1. Victoria Amigable v.

Nicolas Cuenca
GR No L-26400 – February 29, 1972
Facts:
Issue:
Held:

2. Idelfonso Santiago v. Republic of the Philippines

GR No L-48214 – December 19, 1978
Facts:
Issue:
Held:

3. Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Guillermo Villasor

GR No L-30671 – November 28, 1973
Facts:
Issue:
Held:

4. PNB v. Hon. Javier Pabalan

GR No L-33112 – June 15, 1978
Facts:
Issue:
Held:

5. Shigenori Kuroda v. Rafael Jalandoni

GR No L-2662 – March 26, 1949
Facts:
Issue:
Held:

6. People of the Philippines v. Tranquilino Lagman

GR No L-45892 – July 13, 1938
Facts:
Issue:
Held:

7. People of the Philippines v. Primitivo Sosa

GR No L-45893 – July 13, 1938
Facts:
Issue:
Held:

8. US v Ang Tang Ho
GR No 17122 – February 27, 1922
Facts:
Issue:
Held:

9. Restituto Ynot v Intermediate Appellate Court

GR No 74457 – March 20, 1987
Facts:
Issue:
Held:

10. Anastacio Laurel vs Eriberto Misa

GR No. L-409 – January 30, 1947
Facts:
Anastacio Laurel was prosecuted for treason penalized by Article 114 of the RPC allegedly on
the ground that he, being a Filipino citizen, adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and
comfort during the Japanese occupation. Laurel argued that he cannot be prosecuted on such
ground because (1) the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and,
consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2)
there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic.
Issue:
Whether or not the argument raised by Anastacio Laurel should be denied for lack of merit.
Held:
A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent
allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government
or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the
qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of
the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he
receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign.
Absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the
enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is
not transferred thereby to the occupier.

11. Angel Ministerio vs CFI of Cebu

GR No. L-31635 – August 31, 1971
Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint seeking for the payment of just compensation for a registered lot
allegedly taken from them by the National Government through its authorized representatives
for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue without paying just compensation and without any
agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated demands for the
payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner
and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession.
Issue:
Whether or not recovery is barred by the principle of immunity of state.
Held:
The government is immune from suit without its consent. Nor is it indispensable that it be the
party proceeded against. If it appears that the action, would in fact hold it liable, the doctrine
calls for application. It follows then that even if the defendants named were public officials, such
a principle could still be an effective bar. This is clearly so where a litigation would result in a
financial responsibility for the government, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of
property. Under such circumstances, the liability of the official sued is not personal. The party
that could be adversely affected is government. Hence the defense of non-suability may be
interposed.
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for
acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only
legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the
State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the
rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law
or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that,
while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not
have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be
sued without its consent.
If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for
public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be
summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the
procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it,
and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party
entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the
land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment. If there
were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are
now.

12. Emiliano De Los Santos vs IAC

GR No. L-71998-99 – June 02, 1993
Facts:
Petitioners filed a case for prohibition against Lorenzo Cadiente, a private contractor and the
Provincial Engineer for the construction of a road and an artificial creek, without their knowledge
or consent, on a parcel of their land. They alleged that the road and the creek would serve no
public profitable and practicable purpose but for respondents' personal profit.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner may maintain the suit against the defendant public officials.
Held:
The principle of state immunity from suit cannot be invoked to defeat petitioners' claim has long
been settled. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by
the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment
of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment
of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned" to
appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment. It can hardly be doubted that in
exercising the right of eminent domain, the State exercises its jus imperii, as distinguished from
its proprietary rights of jus gestionis. Yet, even in that area, it has been held that where private
property has been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of
immunity from suit cannot be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owner.

13. University of the Philippines vs Hon. Agustin Dizon

GR No. 171182 – August 23, 2012
Facts:
UP entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation
(Stern Builders) for the construction of the extension building and the renovation of the College
of Arts and Sciences Building in the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños
(UPLB).
In the course of the implementation of the contract, Stern Builders submitted three progress
billings corresponding to the work accomplished, but the UP paid only two of the billings. The
third billing was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Despite the
lifting of the disallowance, the UP failed to pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders to sue the
UP and its co-respondent officials to collect the unpaid billing and to recover various damages.
Following the RTC’s denial of its motion for reconsideration, UP filed a notice of appeal.
However, finding that UP filed its appeal beyond the reglementary period; the RTC issued a writ
of execution. Finding that UP filed its appeal out of time, the CA dismissed UP’s appeal.
Subsequently, the sheriff served notices of garnishment on the UP’s depository banks.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC’s issuance of the writ of execution was proper.
Held:
UP’s funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment. Trial judges should not
immediately issue writs of execution or garnishment against the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities to enforce money judgments. They should bear in
mind that the primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle all claims of any sort due from the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities pertains to the
Commission on Audit (COA) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1445. Despite its
establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a
legitimate government function. It is an institution of higher learning, not a corporation
established for profit and declaring any dividends. Irrefragably, the UP is a government
instrumentality, performing the State’s constitutional mandate of promoting quality and
accessible education. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest
accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special trust
fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UP’s mission and purpose,
and should always be subject to auditing by the COA.

14. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation Inc., (Cocofed) vs. Republic of the Philippines
GR Nos. 177857-58 – September 17, 2009
(not finished)
Facts:
COCOFED sought the Court’s approval of the conversion of the 753,848,312 common shares of
San Miguel Corporation (SMC) registered in the names of Coconut Industry Investment Fund
and the so-called "14 Holding Companies." Respondent Republic questioned COCOFED’s
personality to seek the Court’s approval of the desired conversion. Respondent Republic also
disputes COCOFED’s right to impose and prescribe terms and conditions on the proposed
conversion, maintaining that the CIIF SMC common shares are sequestered assets and are in
custodia legis under Presidential Commission on Good Government’s (PCGG’s) administration.
It postulates that, owing to the sequestrated status of the said common shares, only PCGG has
the authority to approve the proposed conversion and seek the necessary Court approval. In
this connection, respondent Republic holds that the coconut levy funds were declared as prima
facie public funds, reinforcing its position that only PCGG, a government agency, can ask for
approval of the conversion.
Eventually, the coconut levy funds that were used to acquire the sequestered CIIF SMC
common shares in question were peremptorily determined to be prima facie public funds.
Issue:
Whether or not to proceed with the conversion or defer action thereon until final adjudication of
the issue of ownership over the sequestered shares properly pertains to the executive branch,
represented by the PCGG.
Held:
The cardinal postulate explains that the three branches must discharge their respective
functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of
separation of powers, neither Congress, the President, nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields
allocated to the other branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the
enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their
interpretation and application to cases and controversies. Jurisprudence is well-established that
the courts cannot intervene or interfere with executive or legislative discretion exercised within
constitutional limits. A Court is without power to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the
President. It may, however, look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in
grave abuse of discretion. Considering the co-equal status of the three branches of government,
courts may not tread into matters requiring the exercise of discretion of a functionary or office in
the executive and legislative branches, unless it is clearly shown that the government official or
office concerned abused his or its discretion.
Corollary to the principle of separation of powers is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction that the
courts will DEFER to the decisions of the administrative offices and agencies by reason of their
expertise and experience in the matters assigned to them. Administrative decisions on matters
within the jurisdiction of administrative bodies are to be respected and can only be set aside on
proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. The only instance when the Courts
ought to interfere is when a department or an agency has acted with grave abuse of discretion
or violated a law. A circumspect review of the pleadings and evidence extant on record shows
that the PCGG approved the conversion only after it conducted an in-depth inquiry, thorough
study, and judicious evaluation of the pros and cons of the proposed conversion.
As long as the PCGG approval is obtained, the exercise of the redemption feature of the SMC in
accordance with the Amended Articles of Incorporation would not constitute a "sale" of the
sequestered asset that is prohibited. The approval by the PCGG, for respondent Republic, of
the conversion is a policy decision which cannot be interfered with in the absence of a showing
or proof, as here, that PCGG committed grave abuse of discretion.

