Marshall constitute the ground of said protests and will under oath, including the one to the effect that the respondents of the
therefore be the subject of investigation and determination. majority party are determined to put into effect immediately the
Pendatun resolution, to deprive the petitioners of their right to sit in the
Debate began upon the adoption of the proposed resolution. Senate, the "sinister purpose" of which was the approval, without the
Afterwards it was unanimously agreed upon to postpone further intervention and participation of petitioners, of important measures,
debate on the question for Monday, May 27, 1946. including an alleged terroristic one for judicial reorganization and the
highly controversial Bell Bill, as soon as the petition was submitted in
The Senate proceeded thereafter to consider another matter during the night of May 27, 1946, the undersigned issued the preliminary
which, in protest against the action taken by the majority on the said injunction prayed for in the petition upon petitioners' filing a cash bond
matter, all the minority senators walked out from the session hall, in the amount of P1,000. (Copy of the order is attached as Appendix
leaving therein only 12 majority senators, including the President of D.)
the Senate. Taking advantage of the absence of all the minority
senators, the 12 majority senators remaining in the session hall On May 29, 1946, the Supreme Court in banc was specially called to
approved and adopted the Pendatun Resolution, notwithstanding the session with the specific purpose of considering the issuance of a writ
fact that the Senate had already postponed the further consideration of preliminary injunction. As the court functioning is a special division
of said resolution to May 27, 1946, and the 12 majority senators, for of six, and the Supreme Court in banc was then in vacation, the
lack of quorum, could not, under the Constitution, proceed with the session had to be called upon the initiative of the Chief Justice. In the
business of the same and, therefore, had not the authority either to meantime, the service of the writ was suspended.
reconsider the resolution taken by the Senate, postponing the
26

The Supreme Court in banc adopted then the following resolution: Justice Jaranilla absent.

The court in banc, having been informed that a writ of Justice Perfecto dissents as follows:
preliminary injunction has been issued in G.R. No. L-543, Jose
O. Vera vs. Jose Avelino by Justice Perfecto under sections 2 The facts alleged in the petition show that petitioners'
and 5 of Rule 60, Resolved to set for hearing the petition for fundamental rights have been trampled upon in open defiance
preliminary injunction on Saturday, June 1st, 1946, at 10 of the law and the Constitution; that respondents, in adopting
o'clock a.m., for the purpose of determining whether or not the the Pendatun Resolution and trying to enforce it, usurped
issuance of said writ was justified. Let notice be given to all the constitutional functions exclusively entrusted by the people to
parties. the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate, as an independent and
separate department of the government; that the people at
The Chief Justice and Associate Justices Paras, Hilado and large, who voted for and of whom petitioners are legal
Bengzon voted to dissolve the preliminary injunction in the representatives, are intended to be deprived of their voice and
meantime. vote on matters of transcendental importance to the welfare
and future of this nation, that are and to be under
Upon the adoption of the above resolution, the undersigned instructed consideration of the Senate. Respondents did not deny these
the Clerk to proceed with the service of the writ of preliminary facts. They reduced themselves to impugn the inherent and
injunction, which was immediately served to respondents. undisputable jurisdiction of this Supreme Court to pass upon
the above mentioned flagrant violations of the Constitution and
On June 3, 1946, a majority adopted the following resolution, to afford coercive relief to the victims thereof. We cannot agree
dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction: with an action which history may give a damaging
interpretation. We must have proper respect to the judgement
Considering that the preliminary injunction was issued in the of posterity. We have a plain duty to uphold the Constitution.
case of Jose O. Vera, petitioners, vs. Jose A. Avelino, We must not shirk that sacred duty. We are called upon to
respondents, G.R. No. L-543, to preserve the status quo and protect the constitutional prerogatives of the representatives of
thus prevent the execution of the acts alleged under oath in the people. Our loyalty to the people does not permit any
the last part of paragraph X of the petition, without the alternative action to that of extending the cloak of our authority
intervention of the petitioners; and taking into consideration so that the representatives of the people may continue
that this court, after hearing both parties, at any rate believes performing unhampered their fundamental prerogatives and
and trusts that the respondents will not carry out said acts functions. We cannot agree with any suspension of their
during the pendency of this proceeding, this court, without exercise in utter violation of the fundamental law of land. The
deciding whether or not the said injunction was justified, sovereignty of the people itself is involved in this case. We
hereby resolves to dissolve it in the meantime, without cannot suffer the idea that in one of the crucial moments in the
prejudice to whatever action or decision this court may take or performance of our functions and in the compliance of our duty
render on the question involved in this case including that of as is pointed out by our conscience, we have faltered. The
jurisdiction. preliminary injunction must not be dissolved.

Justice Paras concurs in the result. Although the belief expressed in the majority resolution is, in effect, a
moral injunction, addressed solely to the sense of responsibility,
fairness, decency, and patriotism of respondents, without any
27

enforceable legal sanction, the majority being sure that respondents That action continues now to be pending before us for decision, the
will not betray the trust reposed on them, yet we felt it our duty to same as respondents' motion to dismiss.
dissent because in questions so important as those raised in this case
we do not agree with indirect and diplomatic procedures, with VI.—UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION
wavering, innocious and hesitating action, with laodicean measures
and resolutions, with equivocal, furtive, and not forth putting attitude. Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution reads as follows:
In judicial matters, the best policy is forthrightness, not ambiguity. The
way of Themis is always rectilinear. Her path is never tortuous, The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
labyrinthine, or misleading. an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
Without any attempt at prophecy, not long after the resolution their respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction, events have shown the composed of nine members, three of whom shall be Justices
moral, indirect, or admonitory injunctions by courts of justice are mere of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
sounds transcribed on scraps of paper, not worthier than the sheets and the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or of
on which they are written. Hocking at the credulity, ingenuousness, the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
and compliance of the majority of this court, with the exclusion of be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party
petitioners, respondents proceeded to carryout the acts alleged in the having the largest number of votes and three of the party
last part of paragraph X of the petition, such as the approval of the having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior
Bell bill, the revamping of the judiciary system of the Philippines, Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
including the unconstitutional reduction of the membership of the
Supreme Court from the eleven to seven, and the measure which The constitution of the Electoral Tribunals is provided in section 13 of
would wipe out the time-honored principle of stability in the Philippine Article VI of the Constitution, wherein it is required that they shall be
civil service system, by placing many thousands of public officers and constituted "within thirty days after the Senate and the House of
employees in iniquitous insecurity in the positions in which they have Representatives shall have been organized with the election of their
invested the be stenergies in years of public service. President and Speaker, respectively."

For the nonce, it will be hard to gauge and appraise the full From the foregoing, it is evident that the power to judge "all contests
consequences of the resolution of June 5, 1946, dissolving the writ of relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of senators and
preliminary injunction based on the majority's belief and trust that representatives, is exclusively lodged in the respective Electoral
events have shown to be completely hazy and groundless. It is only Tribunal, the exclusivity being emphasized by the use of the word
our fervent hope that the consequences, whatever they may be, may "sole" by the drafters of the Constitution.
not dampen the enthusiasm of those who have reposed so much faith
in the success of our sovereign Republic as the pursuivant heralding a By the Pedatun Resolution, respondents exercised, in effect, the
new era to all subjected peoples. power to judge "the election, returns, and qualifications" of petitioners
as senators of the Philippines, duly proclaimed as elected on April 23,
On June 8, 1946, petitioners filed a motion praying that the above 1946.
majority's resolution of June 3, 1946, be reconsidered and that the
writ of preliminary injunction be restored. It remained deplorably From the very words of respondents themselves there can be no
unacted upon for weeks until respondents were able to consummate possible mistakes as to the fact that, in adopting the Pendatun
the acts above mentioned.
28

Resolution, they exercised the judicial power to judge a controversy VI.-A.—THE INTENT OF THE PEOPLE IN THE
concerning the election of petitioners as senators of the Philippines. CONSTITUTION IS IDENTICAL WITH THE INTENT OF
THEIR DELEGATES
From their motion to dismiss dated June 6, 1946, through Solicitor
General Lorenzo Tañada and Atty. Vicente J. Francisco, himself one Even the majority themselves admit that, in construing the
of the Senate, referring to the reasons behind the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, the writings in "The Federalist" of
Pendatun Resolution, we read: the delegates of the constitutional convention, such as Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay, have persuasive force, the same as the book of
The Senate considers it against its dignity and inimical to its Delegate Aruego and of other members of our own constitutional
welfare and integrity to allow petitioners to sit as convention concerning the Constitution of the Philippines. It is only
members pending the final determination of the question logical that the authors themselves should be in the advantageous
whether or not they were duly elected . . . it was an expression situation of construing more exactly the product of their own minds.
of the legislative (?) policy, a desire on the part of the Senate
to recognize only members whom it believes were legally But, as if repenting for making the admission, foreseeing the
elected. (Emphasis supplied.) damaging consequences thereof for the majority's position, they tried
to neutralize it or subtract its validity by seconding the sophistic
The respondents do not constitute the Senate Electoral Tribunal distinction made by Willoughby as to the conclusiveness of the
which has the exclusive jurisdiction to exercise said power. The fact parliamentary proceedings as means by proper construction of the
that latter three among the respondent Senators were chosen to be Constitution, on one side, and of the statutes, on the other, since in
members of said Tribunal does not change the situation, nor cures the the legislative proceedings "it is the intent of the legislature we seek, "
constitution inroad. They, therefore, in adopting the Pendatun while in the preceedings of the constitution convention "we are
Resolution, usurped a power, a jurisdiction, and an authority endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through the
exclusively belonging to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The usurpation discussions and the liberations of their representative." The distinction
has been perpetrated in flagrant violation of the Constitution. The is absolutely groundless. In either the constitutional convention are in
Pendatun Resolution, being unconstitutional, is null and void per se. the legislature, it is the people who speak through their delegates and
representatives, and the intent of the people may only be gathered
Among the Justices who voted to declare it invalid, because it from the utterances of said delegates and representatives. The "intent
wimbles the fundamental law, are two former members of the of the legislature" in ordinary laws is the "intent of the people," both
constitutional convention and of its committee on style, who took and being undistinguishable for all practical purposes. And the "intent
active part in the creation of the Electoral Commission, and a former of the people" in a constitutional convention is identified with the
member of the Second National Assembly which, by constitutional "intent" of their delegates thereof. It is absurd, in practical, and against
amendment, created the present Senate and the two Electoral the realities of all experience to mention "intent of the people" as
Tribunals. Justice Hontiveros, one of the present three Justices who something different from and in opposition to the intent of their own
took part in the framing of the original Constitution, did not participate representatives. The delegates and representatives are the
in the voting. mouthpiece of the people. In the system of the representative
democracy prevailing in the United States of America and in the
We have to bring out these facts because it is only logical that the co- Philippines, the people never speak by themselves, but by their
authors of the Constitution and of its amendments must be in a better chosen mouthpieces — the voters in the matter of selection of
position to interpret their own will, intention, and purposes as they government officers, and the officers in the matter of expressing the
expressed them in their own words in the fundamental law. people's will in government or state matters.
29

There is no essential difference between the parliamentary role of the ideas which boiled in their minds, and gave a definite form to their
delegates to a constitutional convention and that of the members of a own convictions and decisions, said great justices shall not be so
legislature. The fact that the former are charged with the drafting of authoritative in expounding the United States Constitution, because
the fundamental law and the latter with the enactment of ordinary laws they were not members of the federal convention that framed it,
does not change their common character as representatives and eventhough, it should be recalled, Chief Justice Marshall was one of
mouthpieces of the people. In either the Constitution or in the ordinary the outstanding figures in the Virginia convention that ratified said
statutes, it is the thought and the will of the people which are Constitution. The mention is out of place, because it has not been,
expressed. What that thought and that will are can only be gathered and can not be, shown that the constitutional opinions of Marshall and
from the way they are expressed by the representatives. The thought Holmes, for which they were hailed as authorities, are in conflict with
and the will of the people are interpreted and expressed by the what Madison, Hamilton, Jay, and other delegates to the federal
representatives and crystallized in the words uttered and written by convention had said or written as to the intent expressed in said
them. No one may pretend to know the meaning of the expressions fundamental law; while in the present controversy, there is an actual
uttered of the provisions written better than the very persons who conflict of interpretation between former delegates and those who
poured on them their own thoughts and decisions. The thought and never have been, and it happens that the former members of the
the will of the people remain in the abstract, are incapable of caption, constitutional convention taking part in the disposal of this case, are
are more ideological entities, and do not form and cannot be pointed unanimous in construing the document in the drafting of which they
out or determined until and unless their representatives in the took personal and active part.
constitutional convention are in the legislature express them in
concrete and specific words of their own. The collective entity of the Of course, in our atmosphere of freedom of opinion, outsiders may
people is, by its very in being, inarticulate. It becomes articulate only perfectly claim and pretend to know what the delegates to our
through its chosen representatives. Its will is an aphlogistic amber that constitutional convention intended to express in the Constitution better
becomes aflame only in the parliamentary actuations of its delegates. than the delegates themselves, as it is possible for some
anthropologists to claim that they are in a position to recognize the
And if we are not dreaming, we must accept the fact that what the children of some parents better than the parents themselves. But
representatives of the people stereotype either in a constitution or in everybody must also agree that such feats of clairvoyance are not
ordinary laws are their own personal opinions and convictions, their within the range of normal experience and, therefore, must not
own individual and personal thoughts and wills, although in doing so ordinarily be accepted at their face value.
they act in their representative capacity. We, the members of the
Supreme Court, are also representatives of the people and are VII.—UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE
performing our official functions in are presentative capacity, but the
opinions we express and write flow, not from any extrinsic or The Pendatun Resolution has been adopted when there was no
indwelling reservoir of justice, reserved to us by the sovereign people, quorum in the Senate. Those present were only 12, all respondent
but from the spiritual fountain of our own personal consciousness. senators.

We will not dare to dispute any one's claim to wield, in interpreting the When respondents adopted the resolution, they purportedly adopted it
fundamental law, the same authority of such judicial giants as as a resolution of the Senate.
Marshall and Holmes, but we consider it completely out of place to
conclude that, because in the present constitutional controversy we Section 10 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "a majority
maintain that the co-authors of our fundamental law are in better of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller
position to construe the very document in which they have infused the number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance
30

of absent members in such manner and under such penalties as such according to the Penal Code, with arresto mayor or a fine not
House may provide." exceeding 1,000 pesos, or both.

It is evident, therefore, that, to do business, the Senate, being Art. 234. Refusal to discharge elective office.—The penalty
composed of 24 members, needs the presence of at least 13 of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, or both,
senators. "A smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may shall be imposed upon any person who, having been elected
compel the attendance of absent members," but not in exercising any by popular election to a public office, shall refuse without legal
other power, such as the adoption of the Pendatun Resolution. motive to be sworn in or to discharge the duties of said office.

The procedure used by respondents in adopting the Pendatun No one may prevent them from performing the duties of their office,
Resolution is, therefore, conclusively unconstitutional. such as attending the meetings of the Senate or of any of its
committees or subcommittees, or from expressing their opinions or
VIII.—CRIMINAL OFFENSES casting their votes, without being criminally guilty of a violation of
parliamentary immunity, a criminal offense punished by the Penal
Petitioners are among the senators who, having been proclaimed Code withprision mayor.
elected by the Commission on Elections, are duty bound to assume
office from May 23, 1946, under the following mandatory provision of ART. 145. Violation of parliamentary immunity.—The penalty
section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 725: of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
use force, intimidation, threats, or fraud to prevent any
SEC. 12. The candidates for member of the House of member of the National Assembly (Congress)from attending
Representatives and those for Senator who have been the meetings of the Assembly (Congress) or of any of its
proclaimed elected by the respective Board of Canvassers and committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or
the Commission on Elections shall assume office and shall committees or divisions thereof, from expressing his opinions
hold regular session for the year nineteen hundred and forty- or casting his vote; and the penalty of prision correccional shall
six on May twenty-five, nineteen hundred and forty-six. Within be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall,
thirty-five days after the election has been held, both Houses while the Assembly (Congress) is in regular or special session,
of Congress shall meet in session and shall publicly count the arrest or search any member thereof, except this Code by a
votes cast for the offices of President and Vice-President, in penalty higher than prision mayor. (Words in parenthesis
accordance with Article VII, section two of the Constitution. supplied.)
The persons respectively having the largest number of votes
for President and Vice-President shall be declared elected; but From the foregoing, it is evident that respondents have the
in case two or more candidates shall have an equal and inexcusable duty of recognizing petitioners as legal members of the
largest number of votes for either office, one of them shall be Senate, otherwise they may be liable to criminal prosecution for an
chosen President or Vice-President, as the case may be, by a offense defined and punished by the Penal Code with imprisonment
majority vote of the members of Congress in joint session ranging from 6 years to 12 years.
assembled.
IX.—PETITIONERS' CREDENTIALS CONCLUSIVE AS TO THEIR
If petitioners should fail to discharge the duties of their respective RIGHT TO THEIR SEATS IN THE SENATE
offices, they will incur criminal responsibility and may be punished,
31

It is a duty from which respondents can not legally escape. Otherwise (51st Congress, 1st Session [21 Cong. Record, pt. 3, pp.
they will invite the sword of Damocles of criminal prosecution to be 2906-2810], p. 521.)
hanging on their heads. As the Supreme Court of Kansas said in Re
Gunn. 19 L.R.A., 519: The court also quoted from the American and English Encyclopedia,
saying:
But, again we have what is known as a "standard work" on
parliamentary or legislative practice. It is found in almost every The American and English Encyclopedia summarizes the law
public library, is examined and referred to by every legislative of the worth of a certificate of election as follows: "It is settled
assembly and every congressional body, and its title is that when it is made the duty of certain officers to canvass the
"Cushing's Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies." . . . In votes, and issue a certificate of election in favor of the
section 240 it is said: "the principle of parliamentary law successful candidate, a certificate of such officers, regular
applicable to the question are perfectly simple and plain, upon its face, is sufficient to entitle the person holding it to the
founded in the very nature of things, established by the possession of the office during an action to contest the right."
uniform practice and authority of parliament, confirmed by Volume 6, p. 373; 33 Law. ed., 948; State vs. Buckland (23
reason and analogy. These principles are as follows: First, that Kan., 369).
every person duly returned is a member, whether legally
elected or not, until his election is set aside; second, that no The court might well have added that Ruling Case Law wholly
person who is not duly returned, is a member, although legally confirms its stand:
elected, until his election is established; third, that conflicting
claimants, both in form legally returned (that would be where . . . The certificate entitles the recipient to exercise the office
two persons had certificates), are neither of them entitled to be until the regular constitutional authority shall determine who is
considered as members until the question between them has legally elected officer, and it is duty of the incumbent of an
been settled; fourth, that those members who are duly office at the expiration of his term to surrender it to one who
returned, and they alone — the members whose rights are to has received a certificate of election and has qualified
determined being excluded — constitute the judicial tribunal thereunder. If it is desired to contest the election or
for the decision of all questions of this nature." Upon this qualification of such person, this may be done in the manner
question of certificates, we also cite the contest in the United prescribed by law for determining claims to an office.
States Senate from Montana, which is the latest utterance of Disbursing officers, charges with the payment of salaries, have
the highest legislative body in this land. In the report of the a right to rely on the apparent title, and treat the officer who is
majority of the committee it is said: "The majority of the clothed with it as the officer de jure, without inquiring whether
committee are of the opinion that, if this body of persons had another has the better right. While a certificate of election may
lawful and constitutional certificates of their election, that title is be superseded by a decree in proceedings to contest the
a good title against all the world, governing their associates in election, it cannot be subjected to attack in a collateral
that body, governing the senate, governing everybody who proceeding in which the title may be in question; and if the
had a lawful duty to determine who are lawfully elected time should pass within which such proceeding may be
representatives, until there can be an adjudication by the instituted the title may become absolute and indefeasible in
House itself to the contrary; and that nobody can be heard to default of any contest. Hence it has been said that the holder
say, and that no authority can be permitted to inquire into or of a certificate of election who has duly qualified is prima
determine, the actual facts of the election as against the title." facie entitled to the office when his term begins, as against
everyone except a de facto officer in possession under color of
32

authority. He is entitled to retain possession and to perform the members from the roll of the House, and unhesitatingly condemned it
duties of the office without interference until such certificate is in these words:
set aside by some appropriate proceeding." (22 R. C. L., 436,
437.) It seems that while 10 contestants are marked in the
Dunsmore Journal as present, but not voting, 10 names on the
This Supreme Court laid down the same doctrine by stating the certified roll are wholly omitted. Any rightful reason for such
following: omission does not appear. We cannot perceive any valid
reason for such omission, even if 10 certified members had
. . . As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial their seats contested. Every person duly returned too a house
board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a of representatives, and having a certificate, is a member
seat in the National Assembly and to render him eligible to any thereof, whether elected or not, whether eligible or not, until
office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National his election is set aside. And this must be set aside by the
Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935) House, not by the individual members before organization, not
by anyone member, not by any contestant, not by any mob.
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Before organization, a few members properly elected, meeting
Commons and in the Congress of the United States, in causus or otherwise, cannot pass upon the "elections,
confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member- returns, and qualification of a members of the House to be
elect to take his seat. The return of the proper election officers thereafter organized." If one member, before organization can
is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such return object to any other member duly returned and having a
begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from the time that certificate, then all members can be objected to, and there
he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331, could be no one left to organize any house. In McCraryon
332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695;U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Election (2d ed., s. 204) the practice is thus stated; "Where
Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections two or more persons claim the same office, and where a
where the decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. judicial investigation is required to settle the contest upon the
In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted merits, it is often necessary to determine which of the
election is certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, claimants shall be permitted to qualify and to exercise the
and the House, upon being informed of such certificate or functions of the office pending such investigation. If the office
report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same upon the were to remain vacant pending the contest, it might frequently
Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering happen that the greater part of the term would expire before it
the return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for could be filled; and thus the interests of the people might suffer
carrying into execution the determination as circumstances for the want of a public officer. Besides, if the mere institution
may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United of a contest were deemed sufficient to prevent the swearing in
States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular of the person holding the usual credentials, it is easy to see
house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any that every great and serious injustice might be done. If this
actual alteration or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law were the rule, it would only be necessary for an evil-disposed
and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166). person to contest the right of his successful rival, and to
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, 180, 181.) protract the contest as long as possible, in order to deprive the
latter of his office for at least a part of the term; and this might
As a matter of fact, in the Gunn case, the Supreme Court of Kansas be done by a contest having little or no merit on his side for it
had occasion to comment on the exclusion of ten duly proclaimed would be impossible to discover in advance of an investigation
33

the absence of merit. And, again, if the party holding the In 1925, Nicolas A. Rafols was reelected as representative from one
ordinary credentials to an office could be kept out of the office district of Cebu. The House of Representatives of the 7th Philippine
by the mere institution of a contest, the organization of a Legislature suspended his seating. The resolution for suspension was
legislative body-such, for example, as the House of passed after a bitter parliamentary debate between members of the
Representatives of the United States-might be altogether majority belonging to the Nacionalista Party and the members of the
prevented by instituting contest against a majority of the minority belonging to the Democrata Party. The House was then
members; or what is more to be apprehended, the relative presided over by Speaker Manuel A. Roxas, now President of the
strength of political parties against members of one or the Philippines, and among those who with us opposed the resolution for
other of such parties. These considerations have made it suspension were Representative Jose Avelino from Samar, now
necessary to adopt and to adhere to the rule that the person President of the Senate, and the minority floor leader, Claro M. Recto,
holding the ordinary credential shall be qualified and allowed who later became President of the House of Representatives. The
to act pending a contest and until a decision can be had on the arbitrariness and injustice committed against Representative Rafols
merits. were bitterly resented and rankled deep in the hearts of the minority
who felt they were despotically trampled upon by a bulldozing
Now, why should not this principle be followed? Why should majority.
not this rule, which is universal throughout the states of this
Union, and which is accepted and adopted by Congress, be The Pro-Anti political struggle in 1934 resulted in new alignments.
followed in the state of Kansas? It has history to sustain it. It Former Democratas Avelino and Recto happened to align with the
has reason to sustain it. And let us here remark that in every Anti majority, the same as Justice Hontiveros, who also became a
state of this Union where, through political excitement or Delegate to the constitutional convention; and former Nacionalistas
personal contests, a different rule has been adopted, Manuel A. Roxas and Manuel C. Briones happened to align with the
disturbance, violence, and almost bloodshed have always Pro minority.
occurred. (Pp. 522-523.)
In 1934, the constitutional convention was presided over by Claro M.
X.—ELECTORAL CONTESTS ON LEGISLATIVE POSITIONS Recto, as President, Ruperto Montinola, as First Vice President, and
Teodoro Sandico, as Second Vice President. All of them belonged to
Much reliance has been placed by respondents on the Rafols case in the Democrata Party when in 1925 injustice was committed against
support of their authority to suspend the seatings of petitioners Representative Rafols. Recto and Sandico were aligned with the Anti
through the Pendatun Resolution. majority and Montinola with the Pro minority.

We agree that not enough emphasis may be placed on said case, Although the Pro delegates of the convention were only about one-
although not as an isolated one but as the initial link of a chain of fifth of all the members, some of them were elected to preside over
historical events handing with the leading and epoch-making, important committees--Rafael Palma, on principles; Jose P. Laurel, on
although not enough of the publicized case of Angara vs. Electoral the bill of rights; Manuel C. Briones, on legislative power; and
Commission, decided on July 15, 1936, which reversed the ourselves on citizenship. By his leading and influential role in the
pusillanimous, vacillating, and self-contradictory majority position drafting of the Constitution, Manuel A. Roxas was pointed out as the
taken in Alejandrino vs. Quezon, decided on September 11, 1924. Hamilton of our convention.

