UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE INGENIERÍA

FACULTAD DE INGENIERÍA DE PETRÓLEO, GAS NATURAL Y

PETROQUÍMICA

CHANGES IN OIL LEGISLATION AFTER

THE DEEPWATER HORIZON SPILL
PRODUCED BY:

TEAM 2 “THE CHAPULINES”

ESPINOZA CARHUANCHO CHRISTHIAN BRYAN 20150486k

MARCOS CERVANTES MIGUEL ANGEL 20151458K
ROMERO MENDOZA YANFRANCO YONEL 20151391C
MENA CORDOVA JAVIER HUGO 20151424I

TEACHER:

CORTEGANA RUCOBA OSCAR NOE

LIMA – PERÚ
2019
Dedication ii

We dedicate this project to our parents, for their unconditional love, for their work and

sacrifice in all these years, to our teachers, for their dedication, for transmitting all their

knowledge, to our friends, who always encouraged us to carry out this project, who helped us

obtain the means to reach the culmination of this project.

Acknowledgment iii

We want to thank our parents in the first place, for being with us in the whole process of

carrying out this project, for being the main promoters of our dreams, for teaching us to grow, for

teaching us that if we fall we should get up, for support and guide us, for being the bases that

helped us get here, for sacrificing ourselves to give us a good education, to our teachers, for their

dedication, for transmitting all their knowledge especially to Eng. Cortegana Rucoba Oscar Noe,

for his dignified work, for promoting education from generation to generation, instilling values

and sowing knowledge by training better citizens, also thanking us for providing materials and

bibliographies, to our friends who always encouraged us to carry out this project
Abstract iv

This project focuses on the fact that a few months after the closure of the Macondo well,

the government began implementing a series of regulations that hardened safety and operational

standards in the offshore oil and gas industry. First, due to the low performance perceived

immediately after the Deepwater Horizon spill, the Minerals Administration Service, which

previously regulated oil and gas activity on the outer continental shelf, was divided into BOEM

and BSEE. In less than half a decade, sister agencies have tightened offshore oil and gas regulations

and have focused on both safety and spill prevention.

This project will only take into account all regulations made by the Bureau of Safety and

Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) after the Deepwater Horizon spill seeking to raise awareness

of future generations of engineers related to the oil industry.

Tabla de Contenidos v

Chapter 1 DEEPWATER HORIZON ( MACONDO WELL) ......................................................1

Título 2 .................................................................................. ¡Error! Marcador no definido.
Título 2 .................................................................................. ¡Error! Marcador no definido.
Título 3............................................................................... ¡Error! Marcador no definido.
Título 3............................................................................... ¡Error! Marcador no definido.
Chapter 2 CHRONOLOGY AND CAUSES OF THE ACCIDENT ............................................8
Título 2 .................................................................................. ¡Error! Marcador no definido.
Título 3............................................................................... ¡Error! Marcador no definido.
Título 3............................................................................... ¡Error! Marcador no definido.
Chapter 3 CHANGES IN US LEGISLATION .......................................................................... 11
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) ................................................... 11
New Oil Regulations ............................................................................................................. 12
SEMS Final rule ................................................................................................................ 14
Drilling Safety Rule........................................................................................................... 16
SEMS 2 Final Rule ............................................................................................................ 19
Proposed Rule to Strengthen Offshore Safety and Best Practices ....................................... 22
Proposed well control rule ................................................................................................. 24
Chapter 4 CHANGES IN PERU LEGISLATION ...................... ¡Error! Marcador no definido.
Capítulo 4 Resultados y discusión. ............................................ ¡Error! Marcador no definido.
Lista de referencias .................................................................... ¡Error! Marcador no definido.
Apéndice .................................................................................... ¡Error! Marcador no definido.
Vita ............................................................................................ ¡Error! Marcador no definido.
 1

Chapter 1

DEEPWATER HORIZON ( MACONDO WELL)

La noche del 20 de abril de 2010 se produjo un escape de gas seguido de una explosión en
la plataforma petrolífera Deepwater Horizon, que trabajaba para BP en el pozo de
prospección Macondo del Golfo de México

El incendio resultante duró 36 horas, hasta el hundimiento de la plataforma. La fuga de

hidrocarburos al Golfo de Méjico se prolongó durante 87 días antes de que el pozo pudiese
sellarse. Fundamentalmente, el accidente se debió a la pérdida del control sobre la presión
del pozo seguida del fallo del sistema de prevención de explosiones (blowout preventer,
BOP), una válvula especialmente diseñada para mantener condiciones constantes en el
pozo. Después de las explosiones iniciales, las medidas de emergencia del sistema de
prevención de explosiones no lograron sellar el pozo, y se produjo la fuga.

