CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN G.R. NO.

166676

9/8/2019

Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner

vs
Jennifer Cagandahan, Respondent
GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008

Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy
and was later on diagnosed that her ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has no breast nor menstruation. Subsequently, she was
diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too
much secretion of male hormones, androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a
male person. She filed a petition at Regional Trial Court Branch 33 in Siniloan, Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her
gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff.

ISSUE: Whether or not correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.

HELD:

The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright
denial. Supreme Court is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would
be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a
male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being a
male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such
persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Supreme Court: " In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has
handed out. In other words, we respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances
in this case."

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)

The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescrbied by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceeding section, shall inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a
doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled
check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and
for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court
regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.

HELD:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injuction declaring "the privacy of communication
and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who
is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a "lawful
order from the court or which public safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them
for any telltale evidence of marital infedility. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual
and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other
as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.

Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, Aug. 28, 2007

FACTS: On 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of
looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding. They got married on the same
day. Another marriage was held in a church in Tondo. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The
alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona,
and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by
petitioner against respondent. Rosita however asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced
by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children. Restituto only
filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against Restituto.

ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.

HELD: A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Art 53 of NCC. Their marriage contract reflects a marriage license number. A certification
was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification is precise since it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage
license was issued. Issuance of a marriage license where none of the parties is resident, is just an irregularity. Marriage is still valid even if the marriage
license is issued in a place not the domicile of the parties.

Fabian Pugeda, plaintiff-appelle. vs. Rapael Trias, et. al, defendants-appellant. GR No. L-16925 March 31, 1962 (Art. 23)

FACTS:
On January 5, 1916, plaintiff and the Maria C. Ferrer went to the office of the Justice of the Peace, who was then witness Ricardo Ricafrente, to ask
the latter to marry them, that accordingly to Ricafrente celebrated the desired marriage in the presence of two witnesses one of them was Santiago
Salazar and another Amadeo Prudente, and after the usual ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to sign two copies of a marriage contract and after
the witness had signed the some, he delivered one copy to the contracting parties and another to the President of the Sanitary Division, which officer
was at that time the keeper of the records of the civil register. It is also stated that after the marriage, Pugeda and Ferrer lived together as husband
and wife for 18 years.

The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and introduced a phtostatic copy of the marriages in the municipality of Rosario Cavite in the
month of January 1916 which showed that no records of the alleged marriage existed therein but the Justice of the Peace explained perhaps the
person who kept the register forgot to make an entry of the marriage in the registry.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Fabian
Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer exist.

HELD:

Yes, the marriage existed, in view of the proofs presented which are the testimony of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage and the
living together of the parties as husband and wife for 18 years. The failure of the solemnizing officer to send a copy of the marriage certificate as well
when the person who kept the register forgot to make an entry are not a fatal defects.

G.R. No. 193902: June 01, 2011

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondents.
FACTS:
Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam.
Subsequently, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City. A little after a year, Zamoranos
and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed byy the Shari'a Circuit District Court,which issued a
Decree of Divorce.

Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew. As she had previously done in her first
nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic
rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, in order to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in
a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos' first marriage to De Guzman, the union between
her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.

Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and the two were de facto separated. The volatile
relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived
at a compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.

As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against Zamoranos including a petition for annulment, a criminal
complaint for bigamy and dismissal and disbarment from the civil service.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum was bigamous.

HELD: NO.
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who
married another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are governed by
P.D. No. 1083.

It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and
attested to by Judge Usman, was valid

Roberto Domingo
vs
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 104818
September 17, 1993

FACTS:
Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976 while being married with Emerlina dela Paz. He has been unemployed and completely
dependent upon Delia, who has been working in Saudi Arabia, for support and subsistence. Delia only found out about the prior marriage when
Emerlina sued them for bigamy in 1983.
In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman and he was disposing of some of her properties without her
knowledge and consent. In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Roberto and separation of property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purpose of
remarriage.

RULING:
Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the said
projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is
illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy.

Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained
only for purposes of remarriage. A person can conceive of other instances other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition,
distribution and separation of property between the spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery
of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, however, one is required by law to show proof that the previous one was an absolute nullity.

Marriage is an “inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;” as such, it “shall be protected by the State. As a matter of policy, there
should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not declare for himself or herself whether or not the marriage is void.

Case Digest: Domingo v. CA

Published by paul on October 13, 2013 | Leave a response

Eugenio Domingo, Crispin Mangabat and Samuel Capalungan vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, Felipe C. Rigonan and Concepcion R. Rigonan
G.R. No. 127540 17 October 2001

Facts:

