SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF LAW
MENDIOLA, MANILA

CASE DIGESTS

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND

CORRESPONDENCE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

SUBMITTED BY:
ALBA, ERIC JOSEPH MARFIL, OSCAR PEPIN
BASTO, MATTHEW JOSEPH MIRANDA, MIKHAIL ISAAC
ESBER, ANNA BIANCA REANDINO, STEVEN
FABIAN, MARY ABIGAIL SEBOLLENA, BIANCA
FERRIOL, NISSIEL SOLAS, LOREN CHRISTINE
GARCIA, DANIEL ALEXEI VILLANUEVA, JOHN FIEL

GROUP 1

SECTION 1-K

SUBMITTED TO
ATTY. JOSE ANGELO DAVID

FEBRUARY 15, 2019

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

01. RAMIREZ V COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 93833 SEPTEMBER 28, 1995
FACTS
Petitioner, Socorro Ramirez, filed a civil case against private respondent, Ester Garcia,
alleging that in a confrontation in the latter’s office, petitioner was vexed, insulted and humiliated in a
“hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality. To
support petitioner’s claim, she produced a verbatim transcript of the event. The said transcript was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by the petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording the event, the private respondent filed a criminal case
against the petitioner on the ground that secretly taping the confrontation was illegal and a violation of
RA 4200 “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes.” Upon arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
information which the RTC granted. But, private respondent’s filing of Petition for Review on
Certiorari, Court of Appeals declared RTC’s decision to be null and void. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner argues that the provision of RA 4200, Section 1, merely refers to the unauthorized
taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. In a
ddition she avers that the substance and content of the conversation must be alleged in the
information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute as a violation of RA 4200. Finally,
petitioner contends that RA 4200 penalizes the taping of a “private communication” not a “private
convesation”

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner has violated RA 4200 for secretly taping her confrontation with
the private respondent?

HELD
Yes. Section 1 of RA 4200 states that “It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all party to any private communication or spoken word, to tap or wire…or record such
communication…” The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.
The statutes intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the
use of the qualifier “any”.

Second, the nature of the conversations are immaterial to the violation of the statue. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What RA 4200 penalizes
are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the
devices enumerated therein.

Finally, petitioner’s contention of distinguishing communication and conversation being

different form one another is absurd. The legislative meaning of conversation and communication was
clarified as it was used interchangeably by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill, hence
they are one and the same.
 02. ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996
FACTS
March 26, 1982, Cecilia Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and
in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers
and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for
legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed
against her husband. Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return
documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and
consent.

ISSUE
Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence

HELD
The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who
is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order from a court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The breaking of drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infidelity is not justified by the relationship or the intimacies between the husband
and the wife. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save
for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion
for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.
 03. NAVARRO VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 100257, JUNE 8, 1992
FACTS
On or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the nighttime, in the City of Lucena, Province
of Quezon, Philippines, the said accused, being then a member of the Lucena Integrated National
Police, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault one Ike
Lingan inside the Lucena police headquarters, where authorities are supposed to be engaged in the
discharge of their duties, by boxing the said Ike Lingan in the head with the butt of a gun and
thereafter when the said victim fell, by banging his head against the concrete pavement, as a
consequence of which said Ike Lingan suffered cerebral concussion and shock which directly caused
his death. Navarro was charged with homicide with the RTC. The trial court convicted him of
the crime charged. The court admitted in evidence the recorded tape allegedly containing the heated
exchange between Navarro and the deceased Lingan in the police station. The exchange in the voice
recording was confirmed by the testimony of Jalbuena, one who took the recording and witness for
the prosecution.

ISSUE
Whether or not the tape evidence is admissible in evidence with regards to RA 4200

HELD
Yes, the evidence is admissible. RA No. 4200 prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or
recording of private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was
not private, its tape recording is not prohibited. Nor is there any question that it was duly
authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness that he personally
recorded the conversations; that the tape played in the court was the one he recorded; and that the
voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena
testified that he personally made the voice recording; that the tape played in the court was the one he
recorded; and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient
foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution. The voice
recording made by Jalbuena established that there was a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro
and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and that some
form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst
of it.
 04. OPLE VS. TORRES
G.R. NO. 127685, JULY 23, 1998
FACTS
On December 12, 1996, A.O. No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System", was issued by President Fidel Ramos. Petitioner, Blas Ople, a
member of the Philippine Senate assails the order and seeks to invalidate it on two important
constitutional grounds: one, it is an usurpation of the powers of Congress to legislate, and two, it
permissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. A.O. No. 308 was published in four
newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997,
petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and
the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee,
are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, the Supreme Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.

ISSUE
Whether A.O. No. 308, Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System", violates the rights to privacy which is enshrined in the Constitution

HELD
Yes. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority
to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through
his PRN. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may
also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against
self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The
threats emanate from various sources — governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In
the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No.
308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the
pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the
computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the
power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for
being unconstitutional.
 05. VIVARES VS. ST. THERESE COLLEGE
GR NO. 202666, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014

FACTS
Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were
about to attend, Julia and Julienne both minors, along with several others, took digital pictures of
themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay
Tan on her Facebook profile. A computer teacher at minors’ school, Mylene Rheza T. Escuedro,
discovered the pictures. The photos were reported to the Discipline in Charge and the girls were
found to have violated the Student Handbook. The students were sent to the Principal’s office where
they claimed that they were chastised and verbally abused. They are also barred from joining the
commencement exercises.

Angela’s mother filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages asking that the school be denied
from prohibiting the girls from attending commencement. A TRO was granted allowing the girls to
attend graduation and the Plaintiffs filed a writ of habeas data alleging an invasion of their children’s
privacy by the Defendant.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for habeas data because petitioners failed to
prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy.

