[ GR NO.

153476, Sep 27, 2006 ]

HKO AH PAO v. LAURENCE TING +
DECISION
534 Phil. 679

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for review[1] of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA),
dated January 31, 2002 and May 7, 2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 47804, entitled
"Hko Ah Pao, et al., v. Laurence Chua Ting, et al."

The controversy involves two feuding families of the same clan battling over a piece of
property registered in the name of respondents. Petitioners claim that the property was bought
by their patriarch, the late Teng Ching Lay, who allegedly entrusted the same to his son from a
previous marriage, Arsenio Ting, the deceased father of herein respondents.

The antecedents[2] are as follows:

On June 12, 1961, the spouses Aristeo Mayo and Salud Masangkay sold for P70,000 the
property subject of this case which is located at 1723 Vasquez St., Malate, Manila to Arsenio
Ting. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 63991 was subsequently issued in the name of
Arsenio Ting on June 14, 1961.

Arsenio Ting was the son of Teng Ching Lay by his first marriage. At the time of the sale,
Arsenio was a practicing lawyer and, being a Filipino, was qualified to acquire and own real
property in the Philippines. Arsenio was likewise the manager and controlling stockholder of
Triumph Timber, Inc. in Butuan City. Teng Ching Lay, on the other hand, was a Chinese citizen,
and although his name did not appear in the corporate records of Triumph Timber, Inc., he was
the one making business decisions for the company.[3] He became a naturalized Filipino
citizen on January 18, 1966.

A colonial-style house was standing on the disputed lot when it was bought. Teng Ching Lay
occupied the same, together with his second wife, petitioner Hko Ah Pao, and their children,
petitioners Henry and Anna Teng. Arsenio also stayed in the same house.

Several years later, Arsenio married Germana Chua. They moved to a new house that was
erected on the same lot behind the old colonial house. Germana bore three sons, respondents
herein, namely, Laurence, Anthony and Edmund, all surnamed Ting.
Later, Arsenio and his family relocated to Butuan City but they would stay in their old house in
Malate whenever they came to Manila. A caretaker was hired to oversee it. Teng Ching Lay
also transferred to Butuan City. Petitioners remained in the colonial house, and Teng Ching Lay
would join them each time he went to Manila.

Arsenio died in 1972, predeceasing his father, Teng Ching Lay, and leaving as compulsory
heirs, the surviving spouse, Germana, and respondents who were all minors at that time.

In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of Arsenio's estate before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, the court issued an Order on October 23,
1975 approving the project of partition which included, among others, the property in question
which was adjudicated in favor of respondents.

On February 4, 1976, Germana filed a petition for guardianship with the City Court of Butuan
over the persons and properties of her minor children. The court appointed her as guardian on
November 21, 1978.

In view of the Order of the CFI adjudicating the disputed property in favor of respondents, TCT
No. 63991 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 134412 was issued in the name of
respondents on July 3, 1979.

Two years later, trouble brewed between Teng Ching Lay and his daughter-in-law, Germana,
concerning the properties in Manila and Butuan City, as well as the stocks of Triumph Timber,
Inc. which involved millions of pesos. On April 28, 1981, Teng Ching Lay filed before the City
Court of Butuan a motion to recall Germana's guardianship over her minor children for her
failure to give him, as the paternal grandfather of the minors, notice of the guardianship
proceedings pursuant to Articles 344 and 355 of the Civil Code.[4] He added that Germana
sought the guardianship merely to seek authority to sell the properties of the wards. On her
part, Germana averred that Teng Ching Lay had raised this issue only as a leverage against
her in their case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pertaining to the
liquidation of the assets of Timber Triumph, Inc.

On July 21, 1987, the court rendered a decision revoking the letters of guardianship of
Germana, from which she appealed. On January 30, 1989, Teng Ching Lay died. His surviving
heirs, however, decided not to contest any further the letters of guardianship previously
granted to Germana. Hence, on November 3, 1989, the case was ordered terminated.[5]

An estate tax return signed by petitioner Anna Teng was filed for the estate of Teng Ching Lay
whose given address when he was alive was in Buhangin, Butuan City. The residence of
petitioners who were listed as heirs was stated to be on A. Vasquez Street, Ermita, Manila,
which is the property in question. Appearing on the dorsal side of the estate tax return was a
list of properties belonging to Teng Ching Lay. The only properties that were listed, however,
were those located in Cavite and Butuan City.

On May 27, 1991, respondents, through counsel, sent a demand letter to petitioners to vacate
the property in question. When the latter refused, respondents instituted an ejectment case
against them in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.

Petitioners, in turn, on January 21, 1992, filed a complaint for the cancellation of title and
partition with damages and prayer for a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction against
respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Petitioners, who have been
residing in the property since 1961, demanded the reconveyance of its title in their favor on the
ground that Arsenio merely held the property in trust for Teng Ching Lay.

