Legal Protection For The Rights of Woman Employees in India
Legal Protection For The Rights of Woman Employees in India
ON
HIGHLIGHTING THE LEGAL
PROTECTION FOR THE RIGHTS
OF WOMEN EMPLOYEES IN
INDIA
SUBMITTED TO SUBMITTED BY
DR. PARUL GUPTA GROUP NO. 2
18PGHR11 Aditya Jain
18PGHR16 Srusti Chand
18PGHR20 Cherlin Karuvely
18PGHR39 Riya Ahuja
18PGHR52 Sudhanshu
18PGHR59 Vipul Seth
CONTENTS
“Women will account for a substantial proportion of the working age population and
therefore participation of women in the labour force is of utmost importance to realize the
full benefits of demographic dividend... Increasing the labour force participation rate (LFPR)
for women is vital to achieving high growth of employment and overall economic growth. The
Government is keen to address the issue of low female LFPR and WPR (Worker Population
Ratio) and has launched various legislation-based schemes and other programmes/schemes
where the emphasis is on female participation.”
Women form an integral part of the Indian workforce. The total number of female workers in
India is 149.8 million and female workers in rural and urban areas are 121.8 and 28.0 million
respectively (source: census, 2011). Out of total 149.8 million female workers, 35.9 million
females are working as cultivators and another 61.5 million are agricultural labourers. Of the
remaining female workers, 8.5 million are in household Industry and 43.7 million are
classified as other workers.
India’s female labour force participation (FLFP) rate is highest among illiterates and college
graduates in both rural and urban areas, according to this March 2017 World Bank report,
which analysed government data from 2004-05 to 2011-12. 27% Indian women are currently
in the labour force compared to the 75% men. Encouraging more women to join the
workforce is critical to the nation’s ability to benefit from the so-called demographic
dividend.
The government has tried to push female employment quotient up with programmes like the
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), where one-third
of the employment opportunities are set aside for women. Successive governments have also
long supported schemes like STEP, or Support to Training and Employment Programme for
Women, which was launched in 1986-87.
Apart from these, various legal protection measures also exist for rights of women
employees. The main objective if these rights are to encourage and increase the participation
of women in country’s labour force which benefits the reduction of demographic dividend.
There are various issues plaguing the women’s participation in the workforce in terms of
work participation and quality of employment. According to Government sources, in urban
areas, on an average wage/salary paid to females is only 75% of that paid to males, while in
rural areas females are paid 58% of what is paid to the males. This wage disparity differs
across sectors and education levels.
This report concentrates on the various laws that have been implemented for the cause of
increment in women participation in the country’s labour force. The rights available to
woman in India can be classified into two categories, namely as
- The constitutional rights are those which are provided in the various provisions of
the constitution.
- The legal rights, on the other hand, are those which are provided in the various laws
(acts) of the Parliament and the State Legislatures.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO WOMEN
The rights and safeguards enshrined in the constitution for women in India are listed below:
1. The state shall not discriminate against any citizen of India on the ground of
sex [Article 15(1)].
2. The state is empowered to make any special provision for women. In other words, this
provision enables the state to make affirmative discrimination in favour of women
[Article 15(3)].
4. Traffic in human beings and forced labour are prohibited [Article 23(1)].
5. The state to secure for men and women equally the right to an adequate means
of livelihood [Article 39(a)].
6. The state to secure equal pay for equal work for both Indian men and women
[Article 39(d)].
7. The state is required to ensure that the health and strength of women workers are
not abused and that they are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations
unsuited to their strength [Article 39(e)].
8. The state shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and
maternity relief [Article 42].
10. One-third of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in every
Panchayat shall be reserved for women [Article 243-D(3)].
12. One-third of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in every
Municipality shall be reserved for women [Article 243-T(3)].
13. The offices of chairpersons in the Municipalities shall be reserved for women in
such manner as the State Legislature may provide [Article 243-T(4)].
3. LAWS FOR PROTECTION OF WOMEN AT
THE WORKPLACE
The Factories Act, 1948 has been enacted to consolidate and amend the law regulating the
workers working in the factories. It extends to whole of India and applies to every factory
wherein 20 or more workers are ordinary employed. The aim and object of the Act is to
safeguard the interest of workers and protect them from exploitation, the Act prescribes
certain standards with regard to safety, welfare and working hours of workers. The Act also
makes provisions regarding employment of women and young persons (including children
and adolescents), annual leave with wages etc.
The State Government may make rules providing for the exemption from the
restrictions set out in sub-section (1), to such extent and subject to such conditions as
it may prescribe, of women working in fish-curing or fish-canning factories, where
the employment of women beyond the hours specified in the said restrictions is
necessary to prevent damage to, or deterioration in, any raw material.
3.2 THE MINIMUM WAGES ACT, 1948
The Minimum Wages Act, 1948 safeguards the interests of workers by providing fixation of
minimum wages mainly focusing on unorganized sector and in specified occupations (called
scheduled employments) (Section 2 g). The act binds the employers to pay their workers the
minimum wages fixed under the Act from time to time (Section 12). Owing to their
jurisdiction the Central and the State Governments fix, revise, review and enforce the
payment of minimum wages without any discrimination of gender (Section 3).