Figura 1: Mapa del accidente. Fuente: Informe de Sostenibilidad BP 2010

 2

Datos del Pozo

Plataforma semisumergible de perforación en aguas profundas Deepwater Horizon
Compañía contratante: British Petroleum (BP)
Propietario: Transocean Ltd.
Fabricante: Hyundai Heavy Industries (Corea del Sur)
Año de fabricación: 2001
Costo aproximado de la plataforma semisumergible: US$ 350.000.000
Capacidad perforante (incluida la profundidad del agua): 30.000 pies (9144 m)
Capacidad de la torre: 2.000.000 lb
Bombas de lodo: 4 (cuatro), National 14-P-220 de 2200 HP
Dimensiones: Largo: 121 m, Ancho: 78 m, Altura total: 41 m
Potencia instalada: 25.200 HP + 1000 HP para emergencias
Profundidad del agua hasta la cual puede operar: 10.000 pies (3048 m)

Figura 1: Plataforma Semisumergible Deepwater Horizon

El equipo no opera anclado, dado que las catenarias serían no solo muy costosas, sino
también extremadamente pesadas. Por lo tanto, utiliza un sistema informático triplemente
redundante accionado por el posicionamiento satelital que permite mantener la plataforma
en el eje vertical del pozo por medio de varios thrusters (poderosas hélices colocadas en un
túnel orientable).
Los equipos de perforación offshore (costa afuera) son casi iguales a los que perforan en
tierra, puesto que la perforación a partir del lecho marino no presenta diferencias
sustanciales respecto de la perforación onshore (en tierra firme). Las principales
disimilitudes con los equipos de tierra estriban en los siguientes puntos:
 3

A) BOP
Se trata de la ubicación, el diseño y el accionamiento de las válvulas de control de
la boca de pozo, que se encuentran en el lecho del mar, comúnmente denominadas
por el acrónimo
inglés BOP (Blowout Preventers) (ver gráfico 1).
Posee las siguientes rams (esclusas), enumeradas desde arriba hacia abajo:
I) Esclusa de corte para el sondeo y cierre total.
II) Esclusa de corte para el casing (tubería de revestimiento).
III y IV) Cierres anulares (tipo Hydrill), superior e inferior, ajustables a varios
diámetros y también al cierre total.
V) Esclusa de cierre total para ensayos.

Gráfico 1: BOP - Fuente: Diciembre 2010 Petrotecnia

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B) RISER
El tubo llamado riser (elevador), que vincula la BOP con la plataforma y por dentro
del cual se introducen y se extraen todas las columnas y las herramientas utilizadas
en la perforación y puesta en producción del pozo, conduce asimismo el lodo que
Asciende por el espacio anular. De este modo, trae los recortes de terreno y todos
los fluidos provenientes del subsuelo y atraviesa las BOP hasta el circuito de
tratamiento que se encuentra armado en la plataforma por debajo del piso de trabajo
denominado moon pool.
El tramo de tubería que cumple su misma función en un equipo de tierra (que, en
ese caso, no se llama riser) rara vez excede los 2 m de longitud; mientras que, en el
equipo costa afuera, podría llegar a tener una longitud de 3 km.
El accidente
En la perforación de un pozo offshore de aguas profundas, existen varios riesgos: el
ambiental, el minero, el técnico, el de ingeniería, el de inversión y el de comercialización.
Y todos convergen en un pequeño punto, en el fondo del océano, y convierten el objetivo
en un blanco móvil, lo que dificulta la cuantificación del cálculo del TIR y del cálculo de
riesgo a largo plazo de la explotación del petróleo que se encuentra en aguas profundas (y
hay mucho…).
A partir de datos de conocimiento público de la empresa BP y del informe elaborado por
la Comisión de Energía y Comercio del Congreso de los Estados Unidos, realizamos la
siguiente enumeración de las posibles causas del accidente.
El 20 de abril de 2010, la Deepwater Horizon, una de las plataformas semisumergibles para
perforación en aguas profundas de diseño más avanzado del mundo, se encontraba
operando en el pozo Macondo de BP –descubridor de un yacimiento cuyas reservas se
estimaban en 100.000 millones de barriles en el bloque 252 del Cañón del Misisipi, Golfo
de México– a unas 45 millas al sur de la costa de Luisiana cuando se produjo una explosión
seguida de incendio y del posterior naufragio.
La explosión-incendio causó la muerte de once operarios del equipo formado por 126
personas y marcó el inicio del que posiblemente sea el peor desastre ambiental de los
Estados Unidos.
La Deepwater Horizon tenía contrato con BP hasta el año 2013 y su tarifa diaria era de
aproximadamente US$500.000 por día, a lo cual se deben adicionar los servicios
complementarios de la perforación (helicópteros, barcos de abastecimiento, perfilajes,
cementaciones, tecnologías especiales, lodo, etc.).
La plataforma semisumergible Deepwater Horizon, de Transocean, había perforado para
BP un año atrás el pozo descubridor del yacimiento Tiber, cuyas reservas se estimaban en
450.000 millones de barriles –también en el Golfo de México, a 35.132 pies de profundidad
(4132 pies de agua y 31.000 pies por debajo del fondo marino). Disponía de personal
 5

