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Dialogue of Cultures: Platonic Tradition and Contemporary Thomism. Klaipėda: Klaipėdos

MARIJA ONIŠČIK
Vytautas Magnus University

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE PLATONIC PRINCIPLE OF

SUMMARY

The article deals with the main “Platonic” theme in Aquinas – the notion of participation which plays the crucial
role in establishing the ontological unity of his worldview, known as “participational metaphysics”. A brief historical
survey of some 20th century Thomistic investigations of the field presents the classifications, made by C. Fabro and L-B.
Geiger, and shows the importance of liberating the doctrine of the primacy of esse from essentialist suppositions. The
article analyzes some texts by Thomas Aquinas from his Summa contra gentiles, Prima pars of Summa theologiae, The
Commentary on Liber de causis, and The Exposition of De hebdomadibus dealing with the problem of causality, the
conception of a thing as a composition, and the Platonic aspects of the Thomistic doctrine of creation.

A search for “Platonism” in Aquinas inevitably leads to the topic of participation which is not
only the main “Platonic” theme of his philosophy but also the one that elucidates his entire onto-
theological project of bringing together the natural and the supernatural “storeys” of the world and
establishing the unity of the worldview. One can say with Fran O’Rourke, that in Plato, the principle of
participation “is the foundation and coping-stone of his entire vision; it becomes the same for
Aquinas”1. Since the issue of participation in Aquinas is incredible vast, I am going to present here
only some relevant texts and problems.

THE HISTORY OF THE RESEARCH ON THOMISTIC PARTICIPATION

An interest in St. Thomas’s “Platonism” began about seventy years ago and resulted in the
valuable studies by such outstanding Thomistic scholars as Cornelio Fabro, C.P.S., L.-B. Geiger, O.P,
Joseph De Finance, Louis De Raeymaeker, Arthur Little, S.J., W. Norris Clarke, S.J., and Robert J.
Henle, S.J. Although they came from the different schools and represent the different trends of the 20 th
century Thomism, all of them emphasized the special role of esse in Aquinas trying to explain it in
terms of participation. And, in spite of their being deeply rooted in the tradition of treating Thomas as
Aristotelian, all of them have been speaking of “the unmistakable indebtedness of the Angelis Doctor
to the Neo-platonic tradition”2. This “debt” had become more and more recognizable, and finally it has
been generally admitted that “Thomas was neither Platonist nor Aristotelian; he was both”3.
The fruitful insights and the important discoveries emerged in the time of these “classical”
studies on Thomistic participation. First of all, the need to discriminate between different levels and
types of participation found in Aquinas was met with the variety of classification by Fabro and Geiger.
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Fabro proposed two divisions. First is the division into “predicamental” and “transcendental”
participation that corresponds to the division of the “predicamental” causality in the composition of
matter and form and of substance and accident, and of the “transcendental” causality, the correlate of
which is seen in the composition of essence and esse. The “transcendental” type denotes the
“participation of esse by that-which-is”4. The “predicamental” order includes, e.g., for man, animality
and corporeity, and the “transcendental” one – life, intelligence and esse5. Fabro used the vocabulary
of traditional Aristotelian ontology: the first type is applied to “predicaments” and the second to
“transcendentals”.
The second division was found by Fabro in De ente et essentia, the text that does not speak
directly about participation. In Fabro’s view, of three arguments for real distinction between esse and
essentia two are arguments from participation: one from the “static” (or “structural”) and the other
from the “dynamic” participation. By “static” he meant the participation of a thing in its act of being,
building its inner “structure”. The question is whether the relation between a thing and its esse can be
explained in terms of participation at all. According to Fabro, namely this type of participation marks
out the specific Thomistic interpretation of Boethian theme, establishing the real distinction between
participans and participatum, in opposition to the commonly known “simple expression of the
dependence of the creature upon Creator”. The latter is what was meant by the “dynamic”
participation, the participation of potency in act as when essence receives its esse from God6.The
distinction is not at all clear, because both “types” can be described as a relationship between potency
and act: in the first case, as an inner in a thing which is a composite, in the second case, as an outer
between a created thing and esse subsistens. The conclusion was meant in the first place for the real
distinction between essence and its esse thought in terms of participation, and only “afterwards” for the
“dynamic” account of thing’s dependence on the ultimate cause of its being, which in the last analysis
coincides with the “transcendental” type of participation.
With Geiger we have the division of “participation by composition” and “participation by
similitude or by formal hierarchy”. The first clearly corresponds to Fabro’s “static” (and
“predicamental”) participation that constitutes the structure of a thing as a composite, as, e.g., the
relation of matter and form. The second corresponds to Fabro’s “dynamic” or “transcendental”
participation and involves the “participated status of an essence”7 Geiger’s important contribution
consists of the preference he gave to participation “by formal hierarchy”.
It should be observed that all of the division are reducible to two different constitutive modes.
Participation “inside” a thing as a composite is what makes a thing “what it is”, a substance; and
participation “outside” a thing is what makes a thing to be. One can easily notice that the first mode is
essentially Aristotelian and hardly deserves a name of “participation” at all. In order to dig up what is
specifically Platonic in the thought of Aquinas we have to concentrate on the second and “proper”
mode of participation. However, since the issue of participation emerges as an effective method of
“reconciliation” of Aristotelian and Platonic worldview, both modes are important.
Hence, another rather important point, originated with the research in participation, is that of
limitation of a “stronger” element of a composite by a “weaker” one. Already in 1935 De Raeymaeker
stated “that the notion of participation, through the principle of the limitation of act by potency,
constituted the foundation for the whole of metaphysics” 8 Geiger’s “participation by composition”
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involves limitation: “Where the receiving subject is less perfect that the element received, this latter
must be limited by the capacity of the subject”, as, for example, form is limited by matter 9.
The resulted “equation of finite being with its essence” 10 is implied not only in Geiger’s position
but in the other’s as well. Fabro spoke about the limitation of being (esse) by the instances which
determinate it. In a composite, it is an essence of a thing, which specifies and limits its being 11. From
the point of view of the “outer” participation, the limitation is imposed on infinite esse by a finite
entity. However, a thing is expressed in terms of its essence. Hence, although the distinguished
Thomistic scholars were in a search of the metaphysic of esse, all were looking with Aristotelian eyes
in trying to reach and establish the primacy of esse from the essentialist position. Later explorations of
the field, made by Fran O’Rourke, David Burrell, and others add some important insights conductive
to seeing Aquinas as less “Aristotelian” and more original thinker however deeply rooted in the
Platonic tradition.

