AISEP Policy Manual: Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP)
AISEP Policy Manual: Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP)
Foreword
The Australian and New Zealand Governments employ Information Technology (IT) security solutions to
deliver on-line services and protect official information. The Australasian Information Security Evaluation
Program (AISEP) was established to ensure the ready availability of independently evaluated IT security
products that meet these needs.
The AISEP is the Program that manages evaluation and certification of IT security products against the
internationally recognised Common Criteria (CC) standard. The Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), as the
Australian national authority on information security certifies the results of all evaluation tasks performed
under the Program. These certification services are provided from DSD to government without cost.
Successful completion of certification is published on the Evaluated Products List (EPL) on the DSD website.
This document is the policy for the management and operations of the AISEP.
Joe Franzi
Assistant Secretary
Information Security Operations
Defence Signals Directorate
All correspondence in connection with this document should be addressed to:
Director, Evaluations and Industry Coordination
Information Security Operations
Defence Signals Directorate
Locked Bag 5076
Kingston ACT 2604
Australia
Disclaimer
This AISEP Policy Manual has been prepared so as to provide a policy framework for the management and
operations of the AISEP. Nothing in the AISEP Policy Manual should be construed as a representation as to
the future conduct of the Commonwealth in any particular AISEP activity. The AISEP Policy Manual should
not be relied upon as a substitute for independent legal advice.
In the event of any inconsistency, a descending order of precedence shall be accorded to:
a. Any applicable legislation or law;
b. The licensing agreement between DSD and AISEF; and
c. The AISEP Policy Manual.
So that the higher ranked document prevails to the extent of any inconsistency.
Amendment record
Version Date Description
Contents
Foreword................................................................................................................................................................iii
Disclaimer.............................................................................................................................................................. iv
Amendment record.............................................................................................................................................. v
Contents................................................................................................................................................................. vi
History.................................................................................................................................................................... ix
Chapter 1—Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 AISEP overview............................................................................................................................................1
1.2 AISEP authority............................................................................................................................................2
1.3 Overview of AISEP policies.......................................................................................................................2
1.4 Mutual recognition agreements...............................................................................................................2
1.5 Compliance language..................................................................................................................................3
Chapter 2—Organisation of the AISEP............................................................................................................ 5
2.1 AISEP management.....................................................................................................................................5
2.1.1 AISEP governance and managerial roles..............................................................................5
2.1.2 GCSB support to the AISEP.....................................................................................................5
2.2 ACA roles and responsibilities..................................................................................................................7
2.2.1 ACA management......................................................................................................................7
2.2.2 ACA certifiers..............................................................................................................................8
2.2.3 ACA quality assurance and compliance................................................................................9
2.2.3.1 Assessment and compliance....................................................................................................9
2.2.3.2 Documentation control........................................................................................9
2.2.3.3 ACA dispute resolution........................................................................................9
2.2.3.4 Common Criteria certificate withdrawal.......................................................10
2.3 AISEF roles and responsibilities.............................................................................................................10
2.3.1 AISEF management.................................................................................................................11
2.3.2 AISEF evaluator........................................................................................................................11
2.3.2.1 Principal evaluator..............................................................................................11
2.3.3 AISEF licensing requirements...............................................................................................12
2.3.5 NATA accreditation requirements for the AISEF..............................................................14
2.3.6 Associated costs for the AISEF..............................................................................................15
2.3.6 AISEF impartiality....................................................................................................................15
2.3.7 AISEF security...........................................................................................................................15
2.3.8 AISEF archiving and disposal................................................................................................17
Chapter 3—AISEP Evaluation and Operational Policy...............................................................................19
3.1 IT security evaluation and certification................................................................................................19
3.1.1 Plan phase..................................................................................................................................19
3.1.2 Conduct phase..........................................................................................................................22
3.1.3 Conclude phase.........................................................................................................................24
3.1.4 AISEF evaluation progress rules...........................................................................................24
List of Figures
Figure 1: AISEP Stakeholders............................................................................................................................. 1
Figure 2: AISEP Management Framework...................................................................................................... 6
Figure3: ACA Roles............................................................................................................................................... 7
Figure 4: AISEF Roles.........................................................................................................................................10
Figure 5: AISEP Evaluation and Certification Workflow of Activities....................................................19
Figure 6: Common Criteria Certification Mark............................................................................................42
History
1. The Australian and New Zealand (Australasian) public and private sectors increasingly rely on
information technology. The use of computer systems and networks offer many benefits, but there
are also risks associated with their use. This is of particular concern to government agencies and
organisations that provide critical services.