experimentado y de extraordinarios antecedentes tanto operativos como de seguridad y

representaba la vanguardia de la tecnología de perforación offshore en aguas profundas.
El pozo Macondo tenía una profundidad final programada de 19.600 pies (5976 m) y
atravesaba dos formaciones de interés, pero debió ser cortado a los 18.360 pies (5598 m)
(ver gráfico 2) a raíz de una pérdida de circulación que se presentó al atravesar la primera
de las formaciones productivas. La pérdida de lodo es una buena señal desde el punto de
vista de la producción de petróleo de la capa; pero, a su vez, constituye una advertencia en
el sentido de que la cementación tendría que ser particularmente firme. La profundidad del
agua hasta el lecho marino es de 5067 pies (1662 m).

Grafico 2: Características del pozo – Fuente: Diciembre 2010 Petrotecnia

 6

Al momento del descontrol, el pozo Macondo tenía un retraso de 43 días respecto del
programa (21,5 millones de dólares solamente en tarifa diaria de la plataforma
semisumergible).
Este hecho seguramente fijó el contexto en que el operador tomó sus decisiones los días y
las horas anteriores al descontrol del pozo. Pareciera que este atraso generó presiones que
llevaron a adoptar atajos tendientes a apurar su finalización. Como consecuencia, se
redujeron los costos y se ahorró tiempo a costa, en algunos casos, de violar los lineamientos
de la industria y a pesar de las advertencias del personal del propio operador y de los
contratistas acerca del peligro de tener una falla catastrófica en el pozo.

Gráfico 3: El pozo de Macondo – Fuente: Diciembre 2010 Petrotecnia

 7

El Comité del Congreso de los Estados Unidos analizó cinco decisiones cruciales
adoptadas por el operador:
1) Se decidió usar un diseño de entubación que presentara pocas barreras a la
migración
del gas (ver gráfico 3).
2) Se decidió usar un número insuficiente de centralizadores, cuya función es evitar
la canalización del cemento.
3) Se decidió no efectuar el registro de adherencia del cemento (CBL).
4) No se normalizó el lodo del pozo de manera adecuada antes de bombear la
lechada de cemento, dado que solamente se circuló treinta minutos cuando, para un
pozo de 5600 m de profundidad, se necesitan de seis a doce horas de circulación
para homogeneizar y desgasificar convenientemente el lodo.
5) No se fijó la camisa de bloqueo que asegura la empaquetadura del colgador de
la cañería de producción en la cabeza de pozo.
6) El 29 de octubre de 2010, el Laboratorio de Ensayos de Chevron informó que
las pruebas realizadas con la lechada de cemento alveolar o foam cement–lechada
que contiene pequeñas burbujas de nitrógeno para disminuir la densidad empleada
en cementar la cañería de producción del pozo Macondo– “era inestable”.
Investigación del incidente
Inmediatamente después de la explosión, BP puso en marcha una investigación
para la que requirió tanto los servicios de más de cincuenta técnicos y especialistas de
BP, como los del resto del sector. El director de seguridad y operaciones de BP dirigió la
investigación, que se llevó a cabo con total independencia de las operaciones de respuesta
al accidente.
La conclusión de la investigación de BP fue que el accidente no se produjo por una sola
causa. En lugar de un único desencadenante, la investigación reveló la existencia de una
compleja serie de fallos mecánicos, humanos, de diseño, de implementación operativa y
de interacción entre equipos y compañías (entre ellas BP) que contribuyeron al accidente.
El equipo de investigación formuló 26 recomendaciones específicamente referidas a la
perforación, las cuales BP ha aceptado y está introduciendo en sus operaciones de
perforación de todo el mundo.
Entre las recomendaciones formuladas se incluyen medidas para reforzar la gestión de los
contratistas, verificaciones de los sistemas de prevención de explosiones, controles de los
pozos, pruebas de presión para determinar su integridad, sistemas de emergencia, pruebas
del cemento, auditoría y verificación de las plataformas y competencia del personal.
 8