THE HISTORIC SURVEY OF THE THOMISTIC SOURCES OF THE NOTION OF

While “there is no clear evidence that he made use of any of the three works of Plato available to
the Latin West in the thirteenth century” 12, namely, Timaeus (actually only part of it, up to 53c), Phedo
and Meno, it is known that “Aquinas spent years studying Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic positions and
put them both to use within a theological”13, or rather “onto-theological” project. Aquinas proved to be
“a long-standing close reader of strikingly Neo-Platonic texts”14. It was Albert the Great, who
introduced young Thomas to Neo-Platonism. While at Paris (1245-1248), he attended Albert‘s lectures
on Celestial Hierarchy of Pseudo-Dionysius. Then, studying under Albert at Cologne (1248-1252),
Thomas heard his lectures on the Divine names and, presumably, on Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. Along
with Pseudo-Dionysius, the other sources of Neo-Platonic influence on Thomas were Boethius, Arabic
authors, Moses Maimonides, St. Augustine, and the anonymous Book of Causes (Liber de causis,
probably Arabic, written around 850 and translated into Latin in the 12 th century by Gerard of
Cremona). To this list one can add the theological sources which are reflected in the commentaries to
Scripture.
Boethius was the first to comment on: The Exposition of De hebdomadibus of Boethius was
written by Thomas in 1257. Then went the Summa, the very framework of which showing the
emergence (by creation or emanation) of creatures from God and their return to him, is definitely Neo-
Platonic in character. “Aquinas prepared for this project by writing a commentary on Dionysius’s
Divine Names”15, most probably, in 1265. Together with the Prima Pars of the Summa the Disputed
Questions on the Power of God were written in Rome in 1266-1268. Thomas’ Commentary on the
Book of Causes, together with the De substantiis separatis belongs to his last works (the Book was
written in 1272 and the unfinished De substantiis – in 1270-1273) and sums up much of his
“participational metaphysics”. What Thomas was looking for during all his career is “how creatures
participate in the divine”16. The issue is crucial for all range of philosophical problems: for his theory
of language and of analogy, for anthropology, including theory of knowledge and ethics, and, first and
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foremost, for his ontology or “worldview” on the “the whole of beings” (totius entis)17, that overcomes
the “two-storey’s” picture of the world.

THE ORDER OF BEING AND PARTICIPATION

The general “rule” of participation runs as following: “Whatever is of a certain kind through its
essence is the proper cause of what is of such a kind by participation. Thus, fire is the cause of all
things that are afire. Now, God alone is actual being through divine essence itself, while other beings
are actual beings through participation” 18.
Now, “to be of a certain kind” refers to the essence or “whatness” of a thing. Here we have an
answer to the question “what is?” To be a fire is the essence of a fire, and to participate in a fire is to
become a fire to a certain degree (the gradation is very important here and it comes with limitation by
participating of participated). However, a thing of its own proper essence (e.g., wood) does not become
a fire strictly speaking; it does not receive an essence of a fire, but a quality of a fire by participating in
it, so that we can say “The wood is afire”, a participated quality being a predicate in a proposition. So,
there is no real “becoming” in this type of participation.
However, things really become something, come into being as something by participation in that
which is something in such a way that “to be” and “to be something” are connected to make its
identity. An actual account for the thing’s proper “whatness”, based on participation (and omitted in
the given quotation), would be the Platonic one: participated ousia exists as the “other” outside of the
thing itself.
Finally, the same principle accounts not only for things being “something”, but for the most
fundamental, the most basic and simple, and the least accessible fact of their being at all, giving an
answer to the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?”. No matter, whether we consider
“existence itself” or “existence of an individual” 19, that is, being “outside” or being “inside” of a thing, by
participation these two are united. From the Aristotelian point of view, this is a difficult issue for
Thomas as well as for his commentators.
Besides, we are tempted to take existence for a predicate like others. “Whatever is of a certain
kind” could be taken as “whatever is of a kind of an entity”. There is nothing wrong with the
expression; everybody does not agree that “entity” is not a “kind”. Thomas is aware of three different
ways of using the word “to be”: as a copula, as a mark of identity, and as an existential quantifier.
The Platonic universe (“outside” of a particular thing) is commonly understood as constituted by
twofold order of participation with vertical and horizontal relations at both levels: empirical and non-
empirical. This however is oversimplified picture. As derived from Timaeus, the Neo-Platonic
hierarchy consists of four levels: body, soul, intellect, and the divine unity in which goodness, life, and
existence is unified. Thomas has an accurate knowledge of this hierarchy which, as he puts it in the
Commentary on the Book of Causes, establishes “unity in God and distinction in the order of intellect,
soul and body”20.
Thomas is interested in the Neo-Platonic hierarchy very much to make sense of it, for his rather
“Aristotelian” knowledge of so-called “Platonism” makes him anxious about misunderstanding the
point. First of all, “it should be remembered that Plato held that the universal forms of things are
separate and subsist in themselves” 21. Secondly, these “suspicious” separate forms make a hierarchy
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and are endowed with the power of causality on each level. “In accordance with the order of forms, the
Platonists posited the order of separate substances; for example, there is a single separate substance,
which is horse and the cause of all horses, whilst above this is separate life, or life itself, as they term
it, which is the cause of all life, and above this again is that which they call being itself, which is the
cause of all being”22. In other words, the Platonic universal forms “have a kind of universal causality
over the particular beings which participate in them” 23. Hence two rather “Aristotelian” points arises
here: one of causality (“outside”) and the other of “composition” (“inside”). An actual horse must at
least be composed of “horseness”, life and being.