A little piece of history will be helping. With such men and with their background, the convention introduced
the innovation of creating the Electoral Commission of the National
34

Assembly, to which the power to judge upon the election, returns, and From the deliberations of our constitutional convention it is
qualifications of legislators, formerly exercised by legislative bodies, evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the
was transferred. The innovation was introduced precisely with the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matter
purpose of avoiding the repetition of such abuses and injustices as pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
those committed against Rafols, by lodging the judicial power of indefendent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the
deciding electoral contests for legislative positions to where it should knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional
logically belong--to a judicial body, which is expected to do justice and precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining
not to serve partisan political interests without compunctions and legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which
scruples. prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the
Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral
Although the initiative came from the minority, Pros, it was whole Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which
heartedly supported by the majority Anti leaders. The members of the both the majority and minority parties are equally represented
constitutional convention, with the most prominent leaders thereof, to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created,
were fully aware of how changeable the political fortunes of men are, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its
and it was in the interest of everybody that the rights of the minority be membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
equally protected as those of the majority.
The Electoral commission is a constitutional creation, invested
Through Justice Laurel, a former member of the constitutional with the necessary authority in the performance and execution
convention, this Supreme Court said: of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the
Constitution.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed
our fundamental law were in their majority men mature in The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all
years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
with the history and political development of other countries of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as
the world. When, therefore, they deemed it wise to create an complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction
National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the
light of their own experience of other enlightened peoples of Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.
the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was Whisman, 36 S. D., 260; L. R. A., 1917B, 1). (Angara vs.
designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Electoral commission, 63 Phil., 139, 174-176.)
Constitution were cognizant. Nothwithstanding the vigorous
opposition of some members of the convention to its creation, XI.—SEPARATION OF POWERS
the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by
a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon There is much misunderstanding as to the real import meaning, and
the approval of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral scope of the much vaunted principle of separation of power due to the
Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate confusion in many minds between two conceptions: one, naive and
justice of the people." (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural vulgar; and the other, constitutional and strictly juridical. The trouble
Address, March 4, 1861.) lies in the fact that, for lack of more appropriate term, the
35

word separation has been used to convey a group of concepts and avoided its inclusion in the Declaration of Principles inserted as Article
ideas, when the word only expresses just one of partial aspect of one II of the fundamental law. They even went to the extent of avoiding to
of said concepts and ideas. Thus a misconception results by mention it by the phrase it is designated.
confounding a part with the whole or the whole with the part.
XII.—CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTION—THE ONLY ONE
The vulgar notion of separation of powers appears to be simple, ACCEPTABLE
rudimentary, and clear-cut. As a consequence, the principle of
separation of powers creates in the mind of the ignorant or uninitiated The only acceptable conception of the principle of separation of
the images of the different departments of government as individual powers within our democracy in the constitutional one. We must reject
units, each one existing independently, all alone by itself, completely any idea of it as something existing by itself, independent of the
disconnected from the remaining all others. The picture in their mental Constitution and, as some misguided jurist would have it, even
panorama offers, in effect, the appearance of each department as a superior to the fundamental law of the land.
complete government by itself. Each governmental department
appears to be a veritable state in the general set up of the Philippine The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
state, like the autonomous kingdoms and princedoms of them a system of government. It obtains not through express
harajahs of India. Such undiscerning and rudimentary notion can not provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
fit in the pattern framed by the Filipino people through their department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
representatives in the constitutional convention. The true concept of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
the principle of separation of powers may not be obtained but in sphere. . . . The Constitution has provided for an elaborate
conjunction with the political structure set up by the Constitution and system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
only in accordance with the specific provisions thereof. workings of the various departments of the government. For
example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far
The drafters of the constitution were fully acquainted with the then made a check on the legislative power that this assent is
prevailing confusions and misconceptions as to the meaning of the required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to
principle of separation of powers. One outstanding instance is shown the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding
in the self-contradicting, courageless decision in Alejandrino vs. the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-
Quezon (46 Phil., 83), where the majority deflected from the natural thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
and logical consequences of the premises unanimously agreed upon Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the
by all the members of the court using as a subterfuge an erroneous, Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the
disrupting, and subversive interpretation and application of the other hand, the National Assembly operates as check on the
principle of separation of powers, becoming since a fetish of a class of Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission
unanalytical constitutional doctrinaires, distressingly unmindful of its on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain
dangerous implications, eager to emulate, in proclaiming it as a legal officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is
dogma, the plangent exertions of housetop bawlers preaching the essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its
virtues of a new panacea. power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court
shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to
Fully knowing the prevailing misconceptions regarding said principle, appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly
although there was an implicit agreement that it is one of those controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The
underlying principles of government ordered by the Constitution to be Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
established, the delegates to the constitutional convention purposely impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme
36

Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other separate from the others, as the misinformed people would have it. As
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, a matter of fact, there is no government power vested exclusively in
and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if any authority, office, or government agency. Section 1 of Article VI
violative of the Constitution. (Angara vs. Electoral vests the legislative power in a Congress of the Philippines, but this
Commission, 63 Phil., 139, 156, 157.) provision does not preclude the President of the Philippines and the
Supreme Court from partaking in the exercise of legislative power.
The framers of the Constitution had never intended to create or allow The President has the initiative in the making of appropriations which
the existence of governmental departments as autonomous states may not be increased by Congress except those pertaining to
within the republican state of the Philippines. The three departments Congress itself and the judicial department, and the President may
mentioned in the Constitution were created, not as complete veto any bill enacted by Congress (sections 19 and 20, Article VI, of
independent units, but as limbs and organs of the organic unit of the the Constitution). The Supreme Court may declare unconstitutional
department is independent and separate from the others in the sense and, therefore, nullify a law enacted by Congress and approved by the
that it is an organ specifically entrusted with the performance of President of the Philippines (sections 2 and 10, Article VIII, of the
specific functions, not only for the sake of efficiency resulting from Constitution). The Supreme Court exercises, besides, legislative
division of labor, but to avoid tyranny, despotism, and dictatorship power in promulgating rules concerning pleading, practice, and
which, as experience and history have taught, result from the procedure in all courts (section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution)
concentration of government powers in one person or in an
oligarchical group. The executive power is vested in a President of the Philippines
(section 1, Article VII, Constitution of the Philippines), but the Senate
XIII.—FUNDAMENTAL IDEA OF UNITY and House of Representatives, through the Commission on
Appointments, take part in the exercise of the executive power of
The idea of unity is fundamental in our Constitution. appointment (section 12, Article VI, and section 10 [3], Article VII, of
the Constitution), and in the granting of amnesty and in making
The Filipino people ordained and promulgated the Constitution "in treaties (section 10 [6] and 10 [7], Article VII, of theConstitution). The
order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, Supreme Court exercises executive power regarding the transfer of
conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the judges from their districts to another. (Section 7, Article VIII, of the
general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the Constitution.) Tribunals' power to order the execution of their
blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and decisions and mandates is of executive character.
democracy" (Preamble of the Constitution). "The Philippines is a
republic state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior
authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article 11, Constitution). court as may be established by law (section 1, Article VIII, of the
Under this principle we must view the whole government as a unit, Constitution).But there are many instances wherein the President of
and all departments and other government organs, agencies and the Philippines must administer justice, so it is required from him by
instrumentalities as parts of that unit in the same was as the head, the the Constitution to swear to "do justice to every man" (section 7,
hands, and the heart are parts of a human body. Article VII, of the Constitution). And by impeachment proceedings, the
House of Representatives and the Senate exercise judicial function
By examining the provisions of the Constitution, the vulgar notion of (Article IX, of the Constitution). Their power to construe and apply
the principle of separation of powers can be shown to be wrong, as their own rules and their disciplinary power to punish their own
there is neither an office nor a department, created or allowed to be members for disorderly conduct are of judicial nature.
created under the Constitution, that may be considered as effectively
37

Furthermore, there are specific functions of government entrusted to Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
agencies other than the three great departments of government, the emanates from them. (Section 1, Article II.)
legislative, the executive, and the judicial. The judicial function of
judging contests as to election, returns, and qualifications of senators Each department of government is nothing but a mere agency by
in entrusted to the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate; and that of judging which the people exercise its supreme sovereignty. Within the
contests as to election, returns, and qualifications of representatives, framework of the Constitution, our government may be compared to a
to the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (section 11, human being: the legislative department is the brain that formulates
Article VI, of the Constitution).The executive function of auditing the policies and rule through the laws it enacts; the executive department
government accounts is entrusted to a constitutional officer, the is the hand that executes such policies and rules; the judicial
Auditor General (Article XI, of the Constitution), and the administrative department is the conscience that declares what is wrong and what is
function of supervising elections is entrusted to the Commission on right, and determines what acts are in consonance with or inimical to
Elections (Article X, of the Constitution). the constitutional unity as the very condition of life and survival.

To understand well the true meaning of the principle of separation of The brain that defines policies and the hand that executes them may
powers, it is necessary to remember and pay special attention to the go astray and disregard, by their physical power, the infallible
fact that the idea of separation refers, not to departments, organs, or pronouncements and admonitions of conscience; but nothing can and
other government agencies, but to powers exercised. The things should stop conscience in its great ethical mission as a condition
separated are not the subject of the powers, but the functions to be indespensable to existence itself. By the same token, nothing can and
performed. It means division of functions, but not of officials or organs should silence tribunals as the organs, in the government set up by
which will perform them. It is analogous to the economic principle of the Constitution, of the collective conscience of the people. In the long
division of labor practiced in a factory where multiple manufacturing trip of destiny, that collective conscience shall ever be the guiding
processes are performed to produce a finished article. star, unerring even in the gloomiest confusions.

XIV.—APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF Applying to the case at bar the principle of separation of powers in its
POWERS true meaning, the logical result will be precisely the opposite of the
position taken by respondents who, unwittingly, are insistently
In the discussion of the question how the principle of separation of invoking it to challenge the power, authority, and jurisdiction of this
powers must be applied, misunderstood ideas have been asserted as Supreme Court to entertain the petition and to grant petitioners
springboard to jump to rash and unfounded conclusions. Among such coercive relief.
assertions is the one which would have three great departments of
government, not only co-equal in dignity, but, notwithstanding their From the facts of the case, it is evident that respondents encroached
admitted coordination, as actual sovereigns — as if within the sphere upon, invaded, and usurped the ancillary powers to suspend
of the sovereigns can be admitted — each one with full powers to petitioners in relation to the power to judge electoral contests
destroy and trample upon the Constitution, with the victims absolutely concerning senators, a power which the Constitution specifically
incapable and powerless to obtain redress against the offense. Such assigns to the Senate Electoral Tribunal, exclusive of all other
an assertion would make of said departments as states within a state. departments, agencies or organs of government. That power of
The fundamental error of the assertion lies in the failure to consider suspension is accessory, adjective, complementary, and ancillary to
the following principle of the Constitution: the substantial power to judge said electoral contests. The accessory
must follow the principal; the adjective, the substantive; the
complementary, the complemented.
38

It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is appear that neither is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature
for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an
also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., appointive member of the Legislature.
vol. I, pp. 138, 139). (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil., 139, 177.) It is noteworthy that the Congress of the United States has not
in all its long history suspended a member. And the reason is
That power of suspension may, in the interest of reason and justice, obvious. Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates
be exercised by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in relation too an the outraged dignity of the House without depriving the
electoral contest, among other possible cases that can be surmissed, construency of representation; expulsion, when permissible,
where two or more allegedly elected senators are in possession of likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative body while
apparently valid credentials of having been proclaimed as duly giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but
elected. In such a case, as the Constitution does not allow more than suspension deprives the electoral district of representation
twenty-four senators to sit in the Senate and there is, in the meantime, without the district being afforded any means by which to fill
no possibility of determining who among the contestants have been the vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains filled but the
duly elected — all the claimants being in possession of incompatible, occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is equivalent to
self-denying and self-destroying credentials — reason counsels that qualified expulsion or removal. (P. 96.)
all of them be suspended by the Electoral Tribunal pending the
presentation of the necessary evidence to allow one of them to take And Justice Johnson, who dissented on another ground, explained
his seat in the Senate until the contest is finally decided. the ruling in greater detail as follows:

The usurpation perpetrated by respondents is a flagrant violation of The power to punish for misbehavior was intended purely as a
the principle of separation of powers, they having invaded a ground disciplinary measure. When a member of the Legislature is
belonging exclusively to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. removed either by the Governor-General or by the Legislature,
a vacancy exists, and the law gives the Governor-General the
XV.—THE SENATE WITHOUT POWER TO SUSPEND ITS right to appoint, and the people of the district the right to fill the
MEMBERS vacancy by election, so that the people may again, under
either case, be represented. A "suspension" of a member,
Respondents lack the power of suspension, not only as ancillary however, does not create a vacancy, and the people of the
remedy in senatorial election contests, but even in the exercise of the district are without a representative and the Governor-General
Senate judicial power to punish its members for disorderly conduct. cannot appoint one and the people cannot elect one during the
The majority and the minority of the Supreme Court in the case of period of suspension. They are without representation during
Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83), agreed unanimously with that period. They are, for the period of suspension, taxed
respect to said Senate Malcolm, speaking for the Court in said case, without representation. If a member, under the power to
stated: punish, can be suspended for ten or more years, thus
depriving the Governor-General of his right under the law, and
As to whether the power to "suspend" is included in the power the people of the district, of a representative, and without a
to "punish," a power granted to the Houses of the Legislature remedy in the premises.
by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove" a power
granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it would
39

If the power "to punish for disorderly behavior" includes the A great many cases have been studied on the question of
power to suspend or to deprive a member of all his rights, and removal and suspension, and we are confindent in the
if the suspension is in effect a removal, then an appointed assertion that the power to punish does not include the power
member many be removed, under the power to punish, by a to remove or suspend. A suspension from an office or a
mere majority, while the law requires a two-thirds majority to deprivation of the rights of an officer of all his prerogatives,
remove an elective member. In other words, if under the power privileges, and emoluments, is in effect a deprivation or a
to "punish," any member of the legislature, including an removal from office for the time mentioned in the order of
appointive member, may be in effect removed, then an suspension. It has been held that a suspension from office for
elective member may be removed by a majority vote only, thus an indefinite time and lasting for a period of six months, lost its
encroaching upon the power of the executive department of temporary character, ceased to be a suspension, and in effect
the government, as well as violating the powers conferred became a removal from such office. It was held, in the case of
upon the Legislature, because the Legislature cannot remove the State vs. Chamber of Commerce, that the suspension of a
an elective member except by two-thirds majority. member was a qualified expulsion, and that whether it was
called a suspension or expulsion or removal, it in effect
It is strenuously argued by the respondents that the resolution disfrachised the person suspended. In the case of Metsker vs.
depriving the petitioner "of all his prerogatives, privileges, and Nelly, it was held that a suspension or a deprivation for either
emoluments for the period of one year" is not a removal from a definite period is in effect a removal. In the case of Gregory
his office but a mere suspension. The resolution does not use vs. New York, it was held that the power to remove an officer
the word "suspend" but does not use the word "deprive." It or punish him does not include the power to suspend him
provides that the petitioner is "deprived" of all his prerogatives, temporarily from his office. A mere suspension would not
etc., for a period of one year. If that word means anything it create a vacancy, and the anomalous and unfortunate
means that all of the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments condition would exist of an office, — an officer, — but no
of the petitioner and the citizens whom he represents have vacancy, and of no one whose right and duty it was to execute
been taken from him and them. His prerogatives, privileges, the office. (Pp. 100-102.)
and emoluments constitute his right to represent the people of
his district, and his right to exercise all the duties and to XVI.—POWER OF JUDICIAL NATURE
assume all the responsibilities pertaining to his office. His
emoluments constitute his right to receive his salary and the The principle of separation of powers can not be invoked to deny the
benefits pertaining to his office as a senator. If a value can be Supreme Court jurisdiction in this case, because to decide the
placed upon his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments, and question of validity or nullity of the Pendatun Resolution, of whether
if he has been deprived of them, then it must follow that they petitioners are illegally deprived of their constitutional rights and
have been removed from him, or that he has been removed privileges as senators of the Philippines, of whether respondents must
from them. At any rate, the resolution has separated the or must not be enjoined by injunction or prohibition from illegally and
petitioner and the people whom he represents and deprived unconstitutionally trampling upon the constitutional and legal rights of
them of all of one year; and, for all intents and purposes, he petitioners, is a function judicial in nature and, not having been
and the people whom he represents, have been deprived of assigned by the Constitutional to other department of government, is
their prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and in effect, logically within the province of courts of justice, including the Supreme
has been removed from any participation in the legislative Court.
affairs of the government.
40

The power, authority, and jurisdiction to decide any question as to the States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
allocation of powers by the Constitution are of judicial nature and constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the
belong to court of justice. In denying that power to the Supreme Court, courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development
respondents only add insult to injury by maintaining that there is no there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescense for a
remedy for any usurpation being committed in adopting the Pendatun period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
Resolution. moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government.
the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such
The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
between the several departments, however, sometimes makes instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when
it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it
the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
be called upon to determine the proper allocation of power authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties
between the several departments and among the integral or in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
constituent units thereof. secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the this, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
power of our people, acting through their delegates to so controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument
provide, that instrument which is the expression of their by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
sovereignty however limited, has established a republican raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
government intended to operate and function as a harmonious abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain not pass upon the questions of wisdom, justice or expediency
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases
government along constitutional channels, for then distribution and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere people as expressed through their representatives in the
expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good executive and legislative departments of the government.
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the (Angara vs. Election Commission, 63 Phil., 139, 157-159.)
limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are
real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United XVII.—SENATORIAL TERRORISM
41

There is much loose talk as to the inherent power of the Senate to report of the Commission on Elections or in the Pendatun Resolution.
adopt the unsconstitutional Pendatun Resolution for the self- Even in the case that such terrorism really happened, there is no
preservation of the Senate, for its dignity and decorum. We are afraid reason to make any pronouncement based on it without proper
that, by the facts publicly known to everybody, such talks serve only to investigation by proper authorities, and in the present case the proper
reveal sheer hypocrisy. There is absolutely no showing that they are authority that must determine, if such terrorism did really take place
guilty of any disorderly conduct or of any action by which they may be and affect the election on April 23, 1946, concerning senators, is the
subject to criminal prosecution, or that by their conduct they have Senate Electoral Tribunal. And until then there is no reason why
become unworthy to have a seat in Congress. On the other hand, respondents must themselves resort to senatorial terrorism in order to
there are three senators who are under indictment for the heinous oppress, muzzle, and crush minority senators, such as petitioners.
crime of treason before the People's Court, not for acts committed Congressional terrorism is no better than lawless terrorism. Because it
before their election, but for acts committed while they were already is practised by despotice government officials does not make it holy
holding office as such senators. Respondents have not taken any and sacrosanct.
action looking toward the suspension of said three senators. Although
we do not propose to criticize respondents for this inaction, as the XVIII.—NOBODY IS ABOVE THE LAW
three senators undicted for treason must be presumed innocent
unless and until they are finally convicted by the proper court, such There are assertions to the effect that we may exercise jurisdiction
inaction serves to emphasize the iniquitous discrimination committed against individual officers of the Senate, but not against the Senate or
against petitioners, who have not even been indicted before any court against respondents. We do not agree with such an unmanly attitude.
of justice for the slightest violation of law. We do not agree with the theory that the Supreme Court must
exercise its judicial power to give redress to the victims of a
The Pendatun Resolution invokes the report of the Commission on usurpation only when its decision is addressed to minor officers of
Elections as to alleged electoral irregularities in four Central Luzon government, but not when it is addressed to minor officers of
provinces; but there is absolutely nothing in the resolution to show government, but not when it is addressed to powerful ones. We will
that petitioners had anything to do with said irregularities, and incur a grave dereliction of duty if we should refuse to grant the
respondents themselves, in the canvass of votes for President and redress that justice demands only and because we have to reverse an
Vice President, had counted as valid all the votes cast in said Central illegal and unconstitutional act committed by a legislative chamber, or
Luzon provinces and had accepted as good ones the votes they a group of its members, specially if the group forms the majority, or by
themselves obtained therein. In fact, one of them occupied the first Congress itself. To show that under the Constitution nobody is above
place in one of said provinces. This self-contradicting attitude has the law, we have only to refer to its provision which recognizes in the
absolutely no defense in the judgement of any decent person. To this Supreme Court the power to nullify the declare unconstitutional an act
we must add that the Pendatun Resolution, in fact, misquotes the enacted by Congress and approved by the President of the
report of the Commission on elections in the sense that it tries to Philippines. A law passed by Congress is enacted with the direct
convey an impression contrary to said report by quoting parts thereof participation of the two great departments of our government, the
based on unverified and uncorroborated hearsay evidence, and legislative and the executive. Nevertheless, if the law enacted is
ignoring its main conclusion in which it is stated that the alleged unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has the power to declare it so
irregularities did not affect the orderly election in said provinces. and deny effect to the same.

There is much talk as to the alleged terrorism prevailing in the The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution,
provinces in question during election, but there is absolutely no can become the law of the land, is a question deeply
reliable evidence as to such terrorism that can be found either in the interesting to the United States; but, happily, not of an intricacy
42

proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative
recognize certain principles, supposed to have been long and act contrary to the constitution is not law; if the latter part be
well established, to decide it. true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part
of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.
That the people have an original right to establish, for their
future government, such principles, as, in their opinion, shall Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions
most conduce to their own happiness is the basis on which the contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount
whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this law of the nation, and, consequently, the theory of every such
original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant
be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so to the constitution, is void.
established, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority
from which they proceed is supreme, and can seldom act, they This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution,
are designed to be permanent. and, is consequently, to be considered, by this court, as one of
the fundamental principles of our society.
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and
assigns to different departments their respective powers. It xxx xxx xxx
may either stop here, or establish certain limits not to be
transcended by those departments. It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
The government of the United States is of the latter particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that
description. The powers of the legislature are defined and rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, decide on the operation of each.
the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited,
and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law
these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court
be restrained? The distinction between a government with must either decide that case conformably to the law,
limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the
confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if act constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine
prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the
proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution very essence of judicial duty.
controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the
legislature may alter the Constitution by an ordinary act. If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the
constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature,
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the
constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable case to which they both apply.
by ordinary means, or it is On a level with ordinary legislative
acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall Those, then, who controvert the principle that the constitution
please to alter it. is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced
43

to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their and even those of the Legislature in the enactment of laws,
eyes on the constitution, and see only the law. have been exercised in conformity to the Constitution; and if
they have not, to treat their acts as null and void. . . ."
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written
constitutions. It would declare that an act which, according to In this statement of the law, and in the principles there laid
the principles and theory of our government, is entirely void, is down, we fully concur. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 Law. ed.,
yet, in practice, completely obligatory. It would declare that if 377, 390.)
the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act,
notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It Professor Edward S. Corwin, in this book "The Twilight of the
would be given to the legislature a practical and real Supreme Court," says:
omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict
their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and The pivotal proposition was set up that between the making of
declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure. law and its construction was an intrinsic difference of the most
Manbury vs. Madison (1 Cr., 137; 2 Law. ed., pp. 60, 73, 74) vital nature; and that since the latter function was
demonstrably a daily concern of courts, it followed necessarily
But we have found no better expression of the true principle on that the legislature might not perform it in a way to produce
this subject than the language of Justice Hoar, in the Supreme finally binding results.
Court of Massachusetts reported in 14 Gray, 226, in the case
of Burnham vs. Morrissey. That was a case in which the Applied to the Constitution, this reasoning automatically
plaintiff was imprisoned under an order of the House of produces judicial review. As Marshall insists inMarbury vs.
Representatives of the Massachusetts Legislature for refusing Madison, the Constitution, a solemn act of the people
to answer certain questions as a witness and to produce themselves, was made to be preserved, and no organ of
certain books and papers. The opinion, or statement rather, government may alter its terms. But interpretation, which
was concurred in by all the court, including the venerable Chief belongs to the courts exclusively and is "their peculiar and
Justice Shaw; proper province," does not change the law, it conserves it. By
the same token, judicial interpretation of the Constitution is
"The House of Representatives (says the court) is not the final vested with the authority of the Constitution itself. (P. 110.)
judge of its own power and privileges in cases in which the
rights and liberties of the subject are concerned, but the A passage in Cicero's De Legibus, the substance of which was
legality of its action may be examined and determined by this later recalled by Coke, describes the law as "the silent
court. That House is not the Legislature, but only a part of it, magistrate" and the magistrate as "the law speaking." Despite
and is therefore subject in its action to the law in common with the apparent implication of these words, the Roman Law
all other bodies, officers and tribunals within the would seem to have regarded interpretation as primarily an
Commonwealth. Especially is it competent and proper for this extension and condition of the process of law making, as the
court to consider whether its proceedings are in conformity maxim "curius est cendere est interpretari" appears to bear
with the Constitution and laws, because living under a written witness. Reciprocally, the official attitude of the common law
Constitution, no branch or department of the government is has not always escaped skeptical comment. A yearbook of the
supreme, and it is the province and duty of the judicial fourteenth century records a dispute among the judges over
department to determine in cases regularly brought before whether they were enforcing reason or only their own will, and
them, whether the powers of any branch of the government, two hundred years later we find an Elizabethan bishop
44

asserting flatly: "Whoever that an absolute authority to found clear-cut expression in antithetical principles of
interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the constitutional construction, have given rise none the less to
law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who conflicting courses of decision, the potential bases of future
first wrote or spoke them." Suppose the good bishop had opposed arguments which either counsel or the Court may
known of the Constitution of the United States, a law first adopt without incurring professional reproach. In brief,
spoken in 1789 and subject 150 years later to the "absolute alternative principles of construction and alternative lines of
authority" of the Supreme Court to interpret it! (Pp. 112-113.) precedent constantly vest the Court with a freedom virtually
legislative in scope in choosing the values which it shall
What gives the coup de grace to the idea that — in the words promote through its reading of the Constitution. (P. 117.)
of Chief Justice Marshall — "courts are the mere instruments
of the law and can will nothing," is the simple fact that most so- The concept of a "government of laws" simmers down,
called "doubtful cases" could very evidently have been therefore, under the Constitution to a power in the Supreme
decided just the opposite way to which they were decided Court which is without statable limits to set the metes and
without the least infraction of the rules of logical discourse or bounds of political authority in both the nation and the states.
the least attenuation of the principle of stare decisis. (P. 114.) But the dominating characteristic of judicial review, wide-
ranging though it be, is that it is ordinarily or negative power
In short, decision is choice; the very circumstance which only — a power of refusal. The Court can forbid somebody
produces doubtful cases guarantees the Court what Justice else to act but cannot, usually, act itself; in the words of
Holmes has termed "the sovereign prerogative of choice" in Professor Powell, it "can unmake the laws of Congress, but
deciding them. This circumstance may be described as a cannot fill the gap." (P.122.)
factual situation which forthwith divides, as it were, the
acknowleged body of established law as far as it bears upon To summarize: From legal history emerge two conceptions of
the said facts into two opposed — two antinomous — camps. law — that of a code of intrinsic justice, not of human creation
(P. 115.) but discoverable by human reason, and that of a body of
ordinances assertive of human will and owing its binding force
Should the Constitution be construed "strictly" or "liberally"? thereto. The idea of a "government of laws and not of men"
That depends logically on whether it came from the people at originally predicated the sway of the former kind of law and a
large or from state sovereignties. Then there is the antimony of "legislative power" which was merely a power to declare such
"inclusive" versus "exclusive" construction — in Marbury vs. law, and hence was indistinguishable in principle from "judicial
Madison Chief Justice Marshall invoked the latter principle, power." But as we saw in the previous chapter, the very
in McCulloch vs. Maryland he invoked the former. Again there essence of the American conception of the separation of
is the issue whether the Court's mandate to interpret the power is its insistence upon the inherent distinction between
Constitution embraces the power and duty of adopting it to law-making and law-interpreting, and its assignment of the
change circumstances. Marshall thought that it did, while latter to the judiciary, a notion which, when brought to bear
Taney repudiated any such mission for the Court; and in the upon the constitution, yields judicial review. For all that, the
recent Minnesota Moratorium Case the Chief Justice takes as idea that legislative power embraces an element of law-
his point of departure Marshall's doctrine, while Justice declaring power has never been entirely expelled from our
Sutherland, dissenting, builds upon Taney's doctrine. inherited legal traditions, while, conversely, modern analysis of
Furthermore, there are those diverse attitudes of a shifting the interpretative function exercised by courts plainly discloses
majority of the Bench which, though they may never have that it involves unavoidably an exercise of choice substantially
45

legislative in character; and especially is this so as the Another difference between the two cases is the fact that in the
Supreme Court's interpretations of the national Constitution, Angara case, petitioner sought to nullify a resolution of the Electoral
on account of the wealth of alternative doctrines from which commission because it was in conflict with one previously adopted by
the Court may at any time approach its task of interpretation. the National Assembly. The Supreme Court, is denying the petition,
In short, the meaning of "a government of laws" in our nullified instead the resolution of the National Assembly as adopted
constitutional law and theory is government subject to judicial without the powers vested in it by the Constituiton. In the present
disallowance. (Pp. 146, 147.) case, petitioners pray for the annulment of the Pendatun Resolution
which the respondents or the Senate could not and cannot adopt
XIX.—PARALLELISM WITH THE ANGARA CASE without transgressing the Constitution.

