G.R. No.

L-56191 May 27, 1986

JESUS DE JESUS, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (Philippine National Railways), respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission

which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System denying the
claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, of petitioner Jesus de Jesus,
surviving spouse of the late Ester P. de Jesus.

On April 13, 1945, Ester P. de Jesus was employed by the Philippine National Railways
(PNR) as a telephone operator assigned at its San Fernando, Pampanga railway station.
She was transferred in 1964 to the switchboard 'of the PNR Hospital at Caloocan City. De
Jesus worked every other day during the night shift, for continuous periods of 16 hours
starting from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. of the following day.

From November 10, 1978 to April 5, 1979, she was hospitalized four times at the PNR
hospital. Her attending physician, Dr. Juan Pineda, Chief of Clinics, PNR hospital,
diagnozed her ailments as chronic pyelonephritis, diabetes mellitus, anemia and modular
pulmonary metastases which is also known as lung cancer.

According to Dr. Pineda, the ailments of Mrs. de Jesus started sometime in August, 1978
when she experienced progressive loss of weight and sudden loss of appetite
accompanied by body weakness and easy fatigability with no other accompanying signs
and symptoms except frequent urination. Despite medications, no improvement was
noted and she soon complained of non-productive cough and mild lumbar pains. On
December 8, 1978, after more than 33 years of service and at the age of 55 years she
applied for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Act 1616
and Republic Act 4968 which was approved effective March 1, 1979. Retirement benefits
were thereafter given under Retirement Gratuity No. 65520. Ester P. de Jesus died of her
ailments on June 20, 1979. Petitioner Jesus de Jesus, the deceased's husband, filed a
claim for death benefits under P.D. 626, as amended, on August 17, 1979. The claim was
denied by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) on the ground that the
deceased's ailments were not occupational diseases under the Labor Code. According to
the GSIS

Diabetes mellitus is a hereditary disorder of carbohydrate metabolism due to inadequate

production of insulin by the pancreas. Contributing factors for its occurrence are obesity,
excessive consumption of sugar and fat disorders of endocrine glands and most
important, hereditary. Symptoms include excessive thirst and urination, itching, hunger,
weakness and loss of weight.

Anemia is a condition in which the normal amount of red blood cans is reduced. This may
be a complication of the above diseases.

Chronic pyelonephritis is a slowly progressive infection in the renal pelvis and

parenchyma frequently bilateral. It is associated with some obstructive lesions such as
kidney stones and structural abnormalities in the renal tract.
Moreover, there is also no showing that your position as telephone operator in the
Philippine National Railways, Manila, had increased the risks of contracting said
ailments.

This decision was affirmed on review by the Employees' Compensation Commission on

January 15, 1981.

Hence, the instant petition.

Since the ailments of the deceased, as found by her attending physician, manifested
themselves in 1978 or beyond January 1, 1975, the law governing the petitioner's claim
is the New Labor Code (Art. 208, P.D. 442, as amended).

Under Article 167 (L) of the New Labor Code and Section I (b), Rule III of the Amended
Rules on Employees' Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting disability or death
to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed
under Annex "A" of the Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof
must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.

In this case, it is the petitioner's contention that the condition of the deceased's work
increased the risk of her contracting the diseases which caused her death.

After a careful examination of the case, we find the petitioner's claim without merit. The
petitioner has failed to prove by competent evidence that the risk of contracting said
diseases was indeed increased by the working conditions concomitant with the
deceased's employment.

In affirming the GSIS' decision, the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission

cited the following medical discussions to negate causal relation of the deceased's work
to her ailments.

Nodular pulmonary metastases' is a phenomenon which results from infection with tumor
emboli carried by the peripheral veins. Sarcomas, hypernephromas, melanomas and
tumors of the breast, thyroid, and pancreas seem to find the lung an especially favorable
site for the growth of metastases. On x-ray, nodular pulmonary metastases may appear
as a solitary 'cannonball' nodule, multiple nodules, or military dissemination known as
lymphangitis carcinomatosis. Dyspnea and pleuritic pain are the cardinal symptoms of
lung metastases. (Reference: Harrison, T.R. Principles of Internal Medicine, McGraw Hill
N.Y.: 5th Edition, 1966, pp. 945-946). On the other hand, 'anemia' is a condition in which
the amount of blood in the body is decrease From a practical standpoint, the term means
a reduction in the number of and the amount of hemoglobin per unit of blood. The
Medical Division of this Commission discusses the etiologic classification of - as follows:
'(1) loss of blood, (2) deficiency of factors in is; (3) excessive construction of red
corpuscles; (a) Congenital -or hereditary, (b) Acquired; (1) infection (2) chronic diseases;
(3) plumbism following irradiation, drug sensitivity; (4) endocrine deficiencies; (5)
myelophthisic anemia; (6) hypersplenism (7) Idiopathic bone marrow failure; (c)
miscellaneous hypersideremic anemias. Reference: Harrison, T.R.: Principles of Internal
Medicine; McGraw Hill N.Y. 5th edition, 1966, p. 153.'

The decedent's other aliments, namely: diabetes mellitus and chronic pyelonephritis are
likewise not traceable to her employment and employment conditions. 'Diabetes mellitus',
according to medical science is:

A hereditary or developmental disorder of carbohydrate metabolism due to an absolute or

relative insufficiency of the action of insulin appearing at any age as hyperglycemia,
glycosuria, polyuria, polydipsia, polyphagia, pruritus weakness and weight loss. Etiology
and incidence: Insufficient insulin action from causes still unknown is responsible for
most cases of diabetes mellitus. Decreased effectiveness of insulin, which may or may
not be associated with the presence of antagonist to insulin, is probably of greater
etiologic importance than is an inadequate production of insulin by the B-cells of the islets
of Langerhans.

Although the exact cause of diabetes has not been found, some contributory factors are
recognized. Hereditary is important, since there is a familiar history of diabetes in as
many as 50% of cases. Obesity has been indicted. Disorders of endocrine glands other
than the pancreas may be associated with the development of diabetes mellitus. Infection
is a common precursor to the appearance or exacerbation of the disease, probably
making a latent diabetes manifest. Pancreatitis, pancreatic tumors and hemochromatosis
are responsible for occasional cases of diabetes. In certain persons who may be more
susceptible to the eventual development of diabetes (e.g. strong positive family history)
the use of certain drugs may be associated with the appearance of overt diseases. Such
drugs include adrenocortical steroids and thiazide diuretics.

Reference: Lyght, C.E.: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, M.S.D.; N.J. llth
ed., 1966,. pp- 325-326.

Chronic pyelonephritis refers to a slowly progressing infection in the renal pelvis and
parenchyma frequently bilateral The condition may have its origin in an acute
pyelonephritis in childhood, especially in females, or during pregnancy. In males, it is
usually associated with some obstructive lesion, such as renal calculi or prostatic
hypertrophy. The common etiologic agent is the colon bacillus, P. vulgaris, or a related
organism. Less frequently, one of the gram-positive cocci may be responsible.
Reference: C.E. Lyght: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, M.S., N.J. 1lth ed.,
p. 255.

On the other hand, the petitioner alleges that the deceased's continuous night shift duties
coupled with the offensive odor of some medicine and dirty linens that were dumped
regularly near her office, afflicted her weakening lungs and induced the development of
lung cancer and anemia.

To bolster his claim, he submits a clinical history of the deceased and a letter certification
both prepared by Dr. Juan Pineda, who was the attending physician of the deceased,

We regret to note, however, that the allegations have not been substantiated by the
petitioner. While this court has always maintained that the strict rules of evidence are not
applicable in claims for compensation (Neri v. Employees' Compensation Commission,
127 SCRA 672), the basic rule that a mere allegation is not evidence (Topweld
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 44944, August 9, 1985; Lagasca
v. de Vera, 79 Phil. 376) should not be disregarded.

As to the medical view of Dr. Pineda, his endorsement that the deceased's working
condition "contributed immeasurably to the insidious development of her lung lesion" and
that her 11 unusual and prolonged working hours finally sapped her strength leading to
physical exhaustion" which, together with diabetes and anemia, provided a "groundwork
for pulmonary metastases" (Rollo, p. 16), implies aggravation of the disease rather than
its direct causation.

We are, therefore, powerless under the law to reject the respondents' view that the
diseases which the deceased suffered are not caused by employment. As the medical
authorities reveal, those ailments are common to all mankind whether employed or
unemployed, and if employed, irregardless of the nature of the employment.
Under the old Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, which provided for the
concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" it was possible to stretch
the work related nature of an ailment beyond seemingly rational limits.

In this case, however, there is no dispute that the governing law is the New Labor Code,
which according to settled jurisprudence (Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission,
98 SCRA 483; Armena v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851; Felipe
U. Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, GSIS, Metro Manila, G.R. No.
L45662, August 20, 1985), discarded the aforesaid concepts to restore a sensible
equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the
employee's rights to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.

The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers
based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his
right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor
requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral
Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the
employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may
be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The
amount of death benefits has also been doubled.

On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to
the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for
compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet these contingencies. It does not
have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's
compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fund under its
exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it
has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of
Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from
an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on
presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The
lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization
through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent.

The Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund was established after actuarial
studies and on the basis of the provisions of the new law. I commiserate with the claimant
but compassion should be for all beneficiaries and not specific claimants. If we endanger
the stability and liquidity of the Fund through orders compelling payment of benefits
where the law never intended such benefits to be paid, we are not compassionate. We
endanger the scheme.

WHEREFORE, we hold that the decision appealed from should be, as it is, hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 132761. March 26, 2003

NORMA ORATE,, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION

COMMISSION, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (MANILA BAY SPINNING MILLS,
INC.), respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
May 14, 1997 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42280, and its January
29, 1998 Resolution3 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

On December 5, 1972, petitioner Norma Orate was employed by Manila Bay Spinning Mills,
Inc., as a regular machine operator. 4 Her duties included the following:

A) Doffing:

1) Obtain empty cones from storage prior to doffing; incl. patrol round trip.

2) Prepare empty cones to each spindle prior to doffing; incl. attention to

condition of empty cones.

3) Doff full cones to bank over machine.

4) Take empty cones by L. H. drop ends inside cone or wrap around cones
and load to spindle then start spindle.

B) Creeling:

1) Remove empty bobbins from creel pin to conveyor.

2) Obtain one-full cop from bank and remove tail ends.

3) Fit full cop to creel pin and thread to guides

4) Find end from running cone and joint-end from full cop; incl. keep
clearer free from accumulated cone.

5) Remove tail from empty bobbin when necessary. 20%

6) Stop spindles. (occasionally when stop motion malfunction.

10%)

C) Repair Breaks:

1) Patrol to break-end.

2) Stop spindle. (occasionally) 10%

3) Get end from full cop and thread to guides.

 4) Find end from running cone by R.H. and joint ends by knotter on L. H.,
then start spindle; including keep cleaner free from accumulated
cone.

D) Machine Cleaning Duties once per shift (start of shift):

1) Patrol to obtain brush.

2) Brush ends of machine.

3) Brush creel bar.

4) Brush frame beam and stand.5 cräläwvirtualibräry

On March 22, 1995, she was diagnosed to be suffering from invasive ductal carcinoma
(breast, left),6 commonly referred to as cancer of the breast. Consequently, she underwent
modified radical mastectomy on June 9, 1995. 7 The operation incapacitated her from
performing heavy work, for which reason she was forced to go on leave and, eventually, to
retire from service at the age of 44.

On November 17, 1995, petitioner applied for employees compensation benefits 8 with the
Social Security System (SSS), but the same was denied on the ground that her illness is
not work-related. On January 22, 1996, she moved for reconsideration contending that her
duties as machine operator which included lifting heavy objects increased the risk of
contracting breast cancer. 9 The SSS, however, reiterated its denial of petitioners claim for
benefits under the Employees Compensation Program. Instead, it approved her application
as a sickness benefit claim under the SSS, 10 and classified the same as a permanent partial
disability equivalent to a period of twenty-three (23) months. 11 Thus

Respectfully referred is a letter and copies of EC-Sickness Benefit Claim of subject

employee for your further evaluation and review.

Said claim was not considered as EC, however, sickness and disability benefit claims under
SSS were approved, computer print-out hereto attached. 12 cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner requested the elevation of her case to the Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC), which affirmed on June 20, 1996, the decision of the SSS in ECC Case No. MS-
7938-296. The ECC ruled that petitioners disability due to breast cancer is not
compensable under the Employees Compensation Program because said ailment is not
included among the occupational diseases under Annex A of the Rules on Employees
Compensation; and it was not established that the risk of contracting said ailment was
increased by the working conditions at Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc. 13 The dispositive
portion of the ECCs decision reads

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and the
instant case is accordingly DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.14 cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
42280. On May 14, 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the ECC, and
granted petitioners claim for compensation benefit under the Workmens Compensation Act
(Act No. 3428).15 It held that petitioners breast cancer must have intervened before the
effectivity of Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code on Employees Compensation and State
Insurance Fund on January 1, 1975, hence, the governing law on petitioners claim for
compensation benefit is Act No. 3428, which works upon the presumption of
compensability, and not the provisions of the Labor Code on employees compensation. The
Court of Appeals further ruled that since Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc. failed to discharge
the burden of proving that petitioners ailment did not arise out of or in the course of
employment, the presumption of compensability prevails, entitling her to compensation.
The dispositive portion of the said decision states:

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the contested Decision (ECC Case No. MS-7838-296) is
hereby set aside; petitioner instead should be entitled to the benefits under Act No. 3428,
as amended, together with the medical-surgical expenses, including doctors bill.

SO ORDERED.16 cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 17 arguing that it is the Labor Code which
should be applied to her case inasmuch as there is no evidence that the onset of her
breast carcinoma occurred before January 1, 1975. She claimed that the basis of the
computation of her compensation benefits should be the Labor Code and not the
Workmens Compensation Act.

On January 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied her motion for reconsideration. 18 cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition insisting that her disability should be
compensated under the provisions of the Labor Code and not under the Workmens
Compensation Act.

The resolution of the instant controversy hinges on the following issues: (1) What is the
law applicable to petitioners claim for disability benefits? and (2) Is she entitled under the
applicable law to be compensated for disability arising from breast carcinoma?

The first law on workmens compensation in the Philippines is Act No. 3428, otherwise
known as the Workmens Compensation Act, which took effect on June 10, 1928. This Act
works upon the presumption of compensability which means that if the injury or disease
arose out of and in the course of employment, it is presumed that the claim for
compensation falls within the provisions of the law. Simply put, the employee need not
present any proof of causation. It is the employer who should prove that the illness or
injury did not arise out of or in the course of employment. 19 cräläwvirtualibräry

On November 1, 1974, the Workmens Compensation Act was repealed by the Labor Code
(Presidential Decree No. 442). On December 27, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 626 (which
took effect on January 1, 1975) was issued. It extensively amended the provisions of Title
II, Book IV of the Labor Code on Employees Compensation and State Insurance
Fund.20 The law as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing that the
illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by
the working conditions.21 It discarded, among others, the concepts of presumption of
compensability and aggravation and substituted a system based on social security
principles. The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies the
Government Service Insurance System and Social Security System under the Employees
Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the
employers obligation to pay workmens compensation and the employees right to receive
reparation for work-connected death or disability. 22
cräläwvirtualibräry

In Sarmiento v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al.,23 we explained the nature of

the new employees compensation scheme and the State Insurance Fund, as follows

The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers
based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his
right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor
requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral
Employees Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the
employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be
paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The
amount of death benefits has also been doubled.
On the other hand, the employers duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the
scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for
compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet these contingencies. It does not
have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmens
compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fund under its
exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it has
no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational
Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational
disease is automatically paid benefits.

Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on
presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided
situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through the
various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent. . . .

In workmens compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date when the
claimant contracted the disease. An injury or illness which intervened prior to January 1,
1975, the effectivity date of P.D. No. 626, shall be governed by the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, while those contracted on or after January 1, 1975 shall be
governed by the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 626. 24 Corollarily, where the claim
for compensation benefit was filed after the effectivity of P.D. No. 626 without any showing
as to when the disease intervened, the presumption is that the disease was contracted
after the effectivity of P.D. No. 626. 25
cräläwvirtualibräry

In the case at bar, petitioner was found to be positive for breast cancer on March 22,
1995. No evidence, however, was presented as to when she contracted said ailment.
Hence, the presumption is that her illness intervened when P.D. No. 626 was already the
governing law.

The instant controversy is not on all fours with the cases where the Court applied the
presumption of compensability and aggravation under the Workmens Compensation Act,
even though the claim for compensation benefit was filed after January 1, 1975. In the
said cases, the symptoms of breast cancer manifested before or too close to the cut off
date January 1, 1975, that it is logical to presume that the breast carcinoma of the
employee concerned must have intervened prior to January 1, 1975. Thus

(1) In Avendao v. Employees Compensation Commission,26 the Workmens Compensation

Act was applied to a claim for disability income benefit arising from breast carcinoma,
though the said claim was filed only in 1976, after the effectivity of the Labor Code. Per
certification of the physician of the claimant, her breast cancer was contracted sometime in
1959, although the clinical manifestations thereof started only in 1969.

