7/31/2019 G.R. No.

158407
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SECOND  DIVISION

G.R.  No.  158407                          January  17,  2005

FILOMENA  DOMAGAS,  petitioner,  

D  E  C  I  S  I  O  N

CALLEJO,  SR.,  J.:

This   is   a   petition   for   review   on   certiorari,   under   Rule   45   of   the   Rules   of   Court,   of   the   Decision1   of   the   Court   of
Appeals  (CA)  in  CA-­G.R.  CV  No.  73995,  which  affirmed  the  Decision2  of  the  Regional  Trial  Court  (RTC)  of  Dagupan
City,   Branch   44,   in   Civil   Case   No.   2000-­0244-­D,   which   declared   null   and   void   the   decision   of   the   Municipal   Trial
Court  (MTC)  of  Calasiao,  Pangasinan  in  Civil  Case  No.  879.3

The  antecedent  facts  follow.

On  February  19,  1999,  petitioner  Filomena  Domagas  filed  a  complaint  for  forcible  entry  against  respondent  Vivian
Jensen  before  the  MTC  of  Calasiao,  Pangasinan.  The  petitioner  alleged  in  her  complaint  that  she  was  the  registered
owner  of  a  parcel  of  land  covered  by  Original  Certificate  of  Title  (OCT)  No.  P-­30980,  situated  in  Barangay  Buenlag,
Calasiao,  Pangasinan,  and  with  an  area  of  827  square  meters.  On  January  9,  1999  the  respondent,  by  means  of
force,  strategy  and  stealth,  gained  entry  into  the  petitioner’s  property  by  excavating  a  portion  thereof  and  thereafter
constructing   a   fence   thereon.  As   such,   the   petitioner   was   deprived   of   a   68-­square   meter   portion   of   her   property
along  the  boundary  line.  The  petitioner  prayed  that,  after  due  proceedings,  judgment  be  rendered  in  her  favor,  thus:

3.  And,  after  trial,  judgment  be  rendered:

a)  DECLARING  the  writ  of  Preliminary  Mandatory  Injunction  and  Writ  of  Preliminary  Injunction  permanent;;

b)  ORDERING  defendant,  his  representatives,  agents  and  persons  acting  under  her,  to  vacate  the  portion  of
the  property  of  the  plaintiff  occupied  by  them  and  to  desist  from  entering,  excavating  and  constructing  in  the
said  property  of  the  plaintiff  described  in  paragraph  2  hereof  and/or  from  disturbing  the  peaceful  ownership
and  possession  of  the  plaintiff  over  the  said  land,  pending  the  final  resolution  of  the  instant  action;;

c)  ORDERING  defendant  to  pay  reasonable  rental  at  FIVE  THOUSAND  (₱5,000.00)  PESOS  per  month  from
January  9,  1999  up  to  the  time  she  finally  vacates  and  removes  all  constructions  made  by  her  in  the  property
of  the  plaintiff  and  up  to  the  time  she  finally  restores  the  said  property  in  the  condition  before  her  illegal  entry,
excavation  and  construction  in  the  property  of  the  plaintiff;;

d)   ORDERING   defendant   to   pay   actual   damages   in   the   amount   of   TWENTY   THOUSAND   (₱20,000.00)
PESOS;;   moral   damages   in   the   amount   of   TWENTY   THOUSAND   (₱20,000.00)   PESOS;;   attorney’s   fees   of
THIRTY   THOUSAND   (₱30,000.00)   PESOS   in   retainer’s   fee   and   ONE   THOUSAND   FIVE   HUNDRED
(₱1,500.00)  PESOS  per  court  appearance  fee;;  exemplary  damages  in  the  amount  of  TWENTY  THOUSAND
(₱20,000.00)  PESOS,  and,  costs.