15. Cesar Bengzon vs. Hon. Franklin Drilon

GR No. 103524 – April 15, 1992
Facts:
Republic Act No, 910 (as amended by 1797) was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of
Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals. Identical retirement benefits were
also given to the members of the Constitutional Commissions under Republic Act No. 1568 (as
amended by 3595). Later, on the occasion of the Armed Forces Loyalty Day, President Marcos
signed Presidential Decree 578 which extended similar retirement benefits to the members of
the Armed Forces.
Two months later, however, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 644 which authorized
the adjustment of the pension of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions and the officers and enlisted
members of the Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of salaries.
Significantly, under Presidential Decree 1638 the automatic readjustment of the retirement
pension of officers and enlisted men was subsequently restored by President Marcos. A later
decree Presidential Decree 1909 was also issued providing for the automatic readjustment of
the pensions of members of the Armed Forces who have retired prior to September 10, 1979.
Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination against the members of the Judiciary and the
Constitutional Commissions, Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the
repealed provisions of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595. Congress was under
the impression that Presidential Decree 644 became law after it was published in the Official
Gazette on April 7, 1977. In the explanatory note of House Bill No. 16297 and Senate Bill No.
740, the legislature saw the need to reenact Republic Act Nos. 1797 and 3595 to restore said
retirement pensions and privileges of the retired Justices and members of the Constitutional
Commissions, in order to assure those serving in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and
Constitutional Commissions adequate old age pensions even during the time when the
purchasing power of the peso has been diminished substantially by worldwide recession or
inflation.
President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill No. 16297 on the ground that according to her, it
would erode the very foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere faithfully to and
enforce strictly the policy on standardization of compensation as articulated in Republic Act No.
6758 known as Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. She further said that "the
Government should not grant distinct privileges to select group of officials whose retirement
benefits under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast majority
of our civil service servants.
Prior to the instant petition, however, Retired Court of Appeals Justices Manuel P. Barcelona,
Juan P. Enriquez, Juan O. Reyes, Jr. and Guardson R. Lood filed a letter/petition which the
Court treated as an Administrative Matter. The petitioners asked this Court for a readjustment of
their monthly pensions in accordance with Republic Act No. 1797. They reasoned out that
Presidential Decree 644 repealing Republic Act No. 1797 did not become law as there was no
valid publication. Since Presidential Decree 644 has no binding force and effect of law, it
therefore did not repeal Republic Act No. 1797. Their petition was granted and so the Court
authorized that their monthly pensions be adjusted and paid on the basis of RA 1797. Pursuant
to the above resolution, Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill (House Bill
34925).
Later, the President vetoed the Special Provision of House Bill 34925, which authorized the
Presiding Justice to use any savings in any item of the appropriation for the Court of Appeals for
purposes of: (1) improving its compound and facilities; and (2) for augmenting any deficiency in
any item of its appropriation including its extraordinary expenses and payment of adjusted
pension rates to retired justices entitled thereto; and for the payment of adjustment Pension
Rates to Retired Justices.
The reason given for the veto of said provisions is that "the resolution of this Honorable Court in
Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA pursuant to which the foregoing appropriations for the
payment of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have been
enacted effectively nullified the veto of the President on House Bill No. 16297, the bill which
provided for the automatic increase in the retirement pensions of the Justices of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals and chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions by re-enacting
Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595. The President's veto of the aforesaid
provisions was further justified by reiterating the earlier reasons for vetoing House Bill No.
16297.
Issue:
Whether or not the veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Held:
Under the principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the President nor the Judiciary
may encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government. The legislature is
generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws and the
judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and controversies. The challenged veto
has far-reaching implications which the Court can not countenance as they undermine the
principle of separation of powers. The Executive has no authority to set aside and overrule a
decision of the Supreme Court.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices
allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy
and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the
Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of
our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme
Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to
constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease
to be a meaningless provision.
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is
tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly
repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the
utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any
savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the Judiciary is
withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the
disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is
aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment
appropriations where augmentation is needed.
The veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the Judiciary's
appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional provision on "fiscal autonomy."

