MARIANO VS. CA BUTTE VS.

UY
(G.R. NO. 101522 | MAY 28, 1993 | NOCON, J.) (G.R. NO. 15499 | FEBRUARY 28, 1962 | REYES, J.)
FACTS: Jose V. Ramirez was a co-owner of a house and lot located at Sta
Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner within the redemption period does Cruz, Manila. Upon the death of Jose V. Ramirez, all his property including
not terminate the co-ownership and does not vest in him sole ownership. the 1/6 undivided share was bequeathed to his children and grandchildren and
1/3 of the free portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte.
FACTS: Francisco Gosiengfaio is the registered owner of a parcel of land in
Tuguegarao. In his lifetime, he mortgaged the land to Rural Bank of Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez sold the property to Manuel Uy and Sons,
Tuguegarao to secure payment of a loan. Francisco died in without paying the Inc. including the undivided 1/6 share property in Sta Cruz, Manila. On the
debt. His intestate heirs were: his wife Antonia and children Amparo, Carlos, same day, a copy of letter regarding the above-mentioned sell was sent to Bank
Severo, Grace, Emma, Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina, and Jacinto. of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the property of Jose V. Ramirez.
The bank foreclosed on the mortgage but before the redemption period Mrs. Angela M. Butte filed a case against Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc for legal
expired, Antonia, Emma, Lina, Norma, Lina, Carlos and Severo executed a redemption when the latter refused Mrs. Butte to redeem the said sold property.
deed of assignment of the right of redemption in favor of Amparo. Amparo
later on sold the land to Spouses Mariano.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the right of succession to
Grace Gosengfiao, and the other heirs excuded in the deed of assignment filed exercise legal redemption over the share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de
a complaint for recovery and legal redemption with damages against spouses Ramirez.
Mariano. RTC decided in favor of spouses Mariano. CA for Grace Gosiengfia,
et. al. HELD: Yes, Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the right of succession to exercise legal
redemption over the share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez for
ISSUE: Whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole property with her being one of the co-owners of the heirs of the 1/6 undivided property of Jose
own personal funds becomes the sole owner of said property and terminates V. Ramirez.
the existing state of co-ownership?
According to Article 1620 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, a co-owner of
HELD: No. Admittedly, as the property in question was mortgaged by the a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other
decedent, a co-ownership existed among the heirs during the period given by co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the
law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption of the whole property by alienation is gross expensive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
a co-owner does not vest in him sole ownership over said property but will
inure to the benefit of all co-owners. In other words, it will not end to the Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right to redemption, they
existing state of co-ownership. Redemption is not a mode of terminating a co- may only do so in proportion to the share that may respectively have in the
ownership. thing owned in common.
Respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written
notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun
to run.
 RAMIREZ VS. RAMIREZ
(G.R. NO. 22621 | SEPTEMBER 29, 19676 | CONCEPCION, J.) FACTS: Petitioners appealed from the decision of the MTC and RTC ruling
that Helen Guzman’s (American citizen) waiver of her inheritance in favor of
her son was not contrary to the constitutional prohibition against the sale of
FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez died leaving as principal beneficiaries his land to an alien.
widow, MarcelleSemoron de Ramirez, a French woman; his two
grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real
Wrobleski. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance. properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, defendant-
According to the will ½ shall go to Marcelle in full ownership plus usufruct of appellee Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, defendant-appellee David Rey
the 1/3 of the whole estate; the grandsons shall have the ½ of the whole estate; Guzman, both of whom are also American citizens. Helen executed a deed of
and a usufruct in favour of Wanda. quitclaim assigning, transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights,
titles and interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them
ISSUE: Is the partition according to the will valid? inherited from Simeon. Subsequently, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of
land to defendant-appellee Emiliano Cataniag.
RULING: No. As to the usufruct granted to Marcelle, the court ruled that to
give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator’s intention Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint questioning
for his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.As the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances and claiming
to the usufruct in favour of Wanda, the Court upheld its validity. The ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Art. 1621[5]
Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does of the Civil Code.
not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for
naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the ISSUES: Were the petitioners entitled to a right of redemption?
prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange Was the sale of the lot to defendant-appellee Cataniag valid?
for devise of a piece of land. Notwithstanding this, the Court upholds the
usufruct in favour of Wanda because a usufruct does not vest title to the land HELD: NO. The petitioners were not entitled to a right of redemption. The
in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to aliens which is proscribed by subject land is urban. Thus, petitioners have no right to invoke Art. 1621 of the
the Constitution. Civil Code, which presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed is rural.
The court distributed the estate by: ½ to his widow and ½ to the grandsons but YES. The sale to Cataniag is valid. Non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title
the usufruct of the second half shall go to Wanda. to private lands or to lands of the public domain. But what is the effect of a
subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified Filipino citizen?
Jurisprudence is consistent that if the land is invalidly transferred to an alien
who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the
original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid. Since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent
Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed.
The objective of the constitutional provision — to keep our land in Filipino
hands — has been served.