2. Users need confidence that products providing security functionality for their IT systems
perform as claimed by the product vendor. This confidence is best achieved through an impartial
assessment of the product by an independent entity against clearly identified security claims
using internationally recognised criteria.
3. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, DSD performed evaluations internally to meet the need
for the assessment of IT security products. This provided a level of confidence in the security
functionality of key IT security products that were being used by Australian Government agencies.
However, with the rapid proliferation of information technology and the reliance on security, the
demand for evaluated products grew. In June 1994, DSD announced the establishment of the
Australian Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP).
4. Initially, evaluations in Australia were undertaken solely in accordance with the European
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) standard (Ref. [1]). The ITSEC
standard is a harmonised version of national security evaluation criteria developed by the
United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and Germany in the early 1990s.
5. In the mid‑1990s, the Common Criteria (CC) project began to consolidate the evaluation criteria of
the European nations, the United States and Canada and to establish a foundation for widespread
mutual recognition of evaluation results through the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common
Criteria Certificates in the Field of IT Security (also known as the Common Criteria Recognition
Arrangement, or CCRA).
6. The CC replaced national criteria with a worldwide standard: version 2.1 and it was accepted by
the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) on 15 November 1998 as ISO standard
15408. Since then, it has been updated (Refs. [2], [3], [4] and [5]).
7. In 1998, the AISEP began adopting the CC as approved IT security evaluation criteria. Australia
and New Zealand merged their evaluation and certification capabilities in the same year, and the
program was renamed the Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP).
8. In the Program, IT security evaluation activities are outsourced to licensed commercial evaluation
facilities called Australasian Information Security Evaluation Facilities (AISEFs). The Australasian
Certification Authority (ACA) is the oversight body, established through DSD.
9. On 22 September 1999, the Management Committee of the CCRA voted unanimously to
accept Australia and New Zealand, through the AISEP, as certificate-producing participants of
the CCRA. Also through the AISEP, Australia and New Zealand established an agreement with
the United Kingdom to mutually recognise all ITSEC certificates and the maintenance of these
certificates through each nation’s programs.
10. In 2011, the AISEP ceased to conduct ITSEC evaluations and certificate maintenance to focus
solely on CC. At this time, DSD began participating in creating technology tailored Protection
Profiles (PPs) using the CC Standard.
11. PPs are documents that contain a benchmark of security requirements for a technology that
a product vendor must meet to pass evaluation. CC participating governments and industry
experts form technical groups to develop the PPs. Through PPs, DSD can influence industry to
build security products that meet Australian government needs. DSD approved PPs are listed
on the EPL.
Chapter 1—Introduction
AISEF ACA
ENGAGEMENT INTERACTION
Consumer:
IT Security Australian or
Product Vendor ENGAGEMENT New Zealand
Government Agency
30. Figure 2: AISEP Management Framework illustrates the relationship across GCSB and DSD.
GCSB DSD
Assistant Secretary
Information Security
Operations
directs strategic
intent
ACA
Director Evaluations and
Industry Coordination
Principal Certifier
ACA
ACA Quality
Manager Manager
Principal Certifiers
Certifier
51. The ACA provides a client feedback process that allows the product vendor and the AISEF to raise
suggestions for process improvement throughout an evaluation task. Items that are raised at a
formal meeting are minuted and resolved.
52. The ACA exercises control regarding the use of awarded Common Criteria certificates. The ACA
implements mechanisms to prevent or counter the misuse of certificates and to correct false,
misleading or improper statements in relation to the certificate or the AISEP.
53. The ACA communicates in the formal meetings at the beginning and end of the evaluation task
to inform and remind the product vendor of their obligation to use the certificate correctly and
to refrain from misrepresenting the AISEP. The ACA Manager is responsible for taking action if
AISEP certificates or marketing is found to be misused.
