ARTICLE VI.

THE LEGISLATIVE POWER

I. Powers of Congress in general

A. Legislative power (Sec. 1)
1. Meaning
CASES:
Ople vs. Torres, G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998 – delineation of Legislative and Executive powers (read also
the opinions of JJ. Vitug, Panganiban and Kapunan)

TRAC - Whether or not A.O. No. 308 is not just a mere administrative order but a law and hence beyond the power of the
President to issue

T: Yes, A.O. No. 308 is a law and not just a mere administrative order and is hence beyond the power of the
President to issue.

MJ: The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. The grant of legislative power to
Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes
of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or
common interest.

MN: It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It
establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires
a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of
privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Said administrative order
redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that sepa-
rates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to
be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law. Prescinding from these precepts, we hold
that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order.

MN: executive issuance is not legally sufficient to establish an all-encompassing computerized system of iden-
tification in the country. The subject matter contained in AO 308 is beyond the powers of the President to
regulate without a legislative enactment.

C: Thus, A.O. No. 308 is a law and not just a mere administrative order and is hence beyond the power of the
President to issue.

DISSENT

T: No, the issuance of A.O. No. 308 an exercise by the President of legislative power does not properly belong
to Congress.

MJ: The Administrative Code of 1987 has unequivocally vested the President with quasi-legislative powers in
the form of executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum orders and circulars and gen-
eral or special orders. 6 An administrative order, like the one under which the new identification system is em-
bodied, has its peculiar meaning under the 1987 Administrative Code

MN: The new identification reference system is created to streamline the bureaucracy, cut the red tape and
ultimately achieve administrative efficiency. The project, therefore, relates to, is an appropriate subject and falls
squarely within the ambit of the Chief Executive's administrative power under which, in order to successfully
carry out his administrative duties, he has been granted by law quasi-legislative powers, quoted above.

C: Thus, the issuance of A.O. No. 308 an exercise by the President of legislative power does not properly
belong to Congress.

KMU v. Director General, G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006

T: No, EO 420 is not a usurpation of legislative power by the President

MJ: Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

MN: In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and exe-
cuted existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-
friendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Moreover,
EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems of gov’t entities cov-
ered by this have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act
of legislation and is clearly well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate.

C: Thus, EO 420 is not a usurpation of legislative power by the President

David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

 T: PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees."

MJ: Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically
states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives."

MN: To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President
Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, in times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the President may temporarily
take over a privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest only if there is congressional
authority or approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions
under which the President may exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance that due process of
law would be observed.

C: Thus, PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees."

B. Non-legislative powers
II. Composition of Congress (Sec. 2 & 5)
A. Senate
1. Number of members
2. Manner of election
B. HOR
1. Classification & number of members
a. District reps
b. Party-list reps
CASES:
Veteran’s Federation v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 13678, October 26, 2010

T: No, the Constitution does not require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all
circumstances.

MJ: The Art. VI, Sec. 5 of the Philippine Constitution provides that the party-list representatives shall con-
stitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list.

MN: In this case Art. VI, Sec. 5 paragraph 2 is not mandatory but it merely provides a ceiling for party-list
seats in Congress.

C: Thus, the Constitution does not require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all
circumstances.

***********

T: Yes, the two percent threshold requirement is constitutional.

MJ: The Court ruled that the two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of
the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or repre-
sentative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives
chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might
be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which
might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned ac-
cording to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"
to ensure meaningful local representation.

MN: In this case, the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and crystalline. When
the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention.

C: Hence, the two percent threshold requirement is constitutional.

Banat v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009

DISTRIBUTION OF GUARANTEED AND ADDITIONAL SEATS

It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands an equally
unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number of additional
seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.

As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:

First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the
party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is
entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be com-
puted "in proportion to their total number of votes."

The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate "proportional representation" into a mathemat-
ical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned parameters

After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.

Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the
members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each
party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system.
All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall
be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall
thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able
to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the
number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of it obtaining the greatest number of votes.
The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be
entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second
party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for com-
puting the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of
the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional
seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater
than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two
seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional
seat.

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex
fraction:
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides with the present
number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve other qualified
parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use of a
different formula and methodology.

Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013 (reversal of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT
rulings)

T: Yes, a political party may join the party-list system without violating the Constitution and Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7941.

MJ: In the case of Atong Paglaum v. Comelec, political parties can participate in party-list elections provided
they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself and independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010

T: Yes, the Ang LADLAD LGBT Party qualifies for registration as a party-list representative.

MJ: The Supreme court held in the case of Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC that moral disapproval is
not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the par-ty-list
system. The Supreme Court further held that "the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented
sectors is not exclusive".

MN: In this case, the denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts to a statement
of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Re-
spondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosex-
uals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective
targeting that implicates our equal protection clause. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compli-
ance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the
 belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang
Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941.

C: Thus, the Ang LADLAD LGBT Party qualifies for registration as a party-list representative.

Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010

T: There is no legal basin in delisting PGBI

MJ: A party-list group or organization which qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot now
validly be delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. In other words,
the application of this disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the percentage of party-list votes
garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives, a
percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat.

