Logic and Law
Logic and Law
Submitted by:
Divyansh Agrawal
Submitted to:
1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….1
2. Research Design…………………………………………………………………………..2
4. Research Questions……………………………………………………………………….2
11. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………….10
12. Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………..11
1. INTRODUCTION
The rule of law rests on the quality of legal reasoning. The rule of law requires that similar
cases should be decided similarly, that each case should be decided on its merits, and that
decision-making processes should comply with applicable rules of procedure and evidence.
Making the reasoning behind such decision-making transparent and open to scrutiny shifts
the decisions away from mere subjective preference and toward objective rationale. An
important means, therefore, of achieving the rule of law is articulating and evaluating the
various elements of legal reasoning—the reasoning involved in interpreting constitutions,
statutes, and regulations, in balancing fundamental principles and policies, in adopting and
modifying legal rules, in applying those rules to cases, in evaluating evidence, and in making
ultimate decisions.
We spend relatively little time refining general methods for discriminating between good
patterns of reasoning and bad, or developing theories for explaining precisely why good
patterns are good and bad patterns are bad. In sum, we do not pay particular attention to the
logic of legal reasoning1. Law as a subject which is so dependent upon constructing good
arguments, we are oddly uninterested in good methodology for argument construction.
The Idea begins with the basic thinking behind the relation between law and logic then
briefly discusses three types of legal reasoning. Rule-based reasoning and evidence
evaluation, as they are found in law, exhibit distinctive logical features. So does second-order
process reasoning, which can modify both rule-based reasoning and evidence evaluation.
Taken together, these three types give legal reasoning a complex “default” character that is
distinctive to it. In addition, the structure of the legal community promotes the evolution of
reasoning patterns that are well-adapted to the task of solving legal problems. It must be
enough for now to suggest why such research is needed, and why it promises to be a
successful means of discovering the relation between logic and law.
1
The word “logic” refers here to “the study of the methods and principles used to distinguish correct
reasoning from incorrect reasoning,” and to the theories that result from such study. See IRVING M. COPI &
CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 3 (10th ed. 1998). “Correct” reasoning warrants the conclusion to be
true, probably true, or at least plausible. It provides adequate justification for a reasonable person’s adoption
of the conclusion. Logic is distinct from the study of methods for discovering correct lines of reasoning (for
example, heuristics), although logic can help identify the desired goal or end product of heuristic methods.
Logic is also distinct from the study of persuasive use of reasoning in human dialogue (for example,
pragmatics, rhetoric, or psychology), although it can help identify a reasonable basis for persuasion. Logic is
the study of how we ought to reason, if our goal is to discover truth.
1
2. Research Design
In order to approach the prescribed objectives of study, doctrinal model of research
methodology is used by the researcher. The researcher initially introduces the concept of
logic and law and from various offline and online sources. Then, researcher gives brief
thoughts about the rule of law as well as about deductive reasoning, rule-based reasoning,
evidence evaluation, and second-order process reasoning, through which he suggests that
there is something distinctive about logic when applied to law. The researcher has taken help
from the primary sources of information like books and e-sources.
3. Aim and Objectives
The advancement of knowledge is one of the important objectives of the research which
helps in advance a sense of continuity and awareness about the unknown things. However,
the academic objective of literary research is to sharpen the critical approach, insight and
literary sensibility because research cultivates one’s own ability for abstract things.
Therefore, research helps in broadening the mind and makes the researcher aware of the
whole panorama of human life. For further study of logic and law; I would have to decide
some aims and objectives for this research. These are as follows:
4. Research Questions
I would have to decide some questions for this research. These are as follows:
Research is a never ending process of finding and analyzing new ideas. It [Research] is a time
bound activity, and it is strongly result-oriented. Hence, it requires meticulous plan and
efficient execution. The research is based on theoretical material. I would like to concentrate
on the relation in logic and law and various logical reasoning on which law is based.
2
6. LOGIC IN RELATION TO LAW
There is, no doubt, an intimate relation between logic and law. This fact is apparent from
expressions we frequently hear after the trial of a well-contested case where the best legal
talent has been employed on both sides. We often hear expressions as this: "The lawyer for
the defense gave a very logical argument to the jury." "The plaintiff's attorney introduced his
evidence in a logical manner." Before entering into the relation, it is necessary first to give a
short outline of the basis of logic. Logic may be defined as the science of the principles and
conditions of correct thinking; or, in other words, the science which directs our mental
operations in the discovery and proof of truth. Logic is a science in the sense that it is
organized knowledge involving principles.