AISEF
AISEF Quality
Controller Manager
Principal Evaluators
Evaulator
74. An AISEF licence is granted when the following conditions have been met:
a. The applicant has submitted the proposal to the ACA;
b. The ACA has formally accepted the applicant’s proposal; and
c. The applicant has agreed to the conditions of the AISEF licensing agreement.
Note: A standard licensing agreement is available on request from the ACA.
75. Where the ACA rejects an organisation’s application for an AISEF licence, the ACA may, at its
discretion, provide reasons for the decision.
Note:
The decision not to grant to an applicant an AISEF licence is NOT reviewable under
Chapter 5 — Reviewable decisions.
76. An unsuccessful applicant may reapply to become a licensed AISEF six months following the
date of the ACA’s decision not to grant an AISEF licence. An organisation making a second or
subsequent application MUST undergo the process in its entirety.
77. On acceptance of an applicant’s proposal to become an AISEF, the ACA will:
a. Inform the organisation of its success;
b. Facilitate the signing of the licence agreement; and
c. List the facility on DSD’s AISEP website and identify the AISEF as “New and preparing for
NATA accreditation”.
82. An AISEF with a suspended licence MUST NOT carry out evaluation work. The AISEF MUST
NOT:
a. Advertise its services as an AISEF; or
b. Continue to bid for evaluation work.
83. The ACA reviews the suspended status when the suspended AISEF notifies the ACA that the
concerns that caused the suspension have been rectified.
84. The ACA may terminate an AISEF licence if:
a. NATA has cancelled the AISEF accreditation;
b. The AISEF ceases to maintain minimum staffing levels as specified in section 2.3.2 above; or
c. The AISEF fails to rectify an issue that caused licence suspension within a reasonable
timeframe considered appropriate in the opinion of the ACA.
Note: The ACA’s decision to terminate an AISEF’s licence is NOT a reviewable decision under
Chapter 5 — Reviewable decisions.
85. An AISEF with a terminated licence MUST NOT carry out activities under the auspices of the
AISEP.
86. An organisation that was a former AISEF may seek reinstatement by reapplying for a licence. In
assessing a reapplication, the ACA will pay particular attention to those characteristics that caused
the licence termination to ensure that Program quality is upheld.
98. The AISEF MUST nominate a Facility Security Officer, assigned overall responsibility for security
within the AISEF.
99. The AISEF MUST have documented security policies and supporting procedures. As a minimum,
these documents MUST address the following:
a. Physical security;
b. Personnel security; and
c. Information security.
111. The Letter of Recommendation for Evaluation may be submitted by an AISEF, product vendor or
government agency. A template for this letter is available from the DSD website.
112. The Letter of Recommendation for Evaluation forms part of the AISEP Acceptance Package (AAP).
Early submission of the Letter is desirable as it enables the ACA to engage the Government agency
on their evaluation needs prior to the ACA’s review of the evaluation task for acceptance.
f. The proposed evaluation plan contains the level of detail required, is of adequate quality, and
is able to abide by AISEP policies and procedures;
g. The AISEF is able to meet the requirements for specialist technical skills, independence and
impartiality;
h. The product is NOT currently being evaluated in another Scheme that would be covered by a
mutual recognition arrangement or understanding with DSD upon evaluation completion. See
section 4.1.3 below for relevant mutual recognition arrangements and understandings;
i. A contractual agreement exists between the product vendor and the AISEF to have the product
evaluated under the AISEP.
116. The ACA authorises acceptance of an evaluation task into the Program through the formal
notification of a letter. Evaluation activity may not commence until the evaluation task has been
formally accepted and notified by the ACA. When an evaluation task commences, the ACA will
publish the product on the EPL.
117. The ACA may reject an evaluation task for the following reasons:
a. All the requirements specified in paragraph 115 above have not been adequately met; or
b. The evaluation does not meet the national security needs of Australasian government agencies
in protecting their official communication and information systems.
118. The ACA will notify the AISEF if an evaluation task has not been accepted.
Note: A decision to reject an evaluation task is a reviewable decision under Chapter 5 —
Reviewable decisions.