ISSUE
Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the
life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in the case.

HELD
A writ of habeas data protects an individual’s right against invasion of informational privacy,
and a nexus between the right to privacy and the right to life, liberty or security must be proven.

In this case, the core issue was the right to informational privacy, defined as the right of
individuals to control information about themselves. The petitioners argued that the privacy settings
on Facebook limit who can see what information. This gives users a subjective expectation of privacy.
The Court agreed. However, the Court also ruled that before one can have an expectation of privacy in
her Facebook information, he or she must manifest an intention to keep that information private by
utilizing privacy tools. If someone posts something on Facebook and does not limit who can see that
information, there is no expectation of privacy. The photos in the case at hand were all viewable by
the friends of the girls or by the general public. Therefore, the Court ruled that the Defendants did not
violate the minors’ privacy rights by viewing and copying the pictures on the minors’ Facebook
pages.
 06. GAMBOA VS CHAN
G.R. NO. 193636, JULY 24, 2012
FACTS
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative
Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence
of Private Armies in the Country." The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa
Commission, was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country
with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently
in the future. Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission released and
submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.:
The Independent Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to the President" (the Report).
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP –Ilocos Norte) conducted a
series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a
PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP –Ilocos Norte forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the
Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. The list was then on reported through local
media which she claimed resulted to her, as well as her supporters identified with her susceptible to
harassment and police surveillance operations. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and
her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE
Whether the forwarding of information or intelligence report gathered by the PNP to the
Commission is an intrusion to Gamboa’s right to privacy, thus, rendering the remedy of writ of habeas
data proper.

HELD
No. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. The
determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may
be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of
Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved. The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling
of private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It is clear
that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of
PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. In this case, respondents admitted
the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties
and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed
to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are
other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far
outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and
forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the
privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
 07. KATZ vs. UNITED STATES
389 U.S. 347, 18 December 1967
FACTS
Petitioner was convicted and under an indictment charging him with transmitting wagering
information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1084.
At trial, the Government was permitted, over the petitioner’s objection, to introduce evidence of the
petitioner’s end of telephone conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic
listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth from which he had placed
his calls. In affirming his conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the
recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, because “there was no physical
entrance into the area occupied by the petitioner.”

ISSUE
Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area so that evidence
obtained by attaching an electronic listening recording device to the top of such a booth is obtained in
violation of the right to privacy of the user of the both.

HELD
We decline to adopt this formulation of the issues. In the first place, the correct solution of
Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase
“constitutionally protected area.” Secondly, the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general
constitutional “right to privacy.” That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of
government intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all.
Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of governmental
invasion. But the protection of a persons’ general right to privacy — his right to be let alone by other
people — is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the
individual States.

The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a “constitutionally protected area.”
The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not. But this effort to decide whether or
not a given “area,” viewed in the abstract, is “constitutionally protected” deflects attention from the
problem presented by this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. What what it seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.

The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which the petitioner made his
calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he entered it as he would have
been if he had remained outside. But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the
intruding eye — it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply because he made
his calls from a place where he night be seen. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and
pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into
the mouthpiece will not be broadcasted to the world.

The Government contends, however, that the activities of its agent in this case should not be
tested by Fourth Amendment requirements, for the surveillance technique employed involved no
physical penetration of the said telephone booth. The Government’s activities in electronically
listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth, and thus constituted a “search and seizure” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Once this is acknowledged and recognized, it becomes clear that the reach of the
sad Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure
 08. OLMSTEAD V. UNITED STATES
277 U.S. 438 (1928)
FACTS
The evidence in the records discloses a conspiracy of amazing magnitude to import, possess,
and sell liquor unlawfully. Involved were not less than fifty employees, two sea-going vessels for
transportation of the goods to British Columbia, a ranch beyond the city limits of Seattle with a large
underground cache to store the liquor, and many other caches around the area of Seattle, a maintained
city office with executives, secretaries, salesmen, deliverymen, dispatchers, bookkeepers, collectors,
scouts, and an attorney. Olmstead was the leading conspirator and manager of the business. His
invested capital brought him 50 percent of the total income of the company (said to be over 2
million/year), and the other 50 percent went to 11 other investors.

In the main office building there were three different telephones with separate lines for each.
Telephone communication was made throughout the city, the homes of the investors, customers,
Vancouver, to and from the office building and ranch. Times were fixed for the delivery of the
“stuff” to places along the Puget Sound and from there was transported to the various caches.

The information leading to the arrests was made primarily by four Federal prohibition
officers. The officers placed small wires along the main lines outside the homes of the four main
conspirators and that of the office. No intrusion was made into private property. Olmstead was found
to have made dealings with members of the Seattle police to secure the release of any of the
conspiring parties that might get arrested.

ISSUE
Whether the use as evidence of private telephone conversations between the defendants and
others, intercepted by means of wiretapping, amounted to a violation of the fourth and fifth
amendments.

HELD
No. The Court held that neither the Fourth nor Fifth Amendment rights of the recorded parties
were violated. The use of wiretapped conversations as incriminating evidence did not violate their
Fifth Amendment protection against self incrimination because they were not forcibly or illegally
made to conduct those conversations. Instead, the conversations were voluntarily made between the
parties and their associates. Moreover, the parties' Fourth Amendment rights were not infringed
because mere wiretapping does not constitute a search and seizure under the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. These terms refer to an actual physical examination of one's person, papers, tangible
material effects, or home - not their conversations. Finally, the Court added that while wiretapping
may be unethical no court may exclude evidence solely for moral reasons. When criticized for his
opinion, Justice Taft mocked his foes as he wrote to a friend: "If they think we are going to be
frightened in our effort to stand by the law and give the public a chance to punish criminals, they are
mistaken, even though we are condemned for lack of high ideals." This case was reversed by Katz v.
U.S. (1967).