16. Fort Bonifacio Development Corp. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

GR No. 173425 – September 4, 2012
Facts:
On February 8, 1995, Petitioner purchased from the national government a portion of the Fort
Bonifacio reservation. On January 1, 1996, RA 7716 restructured the Value-Added Tax (VAT)
system by amending certain provisions of the old National Internal Revenue Code, extending
the coverage of VAT to real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in
the ordinary course of trade or business. On September 19, 1996, petitioner submitted to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), an inventory of all its real properties, and based on its book
value, petitioner claimed that it is entitled to a transitional input tax credit.
Realizing that its transitional input tax credit was not applied in computing its output VAT,
Petitioner filed with the BIR a claim for refund. Due to the inaction of the respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) via a Petition for Review.
In opposing the claim for refund, respondents interposed that under Revenue Regulations No.
7-95, implementing Section 105 of the Tax Code as amended by E.O. 273, the basis of the
presumptive input tax, in the case of real estate dealers, is the improvements, such as buildings,
roads, drainage systems, and other similar structures, constructed on or after January 1, 1988;
and Petitioner, by submitting its inventory listing of real properties only on September 19, 1996,
failed to comply with the aforesaid revenue regulations mandating that for purposes of availing
the presumptive input tax credits under its Transitory Provisions, "an inventory as of December
31, 1995, of such goods or properties and improvements showing the quantity, description, and
amount should be filed with the RDO no later than January 31, 1996.
Consequently, CTA denied petitioner’s claim for refund. According to the CTA, "the benefit of
transitional input tax credit comes with the condition that business taxes should have been paid
first." In this case, since petitioner acquired the Global City property under a VAT-free sale
transaction, it cannot avail of the transitional input tax credit. The CTA likewise pointed out that
under Revenue Regulations No. (RR) 7-95, implementing Section 105 of the old NIRC, the 8%
transitional input tax credit should be based on the value of the improvements on land such as
buildings, roads, drainage system and other similar structures, constructed on or after January
1, 1998, and not on the book value of the real property.
Issue:
Whether or not RR 7-95, which limited the 8% transitional input tax credit to the value of the
improvements on the land, is invalid because it goes against the express provision of Section
105 of the old NIRC, in relation to Section 100 of the same Code, as amended by RA 7716.
Held:
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a
delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of
law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
objects and purposes of the law, and should not be in contradiction to, but in conformity with,
the standards prescribed by law.
To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict, the provisions of
the enabling law. An implementing rule or regulation cannot modify, expand, or subtract from
the law it is intended to implement. Any rule that is not consistent with the statute itself is null
and void.
While administrative agencies, such as the Bureau of Internal Revenue, may issue regulations
to implement statutes, they are without authority to limit the scope of the statute to less than
what it provides, or extend or expand the statute beyond its terms, or in any way modify explicit
provisions of the law. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter
cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and
an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.
To recapitulate, RR 7-95, insofar as it restricts the definition of "goods" as basis of transitional
input tax credit under Section 105 is a nullity.

17. Joseph Estrada vs. Aniano Desierto

GR No. 146710-15 – March 02, 2001
Facts:
petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was
plagued by a plethora of problems; and later, Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson went on air and
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage; and so, calls for the resignation of the
petitioner filled the air. Consequently, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable as
thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and high velocity intensification of the call for
petitioner's resignation.
Eventually, petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace and issued a press
statement stating that he has strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality
of the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President, and that he does not wish to be a
factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in the civil society.
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. A
special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to
investigate the charges against the petitioner. Later, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings or in any other criminal
complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and
only if legally warranted. Petitioner likewise filed a separate case for Quo Warranto, prayinh for
judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to
have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner
Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent
Arroyo as president of the Philippines.
Held:
Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the government." Or to use the
language in Baker vs. Carr, there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's
claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the presidency. The question is political in
nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which
cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily.
That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de
jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

18. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) vs. Antonino Tobias III
GR No. 177780 – January 25, 2012
Facts:
Tobias opened a savings/current account for and in the name of Adam Merchandising, his
frozen meat business with Metrobank. Six months later, Tobias applied for a loan from
Metrobank, which in due course conducted trade and credit verification of Tobias that resulted in
negative findings. Metrobank next proceeded to appraise the property Tobias offered as
collateral by asking him for a photocopy of the title and other related documents.
Thereafter, Tobias initially availed himself of ₱20,000,000, but took out the balance within six
months. He paid the interest on the loan for about a year before defaulting. His loan was
restructured to 5-years upon his request. Yet, after two months, he again defaulted. Thus, the
mortgage was foreclosed, and the property was sold to Metrobank as the lone bidder.
Consequently, the certificate of sale was issued in favor of Metrobank.
When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to the Registry of Deeds, no
corresponding original copy of the Title was found in the registry vault. Given such findings,
METROBANK requested the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to
investigate. In its report, PAOCTF concluded that the Title and the tax declarations submitted by
Tobias were fictitious. PAOCTF recommended the filing against Tobias of a criminal complaint
for estafa. The Office of the City Prosecutor ultimately charged Tobias with estafa through
falsification of public documents.
Subsequently, Tobias appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ) which, through the Acting
Secretary of Justice, issued a resolution directing the withdrawal of the information filed against
Tobias. Metrobank moved to reconsider, arguing that Tobias had employed deceit or false
pretense in offering the property as collateral by using a fake title; and that the presumption that
the possessor of the document was the author of the falsification applied because no other
person could have falsified the TCT and would have benefitted therefrom except Tobias himself.
Subsequently, the Secretary of Justice denied Metrobank’s motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the Courts may review the determination of the Secretary of Justice as to the
innocence or guilt of the Accused.
Held:
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters
over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the
Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented
in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere
with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in
the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. For instance, in Balanganan v. Court of
Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City, the Court ruled that the Secretary of Justice
exceeded his jurisdiction when he required "hard facts and solid evidence" in order to hold the
defendant liable for criminal prosecution when such requirement should have been left to the
court after the conduct of a trial.