MN: The disqualification should now necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that
did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it registered. To reiter-
ate, (a) Section 6 (8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be
mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes
in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify
for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This, we
declare, is how Section 6 (8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied. We do so under our authority
to state what the law is, 10 and as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis.

Abayon v. HRET, G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010

T: Yes, HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

MJ: HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives.

MN: In this case, a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected member of the House of Repre-
sentatives." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would
be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications therefore ends.

C: Thus, HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

Lico v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015

T: No, COMELEC had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives

MJ: HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives.

MN: In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took
his oath; and... he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the
COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.

C: Thus, COMELEC had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives

Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012

T: No, the COMELEC did not gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration filed
by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means.

MJ: Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that
"seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means" shall be denied registration. This disqual-
ification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that "no political party which seeks to achieve
its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation.

MN: The deliberate brandishing of military power, which included the show of force, use of full battle gear,
display of ammunitions, and use of explosive devices, engendered an alarming security risk to the public.
At the very least, the totality of these brazen acts fomented a threat of violence that preyed on the vulnera-
bility of civilians. The COMELEC did not, therefore, commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated the
Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of the predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to violence or threats
thereof in order to achieve its objectives.

2. Manner of election [Sec. 5(1)]

3. Basic requirement for legislative districts
a. apportionment – number of inhabitants, uniform and progressive ratio [Sec. 5(1)]; contiguous, compact and
adjacent territories [Sec. 5(3)]
 CASES:
Macias v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-18684, September 14, 1961

T: Yes, the apportionment of representative districts under Republic Act 3040 is unconstitutional.

MJ: The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members of the House of Representatives “shall
be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the member of their respec-
tive inhabitants.”

MN: A law giving provinces with a smaller number of inhabitants more representative districts than those
with bigger population is invalid because it violates the principle of proportional representation prescribed
by the Constitution. Inequality of apportionment law is “arbitrary and capricious and against the vital princi-
ple of equality.

Montejo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995

WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated a resolution transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the
municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte.

T: Yes, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it prom-
ulgated a resolution transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the municipality of
Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte.

MJ: Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion, thus:
"Within three (3) years follow-ing the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment
of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section."

MN: Here, the COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its
power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. But based on the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative
apportionment as the Congress itself exercised such power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered
the COMELEC to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment made. Consistent with the limit of its
power to make minor adjustments, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the COMELEC any authority
to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district.

C: Thus, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it prom-
ulgated a resolution transfer-ring the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the municipality
of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte.

Can the court order the COMELEC to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to
the Second District of the province of Leyte?

T: No, the court cannot order the COMELEC to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to
the Second District of the province of Leyte.

MJ: The validity of a legislative apportionment is a justiciable question. But while the Court can strike down
an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot itself make the reapportionment as petitioner would want to
do by directing respondent COMELEC to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the
Second District of the province of Leyte.

MN: In this case, the issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioners
remedy lies with Congress and not to the court.

C: Hence, the court cannot order the COMELEC to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District
to the Second District of the province of Leyte.

b. representation – each city with population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least one
representative [Sec. 5(3)]

CASE: Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010

T: No, a population of 250,000 is not an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.

MJ: The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representa-
tive.”

MN: There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and
the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative,
there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum
of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution
 requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province.

III. Qualifications of members of Congress (Sec. 3 & 6)

A. Citizenship – natural born citizen
CASES:
Vilando v. HRET, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011

T: Yes, Limkaichong is qualified to hold an office in the Republic of the Philippines

MJ: No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the
election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines
for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

MN: Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the Philip-
pines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or
by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the
respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen.

David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016 – on Grace Poe’s citizenship

T: Yes, Grace Poe is eligible to sit as a Senator of the Republic.

MJ: Under Art. 14 of the Hague Convention of 1930 (on Conflict of Nationality Laws), a foundling is presumed to
have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found until the contrary is proved. Although the Philip-
pines is not a signatory to said convention, its provisions are binding as they form part of the law of the land pursuant
to the incorporation clause.

MN: It is safe to say, private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status' commencement from
birth means that private respondent never had to do anything to consummate this status. By defini-
tion, she is natural-born. Though subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status
upon satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No. 9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office
as Senator of the Republic.

B. Age – 35 for Senators, 25 for representatives on the day of the election at the latest
C. Literacy – able to read and write
D. Registration as voter
E. Residence
CASES:
Co v. Electoral Tribunal, G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991

T: Yes, Ong was a resident of the 2 district of Northern Samar.

nd

MJ: Under the previous Constitutions and the 1987 Constitution the term "residence" has been understood as
synonymous with domicile. The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, one intends to return. The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter
how long, continues to be the domicile of that person.

MN: Here, the domicile of origin of respondent, which was also the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Sa-
mar. Respondent was able to establish that he never abandoned said domicile and it remained fixed in Samar as
shown.

Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995 (Read also the other opinions)

T: Yes, Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year residency requirement to
be eligible in running as representative.

MJ: Under the previous Constitutions and the 1987 Constitution the term "residence" has been understood as syn-
onymous with domicile. The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for busi-
ness or pleasure, one intends to return. The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how
long, continues to be the domicile of that person.

MN: In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to
convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It
cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to
the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995 (Read also the other opinions)
 T: Yes, Aquino was rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year residence
in the district.