(2) In Cayco, et al. v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al.,27 the deceased

employees breast carcinoma first showed up in 1972 or 6 years before she died on April
26, 1978. We ruled therein that the presumption on compensability under the Workmens
Compensation Act governs since her right accrued before the Labor Code took effect.

(3) In Ajero v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al.,28 the claimant was confined
and treated for pulmonary tuberculosis and cancer of the breast from January 5 to 15,
1976. In granting the employees claim for income benefit, it was held that her ailments,
especially pulmonary tuberculosis, must have supervened several years before, when the
Workmens Compensation Act was still in force.

(4) In Mandapat v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al.,29 we held that since the
deceased underwent radical mastectomy on May 10, 1975, it is obvious that the tumor in
her right breast started to develop even before 1975. We further noted [t]hat the onset of
cancer is quiet and gradual, in contrast [to] many diseases It takes six to twelve months
for a breast cancer to grow from a size which can just be found to the size actually
encountered at the time of surgery.
(5) In Nemaria v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al.,30 the deceased employee
was confined for cancer of the liver, duodenal cancer, and cancer of the breast, from
September 8-25, 1978, before she succumbed to death October 16, 1978. In the said
case, we recognized that cancer is a disease which is often discovered when it is too late.
Hence, we surmised that the possibility that its onset was even before the effectivity of the
New Labor Code cannot be discounted.

(6) In De Leon v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al.,31 we ruled that the

governing law on the claim for income benefit filed by the mother of the deceased on June
8, 1976 is the Workmen's Compensation Act. The modified radical mastectomy conducted
on the deceased on September 16, 1968 obviously showed that she contracted breast
carcinoma before the effectivity of P.D. No. 626.

Clearly therefore, the presumption of compensability and aggravation under the Workmens
Compensation Act cannot be applied to petitioners claim for compensation benefit arising
from breast cancer. We are not experts in this field to rule that the onset of her breast
carcinoma occurred prior to January 1, 1975, or almost twenty years ago. Hence, the
provisions of the Labor Code govern. For breast carcinoma and resulting disability to be
compensable, the claimant must prove, by substantial evidence, either of two things: (a)
that the sickness was the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the
Rules on Employees Compensation; or (b) if the sickness is not so listed, that the risk of
contracting the disease was increased by the claimants working conditions. 32 cräläwvirtualibräry

There is no dispute that cancer of the breast is not listed as an occupational disease under
Annex A of the Rules on Employees Compensation. As such, petitioner has the burden of
proving, by substantial evidence, the causal relationship between her illness and her
working conditions.

Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. 33 In the case at bar, petitioner argued before the SSS
and the ECC that her job as machine operator, which required lifting of heavy objects
increased the risk of her contracting breast carcinoma. In addition, she contended that her
job in the winding department exposed her to cancer-causing dyes used in coloring
threads.34 In support thereof, she cited the following:

Some industrial chemicals create a cancer hazard for people who work with them. Such
chemicals include aniline dyes, arsenic, asbestos, chromium and iron compounds, lead,
nickel, vinyl chloride, and certain products of coal, lignite, oil shale, and petroleum. Unless
industrial plants carefully control the use of such chemicals, excessive amounts may
escape or be released into the environment. The chemicals then create a cancer hazard for
people in surrounding areas. (World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 3, 1992 ed., p. 119) 35 cräläwvirtualibräry

Regrettably, however, said bare allegations and vague excerpts on cancer do not
constitute such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the
conclusion that there is a causal relationship between her illness and her working
conditions. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions. The
claimant must prove a positive proposition. 36 A perusal of the records reveals that there is
no evidence that she was indeed exposed to dyes. Even assuming that she was dealing
directly with chemicals, there is no proof that the company where she worked did not
implement measures to control the hazards occasioned by the use of such chemicals.

Indeed, cancer is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a persons
employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a
highly paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the deep bowels of the
earth. It makes no difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white
collar employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a
rural area.37
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is not also correct to say that all disability or death resulting from all kinds of cancer are
not compensable. There are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly
induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette
smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for specific cancers, and
asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks of contracting
specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof. 38 This was not satisfied in the
instant case.

Hence, while we sustain petitioners claim that it is the Labor Code that applies to her case,
we are nonetheless constrained to rule that under the same code, her disability is not
compensable. Much as we commiserate with her, our sympathy cannot justify an award
not authorized by law. It is well to remember that if diseases not intended by the law to be
compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance
Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by law ignores the
need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers
and their families look to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and
deaths occur. This stems from the development in the law that no longer is the poor
employee still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer, hence
the necessity of affording all kinds of favorable presumptions to the employee. This
reasoning is no longer good policy. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which
suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. 39
cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 42280, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Employees Compensation
Commission in ECC Case No. MS-7938-296, dismissing petitioners claim for compensation
benefits under the Employees Compensation Program is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 48664 May 20, 1987

GLICERIA C. CASUMPANG, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM AND BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in

ECC Case No. 0713 entitled "Gliceria C. Casumpang v. Government Service Insurance
System (Bureau of Prisons)"which affirmed the decision of the Government Service
Insurance System and denied the claim for death benefits of Gliceria C. Casumpang,
widow of the late Jose Casumpang.

The assailed decision of the Employees Compensation Commission is as follows:

The questioned decision denied the claim for compensation originally filed by the
deceased employee. Jose Casumpang, then working as Prison Guard of the Bureau of
Prisons with assignment at the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm, Zamboanga City.
Upon its conversion to a claim for income benefits for death following the demise of said
Jose Casumpang due to Cancer of the Stomach, the claim is now being prosecuted (sic)
on appeal to this Commission by the herein appellant-widow, Gliceria Casumpang.

The System's denial of the appellant's claim was predicated on the ground that the cause
of death is not an occupational disease nor the result of the deceased's nature of
occupation as Prison Guard, This is the gist of the System's letter-denial dated August 5,
1976, reiterated in its resolutions dated October 4, 1976 and August 18. 1977,
respectively, therein further denying the requests for reconsideration of the appellant.

The preponderance of mandatory legal postulate requiring proof of causation once an

ailment upon which a claim is based is not considered an occupational disease as
defined and understood under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, would
subserve the respondent System's findings that the above-titled claim is not
compensable. The conclusion of the respondent System cannot be faulted. From even
the cursory reading of the record, the evidences (sic) submitted by the appellant in
support of her claim would fail to indicate that the cause of death is in occupational
disease, noting further thereon that the work of the deceased did not involve handling of
wood products such as those of wood workers, loggers, carpenters and employees of
plywood, pulp and paper mills. Neither did these evidences (sic) measure up to the
substantial and positive evidence requirement for a determination of compensability,
since there is no showing that the risk of contracting gastric carcinoma was increased by
the deceased's working conditions.

The contention of the appellant that compensability is presumed once the ailment is
shown to have supervened in the course of employment cannot be accorded merit. The
doctrine of presumptive compensability which was then expressly provided under the old
Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) is not recognized under Presidential Decree
No. 626, as amended, the present law on employees' compensation. In the latter law,
proof of causation by the claimant is imperative, such burden being incompatible with the
presumption of compensability.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby
AFFIRMED, and the instant claim dismissed. (Original Records, Decision of ECC).

The main issue in the case at bar is whether or not cancer of the stomach is an
occupational disease and hence, compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended.

This case falls under the New Labor Code, which fact is admitted by the petitioner herself
(Casumpang's Petition for Certiorari, p. 3).

After a close perusal of the records of the case, nowhere does it appear that Jose
Casumpang contracted his disease or ailments before January 1, 1975. There are no
medical findings. reports, affidavits or any indication that he was suffering from any pain
or discomfort prior to the effectivity of the Labor Code which by liberal interpretation may
have worked in his favor.

There is no dispute that prior to his demise Jose Casumpang had ruptured duodenal
ulcer with generalized peritonitis. 'This condition according to medical findings on record,
worsened into cancer of the stomach which disease finally caused his death. The former
ailment was officially diagnosed in June 28, 1976. In his medical history, this was traced
to hematemesis and melena which began in November 1975. In other words, all of his
ailments were after January 1, 1975.

It is Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, therefore, which is applicable in this case
and not the Workmen's Compensation Act.

It is important to determine which law is applicable.

Under the former Workmen's Compensation Act or Act No. 3428 as amended. the
claimant was relieved of the duty to prove causation as it was then legally presumed that
the illness arose out of the employment'. under the presumption of compensability (Tortal
v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 124 SCRA 211).

However, under the new law, the principles of aggravation and presumption of
compensability have been stricken off by the lawmaker as grounds for compensation
(Milano v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 52).

Under Article 167 (b) of the New Labor Code and Section I (b), Rule Ill of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting disability or death
to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed
under Annex "A" of the Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof
must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions (De Jesus v. Employees Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92).

Under the Labor Code, cancer of the stomach is not an occupational disease considering
the decedent's employment as prison guard.

We agree with the Solicitor General that:

... In ECC Resolution No. 247-A dated April 13, 1977, cancer of the stomach and other
lymphatic and blood forming, vessels was considered occupational only among
woodworkers; wood products industry carpenters, loggers and employees in pulp and
paper mills and plywood mills. The complained illness is therefore not compensable
under the first group provided in the Labor Code.

Under the second ground for compensability, it should be shown that an illness is caused
by employment and that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions. In her letter dated December 6, 1977 to respondent ECC (Annex B),
petitioner claims that her deceased husband escorted inmates to work in the hinterlands
of San Ramon; that at times he was overtaken by rain; that he had to work at night in
case of prison escapes, and that he missed his meals owing to the nature of his duties. It
should be noted however, that said conditions do not bring about cancer of the stomach.
On the ailment of Jose Casumpang, the GSIS found that the evidence (you have)
submitted are not sufficient for us to establish that his ailment is the direct result of your
occupation or employment as Prison Guard in the Bureau of Prisons, Zamboanga City
(GSIS letter dated August 5, 1976, supra.) This was reiterated by the GSIS in its letter
dated October 4, 1976 denying a request for reconsideration. Thus: 'On the basis,
(however), of the papers and evidence on record which you have submitted, it appears
that you have not established that your employment had any causal relationship with the
contraction of the ailment.' Petitioner did not demonstrate that the adverse conditions
mentioned above had direct causal connection with his job which would develop into
cancer of the stomach. (Rollo, pp. 125-126).

The case of Aninias v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, (83 SCRA 806) cited by
the petitioner is not applicable to the cast at bar as the former case applied the
Workmen's Compensation Act. The petitioner's arguments more properly apply claims
falling under the old law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED., The decision of the Government Service

Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission denying the claim are
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158268 April 12, 2006

RHODA CASTOR-GARUPA, herein represented by attorney-in-fact, MS. IMELDA C.

ELECTONA, Petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bayawan District Hospital), Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Workers, whose capabilities have been diminished, if not completely impaired, as a

consequence of their service, ought to be given benefits they deserve under the law.
Compassion for them is not a dole-out, but a right.1

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the decision 2 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67866 dated 17 December 2002 dismissing
petitioner Rhoda Castor-Garupa’s petition for review and affirming respondent
Employees’ Compensation Commission’s (ECC) decision in ECC Case No. MG-11703-
800, and the resolution3 dated 12 May 2003 denying her motion for reconsideration.

The antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Rhoda Castor-Garupa joined the government service on 1 January 1979 as

Resident Physician at the Bayawan District Hospital which has a fifty-bed capacity
located at Zamora Street, Bagawan City, Negros Oriental. On 1 January 1990, she was
promoted to Medical Officer III.4

Sometime in 1994, petitioner started to experience high blood pressure and started to
take medicines by way of self-medication with the help of her husband, Dr. Patrocino G.
Garupa.5 In December 1998, she started to suffer from extreme fatigue and lost her
appetite causing her to lose weight. Fearing that petitioner might be suffering from a
more severe disease, her husband brought her to Cebu City where she was confined at
the Chong Hua Hospital from 1 to 8 February 1999. Petitioner was initially diagnosed with
Chronic Renal Failure secondary to Intrinsic Renal Disease. 6 As a result, she underwent
hemodialysis twice a week.7 She was transferred to the National Kidney and Transplant
Institute (NKTI) where she was confined from 9 to 18 March 1999. The diagnosis was
End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis. On 11 March 1999,
she underwent a kidney transplant with her brother as donor.8

On 16 September 1999, petitioner filed with respondent Government Service Insurance

System (GSIS) a claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, otherwise known as the Employees Compensation Act.9

In a letter dated 4 October 1999, respondent GSIS denied the claim in this wise:
Please be informed that the same cannot be given due course on the ground that
Chronic Renal Failure and Chronic Glomerulonephritis are not among those diseases
listed under "Annex A" of PD 626, as amended.

Section 1(b), Rule III of PD 626, as amended, is explicit in its requirements for
compensability, to wit:

"For the sickness and the resulting disability to be compensable, the sickness must be
the result of an occupational disease listed under "Annex A" of these Rules with the
conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions."

A study of Chronic Glomerulonephritis, the disease that led to your Chronic Rental
Failure, reveals that the disease is not a single entity but a mélange of different diseases
which predominantly affect the glomerular tufts, causing inflammatory changes and
subsequent scarring. It affects all ages but is more frequent before forty. Affects both
sexes but more common in men.

Only a few patients give a clear-cut history of acute nephritis following infection, some
cases of chronic nephritis probably originate in an inapparent infection with streptococcus
following which edema or bloody urine was not noticed, it seems likely that most
instances represent some disease other than poststreptococcal glomerulonephritis. In
other instances evidence for an infectious origin is absent and the beginning of the
disease can be dated only by the last normal examination. Many patients progress into
the terminal stage without even having experienced edema. An occasional patient
develops clear-cut acute glomerulonephritis following respiratory infection, succeeded by
a "nephrotic stage" which yields over a period of years to slowly progressive renal
insufficiency and mounting hypertension, but it is not usual to observe this full sequence
of events in one individual.

The explosive course presents fatigue, anemia and breathless quickly appear,
hypertension is prominent eventhough the heart may not be initially enlarged, the urine
contains large quantities of proteins and red blood cells and may be grossly bloody.

In the slowly progressive course, abnormal urinary findings may be detected in a

completely asymptomatic patient in the course of a routine physical examination.

In view of the foregoing, we regret to deny this claim for benefits under PD 626, as
amended. Criteria for compensability under said law has not been satisfied. 10

Petitioner filed a letter for reconsideration 11 but respondent GSIS treated the same as an
appeal and forwarded the records of the case to respondent ECC.12

The appeal was docketed as ECC Case No. MG-11703-800. In its decision dated 6 April
2001, respondent ECC affirmed respondent GSIS’s finding of non-compensability of
petitioner’s disease and denied the appealed claim. It stated:

The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing - that the illness
was caused by employment and that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by
the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust
fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be
adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed.
Glomerulonephritis is not an occupational disease considering her employment as a
Resident Physician. She must, therefore, prove that her ailment was caused by her
employment or that her working conditions increased the risk of contracting her ailment.

Medical literature describes the nature of Glomerulonephritis as follows:

"Of the many observed forms of Glomerulonephritis, most show evidence of deposits of
antibody-antigen complexes in the glomeruli, the kidney’s filtering units; thus one
common form of the disease occurs two (2) to three (3) weeks after an infection of the
throat or skin with streptococci (a type of germ). Most cases are temporary, but a few
become chronic, leading to kidney failure and Uremia (a serious illness caused by the
inability of the kidneys to eliminate waste products of metabolism." (Robbins, Pathologic
Basis of Disease, 4th edition)

As can be gleaned from the foregoing medical facts, the predisposing factor that might
have given rise to the development of the ailment is not inherent in her working
conditions. Except for the bare allegation that the disease was caused by her
employment and that the risk of contracting the same was increased by her working
conditions, the appellant makes no allegations of essential facts that caused her disease
and how and why her working conditions increased the risk of contracting said disease,
nor was any evidence submitted by appellant to substantiate and support her claim for
benefits under PD 626, as amended. Specifically, she failed to allege in her claim as to
how her employment caused her to contract Glomerulonephritis.

As there was not even a single allegation as to these matters, this Commission has no
basis at all to rule that the appellant got the said disease as a result of or from her job,
and/or that the risk of her contracting said disease was increased by her working
conditions.13

Aggrieved, petitioner, pursuant to Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed her petition
for review with the Court of Appeals raising as the sole issue the compensability of
chronic glomerulonephritis under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. 14 In its
decision15 dated 17 December 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
affirmed in toto the decision of respondent ECC. The motion for reconsideration 16 filed by
petitioner was denied in a resolution dated 12 May 2003. 17 Hence, this instant petition for
review on certiorari.

Petitioner reiterates the sole issue of whether or not her disease, End Stage Renal
Disease secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis, is compensable under Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended. She argues that (1) she was afflicted with the disease
during her employment with the Bayawan District Hospital; (2) there is substantial
evidence to sustain that her employment increased the risk of contracting the disease;
and (3) the law requires merely substantial proof of the risk of contraction and not proof
of the actual or direct causation of the disease.