Plaintiff  further  prays  for  other  reliefs  and  remedies  just  and  equitable  in  the  premises.4

The  case  was  docketed  as  Civil  Case  No.  879.  The  summons  and  the  complaint  were  not  served  on  the  respondent
because   the   latter   was   apparently   out   of   the   country.   This   was   relayed   to   the   Sheriff   by   her   (the   respondent’s)
brother,   Oscar   Layno,   who   was   then   in   the   respondent’s   house   at   No.   572   Barangay   Buenlag,   Calasiao,
Pangasinan.  The  Sheriff  left  the  summons  and  complaint  with  Oscar  Layno,  who  received  the  same.5

Nonetheless,  on  May  17,  1999,  the  court  rendered  judgment  ordering  the  respondent  and  all  persons  occupying  the
property   for   and   in   the   latter’s   behalf   to   vacate   the   disputed   area   and   to   pay   monthly   rentals   therefor,   including
actual  damages,  attorney’s  fees,  and  exemplary  damages.  The  fallo  of  the  decision  reads:

1)  Ordering  the  defendant,  her  representatives,  agents  and  persons  acting  under  her,  to  vacate  the  68-­square
meters  which  she  encroached  upon;;

2)  Ordering  the  defendant  to  pay  a  monthly  rental  of  ₱1,000.00  to  the  plaintiff;;

3)  To  pay  plaintiff  actual  damages  of  ₱20,000.00;;  attorney’s  fees  of  ₱15,000.00  and  exemplary  damages  in
the  amount  of  ₱20,000.00  plus  the  costs.

SO  ORDERED.6

The  respondent  failed  to  appeal  the  decision.  Consequently,  a  writ  of  execution  was  issued  on  September  27,  1999.

On  August  16,  2000,  the  respondent  filed  a  complaint  against  the  petitioner  before  the  RTC  of  Dagupan  City  for  the
annulment  of  the  decision  of  the  MTC  in  Civil  Case  No.  879,  on  the  ground  that  due  to  the  Sheriff’s  failure  to  serve
the  complaint  and  summons  on  her  because  she  was  in  Oslo,  Norway,  the  MTC  never  acquired  jurisdiction  over  her
person.  The  respondent  alleged  therein  that  the  service  of  the  complaint  and  summons  through  substituted  service
on  her  brother,  Oscar  Layno,  was  improper  because  of  the  following:  (a)  when  the  complaint  in  Civil  Case  No.  879
was  filed,  she  was  not  a  resident  of  Barangay  Buenlag,  Calasiao,  Pangasinan,  but  of  Oslo,  Norway,  and  although
she   owned   the   house   where   Oscar   Layno   received   the   summons   and   the   complaint,   she   had   then   leased   it   to

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Eduardo  Gonzales;;  (b)  she  was  in  Oslo,  Norway,  at  the  time  the  summons  and  the  complaint  were  served;;  (c)  her
brother,  Oscar  Layno,  was  merely  visiting  her  house  in  Barangay  Buenlag  and  was  not  a  resident  nor  an  occupant
thereof  when  he  received  the  complaint  and  summons;;  and  (d)  Oscar  Layno  was  never  authorized  to  receive  the
summons  and  the  complaint  for  and  in  her  behalf.7

The   respondent   further   alleged   that   the   MTC   had   no   jurisdiction   over   the   subject   matter   of   the   complaint   in   Civil
Case  No.  879  because  the  petitioner,  the  plaintiff  therein,  failed  to  show  prior  possession  of  the  property.  She  further
claimed  that  the  alleged  forcible  entry  was  simply  based  on  the  result  of  the  survey  conducted  by  Geodetic  Engineer
Leonardo  de  Vera  showing  that  the  property  of  the  respondent  encroached  on  that  of  the  petitioner.

The  respondent  filed  a  Manifestation  dated  August  31,  2000,  and  appended  thereto  the  following:  (a)  a  copy 8  of  her
passport   showing   that   she   left   the   country   on   February   17,   1999;;   (b)   a   copy9   of   the   Contract   of   Lease   dated
November  24,  1997,  executed  by  her  and  Eduardo  D.  Gonzales  over  her  house  for  a  period  of  three  (3)  years  or
until   November   24,   2000;;   (c)   her   affidavit10   stating,   inter   alia,   that   she   owned   the   house   at   Barangay   Buenlag,
Calasiao,   Pangasinan,   which   she   leased   to   Eduardo   Gonzales;;   that   she   was   married   to   Jarl   Jensen,   a   citizen   of
Norway,   on   August   23,   1987   and   had   resided   in   Norway   with   her   husband   since   1993;;   that   she   arrived   in   the
Philippines  on  December  31,  1998,  but  left  on  February  17,  1999;;  she  returned  to  the  Philippines  on  July  30,  2000
and  learned,  only  then,  of  the  complaint  against  her  and  the  decision  of  the  MTC  in  Civil  Case  No.  879;;  her  brother
Oscar  Layno  was  not  a  resident  of  the  house  at  Barangay  Buenlag;;  and  that  she  never  received  the  complaint  and
summons   in   said   case;;   (d)   the   affidavit11   of   Oscar   Layno   declaring   that   sometime   in   April   1999,   he   was   in   the
respondent’s  house  to  collect  rentals  from  Eduardo  Gonzales;;  that  the  Sheriff  arrived  and  served  him  with  a  copy  of
the  summons  and  the  complaint  in  Civil  Case  No.  879;;  and  that  he  never  informed  the  respondent  of  his  receipt  of
the   said   summons   and   complaint;;   (e)   an   affidavit12   of   Eduardo   Gonzales   stating   that   he   leased   the   house   of   the
respondent   and   resided   thereat;;   the   respondent   was   not   a   resident   of   the   said   house   although   he   (Gonzales)
allowed  the  respondent  to  occupy  a  room  therein  whenever  she  returned  to  the  Philippines  as  a  balikbayan;;  and  that
Oscar  Layno  was  not  residing  therein  but  only  collected  the  rentals.