19. Greco Antonious Beda Belgica vs Hon. Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa Jr.
GR No. 208566 – November 19, 2013
Facts:
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice
Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a
writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and
Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President and
Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation
appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it
may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez,
Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr.
(Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated
August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual
"Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided
for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being
acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among others, the 2013 PDAF Article –
"wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to
allow individual legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly,
"after the GAA is passed." They state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report
provide an illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of legislators wield over project
implementation in complete violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers.
Further, petitioners claim that "in the current system where the PDAF is a lump-sum
appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies
the President the chance to veto that item later on. Accordingly, they submit that the item veto
power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that
Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-
given power of the President useless.
Issue:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; and (c) checks
and balances.
Held:
 The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three
fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, it means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and
in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government." To the legislative branch of government, through
Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government,
through the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of
government, through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three
great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere." Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or
construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the
judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." The principle of separation of powers
and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of
government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the
division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other
branches or the citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by
co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in
exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of
one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or
others.
 Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one
branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court
decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2)
ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s performance of its
constitutionally assigned function"; and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when
one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another." In other
words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference
with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s functions.
 The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is
indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the
Executive branch of government. This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of
power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in
them. Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department
should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation
of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.
 In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its
members, should not cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as
earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Congress enters the
picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter,
Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation
act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that
no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation
made by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress’ law-making role
necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the
national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them,
Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the Executive.
 From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional." It
must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight
function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows.
But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any
post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of
any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or
assumption of executive functions.
  As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-
enactment phases of project implementation.
 As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be exclusively
exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular,
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative
and referendum. Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a
bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may
constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of
non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be:
(a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are
allowed to legislate on purely local matters; and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such
as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
 Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to
delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either
filling up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or
ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making). The
conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the
case of People v. Maceren as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the
principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of
legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation"
calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."
 Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been
enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the
statute cannot be sanctioned.
 In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers
post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of
non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the
power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.
 The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and
distinct does not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.
The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. A prime
example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an
item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for
approval through a process known as "bill presentment."
 The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may
exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified under the
Constitution.
  The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the
government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The
Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative
power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It
follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in
exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or
hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every
intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will
presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature.
 The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals
such as to prevent log-rolling legislation, impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as
well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role in the budgetary process.
 For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists
a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of
appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of
the appropriation or of the bill." On this premise, it may be concluded that an
appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of item
veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions"
which provide for parameters of appropriation.
 Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual
legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the
GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As
these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed
and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which
subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the
President‘s power of item veto.

20. Prof. Randolf David vs Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

GR No. 171396 – May 03, 2006
Facts:
On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled "Oplan Hackle I" which
detailed plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni
Homecoming. The plot was to assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members
and President Arroyo herself. Due to the information that numerous businessmen, government
officials, members of the AFP, and NPA plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration.
On February 24, 2006, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 declaring a State of
National Emergency and authorizing her to call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless
violence in the country. She directed the AFP to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence.
Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the
permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales
stated that political rallies, which to the President’s mind were organized for purposes of
destabilization, are cancelled. The Presidential Chief of Staff announced that "warrantless
arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented."
The following day, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the
PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The
raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the
Saturday issue. By virtue of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, several arrests were then made on the
same day.
Petitioners contend that the President committed grave abuse of discretion; and that respondent
officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic
institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it encroaches on the emergency powers of
Congress.
Held:
The tug-of-war always cuts across the line defining "political questions," particularly those
questions "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government." The authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen
belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts. Lansang took the
opposite view. There, the members of the Court were unanimous in the conviction that the Court
has the authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases in order to determine their
constitutional sufficiency. From the principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the
system of checks and balances, "under which the President is supreme, only if and when he
acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether
or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which in this respect, is, in turn,
constitutionally supreme." In 1973, the unanimous Court of Lansang was divided in Aquino v.
Enrile. There, the Court was almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the validity of the
imposition of Martial Law is a political or justiciable question. Then came Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile
which greatly diluted Lansang. It declared that there is a need to re-examine the latter case,
ratiocinating that "in times of war or national emergency, the President must be given absolute
control for the very life of the nation and the government is in great peril. The President, it
intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the People, and God."
During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the
President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the
operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare "a state of national
emergency" and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section
18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can
be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. It may
be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also
to "other national emergency."
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from
Congress. Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the
tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President.
Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during
grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency
powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
 (1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The
taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the
emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the
"the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may
exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a
law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.