The Act also regulates the working hours and enforces overtime payment for working longer
hours or on holidays/off days (Section 13, 14). If the worker has worked lesser hours not due
to own fault like coming late then also minimum wages has to be paid, because the employer
has failed to assign adequate work (Section 15).
With effect from November 2009 the National Floor Level Minimum Wage has been
increased to Rs.100 from Rs.80 (in September 2007). Several states have fixed higher
Minimum wages than those prescribed by Central Government for highly skilled, skilled,
unskilled and semi-skilled workers engaged in Scheduled employments.
Any person paying less than minimum rates of wages can be punished with imprisonment
upto 6 months or with fine upto Rs.500.
Case- Smt. Kala Devi v. State of H.P. and Ors . : In this case the petitioner was employed as
“school mother” with the respondent. It is her grievance that even though she was employed on
temporary basis, she was entitled to the wages payable to class-IV employees of the State.
Undisputedly the State of Himachal Pradesh has issued various circulars/notifications under the
Minimum Wages Act fixing the wages payable to the workers employed by the State. The
petitioner is admitted to have worked on part time basis for atleast 3 to 4 hours in a day. Even
though the petitioner was working for the same time / duration as the regularly appointed
employees, but however she was not given the same scale of salary for which she was working.
Keeping in view the various circulars issued by the State her wages ought to have been enhanced
with the passage of time. The petitioner could not have sustained herself on meagre payment of
Rs. 110/- per month. The employee is definitely entitled to minimum wages or wages which are
fair, just and reasonable. It is not the petitioner’s fundamental right to have periodical revision of
wages but definitely it is petitioner’s legal right to have such wages which are considered to be
minimum wage as fixed by the respondents in terms of its various circulars. Rs. 110/- per month
is too inadequate for a person to live life with human dignity. Petitioner said that is conscious of
the fact that fixation of pay scale / salary depends upon various factors and attending
circumstances and it is solely the prerogative of the Government but however the present case is a
rare exception in which judicial interference is warranted due to lackadaisical approach adopted
by the respondent/State. The State may not have adopted unfair labour practice but
definitely has not shown concern for enhancing the wages so as to make a person sustain
herself. The apathy on the part of the 263 State is appalling. Comparison and empathy ought
to have been shown in this regard
The Act aims at providing equal remuneration to men and women workers and prevention of
discrimination, particularity against women on the ground of gender. In Part IV relating to
the Directive Principles of State Policy Article 39 of the Constitution envisages that the state
shall direct its policy, among other things, towards securing that there is equal pay for equal
work for both men and women. In order to give effect to this provision, in the year which was
being celebrated as the International Women’s Year, President of India promulgated the
Equal Remuneration Ordinance, 1975 on 26th September, 1975 to provide for the payment of
equal remuneration to men and women workers and for the prevention of discrimination on
the ground of sex, against women in the matter of employment. The ordinance was replaced
by the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 which received the assent of the President of India on
11th February, 1976.
The Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 provides for payment of equal remuneration to men and
women workers for same work or work of similar nature without any discrimination and also
prevent discrimination against women employees while making recruitment for the same
work or work of similar nature, or in any condition of service subsequent to recruitment such
as promotions, training or transfer. The provisions oft he Act have been extended to all
categories of employment. The Act is implemented attwo levels viz. Central level and State
level. At the Central sphere, the enforcement of the act is entrusted to the Chief Labour
Commissioner (Central) who heads the Central Industrial Relations Machinery (CIRM).
Equal Pay
The Act applies to an extensive range of employment including the informal sector. It
provides that no discrimination should be made in remuneration for the same work or work of
a similar nature only on the ground of gender. (Section 4)
Recruitment
Further the Act also provides that no gender based discrimination be made while recruiting
for the same work or work of a similar nature, or in any condition of service subsequent to
recruitment such as promotions, training or transfer. (Section 5)
Exceptions
Under this law, no discrimination is permissible in recruitment and service conditions except
where employment of women is prohibited or restricted by the law. (Section 15)
Case - Air India Cabin Crew Association vs Yeshawinee Merchant & Ors on 11 July,
2003 : In a batch of petitions filed by respondents Air India Air hostesses Association and its
members (shortly referred hereinafter as the respondent Association) against the Division
Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 20-23.8.2002, the High Court of
Bombay has held that the age of retirement from flying duties of Air hostesses at the age of
50 years with option to them to accept post for ground duties after 50 and up to the age of 58
years is discrimination against them based on sex which is violative of Articles 14,15 & 16 of
the Constitution of India as also Section 5 of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 (for short the
ER Act) and contrary to the mandatory directions issued by the Central Government under
Section 34 of the Air Corporations Act, 1953( for short Act of 1953).
The Maternity Benefits Act, 1961 aims at regulating employment of women employees all
over the country. The act provides 12 weeks as the maximum period for which any working
woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit. She can avail this benefit as 6 weeks up to and
including the day of her delivery and 6 weeks immediately following the day of her delivery.
(Section 4)
Cash Benefits
Leave with average pay for 6 weeks before and 6 weeks after the delivery.
