Published by AU Press, Canada Journal of Research Practice

Journal of Research Practice

Volume 8, Issue 2, Article M14, 2012

Self-Identity Theory and

Main Article:

Research Methods
Abstract
Mardi J. Horowitz

Distinguished Professor of Psychiatry, School of Medicine, University

of California

Langley Porter Psychiatric Institute, 401 Parnassus

San Francisco, CA 94143-0984, UNITED STATES

[email protected]

This article introduces the focus and methods of clinical psychodynamic

research for researchers and professionals from other fields. It draws
attention to the notions of “self” and “identity,” two key concepts in
psychodynamic sciences. Our different experiences of self are a result of
different unconscious generalizations about self becoming dominant at
different times, in different social or cultural settings. These
generalizations, or self- schemas, are fed by various conscious and
unconscious inputs, which may be of personal or social origin.
Accordingly, self-schemas need not be consistent with each other. Their
overall organization (i.e., self-organization) can vary from being rather
fragmented to effectively harmonious. A harmonious level of self-
organization manifests in an intuitive sense of self as intending,
attending, and expecting according to unified attitudes. A fragmented
level of self-organization, on the other hand, manifests in a chaos of
selfhood, accompanied by a loss of emotional governance. Naturally, the
level of self-organization determines the identity of a person, that is, the
person’s conscious or intuitive sense of sameness over time.
Psychodynamic researchers are interested in assessing the level of self-
organization in a person and supporting the person in achieving higher
levels of self- organization, if possible. The article presents different
methods used in such research, namely quantitative modeling based on
self-report data and analysis of verbal narratives. An awareness of this
field can alert other researchers dealing with human beings to the issues
of multiple selves and the role of unconscious generalizations in how
people feel,
think, and behave in different situations.
Index Terms: Suggested Citation:
research education; research experience; research methods; research

process; social psychology; cognitive psychology; psychotherapy;

identity;

psychodynamics; psychological conflict; self; narrative analysis

Horowitz, M. J. (2012). Self-identity theory and research methods.

Journal of Research Practice, 8(2), Article M14. Retrieved from

http://jrp.icaap.org/index.php/jrp/article/view/296/261

Page 1 of 11

Published by AU Press, Canada Journal of Research Practice

1. Notions of Self and Identity

The identity of a person, within a culture, is a topic of concern
throughout the humanities, cognitive science, psychology, and
psychoanalysis. In psychodynamic sciences the complexity of multiple
self-experiences and social presentations in an individual is addressed in
terms of layers of person schematization (Horowitz, 1991). These person
schemas can explain conflicted and perhaps dissociated self-concepts.
This article will discuss the theory as related to research methods,
emphasizing qualitative analysis of narratives from an individual.
1.1. Unconscious Process of Identity
Identity exists in past, present, and future time frames. I am “the me”
that was and my present contains a focus on my becoming even more me
in the near future. Or, perhaps, I feel dissociated now from past “me”
and my expectations of “what next” may seem conflicted. My identity
feelings at 3 a.m. may be more dreamy than my work identity at 3 p.m.
In psychodynamic research on variation in self-states, as related to
motivation, one considers: (a) social views of the person as well as (b)
conscious and (c) unconscious information within that person.
A metaphor of “push-pull-revise” helps us pay attention to the internal
complexity of self-identity structure and experience. Unconsciously,
enduring self-organization results from generalizations made from past
experiences, generalizations that are like making a map, the pattern on
the map then pushed out to organize the stream of thought and
experience. By the “pushes” out of these generalizations the mind/brain
can organize a connectivity between multiple modules. Meanwhile,
mind/brain “pulls” in the perceptions and information processing
products of all other modules and organizes them. At times, in so doing,
it “revises” itself.
Unconscious pictures, inner cognitive working-models, and maps of self
are dynamic and complex networks of rich, but sometimes contradictory
bits of information. The goal for maturity is to increase harmony
between different schematizations. In clinical studies of psychotherapy,
we look for improvements in identity, self-esteem, and relationship
ability that can be called self-transformative. The transformations we
study in examining individualized change processes in psychotherapy—
the revise part of push-pull-revise— are both realistic and imaginary.
Discontinuities, discords, and memory conflicts abound. To deal with
such complexity, it is desirable to have a theory of categories that can
include configurations of multiple selves within one person. We use
these categories to to analyze and structure the contents of narratives.
1.2. Categories of Self: Schemas, Models, and States
The language used is from cognitive science. A self-schema refers to
unconscious and systematized generalization about self. Self-
representation refers to a conscious belief or potential conscious
expression about “me” that may be symbolized in words, images, or
bodily tensions such as posture, gait, muscle tensions, and gestures.
Subjective reports
Page 2 of 11

Published by AU Press, Canada Journal of Research Practice

contain self-representations of a moment or a remembered period.