No better precedent may be invoked to decide several important Many of the conclusions and pronouncements of the Supreme Court
questions raised in this case than the decision rendered by this very in the Angara case may appear as if written expressly to decide
Supreme Court in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra, which several of the very legal issues raised in the present case. This will
may be considered as an outstanding milestone in Philippine readily appear if we should read "Senate" and "Senate Electoral
jurisprudence. Tribunal," respectively, in lieu of "National Assembly" and "Electoral
Commission," in the following summarized conclusion in said case:
The facts and legal issues in said case are in exact parallel with the
ones in the present controversy. Then, there was a conflict between (a) That the government established by the Constitution
two independent departments or organs of government, the National follows fundamentally the theory of separation of powers into
Assembly and the Electoral Tribunal. Now the conflict is between two the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
equally independent departments or organs of government, the
Senate and the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The differences between (b) That the system of checks and balances and the
the contending parties consist in: (a) that while the former National overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the
Assembly constituted the whole legislative department, the present delimitation of the powers granted.
Senate is but a part of the legislative department; (b) that the National
Assembly that adopted the resolution then in question and, finally, (c) That in case of conflict between the several departments
declared by this Supreme Court as unconstitutional, null, and void, and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the
acted as a body, with undisputable quorum and regularity; while the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
Pendatun Resolution was adopted by but 12 senators or the majority mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
Liberal Party, when there was no quorum present in the Senate. constitutional boundaries.
There is also an accidental difference in the fact that, in the Angara
case, the Electoral Commission was the respondent and the National (d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review
Assembly was not a party, although 6 members thereof were also in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the
parties in the case, they constituting a majority of two-thirds of the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
Electoral Commission membership; while the present case, the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source
Senate Electoral Tribunal is not a party, and the respondents are the of all authority.
majority members of the Senate, which is but a branch of Congress.
In both cases the legislative department upon which the legislative (e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent
power was vested by the Constitution — the National Assembly in constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to
1936 or Congress in 1946 — is definitely not a party.
46

execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to contests against the election of its members, the time and
the legislative than to any other two departments of the manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to
government. be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of
contest.
(f) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of (l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election
members of the National Assembly. of any member, irrespective of whether his election is
contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member
Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was of the National Assembly.
respectively the sole judge of the election, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members. (m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election
of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral
previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its which protests against the election of any member of the
members, to the Electoral Commission. National Assembly should be filed. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, supra.)
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the
Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and Without the slightest ambiguity, in perspicuous and clear-cut
carried with it ex necessitate rei the implied power inter alia to language, the Supreme Court stated the real conflict, grave and
prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner transcendental, in said case as follows:
of filing protests.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it
(j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the
Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral
pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and Commission on the other. (Angara vs. Electoral
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of Commission, supra.)
partisan influence or consideration, which object would be
frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to The Supreme Court then, in the full consciousness of the far-reaching
prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of importance of the pronouncement it had to make, with manly courage
conducting said contests. stated:

(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not From the very nature of the republican government
only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the established in our country in the light of American experience
Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the
elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. . . .
to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing Conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law
47

between departmental powers and agencies of the redress for or against parties like those included in this litigation, has
government are necessarily determined by the judiciary been unmistakably definitely and definitely settled in this jurisdiction.
injusticiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English
type and other European types of constitutional government, XX.—THREE DIFFERENT EDITIONS OF A SENTENCE
the framers of our Constitution adopted the American type
where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by Regret can not be repressed when, upon reading the majority opinion,
the judicial department. . . . The nature of the present one notices that, in the very first paragraph heading it, truth is
controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter unwittingly immolated by, as a counterpart of the Pendatun Resolution
to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies and without the benefit of any ritual, attributing to the Commission on
created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take Elections an assertion which in fact it did not make.
cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict?
And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, The Commission is represented to have fathered the statement that in
would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system the Provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, voting
which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire "did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will."
framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura
vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our This assertion is the third revised edition of a 3-line sentence
constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we appearing in the report of the Commission on Elections. For
are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the clearness, we will reproduce the three editions, the original one and
present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral the amended two:.
Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy
for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent
First edition.—In the report of the Commission on Elections, the
of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the
sentence reads as follows:
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra.) It is believed that the election in the provinces aforesaid did
not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.
Where the Supreme Court wrote "Electoral Commission" in the last
preceding lines, we may also write as well "Senate," "House of Second edition—The drafter of the Pendatun Resolution, who
Representatives," "Congress," "Senate Electoral Tribunal," "House appears to be ready to sacrifice truth if it is necessary to serve or
Electoral Tribunal," or any other constitutional body. bolster his interests and purposes, in reproducing said statement,
without any compunction or scruple, changed the words "it is
believed" to the words "This Commission believes" as follows:
The above pronouncements of the Supreme Court made in the ringing
words penned by Justice Jose P. Laurel who, with President Roxas,
Justice Briones, Justice Hontiveros, former Justices Romualdez and This commission believes that the election in the provinces
Recto, and several others, was among the leaders and most aforesaid did not reflect the true and free expression of the
prominent figures in the constitutional convention, we believe will popular will.
sound through the ages as the expression of permanent truth and
undisputable wisdom. Since the words have been written, the Third edition.—In the majority opinion the idea of belief by third
question as to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to take cognizance persons, contained in the report of the Commission, and the idea of
and decide controversies such as the present one and to grant belief by the Commission, attributed in the Pendatun Resolution are
48

eliminated and substituted by a positive statement by the Commission An abiding respect for truth compels us to point out the above glaring
on Elections of a categorical and conclusive nature as follows: error of fact, which is just a fitting prelude and milieu to a long chain of
errors of law spread over the opinion of the majority, resulting in
The Commission on Elections . . . stated that . . . the voting in conclusions that we are sure will fail to withstand the test of posterity.
said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the
popular will. XX-A.—UNJUSTIFIED AND RECKLESS PRONOUNCEMENTS

The discrepancy is emphasized by reading the following paragraph of The error of reading the report of the Commission on Elections
the report of the report of the Commission on Elections: assertions contrary to the ones appearing therein, induces the
majority to make pronouncements which are necessarily groundless
Except for alleged suppression of the popular will in the and unjustified, because premised on assertions not borne out by the
Provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan and certain truth.
municipalities of Nueva Ecija wherein the voters
were allegedly intimidated or coerced by the Hukbalahaps and Thus, in justifying the adoption of the Pendatun Resolution, the
other lawless elements to such an extent that the election in majority assert that "there are reasons to believe it was prompted by
said provinces is considered a farce, not being the free the dictates of ordinary caution, or of public policy" for "if, as reported
expression of the popular will, the elections throughout the by the corresponding constitutional agency" (the Commission on
country were carried on peacefully, honestly and in an orderly Elections), the elections held in the provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan,
manner, as a result of which the respective representatives- Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija" were so tainted with acts of violence and
elect for all the provinces throughout the country have been intimidation, that the result was not the legitimate expression of the
duly proclaimed by the various boards of provincial voters' choice, the Senate made no grievous mistake in foreseeing
canvassers, and the Commission on Elections on May 23, the probability that, upon proof of such widespread lawlessness, the
1946, also proclaimed those elected senators in accordance Electoral Tribunal would annul the returns in that region
with section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 725. (Emphasis (seeGardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil., 521; Laurel, Elections[2d Ed.], p.
supplied.) 448 et seq.), and declare herein petitioners not entitled to seats in the
Senate."
From the foregoing, it is evident: (1) that the alleged suppression of
the popular will in Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan, and certain Taking as point or departure the false assumption, that of attributing to
municipalities of Nueva Ecija is mentioned by the Commission only as the Commission on Elections a statement that, upon the very face of
a hearsay information that the Commission itself, contrary to the idea its report, is contrary to what it made, the majority, not only attribute to
which the Pendatun Resolution or the majority opinion conveys, does the respondent majority of the Senate preternatural prophetic
not accept; (2) that to emphasize the Commission's refusal to accept foresight, taking for granted what the Senate Electoral Tribunal will do,
the unverified information, it explicitly and conclusively manifested that but by making the pronouncement pretend to assume an improper
"the elections throughout the country were carried on peacefully, role, the one by which, in effect, they pretend to direct and dictate to
honestly and in an orderly manner, as a result of which the respective the Senate Electoral Tribunal what it should do in the pending
representatives-elect for all the provinces throughout the country have electoral protests against petitioners, thus recklessly prejudicing the
been duly proclaimed elected by the various boards of provincial decision and disposal of a litigation pending in an independent tribunal
canvassers, and the Commission on Elections on May 23, 1946, also with exclusive and final constitution jurisdiction over said litigation.
proclaimed those elected senators in accordance with section 11 of
Commonwealth Act No. 725."
49

On second thought, it seems that the majority try, with an apologetic The attack does not stop here. It goes even further when, adducing as
attitude, to recede from the bold position of practically announcing argument by analogy, an uncharitable example is used by comparing
what the Senate Electoral Tribunal, three members of which are the situation imagined without any evidentiary foundation on fact by
Justices of the Supreme Court, will do, by beginning to state that the dissenting minority of one in the Commission on Elections with the
"there should be no diversity of thought in a democratic country, at case if "the inclusion of petitioners" name in the Commission's
least, on the legal effects of the alleged rampant lawlessness, root certificate had been made at the point of a gangster's automatic,"
and basis of the Pendatun Resolution," and ending with the following although adding that " the difference between such situation and the
paragraph: instant litigation is one of degree, broad and wide perhaps, . . . .

However, it must be observed and emphasized, herein is no XXI.—FUTILE EFFORT TO NEUTRALIZE THE SWEEPING EFFECT
definte pronouncement that terrorism and violence actually OF DECISION IN ANGARA CASE
prevailed in a district to such extent that the result was not the
expression of the free will of theelectorate. Such issue was not In a futile effort to neutralize the sweeping effect of the decision of this
tendered in these proceedings. It hinges upon proof to be court in the Angara case, the majority assume unfoundedly that in
produced by protestants and protestees at the hearing of the said case "no legislative body or person was a litigant before the
respective contests. court," and that "no directive was issued against a branch of the
Legislature or any member there of" the statements being premised
We can not but regret that the endeavor is futile, because it can not on the error of fact and law that two-thirds of the members of the
subtract a scintilla from the boldness of the pronouncement Electoral Commission were assemblymen.
emphasized with the following reiteration: "True, they may have no
direct connection with the acts of intimidation; yet the votes may be The fact that this court, in the Angara case, made declarations
annulled just the same, and if that happens, petitioners would not be nullifying a resolution of the National Assembly is, according to the
among the sixteen senators elected." majority, "not decisive," when a better precedent can hardly be cited
to show the practical exercise by the Supreme Court of its power to
Furthermore, the recession seems only to be apparent, used as a declare null and void any legislative resolution violative of the
breathing respite, preparatory to another onslaught, on less fundamental law. The majority recognize the power of this court to
unjustified, reckless, and out of reason. annul any unconstitutional legislative enactment, citing as authorities
the epoch-making decision of Chief Justice Marshall in Marburry vs.
Commenting on section 12 of Commonwealth Act no. 725, the Madison, and the following pronouncement of Justice Sutherland in
majority restrict the provision to those candidates whose proclamation the Minimum Wage Case (261 U. S., 544):
"is clear, unconditional, unclouded," adding — and here comes the
aggressive thrust, prejudging petitioners on the basis of an unfounded . . . The Constitution, by its own terms, is the supreme law of
surmise — "that such standard is not only met by the petitioners, the land, emanating from the people, the repository of ultimate
because is the very document attesting to their election one member sovereignty under our form of government. A congressional
of the Commission on Elections demurred to the non-exclusion of the statute, on the other hand, is the act of an agency of this
votes in Central Luzon, calling attention to the reported reign of terror sovereign authority, and if it conflicts with theConstitution,
and violence in that region, and virtually objecting to the certification of must fall; for that which is not supreme must yield to that which
herein petitioners. To be sure, it was the be clouded condition of is. To hold it invalid (if it be invalid) is a plain exercise of the
petitioners' credential (certificate of canvass) that partly prompted the judicial power — that power vested in courts to enable them to
Senate to enact the precautionary measure herein complained of." administer justice according to law. From the authority to
50

ascertain and determine the law in a given case there XXII.—FALLACIOUS ARGUMENT
necessarily results, in case of conflict, the duty to declare and
enforce the rule of the supreme law and reject that of an It is argued by the majority that conceding that petitioners' suspension
inferior act of legislation which, transcending the Constitution, is beyond the power of the respondents, the petition should be
is of no effect, and binding on no one. This is not the exercise denied, because for this court to order the reinstatement of petitioners
of a substantive power to review and nullify acts of Congress, "would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset the classic
for no such substantive power exists. It is simply a necessary pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into our constitutional
concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a case or setup." The argument is utterly fallacious. There can be no more
controversy properly before the court, to the determination of judicial predominance because the Supreme Court, without shirking
which must be brought the test and measure of the law. its responsibility, should order that petitioners be reinstated in the full
exercise of their constitutional rights, functions and prerogatives, of
If the above reasoning is accepted by the majority with respect to a which they were deprived, in flagrant violation of the fundamental law,
law enacted by two Houses of Congress and approved by the Chief than there will be legislative predominance because Congress should
Executive, there is absolutely no logic in denying its applicability to refuse to be cowed into prevarication in the exercise of its legislative
mere resolutions adopted by just a legislative branch, by the Senate powers, or executive predominance because the President would not
alone, or by a group of senators acting collectively when the Senate is allow denial of his executive functions. And the pattern of checks and
without quorum. The Supreme Court has the power to declare null balances is not disrupted because the Supreme Court should proceed
and void such resolutions when they are in conflict with the to perform its judicial duty by granting petitioners the legal redress to
Constitution, the same as the acts of the President as, according to which they are entitled.
the decision rendered by this court in Planas vs. Gil (67 Phil., 62, 73,
74), cited with approval by the majority, the Supreme Court has the The indictment of volubility flung by Lord Bryce against the Supreme
power of "making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of Court of the United States, resulting from "the political proclivities of
his(the Chief Executive's) acts when these are properly challenged in the man who composed it," is quoted by the majority in order to
an appropriate legal proceeding." support the rule of conduct that "adherence to established principle
should generally be our guiding criterion." We
The majority, accepting the pronouncement in the Angara case that underline generallybecause we prefer it to the word invariably, as,
this court could not decline to take cognizance of the controversy to otherwise, we will expose ourselves to the English author's
determine the "character, scope and extent" of the respective indictment, and with more reason if we should reverse the doctrines
constitutional spheres of action of the National Assembly and the and principles enunciated in the Angara case in order not to displease
Electoral Commission, maintain that in the present case, there is a controlling majority in the Senate.
actually no antagonism between the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate
and the Senate itself, "for it is not suggested that the former has XXIII.—NOT DEMIGODS OUTSIDE THE REACH OF LAW
adopted a rule contradicting the Pendatun Resolution." This assertion
is based on the wrong idea that in order that antagonism may exist Should respondents disobey any order we may issue in this case, the
between two independent bodies, the attacks should be reciprocal majority ask, can we punish them for contempt? Of course. They are
and bilateral, and it is not enough that one should rashly invade the not demigods, duces, fuehrers, or nippon emperor divinities, who are
province of the other. The theory is parallel with the Japanese outside the reach of law. They do not pretend that they are like the
insistence in calling what they term "China Incident" because China king of France who said L'etat c'est moi.
was not able to invade in her turn the Japanese mainland of Honshu.
51

But, why should we render respondents the disservice of entertaining usurpation of functions belonging to courts, is an infringement of the
the false hypothesis that they may disobey any order we may legally Constitution, which is precisely the case of the Pendatun Resolution.
issue? Our people were not crazy enough to elect anarchists to our But the majority would then have only as defendant the officer or
Senate. person holding the victimized citizen in custody, which officer or
person might be a senator or a group of senators.
XXIV.—BUILT ON PRECARIOUS FOUNDATION
The majority's inconsistency can not be hidden.
The majority insist, notwithstanding, in arguing that if we should
punish respondents for contempt because they should have XXVI.—ELECTION CONTESTS—WRONG DEFINITION
disobeyed an order of ours, we would be destroying the
independence and equal importance of legislative bodies, under the The majority maintain that not all the powers of the House or Senate
Constitution. We would never imagine that the independence and as "the sole judge of the election, returns and qualifications of the
equal importance of legislative bodies, under the Constitution, should members" thereof were transferred to the Electoral Commission, but
be precariously built upon the unstable and shifting quagmire of only "all contests" relating to said election, returns and qualifications.
immoral immunity to punishment for contempt, an offense punishable But the use of the words "all contests" in the Constitution does not
under all modern systems of criminal law. affect or limit the transfer of all powers as "the sole judge of the
election, returns and qualifications" of the legislative members,
Dogmatizing ex cathedra, the majority preached that we must because these all powers have always been, from the very beginning,
"disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary is the repository circumscribed by the word "contests." The very words "the sole judge"
of remedies for all political and social ills." Shooting in the dark of imply necessarily contests, because if there is no contest, there is
fantastic hobglobins, insufflated with extraterrestrial life by nothing to be judged.
supercreative imagination, might be an amusing sport, but is
misleading in juridical controversy. No one has ever entertained the The majority adhere to the following quotation: "As used in the
false and laughable notion that the judiciary may afford remedies "for constitutional provisions, `election contest' relates only to statutory
all political and social ills." No one, unless he be a paranoiac contests in which the contestants seek not only to oust the intruder,
mogalomaniac, may pretend to be the happy possessor of any but also to have himself inducted into office." (Laurel on Elections, 2d
political or social panacea. The argument is irrelevant because, in the ed., p. 250; 20 C. J.,58.)The assertion is wrong because there are
case, we are dealing with a constitutional wrong which, under the election contests in which the contestants do not seek to be inducted
fundamental law, can and must be redressed by the judiciary. into office, as when the contestants do not pretend to have won in the
election and, admitting that the protestee obtained the majority votes,
XXV.—FLAGRANT INCONSISTENCY should, however, be ousted because he is unqualified.

A citizen, deprived of liberty by a resolution to incarcerate him for The example of a man, disqualified for having served a long term of
years, illegally and unconstitutionally adopted by a legislative imprisonment, elected to either House of Congress, is a good one not
chamber, according to the majority, may not be denied relief by the in support of the majority's theory that the House may, upon its
courts and "may successfully apply for habeas corpus, alleging the authority, investigate and exclude the disqualified person, but to show
nullity of the resolution and claiming for release," invoking as that the election may be contested before the corresponding Electoral
authorities Lopez vs. De los Reyes (55 Phil., 170) Kilbourn vs. Tribunal in a proper contest, without the protestant seeking to be
Thompson (103 U. S., 168; 26 Law ed., 377). The reason is because himself seated.
the resolution is beyond the bounds of the legislative power, is a
52

XXVII.—UNCONSTITUTIONAL THEORY XXVIII—THE CHARACTER AND PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE

CONSTITUTION
The majority's theory that an election contest does not ensue when a
member of the House raises a question as to the qualification of The discussions as to the character of the legislative power vested in
another because the former does not seek to be substituted for the Congress gives way to a confusion of ideas due mainly to lack of
latter, is based on the wrong definition of an election contest, the one discrimination between preconceived constitutional ideas, ingrained in
limiting it to cases wherein protestants seek also to have themselves the mind during university training, and the actual provisions of the
inducted into the contested office. Having for its basis a wrong Constitution of the Philippines, which enjoy outstanding and
premise, the theory can not be correct. The election contests substantial advantages over older ones, because the delegates to our
mentioned in section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution include constitutional convention embodied in it new precepts and principles
contests "relating to qualifications" of the respective members of the based on the lessons of one century and a half experience of
Senate and of the House of Representatives. To maintain that either American and European countries in constitutional government and
House may investigate and thereafter exclude a disqualified member, four decades of Philippine constitutional history and last juridical and
is to maintain a constitutional heresy. An insistent effort to justify and idealogical discoveries.
approve an action that violates elemental standards of law and justice,
such as the Pendatun Resolution, may often lead one to advancing Whether the Constitution of the United States is only a grant or
unwittingly the most expected theories. delegation of legislative powers to the federal government and the
American state constitutions are mere limitations of plenary powers of
Invoking as authority the erroneous statement made by one of the legislation, having nothing to do with the true character and
attorneys for petitioners during the oral argument to the effect that the physiognomy of our own Constitution which we must examine, not on
power to defer the oath taking until the contest is adjudicated does not the mirror of other constitutions, but on the face of its own concepts,
belong to the corresponding Electoral Tribunals, the majority gleefully precepts and provisions, and there we will see at once that our
jumps to the conclusion that "then it must be held that the House or Constitution is both a grant and a limitation of powers of government
Senate still retains such authority, whether we believe that such decreed by our people, on whom sovereignty resides and from whom
power (to delay induction) stemmed from the privilege of either House all government authority emanates. (Section 1, Article II of the
to be the judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Constitution.) The sovereign people is the repository of all powers of
members thereof, or whether we hold it to be inherent to every government, in fact, also political and social powers. From them
legislative body as a measure of self-preservation. emanate, not only all government authority, but the plenary and
unlimited power of society which is the foundation of government.
Thus we see that the majority seem reluctant to accept the new Social order is established and maintained by the will of the people.
constitutional setup by the creation of the Electoral Commission, later The people is the absolute master of his own destiny. The people is
substituted by the Electoral Tribunals. They would rather stick to the the holder of the universality and residuum of all human powers. This
old order of things when the majority of the Senate and the House of being a natural conviction of humanity since time immemorial
Representatives before the Commonwealth were the absolute although not always articulate and vocal, to justify the absolutism of
dictators of the election, returns and qualifications of the members of kings and emperors, it had been necessary to create the fiction of the
the respective legislative chambers, when they boldly assert that divine genesis of their authority, imposed on the ignorance and
either House has "the privilege to be the judge of the election, returns religious credulity of superstitious masses, so much so that in certain
and qualifications of the members thereof." epochs of history the position of high priest and king were merged in
the same individual. And those who would attach to a high officers of
government, no matter in what department, any kind of monarchial or
53

oligarchical absolutism, unlimited because placed above the law and sovereign people, ultimately the offended party, will render the fitting
not controllable by the provisions of the Constitution or any agency verdict — at the polling precint."
existing under its authority, are only trying to perpetuate the worn-out
tradition of the divine origin of the despotic rulers of the past. We are reluctant to wash our hands so easily. We can not remain
comfortably seated in the highest tribunal of the land nor reconcile
To our mind, no power of government may be exercised by any with our conscience by abstaining to give the relief we are duty bound
branch, agency or officer thereof unless expressly or implicitly granted to give the victims of a political fraud which constitutes a wanton
by the people through the Constitution. Subject to the limitations trampling down of the rights and privileges guaranteed by the
provided therein and in accordance with express provisions, the Constitution. Let us not so easily forget the Rizalian admonition:
residuum of legislative, executive and judicial powers, respectively, "Sufferance is not always a virtue; it is a crime when it encourages
are vested in Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court. It is tyrannies." Let us not disguise such kind of resignation under the
wrong to maintain that any legislative power is vested exclusively in inoffensive name of judicial prudence. Burke said: "There is also a
the Senate. The legislative power is vested in Congress, composed of false, reptile prudence, the result not of caution, but of fear." Fear, as
the Senate and the House for Representatives, and not in any of its favor, should not have place in judicial vocabulary.
branches alone.
XXX.—CONSTITUTIONALISM
XXIX.—RIZALIAN ADMONITION ON TOLERANCE
The present nuclear physics of a far cry from the more than twenty-
Although there is absolutely nothing in the report of the Commission five centuries old theory enunciated by Democritus in the following
on Elections or in the Pendatun Resolution itself which imputes upon words: "By convention sweet is sweet, by convention bitter is bitter, by
petitioners any act of disorderly behavior, it not appearing that they convention hot is hot, by convention cold is cold, by convention color
have anything todo with alleged irregularities and terrorism in the four is color. But in reality there are atoms and the void. That is, the
provinces of Central Luzon, yet had the Senate elected to deprive objects of sense are supposed to be real and it is customary to regard
petitioners of their seat in the Senate under the power to punish and them as such, but in truth they are not. Only the atoms and the void
expel a member for disorderly behaviour provided in section 10 (3) of are real."
Article VI of the Constitution, and the Senate adopted the Pendatun
Resolution in pursuance thereof, the majority of this court would still The heated controversy between Ptolemy and Copernicus, the
dismiss the petition. It appearing that not two-thirds of all members of discoveries of Galileo and Newton, are just small incidents in the
the Senate concurred or could concur in the adoption of the Pendatun perennial struggle in which man is engaged to be, through science,
Resolution and, therefore, under the constitutional provision invoked, fully acquainted with the truth about our universe. It takes 1,600 years
the deprivation of petitioners of their seat in the Senate would appear for one-half of a gram of radium to disintegrate, and it takes one
as a flagrant transgression of the fundamental law, the majority of this second for light to travel 186,300 miles; formerly matter and energy
court would still shield respondents with the palladium of judicial noli were essentially different things, but now solid matter is but
me tangere. Respondents must be very extraordinary beings to enjoy concentrated energy, and energy has weight; it is not yet answered
such an immunity from even the most shocking and tyranical violation whether light is wave of a shower of photons, but it is known that it
of theConstitution. can be weighed. The theory of relativity, opened new vistas in the
panorama of science, but new riddles meet man in the great
The majority would counsel prudence and comity and admonish to adventure to the unknown. Albert Einstein said:
heed the off-limits sign at the Congressional hall, firm in the belief that
"if apolitical fraud has been accomplished, as petitioners aver, the
54