As required, respondent GSIS filed its Comment on 10 October 2003 18 to which petitioner
filed a reply19 dated 16 December 2004. As regards respondent ECC, the Court
dispensed its filing of a reply. 20 Petitioner and respondent GSIS filed their respective
memoranda.21

Petitioner maintains that she was afflicted with the disease during her employment with
the Bayawan District Hospital. Though she admits that Chronic Glomerulonephritis that
eventually led to End Stage Renal Disease is not listed as an Occupational Disease
under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, she argues that
the Court of Appeals and respondent ECC should have considered the nature and
character of the bacterium that caused her affliction. In fact, she alleges that the letter of
respondent GSIS already emphasized the attendant risk of contracting the disease in her
working environment. She says that since the origin of Glomerulonephritis is not clear-cut
and is hard to determine, the symptoms thereof may be established and recorded. In her
case, the Physician’s Certification and the Employer’s Certification which she submitted
to respondent GSIS clearly established that she suffered hypertension as early as 1994
and displayed sudden loss of appetite, edema and general fatigue in 1998 consistent
with symptoms of chronic glomerulonephritis. All these, she claims, establish that she
contracted the debilitating disease during her employment with the Bayawan District
Hospital.

Petitioner argues that there is substantial evidence that shows that her employment
increased the risk of contracting the disease. She says that respondent ECC found the
cause of glomerulonephritis to be the bacterium streptococcus, while respondent GSIS
declared that chronic glomerulonephritis is not a single entity but a mélange of different
diseases which predominantly affect the glomerular tufts. She explains that if
respondents GSIS and ECC, as well as the Court of Appeals, only reviewed the nature
and character of the bacterium streptococcus, they could have easily found out that same
can be easily contracted by mere inhalation, by direct contact by hands, by aerosol
droplets and by secretions from patients and carriers. She adds that as a practicing rural
1avvphil.net

doctor for almost 20 years, it is inevitable that her duty exposes her to direct contact with
patients. Thus, she claims that the increase in risk or probability of contracting the
disease is neither a mere allegation nor a product of conjecture when one works in a
hospital where a mélange of diseases abound.

In proving risk of contraction, petitioner asserts that only substantial or reasonable proof,
not actual or direct causation of the disease between the work and the ailment, is
required since probability and not certainty is the touchstone.

The Court of Appeals declared that since chronic glomerulonephritis is not an

occupational disease, there is a need to prove the risk of contracting the disease. It
posed the question: Was petitioner successful in proving that the disease she contracted
was work related or connected?

The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to demonstrate how her working
conditions caused her disease and that she did not attempt to show any evidence that
would support her claim for benefits. It added that since petitioner failed to introduce
evidence that would support her position, she cannot rely on the "Increased Risk Theory."

We find merit in the petition.

Under Section 1(b) of Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, for
the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must
be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the
conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. Petitioner was diagnosed
as having End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis.
Admittedly, said disease is not one of those enumerated as an Occupational Disease
under Annex "A" of the ECC Rules. This fact, however, will not prevent petitioner’s claim
from being granted as long as she can show that the risk of contracting said ailment was
increased by her working conditions.

Respondent GSIS stated that petitioner’s Chronic Glomerulonephritis, the disease that
led to her Chronic Rental Failure, is not a single entity but a mélange of different
diseases which predominantly affect the glomerular tufts, while respondent ECC found
the cause of glomerulonephritis to be the bacterium streptococcus. From such findings of
both respondents, it is apparent that glomerulonephritis was caused by an infection. The
classic clinical presentation of poststreptococcal glomerulonephritis is full-blown nephritic
syndrome with oliguric acute renal failure. Physical examination reveals hypervolemia,
edema and hypertension.22

For the increased risk theory to apply in compensation cases, the claimant must adduce
reasonable proof between his work and the cause of the disease, or that the risk of
contracting the disease was increased by the claimant’s working conditions. 23 Strict rules
of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. 24 The degree of proof required
under Presidential Decree No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct
causal relation.25 It is sufficient that the hypothesis on which the workmen’s claim is based
is probable since probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. 26

Inasmuch as petitioner’s disease was not listed as an occupational disease, it is

incumbent upon her to adduce substantial proof that would show that the nature of her
employment or working conditions increased the risk of End Stage Renal Disease or
Chronic Glomerulonephritis. The evidence presented by petitioner shows that her
Chronic Glomerulonephritis that led to End Stage Renal Disease was caused by a
streptococcal infection. She attached the Physician’s Certification and the Employer’s
Certification which clearly established that she suffered hypertension as early as 1994
and displayed sudden loss of appetite, edema and general fatigue in 1998 consistent
with symptoms of chronic glomerulonephritis.

Petitioner is a practicing doctor in a public rural hospital from 1 January 1979 until she
underwent a kidney transplant on 11 March 1999. As a doctor who was in direct contact
with patients, she was more exposed to all kinds of germs and bacteria, thus increasing
the risk of contracting glomerulonephritis. Given the nature of her work, and considering
further that resident physicians work for extended hours, the likelihood of petitioner being
infected by the streptococcus bacterium is, without a doubt, increased. We thus find that
the probability of petitioner contracting chronic glomerulonephritis in her workstation has
been substantiated.

Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the presumption of
compensability and the theory of aggravation prevalent under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act. Despite such abandonment, however, the present law has not ceased
to be an employees’ compensation law or a social legislation; hence, the liberality of the
law in favor of the working man and woman still prevails, and the official agency charged
by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal
attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially in light
of the compassionate policy towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and
enhances.27

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 17 December 2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Government
Service Insurance System is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Rhoda Castor-Garupa the
compensation benefits due her under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78617 June 18, 1990

SALVADOR LAZO, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES), respondents.

Oscar P. Paguinto for petitioner.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 2883
which affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's claim for compensation against the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS).

The petitioner, Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines
assigned to its main office in Malate, Manila. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock
in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986, the petitioner rendered
duty from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the
security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime
duty up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, when he asked permission from
his superior to leave early in order to take home to Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice.

On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, the passenger
jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a result, he
sustained injuries and was taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment. He
was later transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined until 25
July 1986.

For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under PD 626,
as amended. His claim, however, was denied by the GSIS for the reason that —

It appears that after performing your regular duties as Security Guard from 2:00 P.M. to
10:00 P.M. on June 18, 1986, you rendered overtime duty from 10:00 P.M. to 5:06 A.M. of
the following day; that at about 5:06 A.M. after asking permission from your superior you
were allowed to leave the Office to do certain personal matter — that of bringing home a
sack of rice and that, while on your way home, you met a vehicular accident that resulted
to (sic) your injuries. From the foregoing informations, it is evident that you were not at
your work place performing your duties when the incident occurred. 1

It was held that the condition for compensability had not been satisfied.
Upon review of the case, the respondent Employees Compensation Commission
affirmed the decision since the accident which involved the petitioner occurred far from
his work place and while he was attending to a personal matter.

Hence, the present recourse.

The petitioner contends that the injuries he sustained due to the vehicular accident on his
way home from work should be construed as "arising out of or in the course of
employment" and thus, compensable. In support of his prayer for the reversal of the
decision, the petitioner cites the case of Pedro Baldebrin vs. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, where the Court awarded compensation to the petitioner therein who
2

figured in an accident on his way home from his official station at Pagadian City to his
place of residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. In the accident, petitioner's left eye
was hit by a pebble while he was riding on a bus.

Respondents claim that the Baldebrin ruling is a deviation from cases earlier decided and
hence, not applicable to the present case.

The Court has carefully considered the petition and the arguments of the parties and
finds that the petitioner's submission is meritorious. Liberally interpreting the employees
compensation law to give effect to its compassionate spirit as a social legislation in Vda.
3

de Torbela u. ECC, the Court held:

4

It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the
morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way
to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where the
school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he
had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve
of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a
point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work,
such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.

Again in Alano v. ECC, it was reiterated:

5

Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of

Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from
7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A-M., while she was waiting for a
ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and
run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. ...

In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work.
She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to
be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal
about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because
her employment required her to be there.

More recently, in Vano vs. GSIS & ECC, this Court, applying the above quoted
6

decisions, enunciated:

Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau of Posts in Tagbilaran City. On July 31,
1983, a Sunday, at around 3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his motorcycle with his son as
backrider allegedly on his way to his station in Tagbilaran for his work the following day,
Monday. As they were approaching Hinawanan Bridge in Loay, Bohol, the motorcycle
skidded, causing its passengers to be thrown overboard. Vano's head hit the bridge's
railing which rendered him unconscious. He was taken to the Engelwood Hospital where
he was declared dead on arrival due to severe hemorrhage.
We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing rulings. Like the deceased in these two
(2) aforementioned cases, it was established that petitioner's husband in the case at bar
was on his way to his place of work when he met the accident. His death, therefore, is
compensable under the law as an employment accident.

In the above cases, the employees were on their way to work. In the case at bar,
petitioner had come from work and was on his way home, just like in the Baldebrin case,
where the employee "... figured in an accident when he was ping home from his official
station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del
Sur ...." Baldebrin, the Court said:
7

The principal issue is whether petitioner's injury comes within the meaning of and
intendment of the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment.'(Section 2,
Workmen's Compensation Act). In Philippine Engineer's Syndicate, Inc. vs. Flora S.
Martin and Workmen's Compensation Commission, 4 SCRA 356, We held that 'where an
employee, after working hours, attempted to ride on the platform of a service truck of the
company near his place of work, and, while thus attempting, slipped and fell to the
ground and was run over by the truck, resulting in his death, the accident may be said to
have arisen out of or in the course of employment, for which reason his death is
compensable. The fact standing alone, that the truck was in motion when the employee
boarded, is insufficient to justify the conclusion that he had been notoriously negligent,
where it does not appear that the truck was running at a great speed.'And, in a later
case, Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 26
SCRA 102, 103, We ruled that '(e)mployment includes not only the actual doing of the
work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and
from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing,
with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over
the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be
in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in
the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee
was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several
hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was
asked to go on overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home. There is no
evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or
that interruptions occurred in the journey.

While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act (under which the Baldebrin case was decided) may have been
abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is significant that the liberality of the law in
8

general in favor of the workingman still subsists. As agent charged by the law to
implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the Employees
Compensation Commission should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in
deciding claims for compensability, especially where there is some basis in the facts for
inferring a work connection to the accident.

This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of
the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that 'all doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.'

The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree (PD 626) to as many
employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder. This is in consonance with the
avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. 9
There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected for a reasonable
period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before
reaching or after leaving the employer's premises.
10

If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to an employee who was on his way from home
to his work station one day before an official working day, there is no reason to deny
compensation for accidental injury occurring while he is on his way home one hour after
he had left his work station.

We are constrained not to consider the defense of the street peril doctrine and instead
interpret the law liberally in favor of the employee because the Employees Compensation
Act, like the Workmen's Compensation Act, is basically a social legislation designed to
afford relief to the working men and women in our society.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case
be remanded to the ECC and the GSIS for disposition in accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 95595 July 8, 1991

JOSE DE GUIA, Petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES'

COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Respondents. chanrobles virtual law library

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court and Article 181 of the Labor Code (Pres.
Decree No. 442, as amended), filed by petitioner on his own
behalf, challenges the Decision of the Employees'
Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the finding
of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) that
petitioner's ailment "Proliferative Diabetic Retinopathy with
Vitreous Hemorrhage" is not compensable. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner was first employed as storekeeper by the Bureau

of Internal Revenue on 23 March 1956. He later earned
several promotions as Assistant Agent, Assistant Examiner,
Revenue Examiner II, and Senior Revenue Examiner on 7
December 1977, until he became, on 1 August 1985, a
Supervising Revenue Enforcement Officer, which position he
held when disability forced him to retire at age 61 on 1
January 1988. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner claims that sometime in 1982, he experienced

loss of vision for which he consulted an eye specialist who
diagnosed his visual impairment as "the result of continuous
visual insult in the pursuit for his duties, wherein cataract
and vitreous hemorrhage sets in as complication of both
eyes" (Annex A, Petition). Laser photo-coagulation was
prescribed and rendered in 1983 by another eye specialist of
the Eye Referral Center who found petitioner to be suffering
from "Proliferative Diabetic Retinopathy with Vitreous
Hemorrhage" (Petition, pp. 3-4). On 8 August 1986, he
underwent panretinal photo-coagulation at the Southeastern
Eye Center of North Carolina, U.S.A. (ibid.). chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On 19 June 1987, he filed a claim for compensation benefits

under Pres. Decree No. 626. On 3 July 1987, the GSIS
denied his claim on the ground that petitioner's underlying
ailment, "diabetes mellitus," is not listed as an occupational
disease and that it has not been shown that the nature of
his work had increased the risk of his contracting his eye
ailment. This Decision was affirmed by the ECC on 17
January 1990, which ruled:

Our medical research shows that diabetes mellitus

is a disorder of carbohydrate metabolism which
may be classified into primary and secondary
metabolism which may be classified into primary
and secondary type. Genetic susceptibility plays a
role in the pathogenesis of the primary type. The
secondary type may be due to pancreatic disease,
hormonal abnormalities, drugs and chemicals,
insulin receptor, abnormalities, genetic
syndromes and other factors. Complications of
the disease involve the eye, kidney, nerves, blood
vessels and other organs. (Harrison's Principles of
Internal Medicine, Braunwald, et al. 11th
Edition).
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We have conducted a thorough study of the facts

of the case and after a careful analysis of the
evidence submitted, we believe appellant's claim
does not fall within the purview of the Employees
Compensation Law (P.D. 626, as amended). chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The records of the instant case is (sic) bereft of

evidence which would show a causal relation
between the ailment (diabetes mellitus) and
appellant's former employment and working
conditions. The case cannot, therefore, be
considered as compensable. (Rollo, pp. 18-19)

Unsuccessful below, petitioner is now before us. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner alleges that, as Revenue Examiner, he spent
endless hours in examining voluminous income tax returns
which subjected him to constant physical and mental stress
(Petition, p. 7). Citing the case of Millora v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, et al. (G.R. No. 69572, 28 July
1986, 143 SCRA 151), he claims that these stresses in
employment are medically recognized as predisposing
factors in the development of diabetes (Rollo, pp. 11-12).
virtual law library
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles

We are constrained to reject petitioner's submissions. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Under the Labor Code, in order that an employee may be

entitled to sickness benefits, they must have resulted from
any illness (a) definitely accepted as an occupational
disease, or (b) caused by employment, subject to proof that
the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Inasmuch as petitioner's "diabetic retinopathy" and its

underlying ailment, "diabetes mellitus," are not listed in the
Table of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex "A" of
the Rules on Employees' Compensation, petitioner is
required to prove a positive proposition, which is, that the
risk of contracting the disease is increased by working
conditions (Rodriguez v. ECC, G.R. No. 46454, 28
September 1989, 178 SCRA 30). That burden of proof,
petitioner has failed to discharge. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner's "diabetic retinopathy" is a complication linked

with his diabetic condition, from which he was suffering for
twenty-five (25) years. The very medical terminology
emphasizes that complication. In other words, petitioner's
eye condition was not contracted by reason of his
employment but came about as a complication of an
underlying disease. Neither can it be said, therefore, that
the risk of contracting the eye ailment was increased by his
working conditions for irrespective of those conditions, the
complication could have set in. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The underlying ailment, "diabetes mellitus" is neither work

connected. It is a metabolic and a familial disease to which
one is pre-disposed by reason of heredity, obesity or old
age. While petitioner states that no one in his family is
suffering from the illness, genetic susceptibility is a factor
that stretches from generation to generation. And even
assuming that petitioner has satisfactorily proven that he is
not predisposed to the disease due to heredity, he has not
shown that he is not predisposed thereto due to old age or
obesity. Stated otherwise, irrespective of the type of work
that petitioner had been engaged in, he could have
contracted diabetes. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We thus find no causal relation between petitioner's basic

illness, "diabetes mellitus" and its complication "diabetic
retinopathy" with his employment and working conditions
nor can we say that the nature of his work had increased
the risk of his contracting either ailment. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The medical certificate (Annex A, Petition), issued in 1982,

which certified that "visual impairment was the result of
continuous visual insult in the pursuit of his duties, " and
that "cataract and vitreous hemorrhage sets in
as complications of both eyes," carefully avoided any
mention of the cause of the complications, i.e., the patient's
diabetic condition. It was the diagnosis of "diabetic
retinopathy" made by the Eye Referral Center that
pinpointed the exact ailment. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

While, indeed, in the case of Millora (supra), it was

recognized that physical and emotional stresses could be
predisposing factors to the development of diabetes, that
was because it was shown therein that the claimant was not
predisposed to "diabetes mellitus" by reason of old age,
obesity or heredity. Similar proof is wanting herein. What
has been established is that petitioner had been suffering
from diabetes for no less than twenty-five (25) years, which
means even before he became a Revenue Examiner, when
he alleges that he was subjected to physical and emotional
stresses.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the judgment

under review is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-62157 December 1, 1987

EULALIO MORA JR., in representation of his deceased wife, LETICIA ADOR

MORA petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and the GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Telecommunication), respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside and annul the decision dated July
29, 1982 of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No.
1524, which affirmed the decision of respondent Government Service Insurance System,
denying petitioner's claim for compensation benefits under the New Labor Code, for
disability and subsequent death of Leticia Mora.