Chapter 2

CHRONOLOGY AND CAUSES OF THE ACCIDENT

CRONOLOGIA DEL ACCIDENTE

• Julio 2007: Un estudio del Servicio de Gestión Mineral del Departamento de Interior
revela que los proyectos de explotación petrolífera en el mar han estado siempre unidos a
muchos accidentes, incendios y muertes.
• 30 de julio de 2008: Un alto cargo del Servicio de Gestión Mineral del Departamento de
Interior se enfrenta a cargos penales por violar la normativa referente al conflicto de
intereses. El Departamento de Interior empieza a investigar otros conflictos de intereses y
el hecho de que muchos antiguos empleados de compañías petrolíferas trabajan después
para el Servicio de Gestión Mineral y viceversa.
• Abril 2009: El Servicio de Gestión Mineral excluye a BP de la necesidad de preparar un
informe detallado de impacto medioambiental, requerido por la Ley Medioambiental
Nacional (National Environmental Policy Act, NEPA). El Washington Post ha publicado
que en el plan de explotación de la plataforma Deepwater Horizon, BP declara que la
posibilidad de que ocurra un vertido de petróleo es “improbable” y que no se han tomado
“medidas mitigadoras más allá de las requeridas por las leyes y la propia normativa de la
compañía para evitar, reducir o eliminar el potencial impacto sobre los recursos
medioambientales”.
• 31 de marzo de 2010: El presidente estadounidense Barak Obama anuncia la apertura de
grandes extensiones de sus aguas costeras para la extracción de petróleo y gas natural.
• 2 de abril: Durante un discurso en Carolina del Norte, el presidente Obama dice que “las
plataformas petrolíferas, además, parece que ya no provocan vertidos en la actualidad.
Tienen una tecnología muy avanzada. Incluso durante el huracán Katrina, los vertidos no
los provocaron las plataformas petrolíferas, sino las refinerías instaladas en la costa”.
• 7 de abril: La Oficina de Responsabilidad Gubernamental declara que algunos altos
cargos del Departamento de Interior suelen ignorar fallos en la seguridad de las plataformas
petrolíferas, incluso cuando podrían producirse derrames de crudo al mar.
• 20 de abril: La plataforma petrolífera de la British Petroleum (BP) explota en el
Golfo de México. Desaparecen once trabajadores que se dan por muertos y siete resultan
heridos de gravedad.
• 23 de abril: La almirante de los guardacostas Mary Landry dice que del pozo no parece
estar saliendo petróleo y que tampoco hay crudo en la superficie.
• 24 de abril: Los guardacostas dan marcha atrás en su anterior declaración y calculan que
el pozo de BP está vertiendo unos mil barriles de petróleo al día a las aguas del Golfo de
México.
 9

• 24 y 25 de abril: La situación en alta mar y el mal tiempo retrasan la llegada de las

patrullas de limpieza a la zona.
• 27 de abril: Se utilizan robots submarinos para tratar de tener el flujo de petróleo sin
suerte.
• 28 de abril: La Asociación Nacional Oceánica y Atmosférica (NOAA, por sus siglas en
inglés) calcula que el pozo de BP está vertiendo unos 5.000 barriles de petróleo al día.
• 29 de abril: El gobernador de Luisiana, Bobby Jindal, declara el estado de emergencia
en la zona.
• 30 de abril 30: Algunos expertos aseguran al Wall Street Journal que el pozo de BP
podría estar expulsando 25.000 barriles de petróleo al día.
• 1 de mayo: El Servicio de Fauna, Flora y Pesca de EEUU calcula que un total de 20
reservas naturales del país se verán afectadas por el vertido, como la Reserva Natural
Nacional de la Isla de Breton, la segunda reserva natural más antigua del país, establecida
por el presidente Theodore Roosevelt en 1904.
• 2 de mayo: El presidente Obama visita la estación de guardacostas de Luisiana y
anuncia que BP tendrá que hacerse cargo de todos los costes que acarree el vertido de
petróleo.
• 3 de mayo: Tony Hayward, alto cargo de BP, anuncia que su compañía se
responsabiliza de la limpieza y todos los daños “legítimos” que el vertido haya podido
provocar.
• 3 de mayo: El senador Robert Menendez propone una ley para incrementar la multa por
responsabilidad y posibles daños para empresas como BP que pasaría de 75 millones de
dólares a 10.000 millones de dólares.
• 4 de mayo: Algunos altos cargos de BP declaran frente al Congreso que el pozo
petrolífero podría estar derramando un total de 60.000 barriles de petróleo al día.
• 4 de mayo: BP anuncia que necesitará tres meses más para poder perforar un pozo
nuevo para controlar la bolsa de petróleo del accidentado.
10
 11

