CRESPO vs.

MOGUL
G.R. No. L-53373 | June 30, 1987

The prosecution of criminal case is under the control and supervision of the Public Prosecutor. However, if the complaint or
information has been submitted at the Court, any discretion of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in sound discretion of the Court. Although its control and supervision is still under the Public Prosecutor, he cannot impose his
opinion at the trial court.

Facts:

1. Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario
Fl. Crespo.

2. When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a
pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the
filing of the information. Judge denied motion but arraignment was deferred to afford time for petitioner Crespo to elevate
matter to CA.

3. CA eventually issued a writ of injunction against Judge Mogul, restraining him from proceeding with arraignment until
DOJ shall have finally resolved the petition for review.

4. DOJ Undersec. reversed the resolution of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for the immediate dismissal
of the information. Thus, a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed. Judge denied motion and set
arraignment.

5. CA denied accused’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for issuance of prelim. writ of
prohibition and/or TRO. Hence, petition for review with SC.

Issue: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss filed by Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of DOJ Sec. to whom the
case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on merits.

Ratio Decidendi:

Yes. The prosecution of a criminal case is under the discretion and control of the Fiscal. The Court cannot interfere therein.
Thus, a fiscal commits no error in asking for the dismissal of case for insufficiency of evidence since he has the authority to do so,
and the Court that grants the same also commits no error.

The rule is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction
or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.

The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has
the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be
secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate
action.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the
fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition
for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter
should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

Lastly, in the event that the motion to dismiss is denied, the fiscal should still, at least, continue to appear for the prosecution
although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control.
IVLER vs. MODESTO-SAN PEDRO

G.R. No. 172716 | November 17, 2010

Topics: There is double jeopardy when the crimes charged against an accused are quasi-offenses. The essence of quasi offenses
under the RPC is that the law punishes the act of the accused being negligent, that if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. And as a careless act is only single, whether the injurious results affect one or several persons, the criminal negligence is
still one and the same, thus it cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

No. Under the Rules of Court, his absence will not forfeit his standing in seeking a relief of the law. His absence will merely render
his bondsman liable on its bond, subject to its forfeiture if the bondsmen failed to produce the body of their principal of explain his
non-production and explain his absence when he was required to appear, for 30 days. Thus, the 30-day period granted to the
bondsmen to produce the body of the accused underlies the fact that the mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the status
of the accused to a fugitive without standing.

Facts:

1. Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the MeTC Pasig City
with two separate offense: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

2. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of
reckless imprudence.

3. The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

4. Petitioner then elevated the matter to RTC Pasig in a petition for certiorari. Petitioner sought from MeTC the suspension
of proceedings in the second case including arraignment, invoking the Special Civil Action as a P.Q.

5. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence,
cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.

6. RTC dismissed the Special Civil Action filed by petitioner, holding that he forfeited his standing to maintain it due to
MeTC’s arrest order for non-appearance at arraignment. Hence, this petition.

Issues:

1) Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in the SCA when MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-
appearance at arraignment.
2) Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in the second criminal
case.

Ratio Decidendi:

1) NO. Rule 124, Section 8[2], in relation to Rule 125, Sec. 1 ROC, authorizes the SC or CA to “also, upon motion of the
appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.” The “appeal” contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review
judgments of convictions.

The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the
applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in the second criminal case finds no basis under procedural rules
and jurisprudence.

Under Rule 114, Sec. 21 ROC, the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject
to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and,
should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted
to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the
accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.
 2) YES. In Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga, the Court held that reckless imprudence is not simply a way of
committing a crime. What is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission
of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art.
13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or
series, of crimes.

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in damage,
either to person or property.

Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that
same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in
the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account
to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same,
and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

Therefore, an accused who is previously convicted or acquitted of a result of a specific imprudent or negligent act can no
longer be subsequently prosecuted for another result of the same specific imprudent or negligent act, as such situation
would place him in double jeopardy.

To the mind of the Court, there are two approaches: First, to complex all consequences of a “365 act” [own phrase] but
only those penalized as grave or less grave offenses, which will then have the effect of barring prosecution for the light
offense since it would be double jeopardy; or second, to simply allege all the consequences of the “365 act” and not apply
Art. 48.