In   her   answer   to   the   complaint,   the   petitioner   alleged   that   the   respondent   was   a   resident   of   Barangay   Buenlag,
Calasiao,  Pangasinan  and  was  the  owner  of  the  subject  premises  where  Oscar  Layno  was  when  the  Sheriff  served
the   summons   and   complaint;;   that   the   service   of   the   complaint   and   summons   by   substituted   service   on   the
respondent,   the   defendant   in   Civil   Case   No.   879,   was   proper   since   her   brother   Oscar   Layno,   a   resident   and
registered  voter  of  Barangay.  Buenlag,  Calasiao,  Pangasinan,  received  the  complaint  and  summons  for  and  in  her
behalf.

The  petitioner  appended  the  following  to  her  answer:  (a)  a  copy13  of  the  Deed  of  Absolute  Sale  executed  by  Jose
Layno   in   her   favor,   dated   August   26,   1992,   showing   that   the   respondent   was   a   resident   of   Barangay   Buenlag,
Calasiao,  Pangasinan;;  (b)  a  Real  Estate  Mortgage14  executed  by  the  respondent,  dated  February  9,  1999  showing
that  she  was  a  resident  of  Barangay  Buenlag,  Calasiao,  Pangasinan;;  (c)  the  Joint  Affidavit 15  of  Vicenta  Peralta  and
Orlando  Macalanda,  both  residents  of  Barangay  Buenlag,  Calasiao,  Pangasinan,  declaring  that  the  respondent  and
her  brother  Oscar  Layno  were  their  neighbors;;  that  the  respondent  and  her  brother  had  been  residents  of  Barangay
Buenlag  since  their  childhood;;  that  although  the  respondent  left  the  country  on  several  occasions,  she  returned  to
the  Philippines  and  resided  in  her  house  at  No.  572  located  in  the  said  barangay;;  and  (d)  the  Voter’s  Registration
Record16  of  Oscar  Layno,  approved  on  June  15,  1997.

After  due  proceedings,  the  trial  court  rendered  a  decision  in  favor  of  the  respondent.  The  dispositive  portion  reads:

WHEREFORE,   judgment   is   rendered   in   favor   of   plaintiff   Vivian   Layno   Jensen   and   against   defendant   Filomena
Domagas,  as  follows:

1.  The  Decision  of  the  Municipal  Trial  Court  of  Calasiao,  Pangasinan  in  Civil  Case  No.  879,  entitled  Filomena
Domagas  versus  Vivian  Layno  Jensen  is  declared  null  and  void,  for  lack  of  jurisdiction  over  the  person  of  the
plaintiff  and  the  subject  matter.

2.  Defendant  Filomena  Domagas  is  ordered  to  pay  plaintiff,  the  following:

a.)  Actual  damages,  representing  litigation  expenses  in  the  amount  of  ₱50,000.00;;

b.)  Attorney’s  fees  in  the  amount  of  ₱50,000.00;;

c.)  Moral  Damages  in  the  amount  of  ₱50,000.00;;

d.)  Exemplary  Damages  in  the  amount  of  ₱50,000.00;;  and

e.)  Costs  of  suit.

SO  ORDERED.17

The   trial   court   declared   that   there   was   no   valid   service   of   the   complaint   and   summons   on   the   respondent,   the
defendant  in  Civil  Case  No.  879,  considering  that  she  left  the  Philippines  on  February  17,  1999  for  Oslo,  Norway,
and   her   brother   Oscar   Layno   was   never   authorized   to   receive   the   said   complaint   and   summons   for   and   in   her
behalf.