THE PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY

The problem of causality arises because of the temptation to think that by participation each
upper level of the hierarchy “creates” the lower one. Thomas argues that this would be to “badly
understand what is said here”. The “right” point is that “participation” means a causal relation to “that
which is through its essence primary such” 24. And although it seems that, accepting the Platonist view,
we are to posit “three levels of superior beings [esse]”25, this is not correct. Thomas notes that,
according to Dionysius, “good itself, being itself, life itself, wisdom itself are not different but one and
the same being, who is God”26.
Here we are still speaking about the set of the “universal” (or “transcendental”) properties,
among which existence is posited. The remaining questions are those of the origin of the essence (say,
“horseness”) of a particular thing, of its essential and accidental properties, and, above all of placing
“the existence commonly participated in by all existing things” 27 in the privilege position in the set.
Thomas draws on the Books of Causes in Summa saying that “neither intelligence nor the soul gives us
being, except in so far as it works by divine operation”28.
Secondary causality is at work when “it happens <...> that something may participate the proper
action of another not by its own power, but instrumentally, in so far as it acts by the power of
another”29. However, the secondary cause cannot be a cause of being, “because the secondary
instrumental cause does not participate in the action of the superior cause, except in so far as by
something proper to itself it works to dispose the effect of the principal agent”. The example of a saw
which in cutting wood “by the property of its own form” (for cutting) nevertheless “produces the form
of a bench” not by itself but by an action of a carpenter, whose it is an instrument30.
The resulting schema is summed up by David Burrell as following: “Whatever is is inanimate,
animate, or intelligent, in the sense that something may simply exist, or exist as a living being, or as an
understanding being”. In other words, an entity is “being in all that he is” 31. In Aristotelian terms, this
would be the “levels of formal cause” that let itself for two interpretations of participation, called by
Burrell the “additive” and the “virtual”. Apparently, Aquinas votes for the latter. It is not by the
“adding” of participating and participated levels of beings in a chain of secondary causes, but by the
ascending virtuality (in the Thomistic sense of implicit actuality) of the “modes of existing”, more and
more “fully realising the reaches of being” 32. O’Rourke speaks about “the motif of the virtual
presence” in Plato, adapted by Aquinas to the extent of “the dependence of every secondary mode of
being upon the perfection of being,” and ultimately of “the participation of all creature in subsistent
divine being (ipsum esse subsistens)”33.
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The decisive argument for Burrell is one of unity of Aristotelian “substantial form”:

Indeed, contrary to the prima facie sense of the Liber de causis, levels of being are not separable or
substract-able. Take away life from a living thing and it remains inanimate for a very short while;
indeed, what is left begins to decompose into elements and is soon no longer identifiable as one thing.
This fact supports the virtual picture: being expresses itself in different ways. Moreover, if “higher
levels” were simply added, what would make the resultant being one sort of thing? This is what
Aristotle meant by the “unity of substantial form”34.

So, the determinant point is that “the bestowal of being [esse] by the first cause is an orderly
bestowal, yielding an inherent order structuring each existing thing so that higher levels are implicit in
lower. Indeed, were this not the case, were being not an abundant source expressing itself in different
ways, then existing would have to be pictured (as many do) as something added to a potential thing”35.
Such a picture would be “doubly redundant”, for it presumes, first, “potential things” being “before
something exists” (these would be some pre-existing “possible essences”); and second, makes
existence an additional feature, an “accident” or a predicate. Burrell points out than the expressions
used by Thomas himself, such as “receiving esse” (one may add “having esse”) are rather risky.
Actually, “such an order is not imposed but inherent, as existing is not an added feature but an inherent
gift”36. Such is a true sense of the Thomistic notion of “participation”.

