Land

bank of the Philippines vs republic of the Philippines

Doctrine:
FOREST lands are outside the commerce of man and unsusceptible of private appropriation in any form.
It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as
forest, timber or mineral lands. Any title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged
innocent purchaser for value shall be cancelled. The rule must stand no matter how harsh it may seem.
Facts:
• Land in Bocana, Kabacan, Davao City which is described as marshy and under water during high tide, it
used to be a portion of a dry river bed near the mouth of Davao River
• It was divided into 4 lots and placed under the name of Bugayong
• Bugayong sold all of the four lots to different persons.
• Sold to spouses Du
• Spouses Du mortgage it to the land bank of the Philippines
• It remained undisturbed until some residents of the land it covered filed a formal petition before the
Bureau of Lands
• They found out that: (1) at the time Sales Patent No. 4576 was issued to Bugayong, the land it covered
was still within the forest zone,; it was released as alienable and disposable land only on March 25,
1981 (2) the land was marshy and covered by sea water during high tide; and (3) Bugayong was never in
actual possession of the land
• In view of the foregoing findings, the Bureau of Lands resolved that the sales patent in favor of Bugayong
was improperly and illegally issued and that the Director of Lands had no jurisdiction to dispose of the
subject land

RTC

• The titles issued to private parties by the Bureau of Lands are void ab initio if the land covered by it is a
25
forest land. It went further by stating that if the mother title is void, all titles arising from the mother
title are also void.
• LBP: it validly acquired mortgage interest or lien over the subject property because it was an innocent
mortgagee for value and in good faith

CA

• Rules against appellant

• It was still within the forestal zone at the time of the grant of the said patent.

ISSUES

• w/n the CA erred in not finding petitioner LBP mortgage right and interest over the subject land as valid
and subsisting under the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of obligation of contracts.

Ruing:

• LBP has no valid and subsisting mortgagee's interest over the land covered
• The contention that LBP has an interest over the subject land as a mortgagee has no merit. The
mortgagor, Lourdes Farms, Inc. from which LBP supposedly obtained its alleged interest has never been
the owner of the mortgaged land. Acquisition of the subject land by Lourdes Farms, Inc. is legally
impossible as the land was released as alienable and disposable only on March 25, 1981

• It is not registerable whether the title is a Spanish title or a Torrens title. It is well settled that a certificate
of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber or mineral land. Any
title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value shall
be cancelled.
• While it is true that the mortgagees, having entered into a contract with petitioner as mortgagor, are
estopped from questioning the latter's ownership of the mortgaged property and his concomitant
capacity to alienate or encumber the same, it must be considered that, in the first place, petitioner did
not possess such capacity to encumber the land at the time for the stark reason that it had been classified
as a forest land and remained a part of the patrimonial property of the State
• There is no impairment of contract but a valid exercise of police power of the State.
• The State's restraint upon the right to have an interest or ownership over forest lands does not violate the
constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contracts. Said restraint is a valid exercise of the police
power of the State.
• Because of the importance of forests to the nation, the State's police power has been wielded to regulate
the use and occupancy of forest and forest reserves.

Estate of Yujuico vs Republic of the Philippines

An action to recover lands of the public domain is imprescriptible. Such right however can be barred by
laches/estoppel under Sec. 32 of P.D. 1529 which recognizes the rights of innocent purchasers for value above the
interests of the government.

https://www.scribd.com/doc/299712791/Yujuico-vs-Republic-Digest-docx

heirs of Malabanan vs republic of the Philippines

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-
Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan
claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30)
years.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-
DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March
15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the
property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding
that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed
the appliocation of Malabanan.


ISSUES:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified
as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to
the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and
disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the
Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is
below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the
provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD:

The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership
of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should
have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain
lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There
must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial
property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property
through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years,
regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over
the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June
1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the
Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public
use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.

DENR vs Mayor Yap

Facts:

• Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed a declatory relief to have a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land titling purposes for the land they’ve been occupying.
• On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
[8]
No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines,
as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA)
• Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-
claimants filed a petition
• They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier
since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
• Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership.
• The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of
the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition.

RTC

• The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their name.
• It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay
were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition

CA

• The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they
occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Issues

• The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTACircular No. 3-82 pose any legal
obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands
in Boracay Island
• Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land, therefore
making these lands alienable.