The  petitioner  appealed  the  decision  to  the  CA  which,  on  May  6,  2003,  rendered  judgment  affirming  the  appealed
decision  with  modifications.  The  CA  ruled  that  the  complaint  in  Civil  Case  No.  879  was  one  for  ejectment,  which  is
an  action  quasi  in  rem.  The  appellate  court  ruled  that  since  the  defendant  therein  was  temporarily  out  of  the  country,
the  summons  and  the  complaint  should  have  been  served  via  extraterritorial  service  under  Section  15  in  relation  to
Section  16,  Rule  14  of  the  Rules  of  Court,  which  likewise  requires  prior  leave  of  court.  Considering  that  there  was  no
prior   leave   of   court   and   none   of   the   modes   of   service   prescribed   by   the   Rules   of   Court   was   followed   by   the
petitioner,  the  CA  concluded  that  there  was  really  no  valid  service  of  summons  and  complaint  upon  the  respondent,
the  defendant  in  Civil  Case  No.  879.

Hence,  the  present  petition.

The  petitioner  assails  the  decision  of  the  CA,  alleging  that  the  appellate  court  erred  in  holding  that  the  respondent’s
complaint   for   ejectment   is   an   action   quasi   in   rem.   The   petitioner   insists   that   the   complaint   for   forcible   entry   is   an
action  in  personam;;  therefore,  substituted  service  of  the  summons  and  complaint  on  the  respondent,  in  accordance
with  Section  7,  Rule  14  of  the  Rules  of  Court,  is  valid.  The  petitioner,  likewise,  asserts  that  Oscar  Layno  is  a  resident
and   a   registered   voter   of   Barangay   Buenlag,   Calasiao,   Pangasinan;;   hence,   the   service   of   the   complaint   and
summons  on  the  respondent  through  him  is  valid.

The  respondent,  on  the  other  hand,  asserts  that  the  action  for  forcible  entry  filed  against  her  was  an  action  quasi  in
rem,  and  that  the  applicable  provision  of  the  Rules  of  Court  is  Section  15  of  Rule  14,  which  calls  for  extraterritorial
service  of  summons.

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The  sole  issue  is  whether  or  not  there  was  a  valid  service  of  the  summons  and  complaint  in  Civil  Case  No.  879  on
the  respondent  herein  who  was  the  defendant  in  the  said  case.  The  resolution  of  the  matter  is  anchored  on  the  issue
of  whether  or  not  the  action  of  the  petitioner  in  the  MTC  against  the  respondent  herein  is  an  action  in  personam  or
quasi  in  rem.

The  ruling  of  the  CA  that  the  petitioner’s  complaint  for  forcible  entry  of  the  petitioner  against  the  respondent  in  Civil
Case  No.  879  is  an  action  quasi  in  rem,  is  erroneous.  The  action  of  the  petitioner  for  forcible  entry  is  a  real  action
and  one  in  personam.

The  settled  rule  is  that  the  aim  and  object  of  an  action  determine  its  character.18  Whether  a  proceeding  is  in  rem,  or
in   personam,   or   quasi   in   rem   for   that   matter,   is   determined   by   its   nature   and   purpose,   and   by   these   only.19  A
proceeding  in  personam  is  a  proceeding  to  enforce  personal  rights  and  obligations  brought  against  the  person  and
is   based   on   the   jurisdiction   of   the   person,   although   it   may   involve   his   right   to,   or   the   exercise   of   ownership   of,
specific  property,  or  seek  to  compel  him  to  control  or  dispose  of  it  in  accordance  with  the  mandate  of  the  court.20
The   purpose   of   a   proceeding   in   personam   is   to   impose,   through   the   judgment   of   a   court,   some   responsibility   or
liability  directly  upon  the  person  of  the  defendant.21  Of  this  character  are  suits  to  compel  a  defendant  to  specifically
perform  some  act  or  actions  to  fasten  a  pecuniary  liability  on  him.22  An  action   in  personam  is  said  to  be  one  which
has  for  its  object  a  judgment  against  the  person,  as  distinguished  from  a  judgment  against  the  propriety  to  determine
its  state.  It  has  been  held  that  an  action  in  personam  is  a  proceeding  to  enforce  personal  rights  or  obligations;;  such
action  is  brought  against  the  person.  As  far  as  suits  for  injunctive  relief  are  concerned,  it  is  well-­settled  that  it  is  an
injunctive  act  in  personam.23  In  Combs  v.  Combs,24  the  appellate  court  held  that  proceedings  to  enforce  personal
rights  and  obligations  and  in  which  personal  judgments  are  rendered  adjusting  the  rights  and  obligations  between
the  affected  parties  is  in  personam.  Actions  for  recovery  of  real  property  are  in  personam.25