Paulina Rigonan owned three parcels of land located at Batac and Espiritu, Ilocos Norte, including a house and warehouse on one parcel. She allegedly
sold them to Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan, who claim to be her relatives. Petitioners Domingo, Mangabat and Capalungan who claim to be Paulina’s
closest surviving relatives, allegedly took possession of the property by means of stealth, force and intimidation and refused to vacate the same. Felipe
Rigonan filed a complaint for reinvindicacion against petitioners in the RTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte, alleging their ownership of the land through the
deep of sale executed by Paulina Rigonan and since then have been in continuous possession of the properties and introduced permanent
improvements thereon. According to the petitioners, the deed of absolute sale was void for being spurious since they inherited the three lots and the
permanent improvements as nearest surviving kin within the fifth degree of consanguinity to Paulina. The RTC ruled in the petitioner’s favor, declaring
them the lawful owners of the contested land. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and ordered the petitioners to vacate the subject
properties and surrender possession thereof.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not private respondents sufficiently established the existence and due execution of the Deed of Absolute and Irrevocable Sale of Real
Property
(2) Whether or not Paulina Rigonan was competent to enter into said contract

Ruling:

Paulina Rigonan was in continuous possession of the property in this case, throwing an inverse implication and serious doubt on the due execution of
the deed of sale. The same parcels of land involved in the alleged sale were still included in the will subsequently executed by Paulina and notarized
by Atty. Tagatag. These circumstances, taken together, militate against unguarded acceptance of the due execution and genuineness of the alleged
deed of sale.

At the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced age and senile, attested by the testimony that she
played with her waste and urinated in bed. She died an octogenarian barely a year when the deed was allegedly executed. The general rule is that a
person is not incompetent to contract merely because of advance years or by reason of physical infirmities. However, when such age or infirmities
have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from properly, intelligently and firmly protecting her property rights when she is
undeniably incapacitated.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and the decision of the Batac RTC is reinstated.

CO- OWNERSHIP
Buenaventura VS. CA
G.R. Nos. 127358 and G.R. Nos. 127449
March 31, 2005

Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that both he and his wife were psychologically
incapacitated.
The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and violation ordered the liquidation of the assets
of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification
as the necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother.
Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondent’s motion issued a resolution increasing the support
pendants like to P20, 000.
The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this
petition.

Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.

Held: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43
of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather
the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and
distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of
the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or
involved in said distribution.

Saturday, March 22, 2014

Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004

FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol for four years. The lost contacts when the school year ended. When Lucio received
a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore, constant communication took place between them. They later became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned
to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the
Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 in Bohol.
Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce
against appellant which was granted on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married
Maria Jececha Lumbago in Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage on the
ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.

ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the
bigamy case.

HELD: Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a
solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage
when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.Republic v. Iyoy

G.R. No. 152577, 21 September 2005

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals. CrasusIyoy was married to FelyIyoy in 1961 and this marriage gave birth
to five children. FelyIyoy eventually left for the States to provide for their family in 1984 and in lessthan a year sent Crasus documents to sign with
regard to a divorce that she applied for. Crasus eventually found out that Fely married Stephen Micklus in 1985 and their relationship has conceived
of a child. Crasus eventually questioned the validity of Fely’s subsequent marriage. The Court of Appeals in deciding this case sided with Fely.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino from the United States is valid and recognized in the Philippines.

RULING:

The court decided in the negative and reversed the Appellate Court’s decision. Basing from the facts, Fely only became a citizen in 1988 and acquired
the divorce in 1984, marrying Micklus a year after. This means that paragraph two of Article 26 cannot be applied in such a way that, Fely is not yet
considered an alien at the time the divorce was acquired and therefore she does not have the capacity to remarry and the marriage is still considered
as subsisting. The Civil Code also provides that Filipino Citizen, with regard to family laws and status are governed by Philippine laws regardless of
where they are. Fely, being a Filipino Citizen then, is not permitted by our laws to acquire a divorce decree since such is not recognized in the
Philippines.

“Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

“WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER
VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE
HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.”

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Article 15.Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad. (9a)

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it
to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

LAVADIA v. HEIRS OF LUNA GR. No. 171914

Topic: Binding Effect; NCC Article 15, FC Article 26, par.2

FACTS:

Atty. Luna married his first wife, Eugenia Zaballero-Luna, in San Miguel, Bulacan. The two begot seven children. However, after almost 20 years of
marriage, Atty. Luna and Eugenia eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966. They agreed to a separation of property which
was manifested in a written agreement. On January 12, 1977, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce degree of his marriage with Eugenia from the Civil and
Commercial Chamber of the CFI in Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic. On that same day, he also contracted another marriage, this time with a
woman named Soledad. Atty. Luna was able to establish his own law firm in the following years. However, he died in 1997, and his properties went to
his son in the first marriage. Soledad then filed a complaint against the heirs of Luna stating that she should own the property since the same were
acquired during the second marriage. In line with the issues regarding property rights, the heirs of Atty. Luna challenged the validity of the second
marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad is valid, therefore the latter has rights over the properties of Atty. Luna
HELD:

NO. Divorce has not yet been recognized in the Philippines. The divorce of the first marriage obtained in the Dominican Republic is deemed VOID.
Moreover, the said marriage contracted by Atty. Luna with Soledad is also deemed VOID ab initio. It is a well stated rule that Civil Law follows the
citizens wherever they go. Citizens of the Philippines are still governed by the Civil Code even though they are somewhere else (unlike Criminal Law).
The latter has no rights over the properties owned by Atty. Luna.