Yet new, still more difficult problems arise which have not XXXI.—THE MOST VITAL ISSUE
been definitely settled as yet. We shall mention only some of
these unsolved problems. Science is not and will never be a The validity of the Constitution of the most vital issue involved in this
closed book. Every important advance brings new questions. case. If no one must be allowed to be above the law, with greater
Every development reveals, in the long run, new and deeper reason no one should be allowed to ignore or to trample upon the
difficulties." (The Evolution of Physics, p. 308.) provisions and mandates sacred by all persons living under the pale
of the Republic of the Philippines, and not rocked of as an insignificant
All theories which, in their day, served useful scientific purposes, had pushpin to toy with.
to give way to others giving better explanations of physical
phenomena. The prevailing theories may not resist the onslaught of Burning with the thirst of immortality, shepherd Erostratus burned the
new intellectual discoveries, but because they may eventually be temple of Ephesus to gain a berth in history. Let us not make of the
discarded themselves is no reason to dispense with them when, in the Constitution of the Philippines another temple of Ephesus. It is much
meantime, they are only ones that can satisfy reason. Otherwise, better to be buried in the dust of eternal oblivion than to permanently
science will be crippled. Paralysis will keep her from new advances. live in the memory of future generations as guilty of arson, as rivals of
the barbaric hordes who destroyed the great works of art of Greece
By the same token, in the history of law, man had to stick in each and Rome, or the contemporary vandals who destroyed without any
epoch to the known as the best of legal institutions. In the millenia of compunction churches and schools, treasures of noble human
human life no more wonderful legal institution was devised by man institutions, or other works wherein the loftiest ideals and aspirations
than constitutionalism, the evolution of which is one of the most of man have blossomed with imperishable grandeur and beauty.
inspiring chapters of history. A mere religious concept, giving voice to Letus spare the Constitution from the deleterious effects of our
moral law, in Israel, a philosophical concept, merely normative, in prejudices and from the ravages of blind passions. Let us keep it as
Greece, it was in republican Rome where it took a definite legal and an underlying beacon of hope, the indestructible foundation of our
political force as the basis of jurisdiction as distinguished national existence, the inexpugnable citadel of the rights and liberties
fromgobernaculum, the reason of the law as opposed to the power of of our people, the eternal rock upon which the Republic of the
government. In England for the common law to prevail over the Philippines shall forever subsist with dignity.
prerogative of the crown it took several hundred years of bitter
struggle. But fate had it that in America is where the evolution of The pamphlet in which it is printed may wizen and shrivel, its paper
constitutionalism had to reach its highest accomplishment. It became rived into shreds, the shreds pulverized into dust and ashes, and
the basis of the government of the United States from its very these reduced into infinitesimal atoms which will finally scatter in the
inception. Now constitutionalism for the world is envisaged as the only wide universe, to form new substances. But the juridical sense of our
hope of humanity to attain the goal that will insure juridical order for people, crystallized in that pamphlet and permeating that paper,
the world, so that men's inventions, including those ominous on embodied in the great document, like the mythological phoenix of
nuclear energy, may be placed under adequate social control. Arabia, undergoing the five hundred years cycle of resurrection, shall
again and again rise in youthful freshness from the scattered ashes
The hope of the Republic of the Philippines lies also on and atoms, the undying symbol of the spirit of law, the flaming banner
constitutionalism. Not the one that would merely offer lip service to the of justice, the magnificent expression of the undaunted will-power to
Constitution, but that would make of that document as one of the live.
living tissues of our body politic, absolutely indispensable to its own
existence. The petition must be granted, and the preliminary injunction of May
29, 1946, must be reissued and made perpetual.
55

5. Ramon Torres

6. Tomas Confessor
BRIONES, M., disidente:
7. Mariano Jesus Cuenco
Despues de las elecciones generales de 23 abril, 1946, en que fueron
elegidos el Presidente y Vice Presidente de Filipinas y los miembros 8. Carlos P. Garcia
del Congreso, el senado y la Camara de Representantes inauguraron 9. Olegario Clarin
se periodo de sesiones reuniendose por primera vez el 25 mayo. Uno
de los primeros documentos que seleyeron en el Senado fue la 10. Alejo Mabanag
roclama expedida por la Comision sobre Eleccionescuyo texto integro
se transcribe a continuacion: 11. Enrique B. Magalona

CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS BY THE COMMISSION ON 12. Tomas Cabili

ELECTIONS OF RETURNS OF VOTES FOR THE OFFICE
OF SENATOR AND PROCLAMATION OF THE 13. Jose O. Vera
CANDIDATES ELECTED IN THE ELECTIONS HELD ON
14. Ramon Diokno
APRIL 23, 1946.
15. Jose O. Vera
We, the undersigned, constituting the Commission on
Elections, do hereby certify that, pursuant to the provisions of 16. Salipada E. Romero
section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 725, we have made the
canvass of the votes cast in the Philippines for the office of
In view of the above result, we hereby proclaim that the above-
Senator in accordance with the statements submitted by the
named sixteen(16) registered candidates are the duly elected
Provincial Board of Canvassers of the different provinces and
Senators in the election held on April 23, 1946.
the City Board of Canvassers of Manila, and that the result
thereof shows the following sixteen (16) registered candidates
to have received the highest number of votes: We further certify that Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Sotto,
Jose Avelino, Melecio Arranz, Ramon Torres, Tomas,
Confesor, Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Carlos P. Garcia
Name of candidates Votes
received the first eight (8) highest number of votes, and that
received
Olegario Clarin, Alejo Mabanag, Enrique B. Magalona, Tomas
Cabili, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, Jose E. Romero and
1. Vicente J. Francisco 735,671
Salipada Pendatun received the next eight (8) highest number
of votes.
2. Vicente Sotto 717,225

3. Jose Avelino We further certify that the attached statement of votes shows
708,420
the number of votes polled by each candidate for the Office of
4. Melencio Arranz Senator in the Philippines by provinces.
666,700
56

In witness whereof, we have signed these presents in the City Gapan, Sta. Rosa and Guimba. These incidents are
of Manila, this 23rd day of May, 1946. still under investigation by the Military Police
Command. After the election we cannot fail to notice
the reports published in the newspapers on the attacks
(Sgd.) JOSE LOPEZ VITO
that have been made by armed bands upon persons or
Chairman
group of persons who were known to have voted for
candidates other than the candidates of those armed
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO ENAGE elements. Even the report submitted to this
Member Commission by the Provost Marshal General on May
20, 1946, . . . contains a recital of incidents of terrorism
I concur in toto, except as regards the proclamation of the 16 that occured in the four provinces of Central Luzon
Senators-elect, on the basis of the canvassing of all the votes herein above mentioned which disturbed or affected
cast in their favor, without excluding those of Central Luzon. the national election in an undesirable manner. Reports
(Separate opinion prepared.) also reached this Commission to the effect that in the
provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and Nueva
Ecija, the secrecy of the ballot was actually violated;
(Sgd.) VICENTE DE VERA that armed bands saw to it that their candidates were
Member voted for; and that the great majority of the voters, thus
coerced or intimidated, suffered from a paralysis of
Acto seguido procediose a la eleccion del Presidente del Senado judgment in the matter of exercising the right of
saliendo elegido como tal el candidato de la mayoria Hon. Jose A. suffrage. Considering all those facts of terrorism,
Avelino que obtuvo 10 votos contra el candidato del partido de la violence and intimidation in connection with elections
minoria Hon. Jose O. Vera que obtuvo 8. Tanto el Sr. Vera como sus which are more or less general in the provinces of
correcurrentes Sres. Diokno y Romero tomaron parte en la votacion. Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, this
Commission believes that the election in the provinces
Elegido el Presidente se iba a proceder a la toma del juramento aforesaid did not reflect the true and free expression of
colectivo de los Senadores electos, pero en esto el Senador Hon. the popular will. It should be stated, however, that the
Salipada Pendatun presento para su aprobacion un proyecto de Commission is without jurisdiction, to determine
resolucion cuyo texto tambien se transcribe integro a continuacion: whether or not the votes cast in the said provinces
which, according to these reports have been cast
Whereas, the Commission on Elections, charged under the under the influence of threats or violence, are valid or
Constitution with the duty of insuring free, orderly, and honest invalid. Suffice to state that in accordance with the
elections, in the Philippines, reported to the President of the provision of Article 1, section 2, of the Constitution,
Philippines on May 23, 1946, that "The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall
"On election day, altho no acts of violence were
exercise all other functions which may be conferred
officially reported to this Commission in connection with
upon it by law. It shall decide — save those involving
the elections, we were advised by our representative in
the right to vote — all administrative questions,
Nueva Ecija that ballot boxes were stolen by armed
affecting elections, including the determination of the
bands in the barrios of the municipalities of Bongabon,
57

number and location of polling places, and the and signified their attention not to vote"; and that ballot boxes
appointment of election inspectors and of other election were taken away from barrios San Miguel, Pasong Isip,
officials . . ." and that the question of whether or not a Pakap, Guimba and Galvan, and that in some instances
vote has been cast legally or illegally is not for this election inspectors were kidnapped;
Commission to determine. The matter is therefore
being brought to the attention of the President and WHEREAS, the terrorism resorted to by the lawless elements
Congress of the Philippines for such action as may be in the four provinces mentioned above in order to insure the
deemed proper pursuant to the requirements of the election of the candidates of the Conservative Wing of the
Constitution that this Commission submit after every Nacionalista Party is of public knowledge and that such
election a report to the said offices on the manner the terrorism continues to this day; that before the elections Jose
election was conducted." O. Vera himself declared as campaign manager of the
Osmeña faction that he was sorry if Presidential Candidate
WHEREAS, the minority report of the Hon. Vicente de Vera, Manuel A. Roxas could not campaign in Huk provinces
member of the Commission on Elections, says among other because his life would be in endangered; and that because of
things, that "we know that as result of this chaotic condition, the constant murders of his candidates and leaders,
many residents of the four provinces have voluntarily banished Presidential Candidate Roxas found it necessary to appeal to
themselves from their home towns in order not to be subjected American High Commissioner Paul V. Mcnutt for protection,
to the prevailing oppression and to avoid being victimized or which appeal American High Commissioner personally
losing their lives;" and that after the election dead bodies had referred to President Sergio Osmeña for appropriate action,
been found with notes attached to their necks, reading: and the President in turn ordered the Secretary of the Interior
"Bumoto kami kay Roxas" (We voted for Roxas); to afford the necessary protection, thus impliedly admitting the
existence and reign of such terrorism;
WHEREAS, the same Judge De Vera says in his minority
report that in the four provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan WHEREAS, the Philippines, a Republic state, embracing the
and Nueva Ecija, the worst terrorism reigned during and after principles of democracy, must condemn all acts that seek to
the election, and that if the elections held in the aforesaid defeat the popular will;
provinces were annulled as demanded by circumstances
mentioned in the report of the Commission, Jose O. Vera, WHEREAS, it is essential in order to maintain alive the respect
Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero, would not and could not for democratic institutions among our people, that no man or
have been declared elected; group of men be permitted to profit from the results of election
held under coercion, in violation of law, and contrary to the
WHEREAS, in his report to the Provost Marshal, col. Amando principle of freedom of choice which should underlie all
Dumlao, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, attached to the report of elections under the Constitution;
the Commission on Elections, states among other things, that
"all the members of the Church of Christ(Iglesia ni Cristo) were WHEREAS, protest against the election of Jose O. Vera,
intimidated and coerced, some kidnapped and murdered" by Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero, have been filed with the
the HUKBALAHAPS "because they had expressed their Electoral Tribunal of the Senate of the Philippines on the basis
opinion that they were going to vote for President-elect Manuel of the findings of the Commission on Elections above quoted;
A. Roxas"; that because of terrorism and coercion "a great
many barrio people have evacuated their respective places
58

NOW THEREFORE, be it resolved by the Senate of the dilaciones, y que, previa la vista correspondiente, dicte
Philippines in session assembled, as it hereby resolves, to sentencia declarando enteramente nula y de ningun valor la
defer the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, citada resolucion, y prohibiendo consecuentemente a los
Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero, pending the hearing and recurridos y a cada uno de ellos a impedir a los recurrentes a
decision of reports lodged against their elections, wherein the continuar en sus cargos como senadores, y prohibiendoles
terrorism averred in the report of the Commission on Elections igualmente a realizar cualquier otro procediemiento ulterior
and in the report of the Provost Marshal constitute the ground para ejecutar la resolucion citada, con las costas. Los
of said protests and will therefore be the subject of recurrentes piden tambien cualquier otro remedio justo y
investigation and determination. equitativo.

Parece que cuando se puso a debate la resolucion arriba transcrita, el El magistrado Perfecto concedio el interdicto preliminar pedido
Senado acordo unanimemente transferir la discusion para la sesion principalmenteen virtud de la alegacion expuesta en el parrafo 10 de
del lunes siguiente, 27 de mayo. Ya se estaba discutiendo otro asunto la demanda, en el sentido de que la resolucion cuestionada tenia por
cuando surgio unacalorado incidente en virtud del cual los Senadores objecto, entre otras cosas, "la realizacion de fines siniestros, tales
de la minoria salierontodos del salon de sesiones, quedandose alli como la aprobacion, sin la fiscalizacion e intervencion de los
solamente el Presidente Avelinocon sus once (11) compañeros de la recurrentes, del Bill Bell, de una medidade reorganizacion judicial
mayoria. Se alega en esta ocasion, ausenteslos Senadores terrorista para el personal de la judicatura y deotras semejantes, y
minoritarios y sin el necesario quorum legal para poder seguir para doblegar a los recurrentes, por tal hitlerico procedimiento a los
despachando asuntos, los Senadores de la mayoria, revocando el manejos de tal mayoria." Sometido el interdicto preliminar a la corte
acuerdo anterior de transferencia, decidieron considerar y aprobar la en pleno, esta lo aprobo en una votacion de seis (6) contra cuatro (4),
resolucion sinmas debate. y al propio tiempo lo señalo a vista para la determinacion de la
cuestion de si su expedicion estaba o no justificada. En dicha vista
Tales son, a grandes rasgos, los hechos que han dado lugar a la que duro 6 horas seguidas, desde la mañana hasta la tarde (una de
demanda quedirecta y originariamente plantean ante este Tribunal las mas largas si no la mas larga que se haya celebrado jamas en los
Supremo los recurrentes Jose O. Vera, Ramon diokno y Jose anales de esta Corte), arguyeron extensamente tanto la
Romero, y cuya parte petitoria es como sigue: representacion de los recurrentes como la de los recurridos. El
Procurador General Tañada comparecio y arguyo en nombre de
POR LO TANTO, los recurrentes respetuosamente piden a estos ultimos, pero limitandose en su informe a cuestionar e impugnar
este Honorable Tribunal y a cualquier Magistrado del mismo, la jurisdiccion de este Supremo Tribunal para conocer y enjuiciar el
tenga a bien expedir un interdicto prohibitorio preliminar asunto bajo el principio de la separacion de poderes que informa
dirigido a los recurridos, sus funcionarios, empleados, agentes nuestra Constitucion. Puede decirse sin exageracion que el tema se
y demas personas que obran en su ayuda, ordenandoles que agoto discutiendose con minuciosidad los puntos constitucionales y
hasta nueva orden del Tribunal, desistan y se abstengan de juridicos planteados en el asunto. Despues de la vista esta Corte en
poner en ejecucion la resolucion arriba mencionada, y impedir pleno, con la solañausencia del Magistrado Jaranilla, y con la
a los recurrentes continuen en sus asientos en el Senado y disidencia del Magistrado Perfecto, acordo disolver el interdicto
ejerzan libremente sus funciones y derechos como senadores prohibitorio preliminar mediante lasiguente orden:
de Filipinas, deshaciendo todo lo hecho en contrario hasta
esta fecha; que acorte los terminos de contestacion; que una Considering that the preliminary injunction was issued in the
vez contestada esta demanda, designe un Comisionado para case of Jose O. Vera et al., petitioners, vs. Jose Avelino,
recibir las pruebas, con instrucciones de que la haga sin respondents, ( G. R. No. L-543), to preserve the status
59