MJ: No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resi-
dent thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

MN: In this case, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in. Aquino’s
assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly sup-
ported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of resi-
dence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.

C: Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one-year residence
in the district.

IV. Term of office (Sec. 4 & 7, Art. VI; Sec. 2, Art. XVIII)
A. Commencement – noon of June 30 next following the election
B. Duration
1. Senators – 6 years; maximum of 2 consecutive terms
a. Senators elected in 1992, 1st 12 served for 6 years (until June 30, 1998), remaining 12 for 3 years (until
June 30, 1995)
b. Overlapping of terms & the Senate as a continuing body
CASES:
Neri v. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 (decision); September 4, 2008 (resolution)

Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate's membership, the composition
of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may
deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the
14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.

Garcillano v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008

T: No, the Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly
published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

MJ: Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or the House of Representa-
tives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure."

MN: In this case, the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed for the reason that
the rules that they will observe was not properly published as provided by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such
inquiry if allowed without observance of the required publication will put a person’s life, liberty and property at stake
without due process of law. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it
shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure."

C: The respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished
rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases.

Balag v. Senate, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018

2. Representatives – 3 years; maximum of 3 consecutive terms

C. Effect of voluntary renunciation
V. Regular and special elections of members of Congress (Sec. 8 & 9)
VI. Salaries and accounts of Members of Congress (Sec. 10 & 20)
CASE: PHILCONSA v. Jimenez, G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965
VII. Parliamentary immunities (Sec. 11)
A. Privilege from arrest
CASE: People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, February 3, 2000 (Also read the concurrence of J. Gonzaga-
Reyes)

Principles:

The immunity from arrest or detention... privilege has always been granted in a... restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may
not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest.
 For relatively minor... offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.

the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior... the Aguinaldo case
involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not
apply to imprisonment... arising from the enforcement of criminal law.

Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in
a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an... aberrant
situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system.

B. Privilege of speech and debate

CASES:
Osmeña v. Pendatun, supra

Issue:
Can Osmena be held liable for his speech?

Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the
House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." The provision has always been understood to mean
that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress
may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself.

Jimenez v. Cabangbang, G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966

Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009
Trillanes v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451, Mar 14, 2018
VIII. Disclosure and Notification Requirements (Sec. 12)
IX. Incompatible and Forbidden Offices (Sec. 13)
CASES:
Adaza v. Pacaña, G.R. No. L-68159, March 18, 1985
Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No.175352, July 15, 2009
X. Inhibitions and Disqualifications (Sec. 14)
CASES:
Puyat v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982
Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

E. Consequential Effects of Decision.

As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court's pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF
Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases
(1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must
only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.

To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares
the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience
and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 266 the doctrine merely "reflect[s] awareness that precisely
because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive
measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to
a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition
of what had transpired prior to such adjudication." 267 "In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored.'" 268 For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied
prospectively.

XI. Sessions (Sec. 15); Read also Sec. 4 and 10, Art. VII
A. Regular session
B. Special sessions
XII. Officers of each House [Sec. 16 (1)]
A. Senate
1. Senate President
CASE: Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949 (decision); March 14, 1949 (resolution of the MR)
2. Others
CASE: Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998
B. House of Representatives
1. Speaker
2. Others
CASE: Baguilat v. Speaker Alvarez, G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017
XIII.Quorum [Sec. 16 (2)]
A. Requirement – majority of each House
 CASE: Avelino v. Cuenco, supra
B. If quorum is absent, a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent
members EXCEPT when such absence is based on a valid reason
CASES:
People v. Jalosjos, supra
Trillanes v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008

C. As long as there is quorum, the Houses of Congress may conduct business and hold session; within a quorum, a
vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws; GR: majority of those constituting a quorum sufficient to repeal
a law
CASE: Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011

Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable
law

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting
requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 32 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054
the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands. Section 16 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution provides that a "majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business." In other
words, as long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies
have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally
sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members
of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054.
Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served
to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Court's
pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS 33 on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the
unconstitutionality: Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have
the ability to bind the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal
footing, exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in
a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactment’s
labors under delusions of omniscience. CIHAED xxx xxx xxx A state legislature has a plenary law-making power
over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new
laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained
by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every
legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be
exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and
before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot
declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing
statutes. 34 (Emphasis ours.) Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in
excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it
significantly constricts the future legislators' room for action and flexibility.

XIV. Rule-making power and power of internal discipline [Sec. 16(3)]

A. Rule-making power
CASES:
Osmeña v. Pendatun, supra
Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997
B. Discipline of members
CASES:
Osmeña v. Pendatun, supra

The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are exclu-
sively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to example a member, the court
will not review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for
which Osmeña may be disciplined, the court believed that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the
matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not
be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this
Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would
thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a
coordinate branch of the Government. This was due to the theory of separation of powers fastidiously ob-
served by this. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction
and is supreme within its own sphere.

Alejandrino v. Quezon, G.R. No. 22041, September 11, 1924)

NO.

Neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of
 their legislative powers by any judicial process.