CREATION IS/OR EMANATION

In the treatise on creation in the Prima pars of his Summa Thomas relates participation to
exemplary, efficient and final causality37. This, however, is not sufficient for the account of how being
(esse) of each particular thing participates in ipsum esse subsistens. So, he speaks of the “universal”
causality that is in work in creation. As Burrell puts it, Aquinas “realised full well that none of
Aristotle’s four causes could describe the act of creating”. For Aristotelian causality “always
presupposes a subject upon which to work. So Aquinas needed a conception of causality not available
from Aristotle <....>; indeed, a cause-of being”38. Certainly, Thomas is very well aware of the point,
when he says: “The ancient philosophers <...> considered only the emanation of particular effects from
particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their action <...>. But this has no place in
the first emanation from the universal principle of things” 39 Thus, O’Rourke is not correct when he
states that Aquinas “transforms participation by equating it with the efficient causality of creation” 40.
Rather one can speak about expansion of the Aristotelian efficient causality to the “universal” causality
of participation.
The usage of the word “emanation” in the creationist context is rather persisting in the Summa
and in the Commentary on the Book of Causes41. The question 45 of the Prima pars in Summa is
dedicated to “the mode of the emanation of things from the First Principle, and this is called
creation”42. The project of the Book of Causes is related by Thomas to that of Pseudo-Dionysius. Both
had the aim to properly turn Neo-Platonic emanation into creation: Pseudo-Dionysius – in respect of
the Creator, and the author of the Book – in respect of the creature. The hypothesis is that using the
term Thomas wants to “reconcile” Platonic participation and Aristotelian causality.
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Let us examine more closely the question 44 of the treatise on creation of the Summa. Thomas
begins his response in the first article of the question by telling that esse of a thing is participated: “It
should be said that we must affirm that whatever in any way exists is from God, for if something is
found to be in a thing through participation, it must be caused in it by that which essentially is that
something, as iron is heated by fire” 43. “In any way exist”, (similarly to the already discussed locus
from Summa contra gentiles), refers to a substance as a composite as well as to any elements of a
composite, say the essence of a thing, or its accidental property.
Now God is a subsistent existence and as such is unique existence per se. What does it mean to
be a “unique existence”? Thomas tries to explain his point by turning to distinctively Platonic terms:
“just as if there were a subsistent whiteness [say, the “idea” or the Form of whiteness] there could only
be one, since whiteness are multiplied by recipients” 44. That is, multitude of white particulars receives
their whiteness from one “idea”, and that is why we can predicate this attribute to them. Whiteness is a
universal that can be predicated of particulars. Existence, however, is neither a predicate, nor a
universal. The fact does not stop Thomas from saying that it follows “that nothing apart from God can
be its own existence, but rather participates in existence”. Why? Because the very principle of
participation involves the particular relation of one to many, which is constitutive for multitude and
diversity, so that there simply could not be any diversity without participating in “oneness”, no matter
how interpreted. And “all the things that are diversified” as “more or less perfect” are such “because of
diverse participation in being” 45. That the thought is purposely Platonic and aims at the
“reconciliation” of Plato and Aristotle, is clear from the closing appeal both to Plato and Aristotle as
the “authorities”: “Hence Plato said that it is necessary that all plurality be reduced to unity, and
Aristotle says in Metaphysics 2 that that which is maximal being and truth is cause of every being and
truth, just as that which is hottest is the cause of all heat” 46. Thus, the issue of participation appears to
be the same as that of causality. This becomes yet more explicit in the response to the first objection,
which rests on the statement that “from the fact that something is being through participation it follows
that is caused by another”. Here one can find and explanation of the baffling indifference as to whether
existence is or is not a predicate: it does not matter because all genuine predicates depend on existence:
“being of such a kind can only be if caused, just as a man incapable of laughter could not exist”47.
In article 3 the Neo-Platonic conception of God as the exemplar cause, which involves “copies”
or imitations of the Idea and corresponds to the Aristotelian formal cause, is considered. The relation
of creatures to God is explained, first, by considering the issue of the “divine ideas” which are one in
God as its essence, but multiple in creatures “insofar as its likeness can be diversely participated by
diverse things” each having a share in the essence of God. These the “divine ideas” are the formal
cause of creation and “God himself is the first exemplar of all things” 48.
As Platonic Demiurges has made a universe as a copy of the Ideas, so Thomas compares God to
the “artisan” in whose mind there are the forms or rationes of his future work49. These, however is not
“species existing of themselves, like man himself, horse himself, and the like”, as the second objection
would suggest50. The Ideas are the intelligible “rationes of everything, <...> that is, the exemplar forms
existing in the divine mind”51. These are needed as presupposed “staff” of causality. However, no pre-
existing “ideas” are needed when “emanation of all beings [totius entis] from the universal cause” is
considered in question 4552. So Aquinas explains that creation is one particular mode of emanation,
hence not all emanation is creation.
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COMPOSITION

The discussed texts allows us “to see creation as the orderly bestowal of things’ being, which
adopts the metaphor of emanation and sees existing as a participation in being by virtue of the One
whose very essence is to-be, and so alone can make things participate in being. And as a way of
spelling out the metaphor of participation, we are invited to see it as an order inherent in each thing”53.
This Burrell’s proposal, (whatever “metaphorical”), takes us to the issue of a “composition”.
From the fact that creatures are beings by participation, their absolute dependence upon God
easily follows. How can a creature than be a “substantial” being, existing through itself, that is, having
esse if its own? The “tension” between participation and substantiality, often explained as the tensions
between Platonism and Aristotelianism, is found in Boethius’s De hebdomadibus. Thomas treats the
problem in his Commentary on De hebdomadibus, where he analyzes the notion of participation at
length.
The most important theses of Boethius state the conception of a thing as composed of esse and
“what is”, the conception, most commonly known as the “Thomistic” one. First, “to be [esse] and that
which is [quod est] are different. For to be itself is not yet, but that which is, having received a form of
being, is and subsits. That which is can participate in something, but to be [esse] itself in no wise
participates in anything. Participation comes about when something already is, and something is when
it receives existence”54. Second, “to be such and such and to be something as that which is, differ. The
former signifies accident, the latter, substance. That which is participates in existence in order to be
and participates in another to be such and such. That which is participates in that which is existence in
order to be, and is in order to participate in something else” 55. The third and the fourth theses claim
very much the same: “In every composite, to be [esse] is one thing and the thing that is, another”, and
“in every simple thing, its existence and that which is are the same” 56.
Commenting on the first thesis (“To be [esse] and that which is [quod est] are different”)
Thomas says, that “we mean one thing when we say to be and another when we say that which is, just
as we signify one thing by to run and another by runner. For to run and to be are signified in the
abstract, like whiteness, but what is, that is being and runner, are signified in the concrete, like
white”57. It can be noticed that “Boethius’s distinction is not identical with what Thomas made of it”58.
The difference is based on the different treatment of esse.
The commentary on the second Boethius’s thesis is based on the discussion of the
“transcendental” and the “predicamental” senses of the word “to be”. At first Thomas reminds us of
the “most common” or transcendental notions which are being, one, and good, then proceeds: “With
respect to being, to be [esse] itself is considered something common and indeterminate, which is
determinate in two ways, first, on the part of the subject, which has existence, and another way on the
part of the predicate, as when we say of man, or of anything, not that it simply is, but that it is such and
such, for example white or black”59.
Here different senses of “to be” are considered. At the first glance it seems that existence is a
predicate: “Just as we can say of him who runs, or the runner, that he runs, insofar as he is the subject
of running and participates in it, so we can say that being, or that which is, is” 60. However, running and
being are different.
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The difference is based on the notion of participation. To participate is as it were to take a part, and
therefore when something receives in a particular way what pertains to another, it is generally said
to participate in it, as man is said to participate in animal, because he does not have the notion of
animal according to its full extension; for the same reason, Socrates participates in Man. So too the
subject participates in its accident, and matter in form, because the substantial or accidental form,
which of its own notion is common, is determined to this or that subject, and similarly the effect is
said to participate in its cause, <...> for example, when we say that air participates in the light of
61
the sun because it does not receive it with the brightness the sun has .