quo and thus prevent the execution of the acts alleged under sus miembros electivos. . . ." Esta disposicion no era de ningun modo
oath in the last part of paragraph X of the petition, without the original: no hacia mas que transplantar a este pais la tradicion y el
intervention of the petitioners; and taking into consideration sistema americano provisto en la clausula 1.ª de la seccion 5 del
that this court, after hearing both parties, at any rate believes Articulo I de la constitucion de los Estados Unidos, que dispone que
and trusts that the respondents will not carry out said acts "cada Camara sera juez de las Elecciones, Actas y Condicciones de
during the pendency of this proceeding, this court, without sus propios miembros. . ."
deciding whether or not the said injunction was justified,
hereby resolves to dissolve it in the meantime, without La Asamblea Constituyente convocada en 1934 para redactar la
prejudice to whatever action or decision this court may take or Constitucionde nuestro Commonwealth pudo haber seguido sobre
render on the questions involved in this case including that of esta materia diferents cursos de accion: reafirmar la tradicion
jurisdiction. americana vigente en este pais desde1902; o seguir el ejemplo de
algunos paises — verbigracia, Canada, Australia,Hungria y Polonia —
Resulta evidente de autos que las cuestiones que tenemos que que habian transladado esta facultad de las Camaras Legislativas al
considerar yresolver son las siguientes: (1) a la luz de nuestra departamento judicial, hablando mas concretamente, al
Constitucion y de nuestras ¿es legal y sostenible la resolucion objecto TribunalSupremo; o bien instituir un sistema mixto, creando un cuerpo
de controversia, en cuanto por ella se priva a los recurrentes de sus constitucional separado e independiente, con jurisdiccion exclusiva
asientos en el Senado de Filipinas, y de los derechos, privilegios y sobre la materia. La Asemblea Constituyente opto por este ultimo
prerrogativas anejos a dichos asientos?; (2) a la luz de nuestra creando "una Comision Electoralque se compondra de tres
constitucion y de nuestrs leyes ¿tiene este Tribunal Supremo Magistrados del Tribunal Supremo que seran designadospor su
jurisdiccion y competencia para conocer, enjuiciar y decidir el asunto? Presidente, y de seis diputados escogidos por la Asamblea Nacional,
tres de los cuales el mayor numero de votos, y tres por el partido que
Primera cuestion.—A la luz de nuestre Constitucion y de lesiga en el mayor numero de votos. Esta Commision Electoral sera
nuestre leyes ¿eslegal sostenible la resolucion objecto de presidida porel Magistrado mas antiguo y conocera exclusivamente
controversia, en cuanto por ella sepriva a los recurrentes de de todas las controversiasrelativas al resultado de la eleccion y a las
sus asientos en el Senado de Filipinas, y de losderechos, calificaciones de los miembrosde la Asamblea Nacional" (Articulo IV,
privilegios y prerrogativas anejos a dichos asientos? Constitucion de Filipinas, 1935). Cuando la Constitucion se reformo
en 1940 restaurandose le legislatura bicameral, la filosofia de la
Antes de la aprobacion de la primera Constitucion del Commonwealth comision electoral se respecto y conservo en la Constitucion
de Filipinas (1935), la Legistura era el juez de las elecciones, actas y reformada y en lugar de una comision se crearon dos, una para cada
condiciones de sus propios miembros. La disposicion original relativa camara, y ya no se llamaba Comision electoral sino Tribunal
a esta materia era la contenida en la Ley Congreso de los Estados Electoral, como para recalcar y subrayar el caracter judicial del nuevo
Unidos de 1.º de julio de 1902 (Ley Organica, articulo 7, parrafo 5), la organismo. El precepto constitucional pertinente es como sigue:
cual preceptuaba que "La Asamblea (Filipina) decidira de las
elecciones, su resultado y las calificaciones de los representantes. . . Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
." Cuando se aprobo la Ley del Congreso de 1916 (Ley Jones, de each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
amplia automania, seccion 18, parrafo 1), la citada disposicion se of all contests relating to the election, returns,and
reincorporo, con una modificacion que la hacia mas enfatica qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral
insertandose la palabra "unicos," a saber: "Que el Senado y la Tribunal shall be composed of nine members, three of whom
Camara de Representantes, respectivamente, seran los unicos shall be Justice of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
jueces de las elecciones, del resultado, escrutinio y condiciones de Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be members of the
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Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may cuestionable que fuera el mismo desde el punto de vista del derecho
be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon o de la moral publica; y que, por tanto, no hay tal usurpacion de
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and poderes constitucionales, no habiendose los recurridos entrometido
three of the party having the second largest number of votes en la esfera de accion del Tribunal Electoral. Sin embargo, no hay
therein. The senior Justice in each Electral Tribunal shall be its mas que leer la resolucion en cuestion para convencerse de que su
Chairman. entera motivacion se deriva de las elecciones de 23 de April, dandose
en ella por establecido, en virtud del informe de la Comision sobre
De lo expuesto resulta evidente que una importante fa cultad judicial Elecciones, que el triunfo de los recurrentes se debio a un estado de
que tenian las camaras legislativas anteriormente — la facultad de terror y violencia en las Provincias de Pampanga, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija
actuar como jueces sobre las elecciones, actas y calificaciones de y Bulacan. Los "por cuantos" de la resolucion hacen referencia a las
sus miembros — ha quedado eliminada completamente bajo la actual supuestas anomalias e irregularidades que viciaron el sufragio en
Constitucion y traspasada tambien completa y plenamente al nuevo dichas provincias; hacen ciertas afirmaciones de caracter general
organismo constitucional — el Tribunal Electoral. La pregunta ahora como la de que Filipinas, a fuer de nacion y estado democratico, debe
en orden es si la resolucion cuestionada que para mayor claridad condenar todo acto tendente a derrotar la voluntad popular, y la de
llamaremos Resolucion Pendatun representa o constituye,por parte que "para mantener vivo entre nosotros el respeto a las instituciones
de los Senadores recurridos, el ejercicio de una facultad democraticas, a ningun hombre o grupo de hombres se debe permitir
constitucional que no les pertenece sino al Tribunal Electoral, y que reporten beneficio de los resultados de una eleccion llev ada a
nuestra contestacion es decididamente afirmativa. Con esa resolucion cabo bajo coercion"; y al final se dice "por cuanto, sobre la base de
en la mano es como si los recurridos hubieran dicho a los recurrentes los informes arriba citados de la Comision sobre Elecciones se han
lo siguiete:"Señores, aqui tenemos un informe de la Comision sobre formulado protestas ante el Tribunal Electoral de Senado contra la
Elecciones en donde se dice que en cuatro provincias del centro de eleccion de Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno y Jose E. Romero"; y luego
Luzon no ha habido sufragio libre, sincero y or denado, por los actos la parte dispositiva en virtud de la cual se priva a los recurrentes del
de intimadacion y violencia de vuestros partidarios. Sin los votos de juramento y de sus asientos en el Senado entre tanto no se resuelvan
esas provincias, vosotros no hubierais triunfado. Por tanto, hasta que las protestas formuladas contra sus actos, interregno que puede
se decida en vuestro favor las protestas formuladas contra vuestras durar meses y hasta años. De todo esto resulta bien claro que los
actas ante el Tribunal Electoral, os negamos el derecho de jurar, de considerandos de la resolucion versan precisamente sobre los
sentarse en estos escaños, de participar en las deliberaciones del mismos hechos electorales cuya determinacion incumbe
Senado y de gozar de los derechos, prerrogativas y privilegios anejos exclusivamente al Tribunal Electoral, y que la interdiccion, o mejor
al cargo de Senador." ¿Que es esto sino una innegabale susurpacion dicho, la suspension de los derechos, prerrogativas y privilegios de
de la facultad exclusiva que tiene el Tribunal Electoral de ser el unico los recurrentes se basa indudablemente en tales considerandos. No
juez de las controversias relativas a la eleccion, actas y calificaciones hay en la resolucion ni la mas minima insinuacion de que se haya
de los miembros de la camara a qu corresponde dicho tribunal? aprobado por altos motivos de dignidad y decoro senatorial — eso
que algun tratadista lllama graficamente medida de profilaxis — como
Se arguye que independientemente de la cuestion electoral cada para evitar el roce deshonroso con miembros que fuerean algo aso
camara, para proteger su existencia, su buen nombre y su decoro, com de la casta despreciable de lost intocables, aquejados de lepra
tiene el poder inherente de suspender a cualquier miembro suyo; que moral en sus personas. No hay ni el menor cargo de torpeza moral
la Resolucion Pendatun se inspiro en estos motivos; que la contra los recurrentes, ni siquiera se insinua que estos fuereon
suspension de los recurrentes es un acto politico que nada tiene que directa o indirectamente responsables del alegado estado de terror y
ever con la determinacion de sus actas por el Tribunal Electoral y no violencia. La conclusion indeclinable, pues, es que la Resolucion
se halla sujeto a revision de parte del departamento judicial por Pendatun enjuicia y resuelve cuestiones o "issues" puramente
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electorales, aceptando prima facie un informe incompetente sobre constitucional bien establecido que el poder de legislar es ilimitado en
terrorismo, violencias y fraudes, y como tal constituye una intromision tanto en cuanto no pugna con la Constitucion, la cual opera como una
en la facultad que bajo la Constitucion tiene el Tribunal Electoral del limitacion. Todos los demas poderes y facultades que no tengan
Senado de ser el unico juez de las controversias relativas a la caracter legislativo deben ser conferidos expresa o implicitamente.
eleccion, actas y calificaciones de los miembros de dicho alto cuerpo Nuestro Congreso, actuando concurrentemente por medio de sus dos
colegislador. camaras, tiene el poder de legislar. "El poder legislativo queda
investido en un Congreso de Filipinas, compuesto de un Senado y de
Pero admitamos por un momento que la Resolucion Pendatun tiene una Camara de Representates (Articulo VI, seccion 1, Constitucion de
ese caracter profilactico que le atribuyen a ultima hora; que, contra lo Filipinas, 1940). Pero ademas de este poder de conjunto, cada
que es evidente y claro con claridad meridiana, esa resolucion nada camara tiene ciertas facultades, entre ellas algunas de caracter
tiene que ver con la determinacion judicial de las actas de los disciplinario, a saber: (a) la de compeler la asistencia de miembros
recurrentes por el Tribunal electoral. La pregunta otra vez en orden s ausentes en la forma y bajo las penas que dicha camara prescriba;
la siguiente: sometida la Resolucion Pendatum a la piedra de toque (b) la de castigar a sus miembros por conducta desordenada, y, con
de nuestra Constitucion ¿puede resistir con exito la prueba? Nuestra la concurrencia de dos terceras partes de sus miembros, expulsar a
contestacion es terminantemente negativa. La Constitucion filipina es un miembro por tal motivo (Articulo VI, seccion 10, ap. 2 y 3). Fuera
el producto de la sabiduria, experiencia y genio politico de nuestro de estas facultades no hay en nuestra Constitucion ninguna otra que
pueblo. No es un documento enteramente original: en ciencia politica autorice la imposicion de un castigo o pena, o envuelva una privacion
las concepciones originales no abundan. Hemos volcado en ella no de derechos, prerrogativas y privilegios, siguiera sea temporal, tal
solo el resultado de nuestra experiencia necessariamentelimitada, como la que se provee en la Resolucion Pendatun. ¿Encaja esta
sino lo que hemos aprendido de la sabiduria y experiencia de otros resolucion en cualquiera de las facultades arriba enumeradas?
pueblos mas avanzados que nosotros, particularmente del pueblo Evidentemente que no. No encaja en el inciso (a)—la facultad de
Americano, con el cual nos ha ligado una convivencia de cerca de compeler disciplinariamente la asistencia de miembros ausentes —
medio sigolo. Despues de largas y laboriosas deliberaciones nuestra porque es superfluo decir que no se trata ni remotamente de tal caso.
Asamablea Constituyente, elegida por el pueblo (1934-1935), adopto Tampoco encaja en el inciso "b" porque se ha admitido desde el
el sistema presidencial de gobierno dividido en tres altospoderes, comienzo que el caso que nos ocupa no es el de conducta
independendientes entre si pero coordinandos en un mecanismo desordenada de un miembro. Tampoco encaja en la facultad de
cuidadosamente elaborado de frenos y contrapesos. Esos poderes determinar y resolver la legalidad y solvencia de las actas y
son: legislativo, ejecutivo y judicial.Sus altas facultades y funciones se credenciales de los recurrentes porque ya hemos demostrado hasta
hallan especificadas en la Constitucion, en capitulos separados. En el la saciedad que habiendose retirado totalmente de las camaras
uso del lenguaje se ha evitado la municiosidad, el pormenorismo la substancia, laesencia de esa facultad trasladandola al Tribunal
caractereistico de las leyesordinarias, a fin de hacer del instrumento Electoral, quedo tambien ipso facto retirada y eliminada la facultad de
suficientemente amplio y flexible para acomodarse y para subvenir a suspender que es nada mas que un incidente un aledaño de la
las necesidades y condiciones cambiantes de los tiempos; pero, con substancia.
todo, los trazos, los lineamientos son suficientemente claros, firmes y
seguros, y creemos puededecirse sin inmodestia que en concision, Pero se dice: el Tribunal Electoral no tiene la facultad de suspender,
en claridad y en buen ordenamiento nuestra Constitucion no cede a esto se halla admitido por todo el mundo; luego esa facultad ha
ninguna de las constituciones escritas que se conocen. quedado, por lo menos, en las camaras como residuo no afectado por
el traspaso de jurisdiccionsobre las credenciales y actas electorales.
Examinemos ahora el departamento o poder legislative que es lo que Sin embargo,esto no es mass que una habil sustileza. En la
nos concierne e interesa en el presente asunto. Es un principio Constitucion no hay mas que dos categorias de poderes: el expreso o
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el implicito (either by express grant or byfair implication from what is establecieron las camaras legislativas eran constitucionalmente los
granted). Como quiera que esa reserva, ese residuo (la facultad de unicos jueces de la eleccion, actas y calificaciones de sus miembros;
suspender) no esta conferido expresamente en la Constitucion, luego asi que la suspension prima facie del juramento y del asiento no fue
hay que suponerlo implicito. Pero ¿implicito de que? Tiene que ser de mas que un incidente en el ejercicio de esa facultad; y, prescindiendo
algo de un poder mas general y mas amplio expresamente de si esto era justo o injusto, prudente o arbitrario, parecia
conferido (parte de un todo) que en este caseo tendria que ser el incuestionable que estaba dentro los poderes y facultades de las
poder de conocer y resolver las controversias electorales sobre las camaras el hacerlo.
actas de los miembros del Congreso. Es asi que este poder ya no lo
tienen las camaras bajo la Constitucion; luego tampoco queda Pero, en realidad, los casos de Fuentebella y Rafols pueden citarse
nada implicito en elias, so pena de sostener que lo implicito, que es para un efecto completamente opuesto al perseguido por los
nada mas que un incidente, puede subsistir por si solo sin abogados dee los recurridos cuando se analizan y discuten amplia y
la substancia — el vaso esencial que lo envuelve y entraña. El objetivamente los motivos, circunstancias y designios que indujeron a
corolario forzoso de todo esto es que los redactores de la nuestra Asamblea Constituyente a abandonar la bien arraigada
Constitucion filipina eliminaron por completo la facultad de suspender tradicion americana de hacer de las camaras legislativas los unicos
no solo del Congreso sino del Tribunal Electroral; que la voluntad jueces de la eleccion, actas y calificaciones de sus miembros,
soberana del pueblo expresada en el codigo fundamental, es que trasladanddo la jurisdiccion a un organismo constitucional
ningun protestado seria privado de sus asiento ni por un solo minuto; completamente separado e independiente. Un analisis de este genero
que ninguna presuncion se estableceria en contra de la legitimidad y viene a ser altamente revelador y expresivo. Lo primero que embarga
solvencia de su acta; que solamente una sentencia final podira la atencion del observador es que cuando se adopto esta reforma
cerrarle las puertas del Congreso. No tenemos porque averiguar si fundamental y original por la Asamblea Constituyente dominaba en
con esta decision la Asamblea Constituyente quiso erigir un firme Filipinas un partido politico fuerte, denso, acaudillado por una
valladar a los excesos y demasias de la pasion politica creando un personalidad genial, brillante, dinamica y poderosa. Ese partido
clima propicio para el desarrollo de las minorias en un pais en que, acababa de ganar en unas elecciones apasionadisimas y muy reidas
como el nuestro, ciertas causas y circunstancias han retardado el una victoria espectacular, abrumadora, que le daba el dominio y
turno periodico y saludable de los partidos; todo lo que nos incumbe control de todos los resortes de la vida politica no solo en la nacion
hacer es señalar y destacar el hecho inexorable, la volicion sino hasta en las provincias y municipios.Ese partido dominaba
constitucional. naturalmente tambien la Convencion Constitucional, la Asamblea
Constituyente. ¿Que hizo ese partido en medio de su omnipotencia?
Se han citado dos casos de nuestra jurisprudencia parlamentaria para ¿Le emborracho ese peligroso licor de los dioses — el licor de la
justificar la Resolucion Pendatun: el caso de Jose Fuentebella en el victoria, el licor del poder? No. Ese partido, sus caudillos, resolvieron
Senado de Filipinas, en 1916, y el caso de Nicolas Rafols en la ser generosos, ser justos, ser prudentes, ser democraticos, y lo
Camara de Representantes, en 1925. Bajo la alegacion de haberse fueron; determinaron pensar en terminos de humanidad, en terminos
cometido graves irregularidades y fraudes en las primeras elecciones de nacion, en terminos de justica pero justicia de verad, en terminos
senatoriales celebradas en el 6. o distrito (provincias bicolanas)al de libertad y democracia, y lo hicieron tal como lo pensaron. Podian
candidato electo Jose Fuentebella se le nego prima facie el juramento haber escrito una constitucion a su talante — una constitucion que
y el asiento pendiente la resolucion de la protesta formulada contra su sirviese sus propios fines, que asegurase su perpetuidad en el poder.
acta. Lo mismo se hizo en el caso de Nicolas Rafols, por alegados No lo hicieron. Y no solamente no lo hicieron, sino que hicieronalgo
fraudes electorales cometidos en el 6.º distrito diputacional de Cebu. mas; algo extraordinario, inconcebible, juzgado a la luz y segun la
Pero la endeblez e inaplicabilidad de estos precedentes salta norma usual del egoismo de los partidos. Teniendo en sus manos un
inmediatamente a la vista si se tiene en cuenta que cuando se poder enorme, formidable, sumamente tentador, el poder de resolver
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las controversias electorales sobre las actas de los miembros de la En la Convencion habi delegados que eran miembros actuales y
Legislatura, renunciaron a ese poder para alojarlo en un cuerpo pasados de la Legislatura, hombres que sabian por propia
constitucional separado e independiente, el cual es practicamente un experiencia como se resolvian las protestas electorales en las
tribunal de justicia: la Comision Electoral, hoy Tribunal Electoral. La camaras legislativas y que, ademas, sabian por sus lecturas lo que
determinacion de hacer este cuerpo lo mas apolitico posible se sobre el particular ocurria en otros paises. Alli estaba, como
denota en el hecho de que sus miembros legislativos estan delegado, Nicolas Rafols — actor del drama politico que determino
distribuidos en igual numero, 3-3, de suerte que los 3 Magistrados uno de los procedentes parlamentarios que se citan — acaso
componen el factor decisivo. rumiando todavia en su fuero interno el agravio contra lo que reputara
arbitrariedad cometida por la mayoria en su caso. ¿Que de extraño
¿Por que los redactores de la Constitucion, y, sobre todo, por que el habia que en medio de tal "background", en medio de tal ambiente
partido politico mayoritario pudo hacer estarenuncia de la que pocos ideologico se formara una fuerte opinionen favor de un cambio de
ejemplos hay en la historia politica del mundo? No parece dificil sistema, en favor de unarbitrio constitucional que sustituyera la
imaginarse los motivos, las causas, sobre todo para uno que como el llamada "justicia politica" con una justicia de verdad, una "justicia
autor de esta opinion tuvo algo que ver, siguera muy modestamente, judicial?"Asi se creo la Comision Electoral. Nada mejor que las
con las tareas de la Asamblea Constituyente. El pueblo filipino estab siguientes palabras del malogrado Magistrado Abad Santos en su
empeñado en una suprema, altisima tarea — la de estructurar el luminosa opinion concurrente en el celebrado asunto de
Estado, la de escribir el codigo fundamental de la nacion no solo para Angara contra Comision Electoral, para definir el caracter del sistema:
los 10 años del Commonwealth sino para la Republica que se "El objeto que se trataba de obtener con la creacion del a Comision
proclamaria despues de dicho periodo de tiempo. Todo el mundo Electoral no era crear un cuerpo que estuviera por encima de la
sabia que la suerte de la democracia en filipinas dependia ley, sino el elevar las elecciones legislativas de la categoria de
principalmente de la Constitucion que se escribiera, no solo en su cuestiones politicas a la de justiciables." (Angara contra Comision
letra sino en su espiritu, y, sobre todo, de la forma y manera como Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil., 151, 200.) Y el ponente en dicho asunto el
ella moldearia, penetraria e influiria en la vida cotidiana del pueblo y Magistrado Laurel se explaya mas todavia con los siguientes
del individuo. Desde luego no eramos unos ilusos, utopistas, pronunciamientos que no tienen desperdicio:
perfeccionistas; no aspirabamos ni mucho menos a crear un trasunto
de la republica ideal de Platon; pero deseabamos hacer lo mejor Los miembros de la Convencion Constitucional que planearon
posible dadas nuestras circunstancias y limitaciones, dada nuestra nuestra ley fundamental eran, en su mayor parte, hombres de
historia y tradiciones, y dado el temperamento y genio politico y social edad madura y de experiencia. A buen seguro muchos de
de nuestro pueblo. Se habia acuñado y popularizado por aquel ellos estaban familiarizados con la historia y desarrollo politico
tiempo la frase "justicia politica" para denotar la clase de justicia de otros paises del mundo. Por tanto, cuando creyeron
convencional que cabia esperar en relacion con las protestas conveniente crear una Comision Electoral como un organismo
electorales planteadas ante las camaras legislativas. No solo se constitucional y lo invistieron con la exclusiva funcion de
aceleraba o demoraba el despacho de las mismas a ritmo con los conocer y fallar las controversias electorales, actas y
dictados de ciertas conveniencias de taifa o grupo, sino que no pocas condiciones de los miembros de la Asamblea
veces el complejo politico o personal era el factor determinante en las Nacional,debieronde haberlo hecho asi, no solamente a la luz
resoluciones y decisiones que se tomaban. Todo esto lo sabian los de su propia experiencia, sino tambien teniendo en cuente la
delegados a la asamblea constituyente, lo sabian los liders de los experiencia de otros pueblos ilustrados del mundo. La
partidos, lo sabian los escritores y pensadores dedicados al estudio creacion de la Comision Electoral fue planeada para remediar
de las ciencias politicas y sociales. ciertos males que conocian los autores de nuestra
Constitucion. No obstante la tenaz oposicion de algunos
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miembros de la Convencion a su creacion, el proyecto como La concesion de facultades a la Comision Electoral para
antes se ha dicho, fue aprobado por ese cuerpo mediante una conocer de todas las controversias relativas a las elecciones,
votacion de 98 contra 58. Todo cuanto se puede decir ahora actas y condiciones de los miembros de la Asamblea
sobre la aprobacion de la Constitucion, la creacion de la Nacional, tiene por objeto hacer que esas facultades sean tan
Comision Electoral es la expresion de la sabiduria y "la justicia completas y queden tan incolumes como si hubieran
esencial al pueblo". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural continuado originalmente en la Legislatura. El haber
Address, marzo 4, 1861.) expresamente investido de esas facultades a la Comision
Electoral, es una negativa tacita del ejercicio de esas
De las deliberaciones de nuestra Convencion Constitucional facultades por la Asamblea Nacional. Y esto es una restriccion
resulta evidente que el objeto era traspasar en tan eficaz a las facultades legislativas como una prohibicion
su totalidad toda la facultad previamente ejercitada por la expresa contenida en la Constitucion (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex.
Legislatura en asuntos pertenecientes a protestas electorales Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman,36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B,
de sus miembros, a un tribunal independiente e imparcial. Sin 1). . . ." (Angara contra Comision Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil., 151-,
embargo, no fue tanto el conocimientoy apreciacion de 188-190.)
precedentes constitucionales contemporaneos comola ha
tiempo sentida necesidad de fallar protestas legislativas, libres Acaso se pueda decir algo mas todavia acerca de los motivos que
de prejuicios partidistas lo que impulso al pueblo, obrando por indujeron la creacion de la Comision Electoral; acaso se pueda
medio de sus delegados a la Convencion, a establecer este aventurar la afirmacion de que con este cuerpo los redactores de la
Cuerpo que se conoce por Comision Electoral. Con estas Constitucion, los caudillos de los partidos se propusieron asegurar
miras, se creo un cuerpo en el que tanto el partido de la por todos los medios y garantias la vida y crecimiento de la
mayoria como el de la minoria estanigualmente representados democracia en Filipinas. Democracia es esencialmente libre discusion
para contrarrestar la influencia partidista en sus de los asuntos publicos, de los problemas de la comunidad;
deliberaciones, y dotado, ademas, de caracter judicial libreexpresion del pensamiento y de la opinion. De esto se sigue
mediantela inclusion entre sus miembros de tres magistrados necesariamente un regimen basado en la existencia de una mayoria
del Tribunal Supremo. que gobierna y de una minoria que aspira a gobernar entretanto que
vigila los actos del gobierno en su doble papel de censor y de
La Comision Electoral es una creacion constitucional, aspirante al poder. La mejor piedra de toque para apreciar y juzgar la
investida de las facultades necesarias para el cumplimiento y calidad de un regimen politico es la manera y forma como trata a las
ejecucion de las funciones limitadas y especificas que la ha minorias y oposiciones. Un gobierno totalitario, despotico, las liquida,
asignado la Comision. Aunque no es un Poder en nuestro las ahoga; un gobierno democratico no solo las respeta, sino que
Gobierno tripartito, es, para todos los fines, cuando obra crea para ellas un clima vital propicio. Mirado en esta sentido el
dentro de los limites de su autoridad, un organismo Tribunal electoral es un instrumento de minorias por antonomasia: la
independiente. Se aproxima mas, ciertamente, al idea basica de su creacion es el desposeer a las mayhorias del poder
Departamento Legislativo que a cualquiera otro. El lugar que de destruir, de aniquilar a las minorias mediante lo que cinicamente
ocupa la disposicion legal (articulo 4) que crea la Comision se ha denominado "justicia politica," e impartir a las minorias las
Electoral en el Titulo VI, titulado "Departamento Legislativo" de maximas garantias de una justicia de verdad — una "justicia judicial"
nuestra Constitucion,es muy significativo. Su composicion es de la mayoria en el Senado, pronunciando su discurso a favor de la
tambien significativa por cuanto etsa constituida por una reforma en la Asamblea Constituyente, dijo entre otros conceptos las
mayoria de miembros de la Legislatura. Pero es un cuerpo siguientes significativas palabras: "Many have criticized, many have
separado e independiente de la Legislatura. complained against the tyranny of the majority in electoral cases. . . ."
65

(Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution,Tomo I, pag. Asamblea desea anular el poder de la Comision (Electoral), puede
263). Por eso es un absurdo sostener que la facultad de suspender hacerlo asi mediante ciertasmaniobras en su primera sesion cuando
utilizada mediante la Resolucion Pendatun haya quedado en el se someten las actas a la Asamblea. El objeto es dar a la Comision
Congreso como residuo, independientemente de la jurisdiccion Electoral todo el poder ejercitado por la Asamblea referente a las
exclusiva del Tribunal Electoral para resolver protestas electorales elecciones, actas y condiciones de sus miembros"
legislativas. Ello equivaldria a sostener que los redactores de la (vease Angara contra Comision Electoral, supra, pag. 179).
Constitucion pusieron un remedio paraderrotarlo al propio tiempo Ese todo de que habla el Sr. Roxas excluye la idea de cualquier
mediante una puerta reservada y trasera por la que podria escurrirse reserva o residuo dejado a las camaras del Congreso.
el pequeño monstruo de la "justicia politica". Este juego infantil no
podian haberlo hecho los redactores de la Constitucion, los liders de Se dice, sin embargo, en la opinion de la mayoria que los debates en
los partidos que tuvieron alguna responsabilidad en la redaccion de la Asamblea Constituyente sobre el precepto constitucional de que se
dicho documento. ¿Que mas? Esa facultada para suspender equivale trata demuestran que la intencion de los redactores de la Constitucion
practicamentea una carta blanca para intervenir y estorbar las no fue el entregar todo a la Comision Electoral (ahora Tribunal
actuaciones y procedimientos del Tribunal Electoral, provocando Electoral), sino que se le confirio solamente la facultad de ser "the
suspicacias, creando anticipadamente prejuicios no solo en la mente sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
del publico sino de los miembros mismos, empequeñeciendo, en una qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."Es decir —
palabra, el prestigio del tribunal. ¿Como se puede pensar que la se arguye — que cuando no hay "contest" o contencion las camaras
Asamblea Constituyente permitiera y posibitara ese resultado tienen la facultad de entender y juzgar de "la eleccion, actas y
antijudicial, reservandoalgo al Congreso en un traspaso de facultades cualificaciones de sus miembros".Esto se desprende, segun la
que se consideraba total, absoluto e incondicional? Los ponencia, del hecho de que mientras el "draft" o proyecto original
tribunalesordinarios de justicia estan por ley protegidos contra todo decia lo siguiente:
estorbo y obstruccion a sus funciones. El Tribunal Electoral —
criatura de la misma Constitucion — tiene, por lo menos, iguales si no The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of the
mejores titulos a esa impermeabilidad, mejor todavia, a esa National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any
inmunidad contra toda obstruccion y entorpecimiento. El hecho de of its members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission.
que la intromision venga del Congreso o de una de sus camaras no
puede ser una justificacion. la redaccion final del proyecto quedo como sigue:

Las deliberaciones de la Asamblea Constituyente arrojan buena luz xxx xxx xxx
sobre el espiritu del precepto que nos ocupa. Queel traspaso de
facultades fue total, absoluto; que al Congreso no se reservo ninguna The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
facultad, mucho menos la de suspender, en toda cuestion relativa a la contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
eleccion de sus miembros, lo denotan bien claro ciertas the members of the National Assembly.
observaciones, que a estas alturas resultan profeticas, del Delegado
ManuelRoxas, uno de los liders mas autorizados de la Asamblea
Se asevera enfaticamente en la opinion de la mayoria que la
Constituyente, hoy primer Magistrado de la nacion. El Sr. Roxas
supresion de la primera parte de la clausula es harto significativa. Ello
estaba contestando varias interpelaciones sobre el alcance del nuevo
demuestra, se dice, que la clausula tenia dos partes con significados
sistema propuesto. Replicando al Delegado Ventura no parece sino
distintos: la primera parte, relativa a casos no contenciosos, y la
que el Sr. Roxas presintiera la Resolucion Pendatun o actos
segunda referente a casos contenciosos. La eliminacion de la primera
semejantes a ella cuando dijo lo siguiente: ". . . Ademas, si la
66

parte venia a reducir consiguientemente la jurisdiccion de la Veamos ahora el proceso de como se enmendo el "draft"original del
ComisionElectoral a los casos contenciosos, reservandose los no precepto. Las siguientes interpelaciones arrojan copiosa luz sobre la
contenciosos a las camaras. Y para probar esta tesis a primera vista cuestion.
deslumbrante se transcribe en la ponencia una larga tirada del diario
de sesiones de la Asamblea Constituyente — tirada que, en verdad, Delegate VENTURA. We have a doubt here as to the scope of
ofrece ciertos equivocos y ambiguedades. Pero esto no es mas que the meaning of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the
un aspecto del cuadro. draft reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting
Estos nos obliga a revisar y examinar toda la parte del diario de the election of anyof its members shall be judged by an
sesiones que abarca los debates sobre el particular.Afortunadamente, electoral Commission ."I should like to ask from the gentleman
las discusiones fueron amplias, plenas de informacion y detalle, y from Capiz whether the election and qualification of the
sobre todo llevadas muyinteligentemente. El Delegado Manuel members whose election is not contested shall also be judged
Roxas, ahora Presidente de Filipinas, era quien sostenia el lado by the Electoral Commission.
afirmativo, esto es, el precepto original tal como lo habia sometido el
llamando Comite de Siete y tal como queda transcritoen el parrafo Delegate ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of
anterior. Un grupo de Delegados, encabezado por el Hon. Alejo the member, there is nothing to be judged; that is why the
Labrador, de Zambales, estaba fundamental y decididamente opuesto word "judge"is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no
a la formula. Estos Delegados no aceptaban la reforma propuesta, qustion about the election of a member, there is nothing to be
querian que se conservase el antiguo sistema por virtud del cual las submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to
camaras eran los jueces exclusivos de la elecccion, actas be determined.
ycualificaciones de sus miembros. Acaso sea pertinente consignar el
hecho de que si bien es verdad que los partidos (anti y pro) habian Delegate VENTURA. But that does carry the idea also that the
declarado una tregua patriotica y saludable en sus luchas dentro de la Electoral Commission shall confirm also the election of those
Convencion, el Sr. Roxas pertenecia al partido minoritario — el de whose election is not contested?
los pros — mientras que el Sr. Labrador era de la mayoria, el partido
fuerte y poderoso de los antis cuyo indiscutible lider era el entonces Delegate ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the
Presidente del Senado Sr. Quezon. La oposicion del Sr. Labrador y gentleman knows, theaction of the House of Representatives
compa_¤_eros se fundaba principalmente en la teoria de la in confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the
separacion de poderes: ellos creian que la reforma era demasiado rules of the Assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not
radical, que la misma venia a mermar grandemente el poder y necessary. After a man (adviertase bien esto) fileshis
prestigio del departamento legislativo,reduciendolo a un estado de credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient, unless
inferioridad y vasallaje, particularmente al poder judicial, en virtud de the election is contested." (Arruego, The Framing of the
la intervencion de miembros de la Corte Suprema en la composicion Philippine Constitution,pp. 267, 268.)
de la Comision o Tribunal Electoral. Acaso sea pertinente decir
tambien que entre los ardientes patrocinadores de la reforma Como se ve, lo que preocupada al Delegado Ventura era que con la
figuraban distinguidos Delegados de la mayoria entre ellos el Hon. fraseologiaindicada la Comision Electoral tuviera jurisdiccion y
Vicente J. Francisco, de Cavite, en la actualidad Senador de Filipinas. competencia hasta sobrelas credenciales no protestadas; parece que
se temia esta ambiguedad. Peroni el Delegado Ventura ni nadie en la
Convencion tuvo jamas en la mente la idea de que la fraseologia
envolvia una dual jurisdiccion: una, de parte de la Asamblea Nacional,
67

sobre las credenciales no protestadas; y otra, de parte de la Comision "and contested elections" was inserted merely for the sake
Electoral, sobre las credenciales protestadas. Y elDelegado Roxas, of clarity.
con su contestaciones, establecio bien claramente que se empleaba
la palabra "judge"; y el "contest," el litigio tenia que ser enjuiciado Delegate CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral
naturalmente por la Comision Electoral. Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm the election
of the members?
De la ultima contestacion del Delegado Roxas transcrita arriba se
deduceincuestionablemente que el no admitia la posibilidad de que la Delegate ROXAS. I do not think so unless there is a protest.
Asemblea Nacional rehusase su confirmacion a una credencial no (Arruego, id.,p. 269.)
protestada o contendida. El sostenia que esta confirmacion no era
constitucional, no era necesaria. Poreso el dijo categoricamente: Pero hay todavia cosa mas importante. En realidad, esta misma
"After a man files his credential, that issufficient, unless the election is custion que nos ocupa ya se planteo en aquellos debates y la
contested." Aplicado este criterio al casoque nos ocupa, equivale a lo solucion que entonces se le diocuadra perfectamente con el criterio
siguiente: Despues de haberse presentado alSenado las credenciales que sostenemos en esta disidencia. ElDelegado Labrador, lider, como
de los recurrentes Sres. Vera, Diokno y Romero (a ello monta el ya se ha dicho, de los opositores a la reforma,hizo al Delegado Roxas
certificado de proclamacion expedido por la Comision sobre algunas interpelaciones que parecian hechas enanticipacion a los
Elecciones), ello era bastante, a menos que su eleccion fuese presentes acontecimientos. He aqui el dialogo Roxas-Labrador:
cuestionada, ycuestionada legalmente, esto es, protestada
debidamente ante el Tribunal Electoral. Delegate LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz
believe that unless this power is granted to the Assembly, the
El pensamiento del Delegado Roxas se aclaro mas contestado otras Assembly on its own motion does nothave the right to contest
interpelaciones. El dijo positiva y terminantemente, replicando al the election and qualification of its members?
DelegadoCinco, que no habia ninguna diferencia entre la primera y
segunda parte de laclausula; que, en realidad, los casos de elections, Delegate ROXAS. I have no doubt that the gentleman is right.
returns and qualifications," y que la frase "and contested elections" se If this draft is retained, as it is, even if two-thirds of the
inserto meramente para los efectos de mayor claridad. Assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications
provided by law, they cannot remove him for that reason.
xxx xxx xxx
Delegate LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only
Delegate CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as be retained by the Electoral Commission.
that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte (Mr.
Ventura) when I arose a while ago.However, I want to ask Delegate ROXAS. By the Assembly for misconduct.
more questions from the Delegate from Capiz. This paragraph
6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election Delegate LABRADOR. I mean with the respect to
asseparated from the first part of the section which refers to the qualifications of the members.
elections, returns and qualifications.
Delegate ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Delegate ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact
the cases ofcontested elections are alreadyincluded in the
phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase
68