Observers can infer the underlying stability or unstable fluctuations of
self-schemas.
Each individual has multiple self-schemas, unconsciously coded in a
repertoire, and units of this repertoire can be activated in the pull part of
the metaphor of push-pull-revise (Horowitz, 1998). A self-state is a
condition organized by the activation of a particular self-schema and
may include conscious identity experiences related to the attributes of
that schema. Self-organization is the overall assembly of self-schemas.
Identity is a conscious or intuitive sense of sameness over time.
Self-schemas include scripts, future intentions and expectations about
self-realization, and core values. These self-schemas function as
cognitive maps; simplifying details into attitudes about relationships.
Schemas, like other maps, can add past information to current
information processing. The use of enduring person schemas in
preconscious processing can lead to high-speed formation of potential
action plans. Person schemas such as role relationship models enhance a
person’s ability to respond quickly to threats and social opportunities,
but may introduce systematic and even motivated errors of appraisal
(Horowitz, 1998).
Each person has a repertoire of self-schemas that are dormant in memory
storages; any one or more of these self-schemas can be activated to
organize other aspects of information processing. Active self-schemas
influence a person’s current sense of identity. Alternative self-schemas,
when activated, can shift the person’s state of mind. Such a shift alters
psychological self-state and social self-presentation (Stern, 1985).
To recapitulate: Identity experiences are organized by active self-
schematizations. Self- organization, the totality of one’s self-concepts
and self-schematizations, is not necessarily an integrated and coherent
organization. People vary in how well they harmonize these parts and
how well they have learned realistic and conceptual self- reflective skills
for dealing with contradictions between parts of self.

2. Research Focus and Methods

2.1. Focus: Levels of Self-Organization
In clinical psychodynamic research we are interested in assessing the
level of self- organization in a person and supporting the person in
achieving higher levels of self- organization, if possible. For example, if
organizing a configuration of parental self- schemas is lacking, the
person might experience different identities as states shift. They might
feel in one state like an all-good parent and in another like an all-bad
parent, or feel like a self-righteous child punisher. Emotional regulation
might be impoverished and impulsive maladaptive actions are more
likely to occur.
People shift from one recurrent state of mind to another as various
aspects of their repertoire become more and less dominant as organizers
of information processing and making plans for actions. The more a
person has developed supraordinate self-schemas, linking multiple
subordinate schemas, the more that person will experience a continuity
Page 3 of 11

Published by AU Press, Canada Journal of Research Practice

of identity. A person with self-reflective awareness of continuity in

identity has enhanced self-acceptance and a greater ability to tolerate
ambivalent emotional states that might otherwise occasion a lapse in
identity coherence. A person at a high level of coherence might know
they were sometimes angry and sometimes not angry, but they were
always loving and caring to a child in their parental role.
While multiple self-schemas can explain otherwise mysterious but
recurrent shifts in state of mind and pattern of social behavior, the level
of integration across self-schemas explains some global issues of
emotional regulation. People differ in the degree to which they have
developed high, integrated, levels of self-organization. The more a
person has harmonized conflicted elements into configurations of person
schemas, the more that person can accept contradictions, external
demands, and frustrations. State transitions will be smooth rather than
accompanied with explosive shifts in mood. Response to frustrations
will be softened and although the person will still have intense negative
affects, they are less likely to be experienced as alarming and out of
control.
Table 1 shows levels of self-organization observed in people. The lowest
level is “fragmented,” indicating very weak coherence among self-
schemas and similarly weak correspondence between self-schemas and
the external social reality. The highest level is “harmonious,”
representing a developed state of self-organization and experiences of an
integrated selfhood.
At the top level of self-organization, people have complex and relatively
harmonious schematizations of self. They can be observed to generally
understand and tolerate frustrations and to master threats and fears. They
can be seen to solve moral dilemmas using a hierarchy of values. When
they have negative moods, they accept and contain them. Their
narratives indicate that they often suffer guilt inappropriately or blame
others irrationally. They know that another person is separate and like
them, experiences wishes, fears, emotional reactions, and conflicts. They
use a well-modulated combination of action and restraint. Individuals at
the top level of self-organization usually maintain commitments even
under stress; they are trustworthy; their sense of “I” and “we” is
continuous over long periods; and their self-esteem sustains them
through periods of rejection, deprivation, and conflict. This kind of
person examines pros and cons and can contemplate alternative ways of
handling social conflicts. The person makes apt choices and is able to
accept personal error with appropriate remorse, while maintaining a
good level of self-esteem.
Most people are not at this top level of self-organization. Dissociation of
selves and projections of bad self-attributes onto others occurs to an
irrational degree. Finding methods to assess such levels is, however, not
easy. Various proxies such as self-reports and descriptions of relevant
signs for observer judgments need to be specified.
Page 4 of 11

Published by AU Press, Canada

Journal of Research Practice

Table 1. States of Self-Organization

Level Description

Harmonious

People at this level have an intuitive sense of self as intending, attending, and expecting according to un
(intentionality). When experiencing conflicts and negative moods, they own these as “of the self.” They
and employ rational actions and restraints. Emotional governance is at its best. Such people in almost ev
people with their own intentions, expectations, and emotional reactions. In the mind, perspectives on rel
the present moment.

Mildly conflicted

People with this degree of coherence have an intuitive sense of self that may contain contradictions of in
Maladaptive relationship behaviors may have approach-avoidance conflicts concerning issues of control
a relationship may stand in the way of developing close and genuine connections. However, their self-kn
between positive and negative relational emotionality are usually smooth and remembered.

Vulnerable

In these states, people shift between intense divergent emotions, for example, feeling grandiose then def
usually noted in self-appraisals and reflective discourse. Illusions about extraordinary personal traits ma
Emotional governance is reduced. Rage may erupt at others who are perceived as insulting to the self. In
view others as tools of self, or they may externalize blame onto others.

Disturbed

In these states, people organize mental life using various self-schemas that break with reality. Rage in th
person. The self may be confused with others in terms of who did or felt what. Within self, thoughts may
real action. State transitions can be explosive, and what occurred in a just former state of mind may be a
rupture.