The influence of logic upon law arises from one fundamental fact, that laws are not self-
applicable - and a rule of law isolated from a world of fact is no more than a speculative
ghost. Principles "live, move and have their being" as indicators of controlling facts. Law,
accurately speaking, is organized principle, and from a political point of view, is the chart by
which human action, in terms of fact is regulated.
Briefly, then, the function of logical reasoning and the connection with the law is to secure
the efficient application of legal principles. Dr. Johnson's definition of lawyers, as reported
by Boswell, contains much of the meat of the matter. "Lawyers," he says, "are a class of the
community who by study and experience have acquired the art and power of arranging
evidence, and applying to the points at issue what the law has settled." From what follows we
will see how accurate Dr. Johnson's definition is, and the art and power of arranging
evidence, and of applying to the points at issue what the law has settled, is the ability to do
this in a logical manner. In other words, it is the efficient application of legal principles.2
Logic is the lifeblood of law3. In case after case, prosecutors, defense counsel, civil
attorneys and judges call upon the rules of logic to structure their arguments. Law professors,
for their part, demand that students defend their comments with coherent, identifiable logic.
We are all familiar with the great line spoken by Professor Kingsfield in The Paper Chase:
“You come in here with a head full of mush and you leave thinking like a lawyer.” What is
thinking like a lawyer? It means employing logic to construct arguments. Our modest claim is
2
Nicholas F. Lucas, Logic and Law, 3 Marq. L. Rev. 203 (1919).
3
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Common Law 1 (1881).
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that a person familiar with the basics of logical thinking is more likely to argue effectively
than one who is not.4
One should make themselves intimately familiar with the fundamentals of deductive
reasoning. Deductive reasoning, as Aristotle taught long ago, is based on the act of proving a
conclusion by means of two other propositions. Perhaps 90 percent of legal issues can be
resolved by deduction, so the importance of understanding this type of reasoning cannot be
overstated.
Logic anchors the law. The law’s insistence on sound, explicit reasoning keeps lawyers and
judges from making arguments based on untethered, unprincipled, and undisciplined
hunches.5 Traditionally, logicians separate the wider universe of logical reasoning into two
general categories: inductive and deductive. As we see, both branches of logic play important
roles in our legal system. We begin with deductive reasoning because it is the driving force
behind most judicial opinions. Defined broadly, deduction is reasoning in which a conclusion
is compelled by known facts.6 For example, if we know that Earth is bigger than Mars, and
that Jupiter is bigger than Earth, then we also know that Jupiter must be bigger than Mars. Or,
imagine that we know our dog becomes deathly ill every time he eats chocolate. From these
examples, we can get an idea of the basic structure of deductive arguments: If A and B are
true, then C also must be true.
The specific form of deductive reasoning that one finds lurking below the surface of most
judicial opinions and briefs is the syllogism— a label logicians attach to any argument in
which a conclusion is inferred from two premises. For example:
Socrates is a man.
4
Mary Massaron Ross, A Basis for Legal Reasoning: Logic on Appeal, J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 179,
182 (2006).
5
See JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK 17 (1933). Dewey says that reasoned thought “converts action that is
merely appetitive, blind and impulsive into intelligent action. Id. S. Morris Engel puts it this way: “The study of
logic . . . helps us free ourselves from ignorant thoughts and actions.” S. MORRIS ENGEL, WITH GOOD
REASON: AN INTRODUCTION TO INFORMAL FALLACIES 42 (1994).
6
See EDWARD P.J. CORBETT & ROBERT J. CONNORS, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 32
(1999) (describing deductive reasoning as “an act of the mind in which, from the relation of two propositions
to each other, we infer, i.e., understand and affirm, a third proposition”).
4
The three parts are called the major premise, the minor premise, and the conclusion. The
major premise states a broad and generally applicable truth. In this example, “All men are
mortal.” The minor premise states a specific and usually more narrowly applicable fact:
“Socrates is a man.” The conclusion then draws upon these premises and offers a new insight
that is known to be true based on the premises: “Socrates is a mortal.” It is no exaggeration to
say that the logic lies at the heart of legal writing.7 Consider the examples taken from
watershed Supreme Court opinions:
Marbury v. Madison8
The Judicial Department’s province and duty is to say what the law is.
Therefore the province and duty of the Supreme Court is to say what the law is.
Therefore a separate educational facility for black children is not permitted under the
Constitution.
A primary strategy for deciding similar cases similarly is to develop and apply substantive
legal rules, which prescribe particular outcomes for particular types of cases. The substantive
rules of law state the conditions under which particular types of governmental action are
justified. Formal logic represents such rules as “conditional propositions.”11 A “proposition”
7
RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 38-39 (1990) (describing the strength of the logic in
legal reasoning).