Ruling

• To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative
act or statute.
• A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of
state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.
• The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
• All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EMMANUEL CORTEZ

FACTS:
4
• On February 28, 2003, respondent Emmanuel C. Cortez (Cortez) filed with the RTC an application for
judicial confirmation of title over a parcel of land located at Barangay (Poblacion) Aguho, P. Herrera
Street, Pateros, Metro Manila.
• In support of his application, Cortez submitted, inter alia, the following documents: (1) tax declarations for
various years from 1966 until 2005; (2) survey plan of the property, with the annotation that the property
is classified as alienable and disposable; (3) technical description of the property, with a certification
issued by a geodetic engineer; (4) tax clearance certificate; (5) extrajudicial settlement of estate dated
March 21, 1998, conveying the subject property to Cortez; and (6) escritura de particion extrajudicial
dated July 19, 1946, allocating the subject property to Felicisima Cotas – Cortez’ mother.
• He alleged that the subject property had been in the possession of his family since time immemorial; that
the subject parcel of land is not part of the reservation of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and is, in fact, classified as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development (BFD).
• He also adduced in evidence the testimony of Ernesto Santos, who testified that he has known the family
of Cortez for over sixty (60) years and that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property since he came to know them.

RTC
 • the Court DECLARES, CONFIRMS, and ORDERS the registration of the applicant’s title thereto.

CA

• The petitioner pointed out that, although Cortez declared that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in
possession of the subject parcel of land since time immemorial, no document was ever presented that
would establish his predecessors-in-interest’s possession of the same during the period required by law.
• It was a mere claim.
• CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal

ISSUE:

• whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated February 7, 2006, which granted the application
for registration filed by Cortez.

Ruling

• yes
• Applicants for original registration of title to land must establish compliance with the provisions of Section
14 of P.D. No. 1529, which pertinently provides that: Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives:
o Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
o Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws.
• After a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, the Court finds that Cortez failed to comply with the
legal requirements for the registration of the subject property under Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No.
1529.
• The 1st requirement was not satisfied, the survey plan does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to
overcome the presumption that the subject property remains part of the alienable public domain. To
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order,
an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are
alienable and disposable.
• The Court nevertheless emphasized that there must be an official declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the development of national
wealth before it can be acquired by prescription; that a mere declaration by government officials that a
land of the public domain is already alienable and disposable would not suffice for purposes of
registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The Court further stressed that the period of acquisitive
prescription would only begin to run from the time that the State officially declares that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the development of national
wealth.

Note: properties classified as alienable and disposable land may be converted into private property by reason of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years. Such property now falls within the contemplation
of "private lands" under Section 14(2) of PD 1529, over which title by prescription can be acquired. Thus, under the
second paragraph of Section 14 of PD 1529, those who are in possession of alienable and disposable land, and
whose possession has been characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the
right to register their title to such land despite the fact that their possession of the land commenced only after 12
June 1945.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DE GUZMAN

Doctrine

Public land remains inalienable unless it is shown to have been reclassified and alienated to a private person

Facts
1
• The Republic appeals the adverse decision promulgated on January 30, 2004, whereby the CA granting
the application of the respondent for the registration of her title covering a parcel of land situated in San
Isidro, Paombong, Bulacan
• The records show that the land subject of the application was a riceland in Paombong, Bulacan,
o that the riceland had been originally owned and possessed by one Mamerto Dionisio since 1907;
o Dionisio, by way of a deed of salehad sold the land to Romualda Jacinto;
o that upon the death of Romualda Jacinto, her sister Maria Jacinto (mother of the respondent)
had inherited the land; that upon the death of Maria Jacinto in 1963,
o the respondent had herself inherited the land, owning and possessing it openly, publicly,
uninterruptedly, adversely against the whole world, and in the concept of owner since then; that
the land had been declared in her name for taxation purposes; and that the taxes due thereon
had been paid, as shown in Official Receipt No. H-7100234.
12
• In their opposition filed by Fiscal Reyes, the Director of Lands and the Director of Forest Development
averred the land is actually a portion of the Labangan Channel operated by the Pampanga River Control
System, could not be subject of appropriation or land registration.
• The areas are within the unclassified region were denominated as forest lands and thus fell under the
exclusive jurisdiction, control and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD)