Medical bonus of at least Rs. 1000 extending to Rs. 20000 if the employer is unable to
provide free medical care to the women employee.(Section 8) (Amended on 15-04-
2008)[2]
Additional leave with pay for upto 1 month on production of proof, revealing illness due
to pregnancy, delivery, miscarriage, or premature birth. (Section 10)In case of
miscarriage , 6 weeks leave with average pay from the date of miscarriage. (Section 9)
The Maternity Benefit Amendment Act makes it mandatory for employers to educate women
about the maternity benefits available to them at the time of their appointment.
The Object of the Contract Labour Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 is to prevent
exploitation of contract labour and also to introduce better conditions of work. A workman is
deemed to be employed as Contract Labour when he is hired in connection with the work of
an establishment by or through a Contractor. Contract workmen are indirect employees.
Contract Labour differs from Direct Labour in terms of employment relationship with the
establishment and method of wage payment. Contract Labour, by and large is not borne on
pay roll nor is paid directly. The Contract Workmen are hired, supervised and remunerated
by the Contractor, who in turn, is remunerated by the Establishment hiring the services of the
Contractor.
The Act applies to the Principal Employer of an Establishment and the Contractor where in
20 or more workmen are employed or were employed even for one day during preceding 12
months as Contract Labour.
Provisions of crèches were made where twenty or more women are ordinarily employed as
contract labour. Female contract labour is to be employed by any contractor between 6.00
A.M. and 7.00 P.M. only with the exception of midwives and nurses in hospitals and
dispensaries.
India finally enacted its law on prevention of sexual harassment against female employees at
the workplace. The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and
Redressal) Act, 2013 ("Sexual Harassment Act") has been made effective on April 23, 2013
by way of publication in the Gazette of India. Guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Vishaka and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others (JT 1997 (7) SC 384)
plays a crucial role in this aspect. Sexual Harassment Act is very wide and is applicable to the
organized sector as well as the unorganized sector.
Law has been enacted with the objective of providing protection to women against sexual
harassment at the workplace and for the prevention and redressal of complaints of sexual
harassment. Sexual harassment is considered as a violation of the fundamental right of a
woman to equality as guaranteed under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India
("Constitution") and her right to life and to live with dignity as per Article 21 of the
Constitution. It is also considered as a violation of a right to practice or to carry out any
occupation, trade or business under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution, which includes a
right to a safe environment free from harassment.
The definition of sexual harassment in the Sexual Harassment Act is in line with the Supreme
Court’s definition in the Vishaka Judgment and includes any unwelcome sexually determined
behaviour (whether directly or by implication) such as
Circumstances of promise (implied or explicit) of preferential treatment in
employment;
Threat of detrimental treatment in employment;
Threat about employment (present or future);
Creating an intimidating or offensive or hostile work environment, or interference
with work for the above;
Humiliating treatment that may affect the lady employee's health or safety
Unwelcome sexually determined behaviour (whether directly or by implication) such
as physical contact and advances,
Demand or request for sexual favours, sexually coloured remarks, showing
pornography,
Apart from dealing with complaints, an employer has additional obligations in the nature of:
a. Providing a safe working environment,
b. Display conspicuously at the workplace, the penal consequences of indulging in acts
that may constitute sexual harassment and the composition of the ICC,
c. Organize workshops and awareness programmes at regular intervals for sensitizing
employees on the issues and implications of workplace sexual harassment and
organizing orientation programmes for members of the Internal Complaints
Committee,
d. Treat sexual harassment as misconduct under the service rules and initiate action
for misconduct.
India’s first legislation specifically addressing the issue of workplace sexual harassment;
the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal)
Act, 2013 (“POSH Act”) was enacted by the Ministry of Women and Child Development,
India in 2013.
The Government also subsequently notified the rules under the POSH Act titled the Sexual
Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013
(“POSH Rules”). The year 2013 also witnessed the promulgation of the Criminal Law
(Amendment) Act, 2013 (“Criminal Law Amendment Act”) which has criminalized
offences such as sexual harassment, stalking and voyeurism.
The POSH Act has been enacted with the objective of preventing and protecting women
against workplace sexual harassment and to ensure effective redressal of complaints of
sexual harassment. While the statute aims at providing every woman (irrespective of her
age or employment status) a safe, secure and dignified working environment, free from all
forms of harassment, proper implementation of the provisions of the statute remains a
challenge.
The State Governments enact their respective shops and establishments act, regulates the
working conditions of employees in a shop or commercial establishment. The SEAs provide
for various provisions including provisions pertaining to (a) notice period for termination, (b)
leave entitlement, and (c) working conditions like weekly working hours, weekly off,
overtime, etc.
The Maharashtra Shops and Establishment Act, 1948 (“MSEA”) is the applicable law in case
of establishments in the state of Maharashtra and while the Delhi Shops and Establishment
Act, 1954 is the applicable legislation in case of establishments based in the state of Delhi.
However, due to the nature of work of certain industries, they may require their female
employees to work beyond the prescribed limits, for which they will need to take prior
permission from the authorities. The approvals for allowing women to work late nights
always comes with special conditions and obligations, on the part of the employer, such as,
providing a safe working environment, providing adequate security during the night hours,
provide transport to their residence after the late working hours, women employees should be
placed in a group while working at nights and not alone, etc. The IT sector has seen an
exponential growth in the recent past and this sector is one which typically has a huge
manpower. We see equal number of men and women working in the IT sector, and they
work late in to the nights for their shift work, due to catering to countries across the
globe, with varied time difference. In order to address the safety of women workers in this
sector, apart from the provisions under the SEA, the State Governments have their
independent IT/ITES policies, which address the issues of women working night shifts and
the various measures to be undertaken by the employer to ensure their safety.