The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer must be sustained.
As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of action, it must be dismissed

XV. Legislative journals and records [Sec. 16(4)]

A. Journals
CASES:
U.S. v. Pons, G.R. No. 11530, August 12, 1916
Arroyo v. De Venecia, supra
B. Legislative journal vs. enrolled bill
CASES:
Morales v. Subido, February 27, 1969 (resolution)
Astorga v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994
Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003 (end 10/10/2019)
XVI. The Electoral Tribunals (Sec. 17 & 19)
A. Jurisdiction
CASES:
Lazatin v. HRET, G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988 (start 10/23/2019)
Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1, 2009
Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013
Lico v. COMELEC, supra (distinguish with Reyes v. COMELEC)
B. Composition (Sec. 17)
CASES:
Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 83767, October 27, 1988
Bondoc v. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991
C. Time of constitution/organization
D. Independence from the House concerned
CASES:
Bondoc v. Pineda, supra
Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936
E. Authority to promulgate rules of procedure: exclusive
CASES:
Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra
Lazatin v. HRET, supra
F. Judicial review of decisions of Electoral Tribunals
CASES:
Co v. Electoral Tribunal, supra - G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
Lerias v. HRET, G.R. No. 97105, October 15, 1991
Tagolino v. HRET, G.R. No. 202202, August 23, 2011
XVII. The Commission on Appointments
CASES:
Coseteng v. Mitra, G.R. No. 86649, July 12, 1990
Guingona v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971, October 20, 1992
XVIII. Manner of the conduct of sessions and voting in Congress
XIX. Specific powers of Congress
A. Power to enact statutes
1. Origin of laws (Sec. 24)
CASES:
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra (Read also the other opinions)
Abakada Guro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005
2. Prohibited measures (Sec. 25(5), 28(4), 30 & 31; also Sec. 3, Art. IX-D; Sec. 4, 5, 10 Art. III; Sec. 2,
Art. VIII]
3. The “one-subject, one-bill” rule [Sec. 26(1)]
CASES:
PHILCONSA v. Jimenez, supra
Tobias v. Abalos, G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994
Tatad v. Secretary, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997
Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, supra
Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, G.R. No. 197676,
February 4, 2014
4. Procedure in the passage of bills in Congress [Sec. 26(2), Art. VI]
a. General Rule: Three readings on separate days; exception
CASES:
Tolentino v. Secretary, supra
Kida v. Senate, supra
b. no-amendment rule
CASE: Abakada Guro v. Ermita, supra (Read also the resolution dated August 14, 2008)
c. The Bicameral Conference Committee
CASE: Abakada Guro v. Ermita, supra
d. Vote requirement for passage of bill – majority of those constituting a quorum
CASE: Kida v. Senate, supra
 e. Manner of voting by legislators
5. The enrolled bill doctrine
CASES:
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Jimenez, G.R. No. L-17931, February 28, 1963
Morales v. Subido, G.R. No. L-29658, November 29, 1968 (decision)
Arroyo v. De Venecia, supra, concurring and dissenting opinion of J. Puno – evolution of the enrolled bill
doctrine
6. Approval of bill into law; veto power of the President (Sec. 27)
a. The rule of presentment
b. Presidential veto
1) Procedure after President vetoes bill
2) Item/partial veto
CASE: Belgica v. Executive Secretary, supra
3) GR: Prohibition of veto of a condition attached to an item; EXC: if condition is an improper provision
CASES:
Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992
PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994
c. “Legislative veto” and post-enactment congressional oversight
CASE: Abakada Guro v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
d. Judicial review of President’s veto power
CASES:
PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, supra
Gonzales v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990
B. Power to Conduct Legislative Inquiry and Question Hour (Sec. 21 & 22)
1. Distinctions
CASE: Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
2. The power of inquiry
a. Who exercises power – the Houses themselves or their respective committees
CASE: In re Camilo L. Sabio, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006
b. Persons covered – anyone, including public officials and private individuals
CASE: Senate v. Ermita, supra
c. Purpose – in aid of legislation
CASES:
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991
Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007
d. Scope
CASES:
Senate v. Ermita, supra
Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008
Neri v. Senate Committee, supra
Romero v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009
e. Governing rules – duly published rules of procedure of either House
CASE: Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committees, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008
f. rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected
CASE: Balag v. Senate, supra
g. when legislative inquiry terminates
CASE: Balag v. Senate, supra
h. Power of legislative inquiry under §21 repeals inconsistent provisions of law
CASE: In Re Camilo L. Sabio, supra
i. Judicial review of issues arising from legislative inquiries
CASE: De la Paz v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009
3. The question hour
C. Power of appropriation (Sec. 25 & 29)
1. Appropriation defined
2. Exclusive origination rule (Sec. 24)
CASES:
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra
Abakada Guro v. Ermita, supra
3. Stages (Guingona v. Carangue)
4. Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President [Sec. 25(1)]
5. Prohibition against riders [Sec. 25(2)]
CASES:
Garcia v. Mata, G.R. No. L-33713, July 30, 1975 – start of 10/30/2019
Gonzales v. Macaraig, supra (read also counter-arguments in the dissent of J. Cruz)
6. Procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving
appropriations for other departments [Sec.25(3)]
7. The power of augmentation [Sec.25(5)]
CASE: Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014 – exam
8. Discretionary funds [Sec. 25(6)]
9. Reenacted budget [Sec. 25(7)]
10. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law [Sec. 29(1)]
CASE: Belgica v. Executive Secretary, supra (re: the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund)
11. Prohibition against appropriation for sectarian purpose [Sec. 29(2)]
CASES:
Aglipay v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1937
 Garces v. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-53487, May 25, 1981 – final requirement, challenge the constitutionality of
public funds
Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon
City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017 (read also the dissent of J. Leonen)
12. Special taxes as a special fund [Sec. 29(2)]
13. The “pork barrel” system – unconstitutional for violation of separation of powers
CASES:
PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, supra
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012
Belgica v. Executive Secretary, supra
14. Riders in an appropriations law
CASE: Garcia v. Mata, supra
D. Power of taxation (Sec. 28)
1. Rule in taxation: uniformity, equitability, and progressiveness [Sec. 28(1)]
CASES:
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra
Abakada Guro v. Ermita, supra
2. GR: Power of taxation cannot be delegated; EXC: delegation to the President of the power to fix tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts [Sec. 28(2)]
CASE: Abakada Guro v. Ermita, supra – expanded VAT law violated Sec 20(1)
3. Tax exemptions
a. to religious, charitable and educational institutions [Sec. 28 (3)]
CASES:
Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-19201, June 16, 1965
Lung Center v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004
b. needs concurrence of majority of all members of Congress [Sec. 28(4)]
E. The power of concurrence/confirmation
1. To a grant of amnesty by the President (Sec. 19, Article VII)
2. To a treaty or international agreement (Sec. 21, Art. VII)
3. To confirm President’s nomination of Vice-President (Sec. 9, Article VII)
F. The war powers [Sec. 23(1), Art. VI]
G. Power to grant emergency powers to the President [Sec. 23(2)]
CASES:
David v. Arroyo, supra
Araneta v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949 (no longer controlling) – when does emergency power
stops
Rodriguez v. Gella, G.R. No. L-6266, February 2, 1953 (no longer controlling)