On   the   other   hand,   a   proceeding   quasi   in   rem   is   one   brought   against   persons   seeking   to   subject   the   property   of
such   persons   to   the   discharge   of   the   claims   assailed.26   In   an   action   quasi   in   rem,   an   individual   is   named   as
defendant  and  the  purpose  of  the  proceeding  is  to  subject  his  interests  therein  to  the  obligation  or  loan  burdening
the  property.27  Actions  quasi  in  rem  deal  with  the  status,  ownership  or  liability  of  a  particular  property  but  which  are
intended   to   operate   on   these   questions   only   as   between   the   particular   parties   to   the   proceedings   and   not   to
ascertain  or  cut  off  the  rights  or  interests  of  all  possible  claimants.  The  judgments  therein  are  binding  only  upon  the
parties  who  joined  in  the  action.28

Section  1,  Rule  70  of  the  Rules  of  Court  provides:

Section  1.  Who  may  institute  proceedings,  and  when.  -­  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  next  succeeding  section,  a
person   deprived   of   the   possession   of   any   land   or   building   in   force,   intimidation,   threat,   strategy,   or   stealth,   or   a
lessor,  vendor,  vendee,  or  other  person  against  whom  the  possession  of  any  land  or  building  is  unlawfully  withheld
after  the  expiration  or  termination  of  the  right  to  hold  possession  by  virtue  of  any  contract,  express  or  implied,  or  the
legal  representatives  or  assigns  of  any  such  lessor,  vendor,  vendee,  or  other  person,  may,  at  any  time  within  one  (1)
year  after  such  unlawful  deprivation  or  withholding  of  possession,  bring  an  action  in  the  proper  Municipal  Trial  Court
against  the  person  or  persons  unlawfully  withholding  or  depriving  of  possession,  or  any  person  or  persons  claiming
under  them,  for  the  restitution  of  such  possession,  together  with  damages  and  costs.

Under   Section   15,   Rule   70   of   the   said   Rule,   the   plaintiff   may   be   granted   a   writ   of   preliminary   prohibition   or
mandatory  injunction:

Sec.  15.  Preliminary  Injunction.  –  The  court  may  grant  preliminary  injunction,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of
Rule  58  hereof,  to  prevent  the  defendant  from  committing  further  acts  of  dispossession  against  the  plaintiff.

A  possessor  deprived  of  his  possession  through  forcible  entry  or  unlawful  detainer  may,  within  five  (5)  days  from  the
filing  of  the  complaint,  present  a  motion  in  the  action  for  forcible  entry  or  unlawful  detainer  for  the  issuance  of  a  writ
of  preliminary  mandatory  injunction  to  restore  him  in  his  possession.  The  court  shall  decide  the  motion  within  thirty
(30)  days  from  the  filing  thereof.

If,  after  due  proceedings,  the  trial  court  finds  for  the  plaintiff,  it  shall  then  render  judgment  in  his  or  her  favor,  thus:

Sec.   17.   Judgment.   –   If,   after   trial,   the   court   finds   that   the   allegations   of   the   complaint   are   true,   it   shall   render
judgment   in   favor   of   the   plaintiff   for   the   restitution   of   the   premises,   the   sum   justly   due   as   arrears   of   rent   or   as
reasonable  compensation  for  the  use  and  occupation  of  the  premises,  attorney’s  fees  and  costs.  If  it  finds  that  said
allegations   are   not   true,   it   shall   render   judgment   for   the   defendant   to   recover   his   costs.   If   a   counterclaim   is
established,   the   court   shall   render   judgment   for   the   sum   found   in   arrears   from   either   party   and   award   costs   as
justice  requires.

