THE SECOND MOSES KOTANE MEMORIAL

LECTURE

THE STATE IN AFRICA: CAN IT BE REFORMED AND TRANSFORMED INTO

AN ENGINE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT?

By

Ibbo Mandaza

Presented at

University of Johannesburg,

10th OCTOBER, 2019

THE STATE IN AFRICA: CAN IT BE REFORMED AND TRANSFORMED INTO AN

ENGINE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT?

By Ibbo Mandaza

Remembering Moses Kotane as we do through this Memorial Lecture, is also to

recall that his life coincided with the most tumultuous events and processes

that shook the world of the twentieth century and beyond. We refer here to

the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in particular, and its often-forgotten impact

upon the emerging anti-colonial struggles across Africa, Asia and Latin America.

In the contemporary world in which a mythical post-Cold War and rampant

neo-liberalism appear to rule supreme, there has developed a stifling amnesia

about the enormous gains made on the back of the revolutions of the

twentieth century, and without which current reality might be a worse

spectacle. As my brother and comrade, Okwudiba Nnoli, has recently observed,

while reminding his fellow citizens in Nigeria on the need to revisit that which

the Founding Fathers of the struggle for independence in Africa understood as

indispensable for national economic independence – namely, the role of ‘‘state

economic enterprises’’:

LECTURE PRESENTED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG

10TH OCTOBER 2019

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 For example, the Soviet Union moved from Third World status in 1918

to First World and Super Power status in 1958 on the basis of state

monopoly of economic activities. Thus, in a mere fifty years, which

began with the devastations of the First World War and the massive

destructions of the Second World War, the Soviet Union made a

phenomenal progress. Its demise has nothing to do with its state

economic activities as bourgeois propaganda contends. Rather, it is the

result of the imperial ambitions of Russia, its ill-advised military

competition with the United States of America, and its consequent

neglect of the economic and political yearnings of its people within and

outside the state economic enterprises.

Similarly, China which is this year celebrating the 70th anniversary of its
revolution, had in twenty years, 1949 – 1969,

‘‘successfully reorganised its economy away from dependence on the

West and from a semi-colony to an independent and self-reliant one.

Although the private sector was re-introduced in the mid-1970s, state

economic activities still control the country’s economy. With this

control, China has now moved from a very backward semi-colony in

1949 to the second most powerful economy in the world today.

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 It is presently seriously challenging for the number one economic

power position. The 2019 Forbes Fortune 500 Global List of the world’s

best performing banks has the best four from China:

1. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.

2. The China Construction Bank Corporation.
3. The Agricultural Bank of China, and
4. The Bank of China
All of the four are fully state-owned banks.’’

So, the Moses Kotane Memorial Lecture today provides us with another

opportunity to reflect briefly on more than a half a century of the post-

independent Africa, on the nature and content of the State, and the class and

social dynamics therein; in doing so, highlight the fact that, so far, the post-

independence period has been characterised by prevalent and pervasive

failure, particularly on the economic front, a living nightmare for the mass of

the African people; and propose herein that the imperative for an organised

turn-around must begin with the State reform and transformation project,

including a return to, and focus on, the public sector – and state economic

enterprises – in the struggle for economic independence and progressive social

development in Africa.

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ZIMBABWE: A STATE ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE?

There could not be no more appropriate illustration that characterises the

contemporary African condition than my own country, Zimbabwe, a subject

which, fortuitously, my brother and comrade, Blade Nzimande, raised
poignantly in his SACP Red October Campaign 2019-2020 Launch Statement a

few days ago on 6thOctober.

Both the subject and context help to inform the debate on the State in Africa,

providing also as it does the opportunity for replacing ‘‘quiet diplomacy’’ with

resolute action on the part of such regional bodies as SADC or the African

Union itself, with respect to addressing such situations as when a sister-state is

on the brink of collapse, with all the consequent implications for its

neighbours, the region and the continent as a whole.

In this regard, the most pertinent statement by Blade Nzimande is his

insistence that ‘‘We must condemn injustice regardless of where it is being

committed in our region and in our continent, and regardless of who is

involved in committing injustice….’’