8
1 Cranch 137 (1803)
9
349 U.S. 294 (1955)
10
The Stages of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy, and Realism, 48 VILL. L. REV. 305, 310 (2003). Justice
Scalia argues that a formalist approach to legal reasoning ensures predictability and fairness. Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1182 (1989).
11
Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by
Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 972 (1996) (defining “rule” in a “logically spare manner, as a prescriptive
5
is the descriptive content of an assertion or statement. It is capable of being either true or
false, and is usually expressed in ordinary language by a sentence or a clause. A
“conditional” proposition has the logical form “if p, then q,” where p and q stand for two
constituent propositions. In the terms of this conditional schema, a legal rule states that if
proposition p (the condition) is true, then this fact warrants that proposition q (the conclusion)
is also true. A warranted conclusion can then warrant additional inferences, based on
additional rules, and can ultimately help justify action or inaction.
While traditional logic has focused on propositions as having one of two values (“true” and
“false”), the dynamic process of rule-based legal reasoning is better understood as assigning
to propositions one of three values (“true” / “undecided” / “false”). When a legal proceeding
begins, all propositions that form the conditions of the applicable legal rules are “undecided.”
Participants in the legal process produce evidence and arguments to persuade the decision-
maker (whether judge, regulator, or fact finder) to change the values of those propositions to
either “true” or “false.” Put another way, the legal rules identify the propositions that are
relevant within the type of proceeding, but the particular proceeding begins with the decision-
maker being neutral on whether the conditions for applying those rules are satisfied or not.
A feature of rule-based legal reasoning that challenges traditional deductive logic is the
possibility of changing the rules themselves as a result of the reasoning. For example, within
common law systems, courts have inherent authority to elaborate new legal rules that apply to
the very case being decided, as well as to future cases. Even when the authority is legislative
and the legal rules are derived from statutes or regulations, a court or administrative agency
has considerable discretion to elaborate new rules of application in pending cases. Whenever
a court or agency explicates a new definition for a legal term, or interprets a legal phrase, or
carves out an exception to an existing rule, it creates a new rule. Such new rules may create
new conditions that extend the branches of the rules tree, or create exceptions that add
defeaters to the tree. Courts sometimes also overrule prior cases, hold statutes
unconstitutional, or vacate administrative regulations, thus removing branches from the tree.
Under the rule of law, however, the action of changing a substantive rule is itself governed by
legal rules and must be justified in each particular case. This second-order aspect of legal
reasoning (reasoning about the rules themselves) will be discussed in a later section of this
Idea.
proposition that has a logical structure the most abstract form of which is reflected in the standard conditional
proposition, either propositional (‘if P then Q’) or predicate (‘for all x, if x is an F then x is a G’)”).
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9. ROLE OF LOGIC IN EVIDENCE EVALUATION
The legal rules therefore identify those issues of fact that are relevant to proving the ultimate
issue of fact.
As the branches of the implication tree extend downward, the terminal conditions at the end
of each sub-branch (the last propositions in each chain) constitute the issues of fact that are
relevant. In any particular case, various participants (such as private parties, prosecutors, or
administrative staffs) produce evidence for the legal record, and use that evidence to try to
prove or disprove those issues of fact. The fact finder’s role is evidence evaluation: deciding
which evidence is relevant to which issues of fact, evaluating the probative value of the
relevant evidence, and making findings of fact based on that evidence. The logic of evidence
evaluation, therefore, studies the methods and principles for the inferential aspects of the
factfinder’s task. It explains the reasoning that a reasonable fact finder would use to
determine the probative value of the evidence.
When a legal proceeding begins, the applicable legal rules identify all of the issues of fact
that may be relevant. The factfinder then links the legally available evidentiary assertions to
those issues of fact, using as heuristics those patterns of default reasoning familiar to the
factfinder. (A logic of evidence evaluation would try to capture the acceptable patterns of
reasoning as plausibility schemas.) The choice of pattern depends upon the nature of the issue
of fact to be proved and the nature of the available evidence. When patterns of evidence are
linked or attached to the terminal propositions of the inverted rule tree, they extend the
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branches of that tree further downward. As the schematic in Figure 2 suggests, the complete
logical model for the legal reasoning in a particular case (the “inference tree” for the case)
has the shape of an inverted triangle, with the implication tree generating the upper branches
of the triangle and the attached patterns of evidence evaluation extending those branches
downward to the evidentiary assertions.