HALILI VS. CA
(G.R. NO. 113539 | MARCH 12, 1998 | CORTES, J.) PILAPIL VS. CA
 (G.R. NO. 55134 | DECEMBER 4, 1995 | ROMERO, J.) Upon discovery of the new titles, petitioners filed a protest with the register of
deeds or Ormoc city, who in a letter informed Carmen, S. ALdrin, Macario
and Dionisio of the existence of the deed of sale in favor of petitioner and
FACTS: Felix Otadora was the registered owner of a parcel of land (273,796-
required them to present their original titles for proper annotation. Such request
sqm) in Ormoc city covered by OCT No. 26026. He died and was survived by
was, however, ignored.
his wife Leona and 3 children (vitaliana, Maxima and Agaton). Subsequently,
Leona and the three children sold portions of said lot, leaving a portion with
On July 1972, Carmen and her husband Masias sold the one-fourth share sold
an area of 51, 019 sqm (Lot 8734-B-5) . Then Leona died.
by Carmen’s father to her to respondent Serafica and Sons Corp. which was
not able to register the same because of the annotation in TCT No. 9130 earlier
On March, 1962, the Otadora siblings, together with their nephew Antonio,
made showing the sale in favor of petitioners. Because of this, the corporation
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition and confirmation of sales, giving
charged the vendors with estafa before the City Fiscal’s Office, but the
each of them one-fourth undivided share in the remaining property. That very
complaint did not prosper.
same day, Vitallana and Agaton sold to petitioners Pilapil and Penaranda an
undivided portion of the, measuring 18,626 sqm of lot Lot 8734-B-5. The deed
Petitioners therefore filed, on December 1973, a complaint for quieting of title,
of sale, which was executed in the presence of Antonio and another witness,
annulment of deeds, cancellation of titles, partition, and recovery of ownership
specified that the possession and ownership of the property sold shall be
with damages, against herein private respondents. The complaint alleged,
transferred to the buyers from the date of the instrument. The deed of
among other things, that petitioners succeeded in possessing only 12,000
extrajudicial partition was annotated on OCT No. 26026. Because of such
square meters of the lot and needed 6,626 square meters more to complete the
partition, OCT No. 26026 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 4026 which,
total area purchased from Vitaliana and Agaton in 1962.
in turn, was superseded by TCT No. 4029, indicating as owners Agaton,
Vitaliana, Maxima, and Antonio. The sale to petitioners was inscribed at the
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the defendants (Serafica & Sons
back of TCT No. 4029 as Entry No. 10903 on March 29, 1962.
Corporation) and against the plaintiffs (Pilapil) hereby dismissing plaintiffs
complaint, and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants for attorney’s fee,
Later, Antonio sold his one-fourth share to his cousin Bensig, who ceded one-
to vacate the lot in question and deliver the same to defendant. In its decision
half thereof to the spouses Visitacion Otadora and S. Aldrin, by a deed of
dated June 1994, the court a quo concluded that the annotation on TCT No.
quitclaim. Because of such, TCT No. 4029 was cancelled and supplanted by
4484 of the sale by Vitaliana and Agaton in favor of petitioners was null and
TCT No. 4484, which showed Agaton, Vitaliana, Maxima, Bensig, and the
void because the latter failed to surrender the owner’s duplicate copy of the
spouses Visitacion and S. Aldrin as owners of Lot 8734-B-5. Petitioners’
title, in violation of Section 55 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).
names did not appear among the owners, although in the memorandum of
encumbrances at the back of TCT No. 4484 regarding the sale to them by
The CA said that OCT No. 26026 thereby became inexistent, it having been
Vitaliana was retained.
already cancelled by TCT(s) Nos. 4026 and 4029. It would have been against
the law to have the deed of sale registered in TCT No. 4029 without an order
Despite the sale of 18, 626 sqm of their undivided share in said lot earlier made
from the proper court authorizing such registration, specifically because OCT
in favor of petitioners, Agaton AGAIN sold his one-fourth share in the lot to
No. 26026 had already undergone two cancellations, first by TCT No. 4026
his daughter Carmen covered by TCT No. 9130. Vitaliana on the other
and then by TCT No. 4029 .It held that Appellants should have filed the
hand, RE-SOLD her one-fourth share to Maxima. 4 days later, Maxima sold
necessary petition with the proper court asking that the Register of Deeds be
her now one-half share to her sons Dionisio and Macario who were able to
authorized to annotate the deed of sale executed by Agaton Otadora and
register the said properties in their names. On Sept, 1971, TCT was issued to
Vitaliana Otadora in their favor. The said title was, therefore, null and void,
spouses Visitacion and S. Aldrin, and another TCT for Carmen and her
and the same did not acquire the effect of a constructive notice to the whole
husband.
world of the interest over the land in question of the plaintiffs-appellants. At
most, the deed of sale is merely a contract between the plaintiffs-appellants piece of property depends on the buyer’s knowledge, actual or constructive, of
and the vendors appearing therein but without any binding effect upon their a prior sale. While there is no direct proof that Carmen and Maxima actually
persons and upon whom bad faith cannot be imputed. Also, The deed of sale knew of the sale to petitioners, they are deemed to have constructive
did not specify what part of the 1/4 share of each of the registered owners who knowledge thereof by virtue of their relationship to both Agaton and Vitaliana.
executed the sale was sold to the appellants. The CA also agreed with the lower Hence, it has become immaterial if the sale to petitioners was properly
court that H. Serafica & Sons Corporation was an innocent purchaser for value annotated on the correct certificate of title or not.