Fragmented In these states, a massive chaos of selfhood can occur. People may regard the self and other
be disowned. This is very painful and can give rise to poorly regulated suicidal or homicidal urges. For t
states are dangerous. The result may be
stigmatization and rejection of the person in this state.

2.2. Methods: Self-Report Questionnaire

Various easy-to-collect self-report measures have been used in
quantitative models to demonstrate the link between perceptions of self
and personal effectiveness. These self- report measures are not sufficient
to reveal the complex contents of conflicts in identity- related beliefs.
For example, Higgins (1987) developed a model that could predict
emotional vulnerability stemming from contradictions between different
manifestations of self: (a) an “actual” self, (b) an “ideal” self of personal
values, (c) an “ought-to-be”
Page 5 of 11

Published by AU Press, Canada Journal of Research Practice

self that one felt a duty to be because of others, and (d) a “can-do” self.
In empirical studies, Higgins found that a large discrepancy between an
actual and ideal self was related to symptoms of depression. An actual
and ought-to-be discrepancy was related to symptoms of anxiety
(Avants, Margolin, & Singer, 1993; Strauman & Higgins, 1987).
Kihlstrom and Cantor (1984) found different configurations of selves
with different relationships: self-schemas of being with a mother were
different from self-schemas associated with ties to a father. Some
configurations may be specific to certain types of relationships, such as
leader-follower, husband-wife, and parent-child (Hart, Stinson, Field,
Ewert, & Horowitz, 1995).
Several investigators found that consistency of authenticity of self-
feelings in different states predicted both physical and psychological
well being (Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, & Ilardi, 1997; Wood, Linley,
Maltby, Baliousis, & Joseph, 2008). People who manifest consistency in
reported traits of self had higher levels of reported self-esteem (Diehl,
Jacobs, & Hastings, 2006). In other research, my colleagues and I used a
short 5-item self-report measure that takes just a minute or two to
complete and that can be used as a repeatable measure since the time
span is the last week (Horowitz, Sonneborn, Sugahara, & Maercker,
1996). This Sense of Self-Regard Questionnaire (SSRQ) has been found
predictive of health or distress over time in two studies—one of HIV
infected men and the other of widows coping with loss.
The SSRQ was filled out by 53 HIV seropositive gay men, who were
then assessed in blood tests for CD4+ cell counts (a measure of immune
functioning) at the same time and again two years later. Greater self-
regard at baseline was significantly and positively correlated with higher
CD4+ counts 29 months later, and this association was strongest among
persons with less social concealment of their gay identity (Ulrich,
Lutgendorf, Stapleton, & Horowitz, 2004). Concealment of gay identity
can be stressful because of a discord in self-state and social self-
presentation, leading to experiences of identity disturbance.
The SSRQ in the second of these studies predicted subsequent
symptoms of distress in widows. Widows filled out a battery of scales
including the SSRQ six months after the death of their spouse. The
scores on the SSRQ at six months were inversely correlated with their
symptom level scores on the Beck Depression Inventory at 14 months
(Horowitz, Sonneborn, Sugahara, & Maercker, 1996).
2.3. Methods: Narrative Analysis
The problems of self leading to disturbances are however, best explored
through narrative analysis, which can also show how problems can be
resolved. My work on assessing conflict among and changes in self-
schemas via narrative analysis will illustrate these benefits.
Relationship conflicts are a key focus in psychodynamic research
(Horowitz, 1991; Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1990). Frank discourse,
as in the context of interviews or psychotherapy, can be transcribed and
analyzed for content. Analysis of narratives can
Page 6 of 11

Published by AU Press, Canada Journal of Research Practice

proceed in steps that progressively reduce the complexity of information

to recurrent patterns.
The specific views of self, and another, are identified by highlighting, or
annotating sections of transcripts. Categories of self-attribution can be
defined by noting repetitions. Summarizing these is a form of qualitative
analysis. Counting repetitions using other judges can then lead to
quantitative analyses.
Transaction sequences are identified and may involve a reordering of
spoken sequences. Imagined elements (“I thought I had become a
ghost”) are designated as such to differentiate them from features found
in stories about what really happened in the past (“I was waking from a
coma in the hospital”).
It may help to use a mapping sentence: “subject” does toward “object,”
“object” does toward “subject.” The sentence used for paraphrasing can
be amplified for roles: I, who am like this and that, did thus and so, to
my husband, who is like this and that, and he responded by doing thus
and so, and I then felt like this. The latter “and then I” can reveal acts of
self-appraisal leading to shame and guilt or pride and self-esteem.
One can take discourse and paraphrase it by such formats in order to
clarify the key descriptions either of self, other, or of a “we.” This
locates repetitions, which are then summarized. In work by my
colleagues and I, a format for summarization has been useful. We called
the self-other model a role relationship model (RRM) (Hart et al., 1995;
Horowitz, 1988, 1991, 1998, 2005; Horowitz & Eells, 1993). We
summarized desired, dreaded, and compromise or defensive RRM
versions into a configuration (RRMC). These contained multiple
selves—one self schema described in each of the RRM of an RRMC.
Details are summarized in Horowitz and Eells (2006). Once contents
have been identified, the variable from narrative analyses that would
relate to self-organizational coherence is a new judgment involving the
level of discord and contradiction between self-schematizations and the
presence or relative absence of supraordinate self-attitudes that could
smooth out and contain discords and contradictions.
Such narrative analyses provide contents that are the particular
attributions of self- schemas and the particular attitudes used in the self-
judgments that can demolish self- esteem. RRM and RRMC formats can
be used to depict desired and dreaded or “defensively safe” roles and
repeated practices within a social group. Of interest, such methods often
draw out values and value conflicts, which are frequently important in
identity growth phenomena. These have possible cultural, ethnic, and
ethnographic extensions.
Self-schemas may be in harmony or in conflict with beliefs of ethnic
peers (Agar, 1986). An individual rejecting a social role of
unquestioning obeisance to a parent, for example, might expect criticism
from all others in the social group, even if there are others who also do
not hold that belief. Values within self-organization can be assessed as
self-critic schemas and these act within the theater of the mind as if they
were different forms of deities, spirits, or pluralities of “we” as in “my
people” (Shweder, 1991). All of these forms of social schemas are
utilized in intuitive self-reflections and self-evaluations. The
Page 7 of 11