ARTICLE VII. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

I. Executive Power (Sec. 1)

CASES:
Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989 (Read also the concurring opinion of CJ Fernan, and the
dissenting opinions of J. Sarmiento & Cruz) – residual power of the president, means the president as head of the state,
can do anything to promote the general welfare of the people as long as it is not contrary to the constitution

Laurel v. Garcia, G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990 (read also the concurrence of J. Padilla and dissent of J. Feliciano) –
the president cannot in the guise of its residual power cannot violate an existing legislative policy. It has the duty to
comply gyapon

II. Qualifications (Sec. 2)

A. Citizenship – natural-born citizen
CASES:
Fornier v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 161824, March 3, 2004 (read also the concurrences and dissents for additional
nuances)

- It bears stressing that petitioner has the burden of establishing his allegations of respondent’s material misrep-
resentation in his Certificate of Candidacy|||

- Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, a “citizen of the Philippines” was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines,
and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term “inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a native-
born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained
Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. Whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in
turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino
citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking
after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been
born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pan-
gasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse
Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regard-
less of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
 - As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not distinguish between legitimate child and illegitimate
child of a Filipino father, we should not make a distinction. The civil status of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself,
is not determinative of the Philippine citizenship.

Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016

- As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, naturalborn citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration
is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. xxx
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide
that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to
be adopted.xxx Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an inter-
national law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a consti-
tutional mechanism such as local legislation. xxx it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to found-
lings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting
through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
-
B. Registered voter
C. Literacy requirement – able to read and write
D. Age on election day – at least 40
E. Residence – at least 10 years immediately preceding election day
CASE: Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, supra
III. Election, Canvass & Proclamation (Sec. 4)
A. Election
B. Canvass & proclamation
CASE: Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013
C. Proclamation of winner
D. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal
CASES:
Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
Macalintal v. PET, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010
Santiago v. Ramos, P.E.T. Case No. 001, February 13, 1996
Poe v. Macapagal-Arroyo, P.E.T. Case No. 002, March 29, 2005
Legarda v. De Castro, P.E.T. Case No. 003, March 31, 2005 (re PET power to correct manifest errors in the SOVs
and COCs); January 18, 2008 (protest mooted)
Roxas v. Binay, P.E.T. No. 004, August 16, 2016
IV. Oath of office (Sec. 5)
V. Term of office (Sec. 4)
A. Duration
B. Eligibility for reelection
1. President: no
CASE: Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010
2. Vice-President: yes; 2 consecutive terms only
VI. Vacancies and manner of filling it in (Sec. 7, 8 & 10)
A. Possible causes of vacancy
CASE: Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001 (read also the concurring opinion of J. Mendoza re
permanent incapacity)
B. Effects of vacancy
C. Role of Congress
VII. Temporary incapacity & serious illness of the President (Sec. 11)
CASE: Estrada v. Arroyo, supra (read also the concurrence of J. Vitug regarding temporary incapacity)
VIII. Privileges and inhibitions (Sec. 6 & 13)
CASES:
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991
Public Interest Center Inc. v. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006
Funa v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010
IX. Presidential Immunity
CASES:
Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 – no post-tenure immunity from criminal prosecution
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) – post-tenure absolute immunity from civil litigation (for acts committed during
incumbency)
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) – no immunity from civil litigation for pre-tenure acts
X. Specific Powers of the President
A. The Appointing Power (Sec. 16); Midnight appointments (Sec. 15)
CASES:
Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011
Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 139554, July 21, 2006
Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005
Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015 (read also the concurring and dis-
senting opinion of J. Brion)
Javier v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-39451, February 20, 1989
Aytona v. Castillo, G.R. No. L-19313, January 19,
Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, supra (read also the concurring and dissenting opinion of J. Brion)
 In Re Appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998
De Castro v. JBC, G. R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010 (read also the dissent of J. Carpio-Morales)
B. The Power of Control and the Faithful Execution clause (Sec. 17)
CASES:
Gascon v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 78389, October 16, 1989
Maceda v. Macaraeg, G.R. No. 88291, May 31, 1991
Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994
David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Chavez v. NHA, G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007
Biraogo v. Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012
C. The Military Powers (Sec. 18)
1. Distinctions
2. The Calling out power
CASES:
IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004
David v. Arroyo, supra
Ampatuan v. Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011
Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012
3. Martial law & suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus
CASES:
Lagman v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017 (read also the separate opinions)
Padilla v. Congress, G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017 (joint voting vs. joint session)
Lagman v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018 (re 2nd extension)
Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 243522, February 19, 2019 (re 3rd extension)
4. Judicial review
CASES:
Lansang v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971
Aquino v. Enrile, G.R. No. L-35546, September 17, 1974
Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, G.R. No. L-61388, April 20, 1983
Fortun v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012 (read also the dissent of J. Carpio)  Read, however,
Lagman v. Executive Secretary, supra
5. Consequences of ML proclamation or suspension of the privilege of the writ
CASE: Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, G.R. No. L-54558, May 22, 1987 (concurring opinion of CJ
Teehankee)
D. The power of executive clemency (Sec. 19)
1. Types – reprieves, commutations, pardons, remission of fines and forfeitures, and amnesty
2. Limitations
CASES:
Llamas v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99031 October 15, 1991
People v. Salle, G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995
3. Evolution of the Philippine laws on presidential pardon
CASE: People v. Salle, supra
4. Effect of grant of pardon
CASES:
Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989 (read also the concurrence of JJ. Padilla and Feli-
ciano)
Risos-Vidal v. Estrada, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
5. Effect of violation of clemency
CASES:
Espuelas v. Provincial Warden of Bohol, G.R. No. L-13223, May 30, 1960
Culanag v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-27206, August 26, 1967
Torres v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 76872, July 23, 1987
In Re Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, G.R. No. 122338, December 29, 1995
6. Grant of amnesty
CASE: Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012
7. President’s power of clemency vs. power of the courts to control the execution of final decisions
CASE: Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999
E. The borrowing power (Sec. 20)
F. The diplomatic power (Sec. 21); also read: Sec. 25, Article XVIII
CASES:
Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000 (read also the dissent of J. Puno)
Nicolas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009 (read also the dissent of JJ. Puno and Carpio)
G. The budgetary power (Sec. 22)
H. The informing power (Sec. 23)
I. The presidential pork barrel
CASE: Belgica v. Executive Secretary, supra
J. Other powers
1. delegated emergency powers [Sec. 23(2), Article VI; also Sec. 17, Article XII]
CASE: David v Arroyo, supra
2. power to call special session of Congress at any time (Sec. 15, Article VI)
3. power to certify urgent bills [Sec. 26(2), Article VI]
4. power to approve or veto legislation [Sec. 27(1), Article VI]
 CASE: Belgica v. Executive Secretary, supra – pork barrel system violates the President’s constitutional line-
item veto power
5. delegated power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts [Sec. 28(2), Article VI]
6. power to concur in the deputation of law-enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities by the COME-
LEC during elections [Sec. 2(4), Article IX-B]
7. power to remove or discipline, upon the recommendation of the Comelec, any officer or employee deputized
by the Comelec during elections [Sec. 2(8), Article IX-C]
8. power to extend beyond three years the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the AFP [Sec. 5(7), Article XVI]
9. powers implicit in the President’s as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers
CASES:
Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, supra – power to conduct peace
negotiations with rebel groups, and to agree to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and/or con-
stitutional amendments
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, supra – power to declare a state of rebellion