Delegate LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of Pero se preguntara: ¿entonces por que se reformo el "draft" o
the Assembly has the right to question the eligibility of its proyecto original eliminando la primera clausula y dejando solo la
members? segunda, o sea la frase "all cases contesting the elections, returns
and qualifications," etc. etc? Es verdad, se hizo la enmienda, pero la
Delegate ROXAS. Before a member can question the misma no es sustancial,no afecta al fondo del precepto, no involucra
eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and make el espiritu del sistema tal como lo definio y explico el Delegado Roxas
the question heard before the Electoral Commission. en sus luminosas respuestas a las diversas interpelaciones,
particularmente las dadas al Delegado Labrador. Se acepto la
Delegate LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall enmienda mas bien por razones puramente psicologicas, esas que
decide whether the election is not contested. conoce bien todo aquel que este familiarzado con la mecanica de los
parlamentos y asambleas deliberativas.Por un lado, el Delegado
Delegate ROXAS. Yes sir; that is the purpose. (Aruego, idem, Roxas veia que habia ciertas dudascon respecto al alcance del
pp. 269, 270.) proyecto tal como estaba fraseado;pero, por otro lado, el decia que
esas dudas carecian de fundamento, que las dos clausulas del
Este dialogo Roxas-Labrador nos da la mejor clave para interpretar el precepto tenian un mismo significado, que la segunda ya estaba
perfecto. Labrador pregunto si bajo el mismo la Asamblea tenia contenida en la primera y se insertaba tan solo para fines de
derecho acuestionar, de su propia iniciativa (on its motion). claridad.Asi que, habil estrategia parlamentario, creyo que podia
la eleccion y cualificacion de sus miembros; Roxas contesto que NO, aceptar perfectamente la enmienda, entre cuyos proponentes (esto
que "aunque dos terceras partes de la Asamblea creyeran que un es muy significativo, como se vera mas adelante) figuraba por cierto
miembro no tenia las cualificaciones provistas por la ley, ellos no el Delegado Rafols, pues con ello no perdia nada, no comprometia ni
podrian removerle por tal razon". un apice de su posicion, y en cambio ganaba mucho, atraia el apoyo
de los indecisos,aseguraba la aprobacion del precepto en la votacion
final, derrotando a los que estaban fundamentalmente opuestos al
Labrador volvio a preguntar inquiriendo sobre quien tenia el derecho
mismo como, en efecto, los derroto por 98 votos contra 56. Que la
de remover. Roxas contesto: la Asamblea Nacional por mala
enmienda no era sustancial y de ningun modoafectaba al sistema, asi
conducta (for misconduct); y la Comision Electoral, con respeto a las
lo declaro categoricamente el Sr. Roxas cuando, defiriendo a una
cualificaciones de losmiembros de la Asamblea.
sugestion del Presidente Recto de la Convencion, definio el alcance
del cambio diciendo que era "tan solo para obviar la objecion
Y cuando Labrador volvio a remachar preguntando si un miembro de apuntadapor varios delegados en el sentido de que la primera
la AsambleaNacional podria, bajo el precepto que se discutia, clausula del 'draft' que dice 'The election, returns and qualifications of
cuestionar la elegibilidadde sus miembros, Roxas contesto the members of the National Assembly' parece dar a la Comision
categoricamente que "antes de que un miembro pudiera cuestionar la Electoral el poder de determinar hasta la eleccion de los miembros
eligibilidad (de otro) debia ir a la Comision Electoral y hacer que la que no han sido protestados."Es decir, que o unico que se quiso
cuestion se oyera ante la Comision Electoral." Es decir que,aplicado aclarar y establecer fuera de toda duda con la enmienda es que el
este criterio al caso nos ocupa, ni el Senador Pendatun, ni ningun poder de la Comision Electoral no podia extenderse a las
otro Senador, ni nadie tenia derecho a cuestionar la elegibilidad de credenciales no protestadas, pero jamas se penso que el efecto de la
los recurrentes Sres. Vera, Diokno y Romero ante el Senado, sino enmienda era el desgajar este poder de la Comision Electoral para
que el asunto debia llevarse directamente al Tribunal Electoral y dejarlo como un residuo en la Legislatura; en otros terminos, jamas
hacer que este lo enjuiciara. se imagino que con la enmienda la Asamblea Nacional todavia podria
69

ser juez de las credenciales no protestadas de sus miembros. He causa de la libertad y democracia, de ningun modo podia ser
aqui las palabras textuales del Sr. Roxas: corresponsable de un precepto constitucional que pudiera dar lugar a
tan tremendas anomalias. Y ¿que decir del Delgado Rafols? ¿Como
The difference, Mr. President, consists only in obviating the se puede concebir que, con sus tristes reminiscencias de lajusticia
objection pointed out by various delegates to the effect that the politica de las mayorias, diera su patrocinio a una enmienda que
first clause which states "The election, returns and pudiera producir tales consecuencias?
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"
seems to give to the Electoral Commission the power to Para remachar la tesis de que cada camara de nuestro Congreso
determine also the election of the members who have not todavia retiene la facultad de determinar "la eleccion, las actas y las
been elected. And in order to obviate, we believe that the cualificaciones de sus miembros" en casos en que no hay protesta, la
amendment is right in that sense . that is, if we amend the mayoria propone en su opinion el siguiente ejemplo: "Es elegido por
draft so that it should read as follows: "All cases contesting the un distrito congresil un hombre que habia servido previamente 10
election, etc.," so that the judges of the Electoral Commission años en las Prisiones de Bilibid, por estafa. Como no tuvo
will limit themselves only to cases in which there has been a contrincante(¡este hombre debia de ser muy popular!), ninguna
protest against the returns. protesta se formula contra su eleccion. Y naturalmente el Tribunal
Electoral no adquiere jurisdiccion sobre el caso, pues no hay 'contest'
No pudo haberse concebido jamas la peregrina, fantastica idea de o controversia. Una vez informada del hecho ¡no puede la
que el "draft" enmendado dejaba a la Asamblea Nacional la facultad Camara, motu propio, suspender la toma de su juramento? ¿No
de enjuiciar la "eleccion, actas y cualificaciones de los miembros" puede la Camara investigarle y despues exclurle? Se observara que
contra los cuales no existiera ninguna protesta ante la Comision cuando un miembro de la Camara suscita una cuestion respecto a las
Electoral, por al sencilla razon de que ello engendraria las siguientes cualificaciones de otro, de ello no se sigue un pleito electoral, pues
anomalias: (a) la creacion de dos jueces: uno, para credenciales no ninguno pretende sustituir a este ultimo."
protestadas — la Asamblea Nacional o Congreso; y otro, para
credenciales protestadas — la Comision o Tribunal Electoral; (b) en Pareceria que estabamos excusados de replicar a este argumento
un momento dado, una mayoria sin escrupulos,viendo peligrar el por dos razones: primera, porque evidentemente el ejemplo propone
poder en sus manos despues de unas elecciones reñidisimas, podria un caso que es completamente distintodel que nos ocupa, pues los
dar un golpe de mano mediante la estratagema de hacer que sus recurrentes no estan acusados de estafa ni de nada que afecta a su
candidatos derrotados se inhiban de protestar ante el Tribunal caracter, y su caso,como ya hemos dicho, es de motivacion
Elctoral a fin de dar lugar a que el Congreso actue directamente enteramente electoral, es decir, relacionada con la forma como fueron
sobre el caso, con la mira de ajusticiar a los candidatos minoritarios elegidos que se dice viciada por actos de violencia y terrorismo de
triunfantes bajo la guillotina de lo que el cinismo de los descreidos ha sus partidarios; y segunda, porque si bien es verdad que el ejemplo
llamado justicia politica de las mayorias; (c) occurriria la paradoja de es meramente hipotetico, plantea, sin embargo, un caso que puede
que las credenciales no protestadas estarian en peor situacion que perfectamente occurrir y pareceria que ni esta Corte ni ningun
las protestada, porque mientras estas ultimas tendrian el beneficio de miembro suyo deberia adelantar su opinion sobre semejante hipotesis
una justicia de verdad, la justicia judicial del Tribunal Electoral, susceptible de realizarse. Pero como del ejemplo se pretende hacer
aquellas caerian bajo la justicia politica de las mayorias, sedientas de argumento aquiles, no tenemos mas remedio que comentarlo y
sangre adversaria. Es indudable que, como hemos dicho en otra discutirlo.
parte de esta disidencia, la Asamblea Constituyente no podia ser
parte en un juego infantil como este; y el Delgado Roxas, con su Ante todo se deben deslindar bien los conceptos. El derecho o
seriedad, con su bien conocida madurezpolitica, con su devocion a la facultad de expulsar a un miembro de una camara legislativa (Articulo
70

VI, seccion 10, ap. 3, Constitucion de Filipinas) es una cosa bien ha argumentado fuertemente que las Camaras no deben tenerlos
diferente del derecho derehusar la admision de uno para ser miembro cuenta, pues se debe conceder que los electores tienen el derecho
de dicha camara. En esto ultimo las cuestiones envueltas se refieren de elegir a quienes quieran para representarles en el Congreso, y se
principalmente, tal vez exclusivamente, a las cualificaciones debe presumir que han tenido en cuenta el caracter y la conducta de
constitucionales de aquiellos que se presentan para ser admitidos aquellos a quienes elegen."
como miembros, o bien a la regularidad y legalidad de las elecciones
en que fueron elegidos; mientras que en lo primero, esto es, en lo que A disregard of the foregoing doctrine, it has been urged,
toca a la expulsion, lo que de lugar a la accion es el caracter personal operates as a denial to the States of a right or privilege
o conducta de la parte afectada (Willoughby, On the Constitution of constitutionally provided for them. Thus, we find James M.
the United States, tomo 1.º, pag. 611). Beck, former Solicitor General of the United States, declaring :
"It seems too clear for argument, that each States has the right
En el ejemplo que propone la mayoria, la condena por estafa no es to select from its people any representative in the Senate (or
cosa que guarda relacion con lascualificaciones constitucionales del the House) that it sees fit, irrespective of his intellectual or
congresista o Representante electo ni con la regularidad y legalidad moral qualifications (provided he possesses the qualifications
de las elecciones en que salio victorioso, por cierto sin ningun specified in the Constitution), . . ." A state may have selected a
contrincante. Es cosa que afecta a su caracter personal o conducta. member of the Senate or secured his nomination by unworthy
Por tanto, no cabe discutir su derecho a ser admitido como miembro means. He may be intelectually unfitted for the high office, and
de la camara; el reune las cualificaciones constitucionales his moral character may, in other respects, leave much to be
(ciudadania, edad, etc.) para ser Representante y la limpieza de su desired. The People of the United States may justifiably think
eleccion esta admitida. Asi que, parafraseando al Delegado Roxas, la that the States has sent to Congress an unfit man, who could
"presentacion de su credencial de que ha sido eligido, es bastante add nothing to its deliberations, and whose influence might
para que sea admitido como miembro." Pero ¿la condena por estafa? well be pernicious. None the less, the States has the right to
¿No puede la camara por este motivo investigarle y excluirle como send him. It is its sole concern, and to nullify its choice is to
elemento no deseable? — pregunta la mayoria. Esta es otra cuestion. destroy the basic right of a sovereign State, and amounts to a
Ya hemos visto que el derecho de admision es una cosa, y el derecho revolution" (Willoughby, idem, pp. 611, 612).
de expulsion, otra. El derecho de expulsion, por mala conducta, lo
tienen las camaras independientemente del Tribunal Electroral. Ya lo El primer precedente — añade el autor citado — de que, como base
dijo el Delegado Roxas, contestando al Delegado Labrador: la para expulsion, los actos cometidos antes de la eleccion no deben ser
facultad de remover, en tratandose de la "eleccion, actas y considerados, fue en el caso del Senador Humphrey Marshall, en
cualificaciones de los miembros," la tiene la Comision o Tribunal 1796, quien fue acusado de que habia cometido perjurio. El Senado
Electoral, previa protesta; la facultad de remover, por mala conducta, en este caso se nego a tomar jurisdiccion para determinar si, de
la tiene la Asamblea (Congreso) hecho, Marshall habia sido reo de un delito, a pesar del hecho de que
el pidio que el Senato investigase y determinase el caso" (supra, p.
Pero examinemos el ejemplo de la estafa que plantea la mayoria hast 612). Parece que en estos casos el criteriogeneral y predominante es
sus ultimas consecuencias. Willoughby dice que sobre este respecto que el sufragio popular es como un especie de Jordan que lava con
el punto principal de controversia es si los actos de mala conducta sus aguas purificadoras todos los pecados cometidos antes de la
objeto de queja debenser solo los subsiguientes a la eleccion y que eleccion. Es como si al pueblo se le supusiera investido de la facultad
afecten a la dignidad del Congreso y al debido desempeño de sus suprema de indultar totalmente a sus favoritos por medio de la balota
funciones, o deben ser tambien los anteriores. "Respecto de los actos electoral.
de los miembros electos cometidos con anterioridad a su eleccion se
71

Se insinua que los recurridos tenian la facultad de adoptar la colateralmentese habla de esto en el caso de Barry. La unica y
Resolucion Pendum en virtud del principio de que todo verdadera cuestion planteadaen esta caso era la de si a un tal
cuerpolegislativo tiene el poder inherente de adoptar reglas para su Cunningham se le podia arrestrar, mediante orden del Senado, y
organizacion, funcionamiento y preservacion. Se cita la practica traerle a la barra para contestar a ciertas preguntassobre la
legislativa de que al inaugurarse un cuerpo deliberativo se forma un procedencia de ciertos fondos gastados en la nominacion y
comite de credienciales que examia los certificados o titulos que eleccionde Vare. La Corte Suprema Federal dijo que si, que esto caia
presentan los miembros para su admision. Dicho comite rinde su dentro de los poderes judiciales del Senado. "Generally" — dice la
informe recomendando la aprobacion o desaprobacion de las Corte — "the Senate is alegislative body, exercising in connection
credenciales. No puede sostenerse una tesis mas peligrosa que esta. with the House only the power to make laws. But it has had conferred
Las camaras legislativas son mas, muchisimo mas que una camara upon it by the Constitution certain powers which are not legislative but
de comercio, por ejemplo. Los legisladores son funcionarios judicial in character. Among these is the power to judge of the
constitucionales. Sus cualificaciones, la invenstidura y el ejercicio de elections, returns and qualifications of its members. That power
su cargo, el termino del mismo,estan definidos y amparados por la carries with it authority to take such steps as may beappropriate and
Constitucion mediante preceptos y disposiciones que operan como necessary to secure information upon which to decide concerning
limitaciones constitucionales sobre el poder legislativo en general. elections" (Barry, supra, 871). Y al final de la sentencia la Corte sienta
Esos preceptos y disposiciones no se pueden enmendar o derogar la siguiente afirmacion que es muysignificativa para el presente caso:
mediante una ley ordinaria, mucho menos mediante una resolucion "Here the question under consideration concerns the exercise by the
simple como la del Senador Pendatun: para enmendarlos o Senate of an indubitable power; and if judicial interference can be
derogarlos hace falta que se reforme la Constitucion por los procesos successfullyinvoked it can only be upon a clear showing of such
que ella preceptua. Hacer depender la admision del legislador o la arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial
tenencia de sus cargo de una resolucion o acuerdo reglamentario es of the due process of law. That condition we are unable to find in the
de los mas subversivo, pues le reduciria a un a situacion tan precaria present case" (Barry, supra, 874). De suerte que, bien mirado, el
y tan endeble que un mero empleado del servicio civil tendria mas asunto de Barry hasta es un argumento en favor de la jurisdiccion de
prestancia y mas seguridad que el. esta Corte Suprema para conocer y enjuiciar la Resolucion
Pendatun,para determinar si con ella se ha infringido o no la
Se nos cita, sin embargo, el caso de Barry vs. United States ex rel. Constitucion.
Cunningham (279 U.S., 867, 874; 73 Law, ed. 597), para demostrar
que la Resolucion Pendatun es valida y legal por entrar y recaer Se arguye que los recurridos no hicieron mas que actuar sobre un
dentro del poder inherente del Senado para suspender a cualquier informe rendido por la Comisioon sobre Elecciones en obediencia a
miembro, independientemente de la cuestion electoral. Hemos un mandato constitucional. En el informe se recitaban ciertos hechos
revisado cuidadosamente la sentencia citada y la hemos hallado y se sentaban conclusiones sobre alegados actos de terrorismo y
inaplicable el presente caso. Es verdad que ella tiene cierta relacion violencia que posian afectar a la eleccion de los recurrentes. Se dice
con el caso de Vare, candidatoa Senador en Pennsylvania en las que la Resolucion Pendatun no es sino la reaccion, la respuesta de
elecciones de 1926, a quien se lenegro prima facie el asiento los recurridos adicho informe; que estos tenian absoluta discrecion
mientras se efectuaba una investigacion dealegadas irregularidades y sobre el particular; que ello entraba dentro de sus poderes politicos y
practicas corruptas cometidas para promover sunominacion y su no era revisable por el departamento judicial. Para contestar esto nos
eleccion, entre ellas el haber hecho promesas impropiase ilegales, bastara repetir que la Resolucion Pendatun es algo mas que el
etc. Pero, aparte de que la suspension del juramento y asientode ejercicio de un poder politico y discrecional: es una usurpacion de
Vare caia del Senado American como "unico juez de la eleccion, poderes constitucionales pertenecientes a otro organismo
actas y calificaciones de sus miembros," solo muy incidental y
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constitucional; y para demostrarlo no necesitamos reproducir los De todo lo antedicho resulta evidente que, resolviendo la promera
argumentos ya extensamente expuestos. cuestion propuesta, la Resolucion Pendatun objeto de controversia es
ilegal, es anticonstitucional y es, por tanto, insostenible.
Por lo demas, el discutido informe de la Comission sobre Elecciones
no tiene el valor ni alcane que le atribuye. Ese informe no podia Segunda cuestion. — A la luz de nuestra Constitucion y de
autorizar ni justifica ninguna accion que como la Resolucion Pendatun nuestras leyes ? tiene este Tribunal Supremo jurisdiccion y
tuviese el efecto de privar a los recurrentes de sus asientos en el competencia para conocer, enjuiciar y decidir el asunto?
Senado, siguera temporalmente. El documento sometido por la
Comision sobre Elecciones que tiene verdadero valor constitucional y Los recurrentes invocan nuestra jurisdiccion pidiendo un remedio a
legal, que tiene fuerza obligatoria, es su proclama declaranda electos que, segun ellos, tienen derecho bajo la Constitucion y la ley. Alegan
a los recurrentes. Esa proclama impone a los recurridos el que son Senadores electos y, por tanto, funcionarios constitucionales
deber ministerial de recibir y aceptar a los recurrentes como de Filipinas, pues el Senado es cuerpo constitucional; que han sido
miembros del Senado hasta que el Tribunal Electoral diga otra cosa. debidamente proclamados por la Comission sobre Elecciones bajo
¿Como un informe, que ni siquiera es al resultado de una las dispposiciones de la Ley No. 725 y, por tanto, tienen derecho por
investigacion propia, sino que esta basado en otros informes de ministerio de la Constitucion y de la ley a ocupar sus asientos en el
fuerea, podia tener la trascendencia que se le ha dado, tomando pie Senado con todos los derechos, prerrogativas y privilegios anejos al
del mismo para una sacudida seismica de tales proporciones como cargo; que, sin embargo, los recurridos, o mas bien una mayoria de
es la suspension de los derechos de tres miembros electos del ellos, han aprobado una resolucion — la Resolucion Pendatun — por
Senado y siete miembros electos de la Camara de Representantes? la cual se les priva de sud asientos; que dicha resolucion infringe la
Ni la imaginacion mas libre y erratica en la Asamblea Nacional pudo Constitucion y la ley; por tanto, piden dictemos sentencia
haberse figurado jamas este efecto a cuenta de esa clausula "declarrando entramente nula y de ningun valor la citada resolucion, y
inofensiva de la Constitucion que manda a la Comision sobre prohibiendo consecuentemente a los recurridos y a cada uno de ellos
Elecciones presentar un informe despues de cada eleccion al Jefe a impedir a los recurrentes a continuar en sus asientos en el Senado
Ejecutivo y al Congreso. de Filipinas y a ejercer libremente sus cargos como Senadores, y
prohibiendoles igualmente a realizer cualquier otro procedimiento
La accion sobre ese informe no puede ir mas alla de los limites que ulterior para ejeccutar la resolucion citada." ¿Podemos negarnos a
confinan cada poder. El Ejecutivo, por ejemplo, investigaria los asumir la jurisdiccion que se invoca? ¿Hay alguna manera de evadir
abusos e irregularidades los funcionarios encargados de ejecutar y la cuestion, inhibiendose este Tribunal de declarar si es o no verdad
hacer cumplir la Ley Electoral en cumplimiento de su mandato que se han infringido la Constitucion y la ley, y de conceder el
constitucional de ejecutar las leyes y de hacer que estas se ejecuten remedio pedido si ha habido tal infraccion? La comodidad, la linea de
fielmente (Constitucion de Filipinas, Articulo VII, secciones 7 y 10); y menor resistencia hubiera sido por el lado de la inaccion, de la
el Congreso estudiaria y consideraria reformas a la ley con vista de inhibicion. Nos damos perfecta cuenta de la tremenda
dicho informe, o bien crearia inmediatamente el Tribunal Electoral responsabilidad que supone el mantener la armonia entre los poderes
para despachar sin demora las protestas sobre elecciones del Estado. Es parte de la prudencia y sabiduria de los gobernantes el
legislativas. El Ejecutivo no podria, por ejemplo, so pretexto de evitar en todo lo posible cualquier ocasion de conflicto entre dichos
tremendas irregularidades y anomalias expuestas en el informe sobre poderes, recordando siempre que si las instituciones son entidades
elecciones locales y provinciales, mandar suspender el juramento de abstractas, por ende anestesicas, insensibles, los hombres estan
algun concejal, alcalde o gobernador provincial electo, puesto que hechos de arcilla animada y ya no son tan impasibles como las
esto seria una usurpacion y una invasion de la jurisdiccion de los instituciones. Pero hemos hallado que en el presente caso nuestro
tribunales de justicia. deber de actuar, y de actuar positivamente, tiene la fuerza de un
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imperativo categorico. Nuestra jurisdiccion esta escrita en la Como se ve, nos llaman a decidir custiones de tremenda importancia
Constitutcion, se halla reafirmada en la ley. En el Titulo VIII de la para el desenvolvimiento constitutcional en este pais; lo que
Constitucion (sobre la judicatura) esta declarada tanto implicita como resolvamos puede trascender mucho mas alla del promedio de
expresamente la facultad judicialde resolver y decidir casos tiempoo en que puede durar nuestra existencia. Puede dicirse sin
constitucionales; y en la regla 67 del Reglamento de los Tribunales inmodestia que grandes diciones del futuro — empleamos la palabra
hallamos la implementacion procesal de esa jurisdiccion y no en su sentido exclusivamente judicial — dependeran de como
competencia. resolvamos esas cuestiones formidables que se nos plantean hoy.