From  the  aforementioned  provisions  of  the  Rules  of  Court  and  by  its  very  nature  and  purpose,  an  action  for  unlawful
detainer   or   forcible   entry   is   a   real   action   and   in   personam   because   the   plaintiff   seeks   to   enforce   a   personal
obligation  or  liability  on  the  defendant  under  Article  539  of  the  New  Civil  Code, 29  for  the  latter  to  vacate  the  property
subject   of   the   action,   restore   physical   possession   thereof   to   the   plaintiff,   and   pay   actual   damages   by   way   of
reasonable  compensation  for  his  use  or  occupation  of  the  property.30

As  gleaned  from  the  averments  of  the  petitioner’s  complaint  in  the  MTC,  she  sought  a  writ  of  a  preliminary  injunction
from  the  MTC  and  prayed  that  the  said  writ  be  made  permanent.  Under  its  decision,  the  MTC  ordered  the  defendant
therein  (the  respondent  in  this  case),  to  vacate  the  property  and  pay  a  "monthly  rental"  of  ₱1,000.00  to  the  plaintiff
therein  (the  petitioner  in  this  case).

On  the  issue  of  whether  the  respondent  was  validly  served  with  the  summons  and  complaint  by  the  Sheriff  on  April
5,  1999,  the  petitioner  asserts  that  since  her  action  of  forcible  entry  against  the  respondent  in  Civil  Case  No.  879
was  in  personam,  summons  may  be  served  on  the  respondent,  by  substituted  service,  through  her  brother,  Oscar
Layno,  in  accordance  with  Section  7,  Rule  14  of  the  Rules  of  Court.  The  petitioner  avers  that  Oscar  Layno,  a  person
of  suitable  age  and  discretion,  was  residing  in  the  house  of  the  respondent  on  April  5,  1999.  She  avers  that  the  fact
that   the   house   was   leased   to   and   occupied   by   Eduardo   Gonzales   was   of   no   moment.   Moreover,   the   Sheriff   is
presumed  to  have  performed  his  duty  of  properly  serving  the  summons  on  the  respondent  by  substituted  service.

The  contention  of  the  petitioner  has  no  merit.

In  Asiavest  Limited  v.  Court  of  Appeals  ,31  the  Court  had  the  occasion  to  state:

In  an  action  in  personam,  jurisdiction  over  the  person  of  the  defendant  is  necessary  for  the  court  to  validly  try  and
decide  the  case.  Jurisdiction  over  the  person  of  a  resident  defendant  who  does  not  voluntarily  appear  in  court  can
be   acquired   by   personal   service   of   summons   as   provided   under   Section   7,   Rule   14   of   the   Rules   of   Court.   If   he
cannot   be   personally   served   with   summons   within   a   reasonable   time,   substituted   service   may   be   made   in
accordance  with  Section  8  of  said  Rule.  If  he  is  temporarily  out  of  the  country,  any  of  the  following  modes  of  service
may  be  resorted  to:  (a)  substituted  service  set  forth  in  Section  8;;  (2)  personal  service  outside  the  country,  with  leave
of  court;;  (3)  service  by  publication,  also  with  leave  of  court;;  or  (4)  any  other  manner  the  court  may  deem  sufficient.32

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Thus,  any  judgment  of  the  court  which  has  no  jurisdiction  over  the  person  of  the  defendant  is  null  and  void.33

In  the  present  case,  the  records  show  that  the  respondent,  before  and  after  his  marriage  to  Jarl  Jensen  on  August
23,  1987,  remained  a  resident  of  Barangay  Buenlag,  Calasiao,  Pangasinan.  This  can  be  gleaned  from  the  Deed  of
Absolute  Sale  dated  August  26,  1992  in  which  she  declared  that  she  was  a  resident  of  said  barangay.  Moreover,  in
the  Real  Estate  Mortgage  Contract  dated  February  9,  1999,  ten  days  before  the  complaint  in  Civil  Case  No.  879  was
filed,   the   petitioner   categorically   stated   that   she   was   a   Filipino   and   a   resident   of   Barangay   Buenlag,   Calasiao,
Pangasinan.  Considering  that  the  respondent  was  in  Oslo,  Norway,  having  left  the  Philippines  on  February  17,  1999,
the   summons   and   complaint   in   Civil   Case   No.   879   may   only   be   validly   served   on   her   through   substituted   service
under  Section  7,  Rule  14  of  the  Rules  of  Court,  which  reads:

SEC.  7.  Substituted  service.  —  If,  for  justifiable  causes,  the  defendant  cannot  be  served  within  a  reasonable  time  as
provided  in  the  preceding  section,  service  may  be  effected  (a)  by  leaving  copies  of  the  summons  at  the  defendant’s
residence   with   some   person   of   suitable   age   and   discretion   then   residing   therein,   or   (b)   by   leaving   the   copies   at
defendant’s  office  or  regular  place  of  business  with  some  competent  person  in  charge  thereof.