CFI

• Ruled in favor of the respondent

CA

• Affirmed the decision

Issue

• w/n the land subject of the application for registration is susceptible of private acquisition
• w/n the trial court as well as the CA erred in granting the application for registration

Ruling

• the appeal is impressed with merit

• Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Property Registration Decree state:
o Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court]
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
§ (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
 disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
§ (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.
• As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more is not
sufficient. Therefore, since the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25 January 1977, it must now be shown that
possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-
in-interest, started on 12 June 1945 or earlier
• She did not present evidence of the land, albeit public, having been declared alienable and disposable by
the State
• a survey conducted by a geodetic engineer that included a certification on the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable was not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land still formed part of
the inalienable public domain
• Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain.
• This doctrine unavoidably means that the mere certification issued by the CENRO or PENRO did not
suffice to support the application for registration, because the applicant must also submit a copy of the
original classification of the land as alienable and disposable as approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
• To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute.
• It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run.

VDA. DE TAN TOCO VS MUNICIPAL OF ILOILO

Facts

• It appears from the record that the widow of Tan Toco had sued the municipal council of Iloilo for the
amount of P42,966.40, being the purchase price of two strips of land which the municipality of Iloilo had
appropriated for widening said stree
• CFI: pay the plaintiff with interest
• CA: affirmed
• On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was unable to pay the said judgment, wherefore
plaintiff had a writ of execution issue against the property of the said municipality, by virtue of which the
sheriff attached two auto trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol automobile, the police
stations on Mabini street, and in Molo and Mandurriao and the concrete structures, with the
corresponding lots, used as markets by Iloilo, Molo, and Mandurriao
• After notice of the sale of said property had been made, and a few days before the sale, the provincial
fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion which the Court of First Instance praying that the attachment on the said
property be dissolved, that the said attachment be declared null and void as being illegal and violative of
the rights of the defendant municipality. To which the court agree, declaring the attachment levied upon
the aforementioned property of the municipality null and void. Mrs Tantoco appealed the decision of CFI
Ilo-Ilo

Issue
 • Whether the Municipal properties can be executed in lieu of the unsatisified obligation

Ruling

• The Administrative Code does not specify the kind of property that a municipality may acquire. However,
article 343 of the Civil Code divides the property of provinces and towns (municipalities) into property for
public use and patrimonial property.
• According to article 344 of the same Code, provincial roads and foot-path, squares, streets, fountains and
public waters, drives and public improvements of general benefit built at the expense of the said towns or
provinces, are property for public use. All other property possessed by the said towns and provinces is
patrimonial and shall be subject to the provisions of the Civil Code except as provided by special laws.
• we believe that the principle governing property of the public domain of the State is applicable to
property for public use of the municipalities as said municipal is similar in character. The principle is that
the property for public use of the State is not within the commerce of man and, consequently, is
inalienable and not subject to prescription. Likewise, property for public of the municipality is not within
the commerce of man so long as it is used by the public and, consequently, said property is also
inalienable.
• It is evident that the movable and immovable property of a municipality, necessary for governmental
purpose, may not be attached and sold for the payment of a judgment against the municipality. The
supreme reason for this rule is the character of the public use to which such kind of property is devoted.
The necessity for government service justifies that the property of public of the municipality be exempt
from execution just as it is necessary to exempt certain property of private individuals in accordance with
section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure

PASAY CITY GOVERNMENT VS CFI

Facts

• In 1964, Isip entered into a contract with the City of Pasay represented by then Mayor Pablo Cuneta for the
construction of a new Pasay City Hall for the contract price of P4.9 million. Isip proceeded with the
construction and accomplished the amount of work equivalent to P1.7 million.
• Pasay paid only the total amount of P1.1 million, leaving a balance of P613,000. Pasay failed to remit the
amount, so Isip filed a case for specific performance with damages before CFI Manila.
• The parties arrived at a draft amicable agreement wherein it was stated that Pasay will remit P613,000 to
Isip and that Isip will start the construction work corresponding to the next stage.
• The Municipal Board enacted an ordinance which approved the Compromise Agreement. CFI approved the
compromise agreement and subsequently issued a writ of execution. An application for and notice of
garnishment were made and effected upon Pasay's funds with the PNB.
• Pasay filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, alleging that the Sheriff has no power to levy or garnish
on execution the general funds, specially the trust funds, of Pasay City.
• CFI denied the motion and ordered the enforcement of garnishment. Hence, Pasay filed a petition for
review before the SC.