To maintain the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies, the Court ruled to uphold the second
approach. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or
less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. According to the Court, this
ruling of prohibiting the splitting of charges under Art. 365 is a constitutionally compelled choice. Constitutionally
impermissible second prosecutions would be avoided.

Hence, SC held that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or
severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365
for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.

REODICA vs. CA
G.R. No. 125066 | July 8, 1998

Topics: Quasi Offenses; Duplicity; Jurisdiction; Prescription;

Facts:

1. One evening, petitioner was recklessly driving a van when she suddenly hit the car of complainant. Three days after the
incident, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint against petitioner with the Fiscal’s Office. Three months after that,
an information was filed before the RTC charging petitioner with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
with Slight Physical Injury. RTC convicted and sentenced to suffer 6 months of arresto mayor. CA affirmed.

Issues:

1) Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 RPC applies to the quasi offenses in question.
2) Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal.
3) Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the offenses in question.
4) Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed.

Ratio Decidendi:

1) NO. Proceeding from the premise R.I.R.I. Slight Physical Injuries (Public Censure) and R.I.R.I. Damage to Property
(Arresto mayor) is a light felony and less grave felony respectively, SC held that they cannot be complexed.
2) NO. Petitioner waived the right to question duplicity when she failed to file MTQ the information before pleading.
 3) NO. The law in force at the time was BP Blg 129 which provided that offenses punishable by imprisonment of not
exceeding 4 years and 2 months were under the juris of the first level courts. Public censure is penalty below arresto menor.
Since arresto menor and arresto mayor do not exceed the limit, first level courts have juris.
4) NO. Applicable law is RPC. Article 90 provides that RIRI-SLP, being a light felony, prescribes in 2 months. On the other
hand, RIRI damage to property is a less grave felony which prescribes in 5 years. Article 91 provides that prescriptive
period is interrupted by filing of complaint or information. Law does not distinguish as to what type of complaint, whether
for P.I. or judicial action. Hence, the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal for P.I., three days after the incident, tolled the
prescriptive period.

ENRILE vs. PEOPLE

Topics: Motion for Bill of Particulars;

Facts:

1. OMB filed an Information for Plunder against Enrile, et al for plunder before the SB. The SB denied Enrile’s motion for
bill of particulars, reasoning that the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial.

2. Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of particulars despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information filed
against him. Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on what his specific participation
in the crime of plunder had been.

Issue: Whether SB committed grave abuse of discretion in denying MBP.

Ratio Decidendi:

YES. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in implementing the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, specifically require certain matters to be stated in the Information for its
sufficiency. The requirement aims to enable the accused to properly prepare for his defense since he is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense charged.

An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense; the evidentiary and other details (i.e., the
facts supporting the ultimate facts) can be provided during the trial.

Ultimate facts is defined as “those facts which the expected evidence will support. The term does not refer to the details
of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established.” It refers to the facts that the
evidence will prove at the trial. Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the ultimate facts; they are
the premises that lead to the ultimate facts as conclusion. They are facts supporting the existence of some other alleged and unproven
fact. While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the Information, matters of evidence — as
distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the offense — do not need to be alleged.

In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the charges or claims in an action, which an accused may
avail of by motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and prepare for trial.

In criminal cases, a bill of particulars details items or specific conduct not recited in the Information but nonetheless pertain
to or are included in the crime charged. Its purpose is to enable an accused: to know the theory of the government’s case; to prepare
his defense and to avoid surprise at the trial; to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same offense;
and to compel the prosecution to observe certain limitations in offering evidence.

The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the accused of the crime
charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence
may immediately know what the Information means. Take note that the prosecutor is not required to include in the bill matters of
evidence relating to how the People intend to prove the elements of the offense charged or how the People intend to prove any item
of factual information included in the bill.

When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a
motion for a bill of particulars. Notably, the failure of the accused to move for the specification of the details desired deprives him
of the right to object to evidence that could be introduced and admitted under an Information of more or less general terms but which
sufficiently charges the accused with a definite crime.

Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting the bill to give full meaning to the accused’s constitutionally guaranteed
rights
 To distinguish, a bill of particulars presupposes a valid Information while a motion to quash is a jurisdictional defect on
account that the facts charged in the Information does not constitute an offense.

The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where the Information is filed.

A reading of the Information filed against Enrile in the present case shows that the prosecution made little or no effort to
particularize the transactions that would constitute the required series or combination of overt acts. Enrile should know the particular
overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination or series of over criminal acts charged in the Info; and likewise, the approximate
dates, at least, of the receipt of the kickbacks and commissions, so that he could prepare the necessary pieces of evidence,
documentary or otherwise, to disprove the allegations against him. Enrile is also entitled to particulars specifying the project that
Enrile allegedly funded coupled with the name of Napoles’ NGO, to sufficiently inform Enrile of the particular transactions referred
to. The government agencies to whom Enrile endorsed Napoles’ NGOs are also material facts that must be specified, since they
served a necessary role in the crime charged — the alleged conduits between Enrile and Napoles’ NGOs. These are materials facts
that must be alleged.

PEOPLE vs. BUCA

Topics: Rape; Date of Commission of Offense;

Facts:

1. Accused-appellant “Anjoy” Buca (Anjoy for brevity), a neighbor of minor victim’s family, entered the house and ordered
AAA’s siblings to go to another room to sleep. When Anjoy and AAA were all alone, Anjoy placed AAA on his lap, pulled
down her panties and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina. He began to have sex with AAA. CCC, the younger
brother, who was at that time hiding below a bench, saw what was happening. CCC came out and pulled AAA away from
Anjoy. Then, Anjoy warned AAA not to tell anyone of what he did or else he will kill her parents.

2. Eventually, three Informations for Rape were filed. Anjoy was convicted under one Information. CA affirmed. Hence this
petition wherein Anjoy argues that the statement in the Information that the rape occurred sometime before December 24,
2002 despite the fact that the prosecution established that the crime was committed on December 24, 2002 violates Rule
110, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, on the requirement of stating the date of the
commission of the offense and the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.

Issue: Whether Anjoy may be convicted of rape despite the failure to allege the exact date of the commission of the crime in the
Information.

Ratio Decidendi:

YES. It bears stressing that the precise date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of the crime.
Failure to specify the exact date when the rape was committed does not render the Information defective. The reason for this is that
the gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of the private complainant under any of the circumstances enumerated under
Article 335 RPC. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date when the offense
was committed an information is sufficient.

Notably, Rule 110, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, states that it is not necessary to
state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the
offense. Such requirement is not applicable to the crime of rape where the date of the commission of the offense is not an essential
element. Also, said Section 11 expressly permits that a crime may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible
to the actual date of its commission. The information charging accused-appellant of rape sometime before December 24, 2002 when
the crime was committed exactly on December 24, 2002 is sufficiently compliant with said Section 11.

Moreover, accused was able to testify about the incident on December 24, 2002. He did not even disavow knowledge of
the incident on that date but, in fact, admitted that he spoke with AAA at their house on December 24, 2002 and even entered AAA’s
house.

1. Jason Ivler vs. Hon. Ma. Rowena Modesto-San Pedro G.R. No. 172716, 17 November 2010
Facts:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and
(2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first
delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the
second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC refused
quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler
sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment, invoking the petition as a
prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence,
cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.
Issue:
1. W/N petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the MTC ordered his arrest
following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries
sustained by respondent; and
2. W/N petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband.
Held:
The RTC dismissed Ivler’s petition for certiorari, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to
maintain said petition arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in the second
offense. Thus, without reaching the merits of the said petition, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but this proved unavailing.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain
his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses
(e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies
(e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical
injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, the Court granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a comment to
the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are
governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal
if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal."
The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.

Yes. The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"
protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The
MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not."