as it was not required by law to go beyond TCT No. 9130 which, on its face,
appeared to be unencumbered. It is not disputed that of the 25,510 square meters which pertain to Vitaliana
and Agaton as their combined undivided share in Lot No. 8734-B-5, an area
ISSUE: (1) The annotation of the sale in their favor on TCT No. 4029 is of 18,626 square meters had been sold to petitioners who, in turn, were able to
ineffectual; possess only 12,000 square meters thereof. Thus, at most, Vitaliana and
(2) The deeds of sale respectively executed by Agaton and Vitaliana in favor Agaton had a remainder of 6,884 square meters of undivided share which they
of Carmen and Maxima are valid and superior to that executed earlier by could have legally disposed of. As it turned out, however, they sold
Agaton and Vitaliana in their favor; their entire individual one-fourth shares to Carmen and Maxima who, as
earlier concluded, were privy to the prior sale to petitioners.
Petitioners contend that the liability of the Otadoras who sold the same
property twice should have been determined to avoid multiplicity of suits Thus, when Carmen sold the property to H. Serafica and Sons Corporation, she
no longer had any rights of dominion to transmit, since her own father who
HELD: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and sold to her the property had himself earlier relinquished his ownership rights
SET ASIDE. Petitioners are declared the lawful owners. in favor of the petitioners. Accordingly, Carmen transmitted no right to the
(1) The court below correctly ruled that the annotation of Entry No. 10903 in corporation.
the certificates of title was not made in accordance with law. To affect the land
sold, the presentation of the deed of sale and its entry in the day book must be Under these circumstances, the corporation, having failed to obtain relief
done with the surrender of the owner’s duplicate of the certificate of through the criminal complaint filed against the spouses Carmen Otadora and
title. Production of the owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title is required Luis Masias, and having relied on the unencumbered transfer certificate of title
by Section 55 of Act No. 496 (now Section 53 of PD No. 1529), and only after shown to it by the Masias spouses, is entitled to damages.
compliance with this and other requirements shall actual registration retroact
to the date of entry in the day book. However, nonproduction of the owner’s As regards the sale made by Vitaliana to her sister Maxima, the former can no
duplicate of the certificate of title may not invalidate petitioners’ claim of longer transmit any property rights over the subject lot when she sold it to her
ownership over the lot involved considering the factual circumstances of this own sister as she had previously sold the same property to petitioners.
case. Moreover, as Vitaliana’s sister, Maxima was actually a co-owner of Lot No.
8734-B-5 which, at the time of the sale to petitioners, was not yet partitioned
(2) It is undisputed that after the sale of the lot to petitioners, the same vendors and segregated. Maxima was, therefore, privy to the contract
sold the same property to persons who cannot be considered in law to be
unaware of the prior sale to the petitioners. On the matter of whether the rights of co-owners had been transgressed by the
Considering these relationships and contrary to the findings of the courts sale to the petitioners, the trial court erroneously ruled that there should be
below, the vendees, Carmen and Maxima, cannot be considered as third parties proof of compliance with Article 1623 of the Civil Code requiring the vendor
who are not bound by the prior sale between Agaton and Vitaliana as vendors of the property to give a written notice of sale to the other co-owners.
and petitioners as vendees, because there is privity of interest between them
and their predecessors. The reason for this is that the validity of a title to a
In view of the foregoing, the sale to the petitioners must be respected by the over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse
successors-in-interest of Agaton and Vitaliana. Inasmuch as petitioners had possession thereof for thirty (30) years, without need of title or of good faith.
managed to possess only 12,000 square meters of the 18,625 square meters The disputed lots are unregistered lands, both parcels being covered only by
they bought from Agaton and Vitaliana, the whole area purchased by them tax declarations formerly in the name of Ramon Bauzon and now transferred
should be taken from the shares of Agaton and Vitaliana upon partition of the to Luis and Eriberta Bauzon. While tax declarations and receipts are not
property. conclusive evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual
possession, as in the instant case, tax declarations and receipts are strong
HEIRS OF MANINGDING VS. CA evidence of ownership.
(G.R. NO. 121157 | JULY 31, 1997 | BELLOSILLO, J.) In the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land in the
concept of owner by virtue of the donation propter nuptias. The possession was
public as it was Roque Bauzon who personally tilled and cultivated the lots.
FACTS: Heirs of Maningding and Bauzon claim that they own the disputed The acts of reaping the benefits of ownership were manifest and visible to all.
lots in common and pro-indiviso. Bauzon aver that their father Roque was the These acts were made more pronounced and public considering that the parcels
owner of the lots by virtue of a deed of donation. of land are located in a municipality wherein ownership and possession are
particularly and normally known to the community. Roque peacefully
According to the Maningdings, Roque repudiated the co-ownership over the possessed the properties as he was never ousted therefrom nor prevented from
sugarland in 1965 and adjudicated it to himself and Maningding renounced enjoying their fruits. His possession was uninterrupted and in good faith