After the factfinder organizes the evidence by relevance, evaluation can proceed upward from
the bottom of the extended tree. After the fact finder assigns plausibility-values to the
evidentiary assertions, the instantiated plausibility schemas warrant the plausibility-values of
higher-level assertions. At the point in each branch where the evidentiary assertions end and
the condition of a rule occurs, the applicable standard of proof directs the factfinder about
how to make a finding of fact based on the plausibility of the evidence. A preponderance-of-
evidence standard is the rule that a factfinder must find the issue of fact to be “true” if the
totality of relevant evidence is to any degree plausible, and must find the issue of fact to be
“false” if that evidence is to any degree implausible. In addition, the legal rules on burden of
persuasion determine which party must lose (which finding to make) if the evidence is
“undecided” or in equipoise.Discovering the logic of legal reasoning means making this
process of evidence evaluation transparent.
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12
rules, to warrant presumptive conclusions, which are then subject to future revision. The
highly structured framework in which law accomplishes evidence evaluation poses
significant challenges to traditional logic.
Legal decision-making is itself a process governed by the rule of law, and a third area of legal
reasoning warrants conclusions about the structure of that process. Process rules allow the
decision-making process to be dynamic, participatory, and interactive, while ensuring that the
process serves the rule of law and the appropriate balance of epistemic and non-epistemic
objectives. Different participants can play different roles, with divisions of labor and
responsibility, ideally within a single, fair, and efficient process. Some participants have
authority to constrain the decision-making power or discretion of other participants. For
example, parties, trial judges, juries, and appellate judges have distinct roles in judicial trials,
and public commenters, regulators, and reviewing courts have other roles in administrative
rulemakings. Proceedings consist of many points where different participants must make
decisions, and many of those decisions (such as rulings on motions) are themselves actions
governed by legal rules and must be warranted by the available evidence.
From the standpoint of logic, such process decisions involve the same kind of rule-based
reasoning and evidence evaluation discussed above. The ultimate issue to be decided may be
whether the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a particular case, or whether a particular
document is admissible as evidence. For such decisions, legal rules define terms and structure
the acceptable lines of reasoning, and the issues of fact often require evidence evaluation. For
example, the citizenship of a party might be a factor in deciding jurisdiction, or the method of
obtaining a document might affect its admissibility as evidence. The logic of rule-based
reasoning and evidence evaluation, therefore, also applies to the reasoning about process
decisions.
Changing legal rules incrementally is a practice that addresses concerns for deciding similar
cases similarly over time, for maintaining predictability of outcome, and for providing due
notice to potentially affected parties. Decisions about adopting or modifying legal rules,
therefore, generally consider cases that were decided earlier. The logic of legal reasoning
should capture the kinds of reasons that courts routinely give for considering two cases to be
similar, and for distinguishing one case from another. Making such reasoning transparent will
be a very difficult task. At a minimum, it will involve identifying the attributes that are
12
See Walker, supra note 19, at 194-95.
9
relevant for comparing legal cases, devising a valid and reliable method of classifying actual
cases on those attributes, and determining how judges and regulators should decide whether
two cases are sufficiently similar or dissimilar.13
11. CONCLUSION
Legal reasoning is the method by which lawyers invent arguments, judges and regulators
make considered legal decisions, and students and professionals learn the law. Legal
language and reasoning, moreover, are evolving, as we adapt them to solve new legal
problems. The existence of a hierarchy of legal decision-makers ensures that all legal
professionals (those who seek to influence the decisions of those decision-makers) use legal
language in ways that judges, regulators, and other attorneys all understand. The goal of this
idea is to be suggestive but open-ended about discovering the logic in law. These brief
thoughts about the rule of law as well as about deductive reasoning, rule-based reasoning,
evidence evaluation, and second-order process reasoning, can only suggest that there is
something distinctive about logic when applied to law.
We in the legal profession have little incentive to engage in such research if we do not
sense a need for it. And if we do not sense that the reasoning we apply to legal problems has
any distinctive and coherent structure, we are unlikely to try to study that structure. What we
need is a professional awakening—to the possibility of discovering a useful logic in law.
13
L. KARL BRANTING, REASONING WITH RULES AND PRECEDENTS: A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF LEGAL
ANALYSIS 6 (2000) (discussing the research goal of using rule-based reasoning and case-based reasoning “as
complementary processes for classification and explanation in legal analysis”); Ashley & Rissland, Law,
Learning, supra note 8, at 33–54 (surveying “the HYPO family of case-based reasoning (CBR) models,” including
HYPO, CABARET, and CATO); Rissland, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 8, at 1968–78 (surveying early
developments in AI and law that used case-based reasoning).
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12. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books Referred
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