Puede decirse que en este respecto nuestra Constitucion es una En parte, el argumento expuesto es correcto y acertado. No se puede
edicion mejorada de la Constitucion federal de los Estados Unidos. discutir que los tres poderes del Estado son iguales e independientes
Como se sabe, la llamada facultad judicial de revisar la Constitucion entre si; que ninguno de ellos es superior al otro, mucho menos el
en controversias propiamente planteadas no se halla concedida poder judicial que entre los tres es el menos fuerte y el mas precario
expresamente en la magna carta americana. Ha diso el genio audaz en medios e implementos materiales. Tampoco se pude discutir que
de sus juristas, particularmente del gran Marshall, el que arrnaco esa bajo la Constitucion cada poder tiene una zona, una esfera de accion
facultad de las penumbras de la Constitucion (Marbury vs. Madison propia y privativa, y dentro de esa esfera un cumulo de facultades
[1803], 1 Cranch, 137) contribuyendo ello grandemente, segun que le pertenecen exclusivamente; que dentro de esa esfera y en el
opinion general de los criticos tanto nacionales como exranjeros, a suso de esas facultades cada poder tiene absoluta discrecion y
fortalecer y estabilizar las instituciones politicas de America. ningun otro poder puede controlar o revisar sus actos so pretexto de
Aprovechando la experiencia americana hemos escrito expresamente que alguien los cuestiona o tach de arbitrarios, injustos, imprudentes
en nuestra Constitucion lo que en Americ no era mas que doctrina o insensatos. Pero la insularidad, la separacion llega solo hasta aqui.
judicial o jurisprudencia. Desde Montesquieu que lo proclamo cientificamente hasta nuestros
dias, el principio de la separacion de poderes ha sufrido tremendas
Se dice, sin embargo, con todo enfasis, con todo vigor, que aun modificaciones y limitaciones. El consenso doctrinal hoy es que la
admitiendo que los recurridos, actuando como mayoria del Senado, teoria es solo relativa y que la separacion de poderes queda
hayan infringido la Constitucion al aprobar la Resolucion Pendatun y condicionada mecanica constitucional — la mecanica de los frenos y
hacerla efectiva, con todo la judicatura, la judicatura filipina no tiene cortapisas. (Willoughby, On the Constitution of the United States,
jurisdiccion para intervenir en el caso, bajo el principio de la tomo 3, pags. 1619, 1620, 2.ª edicion.) Como queda dicho, cada
separacion de poderes que informa nuestra Constitucion. Se arguye poder es absoluto dentro de la esfera que le asigna la Constitucion;
que los tres poderes del Estado son igueles; que ninguno de ellos es alli el juego de sus facultades y funciones no se puede coartar. Pero
superior al otro; que cada poder puede interpretar la Constitucion a su cuando se sale y extravasa de esa esfera invadiendo otros esferas
modo y cuando asi lo hace ningun otro poder puede ni debe constitucionales, ejerciendo facultades que no le pertenecen, la teoria
entrometerse yu revisar su interpretacion; que el Senado es el unico de la separacion ya no le ampara, la Constitucion que es superior a el
juez de sus actos y si algun ciudadano sale agraviado por algun le sale al encuentro, le restringe y le achica dentro de sus fronteras,
alegado atropello a sus derechos constitucionales, su recurso no esta impidiendo sus incursiones anticonstitucionales. La cuestion ahora a
en acudir al poder judicial o al poder ejecutivo, sino en apelar determinar es si bajo nuestro sistema de gobierno hay un mecanismo
directamente al pueblo en la epoca de elecciones, en los comicios, que permite restablecer el juego normal de la Constitucion cuando
empleando el arma civil por excelencia del ciudadano — la balota; y, surgen estos desbarajustes, estos conflictos que podriamos llamar de
finalmente, que el poder judicial no es un "curalo todo," una especie fronteras constitucionales; tambien es cuestion a determinar si
de Don Quijote que con la lanza en ristre pretenda endereezar todos cuando surgen esos conflictos, un ciudadano sale perjudicado en sus
los entuertos. derechos, el mismo tiene algun remedio expedito y adecuado bajo la
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Constitucion y las leyes, y quien puede concederle ese remedio. Y particular cases, may be in favor of very erroneous
con esto llegamos a la cuestion basica, cardinal en este asunto. constructions. Hence the courts of law, necessarily, when the
case arises, must decide upon the validityof particular acts."
Nuestra opinion es que ese mecanismo y ese remedio existen — son Webster, Works, Vol. III, 30. (Willoughby on the Constitution of
los tribunales de justicia. "They very essence of the American the United States, Vol. 1, 2d edition pp. 4,5.)
conception of the separation of powers is its insistence upon the
inherent distinction between lawmaking and law-interpreting, and its En realidad, esta cuestion no es nueva en esta jurisdicion. El
assignment of the latter to the judiciary, a notion which, when brought precedente mas inmediato que tenemos en nuestra jurisprudencia es
to bear upon the Constitution, yields judicial review" (Corwin, The el asunto de Angara contra Comision Electoral ya tantas veces citado
Twilight of the Supreme Court, p. 146). En Angara contra Comision (1936). Por primera vez se planteaban y discutian ante esta Corte
Electoral (supra) dijimos que "prescindiendo del tipo ingles y otros cuestiones importantisimas resultantes de la Constitucion del
tipos europeos de gobierno constitucional, los redactores de nuestra Commonwealth que acababa de promulgarse. Se trataba
Constitucion han adoptado el tipo americano, en donde el precisamente de deslindar las zonas constitucionales ocupadas por la
departamento judicial interpreta y da efecto a la Constitucion escrita. Asamblea Nacional y la Comision electoral; es decir que,
En algunos paises, que han rehusado seguir el ejemplo americano, fundamentalmente, casi, casi las mismas cuestiones que ahora se
se han insertado disposiciones en sus constituciones prohibiendo a plantea ante nosotros. La teoria de la separacion de poderes — el leit
los tribunales que ejerciten su facultad de interpretar la ley motif de la presente controversia — se analizo y discutio alli hasta en
fundamental. Esto se toma como un reconocimiento de lo que, de sus ultimas implicaciones los siguientes; Jose Angara habia sido
otro modo, seria la regla de que a falta de prohibicion expresa los proclamado Representante electo por uno de los distritos de
tribunales estan obligados a asumir lo que logicamente es deber Tayabas. Al inaugurarse la Asamblea Nacional su acta fue
suyo" (Angara contra Comision Electoral, 63, Jur. Fil., 173, 174). confirmada por este cuerpo juntamente con las de otros
Representantes contra quienes no se habian formulado protestas. el
En el famoso asunto de Marbuyr vs. Madison, supra, el Tribunal acta de Angara no estaba protestada entonces. Algunos dias
Supremo de los Estados Unidos, por boca de su gran Chief despues Pedro Insua, su contrincante, presento una protesta ante la
Justice John Marshall, en tarminos inequivocos definio y explico las Comision electoral que acababa solamente de constituirse.
facultades de la judicatura para poner en vigor la Constitucion como Escuadado tras el hecho de que su acta ya habia sido confirmada por
la suprem ley del pais, y declaro que "es terminantemente de la la Asamblea Nacional, Angara vino a esta Corte planteando una
competencia y deber del departamento judicial el decider cual es la accion orginaria para que se expidiera un mandamiento de inhibicion
ley que rige. prohibiendole a la Comision Electoral que siguera conociendo de la
protesta. Esta Corte acepto el reto asumiendo jurisdiccion sobre el
The reasoning of Webster and Kent is substantially the same. caso, procediendo a desempenar su alta funcion de interllamo
Webster says: "The Constitution being the supreme law, it deslinde de facultades constitucionales. Reconociendo y
follows of course, that every act of the legislature constrary to estableciendo firmemente la jurisdiccion exclusiva de la novisima
the law must be void. But who shall decide this question? Shall Comision Electoral sobre controversias relativas a la eleccion de
the legislature itself decide it? If so, then the Constitution miembros de la Asamblea Nacional, esta Corte denego el recurso de
ceases to be legal and becomes only a moral restraint for the prohibicion. Llevaando las cosas por la tremenda, la Asamblea
legislature. If they, and they only, are to judge whether their Nacional, bajo la teoria de la separacion de poderes, pudo haber
acts be conformable to the Constitution, then the Constitution ignorado la decision de esta Corte, pudo haber pasado por encima de
is advisory and accessory only, not legally binding; because, if la Comision Electoral conservandole el asiento a Angara, ya que el
the construction of it rest wholly with them, their discretion, in acta de este habia sido confirmada por ella cuando jjaun no habia
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portesta. No lo hizo. La Constitucion, casi entre los pañales aun de su a los demas departamentos en el ejercicio de su facultad de
cuna, se salvo gracias a la compostura de todo el mundo, saliendo determinar la ley, y de aqui que pueda declarar nulos los actos
ilesa de la prueba, rodeada de grandes prestigios. Las conclusiones y ejecutivos y legislativos que contravengan la Constitucion.
pronunciamientos de la Corte por boca del ponente el Magistrado
Laure, parecen estereotipados para el case que nos ocupa y para el Pero, en esencia, la Constitucion ha delineado con mano firme
presente momento historico con todas sus crisis; asi que los vamos a y en terminos energicos la sasignacion de facultade as los
reproducir en toda su integridad a continuacion: departamentos ejecutivo, legislativo y judicial de Gobierno. La
superposicion y el entralazamiento de funciones y deberees
La separacion de poderes es un principio fundamental de de los varios departamentos, sin embargo, a veces hace dificil
nuestro sistema de gobierno. Se establece, no por disposicion decir precisamente donde termina uno y empieza otro. En
expresa, sino por division real trazada en nuestra tiempos de intraquilidad social o excitacion politica, las
Constitucion. Cada departamento del Gobeierno tiene grandes piedras angulares de la Constitucion son susceptibles
conocimiento exclusivo de las materias que caen dentro de su de ser olvidadas o anubladas, si no desatendidas
jurisdiccion, y es supremo dentro de su propia esfera. Pero del enteramente. En casos de conflicto, el departamento judicial
hecho de que los tres poderes han de conservarse separados es el unico organismo constitucional que puede ser llamado
yu distintos no se sigue que la Constitucion se propuso que para deteminar el proprio deslinde de facultades entre los
fuerean absolutamente irrestringidos e independientes unos varios departamentos y entre las unidades integrales o
de otros. La Constitucion ha dispuesto un sistema elaborado constituyentes de los mismos.
de frenos y cortapisas para asegurar coordinacion en los
trabajos de los varios departamentos del Gobierno. Por Como cualquier producto humano, nuestra Constitucion
ejemplo, el Jefe Ejecutivo, bajo nuestra Constitucion, es hasta carece, desde luego, de perfeccion y perfectibilidad; pero, en
tal punto erigido en un freno para el poder legislativo que se tanto en cuanto estaba en manos de nuestro pueblo
requiere su asentimiento en la aprobacion de las leyes. Sin disponerlo asi, obrando por medio de sus delegados, ese
embargo, esto esta sujeto al ulterior freno de que un proyecto instrumento, que es expresion de su soberania, por limitada
de ley puede convertirse en ley no obstante la negativa del que se, ha establecido un gobierno republicano destinado a
Presidente de aprobarlo, por medio de una votacion de dos obrar y funcionar como un conjunto armonico, bajo un sistema
tercios tiene el Presidente facultad de convocar a la Asamblea de frenos y cortapisas, y con sujecion a las limitaciones y
cuando lo crea conveniente. Por otra parte, la Asamblea restricciones que se disponen en dicho instrumento. La
Nacional funciona como un freno sobre el Ejecutivo, en el Constitucion señala, en un lenguaje nada incierto, las
sentido de que es necesario su consentimiento, por medio de restricciones y limitaciones de los poderes y organismos
la Comision de Nombramientos, en el nombramiento de gubernamentales. Si estas restrcciones y limitaciones fueran
ciertos funcionarlos; y es esencial la conformidad de todos sus traspuestas, seria inconcebible que la Constitucion no hubiera
miembros para la conclusien de tratados. Ademas, en su dispuesto un mecanismo por el cual pudiera encauzarse el
facultad de determinar que tribunales, que no sea el Tribunal curso del Gobierno por los canales constitucionales, pues
Supremo, se habran de establecer, para definir su entoneces la distribucion de poderes seria merea palabreria,
competencia, y de destinar fondos para su sostenimiento, la el bill de derechos meras expresiones sentimentales, y los
Asamblea Nacional rigte al departamento judicial en cierto principios de buen gobierno meros apotegmas politicos.
grado y medida. La Asamblea ejercita, tambien, la facultad Ciertamente, las limitaciones y restricciones que comprende
judicial de conocer de recusaciones. Y la judicatura, a su vez, nuestra Constitucion son reales, como debe serlo en cualquier
con el Tribunal Supremo por arbitro final, frena con efectividad Constitucion. En loos Estados Unidos en donde no se
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encuentra ninguna concesion constitucional expresa en su del pueblo, tal y como se han expresado por medio de sus
Constitucion, la posesion de este poder moderador de los representantes y por los departamentos ejecutivo y legislativo
tribunales, por no diceir ya nada de su origen historico y del Gobierno.
desenvolvimiento aqui, ha sido dejado en reposo por la
aquiescencia popular por un periodo de mas de un siglo y Pero por mucho que pudieramos postular sobre los frenos
medio. En nuestro caso, este poder moderador esta internos de poderes que dispone nuestra Constitucion, debe,
concedido, si no expresamente, por decuccion tacita del con todo, recordarse que, segun las palabras de James
articulo 2, Titulo VIII, de nuestra Constitucion. Madison, el sistema mismo no es el principal paladin de la
libertad constitucional . . . el pueblo, que es el autor de esta
La Constitucion es una defnicion de las facultades del bendicion, debe, tambien, ser su guardian . . . sus ojos deben
Gobierno. ¿Quien es el llamado a determinar la naturaleza, siempre estar alertos para señalar, su voz para delatar . . .
proposito y alcance de esas facultades? La Constitucion agresiones a la autoridad de su constitucion. En ultimo
misma ha dispuesto el organismo de la judicatura como el analisis, pues, el trinof de nuestro Gobierno en los años
medio racional. Y, cuando la judicatura media para determinar venideros debera ser puesto a prueba en el crisol de las
los linderos constitucionales, no mantiene ninguna mentes y en los corazones de los filipinos, mas bien que en
superioridad sobre los otros departamentos; en realida no las salas de consultas y camaras de audiencia de los
anula ni invalida un acto de la Legislatura, sino que solamente tribunales." (Angara contra Comision Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil.,
asevera la solemne y sagrada obligacion a ella asignada por 169-172.)
la Constitucion de determinar pretensiones incompatibles de
autoridad dimanada de la Constitucion, y de establecer para Algo mas se puede añadir sobre el caso de Angara. Alli la Corte
las partes en una contraversia actual los derechos que ese descarto sin vacilaciones la posibilidad de un vacio, de un estado
intrumento asegura y garantiza a las mismas. Esto, a la juridico de inerme impotencia frente a conflictos constitucionales,
verdad, es todo lo que va implicito en la expresion sentando la siguiente conclusion: "En nuestro caso, la indole de la
"supremacia judicial", que propiamente es la facultad de actual contrversia revela la necesidad de un arbitro constitucional
revision judicial bajo la Constitucion. Aun entonces, este poder ultimo que determine la incompatibilidad de facultades entre dos
de revision judicial esta limitado a casos y controversias organismos creados por la Constitucion. Si fueramos a rehusar el
reales, que se ha de ejercitar despues de que las partes han conocer de la contrversia ?quien determinaria el conflicto? Y si se
tenido plena libertad de hacerse oir, y esta, ademas, limitado a dejara sin decidir ni determinar el conflicto ¿no se crearia en si un
la cuestion constitucional suscitada, o a la misma lis vacio en nuestro sistema constitucional que la larga daria por
mota planteada. Cualquier tentativa de abstraccion , solo resultado echar a perder toda la labor? El hacer estas preguntas es
conduciria a la dialectica, y obstaculizaria las cuestiones contestarlas. Natura vacuum abhorret, por lo que debemos evitar toda
legales, y a conclusiones esteriles que nada tendrian que ver postracion en nuestro sistema constitucional." No solamente esto —
con los hechos reales. Circunsrita de este modo a sus añadimos — sino que a toda costa debemos evitar que fuera de la
funciones, la judicatura no se ocupa de resolver cuestiones legalidad sse forme un "territorio de nadie" donde puedan germinar
sobre la cordura, justicia o convenciencia de la legislacion. situaciones peligrosas y explosivas.
Aun mas, los tribunales conceden la presucnion de
constitucionalidad a las leyes aprobadas por la Legisltura, no Pero ademas del caos de Angara tenemos en nuestra jurisprudencia
solamente porque se presume que esta acata la Constitucion, otro precedente mas inmediato todavia en apoyo de la tesis de la
sino, tambien, porque la judicatura, en el fallo de actuales supremacia judicial en tratandose de interpretar la Constitucion y de
casos y controversias, debe reflejar la sabiduria y la justicia dirimir conflictos constitucionales; nos referimos al asunto de Carmen
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Planas, recurrente, contra Jose Gil, Comisionado del Servicio Civil, escribio el articulo no como concejal sino como persona particular;
recurrido, decidido por este Tribunal Supremo el 18 de enero de 1939 que como funcionario ella solamente podia ser investigada y
bajo la ponencia del mismo Magistrado Laurel (67 Phil., 62). Carmen exigirsele responsabilidad por motivo de prevaricacion, mala
Planas, siendo miembro de la Junta Municipal de Manila, publico un conducta o infraccion relacionada con su cargo, y este no era el caso;
articulo en La Vanguardia criticando duramente a ciertos funcionarios que suponiendo que el articulo en cuestion fuera libeloso o contuviera
del Gobierno, entre ellos el Presidente de Filipinas Sr. Quezon, en algo por lo cual la articulista pudiera ser cirminalmente responsable,
relacion con las elecciones de Diputados a la Asamblea Nacional el Codigo Penal y el Procedimiento Criminal Señalan el modo de
celebradas el 8 de noviembre de 1938. Entre los fuertes cargos hacerefectiva esa responsabilidad ante los tribunales de justicia. El
formulados por la articulista contra los dioses del Olimpo oficial , Procurador General, al impugnar el recurso, aleego entre otros
figuraban los siguientes: que, no obstante el tacito interdicto impuesto fundamentos que este Tribunal, bajo "el principio de la separacion de
por la Constitucion al disponer que el Presidente de Filipinas poderes establecido por la Constitucion, no tenia jurisdiccion para
ejerciese su cargo por un solo periodo — años — sin reeleccion, revisar las ordenes del jefe Ejecutivo de que se trata, las cuales son
situandosele de esta manera en las serenas alturas del Poder como de caracter puramente administrativo," citandose en apoyo de la
un supremo arbitro, moderador y neutral, el Sr. Quezon intervino impugnacion las sentencias de este Tribunal en los asunto de
activamente en aquellas elecciones a favor de los nacionalistas Severino contra El Gobernador General y Junta Provincial de Negros
poniendo en juego toda la enorme influencia de su cargo y Occidental, Abueva contra Wood y Alejandrion contra Quezon,
apalstando asi a los condidatos de la oposicion; que toda la citados en otra parte de esta disiddencia. Esta Corte desestimo la
maquinaria del Gobierno se movilizo favor de los candidatos objecion y resolvio que tenia jurisdiccion y competencia sobre el caso,
nacionalistas, colocandose en la vanguardia de dicha movlizaccion diciendo que si bien "los actos del Ejecutivo ejecutados dentro de los
los miembros del Gabinete; y que no se escatimaron medios para limites de su jurisdiccion son sus actos oficialies y los tribunales no
asegurar el trifunfo de los coandidatos de la adminstracion, el fraude dirigiran ni controlaran la accion ejecutiva en tales casos" (la regla es
y la corrupcion inclusive. Al dia si guiente de haberse publicado este la de no-intervencion), sin embargo, "de esta premisa legal no se
articulo sensacional, la Srta. Planasa recibio una carta firmada de la sigue necesariamente que no podemo inquirir la validez o
siguiente manera: "By authority of the President: Jorge B. Vargas, constitucionalidad de sus actos cuando estos se cuestionan y atacan
Secretary to the President," en donde se le decia: "Por la presente se en un procedimiento legal apropiado." "Por lo que respecta a la
le instruye que comparezca ante el Comisionado del Servicio Civil, judicatura" — añadio esta Corte — "si bien es verdad que ella no
sola o acompañada por un abogado, a las 9 de la mañana, agara `ni la estpada ni la bolsa," es por arreglo constitucional
Noviembre 22, para porbar las declaraciones hechas por usted. El el organo llmado para deslindar las fronteras constitucionales, y al
que tales cargo no se puedan sostener o no se pruebe que se han Tribunal Supremo esta encomendada expresamente o por necesari
hecho de buena fe, sera considerado como razon suficiente para su aimplicacion la oblligacion de determinar en procedimientos
suspension o destitucion del cargo." appropieados la validea o constitucionalidad de cualquier tratado, ley,
ordenanaza, orden ejecutiva o regulacion."
La Srta. Planas objeto a la investigacion rescusando al
Comissionaldo del Servicio Civil. Este, sin embargo, insistio en Es verdad que esta Corte denego el recurso interpuesto por la Srta.
proseguir la investigacion y fue entonces cuando ella vino ante este Planas, pero no por el fundamento de la falta de jurisdiccion alegado
Tribunal Supremo pidiendo un mandamiento de prohibicion contra el poor el Procurador General, sino porque llego a la conclusion de que
Comisionado, por los siguientes fundamentos, entre otros: que bajo la la orden de investigacion cuestionada caia dentro de los limites
Constitucion y las leyes que protegen la libertad de palabra y de constitucionales de la jurisdiccion del Presidente, y, por tanto, era
expresion, ella tenia derecho o formular la censura de que se trata valida, constitucional y legalmente. He aqui los prononciamientos
como libre ciudadana de un pais democretico; que, en efecto, ella pertinentes de la Corte, los cuales no tienen desperdicio y reafirman
78

con todo vigor la doctrina de la supremacia judicial en materia de found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one
deslindes constitucionales, establecida en el asunto de Angara, a extreme to the other." (Springer vs. Government [1928], 277
saber: U.S. 189; 72 Law ed., 845, 852.) As far as the judiciary is
concerned, while it holds "neither the sword nor the purse" it is
The Solicitor General, under the last paragraph (par. 10) of his by constitutional placement the organ called upon to allocate
amended answer, raises the question of jurisdiction of this constitutional boundaries, and to the Supreme Court is
court over the acts of the Chief Executive. He contends that entrusted expressly or by necessary implication the obligation
"under the separation of powers marked by the Constitution, of determinig in appropriate cases the constitutionality or
the court has no jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
Executive, evidenced by Annex A and Annex C of the petition, regulation. (Sec. 2 [1], Article VIII, Constitution of the
which are of purely administrative character." Reliance is had Philippines.) In this sense and to this extent, the judiciary
on the prrvious decisions of this court: Severino vs. Governor- restrains the other departments of the government and this
General ([1910], 16 Phil., 366);Abueva vs. Wood ([1924], 45 result is one of the necessary corollaries of the "system of
Phil., 612); and Alejandrino vs. Quezon ([1924], 46 Phil., 83). checks and balances" of the government established.
Although this is the last point raised by the Government in its
answer, it should, for reasons that are apparent, be first to be In the present case, the President is not a party to the
considered. If this court does not have jurisdiction to entertain proceeding. He is neither compelled nor restrained to act in a
these proceedings, then, the same should be dismissed as a particular way. the Commissioner of Civil Service is the party
matter of course; otherwise the merits of the controversy respondent and the theory is advanced by the Government
should be passed upon and determined. that because an investigation undertaken by him is directed by
authority of the President of the Philippines, this court has no
It must be conceded that the acts of the Chief Executive jurisdiction over the present proceedings instituted by the
performed within the limits of his jurisidction are his official acts petitioner, Carmen Planas. The argument is ferafetched. A
and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive action in mere plea that a subordinate officer of the government is
such cases. The rule is noninterference. But from this legal acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an
premise, it does not necessarily follow that we are precluded important averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive
from making an inquirey into the validity or constitutionality of upon this court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative
his acts when those are properly challenged in an appropriate immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial interference is
legal proceeding. The classical separation of governmental not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the subordinate
powers, whether viewed in the light of the political philosophy officials and employees of the Executive Department to the
of Aristotle, Locke, or Montesquieu, or of the postulations of extent that at the mere invocation of the authority that it
Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of purports the jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the validity
government. There is more truism and actuality in or legality of an executive order is necessarily abated or
interdependence than in independence and separation of suspended. The facts in Severino vs. Governor-General
powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of (supra), Abueva vs. Wood (supra), and Alejandrino vs.
Philippine orgin, we cannot lay down "with mathematical Quezon, (supra), are different, and the doctrines laid down
precision and divide the branches into watertight therein must be confined to the facts and legal environment
compartments" not only because "the great ordinances of the involved and whatever general observations might have been
Constitution do not establish and divide fields of blacks and made in elaboratioon of the views therein expressed but which
white" but also because "even the more specific of them are
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are not essential to the determination of the issues presented Planas contra Gil Presidente de Filipinas no era parte directa sino tan
are mere obiter dicta. solo el Comisionado del Servicio Civil.