The undisputed factual background is as follows:

The late Leticia Mora was from 1963 until December 25, 1979 a telegraph operator of the
Bureau of Telecommunications in Tacloban City. During the course of her employment,
and more particularly in January 1978, she complained of frequent epigastric pain
radiating to the periumbilical region. Biopsy conducted at the St. Paul's Hospital in
Tacloban City revealed a diagnosis of adnocarcinoma of the ileocaecal junction (a certain
portion of the small intestine). She underwent "exploratory laparotomy with resection of
ileocaecal junction" but her ailment continued to recur. She filed a claim for disability
benefits under PD 626, as amended, with respondent Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS). The claim was, however, denied by the GSIS on the ground that her
ailment is not an occupational disease considering her particular employment as
telegraph operator. Not satisfied, she sent a letter to the Chairman of respondent
Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) Minister Blas F. Ople, requesting for a
review of her case. She averred that her cancer should be considered by the system as
work-connected since she acquired the same during her sixteen (16) years of
employment. On Nov. 22, 1980, Leticia Mora died. Her appeal to the ECC which was
prosecuted by her husband after her death, was denied, the ECC ruling that the illness
which caused Leticia Mora's death is not work-connected.

Hence, this petition which We find to be meritorious.

The law applicable to the case at bar is the New Labor Code, PD 442, as amended,
which covers injury, sickness, disability or death occurring on or after January 1, 1975.
The new law on employee's compensation makes compensable disability or death
arising from an ailment under any of the following grounds namely: (a) when the illness is
definitely accepted as an occupational disease by the Employees' Compensation
Commission, or (b) when said illness is caused by employment subject to proof that the
risk of contracting the same is increased by the work conditions.

Thus, the New Labor Code particularly Art. 167 (1) as amended by PD 1368, defining
compensable illness, provides:

(1) "Sickness" means any illness definitely accepted as occupational disease listed by
the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the
Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-
related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of
employment. (As amended by Sec. 1, PD 1368).

Implementing the foregoing provision, the Employees' Compensation Commission

promulgated its amended Rules, Section 1 (b), Rule III , of which provides:

Sec. 1 (b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under "ANNEX "A" of these
Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the
risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.

The cause of the decedent's death, is not listed in said Annex "A" as occupational
disease. To be compensable thereby the law requires that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the employment of the deceased. But this requisite proof can be
given only if the cause of the disease cancer can itself be known. However, despite
scientific advances on the matter, even professional experts have not as yet determine its
cause. All that they can say regarding the ailment of the deceased is the following:

Adenocarcinoma ileocaecal junction is malignancy affecting a certain portion of the small

intestines.

Carcinoma of the small intestine occurs more frequently in the male sex with the highest
incidence in the fourth, fifth and sixth decades. Histologically, these carcinomas are
classified into four types: adenocarcinoma medullary, scirrhous and colloid.

The clinical manifestations are variable and depend upon the location, size and character
of the tumor and the degree of malignancy. They are predominantly those of intestinal
obstruction. A history of abdominal distress and pain is frequent. When the tumor
becomes sufficiently large, a movable, palpable mass may be present." (Cecil and
Loeb A Textbook of Medicine, 10th ed., p. 854). (Cited in Comment of respondent ECC,
p. 34).

As stated in Our decisions in Mercado, Jr. v. Employees Compensation Commission, 139

SC0RA 270 citing Cristobal v. ECC, 103 SCRA 329, and Flaviano Nemaria v. Employees'
Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of
Education and Culture promulgated on October 28, 1987, the necessity of proof is
present only when the cause of the disease is known. If not known, there is no duty to
present proof, for the law does not demand an impossibility. Thus, in the Mercado, Jr. v.
Employees Compensation Commission case, We held:

While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation espoused under
the Workmen's Compensation Act may have abandoned under the New Labor Code (the
constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the
liberality of the law in general still subsists.

... As agents charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by
both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in
deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for
inferring a work connection, 103 SCRA 329, 336).

... Where however, the causes of an ailment are unknown to and or undetermined even
by medical science, the requirement of proof of any casual link between the ailment and
the working conditions should be liberalized so that those who have less in life will have
more in law ... .

... The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award of
compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment-the cause or origin of which
is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science-was, in fact caused or the risk
of contracting the same enhanced by his working conditions. Plainly, the condition would
be an impossible one, specially considering that said claimant is most probably not even
conversant with the intricacies of medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of
the material resources to employ medical experts to demonstrate the connection
between the cause and the disease. Considering the liberal character of employment
compensation schemes, the impossible condition should be deemed as not having been
intended and/or imposed. (139 SCRA, pp. 275- 276).

... As an employee, he had contributed to the funds of respondent for 34 years until his
forced retirement. In turn respondent should comply with its duty to give him the fullest
protection, relief and compensation benefits as guaranteed by law." (Ibid., pp. 277).

In the more recent case of Flaviano Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation Commission

and Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of Education and Culture), (supra)
we stated that:

Thus the requirement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment or
work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined or proved. Where
cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the link exists. For certainly,
the law cannot demand an impossibility.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the

respondent Employees Compensation Commission is SET ASIDE and another is
rendered ordering the respondents to pay the herein petitioner the full amount of
compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-58445 April 27, 1989

ZAIDA G. RARO, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences), respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a source of

confusion among the claimants and the government agencies enforcing the employees'
compensation law. The strongly lingering influence of the principles of 94 presumption of
compensability" and "aggravation" found in the defunct Workmen's Compensation Act but
expressly discarded under the present compensation scheme has led to conflict and
inconsistency in employees' compensation decisions.

The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the new principle of "proof
of increased risk." There are two approaches to a solution in cases where it cannot be
proved that the risk of contracting an illness not listed as an occupational disease was
increased by the claimant's working conditions. The one espoused by the petitioner
insists that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary work connection because the
causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that working conditions
increased the risk of contracting the ailment. On the other hand, the respondents state
that if there is no proof of the required work connection, the disease is not compensable
because the law says so.

The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by the
Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office on
March 17, 1975. About four years later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent
headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take sick leaves every now and
then, she sought medical treatment in Manila. She was then a Mining Recorder in the
Bureau.
The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain
tumor. By that time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning power had been
lost.

A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) was denied. A motion for reconsideration was similarly denied.
An appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission resulted in the Commission's
affirming the GSIS decision.

The following issues are raised in this petition:

1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during employment is
compensable under the present compensation laws.

2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the

present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease. (p. 17,
Rollo)

The key argument of the petitioner is based on the fact that medical science cannot, as
yet, positively identify the causes of various types of cancer. It is a disease that strikes
people in general. The nature of a person's employment appears to have no relevance.
Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one who works on
land, in water, or in the bowels of the earth. It makes the difference whether the victim is
employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a
housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.

It is not also correct to say that all cancers are not compensable. The list of occupational
diseases prepared by the Commission includes some cancers as compensable, namely
—

Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment

xxx xxx xxx xxx

16. Cancer of stomach and other Woodworkers, wood products lymphatic and blood
forming vessels; industry carpenters, nasal cavity and sinuses and employees in pulp
and paper mills and plywood mills.

17. Cancer of the lungs, liver Vinyl chloride workers, and brain plastic workers.

(Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation)

The petitioner questions the above listing. We see no arbitrariness in the Commission's
allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be compensated for brain cancer.
There are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by
specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over
a long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust,
among others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks of contracting specific
cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.

The first thing that stands in the way of the petition is the law itself.

Presidential Decree No. 422, as amended, the Labor Code of the Philippines defines
"sickness" as follows:
ART. 167. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Title unless the context indicates
otherwise:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by
the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee
that the risk of contracting the same is by working conditions. For this purpose, the Co on
is empowered to determine and approve occupational and work- related illnesses that
may be considered compensable sable based on hazards of employment. (PD 1368,
May 1, 1978).

Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation clearly defines
who are entitled. It provides:

SECTION 1.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness
must be the result of an occupational disease under Annex A of these rules with the
conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increase by the working conditions. (Emphasis supplied)

The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – the illness was
caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund
has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced.
The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed .

In Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988)
this Court recognized the fact that cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which
strikes; people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a
particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions (e. g. chemical fumes,
nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot conclude that it was the employment
which increased the risk of contracting the disease .

To understand why the "Presumption of compensability" together with the host of

decisions interpreting the "arising out of and in the course of employment" provision of
the defunct law has been stricken from the present law, one has to go into the distinctions
between the old workmen's compensation law and the present scheme.

On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel scheme
under the new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the concepts of
"presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on
social security principles. The present system is also administered by social insurance
agencies — the Government Service Insurance System and Social Security System —
under the Employees' Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible
equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the
employee's right to receive reparation for work- connected death or disability. (Sulit v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980]; Armena v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851 [1983]; Erese v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 138 SCRA 192 [1985]; De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 142 SCRA 92 [1986]; Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission,
et al., GR No. 65680, May 11, 1988).
Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we
now have a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by employers to a
trust fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement.

In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (supra), we affirmed the validity

of the new law by explaining the present system as follows:

We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attack against the

constitutionality of the new law on employee's compensation. It must be noted that the
petitioner filed his claim under the provisions of this same law. It was only when his claim
was rejected that he now questions the constitutionality of this law on appeal by
certiorari.

The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and rejected
claims according to its provisions. We find in it no infringement of the worker's
constitutional rights.

xxx xxx xxx

The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers
based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his
right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim There is no notice of injury nor
requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral
Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the
employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may
be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The
amount of death benefits has also been doubled.

On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to
the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for
compensation payments or set up its own fund to meet these contingencies. It does not
have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's
compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fired under its
exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it
has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of
Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from
an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on
presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The
lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization
through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent.

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. There is no
serious attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.

The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that should
be addressed to the President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not the former
workmen's compensation program with its presumptions, controversions, adversarial
procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the present scheme must be decided
by the political departments. The present law was enacted in the belief that it better
complies with the mandate on social justice and is more advantageous to the greater
number of working men and women. Until Congress and the President decide to improve
or amend the law, our duty is to apply it. (at pp. 4, 5, and 6)

The non-adversarial nature of employees' compensation proceedings is crucial to an

understanding of the present scheme. There is a widespread misconception that the poor
employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer.
Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now
the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are
not entitled under the law. The employer joins its employees in trying to have their claims
approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving a negative proposition that the
disease was not caused by employment. It is a government institution which protects the
stability and integrity of the State Insurance Fund against the payment of non-
compensable claims. The employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to
prove a positive proposition, that the risk of contracting the is increased by working
conditions.

The social insurance aspect of the present law is the other important feature which
distinguishes it from the old and familiar system.

Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All covered employers

throughout the country are required by law to contribute fixed and regular premiums or
contributions to a trust fund for their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust fund. At
the time the amount of contributions was being fixed, actuarial studies were undertaken.
The actuarially determined number of workers who would probably file claims within any
given year is important in insuring the stability of the said fund and making certain that
the system can pay benefits when due to all who are entitled and in the increased
amounts fixed by law.

We have no actuarial expertise in this Court. If diseases not intended by the law to be
compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance
Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law
ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to winch the tens of millions
of workers and their families look for compensation whenever covered accidents, salary
and deaths occur. As earlier stated, if increased contributions or premiums must be paid
in order to give benefits to those who are now excluded, it is Congress which should
amend the law after proper actuarial studies. This Court cannot engage in judicial
legislation on such a complex subject with such far reaching implications.

We trust that the public respondents and the Social Security System are continually
evaluating the actuarial soundness of the trust funds they administer. In this way, more
types of cancers and other excluded diseases may be included in the list of covered
occupational diseases. Or legislation may be recommended to Congress either
increasing the contribution rates of employers, increasing benefit payments, or making it
easier to prove entitlement. We regret that these are beyond the powers of this Court to
accomplish.

For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practising lawyers concerned, this
decision expressly supersedes the decisions in Panotes v. Employees' Compensation
Commission [128 SCRA 473 (1984)]; Mercado v. Employees' Compensation
Commission [127 SCRA 664 (1984)]; Ovenson v. Employees' Compensation
Commission [156 SCRA 21 (1987)]; Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation
Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases with conclusions different from
those stated above.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED The questioned decision of the public
respondents is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-26341 November 27, 1968

ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO., petitioner,

vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO, for herself
and in behalf of her minor children EDWIN, EDGAR and EDNA, all surnamed
PABLO, respondents.

Luisito C. Hofilena for petitioner.

Villavieja and Villanueva for respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission.
Gualberto C. Opong for respondent Irenea M. Pablo and her minor children.

CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (hereinafter referred to as
the IDECO) from the decision dated February 28, 1966 of the Workmen's Compensation
Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) affirming the decision of the
Regional Office VII in Iloilo City, and ordering the IDECO to pay to the widow and children
of Teodoro G. Pablo (Irenea M. Pablo and the minors Edwin, Edgar and Edna, all
surnamed Pablo) the sum of P4,000, to pay to the widow P89 as reimbursement for
burial expenses and P300 as attorney's fees, and to pay to the Commission the amount
of P46 as fees pursuant to section 55 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended.

At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was employed as
a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way home, was shot to death in front of,
and about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO gate, on a private road commonly
called the IDECO road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard to say anything before
or after the killing. The motive for the crime was and still is unknown as Cordero was
himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo's death. At the time of the killing, Pablo's
companion was Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like Pablo, had finished
overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main IDECO gate to the spot
where Pablo was killed, there were four "carinderias" on the left side of the road and two
"carinderias" and a residential house on the right side. The entire length of the road is
nowhere stated in the record.

According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death occurred
in the course of employment and in presuming that it arose out of the employment; (2) in
applying the "proximity rule;" and (3) in holding that Pablo's death was an accident within
the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The principal issue is whether Pablo's death comes within the meaning and intendment
of that "deceptively simple and litigiously prolific", 1 phrase The two components of the
coverage formula — "arising out of" and "in the course of employment." 2 The two
components of the coverage formula — "arising out of" and "in the course of
employment" — are said to be separate tests which must be independently
satisfied;3 however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation
coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, "work-connection,"
because an uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two
portions of the test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries. 4 The
words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its
character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances
under which the accident takes place.5

As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of
employment" when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where
the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in
doing something incidental thereto.6

The general rule in workmen's compensation law known as the "going & coming rule,"
simply stated, is that "in the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in,
going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen's
compensation acts."7 This rule, however, admits of four well-recognized exceptions, to
wit: (1) where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his
employer; (2) where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of his
employer by way of the exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress; (3) where
the employee is charged, while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his
home, or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected with his
employment; and (4) where the employer, as an incident of the employment, provides the
means of transportation to and from the place of employment. 8

We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the second

exception, i.e., injuries sustained off the premises of the employer, but while using a
customary means of ingress and egress.

This exception, known as the "proximity rule," was applied in Philippine Fiber Processing
Co., Inc. vs. Ampil.9 There, the employee, at about 5:15 a.m., while proceeding to his
place of work and running to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch fronting the main
gate of the employer's factory, as a result of which he died the next day. The sole
question was whether or not the accident which caused the employee's death arose out
of and in the course of his employment. This Court ruled in favor of the claimant thus:
The very case of Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co. invoked by the petitioner
intimated that "we do not of course mean to imply that an employee can never recover for
injuries suffered while on his way to or from work. That depends on the nature of his
employment." Considering the facts found by the Commission, namely, that the deceased
Angel Ariar was not under any shift routine; that his assignment covered the entire
working hours of the factory; that the first working hour starts at 6:00 o'clock in the
morning; that it takes at least thirty minutes before the machine operates at full speed or
load; that the spot where he fell (ditch fronting petitioner's factory or sidewalk of its
premises), is immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must
be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore arose out
of and in the course thereof. In Salilig vs. Insular Lumber Co., G.R. No. 28951,
September 10, 1928, referred to in the Comments on the Workmen's Compensation
Commission Act by Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition, compensation was allowed for injury
received by a laborer from an accident in going to his place of work, along a path or way
owned by his employer and commonly used by the latter's laborers.

In contrast is Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz,10 which concerned
injuries sustained by a centrifugal operator. He had reported for work at 9:30 p.m. (March
7, 1958) and was dismissed at 5:30 the following morning. Soon "after he stepped out of
the company gate, and while standing about 2-½ meters from it between the shoulder of
the highway and a railroad that came from inside the compound and intersected the
highway, waiting for a ride home, he was bumped by a jeepney, as a result of which he
sustained" injuries. In holding that these injuries were "not produced by an accident
"arising out of and in the course of employment," " this Court reasoned thus:

The compensability of an injury suffered by an employee proceeding to or coming from

his work depends upon whether or not it is "work-connected." As Chief Justice Kenison of
New Hampshire has put it, "the fact that the employee is travelling to or from work on a
public highway does not necessarily exclude coverage (Brousseau vs. Blackstone Mills,
130 A 2d 543, 545). Conversely, it is not enough to say that the employee would not have
been on the public highway had it not been for his job, since the same can usually be
said of the general public (Payne & Dolan vs. Industrial Commission, 46 NE 2d 925). The
law, in effect, insures the employee against losses arising from the perils of his work. In
other words, the Workmen's Compensation Act covers occupational injuries, which, as
such, must have a causative connection with something, not merely in common with the
public, but peculiar to the employment. In order to warrant recovery for off-the-premises
injuries, it must be shown that there has been a very special danger, some particular risk
which the employer could have caused or allowed to exist. Hence,

It is significant that practically all successful off-the-premises cases have involved normal
route of access to the plant, or an icy sidewalk adjacent to the premises and
therefore identified with the premises in the sense that the employer should have
removed the ice. (Emphasis ours.)