119. The ACA enforces the following additional acceptance requirement for products that contain
cryptographic functionality in scope of the evaluation. Consumers MUST be able to configure the
evaluated product so that DSD Approved Cryptographic Algorithms (DACAs) and DSD Approved
Cryptographic Protocols (DACPs) are used for all cryptographic functions.
Note: DSD Approved Cryptographic Algorithms (DACAs) and DSD Approved Cryptographic
Protocols (DACPs) are specified in the Australian Government Information Security
Manual (ISM) (Ref. [10]).
120. The ACA will consider a request from the product vendor for an evaluation to be conducted
discretely and not be listed on the EPL until the task has completed. However, task progress goals
MUST still be met. The ACA MUST be able to inform Australasian government consumers of the
discrete evaluation should a need arise. The ACA will inform the AISEF and product vendor if this
occurs.
122. The AISEF MUST inform the product vendor that they are responsible for and agree to the
following during the evaluation:
a. Provide personnel and financial resources to fully support the conduct of the evaluation and to
progress the task sufficiently;
b. Provide the necessary equipment and deliverables required for the evaluation This may
include the provision of evaluation deliverables to the ACA; and
c. Allow DSD to provide draft versions of the ST to potential Australasian government
consumers while the product is in evaluation.
138. In some cases, the cost and timeliness implications associated with a change in scope would be
seen as counterproductive to both product vendor and consumer objectives. An option would be
to complete the existing evaluation and then engage in AISEP Assurance Continuity (AAC) for
changes to the product after certification. AAC is described in section 3.2 below.
147. During the investigation, the AISEF may be required to provide additional information on what
actions it has taken or proposes to take, in order to progress the task. The product vendor may be
required to provide information to the ACA to assist it in deciding whether to remove the listing
from the EPL.
148. Should there be insufficient evaluation progress across three consecutive reporting periods; the
ACA will remove the EPL listing for the task. The ACA will formally notify the AISEF and the
product vendor through a letter following the EPL listing removal. The task will not be re-listed
until the AISEF can demonstrate one month of sufficient evaluation progress.
149. The ACA reserves the right to terminate the task if sufficient evaluation progress is not
demonstrated three months consecutively from the issue of the warning letter.
Note: A decision to terminate an evaluation task, after the product vendor has provided
relevant information to the ACA (show-cause process), is a reviewable decision under
Chapter 5 — Reviewable decisions.
150. On termination of a task, the ACA will:
a. Remove the task’s EPL entry;
b. Provide formal notification to the product vendor and the AISEF of the termination of
the task;
c. Provide formal notification to the government agency that provided the Letter of
Recommendation for Evaluation; and
d. Notify known consumers.
151. A task that the ACA has terminated is not permitted to recommence. To continue a previously
terminated evaluation, the task MUST be treated as a new evaluation and the product vendor
renegotiates a contract with an AISEF. The AISEF MUST submit a new AISEP Acceptance Package
(AAP) for the task. However, the ACA may recognise previous evaluation effort in accordance with
re-evaluation policy defined in section 3.2.3 below.
152. If during the course of the evaluation process, the ACA determines the product is unable to meet
evaluation requirements, the ACA will terminate the task.
Note: A decision to terminate an evaluation task, where the product is unable to meet
evaluation requirements, is a reviewable decision under Chapter 5 — Reviewable
decisions.
165. The AISEF contracted to conduct the re-evaluation MUST determine the level of effort required to
re-establish assurance. The product vendor should ensure that the AISEF has access to all previous
evaluation deliverables to ensure the task is performed effectively.
166. The AISEF MUST schedule a meeting with the ACA to discuss and finalise the required level of
effort agreed for the re-evaluation task.
167. A re-evaluation task concludes in the same manner as an evaluation task. Unlike a maintenance
task, a re-evaluation results in a new certificate being issued.
Note: Product vendors MUST seek advice from the ACA for AISEP Assurance Continuity options
where the original evaluation was against a DSD approved Protection Profile.
180. An AISEF, government agency or product vendor may submit an ARI if they:
a. Have difficulty interpreting a component of accepted IT security evaluation criteria,
supporting document or PP;
b. Have difficulty interpreting AISEP policy or a process;
c. Cannot find sufficient guidance in order to perform a required AISEP activity; or
d. Find an error in the current version of an AISEP policy or accepted IT security evaluation
criteria or a supporting document.