But Blade Nzimande, the SACP General Secretary, is also a Cabinet minister in

the Government of South Africa. Accordingly, we hope that this marks a radical

shift in South Africa’s position on its northern neighbour, from that of ‘‘quiet

diplomacy’’ and its inclination to turn a blind eye to the excesses of a

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regime that has over the period since 2000 become a Securocrat state and

thereby undermined constitutional and human rights, not to mention the

devastation of its economy and the consequent diaspora that includes almost

70% of all skilled and professional Zimbabweans; and adopt a deliberate and

structured initiative in which South Africa mobilises both the region and the

African continent towards an international conference on Zimbabwe,

especially now that there is a growing consensus in that country, for a national
dialogue and transitional mechanisms through which to institute political and
economic reforms before the next election.

Blade Nzimande quotes Emmerson Mnangagwa as having said that the

Zimbabwe economy is ‘dead’, having descended from one “moderately

characterised …. as having experienced a huge economic collapse”; and Blade

observes that this state “is still having the tendency to unleash violence against
sections of its people.’’

All this is true except that the situation is one difficult to imagine, unless one

witnesses this terrible reality. On the economic front, Zimbabwe has

descended into one which Tendai Biti, the current chair of the Parliamentary

Public Accounts Committee, describes as ‘Mobutism’, a reference to the

regime of Zaire’s (now Democratic Republic of Congo) strongman Mobutu,

during which the President would simply call and demand that the Finance

Minister, or the Central Bank Governor, disburses, out of the state coiffeurs

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into his personal account abroad, any amount of money, in a number of cases

no less than $100 million. So, only two days ago on 8 October, 2019, the

National Standing Committee of the Opposition Movement for Democratic

Change (MDC), issued the following statement:

‘‘The Party noted that there has been state capture as evidenced by cartels
comprising top state players and a politically connected elite. It is these
cartels that are stealing tax payers’ money through illegal deals and other
nefarious activities that have brought the economy to its knees.’’
Likewise, the Zimbabwean Heads of Christian Denominations stated the

following a day earlier on 7thOctober:

The current deteriorating economic crisis which is characterized by systemic

corruption, shortages of fuel, prices going out of control and collapse of the

health sector needs to be built from the ground with everyone’s support. As

we are meeting, doctors are on strike and other workers such as teachers are

threatening the same as they find it difficult to make ends meet with their

current remunerations. According to ZimVAC figures for 2019, an estimated

7.7 million Zimbabweans are in need of food assistance due to drought.

Malnutrition and the interruption of basic services such as health and

education may have both immediate and long-term negative impact. When

this is combined with high levels of unemployment, stagnant salaries and loss

of buying power of salaries for those who are still employed, one can

conclude that Zimbabwe needs an urgent and holistic solution in which the

grassroots, organized society and political and policy sectors should

contribute to and own.

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Last month, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) confirmed that the

Zimbabwe economy, which under normal circumstances should be earning

annually at least more than $5 billion from exports, including gold and other

mineral resources alone, was imploding. But, coincidentally, the IMF witnessed

during its visit to Harare a sudden spike in the exchange rate from 10

RTGS/Zimbabwe Dollars to the USD greenback, to more than

20RTGS/Zimbabwe Dollars to the greenback: all because of one transaction in

which the cartel (comprising “top state players and a politically connected

elite”) had commandeered, USD$366 million out of state coiffeurs, and, in the

course of dealing on the parallel market, also landed itself in an even stronger

position as central in the fuel, mining (especially gold) and banking sectors.

RESCUING ZIMBABWE: WILL SOUTH AFRICA AND THE REGION RESPOND TO

CIVIC SOCIETY?

Against such a background, it has been a misplaced expectation that the

former liberation movement in Zimbabwe could have been the anchor – or the

driving force – around which to build a national economy, let alone a coherent

and sustained national project. Even the reputation of the struggle itself lies in

tatters, hardly an inspiration to succeeding generations for whom the

liberators have long served their purpose. The fears and suspicions that the

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struggle was more about militarism than politics appears confirmed in reality.