It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. v. Ampil, G.R. No. L-8130 (June 30,
1956), we held the employer liable for an injury sustained by an employee who, as he
was running to his place of work to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch in front of
the factory's main gate and near the same. The ditch was, however, in itself an obvious
hazard which, owing to its proximity to the gate, the employer should have taken
measures to remove. Thus, thru his inaction, he had contributed, in a special way, to the
occurrence of the accident.

In the case at bar, no such special circumstance appears to exist. There is

no particular causative connection between the injury sustained by the employee and
either his work or his employer. Although, as stated in the decision appealed from, the
record does not show that the company "had taken measures to make the waiting place
safe for the employees," neither does the record show either that the accident occurred
at the usual waiting place of the employees, or that said place was particularly unsafe.

Our Workmen's Compensation Act being essentially American in origin and text, it is not
amiss to pay deference to pertinent American jurisprudence. In the precise area of law
here involved, we can draw guidance from an affluence of Federal and State precedents.

From Samuel B. Horovitz' Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation

Laws (1944), pp. 159 to 165, we glean the following observations:

Suppose, however, that the injury occurs on the way to work or on the way home from
work. Injuries going to or from work have caused many judicial upheavals.

The question here is limited to whether the injuries are "in the course of" and not "out of"
the employment. How the injury occurred is not in point. Street risks, whether the
employee was walking or driving, and all other similar questions deal with the risk of
injury or "out of" the employment. "In the course of" deals mainly with the element of time
and space, or "time, place and circumstances."

Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working hours and within one hundred
feet of the employer's premises, on sidewalks or public roads, the question of "in the
course of" the employment is flatly raised.

Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of "in the course of" to include these
injuries. Most of the states will protect the employee from the moment his foot or person
reaches the employer's premises, whether he arrives early or late. These states find
something sacred about the employment premises and define "premises" very
broadly, not only to include premises owned by the employer, but also premises leased,
hired, supplied or used by him, even private alleyways merely used by the employer.
Adjacent private premises are protected by many states, and a few protect the employee
even on adjacent public sidewalks and streets. Where a city or any employer owns or
controls an island, all its streets are protected premises.

There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for a reasonable
period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before
reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. The Supreme Court of the United
States has declared that it will not overturn any state decision that so enlarges the scope
of its act. Hence, a deaf worker, trespassing on railroad tracks adjacent to his employer's
brick-making premises (but shown by his superintendent the specific short crossing over
the track), and killed by a train, was held to be in the course of his employment when hit
by an oncoming train fifteen minutes before his day would have begun. So long as causal
relation to the employment is discernible, no federal question arises.

The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he crosses the
employment threshold is itself subject to many exceptions. Off-premises injuries to or
from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are compensable (1) if the employee is on
the way to or from work in a vehicle owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a
public (e.g., the employer's street car) or private conveyance; (2) if the employee is
subject to call at all hours or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is travelling for
the employer, i.e., travelling workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employee's time
from the moment he leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the employee is on his
way to do further work at home, even though on a fixed salary; (6) where the employee is
required to bring his automobile to his place of business for use there. Other exceptions
undoubtedly are equally justified, dependent on their own peculiar circumstances.

Schneider (supra, at p. 117) makes this significant statement:

The proximity rule exception to the general going and coming rule is that an employee is
generally considered to be in the course of his employment while coming to or going from
his work, when, though off the actual premises of his employer, he is still in close
proximity thereto, is proceeding diligently at an appropriate time, by reasonable means,
over the natural, practical, customary, convenient and recognized way of ingress, or
egress either on land under the control of the employer, or on adjacent property with the
express or implied consent of the employer.

On pp. 98 to 99 of 85 ALR, we find the following disquisition:

The compensation acts have been very generally held not to authorize an award in case
of an injury or death from a peril which is common to all mankind, or to which the public
at large is exposed. 28 R.C. L. 804. And they do not as a general rule cover injuries
received while going to or from work on public streets, where the employee has not
reached, or has left the employer's premises. The question whether an injury arises out
of and in the course of the employment, however, is one dependent upon the facts of
each case, and in some cases, where an injury occured while the employee was going to
or from work, but was in the street in front of the employer's premises, it has been held
compensable.

Thus, in the reported case (Barnett v. Brtiling Cafeteria Co., ante, 85) the injury was held
to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, where the employee slipped
on ice on the sidewalk immediately in front of the employer's place of business, while on
her way to report for duty, and just before entering by the only entrance to her place of
employment. The court here recognized the general rule that, if an employee is injured
while going to or from his work to his house, or to or from some point not visited for the
discharge of a duty arising out of the employment, or while in the use of a public highway,
he does not come within the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but stated
that there is an exception to this rule and that the employment is not limited by the actual
time when the workman reaches the scene of his labor and begins it, or when he ceases,
but includes a reasonable time and opportunity before and after, while he is at or near his
place of employment. The court reasoned that in the case at bar, although the employee
had not entered the employer's place of business, and the sidewalk was a public
highway so much therefore as was in front of the employer's place of business was a
necessary adjunct, used in connection with the business, and that the sidewalk was to a
limited degree and purpose a part of the employer's premises.

In Industrial Commission v. Barber (1927) 117 Ohio St 373, 159 NE 363, the injury was
held to have arisen in the course of the employment where an employee, about five
minutes before the hour when he was to go on duty, was struck by an automobile owned
and driven by another employee, within a short distance from the employer's plant, which
was located at the dead end of a street maintained by the employer from its plant to the
intersection with another street, and, although the street was a public one, it led nowhere
except to the employer's plant, and all of its employees were obliged to use it in going to
and from their work. The court stated that where the conditions under the control of an
industrial plant are such that the employee has no option but to pursue a given course
with reference to such conditions and environments, the pursuance of such course is an
implied obligation of the employer in his contract with such employee, and that when he,
for the purpose of entering his employment, has entered into the sphere or zone
controlled by his employer and is pursuing a course with reference to which he has no
option, he is then not only within the conditions and environments of the plant of his
employer, but is then in the course of his employment; and that, when he receives an
injury attributable to such conditions and environments, there is a direct causal
connection between his employment and his injury, and the injury falls within the class of
industrial injuries for which compensation has been provided by the Workmen's
Compensation Law.
99 C.J.S., at pp. 807-814, has this to say:

It is laid down as a general rule, known as the "going and coming" rule, that, in the
absence of special circumstances, and except in certain unusual circumstances, and
where nothing else appears, harm or injury sustained by an employee while going to or
from his work is not compensable. Such injury, or accident, is regarded by the weight of
authority of many courts as not arising out of his employment, and as not being, or not
occurring, in the course thereof.

However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of inevitable application, and is subject to
qualifications, and to exceptions which depend on the nature, circumstances, and
conditions of the particular employment, the circumstances of the particular case, and the
cause of the injury.

Jaynes vs. Potlach Forests11 expresses with enlightening clarity the rationale for
extending the scope of "course of employment" to certain "off-premises" injuries:

We are urged here to again recognize and apply the distinction between off-premises
injuries which occur on private property and those which occur on public streets and
highways. The extension of the course of employment to off-premises injuries is not
based upon the principle which would justify a distinction upon the narrow ground of
private and public property; it is not sound to say that while an employee is on public
highway he is always there as a member of the public and in nowise in the exercise of
any right conferred by his contract to employment; nor is it a complete answer to say that
while he is on his employer's premises his presence there is by contract right, otherwise
he would be a trespasser. The question of whether or not one is a covered employee
should not be resolved by the application of the law relating to rights to enter upon lands,
or by law of trespass, licensee, invitee or otherwise.

A substantial and fair ground to justify the extension of the course of employment beyond
the premises of the employer is to extend its scope to the necessary risks and hazards
associated with the employment. These risks may or may not be on the premises of the
employer and for this reason there is no justification to distinguish between extended
risks on public highways and private pathways. In fact it is at most a distinction without a
difference. Under the better reasoned cases the technical status as public or private is
obviously of no moment or in any event in and of itself is not conclusive.

Likewise enlightening is the following explanation of the premises rule exceptions:

We have, then a workable explanation of the exception to the premises rule: it is not
nearness, or reasonable distance, or even the identifying or surrounding areas with the
premises; it is simply that, when a court has satisfied itself that there is a distinct "arising
out of" or causal connection between the conditions under which claimant must approach
and leave the premises and the occurrence of the injury, it may hold that the course of
employment extends as far as those conditions extend. (Larson's Workmen's
Compensation Law, 1965 ed., vol. 1, pp. 210-211)

We now direct our attention to the cause of the employee's death: assault.

An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered an

"accident" within the meaning of sec. 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, since the
word "accident" is intended to indicate that "the act causing the injury shall be casual or
unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally responsible." 12

In the cases where the assault was proven to have been work-connected, compensation
was awarded. In Nava, supra, the helmsman of a boat was engaged in hauling the ship's
cable and in coiling the cable partly occupied by a folding bed of one of the passengers.
This passenger, upon being asked, declared his ownership of the bed. Nava expressed
his intention of pushing it out of the way and proceeded to do so. Angered by this, the
passenger exchanged hot words with Nava, and then, with a piece of wood, jabbed Nava
at the pit of the stomach. At this point, the passenger's brother ran up to Nava and
stabbed him to death. The death was adjudged compensable.

In Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. Vda. de Mandaguit,13 the truck which Mandaguit
was driving collided with a cyclist going in the opposite direction. The latter turned around
and immediately pursued the bus. He overtook it a few minutes later when it stopped to
take on passengers. The driver then disembarked from the bus to wash his hands at a
drugstore nearby. The cyclist followed him there and knifed him to death. We affirmed the
grant of compensation upon the finding that the death arose out of and in the course of
employment.

In Galicia vs. Dy Pac,14 the employee, Pablo Carla, was asked to work in lieu of another
employee who had been suspended from work upon request of his labor union; while
Carla was working, the suspended employee asked him to intercede for him, but Carla
refused; an altercation resulted; shortly thereafter the suspended employee stabbed
Carla to death. The death was held compensable because "the injury sustained by the
deceased was caused by an accident arising out of his employment since the evidence is
clear that the fight which resulted in the killing of the deceased had its origin or cause in
the fact that he was placed in the job previously occupied by the assailant."

In the three cases above-cited, there was evidence as to the motive of the assailant.

In A. P. Santos, Inc. vs. Dabacol,15 the death of an employee-driver who, while driving a
cab, was killed by an unidentified passenger, was held compensable by the Commission.
However, the question of whether the assault arose out of the employment, was not
raised on appeal to this Court.

In Batangas Transportation Company vs. Vda. de Rivera,16 that question was raised.
While the employee-driver was driving a bus, a passenger boarded it and sat directly
behind the driver. After about thirty minutes, during which the passenger and the driver
never so much as exchanged a word, the passenger shot the driver to death and then
fled. There was no competent proof as to the cause of the assault, although there were
intimations that the incident arose from a personal grudge. The majority decision 17 ruled
the death compensable. The bases: (1) Once it is proved that the employee died in the
course of the employment, the legal presumption, in the absence of substantial evidence
to the contrary, is that the claim "comes within the provisions of the compensation law"
(sec. 43), in other words, that the incident arose out of the workman's employment. (2)
Doubts as to rights to compensation are resolved in favor of the employee and his
dependents. (3) The Commissioner's declaration on the work-connection might be
binding on the Court. (4) There are employments which increase the risk of assault on
the person of the employee and it is in that sense that an injury or harm sustained by the
assaulted worker arises out of the employment, because the increased risk to assault
supplies the link or connection between the injury and the employment. Among the jobs
enumerated as increasing the risk of assault are (a) jobs having to do with keeping the
peace or guarding property; (b) jobs having to do with keeping or carrying of money
which subject to the employee to the risk of assault because of the increased temptation
to robbery; (c) jobs which expose the employee to direct contact with lawless and
irresponsible members of the community, like that of a bartender; and (d) work as bus
driver, taxi driver or street car conductor.

It has been said that an employment may either increase risk of assault because of its
nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault. The first kind of
employment, the so-called "increased risk" jobs comprehend (1) jobs involving
dangerous duties, such as that of guarding the employer's property, that of carrying or
keeping money, that where the employee is exposed to lawless or irresponsible members
of the public, or that which subjects him to increased or indiscriminate contact with the
public, such as the job of a street car conductor or taxi-driver; 18 (2) jobs where the
employee is placed in a dangerous environment; 19 and (3) jobs of employees whose work
takes them on the highway. On the other hand, the employment itself may be the subject-
matter of a dispute leading to the assault as where a supervisor is assaulted by workmen
he has fired, or where the argument was over the performance of work or possession of
tools or the like, or where the violence was due to labor disputes. 20

In Rivera, supra, the unexplained assault on the employee was considered to

have arisen out of the employment because it occurred in the course of employment.
This Court relied on the presumption of law that in any proceeding for the enforcement of
a claim, the claim is presumed to come within the provisions of the Act. 21 According to this
Court, "this statutory presumption was copied from New York." Concerning the
corresponding New York provision of law, Larson has this to say:

In a few jurisdictions, notably New York and Massachusetts, a statutory presumption in

favor of coverage has figured in unexplained-accident cases. The Massachusetts statute
provides:

In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed, or is physically or
mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to
the contrary, that the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter, that sufficient
notice of the injury has been given, and that the injury or death was not occasioned by
the wilful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another.

This provision was largely copied from the New York section on presumptions, except
that the New York act creates the presumption in all cases, not merely those involving an
employee's death or inability to testify.

The sweeping inclusiveness of this language might seem at first glance to mean that the
mere making of a claim is also the making of a prima facie case, as long as death or
injury is shown to have occurred. The New York and Massachusetts courts have not so
interpreted these statutes, however. It seems to be necessary to establish some kind of
preliminary link with the employment before the presumption can attach. Otherwise, the
claimant widow would have merely to say, "My husband, who was one of your employee,
has died, and I therefore claim death benefits," whereupon the affirmative burden would
devolve upon the employer to prove that there was no connection between the death and
the environment.

It is not yet entirely clear what initial demonstration of employment-connection will give
the presumption a foothold. Apparently, the idea is to rule out cases in which claimant
can show neither that the injury occurred in the course of employment nor that it arose
out of it, as where he contracted a disease but has no evidence to show where he got it.
If there is evidence that the injury occurred in the course of employment, the presumption
will usually supply the "arising-out-of-employment" factor." Larson's Workmen
Compensation Law (1965) vol. 1, pp. 123-124.

We also quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Daus vs.
Gunderman & Sons:22

The statute is not intended to relieve completely an employee from the burden of
showing that accidental injuries suffered by him actually were sustained in the course of
his employment. "It is not the law that mere proof of an accident, without other evidence,
creates the presumption under section 21 of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol.
Law, c. 67) that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. On the
contrary, it has been frequently held, directly and indirectly, that there must be some
evidence from which the conclusion can be drawn that the injuries did arise out of and in
the course of the employment." Proof of the accident will give rise to the statutory
presumption only where some connection appears between the accident and the
employment.

Likewise of relevance is the following treatise:

The discussion of the coverage formula, "arising out of and in the course of employment,"
was opened with the suggestion that, while "course" and "arising" were put under
separate headings for convenience, some interplay between the two factors should be
observed in the various categories discussed.

A few examples may now be reviewed to show that the two tests, in practice, have not
been kept in air-tight compartments, but have to some extent merged into a single
concept of work-connection. One is almost tempted to formulate a sort of quantum theory
of work-connection: that a certain minimum quantum of work-connection must be shown,
and if the "course" quantity is very small, but the "arising" quantity is large, the quantum
will add up to the necessary minimum, as it will also when the "arising" quantity is very
small but the "course" quantity is relatively large.

But if both the "course" and "arising" quantities are small, the minimum quantum will not
be met.

As an example of the first, a strong "arising" factor but weak "course" factor, one may cite
the cases in which recoveries have been allowed off the employment premises, outside
business hours, when an employee going to or coming from work is injured by a hazard
distinctly traceable to the employment, such as a traffic jam overflowing from the
employment premises, or a rock flying through the air from a blast on the premises. Here,
by normal course of employment standards, there would be no award, since the
employee was not on the premises while coming or going. Yet the unmistakable
character of the causal relation of the injury to the employment has been sufficient to
make up for the weakness of the "course" factor. Another example of the same kind of
balancing-out is seen in the line of cases dealing with injury to travelling men or loggers
while sleeping in hotels or bunkhouses. It was shown in the analysis of these cases that,
although the "course" factor is on the borderline when the employee is sound asleep at
the time of injury, a strong causal relation of the injury to the conditions of employment —
as where a fellow-logger runs amok, or a straw falls into the bunkhouse-inmate's throat
from the mattress above, or the employee is trapped in a burning hotel — will boost the
case over the line to success; while a weak causal connection, as where the salesman
merely slips in a hotel bath, coupled with a weak "course" factor due to the absence of
any direct service performed for the employer at the time, will under present decisions
add up to a quantum of work-connection too small to support an award. It was also
shown that when the "course" element is strengthened by the fact that the employee is at
all times on call, the range of compensable sources of injury is broader than when the
employee, although living on the premises is not on call.