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The provisions contained in this article shall
not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined
and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to
commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to
Article 365. These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
 Such ruling secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional
right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula
under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime
effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress
can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall
be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still
keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes
occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

2. Marilou Laude vs. Hon. Roline Ginez-Jabalde G.R. No. 217456, 24 November 2015
Facts:
This involves the celebrated case of Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude (Jennifer) killed at the Celzone Lodge on Ramon Magsaysay
Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). A Complaint for murder
was filed by Jennifer’s sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton before the Office of the City Prosecutor which Information
was later filed with the RTC in Olongapo City.
On 19 December 2014, Pemberton surrendered personally to the RTC Judge and was later arraigned. On the same day of
Arraignment petitioner Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender the Custody of
Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media Coverage. The motion was scheduled on 22 December 2014, 2PM.
According to petitioners, they were only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton’s counsel through registered mail. In any case, they
claim to have also “furnished a copy of the [M]otion personally … at the hearing of the [M]otion. On 23 December 2014, the
Urgent Motion was denied, as well as its motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
W/N the averments of the petitioner, that the 3-day notice rule should be should be liberally applied due to the timing of
the arrest and arraignment, tenable.
Held:
No. Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party be given notice of
hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply with this notice requirement renders the motion defective consistent
with protecting the adverse party’s right to procedural due process.
While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an
exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the
other party nor violate his or her due process rights. The adverse party must be given time to study the motion in order to enable
him or her to prepare properly and engage the arguments of the movant. In this case, the general rule must apply because Pemberton
was not given sufficient time to study petitioners’ Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to procedural due process.
Petitioners admit that they personally furnished Pemberton a copy of the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of
the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail only during the hearing. They attempt to elude the
consequences of this belated notice by arguing that they also served a copy of the Motion by registered mail on Pemberton’s counsel.
They also attempt to underscore the urgency of the Motion by making a reference to the Christmas season and the “series of legal
holidays” where courts would be closed. To compound their obfuscation, petitioners claim that the hearing held on December 22,
2014, attended by Pemberton’s counsel sufficiently satisfied the rationale of the three-day notice rule. These circumstances taken
together do not cure the Motion’s deficiencies.
Even granting that Pemberton’s counsel was able to comment on the motion orally during the hearing, which incidentally
was set for another incident, it cannot be said that Pemberton was able to study and prepare for his counterarguments to the issues
raised in the Motion. Judge Ginez-Jabalde was correct to deny the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail based on noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would
be to prejudice Pemberton’s rights as an accused.
3. Paz Bernardo, et. al vs. People G.R. No. 182210, 5 October 2015
Facts:
Bernardo was charged with five counts of violation of B.P. 22 or Bouncing Checks Law for issuing the checks as payment
for a loan from Carmencita Bumanglag in the amount of P460,000.00 payable on or before its maturity on November 30, 1991 with
12% interest per annum on default.
In September 1992, Bumanglag deposited these checks to Bernardo's account but they were dishonored; the reason given
was "Account Closed." Bumanglag sent Bernardo a notice informing her of the dishonor of the checks but the demand went
unheeded, prompting Bumanglag to initiate the criminal complaint.
Bernardo entered a not guilty plea on arraignment. The prosecution rested its case on September 21, 1994. Bernardo took
the witness stand only on May 9, 1996, to present her defense evidence.
Bernardo argued that she could not be held liable for violation of B.P. 22 because the questioned checks were presented
beyond the 90-day period provided under the law. She also denied having received any notice of dishonor, which she insisted was
essential to prove the material element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.
 Further, she maintained that the checks were never meant to be presented as she had always paid her loans in cash, which
she claimed to have done in the aggregate amount of P717,000.00. According to Bernardo, although Bumanglag returned to her the
title to the property after payment, Bumanglag never bothered to issue her receipts. Bumanglag did not return the checks either.
Following Bernardo's cross-examination, the RTC reset the hearing for redirect examination to September 4, 1996. That
hearing, however, was again reset to April 3, 1997, in view of the absence of Bernardo's counsel. When Bernardo and her counsel
again failed to appear during the April 3, 1997 hearing, and in view of the numerous previous postponements the defense had asked
for, the RTC considered her right to present additional evidence waived.
Bernardo moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied her motion. The RTC, however, gave her ten (10) days within
which to submit her formal offer of evidence, which she failed to do. RTC finally declared that Bernardo had waived her right to
submit her formal offer of evidence.
On May 28, 2003, the RTC found Bernardo guilty of five counts of violation of B.P. 22, stating that it is not the nonpayment
of the obligation but the issuance of a worthless check that B.P. 22 punishes. Bernardo was sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment
for each count of the offense charged and ordered her to indemnify Bumanglag the amount of P460,000.00, plus 12% interest and
5% penalty charges, from December 1, 1991, until full payment.
On appeal, the CA affirmed Bernardo's conviction but deleted the penalty of imprisonment and in lieu thereof, imposed a
P460,000.00 fine. The CA also retained the civil indemnity of P460,000.00 that the lower court imposed, plus 12% interest from
the time of the institution of the criminal charges until full payment.
CA denied Bernardo’s appeal, holding that the 90-day period within which to present a check under B.P. 22 is not an
element of the crime. The CA also did not recognize any merit in Bernardo's claim that she had been denied due process, in view of
the RTC's order waiving her right to present additional evidence.
To the CA, Bernardo had sufficient opportunity to present her defense but did not avail of these opportunities. Instead, she
and her counsel moved for postponement at least nine (9) times, not to mention their subsequent failure to appear four (4) times
despite due notice of the scheduled hearings. CA denied her subsequent MR; hence, this petition.
On March 14, 2011, Bernardo's counsel informed the Court of the petitioner's death on February 3, 2011, and provided, as
well, the names of her heirs, and their address. In due course, the Court required Bernardo's heirs to appear as substitutes for the
deceased Bernardo in the present petition for purposes of Bernardo's civil liability.
Issue:
1. W/N the CA erred in finding that she had been accorded due process; she was denied the full opportunity to present
her defense and was thus deprived of the chance to prove her innocence of the crime charged.
2. W/N Bernardo’s death extinguished her civil liability.
Held:
1. No. Bernardo had not at all been deprived of her day in court. She was afforded ample opportunity to present
evidence in her defense but she did not give this case the serious attention it deserved. For good reason - i.e., the repeated absences
of Bernardo and her counsel - the trial court eventually considered her right to present defense evidence waived.