Not surprisingly, under the vain ‘‘Restore Legacy’’ slogan that accompanied the

coup of November 2017, the military and its surrogate cabal of politicians have

now ensconced themselves in what is now a securocratic or military state, so

predatory and parasitic in nature that it is virtually burning itself out,

compelled as it is to have to rule by the gun. As historical precedents would

inform us, a state which seeks to survive through sheer violence and brute

coercion, is one destined to crash, sooner rather than later. Therefore, the

state-sponsored campaign of violence against the massive opposition, the pre-

emptive abductions of members of civic society bent on expressing their views

through peaceful demonstrations, and the history of rigged elections since

2000, - are but the symptoms of a regime beyond redemption. (A

publication, Excelgate : How Zimbabwe’s 2018 Presidential Election was

stolen – to be released by Sapes Books on 31 October, 2019, is a graphic
illustration of the institutionalized rigging by a military security apparatus, with
the shocking revelation that Mnangagwa ‘’actually got 33% of the vote,
compared to his main rival opposition MDC Leader Nelson Chamisa who

garnered 66%’’).

The question is whether the world stands by while Zimbabwe implodes

completely, with all the consequent implications and ramifications for the mass

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of its citizens in particular; or an urgent rescue plan is instituted, involving a

national strategy, regional superintendence and international scaffolding.

Three years ago in 2016, a group of us, the Platform for Concerned Citizens

(PCC), highlighted the risks attendant to the Zimbabwean situation, including

an analysis which demonstrated that the State was both unwilling and unable

to reform, politically and economically. We warned about the danger of

growing violence and predicted the coup which, as the period since it occurred

in November 2017, to the present testies marked a stage in the disintegration

of the Mugabe/Mnangagwa/Chiwenga regime. It was in that context that the

PCC recommended the establishment of a National Transitional Authority

(NTA), a body to replace the Executive, work with Parliament and the Judiciary,

for a period of two years before elections in 2018, and during which political

and economic reforms would be carried out by an Authority composed mainly

of technocrats and/or prominent citizens. Neither the ruling party nor the

opposition welcomed the NTA idea: the main actors within the state were

already in coup mode by 2016; and the opposition MDC naively believed they

would win and take power in 2018.

So it is that the events since November 2017 have brought Zimbabwe to this

very desperate situation in response to which civic society is insisting that

something akin to the Transitional Authority be instituted as a matter of

urgency. Two weeks ago on 24th September, the Zimbabwe National Citizens’

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Convention made ‘‘A Call to put Citizens, Country and Constitution First in

Zimbabwe’’; insisting that a component, consisting of a cross section of

representatives from civic society, be part and parcel of both the National
Dialogue process and its outcome that should be Transitional Authority.Two
days ago on 8th October, the Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations

(ZHOCD) implied the same, proposing that the Southern African country

suspends general elections for 7 years, ‘‘to give Zimbabweans time to heal

from past political wounds, recover economically and adapt to a fresh culture

of cooperation, nation-building and peace.’’

Accordingly, here is to recommend the Political and Economic Reform Agenda

for Zimbabwe, and thereby seek regional and international support for this

National initiative. Hopefully, South Africa will take the lead by engaging, in the

first instance, both Emmerson Mnangagwa and Nelson Chamisa, but not to the

exclusion of Zimbabwe Civic Society – including the diaspora – which has taken

the lead in this regard.

● The Transitional Authority will be responsible not only for driving the
constitutional and political reforms before the next election, but also

economic recovery.

The restoration of constitutional rule

The restoration of National Institutions
The return of the soldiers to the barracks
Reform of the public service

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Clean up of the judiciary
● A concerted attack on corruption,beginning with a lifestyle audit
of leaders in both public and private sectors

● Regional and International Scaffolding of the Transitional

Authority: on the back of an International Rescue Plan, namely,

the establishment of a USD5 billion Sovereign/Rescue Fund, to be

held in London or New Your, but with the objective of stabilising

the economy, engendering international confidence and

investment and securing a national currency.

● A Social Development Fund:to attend to the urgent needs in

education and healthcare; revival of agriculture, industry, and

employment creation; and the establishment of programmes

designed to rescue the population from the scourge of poverty, as

well as the re-institution of rural development.

● The engagement of the Diaspora, as both investors and joint

venture partners with external factors.

● Both the Sovereign/Rescue and Social Development Funds could

be mobilised internationally and repaid mainly form the proceeds

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 from the export of mineral resources, mainly gold, diamonds and

chrome.

● Amnesty Arrangements:to guard against revenge and vengeance

for acts of commission or omission of the part of state actors; a
negotiated process through which to ensure the repatriation of
externalised resources and/or loot; and the institution of a Truth
and Reconciliation Commission.

