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Actuator Pressure Sensor: 27-00 27-14 27-24 27-34 27-64 ALL Positions 27.00.00.115

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138 views

Actuator Pressure Sensor: 27-00 27-14 27-24 27-34 27-64 ALL Positions 27.00.00.115

trouble shooting

Uploaded by

sirajmy
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Actuator pressure sensor

ATA: 27-00 FIN: ALL Ref: 27.00.00.115


27-14 POSITIONS
27-24
27-34
27-64
A/C Type: A350 A/C Serie: Potential Line First Issue 29-JUN-
Impact: Maintenance Date: 2017
Material
Management
Part Number: ALL STD Key In-Service Last 14-JAN-
Information: Issue Publication 2019
Date:
Supplier: MOOG INC Solution Maintenance
Benefit: Cost
Operational
Reliability
Linked ISI Linked
Articles: 00.00.00197 Documentation:
Linked FAIR- Status: Open
ISP:
Engineering Support
Fault Code/ECAM Warning: First Issue Date: 29-JUN-2017
Model: Last Publication Date: 14-JAN-2019
Manufacturer:
Status: Open

Applicability
All A350-900 actuators (servocontrols, EHA and EBHA).

Description
Some cases of actuators failure due to pressure sensor monitoring were detected in service
and also in Final Assembly Line (FAL).

The design of the pressure sensor is similar on all actuators (same PN) and 75 of such
sensors are installed per aircraft.

The pressure sensor is not an LRI. In case of such failure, the complete actuator has to be
replaced. Dispatch rules with failed actuator depend on the position of the faulty actuator.

Pressure sensor design


In order to measure the pressure, a membrane filled with silicone liquid is in contact with the
hydraulic fluid present inside the actuator. The deformation of this membrane is sensed by a
Wheatstone bridge soaked in this silicone isolator fluid. These electronic components are
wired through a bulkhead toward the back of the sensor with means of glass beads to isolate
the wires routing to the FCRM of the actuator.
Figure1: Sectional view of the pressure sensor
Investigation Status
Several actuators have been returned to MOOG for investigation. Once the fault was
confirmed at pressure sensor level, the sensor was disassembled from the actuator and sent
to its sub-tier supplier (GE Druck, UK) to be investigated.

The following findings have been established from the units returned to MOOG for such
failure:
1. Cracks in Glass-to-metal seal:
Investigation at sub-tier supplier revealed that a glass/pin interface has been damaged
which resulted in isolation oil loss and diaphragm collapse. Most probable root cause is
side loads induced on pins at glass/pin interface by a tool used during the sensor
manufacturing. Improvements in the manufacturing process were already implemented
since March 2015.

Figure 2: crack leading to oil loss at pin 7

These findings were discovered on elevator EHA SN28 from FAL and spoiler servocontrol
189 in service.

2. Gaseous inclusion in glass-to-metal seal:


A gaseous inclusion inside the material of the glass/metal seal assembly is confirmed to be
at the origin of a leak path for the isolation oil. The raw material has been analyzed and
found in conformity with its specification. The localized nature of the defect suggests that
the inclusion propagated with temperature and pressure cycles until the creation of leak
path.

Figure 3: leak path detected in the glass to metal seal


These findings were discovered on spoiler servocontrol SN 716 and elevator servocontrol
SN 512, both removals from in service.

3. Outward deformation of diaphragm:


Pressure sensor removed from elevator EHA SN 77 was found with an outward
deformation of its diaphragm, suggesting an inverted pressure situation inside the sensor.
The root cause of such finding could not be determined.

4. Status of other units returned from in-service:


 Spoiler servocontrol SN 1552 – pressure sensor has been scrapped by MOOG prior
investigation,
 Spoiler servocontrol SN 518 – NFF,
 Rudder servocontrol SN 824 – confirmed failure with unknown origin.

Mitigation / Interim Plan


The AFI corresponding to the fault shall be followed. In case of confirmed failure of the sensor,
only the replacement of the complete actuator will allow clearing the failure.

Permanent Solution
Due to the various different root causes established on the units returned from service, it has
been decided that no specific hardware evolution would be relevant to fully address the
experienced failures.

As an alternative, the maintenance priority of these failures will be reviewed in next FCGS std
11 (availability June 2019), meaning that MMEL alleviation is targeted to address this TFU.

The specific MMEL allowance per different actuator will be detailed in an update of this TFU
in March 2019, once reviewed and agreed with airworthiness authorities.

Survey for the Engineering Support section

© Airbus SAS, 2019. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.The technical information
provided in this article is for convenience and information purposes only. It shall in no case replace the
official Airbus technical or Flight Operations data which shall remain the sole basis for aircraft
maintenance and operation. These recommendations and information do not constitute a contractual
commitment, warranty or guarantee whatsoever. They shall not supersede the Airbus technical nor
operational documentation; should any deviation appear between this article and the Airbus or airline's
official manuals, the operator must ensure to cover it with the appropriate document such as TA, FCD,
RDAS. Access to WISE is supplied by Airbus under the express condition that Airbus hereby disclaims any
and all liability for the use made by the user of the information contained in WISE. It shall be used for
the user's own purposes only and shall not be reproduced or disclosed to any third party without the
prior consent of Airbus.

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