The postponement of the trial of a case to allow the presentation of evidence is a matter that lies with the discretion of the
trial court; but it is a discretion that must be exercised wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances of each case and with a view
to doing substantial justice.

In the present case, the records show that the RTC took all the steps necessary to safeguard Bernardo’s rights and to accord
her the opportunity to present whatever evidence she had in her defense.

2. No. Bernardo's civil liability may be enforced in the present case despite her death. As a general rule, the death of
an accused pending appeal extinguishes her criminal liability and the corresponding civil liability based solely on the offense (delict).
The death amounts to an acquittal of the accused based on the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in her favor,
which can be overcome only by a finding of guilt - something that death prevents the court from making.

The independent civil liabilities, however, survive death and an action for recovery therefore may be generally pursued but
only by filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced against the estate of the accused.

Bernardo’s death pending appeal converted the present action to purely an enforcement of the civil liability incurred. In
particular, the focal issue in the present petition is no longer Bernardo’s criminal liability for violation of B.P. 22 but her civil
liability, which is principally based on contract and the corresponding damage Bumanglag suffered due to Bernardo’s failure to pay.
Can go against Bernardo’s estate or legal representatives.

4. Joey Pestilos, et. al vs. People G.R. No. 182601, 10 November 2014
Facts:
 On February 20, 2005, there was an altercation ensued between the petitioners and the defendant, Atty. Generoso. The
defendant then called the Central Police District to report the incident. The police acted on the report and dispatched officers to go
to the scene of the crime and to provide assistance. Upon arriving at the scene of the crime, they saw the defendant badly beaten.
The defendant pointed the petitioners as those who mauled him which prompted the police officers to “invite” the
petitioners to go to the police station for investigation. At the inquest proceeding, it was found out that the petitioners stabbed the
defendant with a bladed weapon.
On February 22, 2005, the petitioners were then indicted for attempted murder. On March 07, 2005, the petitioners filed
for an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested since there was
no valid warrantless arrest that took place because the police officers did not personally know that they were the perpetrators of the
crime.
The Regional Trial Court denied the petitioners’ Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation and likewise denied
their motion for reconsideration. The petitioners then challenged the decision of the RTC before the Court of Appeals but the CA
issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless
arrest.
Issue:
W/N the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant.