Thus we have three kinds of participation: 1) “the way that the particular participates in the
universal” (notion); 2) “the way in which matter or a subject participates in form or accident”; 3) the
third kind of participation is when the effect participates in its cause 62.
First, a particular thing participates in the “common” esse. “That which is, or being, although
most common is said concretely, and therefore it participates in to be itself, not in the way that the
more common is participated in by the less common, but it participates in to be itself in the way the
concrete participates in the abstract”63.
The second kind of participation “belongs to that which already is. Something is because it
receives to be itself”. Only then it can have some properties by participating in something else.
“Something must first be understood as simply being [esse], and afterwards as being such and such;
but once it is, that is, by participation in to be itself, there remains for it to participate in something
else, that is, in order to be such and such” 64. By this mode “the subject participates in an accident, or
matter in form”65.
However, that which is by participation in “to be itself” is a whole composite substance: its
properties, essential as well as accidental ones, should themselves be participating in esse in order to
be and its form has its being as the element of a composite by participation. In case of there being the
separate forms, that is “if there should be found forms apart from matter” each of them should be
participating in common esse, in order to subsist66.
Having cleared the issue of existence and participation, we then proceed to the other “common”
thing that is goodness. We are to inquire “whether beings are good in essence or by participation” 67.

To understand the question, it should be noted that the question presupposes that to be in essence
and to be by participation are opposed. And in one of the modes of participation distinguished
earlier this is manifestly true, that is, according to the mode whereby the subject participates in an
accident, or matter in form. For an accident is outside the nature of the subject and form outside the
very substance of matter. But in another mode of participation, that whereby the species
participates in the genus [notion], this is also true, according to the opinion of Plato who posited
that the idea of animal is different from the idea of the biped man. But according to the view of
Aristotle, who held that man truly is what animal is, the essence of animal not existing apart from
the difference of man, nothing prevents what is said by participation from being predicated
substantially68.
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Hence the Aristotelian substance as a whole is a participating substance. The opposition between
participation and substantiality could be accepted only if, as in Boethius’s case, what is meant is the
second mode of participation, which operates “inside” of a substance. “Boethius here speaks in terms
of the participation whereby subject participates in accident, and then what is predicated substantially
can be the opposite of what is predicated participatively” 69. The opposition is between Boethius saying
“that if all things are good by participation, it follows that they are in no way good in themselves”,
which is not true, in Thomas’s explanation, if goodness is “the proper accident” of a thing, which is “in
its subjects per se, and yet is predicated of it participatively” 70; and the notion of being “substantial
goods”, which excludes participation.
Boethius supposes that goodness and existence of things “are two different things”. For things
“to be, then differs from their being such-and-such”. Being simple, God, however, is only one “by
nature good” “in virtue of his existence”. Not simply things “could not even exist at all” without
participation in “the good whose very existence is good”. “They are called good simply because their
existence derived” from the Good71.
Thomas makes this an issue on analogy. “The secondary or created good is good because it flows
from the First Good. That is why the existence itself of things is good and any created thing, insofar as
it exists, is good”. The “flowing” appears to be a proportional relation expressed by analogy as well as
a relation of efficient and final causality. “Its existence is good because of its relation to the First
Good, which is its cause, to which it is compared as to its first principle and ultimate end. It is in this
way that something is called healthy because it is ordered to the end of health, as something is called
medical with reference to the effective principle of the art of medicine” 72. The third mode of
participation, “when the effect participates in its cause”, supposedly is in work here. “However,
existence flowing from the first good is not like the first insofar as he is substantially good, and they,
though they are good, would not be good insofar as they exist if they had not flowed from it” 73. There
is a kind of hierarchy in participating: first, in existence, and only then, in goodness. The answer to the
question how things are good – “be participation or by substance” –is: only God is good substantially,
because his very substance is esse ipsum, but created things have all their “inside” structure by the
“outside” mode of participation which is at work in creation.
Thomas’s position is that a created thing is a substance because of creation: by creation “a thing
is made according to its whole substance” 74. First, as a subsisting (“in the case of separate substances”)
and second, as a substisting and composite thing (“in the case of material substances”). And creation is
“directed to the being of a thing”, and “being belongs to that which has being – that is to what subsists
in its own being”75. It is a mere act of existence or “having esse” that matters and not a thing’s
“whatness”, since, in Thomas’s view, “a created thing is called created because it is a being, not
because it is “this” being, since creation is the emanation of all being [esse] from the universal
being”76. In the doctrine of creation the primacy of esse is clearly declared.
However, creation “means that the composite is created so that it is brought into being at same
time with all its principles” 77. Thus not only esse of a thing is participated but also its “whatness” or
quiddity which designates “this” thing. “But as this man participates [in] human nature, so every
created being participates, so to speak, [in] the nature of being, for God alone is his own being”78. This
apparently corresponds to the full Aristotelian notion of a substance.
 11

The other rather important question is about a proper relationship between finite and infinite
being. It seems that the notion of participation somehow blurs the distinction between the finite and the
infinite, the created and the divine, attributing to the finite creature literally “a part” of infinite God.
That the created thing actually is the “composition” of “finite” and “infinite” becomes clear from
the Commentary on the Book of Causes. It is Proclus who speaks about the composition of finite and
infinite. Thomas explains this saying: “what is participates in is not received in the one participating in
its full infinity but particularly”. This is why “the existence received is finite”, but it “can be multiplied
insofar as it is participated existence: this is what composition of finite and infinite means” 79. This
composition is possible due to the limitation of esse by the essence. The author of the Book “calls
participated existence <...> “finite” because it does not participate in it [the subsistent esse] according
to the full infinity of its universality but according to the mode of the nature of the participant” 80.
The point is that Thomas accepts the Neo-Platonic hierarchy of beings. While the ascending
gesture points toward “deification”, (each level “naturally” desires to return to its source), the
descending gradually involves more and more restricted forms.

