Article 2; Section 3 (AFP as Protector) in Relation to Article 3, Section 1 and Article 14,

Section 5 (2) (Academic Freedom)

1) First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia of the PMA v, The Superintendent of the PMA

Facts:
Petitioner, Cadet First Class Cudia, was a member of the Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of
the Philippine Military Academy. He was supposed to graduate with honors as the class
salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy Cadet graduate and
be commissioned as an ensign of the Navy.

Petitioner was issued a Delinquency Report (DR) because he was late for two minutes in
his ENG 412 class, other cadets were also reported late for 5 minutes. The DRs reached
the Department of Tactical Officers and were logged and transmitted to the Company
of Tactical Officers (TCO) for explanation. Cudia incurred the penalty of 11 demerits
and 13 touring hours.

Several days after, Cudia was reported to the Honor Committee (HC) per violation of
the Honor Code. Lying that is giving statements that perverts the truth in his written
appeal stating that his 4th period class ended at 3:00 that made him late for the
succeeding class.

Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the honor report. The HC constituted a
team to conduct the preliminary investigation on the violation, it recommended the
case be formalized. Cudia pleaded not guilty. The result was 8-1 guilty verdict and upon
the order of the Chairman, the HC reconvened in the chambers, after, the Presiding
Officer announced a 9-0 guilty verdict.

The HC denied Cudia’s appeal. The Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG) conducted a
formal review and checking of findings. Special orders were issued placing Cudia on
indefinite leave of absence and pending approval of separation from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of the Commandant of
Cadets requesting his re-instatement. The matter was referred to Cadet Review and
Appeals Board (CRAB) and it upheld the decision.

Cudia wrote a letter to President Aquino but the President sustained the findings of the
CRAB. CHR-CAR issued a resolution finding probable cause for Human Rights Violations.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the PMA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Cudia
in utter disregard of his right to due process and in holding that he violated the
Honor Code through lying.
2. Whether or not the court can interfere with military affairs

Ruling:
1. No. The determination of whether the PMA cadet has rights to due process,
education, and property should be placed in the context of the Honor Code. All
the administrative remedies were exhausted. A student of a military academy
 must be prepared to subordinate his private interest for the proper functioning of
the institution. The PMA may impose disciplinary measures and punishments as it
deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the institution. PMA has
regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. PMA has a right to
invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of the internal rules and
regulations.
2. Yes. The court is part of the checks-and-balance machinery mandated by
Article VIII of the Constitution. The court’s mandate (according to Section 1,
Article 8) is expanded that the duty of the courts is not only to “settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable”
but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government” even
if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. No
one is above the law, including the military, especially in violations of
Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Dispositive:
The petition is denied. The dismissal was affirmed.

ISSUE(s):
(1) Whether or not the PMA, the Honor Committee, and the Cadet Review and Appeals
Board committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing cadet first class Aldrin Jeff P.
Cudia from the academy in utter disregard of his right to due process. [NO]
(2) Whether the PMA, the Honor Committee, and the Cadet Review and Appeals
Board committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that cadet first class Aldrin Jeff
P. Cudia lied, thereby violating the Honor Code. [NO]

(3) Whether the result of the fact-finding investigation independently conducted by the
CHR is of such great weight and persuasive nature that the Court may honor, uphold,
and respect. [NO]

RULING:

AFP Code of Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the Honor System,
military professionalism, and, in general, military culture.

Section 31, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 1 (also known as "The National Defense Act")

o Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1, only President Aquino as the Commander-in-Chief

has the power to appoint and remove a cadet for a valid/legal cause. The law gives
no authority to the HC as the sole body to determine the guilt or innocence of a cadet.
It also does not empower the PMA to adopt the guilty findings of the HC as a basis for
recommending the cadet’s dismissal. In the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia, it is claimed that
the PMA blindly followed the HC’s finding of guilt in terminating his military service.
Section 1 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expanded the scope of judicial power by
mandating that the duty of the courts of justice includes not only “to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable” but also
“to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government”

Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 178 (as amended
by E.O. No. 1005),

Art. XIV, Sec 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "academic freedom shall be enjoyed
in all institutions of higher learning."

As the premiere military educational institution of the AFP in accordance with Section
30, Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59, Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV
of E.O. No. 292, the PMA is an institution that enjoys academic freedom guaranteed by
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.

APPLICATION:

In this case, as shown in the previous discussions, there is no evidence that the findings
of the investigating and reviewing bodies below are not supported by evidence or
vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; that the procedure which led to the findings is
irregular; that palpable errors were committed; or that a grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.

With respect to the core issue whether lying is present in this case, all investigation and
reviewing bodies are in consonance in holding that Cadet 1CL Cudia in truth and in
fact lied. Respondent insist that violation of the Honor Code warrants separation of the
guilty cadet from the cadet corps, under the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the
Philippines Regulation, a violation of the Cadet Honor Code is considered Grave (class
1) delinquency which merits a recommendation for a cadet`s dismissal from the PMA
Superintendent. The same is likewise clear from the Honor Code and Honor System
Handbook.

Cadet Cudia has necessarily and voluntarily relinquished certain civil liberties by virtue
of his entry to the PMA. The PMA enjoys Academic Freedom which authorized it to
impose disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit and consistent with the
peculiar needs of the academy. Cadet Cudia was properly afforded due process. The
Court Differs with Petitioners. Petition is Denied Dismissal of Cadet First Class Cudia was
affirmed by the SC.
Article 2, Sec. 14 (Equality Between Women and Men) in Relation to Article 3, Sec. 1
(Equal Protetion) and Article 8, Section 1 (Judicial Power)

2) Garcia v. Hon Judge Drilon

FACTS: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled
“An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She
claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence,
being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and
also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set
forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a
TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when
petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given
time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as
it would be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and
TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process
and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an
unwanted product of an invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition
for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and
the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted
collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

ISSUES:

WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition
constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is

discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the
due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to
protect the family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional

because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

RULING:

1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may
not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in
appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each
member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not
violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of
due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one
may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be
impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention

that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a
memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue
therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power

includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the power to
enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the
prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the
issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is
consistent with their duty executive function.

HELD:

RA 9262 is NOT UNCONSITUTIONAL.

1. RA 9262 - compliance with the CEDAW

It has been acknowledged that "gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that

seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with
men." RA 9262 can be viewed therefore as the Philippines’ compliance with
the CEDAW, which is committed to condemn discrimination against women and directs
its members to undertake, without delay, all appropriate means to eliminate
discrimination against women in all forms both in law and in practice.

CEDAW

Known as the International Bill of Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the central and most
comprehensive document for the advancement of the welfare of women. The CEDAW,
in its preamble, explicitly acknowledges the existence of extensive discrimination
against women, and emphasized that such is a violation of the principles of equality of
rights and respect for human dignity.

RA 9262 justified under the Constitution

The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the government to actively

undertake ameliorative action that would remedy existing inequalities and inequities
experienced by women and children brought about by years of discrimination. The
equal protection clause when juxtaposed to this provision provides a stronger mandate
for the government to combat such discrimination. Indeed, these provisions order
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities and remove cultural inequities."

The gender-based classification of RA 9262 does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause (application of the substantive equality model)

The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute
prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men
under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the
policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of
the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and
women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are
vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important
governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and
empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies
prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact
essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the
intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification
therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987
Constitution.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

Article 2, Sec. 12 in Relation to Article 3, Sec. 1, Article 3, Sec. 3, Article 3, Sec. 6, Article
3, Sec. 18, Article 6, Sec. 1 and Article 6 Sec. 26.