and quitclaimed their shares over the riceland in favour of Roque. Roque because of his well- founded belief that the donation propter nuptias was
transferred the Riceland to his son, Luis and the sugarland to his daughter, properly executed and the grantors were legally allowed to convey their
Eriberta, both evidenced by deeds of sale. Heirs of Maningding allegedly respective shares in his favor. He likewise appropriated to himself the whole
discovered the transfers made by Roque Bauzon in favor of his children only produce of the parcels of land to the exclusion of all others.
in 1986. Consequently, the heirs sought the partition of the properties as well
as the accounting of the produce but were unsuccessful. Prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long
as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. Co- owners cannot
Bauzon’s contentions: * the Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation over the acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear
riceland was executed not only by Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that title may prescribe in favor of
but also by Segunda Maningding. * denied having executed the Affidavit of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he has repudiated the
Self-Adjudication with regard to the sugarland. * had been in open, claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his claim of adverse and
continuous, notorious, adverse and actual possession of the subject properties. exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period would begin to run. Mere
refusal to accede to a partition, without specifying the grounds for such refusal,
ISSUE: WON Rogue Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties cannot be considered as notice to the other co-owners of the occupant's claim
by acquisitive prescription. of title in himself in repudiation of the co-ownership. The evidence relative to
the possession, as a fact upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be
HELD: YES. Rogue Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish said prescription without
by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or any shadow of doubt; and when upon trial it is not shown that the possession
losing) ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the rights of the
and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be others, the case is not one of ownership, and partition will lie.
in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.
Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary Therefore while prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for of ownership exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and
ten (10) years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights
produces all its effects when the acts of ownership do not evince any doubt as mandatory and a party who fails to appear may be considered as in default. In
to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners. As disclosed by the records, the case at bar, where private respondent and counsel failed to appear at the
Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the property from 1948 to 1986 to the scheduled pre-trial, the trial court has authority to declare respondent in
exclusion of petitioners who were never given their shares of the fruits of the default.
properties, for which reason they demanded an accounting of the produce and
the conveyance to them of their shares. Unfortunately they slept on their rights 2. the trial court is correct in denying the motion to postpone pre-trial for lack
and allowed almost thirty-six (36) years to lapse before attempting to assert of merit for pre-trial should be much more than mere perfunctory treatment.
their right. Perforce, they must suffer the consequence of their inaction. Its observance must be taken seriously if it is to attain its objective i.e speedy
and inexpensive disposition of cases. SC uphold the trial court in ruling in
favor of petitioner, except as to the effectivity of the payment of monthly
AGUILAR VS CA rentals by respondent as co- owner which we here declare to commence only
(G.R. NO. 76351 | OCTOBER 29, 1993 | ROMERO, J.) after the trial court ordered respondent to vacate in accordance with its order
of 26 July 1979.L
FACTS: Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers - Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to
- on October 28, 1969, the 2 brothers purchased a house and lot in Parañaque remain in the co- ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time
where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned
neighborhood. They initially agreed that Virgilio’s share was 2/3 while Senen
was 1/3 but by virtue of a written memorandum in 1970 they agreed that their - being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without
interests in the house and lot should be equal. After the death of their father paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in
petitioner demand respondent to vacate the house and that the property be sold common so long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended
and proceeds thereof shall be divided among them. and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners.
Because of the refusal of Senen, Virgilio filed an action to compel the sale of - when petitioner file an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial
the house and lot so they could divide the proceeds. On July 26, 1979 trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-
court found both to be co-owners of the house and lot in equal shares on the ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly
basis of their written agreement. But ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of also ceased
his participation in the property by defendant's continued enjoyment of the
house and lot, free of rent, despite demands for rentals and continued - the respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his
maneuvers of defendant to delay partition. family vacate