Safety Measures
The Mines Act, 1952 provides for safety measures for labourers working in coal, metallic,
ferrous, and oil mines while working with shafts, opencast workings, conveyors or aerial
ropeways, etc. (Section 57)
Registration as Beneficiary
The Act provides that every domestic worker who has completed 18 years of age, but has not
completed 60 years of age, and is engaged in any domestic work for not less than 90 days in
the preceding 12 months, can be registered as a domestic worker. (Section 16)
Any domestic worker (male or female) registered under the Act who lives in the premises
where workplace is situated is entitled to daily rest period of at least 10 consecutive hours
between ending and recommencing work. Also the domestic workers living in the house are
entitled to annual leave with wages for at least 15 days. (Section 22)
Minimum Wages
All registered domestic workers should be paid minimum wages as per the Minimum Wages
Act, 1948. (Section 22)
The Act specifically makes provisions for penalty in cases where any person knowingly
sends, directs or takes any girl or woman domestic worker to any place for immoral purposes
or to a place where she is likely to be morally corrupted or in any manner sexually exploited.
Such a person shall be subjected to imprisonment for a minimum period of 6 months which
may extend up to 7 years and fine up to Rs.50000 or both. (Section 23)
It makes provision for the registration of all unorganized workers. Also it pertains to welfare
schemes for different sections of the unorganized sector workers on matters relating to life
and disability cover, health, insurance and maternity benefits and old age pension.
For the purpose of this Act, Unorganized Worker means a home-based worker, self-employed
worker or a wage worker in the unorganized sector and includes a worker in the organized
sector who is not covered by any of the Acts mentioned in Schedule II to this Act. Recently
Delhi High Court has ruled that henceforth even all the Placement Agencies in the State of
Delhi will be covered within the ambit of this Act.
4. CASES
AIR INDIA V. NERGESH MEERZA AND OTHERS (1981)
Respondent 1 (Air India) moved Court for transfer of the writ petition filed by the
petitioners, Nergesh Meerza & Others in the Bombay High Court to Supreme Court
because the constitutional validity of Regulation 46(i)(c) of Air India Employees' Service
Regulations (hereinafter referred to as "AI Regulations") and other questions of law were
involved.
Another ground taken by the applicant Air India in the transfer petition was that other writ
petitions filed by the Air Hostesses employed by the Indian Airlines Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as "IAC") which were pending hearing in Supreme Court involved
almost identical reliefs.
The total number of air hostesses at present is 87 and it will at once be seen that most of
them chose to leave service of their own free will."
The Tribunal was also impressed by the argument of the Corporation that AH had to deal
with passengers of various temperaments and a young attractive AH was more suitable for
doing the job.
It has also been pointed out that after 30, the General Manager of the Corporation has the
discretion to extend the age of retirement of an air hostess by one year at a time till she
reaches the age of 40 years.
The only difference that the Settlement made was that the discretion to extend the age of
retirement of AH was increased by 5 years, i.e from 35 years to 40 years.
"An Air Hostess shall retire from the service of the Corporation upon attaining the age of
35 years or on marriage if it takes place within four years of service or on first pregnancy,
whichever occurs earlier."
The age of retirement of AH could be extended up to ten years by granting yearly
extensions at the option of the Managing Director. If the Managing Director chose to
exercise his discretion under Regulation 47 an AH could retire at the age of 45 years.
The termination of the services of AHs on the ground of pregnancy or marriage within four
years is manifestly unreasonable and wholly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution and should be struck down.
No material has been placed before the Court to prove that the efficiency of the AHs is in
any way impaired at the age of 40 or 45 years so as to make a gross discrimination between
the male pursers and AHs.
The court should take into consideration the practical aspects of the matter which
demonstrate the fact that a large number of AHs do not stick to the service but leave the
same well before the age of retirement fixed under the Regulation."
A second limb of the argument which flows from the first contention was that the AHs
were selected for hostile discrimination by the Corporation in the matter of retirement,
termination and promotional avenues which was manifestly unreasonable so as to attract
Article 14 of the Constitution.
That in view of the mode of recruitment, qualifications, retiral benefits and various other
factors the AHs constitute a special category or class of employees different from the AFPs
and they could not be in any way equated with them.
If there are two separate and different classes having different conditions of service and
different incidents, the question of discrimination does not arise.
"Equality is for equals, that is to say, those who are similarly circumstanced are entitled to
an equal treatment but the guarantee enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
cannot be carried beyond the point which is well settled by a catena of decisions of
Supreme Court."
Where the class or categories of service are essentially different in purport and spirit.
Where persons belonging to a particular class in view of their special attributes, qualities,
mode of recruitment and the like, are differently treated in public interest to advance and
boost members belonging to backward classes, such a classification would not amount to
discrimination having a close nexus with the objects sought to be achieved so that in such
cases Article 14 will be completely out of the way.
To begin with, the two classes differ in qualifications, in grades and also in the number of
posts.