CONCLUSION

The brief analysis of some Aquinas’ texts on participation shows that the divisions, proposed for
the notion of participation by Fabro and Geiger, do not properly work. The division that separates
“predicamental” and “transcendental” participation was meant for the distinction between the
“Aristotelian” conception of a composition of matter and form, and of substance and accidence, and
the “Thomistic” one of essence and esse, providing the latter is conceived as a “transcendental”
element or esse commune, gained from “outside” However, from the “Platonic” point of view the two
have to coincide, because the form in question, and even the properties which the accidentality of a
thing consists of, likewise is of a transcendental origin. Thomas agrees with the view on the condition
that the Platonic Forms would be placed in the mind of God. On the other hand, it is not only an
essence of a thing that participates in the transcendental esse. First and foremost it is its particular
finite esse which is constituted by participation in the esse substistent, and the particularity of which
makes us think of it in a “predicamental” way, although the esse of a thing is not its predicate properly
speaking.
The composite as a substantial whole participates not in its own particular esse, as one was
meant by Fabro’s “static” or “structural” participation which remains “inside” a thing, but in
“dynamic” way participates in esse ipsum, or “to be itself” in order to be “that which is”. The same
should be said about Geiger’s “participation by composition”.
“Participation by formal hierarchy” also was based on the “participated status of an essence”, not
of the whole substance. While it is true that a thing is the composition of essence and esse, it is not
only essence what receives its esse from God, but the whole thing comes into being as what it is.
Thomas would not accept any “possible” preexisting essence except the ideas in the mind of God,
which are not at all “possible”, but virtual and coincide with esse ipsum subsistent.
 12

References
1
Fran O’Rourke. Aquinas and Platonism // Contemplating Aquinas. On the Varieties of Interpretation. Ed. by Fergus
Kerr. – London: SCM Press, 2003, p. 267-268.
2
Norris W. Clarke, S.J. The Meaning of Participation in St. Thomas // Proceedings of the American Catholic
Philosophical Association (1952) 26, p. 147.
3
Josef Pieper. Guide to Thomas Aquinas. – Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987, p. 22.
4
Cornelio Fabro, C.P.S., Participation et causalité selon S. Thomas d’Aquinas. – Louvain: Publications universitaires de
Louvain, 1961, p. 52.
5
Helen James John. The Thomist Spectrum. – New York: Fordham University Press, 1966, p. 101-102.
6
Ibid, p. 93-94.
7
Ibid, p. 109. Plg. L.-B. Geiger, O.P. La Participation dans la philosophie de S Thomas d’Aquin. – Paris: Vrin, 1942, p.
28-29.
8
Cit. H.-J. John. Op. cit., p. 123.
9
H.-J. John. Op. cit., p. 109. Plg. L.-B. Geiger. Op. cit., p. 28.
10
H.-J. John. Op. cit., p. 113.
11
Plg. Ibid, p. 91.
12
Ibid, p. 249.
13
John Inglis. On Aquinas. – Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002, p. 21.
14
Ibid, p. 19.
15
Ibid, p. 10.
16
Ibid, p. 19.
17
STh I, q. 45, a. 1.
18
SCG III, 66: Quod est per essentiam tale, est propria causa eius quod est per participationem tale: sicut ignis est causa
omnium ignitorum. Deus autem solus est ens per essentiam suam, omnia autem alia sunt entia per participationem. The
English translation is taken from: Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles. Trans. by V. Bourke. – Garden City, N. Y.:
Doubleday, 1956.
19
Fran O’Rourke. Op. cit., p. 261.
20
In Liber de causis 3: unitatem in Deo constituit, distinctionem autem in ordine intellectum et animarum et corporum.
The English translation is taken from: Thomas Aquinas. The Exposition of The Book of Causes, 1–5. Trans. by R.
McInerny // Thomas Aquinas. Selected Writings – London: Penguin Books, 1998, p. 787-810.
21
Ibid. 3: Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod Plato posuit universals rerum formas separatas per se subsistentes.
22
STh I, q. 65, a. 4: Et secundum ordinem formarum ponebant platonici ordinem substantiarum separatum: puta quod
una substantia separate est quae est equus, quae est causa omnium equorum; supra quam est quaedam vita separate,
quam dicebant per se vitam et causam omnis vitae; et elterius quondam quam nominabant ipsum esse, et causa omnis
esse. Unless otherwise is stated, the English translation (sometimes slightly changed) of the Summa is taken from:
Thomas Aquinas. The Summa Theologica. Trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. –Chicago:
Encyclopeaedia Britannica, 1952.
23
In Liber de causis 3: Et, quia huismodi formae universals universalem quamdam causalitatem, secundum ipsum,
habent supra particularia entia quae ipsas participant.
24
Ibid. 3. Huiusmodi enim sausalitates simplicium entium ponebant secundum participationem; participatur autem non
quidem id quod est participans, sed id quod est primum per essentiam suam tale.
25
Ibid. 4: triplicem gradum superioris esse.
26
Ibid. 3: sententiae Dionysii supra positae, scilicet quod non aliud sit ipsum bonum, ipcum esse et ipsa vita et ipsa
sapientia, sed unim et idem quod est Deus.
27
Ibid. 4: esse participato communiter in omnibus existentibus.
28
STh I, q. 45, a. 5: neque intelligentia vel anima nobimis dat esse, nisi inquantum operator operatione divina.
29
Ibid: Contingit autem quod aliquid participet actionem propriam alicuius alterius, non virtute propria, sed
instrumentaliter, inquantum agit in virtute alterius.
30
Ibid: Sic enim videmus quod sucuris, scindendo lignum, quod habet ex proprietate suae formae, producit scamni
formam, quae est effectus proprius principalis agentis.
31
David B. Burrell. Aquinas’s Appropriation of Liber de Causis to Articulate the Creator as Cause-of-Being //
Contemplating Aquinas. On the Varieties of Interpretation. Ed. by Fergus Kerr. – London: SCM Press, 2003, p. 78.
32
Ibid, p. 78-79.
33
Fran O’Rourke. Op. cit., p. 262.
 13