A somewhat similar balancing-out process is seen in the holding that a borderline course-
of-employment activity like seeking personal comfort or going to and from work falls short
of compensability if the method adopted is unusual, unreasonable and dangerous, while
no such restriction applies to the direct performance of the work.

As an example of the reverse situation, a strong "course" element and a weak "arising"
element; one may recall the "positional" cases discussed in section 10, as well as the
unexplained-fall and other "neutral-cause" cases. Here the course of employment test is
satisfied beyond the slightest doubt: the employee is in the midst of performing the active
duties of his job. But the causal connection is very weak, since the source of the injury —
whether a stray bullet, a wandering lunatic, and unexplained fall or death, or a mistaken
assault by a stranger — is not distinctly associated with employment conditions as such,
and is tied to the employment only by the argument that the injury would not have
occurred to this employee but for the obligation of the employment which placed him in
the position to be hurt. Yet, since the "course" element is so strong, awards are becoming
increasingly common on these facts.

Incidentally, it may be observed that this "quantum" idea forms a useful yardstick for
measuring just how generous a court has become in expanding compensation coverage;
for if a court makes an award when a case, by the above standards, is weak both on
course of employment and on causal connection, one can conclude that the court is
capable of giving the act a broad construction. Thus, an award was made in Puffin v.
General Electric, where the course element was weak (rest period) and the causal
element was weak (setting fire to own sweater while smoking). Both factors were likewise
very weak in O'Leary v. Brown Pacific-Maxon Inc., where the course of employment
consisted of a recreation period interrupted by a rescue of a stranger, and the arising
factor consisted of drowning in a channel where decedent was prohibited from going.
And, in Martin v. Plaut, the course of employment factor was weak (a cook dressing in
the morning) and the causal factor was also weak (an unexplained fall); yet an award
was made in New York.

But another New York case shows that the simultaneous weakness of course and arising
factors may reach the point where the requisite quantum is not found. In Shultz v. Nation
Associates, compensation was denied to an employee who while combing her hair
preparatory to going to lunch negligently struck her eye with the comb. Here we see
thinness on all fronts: as to course of employment time factor, we have a lunch period; as
to the course of employment activity factor, we have care of personal appearance; and as
to the causal factor, we have negligence of the employee. Each weakness standing alone
— lunch period, care of appearance, negligence — would not be fatal; there are many
awards in which one or another of these is present. But when all are present, while an
award is not impossible and could be defended on a point by point basis, it cannot be
relied upon in most jurisdictions by the prudent lawyer. Larson's Workmen's
Compensation Law 1965 ed. Vol. 1, pp. 452.97 to 452.100.

In resume:

1. Workmen's compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident which arise
out of and in the course of employment.

2. Both the "arising" factor and the "course" factor must be present. If one factor is weak
and the other is strong, the injury is compensable, but not where both factors are weak.
Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work-connected.

3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same is presumed to come within
the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a preliminary link must first be
shown to exist between the injury and the employment. Thus if the injury occurred in
the course of employment, it is presumed to have arisen out of the employment.

4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor is present if
the injury takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee
may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental
thereto.
5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee goes to or comes from his
place of work, is not of the employment.

6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the employee's premises, but while
in close proximity thereto and while using a customary means of ingress and egress. The
reason for extending the scope of "course of employment" to off-premises injuries is that
there is a causal connection between the work and the hazard.

7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the Workmen's

Compensation Act. The employment may either increase risk of assault because of its
nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault.

From the milestones, we now proceed to take our bearings in the case at bar, having in
mind always that no cover-all formula can be spelled out with specificity, that the
particular facts and circumstances of each case must be inquired into, and that in any
perceptive inquiry, the question as to where the line should be drawn beyond which the
liability of the employer cannot continue has been held to be usually one of fact.

We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road where Pablo was
killed. In granting compensation, the Commission said that "the road where the deceased
was shot was of private ownership, was called the IDECO road, and led straight to the
main IDECO gate, thus raising the reasonable assumption that it belonged" to the
IDECO. The Commission reasoned out that "even if the ownership of the road were open
to question, there was no doubt that its private character was obviously exploited by the
respondent for the purpose of its own business to such an extent as to make it to all
intents and purposes an extension of its premises," so that the "shooting of the deceased
may be considered to have taken place on the premises, and therefore within the
employment;" and that "while respondent allowed its name to be used in connection with
the private road for the ingress and egress of the employees it did not apparently take the
necessary precaution to make it safe for its employees by employing security guards."

But the IDECO denies ownership of the road. In its memorandum filed with the Regional
Office, IDECO averred that Pablo's death did not originate from his work as to time, place
and circumstances. This, in effect, is a denial of ownership of the road. The decision of
the Regional Office does not state that the road belongs to the IDECO. All that it says is
that Pablo was shot "barely two minutes after he was dismissed from work and while
walking along the IDECO road about twenty (20) meters from the gate." In its "motion for
reconsideration and/or review," the IDECO emphasized that "the place where the incident
happened was a public road, not less than twenty (20) meters away from the main gate
of the compound, and therefore not proximate to or in the immediate vicinity of the place
of work." Again, the ownership of the road was implicitly denied. And in its "motion for
reconsideration and/or appeal to the Commission en banc," the IDECO alleged outright
that the "road where the incident took place, although of private ownership, does not
belong to IDECO. There is absolutely no evidence on record that shows IDECO owns the
road." If the road were owned by the IDECO, there would have been no question that the
assault arose "in the course of employment." 23 But if it did indeed own the road, then the
IDECO would have fenced it, and place its main gate at the other end of the road where it
meets the public highway.

But while the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was using
the same as the principal means of ingress and egress. The private road leads directly to
its main gate.24 Its right to use the road must then perforce proceed from either an
easement of right of way or a lease. Its right, therefore, is either a legal one or a
contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically and properly be charged with
security control of the road. The IDECO owed its employees a safe passage to its
premises. In compliance with such duty, the IDECO should have seen to it not only that
road was properly paved and did not have holes or ditches, but should also have
instituted measures for the proper policing of the immediate area. The point where Pablo
was shot was barely twenty meters away from the main IDECO gate, certainly nearer
than a stone's throw therefrom. The spot is immediately proximate to the IDECO's
premises. Considering this fact, and the further facts that Pablo had just finished overtime
work at the time, and was killed barely two minutes after dismissal from work,
the Ampil case is squarely applicable here. We may say, as we did in Ampil, that the
place where the employee was injured being "immediately proximate to his place of work,
the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his
employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof." Our principal question
is whether the injury was sustained in the course of employment. We find that it was, and
so conclude that the assault arose out of the employment, even though the said assault
is unexplained.

American jurisprudence supports this view.

In Bountiful Brick Company vs. Giles,25 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:

Employment includes both only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of
time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is
to be done. If the employee to be injured while passing, with the express or implied
consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or
over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of
the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of employment
as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the
place of its performance. In other words, the employment may begin in point of time
before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work is
to be done is reached. Probably, as a general rule, employment may be said to begin
when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer's premises where the work is
to be done; but it is clear that in some cases the rule extends to include adjacent
premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and egress with the express or
implied consent of the employer.

The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from dismissal and twenty
meters from the main IDECO gate are "a reasonable margin of time and space
necessary to be used in passing to and from" the IDECO's premises. The IDECO
employees used the private road with its consent, express or implied. Twenty meters on
that road from the main gate is in close proximity to the IDECO's premises. It follows that
Pablo's death was in the course of employment.

In Carter vs. Lanzetta,26 it was held that "such statutes envision extension of coverage to
employees from the time they reach the employer's premises until they depart therefrom
and that hours of service include a period when this might be accomplished within a
reasonable interval;" and that "under exceptional circumstances, a continuance of the
course of employment may be extended by allowing the employee a reasonable time not
only to enter or leave the premises but also to surmount certain hazards adjacent
thereto."

The private road led directly to the main IDECO gate. From this description, it would
appear that the road is a dead-end street. In Singer vs. Rich Marine Sales,27 it was held
that, where the employee, while returning to work at the end of the lunch period, fell at
the curb of the sidewalk immediately adjacent to the employer's premises and one other
located thereon, and the general public used the street only in connection with those
premises, and the employer actually stored boats on the sidewalk, the sidewalk was
within the precincts of employment. In that case there were even two business
establishments on the dead-end street. Here, it is exclusively the IDECO premises which
appear to be at the end of the private road.

We find in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation28 a meaningful statement of the obligation of the
employer to its employees: "That the employer owes, so to speak, a duty of 'safe
passage' to an employee to the point where he can reach the proper arrival or departure
from his work seems without question."

We next quote extensively from Kelty vs. Travellers Insurance Company:29

The rule has been repeatedly announced in Texas that an injury received by an
employee while using the public streets and highways in going to or returning from the
place of employment is not compensable, the rationale of the rule being that in most
instances such an injury is suffered as a consequence of risk and hazards to which all
members of the travelling public are subject rather than risk and hazards having to do
with and originating in the work or business of the employer....

Another exception, however, which is applicable is found in the so-called "access" cases.
In these cases a workman who has been injured at a plane intended by the employer for
use as a means of ingress or egress to and from the actual place of the employee's work
has been held to be in the course of his employment. The courts have said that these
access areas are so closely related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as
a part of the employer's premises. We shall discuss the principal authorities dealing with
this exception to the general rule.

The leading cases in Texas dealing with the "access" exception, and one which we think
is controlling of this appeal, is Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103,
246 S.W. 72, 28 A.L.R. 1402. In that case the employee was employed by Hartburg
Lumber Company, which company operated and owned a sawmill in Hartburg, Texas,
which was a lumber town, consisting solely of the employer's facilities. A railroad track
ran through the town and a part of the lumber company's facilities was situated on either
side of the right-of-way. A public road ran parallel to the railroad tracks which led to the
various buildings on the property of the lumber company. This crossing was used by any
member of the public desiring to go to any part of the lumber company facilities. On the
day in question the decedent quit work at noon, went home for lunch and while returning
to the lumber company plant for the purpose of resuming his employment, was struck
and killed by a train at the crossing in question. The insurance company contended (as it
does here) that the decedent's death did not originate in the work or business of his
employer and that at the time of his fatal injuries he was not in or about the furtherance of
the affairs or business of his employer. The Supreme Court, in an extensive opinion,
reviewed the authorities from other states and especially Latter's Case 238 Mass. 326,
130 N. E. 637, 638, and arrived at the conclusion that the injury and death under such
circumstances were compensable under the Texas Act. The court held that the railroad
crossing bore so intimate a relation to the lumber company's premises that it could hardly
be treated otherwise than as a part of the premises. The Court pointed out that the
lumber company had rights in and to the crossing which was used in connection with the
lumber company's business, whether by employees or by members of the public. In
announcing the "access" doctrine Justice Greenwood said:

Was Behnken engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his
employer when he received the injury causing his death? He was upon the crossing
provided as the means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. He
encountered the dangers incident to use of the crossing in order that he might perform
the duties imposed by his contract of service. Without subjecting himself to such dangers
he could not do what was required of him in the conduct of the lumber company's
business. He had reached a place provided and used only as an adjunct to that business,
and was injured from a risk created by the conditions under which the business was
carried on. To hold that he was not acting in furtherance of the affairs or business of the
lumber company would be to give a strict interpretation to this remedial statute, which
should be liberally construed with a view to accomplish its purpose and to promote
justice.

xxx xxx xxx

In Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, Tex. Civ. App., 125 S. W. 2d 674, wr. ref., this
court followed the rule announced in Behnken, supra. In that case the employee was
killed while crossing the railroad track near his place of employment. In discussing the
question of the situs of the injury Justice Looney said:

Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his place of work not only conduced his
safety and convenience, but contributed to the promptness and efficiency with which he
was enabled to discharge the duties owing his employer; hence the reason and necessity
for his presence upon the railroad track (that portion of the pathway leading over the
railroad right of way) when injured, in our opinion, had to do with, originated in and grew
out of the work of the employer; and that, the injury received at the time, place and under
the circumstances, necessarily was in furtherance of the affairs or business of the
employer.

Again, in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App. 53 S. W. 2d 327, err. ref.,
this court had occasion to follow the "access" doctrine. In that case Chief Justice Jones
quoted from the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Bountiful Brisk
Company, et al. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S. Ct. 221, 72 L. Ed. 507, 66 A. L. R. 1402, as
follows:

An employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin
of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work
is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied
consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or
over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of
the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the
employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his
work at the place of its performance. In other words, the employment may begin in point
of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where the
work is to be done is reached.

The ruling enunciated above is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the road where
Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the employer's premises. It is an "access
area" "so clearly related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the
employer's premises." That portion of the road bears "so intimate a relation" to the
company's premises. It is the chief means of entering the IDECO premises, either for the
public or for its employees. The IDECO uses it extensively in pursuit of its business. It
has rights of passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or contractual,
if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of access to his work solely
because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under obligation to keep
the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that the employees might
encounter therein, one of these dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to
take the proper security measures over the said area which it controls, the IDECO is
liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death.

As therefore stated, the assault on Pablo is unexplained. The murderer was himself killed
before he could be brought to trial. It is true there is authority for the statement that
before the "proximity" rule may be applied it must first be shown that there is a causal
connection between the employment and the hazard which resulted in the injury. 30 The
following more modern view was expressed in Lewis Wood Preserving Company vs.
Jones:31

While some earlier cases seem to indicate that the causative danger must be peculiar to
the work and not common to the neighborhood for the injuries to arise out of and in the
course of the employment (see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557 [137
S.E. 121]; Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E. 2d 189),
later cases have been somewhat more liberal, saying that, "to be compensable, injuries
do not have to arise from something peculiar to the employment." Fidelity & Casualty Co.
of N.Y. v. Bardon, 79 Ga. App. 260, 262, 54 S.E. 2d 443, 444. "Where the duties of an
employee entail his presence (at a place and a time) the claim for an injury there
occurring is not to be barred because it results from a risk common to all others ... unless
it is also common to the general public without regard to such conditions, and
independently of place, employment, or pursuit." New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v.
Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786, cited in Globe Indemnity Co. v. MacKendree, 39
Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46, 47; McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App.
826, 829, 54 S.E. 2d 471, 473.

But even without the foregoing pronouncement, the employer should still be held liable in
view of our conclusion that that portion of the road where Pablo was killed, because of its
proximity, should be considered part of the IDECO's premises. Hence, the injury was in
the course of employment, and there automatically arises the presumption — invoked
in Rivera — that the injury by assault arose out of the employment, i. e., there is a causal
relation between the assault and the employment.

We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after dismissal from overtime
work, and space, twenty meters from the employer's main gate, bring Pablo's death
within the scope of the course factor. But it may logically be asked: Suppose it were three
minutes after and thirty meters from, or five minutes after and fifty meters from, would the
"proximity" rule still apply? In answer, we need but quote that portion of the decision
in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation, supra, which answered a question arising from an
ingenious hypothetical question put forth by the defendant therein:

We could, of course, say "this is not the case before us" and utilize the old saw, "that
which is not before us we do not decide." Instead, we prefer to utilize the considerably
older law: "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof" (Matthew 1:34), appending,
however, this admonition: no statute is static; it must remain constantly viable to meet
new challenges placed to it. Recovery in a proper case should not be suppressed
because of a conjectural posture which may never arise and which if it does, will be
decided in the light of then existing law.

Since the Workmen's Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to

afford relief to workmen, it must be liberally construed to attain the purpose for which it
was enacted.32 Liberally construed, sec. 2 of the Act comprehends Pablo's death. The
Commission did not err in granting compensation.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

G.R. No. 90204 May 11, 1990

MANUEL BELARMINO, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This seven-year-old case involves a claim for benefits for the death of a lady school teacher which the public respondents
disallowed on the ground that the cause of death was not work-connected.

Before her death on February 19, 1982, petitioner's wife, Oania Belarmino, was a
classroom teacher of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports assigned at the
Buracan Elementary School in Dimasalang, Masbate (p. 13, Rollo). She had been a
classroom teacher since October 18, 1971, or for eleven (11) years. Her husband, the
petitioner, is also a public school teacher.
On January 14, 1982, at nine o'clock in the morning, while performing her duties as a
classroom teacher, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally
slipped and fell on the classroom floor. Moments later, she complained of abdominal pain
and stomach cramps. For several days, she continued to suffer from recurrent abdominal
pain and a feeling of heaviness in her stomach, but, heedless of the advice of her female
co-teachers to take a leave of absence, she continued to report to the school because
there was much work to do. On January 25, 1982, eleven (11) days after her accident,
she went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home (p. 8, Rollo).

Her abdominal pains persisted even after the delivery, accompanied by high fever and
headache. She was brought to the Alino Hospital in Dimasalang, Masbate on February
11, 1982. Dr. Alfonso Alino found that she was suffering from septicemia post partum due
to infected lacerations of the vagina. She was discharged from the hospital after five (5)
days on February 16, 1982, apparently recovered but she died three (3) days later. The
cause of death was septicemia post partum. She was 33 years old, survived by her
husband and four (4) children, the oldest of whom was 11 years old and the youngest,
her newborn infant (p. 9, Rollo).

On April 21, 1983, a claim for death benefits was filed by her husband. On February 14,
1984, it was denied by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) which held
that 'septicemia post partum the cause of death, is not an occupational disease, and
neither was there any showing that aforesaid ailment was contracted by reason of her
employment. . . . The alleged accident mentioned could not have precipitated the death
of the wife but rather the result of the infection of her lacerated wounds as a result of her
delivery at home" (p. 14 Rollo).