By and large AH starts almost in the same grade as FP which is a higher post than AFP. (3)
The third higher category is Check FP which has the same emoluments as FPs with the
difference that the Check FPs get an additional allowance of Rs 200 p.m and the number of
posts are 61.
The management was approached by the Association resulting in the said agreement of
May 30, 1977 by which the category of Deputy Chief Air Hostesses was made redundant."
Unfortunately as the decision was taken as far back as 1977 and no grievance was made by
the AHs before the High Court and as this is not a matter which is covered by Article 32 of
the Constitution, we are unable to give any relief to the AHs on this score.
It may also be noted that even though the AHs retire at the age of 35 (extendable to 45)
they get retiral benefits quite different from those available to the AFPs.
For instance, an Air Hostess, who is recruited between the ages of 19 and 25 on a highter
pay scale than that of an Assistant Flight Purser and who retires after service of 10 years, is
entitled to the same quantum of free air passages, which she was entitled to in the 10th year
of her service, for a continuous period of five years thereafter.
An Air Hostess who has completed 15 years of service and retires thereafter is entitled to
free air passages for a continuous period of 10 years thereafter on the basis of the total
number of free air passages she was entitled to in the 15 years of her service.
Having regard to the various circumstances, incidents, service conditions, promotional
avenues, etc. of the AFPs and AHs, the inference is irresistible that AHs though members
of the cabin crew are an entirely separate class governed by different set of rules,
regulations and conditions of service.
Before we deal with the various aspects of this argument, we might mention an important
argument put forward by the Corporation that the class of AHs is a sex-based recruitment
and any discrimination made in their service conditions has not been made on the ground of
sex only but due to a lot of other considerations also.
The Central Government declares that any act of the employer attributable to such
differences shall not be declared to be in contravention of any of the provisions of the Act."
These articles of the Constitution do not prohibit the State from making discrimination on
the ground of sex coupled with other considerations.
For the reasons the argument of Mr Setalvad that the conditions of service with regard to
retirement, etc. amount to discrimination on the ground of sex only is overruled and it is
held that the conditions of service indicated above are not violative of Article 16 on this
ground.
It was also contended that even though the period of the Awards has expired, they continue
to be binding on the parties and as these matters pertain to industrial dispute, Supreme
Court should not disturb the settlement arrived at or the Awards given by the National
Tribunals and allow the disputes to be settled in the proper forum viz. industrial courts.
The Regulation permits an AH to marry at the age of 23 if she has joined the service at the
age of 19 which is by all standards a very sound and salutary provision.
The Court has held that the provisions of the American Constitution cannot always be
applied to Indian conditions or to the provisions of our Constitution.
Any distinction made on the ground of pregnancy cannot but be held to be extremely
arbitrary.
The question is whether the existence or non-existence of 'discrimination' is to be
determined by comparison of class characteristics or individual characteristics.
Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political
logic and constitutional law and is violative of Article 14."
The Court has pointed out that there cannot be any cut and dried formula for determining
the age of retirement which is to be linked with various circumstances and a variety of
factors.
The discrimination involved in the application of the Act is too evident to be explained
away."
We might stress at the risk of repetition that in State of Mysore v. M.N Krishna Murthy
1973 3 SCC 559 Supreme Court clearly held that where classes of service are different,
inequality of promotional avenues was legally permissible.
It is obvious that under this Rule an AH had to retire at the age of 30 years or when she got
married and an unmarried AH could continue up to 35 years.
The Rule was obviously unjust and discriminatory and was amended by a Notification
published in the Gazette of India dated July 13, 1968.
The Notification as also the Rules suffer from two serious constitutional infirmities which
are present in the case of Regulation 46 framed by the AI The clauses regarding retirement
and pregnancy will have to be held as unconstitutional and struck down.
For the reasons given above the writ petitions are allowed in part as indicated in the
judgment and the Transfer Case is disposed of.
SAURABH KUMAR MALLICK V. THE COMPTROLLER AUDITOR
GENERAL OF INDIA ANOTHER(2008)
The petitioner is not satisfied with the manner in which the Inquiry Committee is holding
the inquiry and he filed OA before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench
Both were holding equivalent post, namely, that of Director, though Ms. Geetali Tare
(hereinafter referred to as the 'complainant') was senior to the petitioner.
The submission of the petitioner was that he cannot be charged for sexual harassment 'at
work place' inasmuch as, even as per the allegations in the complaint, the incident allegedly
took place at the residence of the complainant, which is not a work place and Rule 3(c) of
the Conduct Rules had no application.
Not only the petitioner and the complainant were of the same rank, but the complainant was
even senior to the petitioner and no favour could be extracted by the petitioner from her.
Learned Counsel submitted that in these circumstances, there was no causal connection
between 'conduct' and 'favour' and the alleged act could not be treated as misconduct under
Rule 3(c) on this ground also.
The nexus is between the term of employment and the employer-employee relationship and
does not cover private disputes.
Since the alleged incident occurred at the residence of the complain-ant even in the mind of
the complainant, the act was of trespass in her private residence and outraging the modesty.
The alleged harassment outside the work place does not fall within the ambit of the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Vishakha (supra).
It was incumbent upon the disciplinary authority as well as the Inquiry Committee to
follow the procedure laid down in CCS (Appeal) Rules (hereinafter referred to as the
'Appeal Rules'), which was violated in the instant case.