Chapter 3

CHANGES IN US LEGISLATION

Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE)

The US Government began regulating the offshore energy and mineral extraction industry

in the late 1940s, but its jurisdiction was not firmly established until passage of the Outer

Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) of 1953. From 1953 until 2011, predecessor

agencies regulated activities on the Outer Continental Shelf. After the Deepwater Horizon

tragedy in April 2010, BSEE was established in an effort to separate regulatory

responsibilities from activities concerning lease sales and revenue generation (which are

now overseen by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and the Office of

Natural Resource Revenue (ONRR)).

BSEE's creation on October 1, 2011 resulted in a process of continuous regulatory

standardization and enhancement. A number of practical changes have occurred since 2011

including the expansion of Safety and Environmental Management Systems, enactment of

the Well Control Rule, finalization of the Arctic Rule and the Decommissioning Costs

Rule, creation of a near-miss reporting system (SafeOCS), and launching joint inspections

with the US Coast Guard.

Since the first offshore well was established off the coast of California in the early twentieth

century, America has seen a rapid expansion of oil and gas exploration in the marine
 12

environment. Concurrently, the US Government established protocols that would allow the

nation's energy needs to be met while safeguarding our oceans and coastlines. The creation

of BSEE was the most recent effort to learn from the past and establish a focused regulatory

authority staffed with subject matter experts.

Figure 3.1 Offshore Milestones

Source: BSEE Official Website

New Oil Regulations

Just months after the Macondo well was shut off, the government began

implementing a spate of regulations that tightened safety and operational standards on the

offshore oil and gas industry. First, due to perceived poor performance immediately

following the Deepwater Horizon spill, the Minerals Management Service, which
 13

previously regulated oil and gas activity on the outer continental shelf, was split into the

BOEM and the BSEE. In less than a half a decade, the sister agencies have tightened

offshore oil and gas regulations and focused on both safety and spill prevention.

Table 0.1 BSEE Efforts to improve pre-Deepwater Horizon Regulations

Date Regulation Description

May Flexibility Proposal the administration was acting to eliminate

2019 "unnecessary regulatory burdens while
maintaining safety and environmental
protection at sea".
April Proposed Well Control Would update existing regulations to reflect
2015 Rule industry best practices and recommendations
made after the Deepwater Horizon incident.
August Proposed Rule to Would implement best practices and update
2013 Strengthen Offshore regulations offshore production safety
Safety and Best Practices systems and equipment.
April SEMS 2 Final Rule Enhances 2010 SEMS rule to provide greater
2013 protection by supplementing operators
SEMS programs .
August Drilling Safety Rule Addresses well bore integrity and well
2012 control equipment and procedures to enhance
safety of OCS oil and gas activity.
October Workplace Safety Rule Makes mandatory the previously voluntary
2010 practices in the API Recommended Practice
75 for offshore drilling in federal waters.
Source: BSEE
 14

SEMS Final rule

The final SEMS rule, as adopted in 30 CFR 250, requires offshore operators to develop

and implement Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) for oil, gas, and

sulfur operations in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The final rule will apply to all OCS

oil, gas, and sulfur operations and the facilities under BSEE jurisdiction including drilling,

production, construction, well workover, well completion, well servicing, and Department

of Interior (DOI)pipeline activities. The rule became effective on November 15, 2010.

BSEE is incorporating by reference, and making mandatory, the American Petroleum

Institute’s Recommended Practice for Development of a Safety and Environmental

Management Program for Offshore Operations and Facilities, API RP 75, Third Edition,

May 2004, reaffirmed in May2008 in its entirety. This recommended practice, including

its appendices, constitutes a complete Safety and Environmental Management System

(SEMS) program. In addition, BSEE has added further text in the regulation to the

language published in API RP 75 to clarify compliance requirements. It is the intent of the

rule to hold operators accountable for the overall safety of the offshore facility, including

ensuring that all contractors and subcontractors have safety policies and procedures in

place that support the implementation of the operator’s SEMS program and align with the

principles of managing safety set forth in API RP 75.

API RP 75

This recommended practice is intended to assist in development of a management program

designed to promote safety and environmental protection during the performance of

 15

offshore oil and gas and Sulphur operations. This recommended practice addresses the

identification and management of safety hazards and environmental impacts in design,

construction, start-up, operation, inspection, and maintenance, of new, existing, or

modified drilling and production facilities. The objective of this recommended practice is

to form the basis for a Safety and Environmental Management Program (SEMP). By

developing a SEMP based on this Recommended Practice, owners and operators will

formulate policy and objectives concerning significant safety hazards and environmental

impacts over which they can control and can be expected to have an influence.

