PFR Cases 1-20 (Case Digest)
PFR Cases 1-20 (Case Digest)
Tanada vs Tubera
Facts:
The principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus
to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders. Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a
sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves
provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.
Issue:
Whether or not publication of laws is a requirement despite having its own
effectivity date?
Decision:
The Court ruled that Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
2. People vs Que Po Lay
Facts:
Appellant Que Po Lay was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S.
dollars, U.S. checks, and U.S. money orders amounting to $7000. He failed to sell the
same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day as required by Circular
No. 20.
The appeal is based on the claim that circular No. 20 was not published in the
Official Gazette prior to the act of omission imputed to the appellant, and
consequently, said circular had no force and effect.
The appealant contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act. 2930 both
needed said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or
notice of general applicability.
Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638
and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette for said circular
issued for implementation of a law in order to be in effect.
Issue:
Should the circular be published first to have the force and effect of law.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code states that statutes passed by
Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of
the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official
Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code(Republic Act. No. 386) states that laws shall
take effect after fifteen days following their publication in the Official Gazette.
Although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not
published until November 1951, three months after appellant's conviction of its
violation of said circular, particularly its penal provisions, did not have any legal
effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazette after November
of 1957. Therefore appellant could not he be held liable for the violation because it
was not yet binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign
exchange in his possession thereof.
3. Phil. International Trading Corp. vs Judge Angeles
FACTS:
The controversy springs from the issuance by the PITC of Administrative Order No.
SOCPEC 89-08-01, under which, applicants to the PITC for importations from the
People'sRepublic of China (PROC, for brevity) must be accompanied by a variable
and confirmed export program of the Philippine Products to PROC carried out by
the PITC or through tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to
the value of the importation feom PROC being applied for, or, simply at one is to
one ratio.
With the desire to make importations from PROC, private respondents Remington
and Firestone applied for authority to import from PROC. They were granted such
authority after having been completed the necessary requirements needed.
Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export credits
equivalent to the value of their importations, both parties were barred from PROC.
As a result, the privte respondents Remington and Firestone filed a petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus against PITC.
The court ruled that declared Administrative Order to be null and void, since
the same was not published, contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Order is an undue restriction of trade, and hence,
unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes. Upon teial, it was agreed that the evidence presented upon the hearing on the
Preliminary Injunction was sufficient to completely make an official decision, thus,
both parties deemed it proper that the entire case be submitted for decision with the
basis of the evidence presented.
The court rendered its decision on January 4, 1992. The court ruled that PITC's
authority to process and approved applications for imports from SOCPEC and to
issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D. No. 1071, has already been
repealed by EO No. 133, issued on February 27, 1987 by President Aquino.
4. Delgado vs Alonso
5. People vs Bidtu
FACTS:
Mora Bidtu was married to Moro Halid more than 12 years ago. And about 7
months ago, she was also married to Moro Hadjirol. Both marriage were in
accordance with Mohammedan customs. Her second marriage took place after
divorce with her first husband Halid. The said divorce took place before Datu
Gavino Cuevas, of Isabela de Basilan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce is legal?
DECISION: No. The divorce between the defendant and Halid does not satisfy the
conditions prescribed by the Koran and consequently said divorce seems to be of
doubtful religious validity. The court is of the opinion that even if the divorce
alleged by the defense was secured in conformity with Mohammedan doctrines,
such divorce prevail against the Divorce Law of the Philippine Islands (Act.
No.2710) prescribing the causes and conditions under which divorce may be
obtained. Any divorce obtained in the Philippine Islands of causes and under
conditions other than those enumerated in said law, would have no legal effect.
6. Co vs CA
Facts:
On the year of 1984 Criminal complaint was filed against Albino Co for violation of
Batasang Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) by the salvage company in Regional
Trial Court. Co was convicted by the crime charged. Later on Co appealed in the
Court of Appeals on 1987 and he seeks for vindication for the basis of the check
issued is not covered by B.P. Blg. 22 because at the time of issuance of the check
prior to promulgation of the judgement in Que v. People the bouncing check were
not considered a punishable offense because Batasang Pambansa was subsequently
dissolved when 1986 Freedom Constitution was promulgated, but the Court of
Appeal affirmed with his conviction and rejected his appeal, citing Senarillos vs
Hermosisima, 101 Phil 561, stating that the Que doctrine doesn’t amount to the new
law it was merely an interpretation of pre-existing one because BP 22, was enacted
on April 3, 1979. Albino appealed to the court with certiorari under rule 45 of Rule
of the Court on 1991, the court dismissed his appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the court to accused-petitioner of retroactive effect
should be applied?
Ruling:
No, According to Article 4 of the Civil Code “law shall have no retroactive effect
unless the contrary is provide” thus, a law is prospective at all times. Law always
take effect after they have been enacted and published.
7. D.M. Consunji vs CA
Facts:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.
Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building, Pasig
City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and
filed a report dated November 25, 1990. He stated that the victim was rushed to the
Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila and was pronounced dead on arrival
(DOA) by Dr. Errol de Yzo at around 2:15 pm of the same date. The investigation
also disclosed that Jose Juego, victim, was with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo. They
were performing their work as carpenters on a platform made of channel beam. Jose
Juego was crushed to death when the platform fell due to the removal or getting
loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain
block and platform but without a safety lock.
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig a complaint for damages against D.M Consunji, Inc. The RTC rendered a
decision in favor of Mario Juego and receive an amount of of P644,000.
D. M Consunji seeks the reversal of the Court Appeals decision.
Issues:
Whether or not Maria Juego can still claim the recovering damages from D.M
Consunji, Inc.