The question is as to whether the place where the alleged incident took place can be treated
as the 'work place' of the complainant.
It would be an absurd situation where in the criminal case the petitioner faces the charge of
house trespass whereas in the departmental proceedings on the same ground it is treated as
harassment at work place.
The Tribunal observed that there was no definition of 'work place' provided either in the
Conduct Rules or in the decision of the Apex Court in Vishakha's case (supra).
The Tribunal proceeded to determine the meaning of work place with reference to the
dictionaries with advice to itself that to find the general sense in common parlance but
selecting one out of the various words, the context and meaning of the words and
expression used in the Act must have to take colour from that context in which it appears
and should not be made otiose.
The Tribunal was of the view that it was not necessary that a work place would be only a
place where actually office work is per-formed.
In the instant case, as per the complaint Ms. Geetali Tare as well as the applicant have been
functioning as Directors in the Academy, which houses in the close proximity.
The Tribunal is right in even observing that each incident of sexual harassment at the work
place has to be considered in the facts and circumstances of that particular case.
The Tribunal has itself observed that the notion of work place would not extend to those
accommodation, which may be even Government pool accommodation but far away from
the work place.
The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that since both the petitioner and the
complainant are not only of the same rank but the complainant was even senior to the
petitioner and no 'favour' could be extracted by the petitioner from her and the alleged act
would not come within the ambit of sexual harassment, is clearly misconceived.
At the stage, it is not open to the petitioner to challenge this aspect inasmuch as it is only
after the inquiry it would be known whether there is any infraction of Rule 14 or not.
The Petitioner filed Writ Petition (C) No. 1336 of 2008 which was disposed of by Delhi
High Court on 19th February 2008 directing an enquiry into the complaints made by the
Petitioner of sexual harassment against Dr. Malik and certain counter allegations made by
Dr. Malik against the Petitioner.
A request was made for reconstitution of the Committee.
On 29th September 2009 Dr. Rajesh Jain, Professor Ophthalmology at LHMC wrote to the
Director of the LHMC stating that in spite of termination of her services, the Petitioner
was involving herself in departmental work on the basis of the Court's orders.
The Petitioner filed Writ Petition (Civil) No. 2337 of 2010 in Delhi High Court
challenging the extension of her probation without confirmation.
The issue in Writ Petition (C) No. 367 of 2009 concerned the validity of the constitution of
the Committee formed to examine her complaint of sexual harassment against Dr. Malik
and the validity of the proceedings conducted by the Committee and of the Report
submitted by it.
The principal submission of the Petitioner, as regards the first issue, was that she had
throughout been raising the question of proper constitution of the Committee to examine
her complaint against Dr. Malik of sexual harassment.
She did not participate in its proceedings.
She challenged the manner in which the Committee had proceeded with the inquiry.
By the Office Order dated 17th June 2008, the Committee to enquire into the Petitioner's
complaint had been reconstituted.
He stated that senior medical professionals constituted the Committee and there was no
occasion to doubt their bona fides.
One of the first issues to be addressed is the validity of the constitution of the Committee
which inquired into the Petitioner's complaint of sexual harassment against Dr. Malik.
As regards the constitution of the Committee, there cannot be a manner of doubt that it
was not consistent with the requirements of the law as explained by the Supreme Court in
Vishaka.
It is required that the Committee constituted for redressal of the complaints by the victims
of sexual harassment should be headed by an officer sufficiently higher in rank, so as to
lend credibility to the investigations.
Complaints Committee as envisaged by the Supreme Court in its judgment in Vishaka's
Case, will be deemed to be an inquiry authority for the purposes of Central
After filing of the writ petition, the committee was ‗reconstituted', but the Court observed,
with the same members.
The Court was constrained to direct institution of an enquiry committee under the
Secretary of the department which was to consider the complaint of the petitioner in
accordance with the guidelines laid down in Vishaka.
The Court is not satisfied with the explanation given by the MHFW that the members of
the Committee were senior and experienced doctors who had no axe to grind against the
Petitioner and the constitution of the Committee was not vitiated.
The MHFW was conscious about the weakness of the constitution of the Committee and
persisted with it.
The Petitioner objected at the very beginning that the Committee examining her complaint
of sexual harassment was not properly constituted.
A three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered an act of sexual harassment to be in
violation of Articles 14, 15, 19 (1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution.
In the considered view of Delhi High Court, the approach of the Committee in the present
case has been limited and narrow.
If the approach of the Committee is erroneous as in the instant case, it is the duty of Delhi
High Court to point it out and apply a corrective.
Keeping in view the above legal position, Delhi High Court refrains from expressing any
opinion on the merits of the Petitioner's complaint against Dr. Malik.
The Office Order dated 17th June 2008 constituting the committee is also set aside.
The freshly constituted Committee which will hereafter enquire into the Petitioner's
complaint will do so uninfluenced by either the Report of the earlier Committee or any
observation that may have been made by Delhi High Court touching on the merits of the
Petitioner's complaint.
Although the Court finds merit in the Petitioner's criticism of the constitution of the
Experts Committee comprising of members who were under the administrative control of
the
The Court observed, -(i)t is a classic case where the complainant has become the accused
and the accused became the complainants.‖ The Court directed a complaints committee to
be constituted in accordance with the Vishaka Guidelines and the punishment order
against the petitioner was quashed.