While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ El argumento es de esos que, por su sutileza, provocan una batalla
willnot issue to restrain or control the performance of other de argucxias hasta sobre el filo de una navaja, como se suele dicir.
than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C.J., 658), its Es verdad que en el caso de Angara la Asamblea Nacional no era
issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this parte directa porque de su inclusion no habi necesidad; pero ¿cambia
jurisdiction it may issue to any inferior tribunal, corporation, ello el aspecto de la cuestion? ¿Se puede negar que alli habia
board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or conflicto de jurisdicciones contituciones constitucionales entre la
ministerial, whose acts are without or in excess of jurisidction. Asamablea y la Comision electoral y que cuando, a instancia de
(Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms parte, se invoco y pidio la intervencioon de esta Corte, la misma
"judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in intermvino y se declaro competente para hacer el deslinde
the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the constituticonal y finalmente adjudico la zona disputada a la Comision
challenged investigation by the respondentCommissioner of (Tribunal) Electoral? Supongase que una mayoria de los miembros de
Civil Service, which investigation if unauthorized and is la Asamblea Nacional, pasando por encima de la sentencia de esta
violative of the Constitution as contended is a fortiori without or Corte, hubieran insistido en hacer efectiva la confirmacion del acta de
in excess or jurisdiction. The statutory rule in this jurisdiction is Angara y le hubieran dado un asiento en los escanos de dicha
that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts Asamblea, despojando a la Comision Electoral de su derecho de
or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own conocer y enjuiciar la protesta de Insua ?hubiera ello modificado la
jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the fase fundamental del caso, haciendo constitucional lo que era
jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate anticonstitucional, y hubiera perdido este Tribunal Supremo la
cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in jurisdiccion para entender del asunto? Indudablemente que no: la
excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, infraccion de la Constitucion seria misma, tal vez mayor y mas grave;
where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, y la jurisdiccion de este Tribunal para interveneir en el conflicto, mas
or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an obligada y mas forzosa, a fin de mantener inviolada la suprema Ley
oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." de la nacion. En otras palabras, la inhibicion judicial no seria una
(Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304, actitud mas correcta, mas sana y mas prudente tan solo porque la
307; Aglipay vs. Ruiz [1937], 35 Off. Gaz., 1264.) This court, infraccion de la Constitucion fuera mas audaz y mas agresiva. Aqui
therefore, has jurisdiction over the instant proceedings and will no habria medias tintas: to be or not to be, que dijo Hamlet.
accordingly proceed to determine the merits of the present
controversy. Y lo propio se puede decir del asunto de Planas contra Gil. Es verdad
que el Presidente no estaba nombrado como parte directa en el litigio.
Se arguye, sin embargo, que de permitirse la interventcionjudicial Pero ?que mas da? ?No se trataba de una orden ejecutiva expedida
para deslinde constitucional o para dirimir conflictos constitucionales, por directa autorizacion del Presidente? Y asi como se pudo dictar
ello tiene que ser en casos o procedimientos apropiados. Se dice que una sentencia a favor del recurrido por el fundamento de que con la
en el asunto de Angara la intromision judicial era procedente y expedicion de la orden cuestionada el Presidente ne se habia
justificada porque en el la parte litigante era solo la Comision extralimitado de sus facultades constitucionales y estatutorias, a
(Tribunal) Electoral, como recurrida, y la Asamblea Nacional, como sensu contrario tambien se hubiera podido dictar una sentencia
uno de los tres poderes del Estado, no era ni recurrente ni recurrida. adversa, es decir, si se hubiese tratado de un acto ejecutivo que cae
Por analogia se insinua tambien que en el asunto de fuera de las facultades conferidas al Presidente por la Constitucion; y
80

en este ultimo caso la sentencia no hubiera sido menos derogatoria las facultades constitucionales del poder envuelto en el litigio; de ahi
tan solo porque hubiese estado dirigida contra el Comisionado del la negativa del departamento judicial a intervenir, a entrometerse.
Servicio Civil que actuaba por mandato directo del Presidente. El que
esta a las maduras, tambien debe estar a las duras. . . . Y si examinamos los precedentes locales sobre la materia, vemos
que la veta de la jurisprudencia tiene el mismo tipo, la misma
Se nos dice, sin embargo, que el caso de Angara no es la cita naturaleza. En el asunto de Barcelon contra Baker y Thompson (5
pertinente aplicable, sino el de Alejandrino contra Quezon (46 Jur. Jur. Fil., 89) se declaro legal lo hecho por el Gobernador General por
Fil., 87, 151), decidido en 1924. El Senador Alejandrino agredio a otro la razon de que caia dentro de sus poderes politicos o ejecutivos bajo
miembro del Senado fuera de la sala de sesiones de resultas de un la constitucion.
debate acalorado. Con motivo del incidente la mayoria aprobo una
resulucion. suspendiendo a Alejandrino por un año y privandole, Lo propio se hizo en los siguientes asuntos:
ademas, de todas sus prerrogativas, privilegios y emolumentos
durante dicho periodo de tiempo. Alejandrino planteo ante esta Corte Forbes contra Chuoco Tiaco y Crossfield, 16 Jur. Fil., 535; Asunto
una accion originaria pidiendo la expedicion de una orden de McCulloch Dick, 38 Jur. Fil., 43, 225, 240;
de mandamus o interdicto para que se le repusiera en su cargo on Severino contra gobernador General y Junta Provincial de Negros
todos los drechos y privilegios anexos. Se denego el recurso por el Occidental, 16 Jur. Fil., 369; Abueva contra Wood, 45 Jur. Fil., 643.
fundamento de que esta Corte carecia de jurisdiccion para conocer
del asunto. Al negarse esta Corte a revisar lo actuado por el Jefe Ejecutivo en los
casos citados, ha tenido indudablemente en cuenta el siguiente
Un somero examen del caso Alejandrino demuestra, sin embargo, pronunciamiento del Chief Justice Marshall en el citado asunto de
que no tiene ninguna paridad con el que nos ocupa. Es evidente que Marburry vs. Madison: "The Constitution itself endows the President
el Senado tenia el derecho de castigar a Alejandrino dentro de sus with certain important political powers in the exercise of which he is to
facultades disciplinarias provistas por la ley organica — la Ley Jones. use his own discretion, and is accountable onlyu to his country in his
Esta era una facultad discrecional y constitucional cuyo ejercicio no political character, and to his own conscience." De modo que, en
podia ser regido ni revisado por ningun otro poder. Como hemos ultimo resultado, en tales casos se ha reconocido que el ejecutivo ha
dicho mas arriba, cada poder es arbitro unico y exclusivo dentro de su ejercido solamente sus poderes constitucionales; nada hay en ellos
esfera constitucional. (Planas contra Gil, 67 Phil., 62.) Ninguno tiene que sugiera la idea de la inmunidad e irresponsabilidad por una
derecho a entrometerse en la forma como se las arregla alli. Pero infraccion de la Constitucion.
nuestro caso es completamente diferente. Aqui los recurridos o la
mayoria de los Senadores han ejercido una facultad que Contra la pretension de que el departamento judicial no puede revisar
constitucionalmente no les pertenece. Por tanto, han traspasado los los procedimientos de una Camara legislativa en casos de
confined de su predio constitucional, invadiendo otro; por tanto, la extralimitacion constitucional y dictar la orden correspondiente, militan
Resolucion Pendatun es completamente ultra vires. Y no es varios precedentes en la jurisprudencia americana. El mas conocido y
necesario que repitamos los argumentos ya extensamente celebrado entre ellos es el asunto de Kilbourn vs. Thompson (103
desarrollados acercade este punto. U.S., 168; 26 Law. ed., 377). En 1876 la Camara de Representantes
de los Estados Unidos aprobo una resolucion disponiendo que se
Todas las autoridades que se citan en la decision de la mayoria en el investigara cierta compania en la que el gobierno federal, por medio
asunto de Alejandrino tienen la misma ratiodecidendi, el mismo leit del Secretario de la Marina, habia hecho depositos improvidentes de
motif. Se trata de casos en que los actos discutidos recaian dentro de dinero publico. Se decia que la compania estaba en quiebra y el
gobierno federal era uno de los mayores acreedores. Se alegaba,
81

ademas, en la resolucion que los tribunales eran impotentes para the Congress or either branch of it, save in the cases
hacer algo en el caso y proteger el interes publico. Se nombraba en la specifically enumerated to which we have referred . . .
resolucion un comite de cinco Representates para efectuar la
investigacion. We are of opinion, for these reasons, that the Resolution of the
House of Representatives authorizing the investigation, was in
En el curso de la investigacion se le cito al recurrente Hallet excess of the power conferred on that body by the
Kilbourn subpoena duces tecum para que produjera ante el comite Constitution; that the committee, therefore, had no lawful
ciertos documentos y contestase ciertas preguntas. Killbourn se nego authority to require Mr. Kilbourn to testify as a witness beyond
a hacer lo uno y lo otro. Kilbourn fue entonces arrestado por orden del what he voluntarily chose to tell; that the orders and
Speaker y como quiera que siguio rehusando contestar las mismas resolutions of the House, and the warrant of the Speaker,
preguntas formulada ahora por el Speaker y producir los documentos under which Mr. Kilbourn was improsined, are, in like
requeridos por el comite, la Camara aprobo otra resolucion manner, void for want of jurisdiction in that body, and that his
disponiendo que Kilbourn fuese otra vez arrestado y detenido en la imprisonment was without any lawful authority. (Kilbourn vs.
carcel de Distrito de Columbia hasta que se aviniese a cumplir la Thompson, 103 U.S., 168; 26 Law. ed., 377.)
orden contenida en las resoluciones de la Camara de representantes.
Kilbourn no solo inistio en su negativa, sino que formulo una queja Finalmente, la Corte dispuso que la causa contra Thompson, el
contra el sargento de armas de la Camara y los cinco miembros del sargento de armas, se devolviera al tribunal de origen para ulteriores
Comite por "trespass for false imprisonment," acusandoles de haberle procedimientos. Se estimo el sobreseimiento con respecto a los
arrancado de su casa mediante fuerza y detnido por 45 dias en la miembros del comite bajo el principio de la libertad parlamentaria de
carcel. Elevado el asunto al Tribunal Supremo Federal, este declaro debate qu les hacia imunes. A proposito de esto ultimo son muy
que la resolucion de investigacion era anticonstitucional; que la significativas las siguientes palabras de la Corte:
investigacion no tenia por objeto una accion legislativa sino que era
mas bien para una inquisicion de caracter judicial; asi que la Corte It is not necessary to decided here that there may not be
declaro lo siguiente: things done, in the one House or other, of an extraordinary
character, for which the members who take part in the act may
In looking to the Preamble and Resolution under which the be held legally responsible. If we could suppose the members
committee acted, before which Mr. Kilbourn refused to testify, of these bodies so far to forget their high functions and the
we are of opinion that the House of Representatives not only noble instrument under which they act as to imitate the Long
exceeded the limit of its own authority, but assumed a power Pariliament in the execution of the Chief Magistrate of the
which could only be properly exercised by another branch of Nation, or to follow the example of the French Assembly in
the government, because the power was in its nature clearly assuming the functions of a court for capital punishment, we
judicial. are not prepared to say that such an utter perversion of their
powers to a criminal purpose would be screened from
The Constitution declares that the judicial power of the United punishment by the constitutional provision for freedom of
States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such debate. (Idem. p. 392.)
inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain. If
what we have said of the division of the powers of the Ademas de la precedente cita, varias decisiones de los mas altos
government among the three departments be sound, this is tribunales pueden ictarse en apoyo de la doctrina de que "todos los
equivalent to a declaration that no judicial power is vested in funcionarios, departamentos o agencias gubernamentales estan
sujetos a restriccion judicial cuando obran fuereaa de sus facultades,
82

legales o constitucionales, y por virtud de dicha extralimitacion privan resolucion que es ilegal, que es anticonstitucional, lo mismo que se
a un ciudadano de sus derechos" (Osborn vs. United States Bank, 9 hizo en el asunto de Kilbourn. Se les restringe y cohibe como se les
Wheaton [U.S.], 739; Board of Liquidation vs. McComb, 92 [U.S.], restringiria y cohibiria si, por ejemplo, en vez de la Resolucion
531; United States vs. Lee, 106 U.S., 196; Virginia Cases, 114 U.S., Pendatun, hubieran aporbado otra resolucion mandando a la carcel a
311; Regan vs. Farmers & Co., 154 U.S., 362; Smith vs. Ames, 169 los recurrentes hasta que el Tribunal Electoral resuelva la cuestion de
U.S. 466; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123; Philadelphia Co. vs. sus actas. ¿Habria alguien que sostuviera que si en tal caso vinieran
Stimson, 223 U.S. 605.) a esta Corte los afectados para pedir el adecuado remedio contra el
atropello, esta Corte no podria concederlo bajo la teoria de la
Respecto de la facultad judicial para expedir, en casos apropiados, sepracion de poderes? Luego la cuestion se reduce a una de grado,
ordenes coercitivas dirigidas a funcionarios de la Legislatura, hay en de tamaño de la transgresion constitucional; pero es obvio que
la jurisprudencia americana una buena copia de autoridades. He aqui nuestra jurisdiccion y competencia no queda condicionada por el
algunas de ellas: volumen de la transgresion. ¿Y quien diria en tal caso que el Senado
de Filipinas ha sido el sujeto de la orden de interdicto, con grave
. . . En el asunto Ex parte Pickett (24 Ala., 91) se libro el desdoro de sus altos prestigios como uno de los tres poderes del
mandamiento contra el Presidente de la Camara de Estado?
representantes para obligarle a que certificara al Interventor
de Cuentas Publicas la cantidad a que tenia derecho el Puesto que la accion en el presente caso va dirigida no contra el
recurrente como miembro de lal Camara como compensacion Senado como corporacion o institucion, sino contra una mayoria de
por millaje y dietas. En el asunto de State vs. Elder (31 Neb., sus miembros como personas, como individuos, si bien en su
169), se libro el mandamiento para obligar al Presidente de la concepto de Senadores, dicho se esta que tenemos competencia
Camara de Representantes para que abriera y publicara los para conceder el recurso, no solo por las razones constitucionales ya
resultados de la eleccion general. En el asunto de State vs. expuestas, sino porque esta claramente reconocida y definida dicha
Moffitt (5 Ohio, 350) se declaro que procedia expedir competencia en nuestros estatutos: anteriormente en los articulos
un mandamus contra el Presidente de la Camara de 226 y 516 de la Ley No. 190 (Cod. de Proc. Civ.), y ahora en la regla
Representantes para obligarle que certificara la eleccion y 67, secciones 2 y 4, Reglamento de los Tribunales. Estas
nombramiento de funcionarios. En el asunto de Wolfe vs. disposiciones legales prescriben que el mandamiento de inhibicion
McCaull (76 Va., 87) se expidio el mandmiento para obligar al (prohibition) puede expedirse a "una corporacion, junta, o persona, en
Archivero de las Nominas de la Camara de Representantes a ejercicio de sus funciones judicales o ministeriales, siempre que se
que imprimiera y publicara un proyecto de ley aprobado por la demuestre que carecian de competencia o se han extralimitado de
Legislatura y, a solicitud, que facilitara copia del mismo ella en las actuaciones que hayan practicado" (Planas contra Gil
propiamente certificada. (Veanse tambien los asuntos de ut supra). Sin embargo, se arguye que los recurridos como
Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U.S., 168; Statee vs. Gilchrist, 64 Senadores no ejercen funciones judiciales ni ministeriales, sino
Fla., 41People vs. Marton, 156 N.Y., 136.) legislativas; luego la regla no es aplicable a ellos. Pero es evidente
(Alejandrino contra Quezon, 46 Jur. Fil, 87, 149.) que en el presente caso la funcion de que se trata no es de caracter
legislativo sino ministerial; apenas es necesario decir que la
De lo expuesto resulta evidente que esta Corte tiene facultad para Resolucion Pendatun no es un acto legislativo. Bajo la Constitucion y
dictar la sentencia y expedir el interdicto que se solicita. La orden ira los estatutos el derecho de un miembro electo del Congreso a ser
dirigida no contra el Senado de Filipinas, entidad abastracta que nada admitido y a ocupar su asiento es de naturaleza ministerial,
ha hecho contra la Constitucion. La orden resitringente ira dirigida imperativa. La Ley No. 725 del Commonwealth, aprobada por el
contra los recurridos en cuanto ellos intentan hacer efectiva una pasado Congreso para implimentar la Ley Electoral con vista a Las
83

elecciones nacionales del pasado 23 de Abril, dice en parte lo sola presentacion de sus credenciales que en este caso viene a ser la
siguiente: proclama expedidda por la Comision sobre Elecciones declarandolos
electos (Delegado Roxas, debates en la Asamblea Constituyente, ut
ART. 11. La Comision de Elecciones hara el escrutinio de los supra). Se dice que la frase shall assume office, con ser imperative,
resultados para Senadores tan pronto como se hayan recibido no impone una obligacion especifica de admitir a cualquier miembro
las actas decada provincia y ciaudad, pero no depues del electo, sino que es tan solo un mandamiento, un directive al
viente de mayo de milnovecientos cuarenta y seis. Sera legislador electo para que tome posesion de su cargo
proclamados elegidos los dieciseis candidatos inscritos que inmediatamente, como si un candidato triunfante que, es de presumir,
obtuvieren el mayor numero de votos para el cargo de se presento voluntariamente candidato y a lo mejor gasto una fortuna
Seandor. En caso de que apareciere de los resultados del para promover su eleccion, necesitara de eseukase legislativo para
escrutinio de los votos para Senadores que dos os mas asumir su oficio. Pero concedamos por un momento, arguendo, que
candidatos han obtenido el mismo numero de votos para el esa disposicion legal no tiene mas que el significado de una especie
decimosexto puesto, la Comision de Elecciones, despues de de conscripcion civil, todavia cabe preguntar: ¿como prodri el
hacer constar este hecho en el acta correspondiente, legislador electoasumir forzosamente (shall) su cargo, si, por otro
celebrara otra sesion publica, previa notificacion con tres dias lado, un mayoria de sus compañeros en conclave tuvieran la facultad
de antelacion a todos los candidatos empatados, para que discrecional — que puede degenerar en arbitraria — de negarle el
ellos os sus representantes debidamente autorizados puedan asiento, siquiera sea con caracter temporal? ¿No seria ello
estar presentes si asi lo desearen, en la cual procedera al claramente un absurdo, un contrasentido? Luego la conclusion logica
sorteo de los candidatos empatados y proclamara el candidato y natural es que esa frase imperativa es de doble via, esto es, tanto
que saliere favorecido por la suerte. El condidato asi para admitir al miembro electo como para que este asuma el cargo.
proclamado tendra derecho a tomar posesion del cargo del
mismo modo que si hubiere sido elegido por pluralidad de Se apunta el temor de que la intervencion judicial en el caso que nos
votos. Acto seguido, la Comision de Elecciones levantara acta ocupa puede dar lugar a una grave consecuencia — la de que una
del procedimiento seguido en el sorteo, de su resultado y de la orden adversa sea desobedecida por los recurridos, suscitandose por
proclamacion subsiquiente. Se enviaran copias cerfificadas de tal motivo un conflicto de poderes. Pero, aparte de que el deber —
dicha acta por correo certificado al Secretario del Senado y a maxime si esta impuesto por la Constitucion y las leyes — se tiene
cada uno de os candidatos empatados. que cumplir rigurosamdnete por penoso que fuese sin consideraciona
las consecuencias, parece impropio e injusto presumir que los
Art. 12. . . . The candidates for Member of the House of recurridos sean capaces, en un momento dado, de desplazar las
Representatives and those for Senator who have been cuestiones que entraña la presente controversia del elevado nivel en
proclaimed elected by the respective Board of Canvassers and que deben discutirse y resolverse, en medio de un atmosfera de
the Commission on Elections shall assume office and shall absouta impersonalidad y objetividad, libre de los miasmas de la
hold regular session for the year 1946 on May 25, 1946 (las pasion y suspicacia Y no se diga, fulanizando ostensiblemente la
bastardillas son nuestras). cuestion que cuando la judicatura, en el apropiado ejercicio de su
facultad de interpretar la Constitucion y los estatutos, dicta un fallo
Si bajo estas disposisciones legales los recurrentes tienen el derecho adverso a ciertos intereses y a ciertos hombres pertenecientes a otro
de asumir el cargo, es obvio que los demas Senadores, entre ellos poder del Estado, humilla y empequeñece con ello a ese poder,
los recurridos, tienen el correlativo deber ministerial de no impedirles colocandolo en condicion inferior y subalterna. en los grandes
el ejercicio de ese derecho, o dicho de otro modo, el correlativo deber conflictos y disputas sobre la cosa publica lo que, en verdad,
ministerial de admitirles para que tomen posesion de sus cargos a la empequeñece y deslustra no es el contrateimpo y reves que se sufre
84

— incidente inevitable en toda noble lid por la razon, la verdad y la plantear directamente la cuestion ante el pueblo elector. Si los
justicia — sino la falta de esa serena dignidad, de ese sentido sobrio recurrentes tienen razon, el pueblo les reivindicara eleigiendoles o
de propia inhibicion y propio dominio paa aceptar y sufrir el reves, de elevando a su partido al poder, repudiando, en cambio, a los
todo eso que es la mejor piedra de toque de la madurez politica y de recurridos o a su partido. algunas cosas se podrian decir acerca de
las virtudes publicas en un regimen de caracter popular y este argumento. Se podria decir, por ejemplo, que el remedio no es
democratico. Los hombres van y vienen, pasan con sus miserias y expedito ni adecuado porque la mayoria de los recurridos han sido
sus disputas en la interminable caravana del tiempo; las instituciones elegidos para un periodo de seis años, asi que no se les podra exigir
quedan, y eso es lo que importa salvar a toda costa por encima de las ninguna responsabilidad por tan largo tiempo. Se podria decir
pasiones y caprichos transeuntes del momento. tambien que en una eleccion politica entra muchos factores, y es
posible que la cuestion que se discute hoy, con ser tan fervida y tan
Se esta corte tiene, segun la Constitucion, facultad para conceder el palpitante, quede, cuando llegue el caso, obscurecida por otros
remedio solictado, es de suponer que los recurridos acataran el fallo "issues" mas presionantes y decisvos. Tambien se podria decir que,
que se dicte, pues son hombres de orden y de ley, y seran los independientemente de la justicia de su causa, un partido minoritario
primeros en dar el ejemplo de cumplir los mandatos de la siempre lucha con desventaja contra el partido mayoritario.
Constitucion, interpretados y aplicados por la judicatura; pero si — lo
que para nosotros es imposible que ocurra — escudandose tras sus Pero, a nuestro juicio, la mejor contestacion al argumento es que no
privilegios, llegaren al extremo de cometer desacato, que cada cual cabe concebir que los redactores de la Constitucion filipina hayan
asuma su responsabilidad ante su conciencia, ante el pais y ante la dejado en medio de nuestro sistema de gobierno un peligroso vacio
historia. Esta Corte habra cumplido solamente consu deber, sin en donde quedan paralizados los resortes de la Constitucion y de la
miedo y sin favor, y en la forma mejor que le haya sido dable hacerlo ley, y el ciudadano queda inerme, importente frente a lo que el
en la medida de sus luces y alcances. considera flagrante transgresion de sus derechos. Los redactores de
la Constitucion conocian muy bien nuestro sistema de gobierno —
En esta jurisdiccion tenemos un precedente tipico, claro y terminante sistema presidenecial. Sabian mauy bien que este no tiene la
de orden coercitiva dirigida por el departamento judicial al flexibilidad del tipo ingles — el parlamentario. En Inglaterra y en los
departamento ejecutivo del gobierno. Nos referimos al asunto de paises que siguen su sistema hay una magnifica valvula de seguridad
Concepcion contraParedes (42 Jur. Fil., 630) en el cual se trataba de politica; cuando surge una grave crisis, de esas que sacuden los
una solicitud de mandamiento de inhibicion ordenando al recurrido cimientos de la nacion, el parlamento se disuelve y se convocan
Secretario de Justicia de inhibicion ordenando al recurrido Secretario elecciones generales para que el pueblo decida los grandes "issues"
de Justicia que desistiera de poner en vigor las disposiciones de la del dia. Asi se consuman verdaderas revoluciones, sin sangre, sin
Ley No. 2941 que exigia a los jueces de primera instancia que violencia. El sistema presidencial no tiene esa valvula. El periodo que
echasen suertes cada cinco años para el cambio de distritos. Esta media de eleccion a eleccion es inflexible. Entre nosotros, por
Corte declaro que la ley popularmente conocida por ley de la "loteria ejemplo, el periodo es de seis años para el Senado, y de cuatro años
judicial" era anticonstitucional. Se concedio, por tanto, el para la Camara de Representantes y los gobiernos provinciales y
mandamiento de prohibicion, haciendose definitivo el interdicto municipales. Solamente se celebran elecciones especiales para
preliminar expedido. cubrir vacantes que ocurran entre unas elecciones generales y otras.
Se comprendera facilmente que bajo un sistema asi es harto
Solo nos queda por considerar el argumento deprimente, peligroso, es jugar con fuego el posibilitar situaciones donde el
desalentador de que el caso que nos ocupa no tiene remedio ni bajo individuo y el pueblo no pueden buscar el amparo de la Constitucion y
la Constitucion ni bajo las leyes ordinarias. A los recurrentes se les de las leyes, bajo procesos ordenandos y expeditos, para proteger
dice que no tienen mas que un recurso: esperar las elecciones y sus derechos.
85

En resumen, direcmos lo siguiente: Footnotes

Tenemos una Constitucion escrita que representa el genio politico y 1

e.g., jeopardy in prosecution; two-thirds vote to declare law
socio de nuestro pueblo, que encarna nuestra historia, nuestras unconstitutional, etc.
tradiciones, nuestra civilizacion y cultura influida por las mas grandes
civilizaciones y culturas conocidas en el mundo. Esa Constitucion se 2
Legislative members of the Commission were not sued as
escribio no solo para el Commonwealth, sino para la Republica: esta assemblymen.
hecha para perdurar y sobrevivir a todas las crisis y vicisitudes.
Sobrevivio casi milagrosamente a la peor de estas — la ocupacion 3
Not qualified as selector—not qualified as congressmann
japonesa. Es un formidable instrumento de libertad y democracia. Su (Constitution, Article VI, section 7, in relation with section 94 a]
modelo mas cercano es la Constitucion americana, pero en ciertos Election Code).
respectos es una superacion del modelo. Uno de sus aspectos mas
originales y progresivos es indudablemente la creacion del Tribunal 4
See Lopez ve. De los Reyes, supra.
Electoral. Esta reforma constituye el valiente reconocimiento de una
dura realidad, al propio tiempo que un energico remedio.

Pero en las constituciones la letra no es el todo, ni siquiera lo

principal. Lo imporatante, lo fundamental es el espiritu, el caracter del
pueblo; son las practicas, las costumbres, los habitos politicos que
vivifican e implementan la letra esrita que es inorganica e inerte.
Exceptuando el parentesis tragico de la guerraa, nuestra Constitucion
lleva unos ocho años de vigencia. En ese breve periodo de tiempo se
ha formado en su derredor una limitada jurisprudencia, encaminada a
robustecerla y expandirla como intrumento de libertad y democracia.
Los casos de Angara y Planas, tan copiosamente comentados en
esta modesta disidencia, son tipicamente representativos de esa
magnifica tendencia. La custion ahoraa es si esta ha de poder
continuar sin estorbos, sin trabas, o ha de sufrir un serio reves en su
marcha ascendente. Nuestro sentir es que se debe permitir el
ordenado desenvolvimiento de la Constitucion en toda su anchura,
bajo los amplisimos auspicios de la libertad, en terminos y
perspectivas que hagan de ella la formidable herramienta de
democracia y justicia que debe ser.

¡ Ojala el resultado del presente asunto no sea parte para estorbar

ese desenvolvimiento!