Strict  compliance  with  the  mode  of  service  is  required  in  order  that  the  court  may  acquire  jurisdiction  over  the  person
of  the  defendant.34  The  statutory  requirement  of  substituted  service  must  be  followed  faithfully  and  strictly  and  any
substituted  service  other  than  that  authorized  by  the  statute  is  rendered  ineffective.35  As  the  Court  held  in  Hamilton
v.  Levy  :36

…  The  pertinent  facts  and  circumstances  attendant  to  the  service  of  summons  must  be  stated  in  the  proof  of  service
or   Officer’s   Return;;   otherwise,   any   substituted   service   made   in   lieu   of   personal   service   cannot   be   upheld.  This   is
necessary  because  substituted  service  is  in  derogation  of  the  usual  method  of  service.  It  is  a  method  extraordinary
in  character  and  hence  may  be  used  only  as  prescribed  and  in  the  circumstances  authorized  by  statute.  Here,  no
such   explanation   was   made.   Failure   to   faithfully,   strictly,   and   fully   comply   with   the   requirements   of   substituted
service  renders  said  service  ineffective.37

In  Keister  v.  Narcereo,38  the  Court  held  that  the  term  "dwelling  house"  or  "residence"  are  generally  held  to  refer  to
the   time   of   service;;   hence,   it   is   not   sufficient   to   leave   the   summons   at   the   former’s   dwelling   house,   residence   or
place  of  abode,  as  the  case  may  be.  Dwelling  house  or  residence  refers  to  the  place  where  the  person  named  in  the
summons  is  living  at  the  time  when  the  service  is  made,  even  though  he  may  be  temporarily  out  of  the  country  at  the
time.  It  is,  thus,  the  service  of  the  summons  intended  for  the  defendant  that  must  be  left  with  the  person  of  suitable
age   and   discretion   residing   in   the   house   of   the   defendant.   Compliance   with   the   rules   regarding   the   service   of
summons  is  as  much  important  as  the  issue  of  due  process  as  of  jurisdiction.39

The  Return  of  Service  filed  by  Sheriff  Eduardo  J.  Abulencia  on  the  service  of  summons  reads:

Respectfully   returned   to   the   court   of   origin   the   herein   summons   and   enclosures   in   the   above-­entitled   case,   the
undersigned  caused  the  service  on  April  5,  1999.

Defendant   Vivian   Layno   Jensen   is   out   of   the   country   as   per   information   from   her   brother   Oscar   Layno,   however,
copy  of  summons  and  enclosures  was  received  by  her  brother  Oscar  Layno  on  April  5,  1999  as  evidenced  by  his
signature  appearing  in  the  original  summons.

Calasiao,  Pangasinan,  April  6,  1999.

(Sgd.)
EDUARDO  J.  ABULENCIA

Junior  Process  Server40

As   gleaned   from   the   said   return,   there   is   no   showing   that   as   of  April   5,   1999,   the   house   where   the   Sheriff   found
Oscar  Layno  was  the  latter’s  residence  or  that  of  the  respondent  herein.  Neither  is  there  any  showing  that  the  Sheriff
tried  to  ascertain  where  the  residence  of  the  respondent  was  on  the  said  date.  It  turned  out  that  the  occupant  of  the
house  was  a  lessor,  Eduardo  Gonzales,  and  that  Oscar  Layno  was  in  the  premises  only  to  collect  the  rentals  from
him.  The  service  of  the  summons  on  a  person  at  a  place  where  he  was  a  visitor  is  not  considered  to  have  been  left
at  the  residence  or  place  or  abode,  where  he  has  another  place  at  which  he  ordinarily  stays  and  to  which  he  intends
to  return.41

The  Voter’s  Registration  Record  of  Oscar  Layno  dated  June  15,  1997  wherein  he  declared  that  he  was  a  resident  of
No.   572   Barangay   Buenlag,   Calasiao,   Pangasinan,   as   well   as   the   Joint  Affidavit   of   Vicenta   Peralta   and   Orlando
Macasalda  cannot  prevail  over  the  Contract  of  Lease  the  respondent  had  executed  in  favor  of  Eduardo  Gonzales
showing  that  the  latter  had  resided  and  occupied  the  house  of  the  respondent  as  lessee  since  November  24,  1997,
and  the  affidavit  of  Eduardo  Gonzales  that  Oscar  Layno  was  not  residing  in  the  said  house  on  April  5,  1999.