Already noticed, the observations of the Supreme Court in Vishaka have not been adhered
to by the MHFW in directing the Petitioner's transfer from out of the VMMC.
The victims of sexual harassment should have the option to seek transfer of the perpetrator
or their own transfer.‖ (emphasis supplied)
The Petitioner pointed out that even in the LHMC she has not been permitted to function
and she has had to repeatedly approach the CAT and Delhi High Court.
VISHAKA & ORS. V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS., (1997) 6 SCC 241
This Writ Petition has been filed for the enforcement of the fundamental rights of working
women under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India in view of the prevailing
climate in which the violation of these rights is not uncommon.
The present petition has been brought as a class action by certain social activists and
NGOs with the aim of focusing attention towards this societal aberration, and assisting in
finding suitable methods for realization of the true concept of 'gender equality'; and to
prevent sexual harassment of working women in all work places through judicial process,
to fill the vacuum in existing legislation.
The immediate cause for the filing of this writ petition is an incident of alleged brutal gang
rape of social worker in a village of Rajasthan. That incident is the subject matter of a
separate criminal action and no further mention of it, by us, is necessary.
The incident reveals the hazards to which a working woman may be exposed and the
depravity to which sexual harassment can degenerate; and the urgency for safeguards by
an alternative mechanism in the absence of legislative measures. In the absence of
legislative measures, the need is to find an effective alternative mechanism to fulfill this
felt and urgent social need.
Each such incident results in violation of the fundamental rights of 'Gender Equality' and
the 'Right of Life and Liberty'. It is clear violation of the rights under Articles 14, 15 and
21 of Constitution.
One of the logical consequences of such an incident is also the violation of the victim's
fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) 'to practice any profession or to carry out any
occupation, trade or business'. Such violations, therefore, attract the remedy under Article
32 for the enforcement of these fundamental rights of women.
This class action under Article 32 of the Constitution is for this reason. A writ of
mandamus in such a siltation, if it is to be effective, needs to be accompanied by
directions for prevention; as the violation of fundamental rights of this kind is a recurring
phenomenon.
The fundamental right to carry on any occupation, trade or profession depends on the
availability of a "safe" working environment. Right to life means life with dignity.
The primary responsibility for ensuring such safety and dignity through suitable
legislation, and the creation of a mechanism for its enforcement, is of the legislature and
the executive.
When, however, instances of sexual harassment resulting in violation of fundamental
rights of women workers under Articles 14, 19 and 21 are brought before us for redress
under Article 32, an effective redressal requires that some guidelines should be laid down
for the protection of these rights to fill the legislative vacuum.
The notice of the petition was given to the State of Rajasthan and the Union of India. The
learned Solicitor General appeared for the Union of India and rendered valuable
assistance in the true spirit of a Law Officer to help
This verdict was superseded by the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI VS FEMALE WORKERS (MUSTER
ROLL), 8 MARCH, 2000
In this case, female workers (muster roll), engaged by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi,
raised a demand for grant of maternity leave which was made available only to regular female
workers but was denied to them on the ground that there services were not regularised and,
therefore, they were not entitled to any maternity leave. Their case was espoused by the Delhi
Municipal Workers Union (for short, 'the Union') and, consequently, the following question
was referred by the Secretary (Labour), Delhi Administration to the Industrial Tribunal for
adjudication :-
"Whether the female workers working on Muster Roll should be given any maternity benefit? If
so, what directions are necessary in this regard?"
The Union filed a statement of claim in which it was stated that Municipal Corporation of
Delhi employs a large number of persons including female workers on muster roll and they are
made to work in that capacity for years together though they are recruited against the work of
perennial nature. It was further stated that the nature of duties and responsibilities performed
and undertaken by the muster roll employees are the same as those of the regular employees.
The women employed on muster roll, which have been working with the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi for years together, have to work very hard in construction projects and
maintenance of roads including the work of digging trenches etc. but the Corporation does not
grant any maternity benefit to female workers who are required to work even during the period
of mature pregnancy or soon after the delivery of child. It was pleaded that the female workers
required the same maternity benefits as were enjoyed by regular female workers under the
Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. The denial of these benefits exhibits a negative attitude of the
Corporation in respect of a humane problem.
The Corporation in their written statement, filed before the Industrial Tribunal, pleaded that the
provisions under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 or Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules were
not applicable to the female workers, engaged on muster roll, as they were all engaged only on
daily wages. It was also contended that they were not entitled to any benefit under the
Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. It was for these reasons that the Corporation contended
that the demand of the female workers (muster roll) for grant of maternity leave was liable to
be rejected.
The Tribunal, by its Award dated 2nd of April, 1996, allowed the claim of the female workers
(muster roll) and directed the Corporation to extend the benefits under the Maternity Benefit
Act, 1961 to muster roll female workers who were in the continuous service of the Corporation
for three years or more. The Corporation challenged this judgment in a Writ Petition before the
Delhi High Court which was dismissed by the Single Judge on January 7, 1997. The Letters
Patent Appeal (LPA No. 64 of 1998), filed thereafter by the Corporation was dismissed by the
Division Bench on March 9, 1998 on the ground of delay. Learned counsel for the Corporation
contended that the Division Bench was not justified in rejecting the appeal on the ground of
delay which ought to have been condoned as there was only a 33 days' delay in filing the
Letters Patent Appeal which was caused on account of the opinion of different Departments
which had to be obtained before filing the Letters Patent Appeal.