According to petitioners, Teng Ching Lay purchased the property from the spouses Aristeo
Mayo and Salud Masangkay but it was made to appear in the contract of sale that Arsenio was
the vendee because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens owning land in the
Philippines. They claim that they became aware of the TCT in the name of respondents only
when the latter instituted an ejectment suit against them, and notwithstanding the efforts on
their part to settle the dispute, respondents refused to recognize their ownership of the
property.

Petitioners' principal witness was Angel Sembrano, corporate accountant of Triumph Timber,
Inc., and Teng Ching Lay's personal accountant. According to Sembrano, he met Arsenio when
he was hired as an accountant of Triumph Timber, Inc. in 1959. As Teng Ching Lay's personal
accountant from 1960 to 1989, he prepared the latter's income tax returns and purchases. In
June of 1961, Arsenio allegedly told him that his father was going to buy a house in Manila,
and directed him to prepare a voucher and a check of the corporation for P200,000 payable to
Teng Ching Lay. Said voucher and check, however, along with the other records of the
corporation, were allegedly lost during the flood that hit Butuan City in 1981.

Sembrano likewise stated that when he went to Manila in November of 1961, Teng Ching Lay
brought him to the house that he purportedly bought but since he was a Chinese national at
that time, the title to the property was placed in the name of Arsenio.[6]

On cross-examination, Sembrano mentioned that he did not know who the vendor of the
property was but the purchase price, as he was supposedly told by Arsenio, was P150,000;
that not all the documents of the corporation were presented in the proceedings at the SEC;
that he did not know where the proceeds of the check went; and, that Teng Ching Lay filed
income tax returns for 1961 and 1962. He insisted that Arsenio informed him that the check
was intended for the purchase price of the house and lot in Manila, and that he even saw the
unsigned deed of conveyance.[7]

Respondents, on the other hand, contended that the property was paid for and legally acquired
by their father, Arsenio, and that it was among those adjudicated to them by virtue of a special
proceedings before the CFI of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. They asked for the dismissal
of the complaint, and filed a counterclaim that prayed for damages as well as compensation for
the use of a portion of the property by petitioners.

Meanwhile, on February 24, 1993, the MeTC rendered a decision in the ejectment case
ordering petitioners to vacate the premises. Petitioners appealed to the RTC of Manila but the
RTC affirmed the decision of the MeTC, stating that petitioners failed to take earnest efforts to
reach a compromise agreement with respondents prior to the filing of the ejectment case.

On September 30, 1994, the RTC, in the aforestated civil case, rendered its decision
dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners on the

ground that petitioners failed to prove that Arsenio was merely holding the subject property in
trust for his father, Teng Ching Lay, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.[8]
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC on January 31, 2002, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the lower court in Civil Case
No. 92-60333 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto by this Court.

SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

WHETHER THE RULE ON LACHES MAY BE APPLIED TO THIS CASE.

II

WHETHER SECTION 42 (2ND SENTENCE), RULE 130 OF THE REVISED RULES OF

EVIDENCE AND THE HOLDINGS IN SEVERAL CASES MAY BE APPLICABLE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF ANGEL SEMBRANO RELATIVE TO THE DECLARATION, AS WELL AS
ACTION, OF THE LATE TENG CHING LAY THAT THE LATTER OWNED THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION.

III

WHETHER SECTION 38, RULE 130, OF THE REVISED RULES OF EVIDENCE MAY BE
APPLICABLE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ANGEL SEMBRANO AFFECTING THE
DECLARATION TO HIM OF ARSENIO TING, I.E. "BIBILI SI TATAY NG BAHAY SA MAYNILA"
AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE.

IV

WHETHER THE HOLDING IN PEOPLE V. ULPINDO, 256 SCRA 201 AND PEOPLE V. LIAN,
255 SCRA 532 MAY BE APPLIED TO ANGEL SEMBRANO'S TESTIMONY AS CONTAINED
IN THE TSN.

WHETHER SECTION 34, RULE 130, OF THE REVISED RULES OF EVIDENCE MAY BE
APPLICABLE TO RESPONDENT ANTHONY TING'S ADMISSION AS EXTANT IN THE
RECORD TO SHOW SPECIFIC INTENT, HABIT AND THE LIKE ON THE PART OF TENG
CHING LAY IN HAVING HIS SON, ARSENIO TING, ACT AS HIS TRUSTEE OF SEVERAL
PROPERTIES.

VI

WHETHER SECTION 26, RULE 130 OF THE REVISED RULES OF EVIDENCE (ON
ADMISSION AGAINST INTEREST) AND SECTION 4, RULE 129 (ON JUDICIAL ADMISSION)
OF THE SAME RULES MAY BE APPLIED TO RESPONDENT ANTHONY TING'S
ADMISSION AS EXTANT IN THE RECORD, I.E., THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS
OWNED BY TENG CHING LAY.