Held:
Yes. The petitioners were validly arrested. In light of the discussion on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for a valid
warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by
the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement
of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the
Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.
In the case, to summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his
alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged
crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners
as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood; more
importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with
Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired.
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than one
hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, it is deemed
reasonable to conclude that the police officers have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners’
warrantless arrests. Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that: When an offense has just been
committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it.
The circumstances qualify as the police officers’ personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge,
prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider if the police officers
have complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the
requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the
determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately dispatched the arresting
officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim. This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that the police
officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime had been committed - the police immediately responded and had personal
knowledge that a crime had been committed.

WILFRED N. CHIOK vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and RUFINA CHUA

G.R. No. 179814 | December 7, 2015

Facts:

Chiok was charged with estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Chiok pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued, with both parties presenting their evidence in support of
their respective claims and defenses.

According to the Prosecution, petitioner Rufina Chua (Chua) met Chiok in mid-1989, during which he offered to be her
investment adviser. Convinced by Chiok’s representations and the fact that he is Chinese, Chua made an initial investment of
P200,000.00, allegedly to buy Meralco and PLDT shares. She rolled over the original investment and profits, and this went on
until 1994. For each of their transactions, Chua claimed she was not given any document evidencing every stock transaction and
that she only relied on the assurances of Chiok. In mid-1995, she accepted his proposal to buy shares in bulk in the amount of
P9,563,900.00. Chua alleged that she deposited P7,100,000.00 to Chiok’s Far East Bank, Annapolis account on June 9, 1995 and
delivered to him P2,463,900.00 in cash later that same date at the Han Court Restaurant in Annapolis, Greenhills. As proof, she
presented a deposit slip dated June 9, 1995 of Chiok’s Far East Bank Annapolis account. There was no receipt or memorandum
for the cash delivery.

Chua narrated that she became suspicious when Chiok later on avoided her calls and when he failed to show any
document of the sale. He reassured her by giving her two interbank checks, Check No. 02030693 dated July 11, 1995 for
P7,963,900.00 and Check No. 02030694 dated August 15, 1995 in the amount of P1,600,000.00 (interbank checks). The interbank
checks were given with the request to deposit the first check only after 60-75 days to enable him to generate funds from the sale of
a property in Hong Kong. Both inter- bank checks were ultimately dishonored upon presentment for payment due to garnishment
and insufficiency of funds. Despite Chua’s pleas, Chiok did not return her money. Hence, she referred the matter to her counsel
who wrote a demand letter dated October 25, 1995. Chiok sent her a letter-reply dated November 16, 1995 stating that the money
was Chua’s investment in their unregistered partnership, and was duly invested with Yu Que Ngo. In the end, Chua decided to file
her complaint- affidavit against him in the Pasig Prosecutor’s Office.

In his defense, Chiok denied that he enticed Chua to invest in the stock market, or offered her the prospect of buying shares of
stocks in bulk. Chiok maintained that from the time he met her in 1991 and until 1995, he previously only had dollar transactions
with Chua. It was in 1995 when both of them decided to form an unregistered partnership. He admitted that the P7,963,900.00 she
gave him before she left for the United States was her investment in this unregistered partnership. Chua allegedly instructed him
to invest according to his best judgment and asked him to issue a check in her name for her peace of mind. Chiok denied having
received the P2,463,900.00 in cash from her.

RTC convicted Chiok of the crime of estafa. In appeal, The CA found that the RTC conviction did not contain findings
of fact on the prosecution’s evidence but merely recited the evidence of the prosecution as if such evidence was already proof of
the ultimate facts constituting estafa. Simply put, the prosecution was not able to prove the element of misappropriation (i.e.,
38
deviation from Chua’s instructions). As to the civil aspect, the CA found Chiok liable to Chua for the amount of P9,500,000.00,
the amount he admitted on record.