Trial court ordered defendant to vacate the property for they could not agree - petition is granted
to the amount. CA set aside the order of the trial court of 26 April 1979 as well
as the assailed judgment rendered by default.

ISSUS: WON CA erred in not holding that the motion of defendant through
counsel to cancel the pre-trail was dilatory in character

WON CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial

HELD: 1. the law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pre- trial is
 provided in Article 1088 of the Civil Code. Unless a project of partition is
effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite portion of the
inheritance. Without partition, either by agreement between the parties of by
judicial proceeding, a co-heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate.

For where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate such heirs. 1 Upon the
death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole
estate left wtih respect to the part of portion which might be adjudicated to
him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of
the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided.

CARVAJAL VS. CA
(G.R. NO. 44426 | FEBRUARY 25, 1982 | TEEHANKEE, J.)
PAMPLONA VS. MORETO
FACTS: The subject lot was originally owned by Hermogenes Espique and (G.R. NO. 33187 | MARCH 31, 1980 | GUERRERO, J.)
his wife and after their death, the lot was succeeded by their children, Maria,
Evaristo, Faustino, Estefanio and Tropinio. Petitioner then averred that he SUMMARY: Flaviano and Monica Moreto had 6 children. The spouses
purchased the 2/5 of the lot from Estefanio and respondents purchased 1/5 of owned 3 lots in Laguna. Six years after Monica died, Flaviano sold Lot 1495
the lot from Evaristo. The part of the land in controversy was the 1/5 portion. to the Pamplona spouses. Flaviano pointed to the eastern part of Lot 1496 as
This prompted the private respondents to file a case of ejectment and recovery the lot 1495 subject of the sale. The Pamplona spouses built houses thereon
of possession, where in fact there has been no partition yet on the subject lot. and introduced improvements including a pig corral. It turns out the lot is part
Both the lower court and the appellate court ruled in favor of the respondents. of Lot 1496. The trial court and CA held that the sale made by Flaviano is valid
Hence, this petition. only as to the ½ because the other half pertains to the heirs of Monica (i.e.,
their 6 children). The SC held that the sale is valid in its entirety.
ISSUE: Whether the co-owners may sell a specific part of the co-owned
property without partition. DOCTRINES: At the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership was
already dissolved six years before, therefore, the estate became a co-ownership
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in negative and reversed the decision of the between Flaviano Moreto, the surviving husband, and the heirs of his deceased
lower court. The fact that the sale executed by Evaristo G. Espique in favor of wife, Monica Maniega. Since this is a co-ownership, Art. 493 of the Civil Code
respondents and the sale executed by Estefanio Espique in favor of petitioner is applicable. There was a partial partition of the co-ownership when at the
were made before the partition of the property among the co-heirs does not time of the sale, Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area and location of the 781
annul or invalidate the deeds of sale and both sales are valid. sq. meters sold by him to the Pamplona spouses on which the latter built their
house.
However, the interests thereby acquired by petitioner and respondents are
limited only to the parts that may be ultimately assigned to Estefanio and FACTS: On July 30, 1952, or more than 6 years after the death of his wife
Evaristo, respectively, upon the partition of the estate 7 subject to provisions Monica, Flaviano, without the consent of their heirs, and before any liquidation
on subrogation of the other co-heirs to the rights of the stranger purchaser of their conjugal partnership could be effected, executed in favor of Geminiano
Pamplona (petitioner), the deed of absolute sale covering lot No. 1495 for in the fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and he therefore may alienate,
P900.00. The sold lot consists of 781 square meters. assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
unless personal rights are in question.
The spouses Pamplona constructed a house on the eastern part of Lot 1946
because Flaviano pointed to it as lot the sold them. Rafael, their son, also built Since it is a co-ownership, Article 493 of the New Civil Code is applicable:
a house thereon. Improvements were introduced including a cemented piggery
corral. It was found out that the lot was actually a part of Lot 1496. Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the respondents
demanded on the petitioners to vacate the premises on the ground that Flaviano The effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to
had no right to sell the lot as the same belongs to the conjugal partnership of the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter was already dead when the sale ownership.
was executed without the consent of the respondents who are the heirs of
Monica. The conjugal partnership consisted the ff:
Lot 1495 – 781 square meters
The spouses Pamplona refused to vacate the premises occupied by them, Lot 1496 – 1021 square meters
hence, this suit was instituted by the heirs of Monica seeking for the Lot 4545 – 544 square meters
declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale as regards one-half of the property The three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters. These three parcels of lots
subject matter of said deed. (The other ½ rightfully belongs to Flaviano) are contiguous with one another as each is bounded on one side by the other.

