Republic of the Philippines surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena,

SUPREME COURT all surnamed Isidoro.

Manila
On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in
EN BANC the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the
will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the
G.R. No. L-18148 February 28, 1963 testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes,
whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives
DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the aforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an
deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the instituted heirs, namely: opposition to the executor's project of partition and
ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners, submitted a counter-project of partition of their own,
vs. claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not
HERMOGENA REYES, namely: FRANCISCO REYES, ET AL., and to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the
JOSE ISIDORO, ET AL., respondents. spouses.

Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices for petitioners. The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and
Romerico F. Flores for respondents. February 10, 1960, respectively, set the two projects of
partition for hearing, at which evidence was presented by the
parties, followed by the submission of memoranda
BARRERA, J.:
discussing certain legal issues. In the memorandum for the
executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that
This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the the properties disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio
Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Capili belonged to him exclusively and not to the conjugal
Bulacan holding that the probate court in Special Proceeding 1101 partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had donated to him
had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed of donation in her half share of such partnership; (2) that the collateral
question and to pass upon the question of title or ownership of the heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds
properties mentioned therein. to question the validity of the donation; and (3) that even
assuming that they could question the validity of the
The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of the Court of donation, the same must be litigated not in the testate
Appeals as follows: proceeding but in a separate civil action.

Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
The first died on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
the settlement of his estate was instituted in the Court of the Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing
Fist Instance of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
October 9, 1958, disposing of his properties in favor of his stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all
surnamed Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part,
surnamed Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes herself died on April argued that the deed of donation itself was determinative of
24, 1959. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the original conjugal character to the properties, aside from
the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was the legal presumption laid down in Article 160 of the Civil
substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs, Code, and that since the donation was null and void the
namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all deceased Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share
 of his wife and therefore could not validly dispose of it in the property, in which case the probate court may pass
his will. provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action.2 However, we have also held that
On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M. when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is
Mejia presiding, issued an order declaring the donation void optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title
without making any specific finding as to its juridical nature, to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may
that is, whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa, for the definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561;
reason that, considered under the first category, it falls Manalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); and that with the consent
under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial
donations between spouses during the marriage; and administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the
considered under the second category, it does not comply course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons
with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in are not prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).
relation to Article 805 of the same Code, there being no
attestation clause. In the same order the court disapproved In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial
both projects of partition and directed the executor to file court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the power
another," dividing the property mentioned in the last will and of the probate court in this case to adjudicate in the testate
testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties proceedings, the question as to whether the properties herein
mentioned in the deed of donation, Exhibit B, between the involved belong to the conjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili and
instituted heirs of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal Hermogena Reyes, or to the deceased husband exclusively?
heirs of the deceased Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that
the said properties were conjugal properties of the deceased At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a
spouses." On September 27, 1960, the executor filed a question of jurisdiction, in the sense advanced by appellants that
motion for new trial, reiterating and emphasizing the the trial court had completely no authority to pass upon the title to
contention previously raised in their memorandum that the the lands in dispute, and that its decision on the subject is null and
probate court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the void and does not bind even those who had invoked its authority
claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena Reyes involving title and submitted to its decision because, it is contended, jurisdiction
to the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio Capili and is a creature of law and parties to an action can not vest, extend or
taking exception to the court's declaration of the nullity of broaden it. If appellants' contention is correct, then there can be no
the donation "without stating facts or provision of law on exception to the no-jurisdiction theory. But as has been stated in the
which it was based." The motion for new trial was denied in case of Cunanan v. Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking
an order dated October 3, 1960. through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason: "Determination of title to
property is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being responding Soriano's objection (that the probate court lacked
affirmed, petitioners filed this present petition for review by jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to the
certiorari. estate) relates exclusively to the procedure, which is distinct from
jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a mode of practice (the
The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in filing of an independent ordinary action) which may be waived".
not declaring that the probate court, having limited and special Strictly speaking, it is more a question of jurisdiction over the
jurisdiction, had generally no power to adjudicate title and erred in person, not over the subject matter, for the jurisdiction to try
applying the exception to the rule. controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding the
ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been
In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general recognized to be vested in probate courts. This is so because the
rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of the
testate or intestate proceedings,"1 except where one of the parties estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.
prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate and
payment of all the debts and expenses.3 Thereafter, distribution is character of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to the
made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled opposition of the respondents". In other words, by presenting their
to succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature of an action of project of partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the
partition, in which each party is required to bring into the mass claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband),
whatever community property he has in his possession. To this end, petitioners themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the
and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce properties — which is well within the competence of the probate
proofs relative to the ownership of the properties in dispute. All the court — and just because of an opposition thereto, they can not
heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the
before the court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all jurisdiction of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the
matters and incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such parties who raise the objection are the ones who set the court in
estate, so long as no interests of third parties are affected.4 motion.5 They can not be permitted to complain if the court, after
due hearing, adjudges question against them.6
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question
of ownership of certain of the properties involved — whether they Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to
belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. raise the question of ownership of the properties involved because
This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court the widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the
which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her
to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of
among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of those inventoried properties. But the very authorities cited by
course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by her appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have
heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he
himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence without
parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of the knowledge works no estoppel.7 In the present case, the deceased
deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow acted as she did because of the deed of donation she
widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And executed in favor of her husband not knowing that such deed was
it is this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has not
Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an been executed with the required formalities similar to a will.
heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the
requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in
petitioners and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against
claiming title under the testator. appellants. So ordered.

Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
of the determination of the question of ownership of the disputed Makalintal, J., took no part.
properties. This is not borne by the admitted facts. On the contrary,
it is undisputed that they were the ones who presented the project
of partition claiming the questioned properties as part of the
testator's asset. The respondents, as representatives or substitutes
of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and
submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of
them must be deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in
the same proceeding. Certainly, the petitioners can not be heard to
insist, as they do, on the approval of their project of partition and,
thus, have the court take it for granted that their theory as to the