The SEMP is based on the following hierarchy of program development:

1. Safety and environmental policy

2. Planning

3. Implementation and operation

4. Verification and corrective action

5. Management review

6. Continual improvement

It is recommended that each operator have a safety and environmental management

program for their operations. The owner(s) should support the operator’s SEMP.

Management (owner and operator) should require that the program elements discussed in

Sections 2 through 12 of this publication are properly documented and available at field

and/ or office locations, as appropriate for each program element.

 16

Management Program Elements

The program elements described herein address the following 11 areas:

a. Safety and environmental information.

b. Hazards analysis.

c. Management of change.

d. Operating procedures.

e. Safe work practices.

f. Training.

g. Assurance of quality and mechanical integrity of critical equipment.

h. Pre-startup review.

i. Emergency response and control.

j. Investigation of incidents.

k. Audit of safety and environmental management program elements.

l. Documentation and record keeping.

Drilling Safety Rule

The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEM) is

submitting to the Federal Register for publication the interim final Drilling Safety Rule.

The Drilling Safety Rule will be effective immediately upon publication.

The Drilling Safety Rule imposes requirements that will enhance the safety of oil and gas

drilling operations on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). It addresses both well bore

integrity and well control equipment and procedures.

 17

Well bore integrity provides the first line of defense against a blowout by preventing a loss

of well control. It includes the appropriate use of drilling fluids and the well bore casing

and cementing program. Provisions in the rule addressing well bore integrity are:

• Making mandatory the currently voluntary practices recommended in the American

Petroleum Institute’s (API) standard, RP 65 – Part 2, Isolating Potential Flow Zones

During Well Construction (an industry standard program);

• Requiring submittal of certification by a professional engineer that the casing and

cementing program is appropriate for the purposes for which it is intended under

expected wellbore pressure.

• Requiring two independent test barriers across each flow path during well

completion activities (certified by a professional engineer).

• Ensuring proper installation, sealing and locking of the casing or liner.

• Requiring approval from the BOEM District Manager before replacing a heavier

drilling fluid with a lighter fluid.

• Requiring enhanced Deepwater well control training for rig personnel.

Well control equipment includes the Blowout Preventer (BOP) and control systems that

activate the BOP. Provisions in the rule on well control equipment include:

• Submittal of documentation and schematics for all control systems.

 18

• Requirements for independent third party verification that the blind-shear rams are

capable of cutting any drill pipe in the hole under maximum anticipated surface

pressure.

• Requirement for a subsea BOP stack equipped with Remotely Operated Vehicle

(ROV) intervention capability (at a minimum the ROV must be capable of closing

one set of pipe rams, closing one set of blind-shear rams, and unlatching the Lower

Marine Riser Package).

• Requirement for maintaining a ROV and having a trained ROV crew on each

floating drilling rig on a continuous basis.

• Requirement for auto shear and Deadman systems for dynamically positioned rigs.

• Establishment of minimum requirements for personnel authorized to operate

critical BOP equipment.

• Requirement for documentation of subsea BOP inspections and maintenance

according to API RP 53, Recommended Practices for Blowout Prevention

Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells.

• Require testing of all ROV intervention functions on subsea BOP stack during

stump test and testing at least one set of rams in initial seafloor test.

• Require function testing auto shear and Deadman systems on the subsea BOP stack

during the stump test and testing the Deadman system during the initial test on the

seafloor.

• Require pressure testing if any shear rams are used in an emergency.

 19

This Drilling Safety Rule is issued under an emergency rulemaking process consistent with

Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requirements. The equipment, systems and improved

practices stipulated in the rule are immediately necessary for the safety of OCS oil and gas

drilling operations and the protection of the environment.

SEMS 2 Final Rule

This final rule will revise and add several new requirements to regulations for Safety and

Environmental Management Systems (SEMS). These requirements pertain to developing

and implementing stop work authority (SWA) and ultimate work authority (UWA),

requiring an employee participation plan (EPP), and establishing guidelines for reporting

unsafe working conditions. The rule establishes additional requirements for conducting job

safety analyses (JSA) for activities identified in an operator’s SEMS program. In addition,

this final rule requires that SEMS programs be audited by an accredited audit service

provider (ASP). This rulemaking will further support BSEE’s efforts to reduce the

occurrence of accidents, injuries, and spills during oil and gas activities on the Outer

Continental Shelf (OCS).