CFI – Laguna ruled in favor of the respondents. The deed of sale was nullified Since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land
as to the ½ belonging to the heirs). Spouses Pamplona appealed to CA but the area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to
CA affirmed the CFI. dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona spouses. Indeed, there
was still a remainder of some 392 sq. meters belonging to him at the time of
ISSUE: WON the sale made by Flaviano to the Pamplona spouses is valid in the sale.
its entirety or as to his ½ share only. (Entirely)

RATIO: When the Pamplona’s bought the lot, Monica was already dead The CA is wrong in ruling that the sale was valid as to one-half and invalid as
hence, the conjugal partnership of the Moreto spouses was already dissolved. to the other half.
The conjugal estate was not inventoried, liquidated, settled, and divided by the
heirs. Neither was there a judicial or extra-judicial partition between Monica’s The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as
heirs. Accordingly, the estate became a property of community between vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries over which
Flaviano and their children in the concept of co-ownership. the fences were to be erected without objection, protest or complaint by the
other co- owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such
Marigsa v Macabundoc: The community property of the marriage, at the alienation, occupation and possession, a factual partition or termination of the
dissolution of this bond by the death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to co-ownership, although partial was created, and barred not only the vendor,
the legal partnership and becomes the property of a community, by operation Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private respondents herein from
of law, between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse, or asserting as against the vendees-petitioners.
the exclusive property of the widower or the widow, if he or she be the heir of
the deceased spouse. Every co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and DISPOSITIVE:
The judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with modification, the sale On 30 December 1959, Crispina Perez and her children, Rosita Aquitania
is valid in its entirety. Belmonte, Remedios Aquitania Misa, Manuel Aquitania, Sergio Aquitania and
Aurora Aquitania sold to Elena Pajimula (and Ciriaco Pajimula), the remaining
2/3 western portion of Lot 802 with an area of 958 square meters. Leonora
Estoque based her complaint for legal redemption on a claim that she is a co-
owner of lot 802, for having purchased 1/3 portion thereof, containing an area
of 640 square meters as evidenced by a deed of sale, which was executed on
28 October 1951 by Crispina Perez de Aquitania, one of the co-owners, in her
favor. On the other hand, Elena Pajimula (and Ciriaco Pajimula), who on 30
December 1959 acquired the other 2/3 portion of Lot 802 from Crispina
Aquitania and her children, claimed that Estoque bought the 1/3 southeastern
portion, which is definitely identified and segregated hence there existed no
co-ownership at the time and after Estoque bought the portion, upon which
right of legal redemption can be exercised or taken advantage of. The CFI La
Union (Civil Case 1990), upon motion by Pajimula, dismissed the complaint
for legal redemption by a co-owner (retracto legal de comuneros) on account
of failure to state a cause of action.