Issue:

Are Pasay City funds deposited with PNB exempt from execution or garnishment?

Held:

 • All government funds deposited with the PNB by any agency or instrumentality of the government, whether
by way of general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or
levy. But, inasmuch as an ordinance has already been enacted expressly appropriating the amount of
P613,096.00 of payment to Isip, then the funds may be garnished
• this move on the part of the petitioner-appellant is at first glance laudable for "all government funds
deposited with the Philippine National Bank by any agency or instrumentality of the government, whether
by way of general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or
levy (Commissioner of Public Highways vs. San Diego, L-30098, 31 SCRA 616 [Feb. 18, 1970]). But, inasmuch
as an ordinance has already been enacted expressly appropriating the amount of P613,096.00 of payment
to the respondent-appellee, then the herein case is covered by the exception to the general nile
• the amount of P613,096.00 has already been collected through execution and garnishment upon the funds
of Pasay City with the Philippine National Bank.

ESPIRITU VS MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF POZORRUBIO

Facts

• This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan ordering the removal of
appellants' stalls from the public plaza of appellee municipality, within ten days from notice.
• Appellants had voluntarily vacated the public plaza of Pozorrubio by transferring and removing their
buildings and therefrom to private lots fronting the plaza; and that the municipality had already begun the
construction of concrete fences in the premises, formerly occupied by appellants, without any complaint
whatsover from them or their counsel; and that consequently, the present case has become moot and
academic, and asking that the present appeal be dismissed.
• For guidance of town officials and residents
o During the last world war, the market building of the town of Pozorrubio was destroyed, and
after Liberation, the market vendors began constructing temporary and make-shifts stalls,, even
small residences, on a portion of the town plaza
o The Municipal Treasurer collected from these stall owners fees at the rate of P.25 per square
meter a month.
o In time, the whole municipal market was rehabilitated, but the owners of the structures on the
plaza failed and refused to transfer to said market place.
o It was not used for stalls only but also for residence.

Issue

o w/n town plaza can be used for the construction of market stalls and can it be leased?

Ruling

o The trial court found that the fee of P.25 per square meter collected by the Municipal Tresurer,
was not for the rent of the portion of the public plaza occupied by the market stalls, as claimed
by appellants, but rather the market stall fees charges on all market vendors in a public market;
and that there was absolutely no contract or agreement between the appellants on one side and
the municipality on the other, about renting of the Plaza to the former.
o There is absolutelyno question that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market
stalls, specially of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to
abatement according to law.
o Town Plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made
available to the public in general. They are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed
of or even leased by the municipality to private parties.
 o While in case of war or during an emergency, town plazas may be occupied temporarily by
private individuals, as was done and as was tolerated by the Municipality of Pozorrubio, when
the emergency has ceased, said temporary occupation or use must also cease, and the town
officials should see to it that the town plazas should ever be kept open to the public and free
from encumbrances or illegal private constructions.

PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE VS CITY OF ZAMBOANGA

Facts:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the
then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality
of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that “Buildings and properties which the
province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of
Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General.”

Such properties include lots of capitol site, schools, hospitals, leprosarium, high school playgrounds, burleighs, and
hydro-electric sites.
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del
Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and obligations of the old province were to be divided
between the two new ones, Sec. 6 of that law provided “Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and other
properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of
Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines, upon the
recommendation of the Auditor General.”

However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39 by
providing that, “All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located
within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga.”

This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5, 1962, a complaint against defendants-appellants
Zamboanga City; that, among others, Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for depriving Zamboanga del
Norte of property without due process and just compensation.

Lower court declared RA 3039 unconstitutional as it deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties.

Hence the appeal.

Issue:
Whether RA 3039 is unconstitutional on the grounds that it deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its private
properties.

Held:
No. RA 3039 is valid. The properties petitioned by Zamboanga del Norte is a public property.