The Industrial Tribunal, which had given an award in favour of the respondents, had noticed
that women employees had been engaged by the Corporation on muster roll, that is to say, on
daily wage basis for doing various lands of works in projects like construction of buildings,
digging of trenches, making of roads, etc., but had been denied the benefit of maternity leave.
Though the women employees were on muster roll and had been working for the Corporation
for more than 10 years, they were not regularised. The Tribunal, however, came to the
conclusion that the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act had not been applied to the
Corporation and, therefore, it felt that there was a lacuna in the Act. It further felt that having
regard to the activities of the Corporation, which had employed more than a thousand women
employees, it should have been brought within the purview of the Act so that the maternity
benefits contemplated by the Act could be extended to the women employees of the
Corporation. It felt that this lacuna could be removed by the State Govt. by issuing the
necessary notification under the Proviso to Section 2 of the Maternity Act. This Proviso lays
down as under:
"Provided that the State Government may, with the approval of the Central Government, after
giving not less than two month notice of its intention of so doing, by notification in the Official
Gazette, declare that all or any of the provisions of this Act shall apply also to any other
establishment or class of establishments, industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise."
It is to be remembered that the Municipal Corporation or Boards have already been held to be
"industry" within the meaning of "Industrial Disputes Act", in Udge Budge Municipality v. Sri.
P.R. Mukherjee, (1953) 1 LLJ 195 (SC), it was observed that the Municipal activity would fall
within the expression "undertaking" and as such would be an industry.
On 18th of December, 1979, the United Nations adopted the "Convention on the Elimination
of all forms of discrimination against women".
"Article 11
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women
in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the
same rights, in particular;
(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to promotion, job security
and all benefits and conditions of service and the right to receive vocational training and
retraining, including apprenticeships, advanced vocational train-ing and recurrent training;
(d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in respect of
work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work;
(e) The right to social security, particularly in cases of retire-ment, unemployment, sickness,
invalidity and old age and other incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave.
(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including the
safeguarding of the function of repro-duction.
(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy
or of maternity leave and discrimi- nation in dismissals on the basis of marital status;
(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of
former employment, seniority or social allowances;
(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to enable parents to
combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in public life, in
particular through promoting the establishment and develop-ment of a network of child-care
facilities;
(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work proved to be
harmful to them.
3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article shall be reviewed periodically
in the light of scientific and technological knowledge and shall be revised, repealed or
extended as necessary."
[Emphasis supplied] These principles which are contained in Article 11, reproduced above,
have to be read into the contract of service between Municipal Corporation of Delhi and the
women employees (muster roll); and so read these employees immediately become entitled to
all the benefits conceived under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. We conclude our discussion
by providing that the direction issued by the Industrial Tribunal shall be complied with by the
Municipal Corporation of Delhi by approaching the State Government as also the Central
Government for issuing necessary Notification under the Proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section
2of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, if it has not already been issued. In the meantime, the
benefits under the Act shall be provided to the women (muster roll) employees of the
Corporation who have been working with them on daily wages.
5. CONCLUSION
In the first four months of 2017, a nugget of information went by unnoticed: while jobs for
men increased by 0.9 million, 2.4 million women fell off the employment map, according to
the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), a think tank. “Only women suffer when
there’s an employment problem,” said Mahesh Vyas, CMIE managing director and CEO. If
the number of women who quit jobs in India between 2004-05 and 2011-12 (the last year for
which census data is available), was a city, it would, at 19.6 million, be the third-most
populated in the world, after Shanghai and Beijing.
Even more inexplicably, women went missing from the workplace at precisely the same time
that girls were making massive advances in education. The enrolment rate of girls in
elementary education is nearly 100%. In higher education, it’s nudged up from just 7.5% in
2002-03 to 20% in 2012-13. Education should lead to jobs, but that’s not happening in
India. The law should start at the grass root level where the girls are educated under the
Right To Education Act, 2009 to make sure they are educated and supported well-enough to
decide their career.
Law makers and companies alike are trying to improve this scenario. The recent extension of
the maternity leave to 6 months is a testament to this fact. However, it should not stop there.
Various other policy changes and initiatives are required to get more women into the work
force. This could include policy tools such as quotas and training, to ensure that all of India’s
women have the opportunity to undertake rewarding work — work that will allow them to
determine the course of their own lives, those of their families and that of their country.
6. REFERENCES
https://indiankanoon.org
https://www.ilo.org
https://en.wikipedia.org
http://labour.gov.in/womenlabour/about-women-labour
http://www.livelaw.in/womens-day-special-15-judgments-that- made- india-a-better-
place-for-women/
https://paycheck.in/main/career-tips/women-paycheck/women-legislation
https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/standards-women- labour- law/
https://www.bloombergquint.com/union-budget- india/2017/01/16/budget-2017-
indias-missing-women-workers
https://thewire.in/165005/indian-workplaces- losing-women-nationwide/
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women- labour-force- india