The Court held that the deeds of sale show that the lot acquired by Estoque
was different from that of the Pajimula; hence they never became co-owners,
and the alleged right of legal redemption was not proper. Estoque appealed.
CASTRO VS. ATIENZA ISSUE: WON right of redemption can be exercised by Estoque?
ESTOQUE VS. PAJIMULA
(G.R. NO. 24419 | JULY 15, 1968 | REYES, J.) HELD: NO. Appellant Estoque became the actual owner of the Southeastern
third of lot 802on October 29, 1951. Wherefore, she never acquired an
undivided interest in lot 802. Andwhen eight years later Crispina Perez sold to
FACTS: Lot 802 of the Cadastral survey of Rosario, covered by OCT RO- the Apelles Pajimula the western.
2720 (N.A.), was originally owned by the late spouses Rosendo Perez and
Fortunata Bernal, who were survived by their children namely, Crispina Perez, Two-thirds of the same lot, appellant did not acquire a right to redeem the
Lorenzo Perez and Ricardo Perez. Ricardo Perez is also now dead. On 28 property thus sold, since their respective portions were distinct and separate.
October 1951, Crispina P. Vda. de Aquitania sold her right and participation (1) The deed of sale to Estoque (Annex A of the complaint) clearly specifies
in Lot 802 consisting of 1/3 portion with an area of 640 square meters to the object sold as the southeastern third portion of Lot 802 of the Rosario
Leonora Estoque. On 29 October 1951, Lorenzo Perez, Crispina Perez and Cadastre, with an area of 840square meters, more or less. Granting that
Emilia P. Posadas, widow of her deceased husband, Ricardo Perez, for herself the seller, Crispina Perez Vda. de Aquitania could not have sold this
and in behalf of her minor children, Gumersindo, Raquel, Emilio and Ricardo, particular portion of the lot owned in common by her and her two brothers,
Jr., executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement wherein Lorenzo Perez, Emilia Lorenzo and Ricardo Perez, by no means does it follow that she intended to
P. Posadas and her minor children assigned all their right, interest and sell to appellant Estoque her 1/3 undivided interest in the lot for mentioned.
participation in Lot 802 to Crispina Perez. There is nothing in the deed of sale to justify such inference. That the seller
could have validly sold her one-third undivided interest to appellant is no proof
that she did choose to sell the same.
 MTC sold its rights over the lot to Santiago Sambrano and, again, had the sale
(2) While on the date of the sale to Estoque (Annex A) said contract may have annotated on the title. One-half of the property passed into the hands of
been ineffective, for lack of power in the vendor to sell the specific portion MELITONA LAGPACAN, and her husband JORGE MALACAS.
described in the deed, the transaction was validated and became fully effective
when the next day (October 29,1951) the vendor, Crispina Perez, acquired the Meanwhile, Rosa failed to settle her obligation with PNB. Hence, PNB,
entire interest of her remaining co-owners(Annex B) and thereby became the pursuant to the PA, sold the WHOLE LOT at a public auction. PNB became
sole owner of Lot No. 802 of the Rosario Cadastral survey (Llacer vs. Muñoz, the owner since it was the highest bidder. Rosa failed to redeem and PNB
12 Phil. 328). Article 1434 of the Civil Code of the Philippines clearly consolidated its title over the lot. However, the consolidation was not
prescribes that.When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates annotated on the owner’s duplicate title since Rosa failed to surrender it.
and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title
passes by operation of lawto the buyer or grantee." CA decision affirmed On November 25, 1950, PNB filed a petition before the trial court which asked
that the original title over the land be declared null and void and prayed that a
new title be issued in its name. Trial court acted favourably on PNB’s petition
PNB VS. CA and ordered what was prayed for on October 2, 1951.
(G.R. NO. 34404 | JUNE 25, 1980 | GUERRERO, J.)
On May 24, 1954, PNB sold the property to Felizardo Reyes. A new owner’s
duplicate title was issued in Reyes’s name.
FACTS: Property in question originally belonged to the conjugal property of
Inigo Bitanga and Rosa Ver. The original certificate of title was issued to them On May 17, 1954, the heirs of Heirs of Inigo Bitanga, filed a complaint before
and inserted in the register of deeds of Ilocos Norte. However, this issuance the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte against the Philippine National
was only given on December 15, 1937 which was after Inigo died (September Bank, the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Norte and Felizardo Reyes, for
25, 1935). reconveyance of real property and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of
an ex-parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining and enjoining the PNB
Still before the issuance of the title, Rosa mortgaged the entire property in and Felizardo Reyes from consummating the sale of the property in question
favour of PNB on October 20, 1936 for the sum of 500 pesos. However, the and prohibiting the Register of Deeds from registering the sale in favor of
mortgaged lien was not annotated in the register of deeds when the original Felizardo Reyes. the writ of preliminary injunction was issued. During the
certificate was issued. Nevertheless, the power of attorney in favour of PNB pendency of the case, Melitona Lagpacan and Jorge Malacas, filed a Motion
stated that in the event Rosa defaults, it would have the capacity to take to admit their complaint in intervention, alleging that they had a legal interest
possession of, and retain the property mortgaged, to sell or lease the same or in the subject matter of the case, and the same was granted.
any part of it, and to do such other acts as necessary in the performance of the
power granted to the mortgagee. This PA was, on the other hand, annotated on On November 16, 1960, the CFI ruled in favour of the heirs of Bitanga and the
the original certificate title. Malacas spouses. It mentioned that the lot in question was conjugal in nature;
that half would go to the heirs and half would go to rosa ver. The mortgage to
Meanwhile, Rosa Ver defaulted in the fulfilment of her obligation with Manila PNB is not an existing lien since it did not have a special mention in the decree
trading. So, MTC levied upon her share in the lot in question on December 13, of registration and that the acquisition of MTC was valid and legal. Since the
1939 and had the attachment annotated on the title. Rosa’s interest in the lot in MTC acquisition was valid and legal, the sale made to Sambrano is likewise
question was sold at a public auction and was sold to MTC as the highest valid and legal, as well as the sale to the Malacas spouses. Felizardo Reyes