181. The ACA assigns a unique identifier and issues an acknowledgement to the originator on receipt
of an ARI.
182. In response to an ARI, the ACA will, via email or letter:
a. Provide a resolution to the ARI; or
b. Explain why the ACA has determined that the matter in question is not required to be resolved
through an interpretation.
183. The ACA publishes an AISEP interpretation for a resolution that involves interpreting accepted IT
security evaluation criteria. The ACA distributes the AISEP interpretation for comment before it is
finalised.
184. The ACA submits a final AISEP interpretation that relates to IT security evaluation criteria to the
appropriate criteria authorities for submission to the relevant international interpretation process.
185. The ACA withdraws the superseded AISEP interpretation after the international bodies have
reviewed scheme interpretation and the response is final.
186. A resolution to the ARI that may involve interpreting or modifying an AISEP policy or procedure
is posted on the AISEP website. An ARI resolution is incorporated in the next release. See section
4.2.3 below describes the update cycle for AISEP policies.
4.3.3 Certificate
223. The ACA ensures that the content of the certificate complies with the requirements specified in
Annex J of the CCRA (Ref. [6]).The certificate for AISEP evaluations includes the following details:
a. Product vendor name;
b. Product name;
c. Product type;
d. Version and release numbers;
e. Protection Profile conformance (if applicable);
f. Evaluation platform (optional);
g. AISEF name;
h. The IT security evaluation criteria that was used;
i. Certificate number;
j. Date issued; and
k. EAL including any augmentations.
234. The AISEF MUST include the following major areas within the ETR for product evaluations:
a. Executive summary;
b. Introduction;
c. Product description (to include an overview, usage and environmental assumptions) threats,
organisational security policies and a clarification of scope;
d. The evaluation context, including the evaluated configuration, security policy, product
architecture and testing efforts;
e. Evaluation results;
f. Product delivery and installation;
g. Conclusions and recommendations;
h. Evaluation documentation; and
i. Problem reports and resolutions.
5.1 Decisions
246. During the In-Evaluation stage, the product vendor may indicate in marketing material that
the product is undergoing evaluation, but MUST NOT use the logo associated with a certified
product, as shown in Figure 6: Common Criteria Certification Mark, until certification is achieved.
247. The product vendor MUST seek ACA approval prior to publicly releasing material that makes
reference to the AISEP, ACA or DSD.
A.1 References
1. Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), Commission of the European
Communities CD-71-91-502-EN-C, Version 1.2, June 1991.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general
model, CCMB-2009-07-001, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional
components, CCMB-2009-07-002, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009.
4. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance
components, CCMB-2009-07-003, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009.
5. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Evaluation Methodology,
CCMB-2009-07-004, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009.
6. Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information
Technology Security, May 2000.
7. Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements, CCIMB-2004-02-009, Version 1.0, February 2004.
8. ISO/IEC 17025: Field Application Document, Information and Communications Technology Testing,
Supplementary requirements for accreditation, National Association of Testing Authorities, Australia.
9. Memorandum of Understanding between Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program and
United Kingdom Information Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme, 20 November 2002.
10. Australian Government Information Security Manual (ISM), Defence Signals Directorate, [annual
release].
11. New Zealand Information Security Manual (NZISM), Government Communications Security Bureau,
[annual release].
12. Intelligence Services Act 2001, Commonwealth of Australia.
13. Archives Act 1983, Commonwealth of Australia, 1983.
14. AISEP Evaluator Policy, Defence Signals Directorate, Version 4.0, August 2011.
15. AISEP Certifier Policy, Defence Signals Directorate, Version 4.0, August 2011.
A.2 Abbreviations
AAC AISEP Assurance Continuity DDSD Director Defence Signals Directorate
ACA Australasian Certification Authority DGCSB Director Government Communications
ACM AISEF Controllers Meeting Security Bureau
ACT Australian Capital Territory DEI Director ICT Evaluations and Industry
Coordination, DSD
AISEF Australasian Information Security
Evaluation Facility DSD Defence Signals Directorate (Australia)