SWA

This final rule will require operators to create and implement a SWA program. This

program will ensure that all personnel are given the responsibility and authority to stop
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work when they witness an activity that creates an imminent risk or danger to the health or

safety of an individual, to the public, or to the environment. The SWA will include

authority to stop the specific task(s) or activity that poses an imminent risk or danger as

defined in § 250.1930(a). The rule provides further that individuals who receive

notification to stop work must comply with the direction immediately. In supporting the

safe execution of work and to promote a culture of safety at work, all personnel should

have the responsibility and authority, without fear of reprisal, to stop work or decline to

perform an assigned task when an immediate risk or danger exists. Personnel exercising

the SWA should have discussions with co-workers, supervisors, and/or safety

representatives to attempt to resolve any safety issues that are causing the imminent danger

or risk. When a work stoppage occurs, the final rule provides that the person in charge of

the conducted activity is responsible for ensuring the work is stopped in an orderly and safe

manner. The final rule further provides that work may be resumed when the individual on

the facility with UWA determines that the imminent danger or risk does not exist or no

longer exists. The BSEE now requires the operator to conduct training on their SWA

procedures as part of orientations for all new personnel who perform activities on the OCS.

Additionally, the SWA procedures must be reviewed as part of all safety-focused meetings

related to facilities subject to SEMS.

UWA

The final rule now requires that an operator’s SEMS program specify who has the UWA

on the operator’s facilities. This requirement could be met, for instance, by posting a notice

in an easily accessible public location. The individual with UWA will be the individual on
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the facility with the final responsibility for making decisions. The individual with UWA

has a key role in assuring that the operator’s SEMS program is implemented in a manner

that addresses personnel safety and environmental protection. Under the final rule, the

operator’s SEMS program must identify and designate the individual with the UWA on the

facility. Only a single individual will have UWA at any given time, so operators must take

into consideration all applicable USCG regulations that deal with designating a person in

charge (in accordance with USCG regulations) of a MODU or a floating facility on the

OCS.

EPP

This rule now requires operators to develop and implement an EPP. Under this rule, an

operator who performs regulated activities on the OCS will be required to consult with its

employees regarding the development, implementation, and modification of its SEMS

program. The operator will also have to develop a written plan of action regarding how

appropriate onshore and offshore employees will participate in the SEMS program

development and implementation. The operator will have to provide its personnel access

to relevant sections of the SEMS program.

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Proposed Rule to Strengthen Offshore Safety and Best Practices

The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement is proposing to amend and update

current regulations regarding production systems and equipment that is used to collect and

treat oil and gas from Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) leases. The proposed rule will address

recent technological advances involving production safety systems, subsurface safety

devices, safety device testing, and life cycle analysis. Production systems play a critical

role in protecting personnel and the environment. This rule will help to reduce the number

of production incidents resulting in oil spills, injuries and fatalities.

Background

There are more than 3,000 facilities located on the OCS that are involved in the collection

and treatment of oil and gas collected from oil and gas wells. These facilities range in size

and scale from unmanned single well caissons to huge, manned deepwater facilities

containing state of the art technology. All of the facilities contain equipment, sensing

devices, and control systems to ensure that the oil and gas can be moved from the well to

a pipeline in a safe and environmentally protective manner.

This proposed rule will revise 30 CFR 250 subpart H - Oil and Gas Production Safety

Systems and make the first major changes to this section of the regulations since 1988.

This regulatory action will ensure that the regulations are keeping pace with industry's

recent technological advancements, which often rely of the use of equipment that is located

on the seabed. These new technologies are more complex than those that were traditionally

used for shallow water drilling on shelf areas, where safety equipment was traditionally
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placed on the rig itself, rather than on the seafloor. With the shift to deeper water in the

past decade, more specialized requirements and regulations are required for these newer

and emerging safety technologies.

Proposed Changes in the Rule

The proposed Subpart H revisions will:

• Completely restructure Subpart H to have shorter, easier-to-read sections, address

specific operating requirements for subsea production systems, and update and

expand the industry technical standards that are incorporated by reference;

• Contain regulatory language concerning the use of best available and safest

technology that is consistent with the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act's statutory

mandate;

• Clarify the operator's regulatory obligations related to life cycle analysis of critical

equipment. Life cycle analysis is the control and traceability of a wide range of

activities during the service life of the equipment ranging from design verification

to repair and maintenance. The requirements have previously been included in

standards that were incorporated by reference into BSEE regulations;