The OSG did not file a motion for reconsideration on the ground of double jeopardy. Chua, on the other hand, filed a
motion for reconsideration on August 8, 2007. Chiok also filed his own motion for reconsideration, on the civil liability imposed
on him.

Issue:

Whether or not Chua has a legal personality to file and prosecute this petition.

Held:

None. Chua lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision because it is only the OSG, on behalf of
the State, which can bring actions in criminal proceedings before this Court and the CA. It is only the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), on behalf of the State, which can bring actions in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court (SC) and the
Court of Appeals (CA).

In the prosecution of the offense, the complainant’s role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution such that when
a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be
undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General.—The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the party
affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the State and not the private complainant. The interest of the private complainant
or the private offended party is limited only to the civil liability. In the prosecution of the offense, the complainant’s role is limited
to that of a witness for the prosecution such that when a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an
appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. The private offended
party or complainant may not take such appeal, but may only do so as to the civil aspect of the case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTORIA R. ARAMBULO and MIGUEL ARAMBULO, JR.

G.R. No. 186597 | June 17, 2015

Facts:
 Records show that respondent Victoria R. Arambulo (Victoria), Emerenciana R. Gungab, Reynaldo Reyes (Reynaldo),
Domingo Reyes (Domingo), Rodrigo Reyes and Oscar Reyes (Oscar) are the heirs of Spouses Pedro C. Reyes and Anastacia
Reyes. Anaped Estate, Inc. (Anaped) was incorporated as part of the estate planning or as conduit to hold the properties of the
estate of Pedro Reyes for and in behalf of his heirs.

Jose Buban (Buban), as Vice President and General Manager of Anaped Estate, Inc. (Anaped), filed a complaint for
estafa against Victoria and her husband Miguel Arambulo, Jr. (Miguel) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City.
He alleged that Victoria failed to remit the rentals collected from the time the ownership of the commercial apartments was
transferred to Anaped.

On 24 April 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Alvin A. Almora recommended the filing of an Information against
respondents. On 1 June 2001, respondents were charged with estafa.

On 14 April 2003, respondents filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question in view of
the pendency of two intra-corporate cases pending before the RTC of Quezon City and Makati City. SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 is
a petition filed by Victoria’s brother Oscar for accounting of all corporate funds and assets of Anaped, annulment of sale,
injunction, receivership and damages. SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 is a petition filed by Victoria and her brothers Reynaldo and
Domingo questioning the authority of their elder sibling Rodrigo Reyes and Emerenciana R. Gungab, as well as the Anaped Board
of Directors and officers, including private complainant Buban to act for and in behalf of the corporation.

In their motion to suspend proceedings, respondents asserted that the resolution of the SEC cases in their favor
particularly the issues of whether of the group of Rodrigo and Buban are the lawful representatives of the corporation and whether
they are duly authorized to make a demand for remittance would necessarily result in their acquittal in the criminal case.

On 28 August 2003, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, granted the motion for suspension of
the proceedings. The trial court reasoned that the issue in the SEC cases, i.e., who between the groups has the right to act for and
in behalf of the corporation, has a direct link to the issue of the culpability of the accused for estafa.

The appellate court ruled that in SEC Case No. 03-99- 6259:

[T]he issue is the legality of the election of ANAPED Board of Directors, as well as the authority of its officers, which include
private complainant Jose Buban, to act for and in behalf of the corporation. Clearly, it involves facts that are intimately related to
those upon which the criminal case is based. The resolution of the issues raised in this intra-corporate dispute will ultimately
determine the guilt or innocence of [respondents] in the crime of estafa initiated by Jose Buban. It must be remembered that one
of the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is a
demand made by the offended party to the offender. A valid demand must therefore be made by an offended party to the offender.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that there exists a prejudicial question which calls for the
suspension of the criminal proceedings before the trial court.

Held:

No. A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.