This indeed is a tall order, but with the requisite political will, it can be

accomplished.

CONCLUSIONS ON POST LIBERATION SOUTHERN AFRICA: CONCRETIZING THE

PAN AFRICAN AGENDA

THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION?

In conclusion, there is need for consensus among progressive African

intellectuals and activists alike, about the political and economic realities,

particularly in post-liberation Southern Africa.

First, the expectations of the ‘‘national democratic revolution’’, the stage

immediately succeeding the end of the struggle for national liberation, have

remained largely illusory in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and

even in South Africa wherein the term was coined in 1988 through the work of

Joe Slovo and his comrades in the South African Communist Party (SACP).

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Worse still, the former national liberation movements of Southern Africa have

failed miserably to act as the anchor factor – or the driving force – around

which to build a national economy, let alone a coherent national programme.

To be frank, the former national liberation movements of Southern Africa have

long served their purpose and, in many cases, now run the risk of inviting

ridicule and cynical commentary, not only on the part of the part of our

detractors, but also succeeding generations in Africa, including our own

children and grandchildren.

THE BURDEN OF CONTINUITY

Second, and largely as a consequence of the foregoing in which the leadership

has been found wanting in terms of both capacity and political resolve, there is

the burden of continuity in an economy in which the combined forces of

international capital and (white) bourgeois interests have for decades reigned

supreme, at the expense of the (black) majority of peasants, workers and a

fledgling black middle class. In the Southern African context, this has

bequeathed a peculiar form of ‘‘decolonisation’’ or part thereof, but one in

which vested interests of old have not only remained largely intact, but even

thrived, under the peaceful and democratic conditions of the post-liberation

dispensations. Attempts in Zimbabwe and South Africa at ‘‘intervention’’, as in

the case of the former with respect to the Land Question, or Black Economic

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Empowerment (BEE) as with respect to the latter, have yielded only scant

success; and, in the final analysis, just adding numbers to that group called the

comprador bourgeoisieabout whom we discuss shortly.

A lot has been said recently about the ‘‘Land Reform’’ issue in Zimbabwe,

including a claim that Mugabe delayed the process until 2000, in deference to

the considerations attendant to the liberation process in South Africa,

particularly the need not to scare the whites who would have become more

intransigent in the face of the kind of aggression and ruthlessness with which

many of their counterparts across the Limpopo lost their farms under the fast

track land seizures. As one who was close to the process in Zimbabwe, I can

with confidence state that this version of events is far from the truth. Suffice it

to state for the time being that, not only was the imperative of resolving the

Land Question in Zimbabwe so grossly belated on the part of a government

which lacked the capacity and political resolve to do so; but, more important, it

was a process which was prompted belatedly in 2000, less on the basis of the

political and economic imperatives of a struggle about which the Land

Question was central, than as part of a defensive action designed to pre-empt

an election outcome in which Mugabe and his party would have lost to the

Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the June elections of 2000. In fact,

the rejection by the opposition of the proposed new constitution in the

referendum of February 2000, is what, in effect, prompted the violent and

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largely disorganised fast track land reform programme. So, while the latter was

historically significant in heralding a process through which the Land Question

is being resolved in Zimbabwe, it is also a fact that it has yielded new questions

about property rights, not least the spectre of a black minority having replaced

a white minority, to the extent that the ruling elite - composed of politicians

from the ruling party and the state, the top brass in the military,

police, security and public service – inherited, gratis, the best of those 4000 or

more farms. As already described above, the combination of a securocrat state

and its attendant campaign of economic mismanagement, accounts, in large

measure, for the disaster that is Zimbabwe today.