bidder. A deed of sale was executed in favour of MTC and was again annotated was deemed not a purchaser in good faith and the trial ordered the cancellation
on the title. of the duplicate title in Reyes’ name.
PNB and Reyes appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the judgment of the lower
court and ordered that new titles be issued in the names of the heirs of Bitanga On the other hand, there is no showing that the Manila Trading Company
and spouses Malacas (half to the heirs and half to the Spouses). It also (MTC) had any knowledge or notice of the prior mortgage in favor of the PNB,
mentioned that the new titles would be free from encumberance regarding the hence, it may be safely presumed that it (MTC) acquired the rights of Rosa
claims of PNB and Reyes. PNB filed an M.R. to the CA but was denied, hence, Ver and Guillermo Bitanga as an innocent purchaser for value and free from
the current petition. all incumbrances. From the MTC, the aforesaid rights of Rosa and Guillermo
passed to Santiago Sambrano, and from the latter, to the Malacas Spouses.
In this petition, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the There is no question, therefore, as to spouses’ rights over the property, as
CA decision became final and executory since Reyes failed to join PNB in this against the PNB or its transferee, Felizardo Reyes. The intervenors merely
recourse. Moreover, it assailed the issues of PNB because they were questions stepped into the shoes of MTC, a prior purchaser in good faith, and thereby
of fact and not of law, hence, they are proper for the review of SC. became entitled to all the defenses available to said Company, including those
arising from the acquisition of the property in good faith and for value.
SC denied petition initially but PNB filed an M.R. stating that it still has
interests in the property. S.C. reconsidered. The judgment of the CA was AFFIRMED but was modified with respect to
the shares of the Spouses Malacas and the Heirs (since the spouses stepped
ISSUES: WON Rosa Ver could really mortgage the entire lot to PNB. (NO) into the shoes of the MTC, they also acquired the rights and interests of
WON the sale of PNB and/or the sale of MTC were valid. (PNB:NO ; MTC: Guillermo Bitanga, hence the heirs now have 2/5 while the spouses have 3/5).
YES)
SUNSET VIEW VS. CAMPOS
HELD: SC said that lot was conjugal. When Inigo died, a co-ownership was (G.R. NO. 52361 | APRIL 27, 1981 | FERNANDEZ, J.)
established between the heirs and Rosa Ver. Hence, Rosa cannot validly
mortgage the whole lot since it would prejudice the rights of her co-owners,
the heirs. FACTS: The petitioner, Sunset View Condominium Corporationis a
condominium corporation within the meaning of Republic Act No. 4726 in
One of the essential requisites to the contract of pledge and mortgage is that relation to a duly registered Amended Master Deed with Declaration of
the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing. The effect of the Restrictions of the Sunset View Condominium Project located at 2230 Roxas
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which Boulevard, Pasay City of which said petitioner is the Management Body
may be allotted to him in the division upon the TERMINATION OF THE CO- holding title to all the common and limited common areas.
OWNERSHIP. Thus, Rosa could only mortgage her share and not the whole
lot. She cannot give what is not hers. The private respondent, Aguilar-Bernares Realty, a sole proprietorship owned
She only had usufrutuary rights over the estate left by the husband. Not being and operated by the spouses Emmanuel G. Aguilar and Zenaida B. Aguilar, is
an owner, she cannot alienate or dispose of the objects included in the usufruct. the assignee of a unit, “Solana”, in the Sunset View Condominium Project with
(as per the old civil code which was in force during the time of Inigo’s death). La Perla Commercial, Incorporated, as assignor. The La Perla Commercial,
Incorporated bought the “Solana” unit on installment from the Tower Builders,
Though there were tax declarations in the name of Rosa, it does not alter the Inc. The petitioner, Sunset View Condominium Corporation, filed for the
conjugality of the lot. Tax declarations are not sufficient evidences of title and collection of assessments levied on the unit against Aguilar-Bernares Realty.
should not prejudice the rights of the co-owners. As far as the shares are The private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds
concerned, the respective shares of the co-owners were not included in the (1) that the complaint does not state a cause of action: (2) that the court has no
mortgage. Thus, mortgage/subsequent sale to PNB and subsequent sale of jurisdiction over the subject or nature other action; and (3) that there is another
PNB to Reyes were invalid. action pending between the same parties for the same cause. The petitioner
filed its opposition.
The motion to dismiss was granted by the respondent Judge, pursuant to
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4726, a “holder of a separate interest” and
consequently, a shareholder of the plaintiff condominium corporation; and that
“the case should be properly filed with the Securities & Exchange Commission
which has exclusive original jurisdiction on controversies arising between
shareholders of the corporation.” the motion for reconsideration thereof having
been denied, the petitioner, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge, filed the instant petition for certiorari praying that the said
orders be set aside.

ISSUE: Whether the CFI or the City Courts have jurisdiction over the claims
filed by Sunset View, the condominium corporation.

HELD: Not every purchaser of a condominium unit is a shareholder in the

corporation. The Mater Deed determines when ownership of the unit and
participation in the corporation vests in the purchaser.

The City Court and the CFI have jurisdiction.

The share of stock appurtenant to the unit win be transferred accordingly to the
purchaser of the unit only upon full payment of the purchase price at which
time he will also become the owner of the unit. Consequently, even under the
contract, it is only the owner of a unit who is a shareholder of the
Condominium Corporation. Inasmuch as owners is conveyed only upon full
payment of the purchase price, it necessarily follows that a purchaser of a unit
who has not paid the full purchase price thereof is not The owner of the unit
and consequently is not a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.
In this case, the Master Deed provides that ownership is transferred only upon
full payment of the purchase price.

Private respondents have not yet fully paid the purchase price, hence they are
not shareholders and the SEC has no jurisdiction over the claims.