Published by AU Press, Canada Journal of Research Practice

attitudes involved and applied to self-states can strengthen or weaken an

individual’s conscious sense of identity. Such complexities can be
examined in intensive narrative analyses that can also show change in
harmony or discord within self over time.
Example. Wish Fear Dilemma
Here is an example of using a mapping sentence to paraphrase what is
said. The narrator (female) is describing experiencing a new intimate
relationship with Sidney (male). This is the kind of relationship she had
for well over a decade with a previous spouse (James, male), who died
suddenly over a year ago.
I went for a weekend with Sidney and it started out to be happy and
exciting for me. Just when I wanted to enjoy how good I looked for the
first time in a long time and what a fine man Sidney really is, I suddenly
thought of James. I felt, I don’t know why, it seems so irrational, very,
very badly, like I was a cheater.
The paraphrase begins with the “I, who am,” format like this: “I who am
a cheater, felt badly about James.” By implication, one might add that
she views James as accusing her of cheating. The paraphrase also has:
“I, who am a good-looking woman, was happy and excited with Sidney,
who is a fine man.”
One paraphrase can go into a desired RRM, the other paraphrase into a
dreaded RRM. An approach-avoidance dilemma results in the cycle or
sequence. It could be paraphrased as:
(Whenever) I, who am a good looking woman, wanted to feel happy and
excited with Sidney, who is a fine man, I, who was a wife to James, felt
badly that I am cheating on James (who is in my unconscious mind yet
alive although I know consciously that he is dead).
As a result of activating this role relationship model of loving Sidney
and so (as she imagines) hurting James, she enters a guilty-feeling state
of mind. The roles of Sidney and James in this kind of “wish fear
dilemma” are also reversible. She feels guilty toward Sidney if she
retains her identity as faithful with and intimate to only James. In this
way a recurring identity and roles of relationship conflict can be
clarified. The narrative analysis could go on to explicate social values
within this subject as rules for right conduct, in this case, her
community’s view on whether or not fidelity to a marriage is permanent
even beyond spousal death.

3. Discussion
Quantitative studies indicate the importance of identity and self-esteem
related dimensions on both psychological and physical well-being, and
these undoubtedly affect social coherence issues as well. Understanding
self-identity in relation to culture requires qualitative studies, and these
rest on a long history of narrative analysis. Psychodynamic research
indicates some ways of bringing categories that can include often
unconscious attitudes and conflicts into the framework of narrative
analyses.
Page 8 of 11

Published by AU Press, Canada Journal of Research Practice

We who see science as a sober and objective search for the truth also
recognize that subjectivity can be both an obstacle and a help: we should
include analysis of our own subjectivity for its assets and liabilities. The
liability is bias. Bias can operate in the categories used to organize
narrative analyses, even though categories for judgments by those who
examine the narratives improve the chances for objectivity and relative
truth.
In the type of narrative analysis discussed in this article, subjectivity is
sometimes a help. The method of configurational analysis and role
relationship models promotes paraphrasing of what the speaker of the
narrative meant. It includes intuitive recognition of patterns of omission,
and may fill in some of the missing information with inferences that
look through defensive avoidances to infer what was probably avoided.
This controlled subjectivity of the analyst may either enrich or endanger
validity. The danger can be reduced by looking for reliability in
inferences. This is done by independent reviews of the same narratives,
using the same categories, but blind to the reports of another team.
For example, two teams can read and infer the patterns of contents in a
defined set of narratives. A third team does not infer patterns but rather
is charged with examining the reports of the two teams for degrees of
agreement and disagreement. This can even add a quantitative
component, a type of reliability rating. This can also lead to qualitative
re- examination of differences in contents reported by the two teams.

4. Conclusions
Psychodynamic studies provide categories of self-attributes, other
person’s roles, and transactional as well as emotional scenarios. These
categories can be used as a systematic format for analyzing and
structuring contents detected in or paraphrased from a transcribed
interview. Psychodynamic studies emphasize focus on conflict within
the mind, and this method allows for an objective approach to specifying
conflicts within parts of the self. This method can be used elsewhere, in
other scholarly disciplines to locate conflicts between sets of meaning.
The word identity itself refers to continuity in a sense of self within a
person, and the word also refers to how that person is socially regarded.
The cultures in question may say whether that regard is positive or
negative, making the person feel pride or shame. An approach that can
describe identity conflicts may be valuable in contemporary cultural
studies. The reason is that continuity is not as traditional as it once was
because change is rampant. An individual’s roles are now subject to a
high degree of plasticity because of the modern high rate of alterations
in economy, belonging, and ecology. Cultures clash socially, and within
the individual mind.
The suitably complex theory of identify and self-organizational structure
presented here may also be useful in conducting multi-cultural studies
where identity change and self- role alternatives are an active part of
historical transition from tradition to modernity. Research practitioners
may find the mapping sentence approach useful as a way to
Page 9 of 11