On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, the latter issued Resolution

No. 3913 dated July 8, 1988 holding:

We agree with the decision of the system, hence we dismiss this appeal. Postpartum
septicemia is an acute infectious disease of the puerperium resulting from the entrance
into the blood of bacteria usually streptococci and their toxins which cause dissolution of
the blood, degenerative changes in the organs and the symptoms of intoxication. The
cause of this condition in the instant case was the infected vaginal lacerations resulting
from the decedent's delivery of her child which took place at home. The alleged accident
in school could not have been the cause of septicemia, which in this case is clearly
caused by factors not inherent in employment or in the working conditions of the
deceased. (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)

Hence, this petition for review.

After a careful consideration of the petition and the annexes thereof, as well as the
comments of the public respondents, we are persuaded that the public respondents'
peremptory denial of the petitioner's claim constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.

Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation enumerates the
grounds for compensability of injury resulting in disability or death of an employee, as
follows:

Sec. 1. Grounds — (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the
following conditions:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order
for the employer.

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness
must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with
the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.

(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting
disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules.

The illness, septicemia post partum which resulted in the death of Oania Belarmino, is
admittedly not listed as an occupational disease in her particular line of work as a
classroom teacher. However, as pointed out in the petition, her death from that ailment is
compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of her employment
contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs.
Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of
recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of her
pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about
her premature delivery which caused the development of post partum septicemia which
resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the proximate or responsible cause that set in
motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise.

. . . what is termed in American cases the proximate cause, not implying however, as
might be inferred from the word itself, the nearest in point of time or relation, but rather,
[is] the efficient cause, which may be the most remote of an operative chain. It must be
that which sets the others in motion and is to be distinguished from a mere preexisting
condition upon which the effective cause operates, and must have been adequate to
produce the resultant damage without the intervention of an independent cause. (Atlantic
Gulf vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 166,171.)

The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom. (Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181.)

Thus in Enriquez v. WCC, 93 SCRA 366, 372, this Court ruled:

. . . Verily, the right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening

upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury (82 Am. Jur.
132). Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment,
every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the
employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to
complainants own negligence or misconduct ( I Larson Workmen's Compensation Law 3-
279 [1972]). Simply stated, all the medical consequences and sequels that flow from the
primary injury are compensable. (Ibid.)

Mrs. Belarmino's fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment
as a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it: her
recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post
partum and death, are compensable.
There is no merit in the public respondents' argument that the cause of the decedent's
post partum septicemia "was the infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the
decedent's delivery of her child at home" for the incident in school could not have caused
septicemia post partum, . . . the necessary precautions to avoid infection during or after
labor were (not) taken" (p. 29, Rollo).

The argument is unconvincing. It overlooks the fact that septicemia post partum is a
disease of childbirth, and premature childbirth would not have occurred if she did not
accidentally fall in the classroom.

It is true that if she had delivered her baby under sterile conditions in a hospital operating
room instead of in the unsterile environment of her humble home, and if she had been
attended by specially trained doctors and nurses, she probably would not have suffered
lacerations of the vagina and she probably would not have contracted the fatal infection.
Furthermore, if she had remained longer than five (5) days in the hospital to complete the
treatment of the infection, she probably would not have died. But who is to blame for her
inability to afford a hospital delivery and the services of trained doctors and nurses? The
court may take judicial notice of the meager salaries that the Government pays its public
school teachers. Forced to live on the margin of poverty, they are unable to afford
expensive hospital care, nor the services of trained doctors and nurses when they or
members of their families are in. Penury compelled the deceased to scrimp by delivering
her baby at home instead of in a hospital.

The Government is not entirely blameless for her death for it is not entirely blameless for
her poverty. Government has yet to perform its declared policy "to free the people from
poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living,
and improve the quality of life for all (Sec. 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution and Sec. 9, Art. II,
1987 Constitution). Social justice for the lowly and underpaid public school teachers will
only be an empty shibboleth until Government adopts measures to ameliorate their
economic condition and provides them with adequate medical care or the means to
afford it. "Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society" (PLDT v.
Bucay and NLRC, 164 SCRA 671, 673). By their denial of the petitioner's claim for
benefits arising from the death of his wife, the public respondents ignored this imperative
of Government, and thereby committed a grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The respondents Employees

Compensation Commission and the Government Service Insurance System are ordered
to pay death benefits to the petitioner and/or the dependents of the late Oania Belarmino,
with legal rate of interest from the filing of the claim until it is fully paid, plus attorney's
fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the award, and costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 84307. April 17, 1989.]

CIRIACO HINOGUIN, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION and

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Armed Forces of the Philippines), Respondents.

Alexander A. Acain for petitioner.

DECISION

FELICIANO, J.:

This Petition for Review is directed against the Decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission
("ECC") in ECC Case No. 3275 (Ciriaco Hinoguin v. Government Service Insurance System [Armed
Forces of the Philippines]) which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System
("GSIS") denying petitioner’s claim for compensation benefit on account of the death of petitioner’s
son, Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin.

The deceased, Sgt. Hinoguin started his military service in 1974, when he was called to military
training by the Philippine Army. He later on enlisted in the Philippine Army as a private first class. At
the time of his death on 7 August 1985, he was holding the rank of Sergeant per Special Order P-
4200, HPA, dated 15 October 1985, in "A" company, 14th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division, PA.
The Headquarters of the 14th Infantry Battalion was located at Bical, Muñoz, Nueva Ecija. Sgt.
Hinoguin was Detachment Non-Commissioned Officer at Capintalan, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, "A"
Company being stationed at Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.

On 1 August 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin and two (2) members of his Detachment, Cpl. Rogelio Clavo and Dft.
Nicomedes Alibuyog, sought permission from Captain Frankie Z. Besas, Commanding Officer of "A"
Company to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, "to settle [an] important matter thereat."
1 Captain Besas orally granted them permission to go to Aritao and to take their issued firearms with
them, considering that Aritao was regarded as "a critical place," 2 that is, it had peace and order
problems due to the presence of elements of the New People’s Army ("NPA") in or in the vicinity of
Aritao.

Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog left Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, about noon on 1 August
1985 and arrived in Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, about 1:30 o’clock P.M. on the same day. 3 They
proceeded to the home of Dft. Alibuyog’s parents where they had lunch. About 4:00 o’clock P.M., the
three (3) soldiers with a fourth man, a civilian and relative of Dft. Alibuyog, had some gin and beer,
finishing a bottle of gin and two (2) large bottles of beer. Three hours later, at about 7:00 o’clock
P.M., the soldiers left the Alibuyog home to return to their Company Headquarters. They boarded a
tricycle, presumably a motor-driven one, Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo seating themselves in the
tricycle cab while Dft. Alibuyog occupied the seat behind the driver. Upon reaching the poblacion of
Aritao, Dft. Alibuyog dismounted, walked towards and in front of the tricycle cab, holding his M-16
rifle in his right hand, not noticing that the rifle’s safety lever was on "semi-automatic" (and not on
"safety"). He accidentally touched the trigger, firing a single shot in the process and hitting Sgt.
Hinoguin, then still sitting in the cab, in the left lower abdomen. The Sergeant did not apparently
realize immediately that he had been hit; he took three (3) steps forward, cried that he had been hit
and fell to the ground. chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

His companions rushed Sgt. Hinoguin to a hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, for treatment. Their
Company Commander, Capt. Besas, hurried to the hospital upon being notified of the shooting and
there talked with the wounded Sergeant. The latter confirmed to Capt. Besas that he had indeed been
accidentally shot by Dft. Alibuyog. Sgt. Hinoguin was later moved to the AFP Medical Center in Quezon
City and there he died on 7 August 1985. The Death Certificate lists "septic shock" as immediate
cause of death, and "generalized septicemia of peritonitis" as antecedent cause, following his
sustaining a gunshot wound.

An investigation conducted by H.Q., 14th Infantry Battalion on 11 August 1985 concluded that the
shooting of Sgt. Hinoguin was "purely accidental in nature." 4 On 19 November 1985, a "Line of Duty
Board of Officers" was convened by H.Q., 14th Infantry Battalion, "to determine Line of Duty Status of
[the] late Sgt. Lemick Hinogiun 640407 (Inf.) PA, a member of "A" Co., 14IB, 5ID, PA who died . . .
due to Gun Shot Wound as a result of an accidental fire (sic) committed by Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog
085-5009 (Inf) PA . . ." After receiving and deliberating on the Investigation Report dated 11 August
1985 together with the sworn statements of witnesses Alibuyog, Clavo and Besas, and after some
further questioning of Capt. Besas, the Line of Duty Board reached the following conclusion and
recommendation: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sgt. Hinoguin was then the designated Detachment Commander of Capintalan detachment. On or
about 011300H August 1985 Dft Alibuyog invited Sgt. Hinogiun and Cpl. Clavo to his home to
celebrate at Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. They asked permission to go on overnight and to allow them to
carry their firearms with them because the place where they were going is critical. They were given
such permission verbally by their Commanding Officer. The death of Sgt. Hinoguin was purely
accidental as the Investigation Report presented here proved beyond reasonable [doubt] the fact that
Dft. Alibuyog had no grudge either [against] Cpl. Clavo or Sgt. Himoguin.

RECOMMENDATION: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The recommendation written by the Chairman and unanimously voted for by the members contain the
following:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Board after a thorough deliberation on presented evidences declares that the Death of Sgt.
Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf) PA is in Line of Duty.

The Board recommend further that all benefits due the legal dependents of the late Sgt. Lemick
Hinogiun be given." 5 (Italics supplied)

Sometime in March 1986, petitioner filed his claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 (as
amended), claiming that the death of his son was work-connected and therefore compensable. This
was denied 6 by the GSIS on the ground that petitioner’s son was not at his work place nor
performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine Army at the time of his death.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which Motion was, however, denied by the GSIS. This
denial was confirmed by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission ("WCC") in a Decision dated 24
May 1988 which stated that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
" [F]rom the recital of the facts therein [we found it] very difficult for us to perceive where the work-
connection of the events that led to appellant’s son’s death lies. Under the law, death resulting from
injury is considered compensable if it arises out of and in the course of employment. Definitely, the
death of Hinoguin did not arises out of employment. Clearly, the facts showed that he was not on his
place of work, nor was he performing official functions. On the contrary, he was on pass and had just
came from a merrymaking when accidentally shot by his companion." 7 (Italics supplied) chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the death of Sgt. y Hinoguin is
compensable under the applicable statute and regulations.

Considering that Sgt. Hinoguin died on 7 August 1985, the applicable law is to be found in Book Four,
Title III of the Labor Code, as amended. It may be noted at the outset that under Article 167 (g) of
the Labor Code, as amended and Section 4 (b) (1) of Rule I of the Amended (Implementing) Rules on
Employees’ Compensation, the term "employee" includes a "member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines." Rule XIII entitled "Death", of the Amended (Implementing) Rules provides in part as
follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. Conditions to Entitlement. — (a) The beneficiaries of a deceased employee shall be

entitled to an income benefit if all of the following conditions are satisfied: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) The employee had been duly reported to the System;

(2) He died as a result of injury or sickness; and

(3) The System has been duly notified of his death, as well as the injury or sickness which caused his
death.

His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such death occurred before the employee is duly reported
for coverage of the System.

x x x"

Article 167 (k) of the Labor Code as amended defines a compensable "injury" quite simply as "any
harmful change in the human organism from any accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment." The Amended (Implementing) Rules have, however, elaborated considerably on the
simple and succinct statutory provision. Rule III, Section 1 (a) reads:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. Grounds. — (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable,
the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following grounds: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the
employer.

x x x"

(Italics supplied)

It will be seen that because the Amended (Implementing) Rules are intended to apply to all kinds of
employment, such rules must be read and applied with reasonable flexibility and comprehensiveness.
The concept of a "work place" referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied
to a soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in
a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is
stationed. In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva Viscaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.
Aritao being approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt.
Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding Officer to proceed to
Aritao, and it appears to us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot
be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding
officer. We note that the three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not
utilize in full. They were not on vacation leave. Morever, they were required or authorized to carry
their firearms with which presumably they were to defend themselves if NPA elements happened to
attack them while en route to and from Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA
elements as they might encounter. Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs
while on their way to or from Aritao and been fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed
by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the
death a compensable one.

Turning to the question of whether Sgt. Hinoguin was performing official functions at the time he
sustained the gunshot wound, it has already been pointed out above that the Line of Duty Board of
Officers of the 14th Infantry Battalion Headquarters had already determined that the death of Sgt.
Hinoguin had occurred "in line of duty." It may be noted in this connection that a soldier on active
duty status is really on 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and
military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times,
7 days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status (which Sgt. Hinoguin was not).
Thus, we think that the work-connected character of Sgt. Hinoguin’s injury and death was not
effectively precluded by the simple circumstance that he was on an overnight pass to go to the home
of Dft. Alibuyog, a soldier under his own command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not effectively cease performing
"official functions" because he was granted a pass. While going to a fellow soldier’s home for a few
hours for a meal and some drinks was not a specific military duty, he was nonetheless in the course of
performance of official functions. Indeed, it appears to us that a soldier should be presumed to be on
official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition
temporarily by, e.g., going on an approved vacation leave. 8 Even vacation leave may, it should be
remembered, be preterminated by superior orders.

More generally, a soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain risks, for instance, that he will be
fired upon by forces hostile to the State or the Government. That is not, of course, the only risk that
he is compelled to accept by the very nature of his occupation or profession as a soldier. Most of the
persons around him are necessarily also members of the Armed Forces who carry firearms, too. In
other words, a soldier must also assume the risk of being accidentally fired upon by his fellow soldiers.
This is reasonably regarded as a hazard or risk inherent in his employment as a soldier.

We hold, therefore, that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by an accidental
discharge of the M-16 of Dft. Alibuyog, in the circumstances of this case, arose out of and in the
course of his employment as a soldier on active duty status in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
hence compensable.

It may be well to add that what we have written above in respect of performance of official functions
of members of the Armed Forces must be understood in the context of the specific purpose at hand,
that is, the interpretation and application of the compensation provisions of the Labor Code and
applicable related regulations. It is commonplace that those provisions should, to the extent possible,
be given the interpretation most likely to effectuate the beneficient and humanitarian purposes
infusing the Labor Code.

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the GSIS taken through its Claim Review Committee dated 20
November 1986 and the Decision dated 24 May 1988 of the Employees’ Compensation Commission in
ECC Case No. 3275, are hereby REVERSED and the GSIS is hereby DIRECTED to award all applicable
benefits in respect of the death of Sgt. Lemick G. Hinogiun, to petitioner. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 128524. April 20, 1999.]

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT

OF APPEALS and FELONILA ALEGRE, Respondents.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

May a moonlighting policeman’s death be considered compensable? This is the crux of the controversy
now at bar.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The records 1 disclose that private respondent Felonila Alegre’s deceased husband, SPO2 Florencio A.
Alegre, was a police officer assigned to the Philippine National Police station in the town of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur. On that fateful day of December 6, 1994, he was driving his tricycle and ferrying
passengers within the vicinity of Imelda Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio, Jr.,
Team/Desk Officer of the Police Assistance Center located at said complex, confronted him regarding
his tour of duty. SPO2 Alegre allegedly snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and even directed curse words upon the
latter. A verbal tussle then ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting of the deceased
police officer.

On account of her husband’s death, private respondent seasonably filed a claim for death benefits
with petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
626. In its decision on August 7, 1995, the GSIS, however, denied the claim on the ground that at the
time of SPO2 Alegre’s death, he was performing a personal activity which was not work-connected.
Subsequent appeal to the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) proved futile as said body, in
a decision dated May 9, 1996, merely affirmed the ruling of the GSIS.

Private respondent finally obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of Appeals when on February 28,
1997, the appellate court reversed 2 the ECC’s decision and ruled that SPO2 Alegre’s death was work-
connected and, therefore, compensable. Citing Nitura v. Employees’ Compensation Commission 3 and
Employees’ Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, 4 the appellate court explained the
conclusion arrived at, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

" [T]he Supreme Court held that the concept of a ‘workplace’ cannot always be literally applied to a
person in active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a
factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office.

It is our considered view that, as applied to a peace officer, his work place is not confined to the police
precinct or station but to any place where his services, as a lawman, to maintain peace and security,
are required.

At the time of his death, Alegre was driving a tricycle at the northeastern part of the Imelda
Commercial Complex where the police assistance center is located. There can be no dispute therefore
that he met his death literally in his place of work.

It is true that the deceased was driving his tricycle, with passengers aboard, when he was accosted by
another police officer. This would lend some semblance of viability to the argument that he was not in
the performance of official duty at the time.

However, the argument, though initially plausible, overlooks the fact that policemen, by the nature of
their functions, are deemed to be on a round-the-clock duty." cralaw virtua1aw library

Aggrieved, GSIS comes to us on petition for review on certiorari reiterating its position that SPO2
Alegre’s death lacks the requisite element of compensability which is, that the activity being
performed at the time of death must be work-connected.

We grant the petition.

As stated at the outset, the sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether the death of SPO2 Alegre is
compensable pursuant to the applicable laws and regulations.