ARTICLE VIII. THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

I. Judicial Power (Sec. 1)

A. Repository
B. Meaning
1. Traditional judicial power
2. Judicial review
a. Classification
1) Traditional appellate power [Sec. 5(2), Art. VIII]
2) Expanded power of judicial review (Sec. 1, Art. VIII)
CASE: Llamas v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99031 October 15, 1991
b. Functions
CASES:
Occeña v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-56350, April 2, 1981 (e.g., legal effect of the ruling of Javellana v. Execu-
tive Secretary)
Salonga v. Paño, G.R. No. L-59524, February 18, 1985
II. Power to define, prescribe, and apportion jurisdiction of courts [Sec. 2(1)]
A. GR: As the Constitution provides, or as Congress provides
CASE: COMELEC v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 171208, September 7, 2007
B. Limitation of the plenary power of Congress: It may not deprive SC of its jurisdiction under the Constitution
III. Security of tenure [Sec. 2(2)]
CASE: De la Llana v. Alba, G.R. No. L-57883, March 12, 1982 (citing the concurring opinion of J. Laurel in Zandueta
v. De la Costa, G.R. No. L-46267, November 28, 1938)
IV. Appointments to the judiciary (Sec. 9)
A. Qualifications
1. SC
CASE: Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
2. lower courts
CASE: Villanueva v. JBC, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015
B. The Judicial and Bar Council (Sec. 8)
1. under the supervision of the SC
CASE: Jardeleza v. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014 (Read also the concurrence of J. Brion and
dissent of J. Leonen)
2. composition
CASE: Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012 (decision); April 16, 2013 (resolution)
3. functions & rule-making power
V. Fiscal Autonomy [Sec. 3]
CASE: Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992
VI. The Supreme Court [Sec. 4]
A. Composition
B. Vacancies
1. How created
2. When filled up – within 90 days from the occurrence; appointments to vacancies in the judiciary not covered by
the midnight appointments ban
CASE: De Castro v. JBC, G. R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
3. Disbarment against an incumbent SC Justice not allowed; BUT quo warranto is a viable remedy to remove an
SC justice whose appointment is void
CASES:
Cuenco v. Fernan, A.M. No. 3135, February 17, 1988
Republic v. Sereno, supra
C. Jurisdiction
1. En Banc cases (per SC Internal Rules, A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, promulgated on May 4, 2010)
a. cases involving the constitutionality or validity of a treaty, international or executive agreement, law, exec-
utive order, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
b. appeals in criminal cases where the trial court imposes death penalty or reclusion perpetua
c. cases raising novel questions of law
CASES:
 Laurel v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, February 27, 2006 (decision, First Division); January 13, 2009 (res-
olution, En Banc)
d. cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls
e. cases involving decisions, resolutions, and orders of the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA
f. cases where the penalty recommended or imposed is dismissal of a judge, disbarment of a lawyer, sus-
pension of any of them for a period of more than 1 year, or a fine exceeding Php40,000.00
g. cases covered by the preceding paragraph and involving the reinstatement in the judiciary of a dismissed
judge, the reinstatement of a lawyer in the roll of attorneys, or the lifting of a judge’s or a lawyer’s suspension
h. cases involving the discipline of a Member of the SC, or a Presiding Justice, or any Associate Justice of
the collegial appellate court
i. cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court en banc or by a Division may be modified or
reversed
CASE: Cabuay v. Malvar, G.R. No. 123780, September 24, 2002
j. cases involving conflicting decisions of two or more divisions
CASE: Cabuay v. Malvar, supra
k. cases where three votes in a Division cannot be obtained
l. Division cases where the subject matter has a huge financial impact on businesses or affects the welfare
of a community
m. other division cases that, in the opinion of at least 3 Members of the Division who are voting and present,
are appropriate for transfer to the Court en banc
CASE: Secretary of the DPWH v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013 (decision); April 21,
2015 (resolution)
n. cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient importance to merit its attention
CASE: In Re Letters of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC, March 13, 2012
o. all matters involving policy decisions in the administrative supervision of all courts and their personnel
2. Division cases – cases not otherwise under the jurisdiction of the En Banc
D. Voting requirement for decisions/resolutions
1. En Banc
a. Concurrence requirement
b. Deadlock in voting
i. In decisions – dismiss the case
CASE: Cruz v. Secretary, G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000
ii. In resolution of an MR to a decision – deny MR
CASE: Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997 (decision); June 10, 1997 (resolution)
c. Flips
i. In the same case
CASES:
Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011 (resolution on the MR, per J. Nachura, reversing
the decision promulgated on February 10, 2010, per J. Peralta)
Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014 (“decision” on the MR, per
J. Brion, reversing the decision promulgated on September 4, 2012, per J. Bernabe)
Maliksi v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203302, April 11, 2013 (resolution on the MR, per J. Bersamin, revers-
ing the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, per J. Carpio)
ii. In a separate case
CASES:
In Re Appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998 (midnight
appointments bar applies to the judiciary)  De Castro v. JBC, G. R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
(midnight appointments bar does not apply to the judiciary)
Philconsa v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994 (challenge against the Countrywide Devel-
opment Fund failed)  LAMP v. Secretary, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012 (challenge against PDAF
failed)  Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013 (challenge against the PDAF article
in the 2013 GAA and all other similar congressional pork barrel allocations succeeded)
d. Flips, flops and flip-flops
CASE: League of Cities v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951
(1) November 18, 2008 (6-5 decision granting petition and declaring the cityhood laws unconstitutional)
(2) March 31, 2009 (7-5 resolution denying MR)
(3) April 28, 2009 (6-6 Resolution denying 2nd MR)
(4) June 2, 2009 (Resolution clarifying the April 28, 2009 Resolution)
(5) Entry of Judgment
(6) December 21, 2009 (6-4 decision of reversal, granted respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of June 2, 2009 and declared the cityhood laws constitutional)
(7) August 24, 2010 (7-6 resolution granting petitioner’s Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and
a Motion to Annul Decision dated December 21, 2009 and reinstating the November 18, 2008 decision)
(8) February 15, 2011 (7-6 resolution granting respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of the August 24,