In short, the failure to address the burden of continuity in a manner designed

to institute both redistribution of wealth and enhance production remains a

challenge in Southern Africa in general. In this regard, South Africa itself should

not think that it is immune to the problems that have caused ‘’forced

migration’’ from both the sub-region and beyond. For as long as the structure

of the economy remains as it has been, it is inevitable that the growing army of

unemployed, already 10 million plus in South Africa, will become just as

restless and foot loose as their counterparts across the border. The question is

whether such ‘‘forced migration’’ will head into the neighbourhood of

Southern Africa, beyond into the continent, or across the seas, as is happening

in the case of the many African citizens seeking succour in Europe, while

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hundreds perish in the Mediterranean or even in the Sahara Desert, long

before they reach their unknown destinations. The more reason why there

should be a more holistic and regional approach to the problem of ‘‘forced

migration’’, including the need to address the historical foundations of unequal

and uneven development within and between African countries, including

those of Southern Africa. This pathology of development has been exacerbated

in the period since the end of apartheid : for example, the expansion (and

externalisation?) of South African (white) capital into the rest of the sub-

region, in the form of the ‘‘supermarket’’ or ‘‘shopping mall’’ economy – the

flood of consumer goods, thus further undermining the manufacturing

capacities of the neighbouring SACU and/or SADC countries, not to mention

the consequent growth in unemployment and ‘‘forced migration’’ into South

Africa itself. Therefore, for example, would it not help if, instead of exporting

finished goods, the South African companies concerned could establish

manufacturing plants in these countries, in partnership with local and

emergent players in the respective sectors?

THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE: THE ABSENCE OF A VIABLE CLASS OR

PRIVATE SECTOR AS THE ENGINE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Historically, the national bourgeoisie has been touted as the anchor class

through which the national economy is defined, developed and defended

(through the requisite interaction – such as trade and laws of rapidity – with

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other national bourgeoisies in the international bourgeoisies in the

international capital system). As has been adequately explained elsewhere, the

very nature of colonialism, especially apartheid and white settler colonialism,

was such as to have pre-empted the development of a black national

bourgeoisies in Africa. And even though we discern the features of an

emergent bourgeoisie in such countries as Nigeria, Kenya and even South

Africa itself, Samir Amin and other economists have explained why, in this era

of the dominance of international capital, the national bourgeois project is not

feasible. Whatever, the case the reality is that Africa has succeeded only in

producing the comprador bourgeoisie,the residue of international finance

capital, as the class which now straddles both the public and the so called

private sectors, and has increasingly captured the State in our countries, in

partnership with international capital and/or its cartels.

For the record, Mao Tse Tung, in his ‘‘Analysis of the Classes in Chinese

Society’’, states that,

‘‘A comprador, in the original sense of the word, was the Chinese manager,

or the senior Chinese employed in a foreign establishment. The compradors

served foreign economic interests and had close connection with imperialism

and foreign capital.’’

Elsewhere, particularly in the 18th Steve Biko Memorial Lecture (‘‘Pan

Africanism, Class and The State in Southern Africa,’’ 9 November, 2017), I

17
outlined in some detail the historical origins of the comprador bourgeoisie in

Southern Africa in particular and Africa generally, including the role such

multinationals – e.g. Anglo-America, LONRHO, etc – as have been associated

with the extractive industries , and will have ‘‘compradorized’’ even some of

the key African nationalists, even before Freedom Day itself.

‘‘But perhaps, not surprisingly, it has been largely through the

extractive industries…. that the comprador bourgeoisie has grown during this

post-liberation period, expressing itself as it has, not only through the

members of the political and military - security and bureaucratic hierarchy,

and in collaboration with their counterparts in the private sector and in

multinationals at home and abroad; but also in the apparent conflation

between power, corruption, and wealth.’’

But the main import of my submission today is to underscore why the

comprador bourgeoisie cannot and will never serve as the engine of the

development in Africa. For, by nature, the comprador bourgeoisie is a class in

itself and for itself; it is bereft of a national vision nor national interest, mainly

because it is incapable of conceiving such; and, more significantly, it is a class

that lives for today, uncertain about tomorrow and hence the looting of the

coiffeurs becomes a frenzy. These are nothing less than thieves, says my late

brother, Gilbert Mudenda.

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THE FUTURE OF AFRICA: THE REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE

ON A CONTINENTAL FRAMEWORK

So, fifty years since Amilcar Cabral raise the question in 1969 (in Revolution in
Guinea), we are back to it today: since post-independent Africa does not have

an anchor class such as the national bourgeoisie in the capitalist state, who

should play that central role as the driving force for economic independence

and development?