Published by AU Press, Canada Journal of Research Practice

condense narratives for an analytic review. The condensation to key

variables allows for an objective analysis of what themes are indeed
repetitive.
For example, philosophers might examine narrative for value conflicts
due to rapid changes in moral and spiritual stances. Such scholars could
use a mapping sentence such as this: I, who am (attributes), should
behave towards others, who are (attributes), according to (rules of right
or wrong action) and the consequences will be (what follows). That
which is inserted in the parentheses would be expected to be multiple
patterns, conflicted ones, not unitary ones. In that way common
dilemmas could be highlighted and understood.
Cultural historians and anthropologists, as well as other scholars in the
humanities might use this approach to unpack their own complex tangles
of variables about identity and role. The narratives could be distilled
down into self-concepts and role concepts, as well as scenarios for
accepted and unaccepted actions. The splits and dissociations that
characterize so much of modern life could be objectively laid out for a
given time, place, and group.

Identity Theory
Identity theory is a family of views on the relationship between mind and body. Type Identity
theories hold that at least some types (or kinds, or classes) of mental states are, as a matter of
contingent fact, literally identical with some types (or kinds, or classes) of brain states. The
earliest advocates of Type Identity—U.T. Place, Herbert Feigl, and J.J.C. Smart, respectively—
each proposed their own version of the theory in the late 1950s to early 60s. But it was not until
David Armstrong made the radical claim that all mental states (including intentional ones) are
identical with physical states, that philosophers of mind divided themselves into camps over the
issue.
Over the years, numerous objections have been levied against Type Identity, ranging from
epistemological complaints to charges of Leibniz's Law violations to Hilary Putnam's famous
pronouncement that mental states are in fact capable of being "multiply realized." Defenders of
Type Identity have come up with two basic strategies in response to Putnam's claim: they restrict
type identity claims to particular species or structures, or else they extend such claims to allow
for the possiblity of disjunctive physical kinds. To this day, debate concerning the validity of
these strategies—and the truth of Mind-Brain Type Identity—rages in the philosophical
literature.