In  sum,  then,  the  respondent  was  not  validly  served  with  summons  and  the  complaint  in  Civil  Case  No.  879  on  April
5,  1999,  by  substituted  service.  Hence,  the  MTC  failed  to  acquire  jurisdiction  over  the  person  of  the  respondent;;  as
such,  the  decision  of  the  MTC  in  Civil  Case  No.  879  is  null  and  void.

IN  LIGHT  OF  ALL  THE  FOREGOING,  the  petition  is  DENIED  for  lack  of  merit.  No  costs.

SO  ORDERED.

Puno,  (Chairman),  Austria-­Martinez,  Tinga,  and  Chico-­Nazario,  JJ.,  concur.

Footnotes

1  Penned  by  Associate  Justice  Conrado  M.  Vasquez,  Jr.  with  Associate  Justices  Mercedes  Gozo-­Dadole  and
Rosmari  D.  Carandang,  concurring;;  Rollo,  pp.  25-­33.

2  Penned  by  Judge  Crispin  C.  Laron  (Retired).

3  Entitled  "Filomena  Domagas  v.  Vivian  Layno  Jensen."

4  Records,  p.  13.

5  Id.  at  20.

6  Id.  at  79.

7  Records,  p.  2.

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8  Id.  at  54-­56.

9  Id.  at  57-­58.

10  Id.  at  53.

11  Id.  at  60.

12  Id.  at  59.

13  Id.  at  46.

14  Id.  at  47.

15  Id.  at  50

16  Exhibit  "6."

17  Records,  p.  126.

18  National  Surety  Co.  v.  Austin  Machinery  Corporation,  35  F.2d  842  (1929).

19  Sandejas  v.  Robles,  81  Phil.  421  (1948).

20  Id.  at  424.

21  Asiavest  Ltd.  v.  Court  of  Appeals  ,  296  SCRA  539  (1998).

22  Hughes  v.  Hughes,  278  S.W.  121  (1925).

23  Green  Oaks  Apartments,  Ltd.  v.  Cannon,  696  S.W.  2d  415  (1985).

24  60  S.W.  2d  368  (1933).

25  PNB  v.  Court  of  Appeals,  153  SCRA  435  (1987).

26  Freeman  v.  Alderson,  30  L.Ed.372  (1886).

27  Banco  do  Brasil  v.  Court  of  Appeals  ,  333  SCRA  545  (2000).

28  Perry  v.  Young,  182  S.W.  577  (1916).

29  ART.   539.   Every   possessor   has   a   right   to   be   respected   in   his   possession;;   and   should   he   be   disturbed
therein  he  shall  be  protected  in  or  restored  to  said  possession  by  the  means  established  by  the  laws  and  the
Rules  of  Court.

possessor  deprived  of  his  possession  through  forcible  entry  may  within  ten  days  from  the  filing  of  the
complaint  present  a  motion  to  secure  from  the  competent  court,  in  the  action  for  forcible  entry,  a  writ  of
preliminary   mandatory   injunction   to   restore   him   in   his   possession.   The   court   shall   decide   the   motion
within  thirty  (30)  days  from  the  filing  thereof.

30  Progressive  Development  Corporation,  Inc.  v.  Court  of  Appeals  ,  301  SCRA  637  (1999).

31  296  SCRA  539  (1998).

32  Id.  at  552-­553.

33  Lam  v.  Rosillosa,  86  Phil.  447  (1956).

34  Venturanza  v.  Court  of  Appeals,  156  SCRA  305  (1987).

35  Umandap  v.  Sabio,  Jr  .,  339  SCRA  243  (2000).

36  344  SCRA  821  (2000).

37  Id.  at  829.

38  77  SCRA  209  (1977).

39  Ang  Ping  v.  Court  of  Appeals  ,  310  SCRA  343  (1999).

40  Records,  p.  20.

41  John  Hancock  Mutual  Life  Insurance  Co.  v.  Gooley,  118  ALR  1484  (1938);;  Albers  v.  Bramberg,  32  N.E.  2d
362  (1941).

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