34
David B. Burrell. Op. cit., p. 79-80.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid, p. 80-81.
37
Plg. STh I, q. 44.
38
David B. Burrell. Op. cit., p. 77.
39
STh I, q. 45, a. 2, ad 1: antiqui philosophi <...> non consideraverunt nisi emanationem effectuum particularium a
causis particularibus, quas necesse est praesupponere aliquid in sua action. <...>. Sed tamen hoc locum non habet in
prima emanation ab universali rerum principio.
40
Fran O’Rourke. Op. cit., p. 270.
41
Burrell has a problem with Thomas using the Neo-Platonic term “emanation” for some reasons. First, creation cannot
be a process in time, and emanation can. Second, emanation should be necessary and creation is free. Plg. David B.
Burrell. Op. cit., p. 76.
42
STh I, q. 45, prol.: de modo emanationis rerum a primo principio, qui dicitur creation.
43
STh I, q. 44, a. 1: Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere omne quod quocumque modo est, a Deo esse. Si enim
aliquid invenitur in aliquot per participationem, necesse est quod causetur in ipso ab eo cui essentialiter convenit; sicut
ferrum fir ignitum ab igne. The English translation of question 44 is taken from: Thomas Aquinas. Selected Writings.
Trans. by Ralph McInerny. London: Penguin Books, 1998, p. 360-367.
44
Ibid: si albedo esset subsistens, non posset esse nisi una, cum albedines multiplicentur secundum recipientia.
45
Ibid: omnia quae diversificantur secundum diversam participationem essendi, ut sint perfectius vel minus perfecte,
causari an uno primo ente, quod perfectissime est.
46
Ibid: Unde et Plato dixit quod necesse est ante omnem multitudinem ponere unitatem. Et Aristotelis dicit, in II
Metaphys., quod id quod est maxime ens et maxime verum, est causa omnis entis et omnis veri, sicut id quod maxime
calidus est, estr causa omnis caliditatis.
47
STh I, q. 44, a. 1, ad 1: ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem est ens, sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio. Unde
huiusmodi ens non potest esse, quin sit causatum, sicut nec homo, quin sit risibile.
48
STh I, q. 44, a. 3: Quae quidem licet multiplicentur secundum respectum ad res, tamen non sunt realiter aliud a divina
essential, prout eius similitude a diversis participari potest diversimode. Sic igitur ipse Deus est primum exemplar
omnium.
In STh I, q. 84, a. 5 and elsewhere Thomas reminds us that it was Augustine who “for Platonic forms <...> substituted
the reasons (rationes) of all creatures existing in the divine mind”. (Augustinus <...> posuit loco harum idearum quas
Plato ponebat, rationes omnium creaturarum in mente divina existere).
49
Plg. STh I, q. 44, a. 3, ad 1.
50
STh I, q. 44, a. 3, ob. 2: species per se existents, ut per se hominem, et per se equum, et huismodi.
51
STh I, q. 44, a. 3: rationes omnium rerum, <...> quas supra diximus ideas, id est formas exemplars in mente divina
existents.
52
STh I, q. 45, a. 1: Sed etiam emanationem totius entis a causa universali.
53
David B. Burrell. Op. cit., p. 80.
54
Boethius. On the Hebdomads. Trans. by R. McInerny // Thomas Aquinas. Selected Writings. – London: Penguin
Books, 1998, p. 146.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
57
In De Hebdom. 2: Dicit ergo primo, quod diversum est esse, et id quod est. <...> Aliud autem significamus per hoc
quod dicimus esse, et aliud: per hoc quod dicimus id quod est; sicut et aliud significamus cum dicimus currere, et aliud
per hoc quod dicitur currens. The English translation is taken from: Thomas Aquinas. How are Things Good? Exposition
of On the Hebdomads of Boethius. Trans. by R. McInerny // Thomas Aquinas. Selected Writings. – London: Penguin
Books, 1998, p. 143–162.
58
James A. Weisheipl. Friar Thomas D’Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Work. – Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1974,
p. 137.
59
In De Hebdom. 2: Circa ens autem consideratur ipsum esse quasi quiddam commune et indeterminatum: quod quidem
dupliciter determinatur; uno modo ex parte subiecti, quod esse habet; alio modo ex parte praedicati, utpote cum dicimus
de homine, vel de quacumque alia re, non quidem quod sit simpliciter, sed quod sit aliquid, puta album vel nigrum.
60
Ibid: sed sicut id ipsum quod est, significatur sicut subiectum essendi, sic id quod currit significatur sicut subiectum
currendi: et ideo sicut possumus dicere de eo quod currit, sive de currente, quod currat, inquantum subiicitur cursui et
participat ipsum; ita possumus dicere quod ens, sive id quod est, sit, inquantum participat actum essendi.
61
Ibid: differentia sumitur secundum rationem participationis. Est autem participare quasi partem capere; et ideo quando
aliquid particulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet, universaliter dicitur participare illud; sicut homo dicitur
 14