Table of Contents
1. Early Versions of the Theory
2. Traditional Objections
3. Type vs. Token Identity
4. Multiple Realizability
5. Attempts at Salvaging Type Identity
6. References and Further Reading
1. Early Versions of the Theory
Place accepted the Logical Behaviorists' dispositional analysis of cognitive and
volitional concepts. With respect to those mental concepts "clustering around the notions of
consciousness, experience, sensation, and mental imagery," however, he held that
no behavioristic account (even in terms of unfulfilled dispositions to behave) would suffice.
Seeking an alternative to the classic dualist position, according to which mental states possess an
ontology distinct from the physiological states with which they are thought to be correlated,
Place claimed that sensations and the like might very well be processes in the brain—despite the
fact that statements about the former cannot be logically analyzed into statements about the
latter. Drawing an analogy with such scientifically verifiable (and obviously contingent)
statements as "Lightning is a motion of electric charges," Place cited potential explanatory power
as the reason for hypothesizing consciousness-brain state relations in terms of identity rather than
mere correlation. This still left the problem of explaining introspective reports in terms of brain
processes, since these reports (for example, of a green after-image) typically make reference to
entities which do not fit with the physicalist picture (there is nothing green in the brain, for
example). To solve this problem, Place called attention to the "phenomenological fallacy"—the
mistaken assumption that one's introspective observations report "the actual state of affairs in
some mysterious internal environment." All that the Mind-Brain Identity theorist need do to
adequately explain a subject's introspective observation, according to Place, is show that the
brain process causing the subject to describe his experience in this particular way is the kind of
process which normally occurs when there is actually something in the environment
corresponding to his description.
At least in the beginning, J.J.C. Smart followed U.T. Place in applying the Identity Theory only
to those mental concepts considered resistant to behaviorist treatment, notably sensations.
Because of the proposed identification of sensations with states of the central nervous system,
this limited version of Mind-Brain Type Identity also became known as Central-State
Materialism. Smart's main concern was the analysis of sensation-reports (e.g. "I see a green
after-image") into what he described, following Gilbert Ryle, as "topic-neutral" language
(roughly, "There is something going on which is like what is going on when I have my eyes
open, am awake, and there is something green illuminated in front of me"). Where Smart
diverged from Place was in the explanation he gave for adopting the thesis that sensations are
processes in the brain. According to Smart (1959), "there is no conceivable experiment which
could decide between materialism and epiphenomenalism" (where the latter is understood as a
species of dualism); the statement "sensations are brain processes," therefore, is not a straight-out
scientific hypothesis, but should be adopted on other grounds. Occam's razor is cited in support
of the claim that, even if the brain-process theory and dualism are equally consistent with the
(empirical) facts, the former has an edge in virtue of its simplicity and explanatory utility.
Occam's razor also plays a role in the version of Mind-Brain Type Identity developed by Feigl
(in fact, Smart claimed to have been influenced by Feigl as well as by Place). On the
epiphenomenalist picture, in addition to the normal physical laws of cause and effect there are
psychophysical laws positing mental effects which do not by themselves function as causes for
any observable behavior. In Feigl's view, such "nomological danglers" have no place in a
respectable ontology; thus, epiphenomenalism (again considered as a species of dualism) should
be rejected in favor of an alternative, monistic theory of mind-body relations. Feigl's suggestion
was to interpret the empirically ascertainable correlations between phenomenal experiences
("raw feels," see Consciousness and Qualia) and neurophysiological processes in terms of
contingent identity: although the terms we use to identify them have different senses, their
referents are one and the same—namely, the immediately experienced qualities themselves.
Besides eliminating dangling causal laws, Feigl's picture is intended to simplify our conception
of the world: "instead of conceiving of two realms, we have only one reality which is represented
in two different conceptual systems."
In a number of early papers, and then at length in his 1968 book, A Materialist of the Mind,
Armstrong worked out a version of Mind-Brain Type Identity which starts from a somewhat
different place than the others. Adopting straight away the scientific view that humans are
nothing more than physico-chemical mechanisms, he declared that the task for philosophy is to
work out an account of the mind which is compatible with this view. Already the seeds were
sown for an Identity Theory which covers all of our mental concepts, not merely those which fit
but awkwardly on the Behaviorist picture. Armstrong actually gave credit to the Behaviorists for
logically connecting internal mental states with external behavior; where they went wrong, he
argued, was in identifying the two realms. His own suggestion was that it makes a lot more sense
to define the mental not as behavior, but rather as the inner causes of behavior. Thus, "we reach
the conception of a mental state as a state of the person apt for producing certain ranges of
behavior." Armstrong's answer to the remaining empirical question—what in fact is the intrinsic
nature of these (mental) causes?—was that they are physical states of the central nervous system.
The fact that Smart himself now holds that all mental states are brain states (of course, the
reverse need not be true), testifies to the influence of Armstrong's theory.
Besides the so-called "translation" versions of Mind-Brain Type Identity advanced by Place,
Smart, and Armstrong, according to which our mental concepts are first supposed to be
translated into topic-neutral language, and the related version put forward by Feigl, there are also
"disappearance" (or "replacement") versions. As initially outlined by Paul Feyerabend (1963),
this kind of Identity Theory actually favors doing away with our present mental concepts. The
primary motivation for such a radical proposal is as follows: logically representing the identity
relation between mental states and physical states by means of biconditional "bridge laws" (e.g.,
something is a pain if and only if it's a c-fiber excitation) not only implies that mental states have
physical features; "it also seems to imply (if read from the right to the left) that some physical
events...have non-physical features." In order to avoid this apparent dualism of properties,
Feyerabend stressed the incompatibility of our mental concepts with empirical discoveries
(including projected ones), and proposed a redefinition of our existent mental terms. Different
philosophers took this proposal to imply different things. Some advocated a wholesale scrapping
of our ordinary language descriptions of mental states, such that, down the road, people might
develop a whole new (and vastly more accurate) vocabulary to describe their own and others'
states of mind. This begs the question, of course, what such a new-and-improved vocabulary
would look like. Others took a more theoretical/conservative line, arguing that our familiar ways
of describing mental states could in principle be replaced by some very different (and again,
vastly more accurate) set of terms and concepts, but that these new terms and concepts would
not—at least not necessarily—be expected to become part of ordinary language. Responding to
Feyerabend, a number of philosophers expressed concern about the appropriateness of
classifying disappearance versions as theories of Mind-Brain Type Identity. But Richard Rorty
(1965) answered this concern, arguing that there is nothing wrong with claiming that "what
people now call 'sensations' are (identical with) certain brain processes." In his Postscript to "The
'Mental' and the 'Physical'," Feigl (1967) confessed an attraction to this version of the Identity
Theory, and over the years Smart has moved in the same direction.
2. Traditional Objections
A number of objections to Mind-Brain Type Identity, some a great deal stronger than others,
began circulating soon after the publication of Smart's 1959 article. Perhaps the weakest were
those of the epistemological variety. It has been claimed, for example, that because people have
had (and still do have) knowledge of specific mental states while remaining ignorant as to the
physical states with which they are correlated, the former could not possibly be identical with the
latter. The obvious response to this type of objection is to call attention to the contingent nature
of the proposed identities—of course we have different conceptions of mental states and their
correlated brain states, or no conception of the latter at all, but that is just because (as Feigl made
perfectly clear) the language we use to describe them have different meanings. The contingency
of mind-brain identity relations also serves to answer the objection that since presently accepted
correlations may very well be empirically invalidated in the future, mental states and brain states
should not be viewed as identical.
A more serious objection to Mind-Brain Type Identity, one that to this day has not been
satisfactorily resolved, concerns various non-intensional properties of mental states (on the one
hand), and physical states (on the other). After-images, for example, may be green or purple in
color, but nobody could reasonably claim that states of the brain are green or purple. And
conversely, while brain states may be spatially located with a fair degree of accuracy, it has
traditionally been assumed that mental states are non-spatial. The problem generated by
examples such as these is that they appear to constitute violations of Leibniz's Law, which states
that if A is identical with B, then A and B must be indiscernible in the sense of having in
common all of their (non-intensional) properties. We have already seen how Place chose to
respond to this type of objection, at least insofar as it concerns conscious experiences—that is,
by invoking the so-called "phenomenological fallacy." Smart's response was to reiterate the point
that mental terms and physical terms have different meanings, while adding the somewhat
ambiguous remark that neither do they have the same logic. Lastly, Smart claimed that if his
hypothesis about sensations being brain processes turns out to be correct, "we may easily adopt a
convention...whereby it would make sense to talk of an experience in terms appropriate to
physical processes" (the similarity to Feyerabend's disappearance version of Mind-Brain Type
Identity should be apparent here). As for apparent discrepancies going in the other direction (e.g.,
the spatiality of brain states vs. the non-spatiality of mental states), Thomas Nagel in 1965
proposed a means of sidestepping any objections by redefining the candidates for identity: "if the
two sides of the identity are not a sensation and a brain process but my having a certain sensation
or thought and my body's being in a certain physical state, then they will both be going on in the
same place—namely, wherever I (and my body) happen to be." Suffice to say, opponents of
Mind-Brain Type Identity found Nagel's suggestion unappealing.
The last traditional objection we shall look at concerns the phenomenon of "first-person
authority"; that is, the apparent incorrigibility of introspective reports of thoughts and sensations.
If I report the occurrence of a pain in my leg, then (the story goes) I must have a pain in my leg.
Since the same cannot be said for reports of brain processes, which are always open to question,
it might look like we have here another violation of Leibniz's Law. But the real import of this
discrepancy concerns the purported correlations between mental states and brain states. What are
we to make of cases in which the report of a brain scientist contradicts the introspective report,
say, of someone claiming to be in pain? Is the brain scientist always wrong? Smart's initial
response to Kurt Baier, who asked this question in a 1962 article, was to deny the likelihood that
such a state of affairs would ever come about. But he also put forward another suggestion,
namely, that "not even sincere reports of immediate experience can be absolutely incorrigible." A
lot of weight falls on the word "absolutely" here, for if the incorrigibility of introspective reports
is qualified too strongly, then, as C.V. Borst noted in 1970, "it is somewhat difficult to see how
the required psycho-physical correlations could ever be set up at all."