Under the pertinent guidelines of the ECC on compensability, it is provided that "for the injury and the
resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment
accident satisfying all of the following conditions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the
employer." 5

Actually, jurisprudence is rather scant with respect to the above rules’ application in the case of police
officers. Nevertheless, owing to the similarity of functions, that is, to keep peace and order, and the
risks assumed, the Court has treated police officers similar to members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines with regard to the compensability of their deaths. Thus, echoing Hinoguin v. Employees’
Compensation Commission, 6 a case involving a soldier who was accidentally fired at by a fellow
soldier, we held in Employees’ Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, 7 that "members of the
national police are by the nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day" because
"policemen are subject to call at any time and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed
citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community." cralaw virtua1aw library

Upon examination of the Court of Appeals’ reasoning, we believe that the appellate court committed
reversible error in applying the precepts enunciated in the cited cases. While we agree that policemen,
like soldiers, are at the beck and call of public duty as peace officers and technically on duty round-
the-clock, the same does not justify the grant of compensation benefits for the death of SPO2 Alegre
based on the facts disclosed by the records. For clarity, a review of the cases relevant to the matter at
hand is in order.
In Hinoguin, the deceased Philippine Army soldier, Sgt. Limec Hinoguin, together with two other
members of his detachment, sought and were orally granted permission by the commanding officer of
their company to leave their station in Carranglan, Nueva Ecija to go on overnight pass to Aritao,
Nueva Vizcaya. As they were returning to their headquarters, one of his companions, not knowing that
his M-16 rifle was on "semi-automatic" mode, accidentally pulled the trigger and shot Sgt. Hinoguin
who then died as a result thereof. Ruling for the grant of death compensation benefits, this Court
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The concept of a ‘workplace’ referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied
to a soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in assembly line in a
factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is
stationed. In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.
Aritao being approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt.
Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding Officer to proceed to
Aritao, and it appears to us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot
be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding
officer. We note that the three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not
utilize in full. They were not on vacation leave. Moreover, they were required or authorized to carry
their firearms with which presumably they were to defend themselves if NPA elements happened to
attack them while en route to and from Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA
elements as they might encounter. Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs
while on their way to or from Aritao and been fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed
by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the
death a compensable one." chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Then came the case of Nitura, likewise involving a member of the Philippine Army, Pfc. Regino S.
Nitura, who was assigned at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. At the time he met his death,
he was instructed by his battalion commander to check on several personnel of his command post
who were then attending a dance party in Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. But on his way back to
the camp, he passed, crossed and fell from a hanging wooden bridge which accident caused his death.
Reversing the ECC which earlier denied death benefits to the deceased’s widow, the Court ruled: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the case at bar, Pfc. Nitura’s station was at
Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. But then his presence at the site of the accident was with
the permission of his superior officer having been directed to go to Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City.
In carrying out said directive, he had to pass by the hanging bridge which connects the two places. As
held in the Hinoguin case (supra.), a place where soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at
cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their
commanding officer.

As to the question of whether or not he was performing an official function at the time of the incident,
it has been held that a soldier on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day official duty status
and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the
orders of his superior officers at all times, seven (7) days a week, except, of course, when he is on
vacation leave status. Thus, a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to
have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by going on approved
vacation leave." cralaw virtua1aw library

The more recent case which was cited by the appellate court in support of its decision is Employees’
Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals. This time, the claim for death compensation benefits
was made in behalf of a deceased police officer, P/Sgt. Wilfredo Alvaran, who, at the time of his
death, was a member of the Mandaluyong Police Station but assigned to the Pasig Provincial Jail.
Findings showed that the deceased brought his son to the Mandaluyong Police Station for interview
because the latter was involved in a stabbing incident. While in front of the said station, the deceased
was approached by another policeman and shot him to death. Both the GSIS and the ECC denied the
claim by the deceased’s widow on the ground that Sgt. Alvaran was plainly acting as a father to his
son and that he was in a place where he was not required to be. The Court of Appeals reversed said
denial which decision was affirmed by this Court, declaring that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"But for clarity’s sake and as a guide for future cases, we hereby hold that members of the national
police, like P/Sgt. Alvaran, are by the nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day.
Except when they are on vacation leave, policemen are subject to call at anytime and may be asked
by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the
community.

x x x

We hold that by analogy and for purposes of granting compensation under P. D. No. 626, as
amended, policemen should be treated in the same manner as soldiers.
While it is true that, "geographically" speaking, P/Sgt Alvaran was not actually at his assigned post at
the Pasig Provincial Jail when he was attacked and killed, it could not also be denied that in bringing
his son — as a suspect in a case — to the police station for questioning to shed light on a stabbing
incident, he was not merely acting as father but as a peace officer." cralaw virtua1aw library

From the foregoing cases, it can be gleaned that the Court did not justify its grant of death benefits
merely on account of the rule that soldiers or policemen, as the case may be, are virtually working
round-the-clock. Note that the Court likewise attempted in each case to find a reasonable nexus
between the absence of the deceased from his assigned place of work and the incident that led to his
death.

In Hinoguin, the connection between his absence from the camp where he was assigned and the place
where he was accidentally shot was the permission duly given to him and his companions by the camp
commander to go on overnight pass. According to the Court, "a place which soldiers have secured
lawful permission cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to
go by their commanding officer" and, hence, the deceased is to be considered as still in the
performance of his official functions.

The same thing can be said of Nitura where the deceased had to go outside of his station on
permission and directive by his superior officer to check on several personnel of his command who
were then attending a dance party.

As for P/Sgt. Alvaran in the Employees’ Compensation Commission case, although he was not given
any directive or permission by a superior officer to be at the Mandaluyong Police Station, his presence
there was nonetheless justified by the peacekeeping nature of the matter he was attending to at the
time that he was attacked and shot to death, that is, bringing his son to the police station to answer
for a crime, a basic duty which any policeman is expected and ought to perform.

Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death
benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b)
that the employee must have been performing his official functions; and (c) that if the injury is
sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not
difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegre’s widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her.
Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying
passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no
particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In the absence of such prior authority as in
the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of the act attended to by the policeman at
the time he died even without the explicit permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case
of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in
the ECC guidelines. That he may be called upon at any time to render police work as he is considered
to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the
conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to
exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one pointing out
that he already complied with the duty detail. 8 At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to
policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within
the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give
rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all
acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on
official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in character.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.
R. SP No. 42003 dated February 28, 1997, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs. chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 136200 June 8, 2000

CELERINO VALERIANO, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

To be compensable, an injury must have resulted from an accident arising out of and in
the course of employment. It must be shown that it was sustained within the scope of
employment while the claimant was performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental
thereto or while following the orders of a superior. Indeed, the standard of "work
connection" must be satisfied even by one who invokes the 24-hour-duty doctrine;
otherwise, the claim for compensability must be denied.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the January 30, 1998 Court of
Appeals 1 (CA) Decision, 2 as well as the September 25, 1998 Resolution 3 in CA-GR SP No.
31141. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows: 4

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission

dated April 1, 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

The September 25, 1998 Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are summarized in the assailed
Decision as follows: 5

Celerino S. Valeriano was employed as a fire truck driver assigned at the

San Juan Fire Station. Sometime on the evening of July 3, 1985, petitioner
was standing along Santolan Road, Quezon City, when he met a friend by
the name of Alexander Agawin. They decided to proceed to Bonanza
Restaurant in EDSA, Quezon City, for dinner. On their way home at around
9:30 PM, the owner-type jeepney they were riding in figured in a head-on
collision with another vehicle at the intersection of N. Domingo and
Broadway streets in Quezon City. Due to the strong impact of the collision,
petitioner was thrown out of the vehicle and was severely injured. As a
result of the mishap, petitioner was brought to several hospitals for
treatment.

On September 16, 1985, he filed a claim for income benefits under PD

626, with the Government Security Insurance Service. His claim for
benefits was opposed on the ground that the injuries he sustained did not
directly arise or result from the nature of his work. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration of the denial by the System but the same was turned
down on the ground that the condition for compensability had not been
satisfied. Petitioner then interposed an appeal to the Employees'
Compensation Commission (ECC for short). In a decision dated April 1,
1993, the ECC ruled against herein appellant, the pertinent portions of
which are stated in the following wise:

After a study of the records of the case

under consideration, we find the decision of
the respondent System denying appellant's
claim in order.

Under the present compensation law, injury

and the resulting disability or death is
compensable if the injury resulted from an
accident arising out of and in the course of
employment. It means that the injury or death
must be sustained while the employee is in
the performance of his official duty; that
the injury is sustained at the place where
 his work requires him to be; and if the
injury is sustained elsewhere, that the
employee is executing an order for the
employer. The aforementioned conditions are
found wanting in the instant case. The
accident that the appellant met in the
instant case occurred outside of his time and
place of work. Neither was appellant
performing his official duties as a fireman
at the time of the accident. In fact,
appellant just left the Bonanza Restaurant
where he and his friends had dinner.
Apparently, the injuries appellant sustained
from the accident did not arise out of [and]
in the course of his employment. Considering
therefore the absence of a causal link
between the contingency for which income
benefits [are] being claimed and his
occupation as fireman, his claim under PD
626, as amended, cannot be given due course.

The CA Ruling

The Court of Appeals agreed with the finding of the Employees' Compensation Commission
that petitioner's injuries and disability were not compensable, emphasizing that they were
not work-connected.

Turning to the case before us, the evidence on record shows that herein
petitioner was injured not at the place where his work required him to be.
Neither was he executing an order from his superior, nor performing his
official functions at the time of the accident. It must be recalled that at the
time of the accident, petitioner was already dismissed from his regular 8-
hour daily work. He was walking along Santolan Road when he met his
friend and they decided to go to Bonanza Restaurant for dinner.
Notwithstanding his claim that he can be called to report for work anytime
in case there is a fire, or that his position is akin to that of a military man,
a contention we cannot support, still the circumstances leading to the
accident in which he was injured reveals that there is no causative
connection between the injury he sustained and his work. Petitioner's
invocation of the ruling in Hinoguin vs. ECC, 172 SCRA 350 is misplaced.
In that case, petitioner Sgt. Hinoguin was a member of the Armed Forces
and soldiers are presumed to be on official duty 24 hours a day. In the
case at bar, petitioner is a fireman with a specific tour of duty. To sustain
petitioner's contention of compensability would, in effect, make the
employer, in this case the State, the insurer against all perils. That is not
the intendment of our lawmakers in enacting the Workmen's Compensation
Act. 6

Hence, this Petition. 7

The Issues

In his Petition, 8 Petitioner Celerino Valeriano urges the Court to resolve the following
questions:

I
 WHETHER PETITIONER'S INJURIES ARE WORK-CONNECTED.

II

WHETHER PETITIONER FIREMAN, LIKE SOLDIERS, CAN BE PRESUMED TO

BE ON 24-HOUR DUTY. 9

These questions point to the sole issue of the compensability of Petitioner Valeriano's
injuries and resulting disability.

The Court's Ruling

We find no merit in the Petition.

Main Issue:

Compensability of Valeriano's

Injuries and Resulting Disability

Disability benefits are granted an employee who sustains an injury or contracts a sickness
resulting in temporary total, permanent total, or permanent partial, disability. 10 For the
injury and the resulting disability to be compensable, they must have necessarily resulted
from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. 11

Were Petitioner's Injuries

Work-Connected?

Citing Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 12 the Court
of Appeals dismissed petitioner's claim on the ground that he had not been injured at his
work place, executing an order of his superior, or performing official functions when he
met the accident.

We agree. In Iloilo, the Court explained the phrase "arising out of and in the course of
employment" in this wise:

The two components of the coverage formula - "arising out of" and "in the
course of employment" - are said to be separate tests which must be
independently satisfied; however, it should not be forgotten that the basic
concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best
expressed in the word, "work-connection, because an uncompromising
insistence on an independent application of each of the two portions of the
test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries. The
words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are
descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the
time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place.

As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in

the course of employment" when it takes place within the period of the
employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably . . . be, and
while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental
thereto. 1

Thus, for injury to be compensable, the standard of "work connection" must be

substantially satisfied. The injury and the resulting disability sustained by reason of
employment are compensable regardless of the place where the injured occurred, if it can
be proven that at the time of the injury, the employee was acting within the purview of his
or her employment and performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto. 14
Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a firetruck driver
was related to the injuries he had suffered. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a
purely personal and social function - having dinner with some friends - is clear from the
records of the case. His injuries were not acquired at his work place; nor were they
sustained while he was performing an act within the scope of his employment or in pursuit
of an order of his superior. Thus, we agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate
court that his injuries and consequent disability were not work-connected and thus not
compensable.

Applicability of Hinoguin

and Nitura

Petitioner debunks the importance given by the appellate court to the fact that he was not
at his work place and had in fact been dismissed for the day when he met the accident. He
argues that his claim for disability benefits is anchored on the proposition that the
exigency of his job as a fireman requires a constant observance of his duties as such;
thus, he should be considered to have been "on call" when he met the accident. He
underscores the applicability of Hinoguin v. ECC 15 and Nitura v. ECC 16 to his case.

In Hinoguin and Nitura, the Court granted death compensation benefits to the heirs of Sgt.
Limec Hinoguin and Pfc. Regino Nitura, both members of the Philippine Army. After having
gone elsewhere on an overnight pass, Sgt. Hinoguin was accidentally shot by a fellow
soldier during the former's return trip to their headquarters. Pfc. Nitura, on the other hand,
died after falling from a bridge during his trip back to his camp. At the time of his death,
he had just accomplished his commander's instruction to check on several personnel of his
command post who were then at a dance party.

Both cases espoused the position that the concept of "work place" cannot always be
literally applied to a soldier on active duty status who, to all intents and purposes, is on a
24-hour official duty status, subject to military discipline and law and at the beck and call
of his superior officers at all times, except when he is on vacation leave status. 17

This ratiocination, later applied to police officers in Employees' Compensation Commission

v. Court of Appeals, 18 was dissected in the more recent GSIS v. Court of Appeals. 19 In the
latter case, the deceased police officer, SPO2 Florencio Alegre, was moonlighting as a
tricycle driver at the time of his death. The Court reviewed Hinoguin, Nitura and ECC and
noted that in each case death benefits were granted, not just because of the principle that
soldiers or policemen were virtually working round the clock. More important, there was a
finding of a reasonable nexus between the absence of the deceased from his assigned
place of work and the incident causing his death. The Court explained:

In Hinoguin, the connection between his absence from the camp where he
was assigned and the place where he was accidentally shot was the
permission duly given to him and his companions by the camp commander
to go on overnight pass. According to the Court, "a place [where] soldiers
have secured lawful permission cannot be very different, legally speaking,
from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer"
and hence, the deceased is to be considered as still in the performance of
his official functions.

The same thing can be said of Nitura where the deceased had to go
outside of his station on permission and directive by his superior officer to
check on several personnel of his command who were then attending a
dance party.

As for P/Sgt. Alvaran in the Employees' Compensation Commission case,

although he was not given any directive or permission by a superior officer
to be at the Mandaluyong Police Station, his presence there was
nonetheless justified by the peacekeeping nature of the matter he was
attending to at the time . . . he was attacked and shot to death, that is,
 [while] bringing his son to the police station to answer for a crime [-] a
basic duty which any policeman is expected and ought to perform. 20

Ruling that the death of SPO2 Alegre was not compensable, the Court pointed out that the
24-hour-duty doctrine should not embrace all acts and circumstances causing the death of
a police officer, but only those that can be categorized as police service in character. It
further held:

Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with
respect to claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must
be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee
must have been performing his official functions; and (c) that if the injury
is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order
for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegre's
widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the
matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of
ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in
nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his
superior officer. In the absence of such prior authority as in the cases of
Hinoguin and Nitura, or peace-keeping nature of the act attended to by the
policeman at the time he died even without the explicit permission or
directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no
justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the
ECC guidelines. That he may be called upon at anytime to render police
work as he is considered to be on around-the-clock duty and was not on an
approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at[,]
considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to
exercise his authority and duty as policeman. In fact, he was refusing to
render one[,] pointing out that he already complied with the duty detail. At
any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers,
serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them
within the scope of the guidelines rather than [as] a blanket license to
benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other
words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all
acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to
those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically
police service in character. 21

We recognize the importance and laud the efforts of firemen in our society. Indeed, the
nature of their job requires them to be always on alert, like soldiers and police officers,
and to respond to fire alarms which may occur anytime of the day. Be that as it may, the
circumstances in the present case do not call for the application of Hinoguin and Nitura.
Following the rationalization in GSIS, the 24-hour-duty doctrine cannot be applied to
petitioner's case, because he was neither at his assigned work place nor in pursuit of the
orders of his superiors when he met an accident. But the more important justification for
the Court's stance is that he was not doing an act within his duty and authority as a
firetruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained his injuries. We
cannot find any reasonable connection between his injuries and his work as a firetruck
driver.

While we sympathize with petitioner's plight, we cannot grant his Petition. True, the policy
is to extend the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 626 to as many qualified
employees as possible, 22 but this must be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying
undeserving claims for compensation. 2 Considering the circumstances in petitioner's case,
he cannot be deemed qualified for disability benefits under the law.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.