• Add rigorous design and testing requirements for boarding shut down valves, as

they are the most critical component of the subsea system. These valves allow

hydrocarbon flow to a facility to be stopped in an emergency. These new

requirements will ensure the maximum level of safety for personnel located on the

production facility;
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• Add new inspection and repair requirements for tube type heaters. These heaters

are used in the treatment process to help to separate water and oil. Failure of this

equipment to be properly inspected and maintained has resulted in several incidents

in recent years;

• Prohibit the installation of new single bore production risers from floating

production facilities. BSEE believes that this technology does not provide an

acceptable level of safety since the integrity of the riser may be compromised when

operations are performed;

• Codify existing BSEE policy and guidance related to deepwater production

equipment and systems to make sure they represent best practices, that the

regulatory process is transparent, and that the requirements are enforceable;

• Require that documentation/schematics are certified by registered professional

engineers (based on the Atlantis investigation); and

• Increase approved leakage rates for certain safety valves to ensure consistency with

industry standards and to reduce risks created by replacing these valves in

deepwater and subsea applications,

Proposed well control rule

Following the Deepwater Horizon incident on April 20, 2010, multiple investigations were

conducted to determine the causes of the incident and to make recommendations to reduce

the likelihood of a similar incident in the future. The investigative groups included:

• DOI/Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Joint Investigation Team;

• National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore

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Drilling

• Chief Counsel for the National Commission; and

• National Academy of Engineering.

Each investigation outlined several recommendations to improve offshore safety. The

BSEE evaluated the recommendations and acted on a number of them quickly to improve

offshore operations while other recommendations required additional input from industry

and other stakeholders. The requirements in this proposed rule are based on

recommendations made by the previously listed investigative bodies, which found a need

to enhance well-control best practices to advance safety and protection of the environment.

This proposed rulemaking would:

1. Incorporate the following industry standards:

- American Petroleum Institute (API) Standard 53, Blowout Prevention Equipment

Systems for Drilling Wells;

- American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/API Specification (Spec.)11D1,

Packers and Bridge Plugs; and

- API Recommended Practice (RP) 17H, Remotely Operated Tools and Interfaces

on Subsea Production Systems.

As related to BOP systems:

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- ANSI/API Spec. 6A, Specification for Wellhead and Christmas Tree Equipment;

- ANSI/API Spec. 16A, Specification for Drill-through Equipment;

- API Spec. 16C, Specification for Choke and Kill Systems;

- API Spec. 16D, Specification for Control Systems for Drilling Well Control

Equipment and Control Systems for Diverter Equipment; and

- ANSI/API Spec. 17D, Design and Operation of Subsea Production Systems

Subsea Wellhead and Tree Equipment.

2. Revise the requirements for Deepwater Operations Plan (DWOP) which are

required to be submitted to BSEE, to include requirements on free standing hybrid

risers (FSHR) for use with floating production, storage, and offloading units

(FPSO).

3. Revise sections in 30 CFR 250 Subpart D, Oil and Gas Drilling Operations, to

include requirements for:

- Submittal of equivalent circulating density (ECD) with the Application for Permit

to Drill (APD);

- Safe drilling margin;

- Wellhead description;

- Casing or liner centralization during cementing; and

- Source control and containment.

4. Revise sections in Subparts E, Oil and Gas Well-Completion Operations, and F, Oil

and Gas Well-Workover Operations, to include requirements for:

- Packer and bridge plug design, and

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- Production packer setting depth.

5. Revise sections in Subpart Q, Decommissioning Activities, to include requirements

for:

- Packer and bridge plug design,

- Casing bridge plugs, and

- Decommissioning applications and reports.

6. Add new Subpart G, Well Operations and Equipment, and move common

requirements from Subparts D, E, F, and Q into new Subpart G.Include new

requirements in Subpart G for:

- Rig and equipment movement reports, - Real-time monitoring, and - Revised BOP

requirements, including:

- Design and manufacture/quality assurance;

- Accumulator system capabilities and calculations;

- BOP and remotely operated vehicle (ROV) capabilities;

- BOP functions (e.g., shearing);

- Improved and consistent testing frequencies;

- Maintenance;

- Inspections;

- Failure reporting;

- Third-party verification; and

- Additional submittals to BSEE including up-to-date schematics.

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7. Incorporate the guidance from several Notices to Lessees and Operators (NTLs)

into Subpart G for:

- Global Position Systems (GPS) for Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs);

- Ocean Current Monitoring;

- Using Alternate Compliance in Safety Systems for Subsea Production Operations;

- Standard Reporting Period for the Well Activity Report (WAR); and

- Information to include in the WARs and End of Operation Reports (EOR).