VII

WHETHER, AS APPLIED TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THE CASE, THE RULE ON

BURDEN OF EVIDENCE, I.E., TO SHOW THAT ARSENIO TING PAID THE PRICE OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY, BEING CAPABLE OF DOING SO, WAS SHIFTED TO
RESPONDENTS AFTER PETITIONERS HAD SUCCESSFULLY PROVEN, BY TESTIMONIAL
EVIDENCE, THAT THE PURCHASE PRICE OF THE PROPERTY WAS PAID BY TENG
CHING LAY AND MERELY ENTRUSTED THE SAME TO HIS SON, ARSENIO TING, AS THE
FORMER WAS THEN A CHINESE CITIZEN WHO WAS NOT ALLOWED TO OWN REAL
ESTATE PROPERTY (1935 CONSTITUTION) LET ALONE THE FACT THAT THE FORMER,
BY PREVIOUS CONDUCT, HAD ALREADY ENTRUSTED TO HIS SON SEVERAL
PROPERTIES UNDER THE SAME REASON.
The Court notes that while the petition had been filed under Rule 45, the issues and the
contentions advanced herein have been presented in a manner that a resolution of such will
require this Court to re-examine the findings of fact of both the RTC and the CA.

The basic rule is that factual questions are beyond the province of this Court in a petition for
review[10] because only questions purely of law may be raised in such a petition. One test to
determine if there exists a question of fact or law in a given case is whether the Court can
resolve the issue that was raised without having to review or evaluate the evidence, in which
case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it will be a question of fact. Thus, the petition must not
involve the calibration of the probative value of the evidence presented.[11] In addition, the
facts of the case must be undisputed, and the only issue that should be left for the Court to
decide is whether or not the conclusion drawn by the CA from a certain set of facts was
appropriate.[12]

In the present case, however, the circumstances surrounding the ownership of the property
that is central to the parties' disagreement are put at issue. A resolution of this point will require
a re-evaluation of the evidence on record. In an appeal via certiorari, the Court may not review
the factual findings of the CA,[13] and petitioners have not shown that this case falls under any
of the recognized exceptions to this rule.[14]

Nonetheless, even if the Court were to exercise utmost liberality and veer away from the rule,
the records will show that, indeed, petitioners failed to establish their case by a preponderance
of evidence.

In civil cases, the burden of proof to be established by a preponderance of evidence is on the

party who is asserting the affirmative of an issue.[15] Preponderance of evidence means
probability of truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than
that which is offered in opposition thereto.[16]

Petitioners primarily rely on Angel Sembrano's testimony to substantiate their claim. The
latter's testimony, however, consists mainly of hearsay, which carries no probative value.[17]
He did not have personal knowledge as to the execution of the contract of sale between
Arsenio and the Masangkay spouses nor the alleged agreement between the former and Teng
Ching Lay. He could only testify as to what the deceased had allegedly told him. Thus, any
evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its evidentiary weight is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the
witness stand.[18]

Even if the alleged statement of Arsenio to Sembrano relating to the fact that his father, Teng
Ching Lay, was buying a house in Manila, can be admissible in evidence as a declaration
against his pecuniary interest under Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,[19] still, the
veracity as to whether the deceased actually made this statement is subject to scrutiny.
Clearly, the RTC and the CA cast doubt on Sembrano's credibility, and the Court does not find
any reason to hold otherwise.

Time and again, the Court has held that it will not interfere with the trial court's assessment
regarding the credibility of witnesses, absent any showing that it overlooked, misapplied or
misunderstood some facts or circumstances of weight and substance or that it gravely abused
its discretion. Here, both the RTC and the CA were not convinced of the truthfulness of
Sembrano's bare testimony. He did not present any documentary proof to support his
statements, particularly with regard to the P200,000 check that he supposedly gave to Arsenio
for the payment of the property in question.

Furthermore, Sembrano's testimony on behalf of petitioners is about an alleged declaration

against an interest of a person who is dead in an action that is in effect a claim against his
estate. Such a testimony if coming from a party would be barred by the surviving parties rule,
or the dead man's statute, in the Rules of Court:
Section 23, Rule 130. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. - Parties
or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of
unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against
such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death
of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
And while Sembrano is not a party, he is practically a surrogate of petitioners since he was the
personal accountant of their predecessor-in-interest and the corporate accountant of the
corporation he controlled.

At any event, the issues propounded by petitioners have been discussed lengthily and ruled
upon by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions. Hence, the Court does not deem it
necessary to further delve into these matters. The evidence on record supports the assailed
findings and conclusions specifically with regard to the ownership of the property in question
that is reflected in the Torrens title[20] which was issued in the name of Arsenio pursuant to the
deed of sale.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when adopted and affirmed by the
CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court.[21] This Court
is not a trier of facts and generally does not weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by
the CA.[22] Absent any showing that some facts of certain weight and substance were
overlooked which, if considered, would affect the outcome of the case, the Court, as in this
case, will uphold the findings of the RTC and the CA.

Consequently, since petitioners failed to prove that Teng Ching Lay was the real owner of the
property involved herein, their proposition that a constructive trust exists must likewise fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals,
dated January 31, 2002 and May 7, 2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 47804, are
AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.