3. Type vs. Token Identity

Something here needs to be said about the difference between Type Identity and Token Identity,
as this difference gets manifested in the ontological commitments implicit in various Mind-Brain
Identity theses. Nagel was one of the first to distinguish between "general" and "particular"
identities in the context of the mind-body problem; this distinction was picked up by Charles
Taylor, who wrote in 1967 that "the failure of [general] correlations...would still allow us to look
for particular identities, holding not between, say, a yellow after-image and a certain type of
brain process in general, but between a particular occurrence of this yellow after-image and a
particular occurrence of a brain process." In contemporary parlance: when asking whether mental
things are the same as physical things, or distinct from them, one must be clear as to whether the
question applies to concrete particulars (e.g., individual instances of pain occurring in particular
subjects at particular times) or to the kind (of state or event) under which such concrete
particulars fall.
Token Identity theories hold that every concrete particular falling under a mental kind can be
identified with some physical (perhaps neurophysiological) happening or other: instances of
pain, for example, are taken to be not only instances of a mental state (e.g., pain), but instances
of some physical state as well (say, c-fiber excitation). Token Identity is weaker
than Type Identity, which goes so far as to claim that mental kinds themselves are physical
kinds. As Jerry Fodor pointed out in 1974, Token Identity is entailed by, but does not entail,
Type Identity. The former is entailed by the latter because if mental kinds themselves are
physical kinds, then each individual instance of a mental kind will also be an individual instance
of a physical kind. The former does not entail the latter, however, because even if a concrete
particular falls under both a mental kind and a physical kind, this contingent fact "does not
guarantee the identity of the kinds whose instantiation constitutes the concrete particulars."
So the Identity Theory, taken as a theory of types rather than tokens, must make some claim to
the effect that mental states such as pain (and not just individual instances of pain) are
contingently identical with—and therefore theoretically reducible to—physical states such as c-
fiber excitation. Depending on the desired strength and scope of mind-brain identity, however,
there are various ways of refining this claim.

4. Multiple Realizability
In "The Nature of Mental States," (1967) Hilary Putnam introduced what is widely considered
the most damaging objection to theories of Mind-Brain Type Identity—indeed, the objection
which effectively retired such theories from their privileged position in modern debates
concerning the relationship between mind and body.

Putnam's argument can be paraphrased as follows: (1) according to the Mind-Brain Type Identity
theorist (at least post-Armstrong), for every mental state there is a unique physical-chemical state
of the brain such that a life-form can be in that mental state if and only if it is in that physical
state. (2) It seems quite plausible to hold, as an empirical hypothesis, that physically possible
life-forms can be in the same mental state without having brains in the same unique physical-
chemical state. (3) Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the Mind-Brain Type Identity theorist is
correct.

In support of the second premise above—the so-called "multiple realizability" hypothesis—

Putnam raised the following point: we have good reason to suppose that somewhere in the
universe—perhaps on earth, perhaps only in scientific theory (or fiction)—there is a physically
possible life-form capable of being in mental state X (e.g., capable of feeling pain) without being
in physical-chemical brain state Y (that is, without being in the same physical-chemical brain
state correlated with pain in mammals). To follow just one line of thought (advanced by Ned
Block and Jerry Fodor in 1972), assuming that the Darwinian doctrine of evolutionary
convergence applies to psychology as well as behavior, "psychological similarities across species
may often reflect convergent environmental selection rather than underlying physiological
similarities." Other empirically verifiable phenomena, such as the plasticity of the brain, also
lend support to Putnam's argument against Type Identity. It is important to note, however,
that Token Identity theories are fully consistent with the multiple realizability of mental states.
5. Attempts at Salvaging Type Identity
Since the publication of Putnam's paper, a number of philosophers have tried to save Mind-Brain
Type Identity from the philosophical scrapheap by making it fit somehow with the claim that the
same mental states are capable of being realized in a wide variety of life-forms and physical
structures. Two strategies in particular warrant examination here.