participare animal, quia non habet rationem animalis secundum totam communitatem; et eadem ratione Socrates
participat hominem; similiter etiam subiectum participat accidens, et materia formam, quia forma substantialis vel
accidentalis, quae de sui ratione communis est, determinatur ad hoc vel ad illud subiectum; et similiter effectus dicitur
participare suam causam, <...> puta, si dicamus quod aer participat lucem solis, quia non recipit eam in ea claritate qua
est in sole.
62
Ibid: [modus] quo particulare participat universale; [modus] quo materia vel subiectum participat formam vel
accidens.
63
Ibid: Sed id quo est, sive ens, quamvis sit communissimum, tamen concretive dicitur; et ideo participat ipsum esse,
non per modum quo magis commune participatur a minus communi, sed participat ipsum esse per modum quo
concretum participat abstractum.
64
Ibid: participation conveniat alicui cum iam est. Sed ex hoc aliquid est quod suscipit ipsum esse. <...> Primo oportet ut
intelligatur aliquid esse simpliciter, et postea quod sit aliquid; et hoc patet ex praemissis. Nam aliquid est simpliciter per
hoc quod participat ipsum esse; sed quando iam est, scilicet per participationem ipsius esse, restat ut participet
quocumquae alio, ad hoc scilicet quod sit aliquid.
65
In De Hebdom. 3: illum modum quo subiectum dicitur participare accidens, vel material formam.
66
In De Hebdom. 2:Si ergo inveniantur aliquae formae non in materia <...>.
67
In De Hebdom. 3: utrum entia sint bona per essentiam, vel per participationem.
68
Ibid: Ad intellectum huius quaestionis considerandum est, quod in ista quaestione praesupponitur quod aliquid esse
per essentiam et per participationem sint opposita. Et in uno quidem supradictorum participationis modorum manifeste
verum est: scilicet secundum illum modum quo subiectum dicitur participare accidens, vel materia formam. Est enim
accidens praeter naturam subiecti, et forma praeter ipsam substantiam materiae. Sed in alio participationis modo, quo
scilicet species participat genus, hoc verum est quod species participat genus. Hoc etiam verum est secundum sententiam
Platonis, qui posuit aliam esse ideam animalis, et bipedis hominis. Sed secundum sententiam Aristotelis, qui posuit quod
homo vere est id quod est animal, quasi essentia animalis non existente praeter differentiam hominis; nihil prohibet, id
quod per participationem dicitur, substantialiter praedicari.
69
Ibid: Boetius autem hic loquitur secundum illum participationis modum quo subiectum participat accidens; et ideo ex
opposite dividitur id quod substantialiter et participative praedicatur.
70
Ibid: Nam proprium accidens secundum hinc modum per se inest subiecto, et tamen participative de eo praedicatur.
71
Boethius. Op. cit., p. 156.
72
In De Hebdom. 4: secundum bonum, quod est creatum, est bonum secundum, quod fluxit a primo bono, quod est per
essentiam bonum. Cum igitur esse omnium rerum fluxerit a primo bono, consequens est quod ipsum esse rerum
creatarum sit bonum, et quod unaquaeque res create, inquantum est, sit bona. <...> Esse autem secundi boni est quidem
bonum, non secu ndum rationem proprie essentiae, quia essential eius non est ipsa bonitos, sed vel humanita, vela liquid
alioud huismodi; sed esse eius habet quod sit bonum ex habitudine ad primum bonum, quod est eius causa: ad quod
quidem comparator sicut ad primum principium et ad ultimum finem; per modum quo aliquid dicitur sanum, quo aliquid
ordinatur ad finem sanitatis; ut dicitur medicinal secundum quod est a principio effective artis medicinae.
73
In De Hebdom. 5: Et tamen esse fluens a primo bono non est simile primo quod est substantialiter bonum, a quo nisi
fluxissent, licet essent bona, non tamen essent bona in eo quod sunt, inquantum scilicet non essent ex primo bono.
74
STh I, a. 45, a. 3, sed contra: creation, qua fit aliquid secundum totam substantiam.
75
STh I, a. 45, a. 4: Unde illis proprie convenit fiery et creari, quibus convenit esse. Quod quidem convenit proprie
subsistentibus, sive sint simplicia, sicut substantiae separate; sive sint composite, sicut substantiae materiales. Illi enim
proprie convenit esse, quod habet esse; et hoc est subsistens in suo esse.
76
STh I, a. 45, a. 4, ad 1: Nam ex eo dicitur aliquid creatum, quod est ens, non ex eo quod est hoc ens, cum creation sit
emanation totius esse ab ente universali.
77
STh I, a. 45, a. 4, ad 2: compositum sic dicitur creari, quod simul cum omnibus suis principiis in esse producitur.
78
STh I, q. 45, a. 5, ad 1: Sed sicut hic homo participat humanam naturam, ita quodcumque ens creatum participat, ut ita
dixerim, naturam essendi, quia solus Deus est suum esse. The theological part of the participational doctrine of creation
is one of grace, by means of which we actually participate in the divine nature. Here we can rely on Scriptures when “we
speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker, according to II Peter 1, that we may be partakers of the
Divine Nature” (STh I-II, q. 50, a. 2: Sed si loquamur de aliqua superiori natura, cuis homo potest esse particeps,
secundum illud II Petr. I, ut simus consortes naturae divinae.)
79
In Liber de causis 4: quod esse participat est finitum, quia quod participatur non recipitur in participante secundum
totam suam infinitatem sed particulariter. <...> Ipsum esse quod recipit, est finitum, Et ex hoc sequitur quod esse
intelligentiae multiplicari posit in quantum est esse participatum: hoc enim significant composition ex finito et infinito.
80
In Liber de causis 5: ipsum autem esse participatum vocat finitum quia non participatur secundum totam infinitatem
suae universalitatis sed secundum modum naturae participantis.