The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in question. For, the
matter involved here is the extent of legislative control over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a
province is one. The principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal
corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over
it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no
absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just
compensation.
The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which it is intended and devoted.
Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations,
must be used in classifying the properties in question?

Civil Code
The Civil provide: ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public
use and patrimonial property; ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities,
consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades,
and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All other property possessed
by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special
laws.

Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School
playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital
site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for
public use. They would fall under the phrase “public works for public service” for it has been held that under the
ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding
enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.

Law of Municipal Corporations

On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal
Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the
rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held and,
devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc.

Final Ruling
The controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations — State vs. Province — than
along that of Civil Law. If municipal property held and devoted to public service is in the same category as ordinary
private property, then that would mean they can be levied upon and attached; they can even be acquired thru
adverse possession — all these to the detriment of the local community. It is wrong to consider those properties as
ordinary private property.

Lastly, the classification of properties other than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under Art.
424 of the Civil Code — is “… without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.” For purpose of this article, the
principles, obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as “special laws”. Hence, the
classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public should prevail over the
Civil Code classification in this particular case.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby entered as follows:.
(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum the
amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the latter out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to
the latter; and
(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever balance remains of plaintiff’s
54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of
Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of
quarterly payments from the allotments of defendant City, in the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of
Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. No costs. So ordered.

SALAS VS JARENCIO

Legal doctrine
Regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with
its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the state for the benefit of its
inhabitants whether it be for government or propriety purposes.

Facts

• On February 24, 1919, the 4th Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, acting as a land registration
court, rendered judgment in declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land in the
City of Manila
• On august 21 1920, title no. 4329 issued on in favor of the city of manila after the land in question was
registered in the city’s favor. The torrens title expressly states that the city of manila was the owner in
“fee simple” of the said land
• On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila, adopted a resolution requesting His Excellency,
the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the City property bounded by
Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska Streets, a patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of
reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof
• The said resolution of the municipal board of the cit of manila was officially transmitted to the president
of the Philippines the ff day, to which a copy was furnished to the senate and house of representatives of
the congress of the Philippines
• June 20 1964- RA 4118 was passed by the Senate and approved by the President pursuant to the request.
Such bil was enacted for social justice perposes that they be sold to their current landless occupants.
• But due to reasons which do not appear in the record, the City of Manila made a complete turn-about, for
on December 20, 1966, Antonio J. Villegas, in his capacity as the City Mayor of Manila and the City of
Manila as a duly organized public corporation, brought an action for injunction and/or prohibition with
preliminary injunction to restrain, prohibit and enjoin the herein appellants, particularly the Governor of
the Land Authority and the Register of Deeds of Manila, from further implementing Republic Act No.
4118, and praying for the declaration of Republic Act No. 4118 as unconstitutional.

Issues

• Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the city of manila?

• Is RA no. 4118 valid and not repugnant to the constitution.

Ruling
st
1 issues

• It is argued that the parcel of land involved herein has not been used by the City of Manila for any public
purpose and had not been officially earmarked as a site for the erection of some public buildings
• The rule is that when it comes to property of the municipality which it did not acquire in its private or
corporate capacity with its own funds, the legislature can transfer its administration and disposition to an
agency of the national government to be disposed of according to its discretion.
• The possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate
capacity, such property is held in trust for the state for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for
governmental or propriety purposes
• The city of manila, although declared by the cadastral court as owner in fee simple, has not shown by any
shred of evidenve in what manner it acquired said land as its private or patrimonial property. The
presumption is that such land cmae form the state upon the creation of the municipality
• That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this title should be deemed to be held in
trust for the state as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the city of manila granted by
the sovereignty upon its creation
 • Therefore, the land in question pertains to the state and the city of manila merely acted as trustee for the
benefit of the people therein for whom the state can legislate in the exercise of its legitimate powers.
nd
2 issue

• Yes, it is valid
• Consequently , the city of manila was not deprived of anything it owns, either under the due process
clause or under the eminent domain provisions of the constitution. If it failed to get from the congress the
concession it saught of having the land involved given to it as its patrimonial property, the courts possess
no power to grant that relief. Republic act no. 4118 does not, therefore, suffer from any constitutional
infirmity.

COMMISIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS VS LOURDES SAN DIEGO