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Airball Make It Rain

Sulpicio Intod and others fired gunshots at the bedroom of Bernardina Palangpangan with the intent to kill her, as instructed by Aniceto Dumalagan in a land dispute. However, Palangpangan was not in the bedroom at the time, and no one was hurt. Intod was convicted of attempted murder but argued he should only be liable for impossible crime. The Supreme Court ruled Intod was only liable for impossible crime under the Revised Penal Code because the absence of the intended victim made the accomplishment of the crime inherently impossible, not just prevented by extraneous circumstances.

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Nelda Enriquez
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39 views2 pages

Airball Make It Rain

Sulpicio Intod and others fired gunshots at the bedroom of Bernardina Palangpangan with the intent to kill her, as instructed by Aniceto Dumalagan in a land dispute. However, Palangpangan was not in the bedroom at the time, and no one was hurt. Intod was convicted of attempted murder but argued he should only be liable for impossible crime. The Supreme Court ruled Intod was only liable for impossible crime under the Revised Penal Code because the absence of the intended victim made the accomplishment of the crime inherently impossible, not just prevented by extraneous circumstances.

Uploaded by

Nelda Enriquez
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

G.R. No. 103119. 21 October 1992

Art. 2, Par. 2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

FACTS:

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and
Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena,
Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a
meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be
killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany
the four men, otherwise, he would also be killed.

At about 10:00 pm of the same day, Mandaya accompanied Intod’s group and pointed
the location of Palangpangan’s bedroom. Thereafter, the group fired at the said room.
However, Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her
son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No
one was hit by the gun fire.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder which the Court of
Appeals affirmed. Petitioner seeks the modification of the judgment by holding him liable
only for an impossible crime, citing the Article 4 paragraph 2 of the Revise Penal Code.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not
impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict
Intod for attempted murder.

ISSUE:

Is the petitioner only liable for an impossible crime?

RULING:

Yes. Intod is only liable for impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the
intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Legal impossibility
would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to
perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act;
(3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence
resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. On the other hand, factual
impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond
his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.

The case at bar belongs to factual category. Petitioner shoots the place where he
thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place
and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because
the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will,
will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for
an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which
prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident
independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.

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