2010 Resolution)
(9) April 12, 2011 (7-6 resolution denying with finality petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration)
2. Division
a. Concurrence requirement
b. MRs in a Division case
CASE: In Re Letters of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, supra
c. Deadlocks in voting
i. In decisions – refer to En Banc
ii. In resolution to an MR of a decision – MR denied, decisions stands
CASE: Fortich v. Corona, G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998 (Decision); November 17, 1998 (Resolution
of the 1st MR); August 19, 1999 (of the 2nd MR)
VII. Requisites of judicial review
A. actual case or controversy
CASES:
Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998 (read also the dissent of J. Kapunan)
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003
Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008
Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011
Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013
Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
1. Moot cases – GR: SC refuses to take cognizance or to decide on the merits; exception
CASES:
Salonga v. Paño, supra
Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004
Enrile v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 132986, May 19, 2004
Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008
Corona v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012
B. legal standing
CASES:
Liban v. Gordon, supra (decision)
IBP v. Zamora, supra
Biraogo v. Truth Commission, supra
Chavez v. JBC, supra
Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004
Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006
White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009
Quinto v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009
C. earliest opportunity
CASES:
Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010
Hacienda Luisita Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011
Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
D. necessity of deciding the constitutional question (lis mota)
CASES:
Zandueta v. De la Costa, G.R. No. L-46267, November 28, 1938
Flores v. Comelec, G.R. No. 89604, April 20, 1990
Tarrosa v. Singson, G.R. No. 111243 May 25, 1994
Sameer Oversees Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014
Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No.175352, January 18, 2011 (resolution)
VIII. Declaration of unconstitutionality
A. Effect
1. Orthodox view – law declared unconstitutional is void and deemed inexistent from the very beginning
CASE: Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management, G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011
2. Operative fact doctrine – actual existence of law before it is declared unconstitutional an operative fact with
consequences that cannot be ignored
CASES:
Manila Motor Company Inc. v. Flores, G.R. No. L-9396, August 16, 1956
Agbayani v. PNB, G.R. No. L-23127, April 29, 1971
Umali v. Comelec, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014
B. Partial unconstitutionality
CASES:
In Re Cunanan), [un-docketed], March 18, 1954 (resolution)
Salazar v. Achacoso, G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990
C. Significance of the separability clause
CASE: Tatad v. Secretary, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997
D. Relative constitutionality
CASE: Central Bank Employees Association v. BSP, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004
IX. Powers of the Supreme Court [Sec. 5]
A. Original jurisdiction
B. Appellate jurisdiction (review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari)
C. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require
1. temporary assignment shall not exceed 6 months without the consent of the judge concerned
D. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice
E. Rule-making
1. Scope
a. protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
CASE: Razon v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009
b. pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts
CASE: Re Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS From Payment of Legal Fees, A.M.
No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010
c. admission to the practice of law
CASE: In re Garcia, [un-docketed], August 15, 1961
d. the integrated bar
CASE: In re Edillon, A.M. No. 1928, August 3, 1978
e. legal assistance to the under-privileged
 2. Limitations
a. shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases
b. shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade
c. shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights
CASE: Primicias v. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953
3. Includes power to review the rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies, which shall remain
effective unless SC disapproves
CASE: De Guzman v. People, G.R. No. L-54288, December 15, 1982
4. Not subject to repeal, alteration or supplementation by Congress (unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions)
CASE: Primicias v. Ocampo, supra
F. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law
CASE: Re: Memorandum dated July 10, 2017 from AJ Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, A.M. No. 17-07-05-
SC, July 3, 2018
G. Administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof [Sec. 6]; power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal [Sec. 11]
CASES:
Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 167916, August 26, 2008
Civil Service Commission v. Andal, G.R. No. 185749, December 16, 2009
Re: Request for Guidance/Clarification on Section 7, Rule III of R.A. 10154, A.M. 13-09-08-SC, October 1,
2013
In Re Justice Gregory Ong, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J, September 29, 2014
X. Tenure of Judges (Sec. 11)
CASE: Re: Report on the Judicial Audit in RTC-Branch 15, Ozamiz City, A.M. RTJ-04-1849, September 20, 2004
XI. Consultations and Decisions (Sec. 13 & 14)
A. Prior consultation and assignment of a ponente – SC conclusions in any case shall be reached in consultation
before the case the case assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court
B. CJ certification that there was prior consultation before assignment to ponente
CASE: Prudential Bank v. Castro, A.M. No. 2756, March 15, 1988
C. Voting must be explained
D. Decision shall express the facts and the law on which it is based
CASES:
Bernabe v. Geraldez, G.R. No. L-39721, July 15, 1975
University of the Philippines v. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012
E. petition for review or motion for reconsideration shall not be denied due course without stating the legal basis there-
for
CASES:
Mendoza v. CFI, G.R. No. L-35612-14, June 27, 1973 (read also the concurrence of J. Barredo)
Borromeo v. CA, G.R. No. L-82273, June 1, 1990 – validity of minute resolutions
XII. Salaries of Judges [Sec. 10]
CASE: Nitafan v. CIR, G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987
XIII.Periods of Decision [Sec. 15]
CASE: Marcelino v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-42428, March 18, 1983
XIV. Annual Report [Sec. 16]
XV. Non-designation of SC Members to quasi-judicial and administrative bodies [Sec. 12]
CASES:
In Re: Designation of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5, 1988
Macalintal v. PET, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010