In a 1969 review of "The Nature of Mental States," David Lewis attacked Putnam for targeting
his argument against a straw man. According to Lewis, "a reasonable brain-state theorist would
anticipate that pain might well be one brain state in the case of men, and some other brain (or
non-brain) state in the case of mollusks. It might even be one brain state in the case of Putnam,
another in the case of Lewis." But it is not so clear (in fact it is doubtful) that Lewis' appeal to
"tacit relativity to context" will succeed in rendering Type Identity compatible with the multiple
realizability of mental states. Although Putnam does not consider the possibility of species-
specificmultiple realization resulting from such phenomena as injury compensation, congenital
defects, mutation, developmental plasticity, and, theoretically, prosthetic brain surgery, neither
does he say anything to rule them out. And this is not surprising. As early as 1960, Identity
theorists such as Stephen Pepper were acknowledging the existence of species (even system)-
specific multiple realizability due to emergencies, accidents, injuries, and the like: "it is
not...necessary that the [psychophysical] correlation should be restricted to areas of strict
localization. One area of the brain could take over the function of another area of the brain that
has been injured." Admittedly, some of the phenomena listed above tell against Lewis' objection
more than others; nevertheless, prima facie there seems no good reason to deny the possibility of
species-specific multiple realization.
In a desperate attempt at invalidating the conclusion of Putnam's argument, the brain-state
theorist can undoubtedly come up with additional restrictions to impose upon the first premise,
e.g., with respect to time. This is the strategy of David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson,
who wrote in a 1996 book that "there is...a better way to respond to the multiple realizability
point [than to advocate token identity]. It is to retain a type-type mind-brain identity theory, but
allow that that the identities between mental types and brain types may—indeed, most likely
will—need to be restricted. Identity statements need to include an explicit temporal restriction."
Mental states such as pain may not be identical with, say, c-fiber excitation in humans (because
of species-specific multiple realization), but—the story goes—they could very well be identical
with c-fiber excitation in humans at time T. The danger in such an approach, besides its ad
hoc nature, is that the type physicalist basis from which the Identity Theorist begins starts
slipping into something closer to token physicalism (recall that concrete particulars are
individual instances occurring in particular subjects at particular times). At the very least, Mind-
Brain Type Identity will wind up so weak as to be inadequate as an account of the nature of
mental.
Another popular strategy for preserving Type Identity in the face of multiple realization is to
allow for the existence of disjunctive physical kinds. By defining types of physical states in
terms of disjunctions of two or more physical "realizers," the correlation of one such realizer
with a particular (type) mental state is sufficient. The search for species- or system-specific
identities is thereby rendered unnecessary, as mental states such as pain could eventually be
identified with the (potentially infinite) disjunctive physical state of, say, c-fiber excitation (in
humans), d-fiber excitation (in mollusks), and e-network state (in a robot). In "The Nature of
Mental States," Putnam dismisses the disjunctive strategy out of hand, without saying why he
thinks the physical-chemical brain states to be posited in identity claims must be uniquely
specifiable. Fodor (in 1974) and Jaegwon Kim (1992), both former students of Putnam, tried
coming to his rescue by producing independent arguments which purport to show that
disjunctions of physical realizers cannot themselves be kinds. Whereas Fodor concluded that
"reductionism... flies in the face of the facts," however, Kim concluded that psychology is open
to sundering "by being multiply locally reduced."
Even if disjunctive physical kinds are allowed, it may be argued that the strategy in
question stillcannot save Type Identity from considerations of multiple realizability. Assume that
all of the possible physical realizers for some mental state M are represented by the ideal,
perhaps infinite, disjunctive physical state P; then it could never be the case that a physically
possible life-form is in M and not in P. Nevertheless, we have good reason to think that some
physically possible life-form could be in P without being in M—maybe P in that life-form
realizes some other mental state. As Block and Fodor have argued, "it seems plausible that
practically any type of physical state could realize any type of psychological state in some
physical system or other." The doctrine of "neurological equipotentiality" advanced by renowned
physiological psychologist Karl Lashley, according to which given neural structures underlie a
whole slew of psychological functions depending upon the character of the activities engaged in,
bears out this hypothesis. The obvious way for the committed Identity theorist to deal with this
problem—by placing disjunctions of potentially infinite length on either side of a biconditional
sign—would render largely uninformative any so-called "identity" claim. Just how
uninformative depends on the size of the disjunctions (the more disjuncts, the less informative).
Infinitely long disjunctions would render the identity claim completely uninformative. The only
thing an Identity Theory of this kind could tell us is that at least one of the mental disjuncts is
capable of being realized by at least one of the physical disjuncts. Physicalism would survive,
but barely, and in a distinctly non-reductive form.
Recently, however, Ronald Endicott has presented compelling considerations which tell against
the above argument. There, physical states are taken in isolation of their context. But it is only if
the context is varied that Block and Fodor's remark will come out true. Otherwise, mental states
would not be determined by physical states, a situation which contradicts the widely accepted
(in contemporary philosophy of mind) "supervenience principle": no mental difference without a
physical difference. A defender of disjunctive physical kinds can thus claim that M is identical
with some ideal disjunction of complex physical properties like "C1 & P1," whose disjuncts are
conjunctions of all the physical states (Ps) plus their contexts (Cs) which give rise to M. So while
"some physically possible life-form could be in P without being in M," no physically possible
life-form could be in C1 & P1 without being in M. Whether Endicott's considerations constitute
a sufficient defense of the disjunctive strategy is still open to debate. But one thing is clear—in
the face of numerous and weighty objections, Mind-Brain Type Identity (in one form or another)
remains viable as a theory of mind-body relations.