The history of post-independent Africa has been largely an account of the state

itself. It continues to be the theatre and centre of power and its attendant class

struggles; it is an arena so coveted as the very source and repository of the

fruits of independence. It is almost the very heart of society, the latter can

hardly survive without it. Regrettably, there has been the tendency to

distinguish between the political from the economic, forgetting that the two

are dialectically related and hence political economy. For example, there has

been over the decades a disproportionate emphasis on the political features of

the State – whether it is democratic enough and its conduct with respect to the

rule of law and human rights – than the economic issues which have been

increasingly assigned to the private sector. In true neo-liberal fashion, there

has grown the notion that the state exists only to facilitate economic activity

but not be involved in it. All this against the stark reality that democracy,

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human rights and the rule of law are most threatened when the economy is in

distress and the conditions of inequality in society are most pronounced.

Therefore, what’s required urgently in Africa is a return to the drawing board in

which the false dichotomy between the public and private did not exist. As

Nnoli has asserted, the ‘Founding Fathers’ of our struggle for independence in

Africa ‘‘understood the wisdom of state economic independence’’. To

highlight this point is not to ignore the private sector nor to have elements

therein ‘‘nationalised’’. Indeed, we should continue to encourage

entrepreneurship as a historical feature of African society. However, the

private sector in the contemporary African situation has remained essentially

weak and dependent on multinationals and the vagaries of international

capital, including the fallacy that economic development is impossible except

through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). As Nnoli points out with respect to

Nigeria:

The truth is that in the world economy, around 80% of the required FDI went

to six countries of the USA, China, Japan, Germany and France. The remaining

20% was dominated by India, Brazil, the Netherlands, Ireland and Singapore.

How much does anyone seriously think that Nigeria can get from this cut

throat competition for investment? For this reason history will judge

Obasanjo and Atiku very harshly for their ignominious role in dismantling the

nation’s fledging public sector instead of fighting the corruption within it.’’

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As weak and vulnerable as the private sector is in most of Sub-Saharan Africa,

hence, too, the prevalence within it of the comprador elements to which

reference has been made.

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THE WAY FORWARD

Accordingly, the Reform Agenda of the State in Africa must be both political

and economic.

- Constitutional and Developmental Democracy

On the political front, the necessity of sustaining and deepening

the struggle for constitutional and developmental democracy,
within the context of the separation of powers, between an
Executive (which is supposed to be accountable), the Legislature
(which is supposed to be both well informed and vibrant, as the
representatives of the people), and a Judiciary (which is supposed
to be fiercely independent, being the ‘‘soul of the nation’’).

- National Institutions : established in terms of the constitution of

the country and therefore staffed by persons of integrity,

non-partisan and patriotic.

- A concerted attack in corruption, beginning with a life-style audit

of leaders in both public and private sectors, including a public

disclosure of assets on the part of office holders.

- Regional and PanAfrican Cooperation : The imperative of creating

political and cultural symmetries across such regions as SADC, East

African Community (EAC), and ECOWAS ; and, in turn, between

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 these and the African Union itself. The provisions designed to

effect regional and continental unity should be given concrete

expression at the national level, including immediate institution of

a borderless Africa and the attendant freedom of movement of its

citizens across the Motherland.

On the economic front :

- Restoration, Reform and Rationalisation of Public Enterprises, as

viable economic units, well-staffed by qualified and efficient

personnel; and adhering to the corporate governance criteria

applicable to any organisation. In addition, the public economic

enterprises should focus on those sectors most in need of

benefitiation - eg. Mining and agriculture - and therefore given to

manufacturing, industrial and technological development and, of

course, employment creation. They must compete with those in

the private sector and, if necessary, partner these, including such

multinationals as those from which to gain expertise and access to

markets.

- The Restoration of the National Development Plan, to ensure

equal and even development across the country, including rural

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 development, human development and social security, and

attention to the vulnerable groups in society.

- Regional Public Enterprises, to be established along, and taking

into account, existing trade linkages in such key sectors as energy,

transport, infrastructure and effecting those sectoral provisions

already existing at both regional and continental levels.

- The African Economic Community : the provisions for the AEC are
clearly spelt out in the Abuja Treaty; what’s required now is the

requisite leadership and political resolve with which to concretize

the African Economic Community.

CONCLUSION

Kwame Nkruma’s clarion call – ‘Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else

will be added unto it’ – still rings hollow for the majority of Africa’s citizens. As

students of Marxism-Leminism, we know that political freedom and democracy

are meaningless unless founded on economic growth and development.

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