Aptly put, the following requisites must be present for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to
cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case: (1) the civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised
in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question
must be lodged in another tribunal.

As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 does not present a prejudicial question to the
criminal case for estafa. It is an action for accounting of all corporate funds and assets of Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction,
receivership and damages. Even if said case will be decided against respondents, they will not be adjudged free from criminal
liability. It also does not automatically follow that an accounting of corporate funds and properties and annulment of fictitious sale
of corporate assets would result in the conviction of respondents in the estafa case.

With respect to SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, however, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ finding that a prejudicial question
exists. The Complaint in SEC Case No. 03-99- 6259 prays for the nullification of the election of Anaped directors and officers,
including Buban. Essentially, the issue is the authority of the aforesaid officers to act for and behalf of the corporation.

On the other hand, the issue in the criminal case pertains to whether respondents committed estafa. Under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (1) that the money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (4) that there is demand by the offended party to the offender.

The elements of demand and misappropriation bear relevance to the validity or invalidity of the authority of Anaped
directors and officers. In Omictin v. Court of Appeals, we held that since the alleged offended party is the corporation, the validity
of the demand for the delivery rests upon the authority of the person making such a demand on the company’s behalf. If the
supposed authority of the person making the demand is found to be defective, it is as if no demand was ever made, hence the
prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.

In this case, the resolution of the issue of misappropriation by respondents depends upon the result of SEC Case No. 03-
99-6259. If it is ruled in the SEC case that the present Anaped directors and officers were not validly elected, then respondent
Victoria may have every right to refuse remittance of rental to Buban. Hence, the essential element of misappropriation in estafa
may be absent in this case.

SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, FIELD INVESTIGATION
OFFICE, Office of the Ombudsman, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD

G.R. Nos. 212140-41 | January 21, 2015

Facts:

On 25 November 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint in OMB-C-C-13-0313, filed
by the NBI and Atty. Baligod, which prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for Plunder as defined in RA No. 7080 be
conducted against Sen. Estrada. Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit in OMB-C-C-13-0313 on 9 January 2014.

On 3 December 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint in OMB-C-C-13-0397, filed by
the FIO of the Ombudsman, which prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for Plunder, as defined in RA No. 7080, and
for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, be conducted against Sen. Estrada. Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit in OMB-
C-C-13-0397 on 16 January 2014.

Eighteen of Sen. Estrada’s corespondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013
and 14 March 2014.

On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other
Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings (Request) in OMB-C-C-13-0313.

Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the
evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”

On 27 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Order in OMB-C-C-13-0313. The pertinent portions of the
assailed Order read:

This Office finds however finds that the provisions pertaining to Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section
4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman] do not entitle respondent [Sen. Estrada] to be furnished
all the filings of the respondents.

It is to be noted that there is no provision under this Office’s Rules of Procedure which entitles respondent to be
furnished all the filings by the other parties, e.g., the respondents. Ruby Tuason, Dennis Cunanan, Gondelina G. Amata and Mario
L. Relampagos themselves are all respondents in these cases. Under the Rules of Court as well as the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, the respondents are only required to furnish their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence to the
complainant, and not to the other respondents.

To reiterate, the rights of respondent [Sen.] Estrada in the conduct of the preliminary investigation depend on the rights
granted to him by law and these cannot be based on whatever rights he believes [that] he is entitled to or those that may be derived
from the phrase “due process of law.”

Thus, this Office cannot grant his motion to be furnished with copies of all the filings by the other parties.

Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s 27 March 2014 Order denying his Request, Sen.
Estrada filed the present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and sought to annul and set aside the 27 March 2014 Order.

Issue:

Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing the challenged order dated 27 March 2014, acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and violated Sen. Estrada’s
constitutional right to due process of law.

Held:

No. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.

First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits
of his co-respondents.

The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II of
Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, for ready reference.

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates his constitutional
right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due
process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require
is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the
time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses] have been
secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents,
directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there is still
no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the
supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of
the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.

Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable
cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary
investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the
right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary
investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary
investigation is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the
respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’
evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there
exists prima facie evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the
evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.