RULING:
No, the respondent is not precluded from recovering the damages. Maria Juego was
unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits.
Pursuant to the Article 3 of the Civil Code, Ignorance of the excuses no one from
compliance therewith. The application of this article is limited only to mandatory
and prohibitory laws. It may be deduced from the language of the provision, which,
notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with
the laws. Accordingly, the respondent’s ignorance thereof cannot be held against
her.
8. Cui vs Arellano University
Facts:
Emeterio Cui enrolled in the school year 1948- 1949 in the college of law in the
Arrelano university and was a scholar, The Plaintiff was made to sign a contract to
waive his right to transfer to another school without refunding the equivalent of
scholarship cash. The plaintiff studied in the defendant university until the first
year of his fourth year and transferred to Abad Santos University for the last
semester. After Graduating he decided to take the bar exam and needed his
Transcript of records in the defendant university, so he petitioned for the issuance
of his transcript of records, but he was denied unless he pays back the amount of
1,033.87 that was refunded to him, The plaintiff paid the amount in protest and the
defendant received a copy of the Memorandum no. 38 Issued by the director of
public schools.
Issue:
Whether or not the provision of contract between Plaintiff and defendant is valid or
not?
Decision:
Memorandum no. 38 is a sound policy, therefore the contract is a direct violation of
the memorandum, repugnant to the sound morality and civic honesty and is null
and void. Scholarships are awarded in the recognition of merit and not to attract
and keep students in the school.
9. Miciano vs Brimo
Facts:
Joseph G. Brimo, a Turkish Citizen, after residing for a considerable length of time in
the Philippines, stated in his will that the distribution of his properties be made in
accordance to the Philippine Laws. Juan Miciano, judicial administrator, filed a
scheme of partition which was approved by the Court but questioned by the
deceased's brother. Andre Brimo (the brother) argued that said scheme of partition
is violating Article 10 of the Civil Code (said partition is not in accordance with
deceased's Turkish nationality) .
Issue:
WON the provision in the will which states that the properties are to be disposed of
in accordance to the Philippine laws valid.
Ruling:
No. It is clear in Article 16 of the Civil Code that the national law of the testator
should be the one regulating his will. Therefore, Turkish law should govern thr
disposition of Joseph Brimo's property.
10. Barreto vs Gomzales
11. Pilapil vs Ibay Somera
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent (Mr. Geiling) has the legal standing to prosecute
the petitioner (Ms. Pilapil)?
Ruling:
The court ruled dismissing complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction.
12. Roehr vs Rodriguez
13. Garcia vs Recio
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen,
in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, allegedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Australian Family Court.On June 26, 1992, respondent became an
Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the
Australian Government. Petitioner-a Filipina- and respondent were married on
January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. In their
application for marriage license, respondent was declared as single and
Filipino.Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with
their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a
complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of
bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he
married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of the respondents
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained in Australia by that very fact or act
terminated his first mareiage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract
a second marriage with the petitioner.
RULING:
No. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad, because Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 allows the former to contract
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple,
who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent
with their National Laws.
Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the foreign law allowing it. Presentatio solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
14. Bellis vs Bellis
15. Albenso Enterprise vs CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered mild steel plates ordered by
Guaranteed Industries, Inc. located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. As
payment, Albenson was given a check in the amount of P2,575.00 issued by a
“Eugenio Baltao”. When presented for payment however, the check was dishonored
for the reason "Account Closed." Petitioner, filed the case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 against said Eugenio S. Baltao after the latter refused to replace
the dishonored check. However, there was a mistake of identity as there was
another “Eugenio Baltao” conducting business at the saJme building - Eugenio
Baltao’s son, Eugenio Baltao III. It was found that the signature of the check was not
of Eugenio S. Baltao and because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case
against him, respondent Baltao filed a complaint for damages stated on Articles 19,
20, and 21 of the Civil Code against petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent have a cause of action based on principle of
abuse of rights (Article 19) resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other
applicable provision of law.
DECISION: No, petitioners could not be held liable of violating the principle of
abuse of rights. What made petitioners file the complaint against private respondent
was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a check which they
believed was issued by private respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries
regarding the origin of the check, but private respondent did not clarify the issue
about the mistake in identity immediately. Instead, private respondent immediately
filed an action for damages. The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are
the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general
sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their
own sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of
his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for
injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 has the following elements: 1) There is an act
which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or
public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure. There is no proof or showing
that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the case against
private respondent. And in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith committed
by petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages.
16. Magbanua vs IAC
Facts:
A joint case was rendered in CAR case no. 827, 828 and 829. The defendants who
are shared tenants of the six plaintiffs, off lead free flow water from the plaintiffs
farm land which causes the dry up of most of their own land resulting a great
damage and told the plaintiffs that they should leave their areas because they can no
longer plant palay due to the lack of water. The plaintiff implore that the defendants
be declared as a leasehold tenants and be ordered to pay the damages and the
attorney’s fee. The trial court rendered a decision in favour to the plaintiffs, as to
maintained their agricultural land, prohibits the defendants of disrupting the free
flow of water to their own land, granting moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees, etc. The defendants appealed to the IAC as to deleting the award of
moral and exemplary damages to the plaintiff. The trial court did not agree to IAC
because the defendants violated plaintiffs rights and caused damages onto them.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to moral and exemplary damages and
the attorney’s fee?
Ruling:
The petition is granted and the defendants are liable to pay the plaintiffs
damages and attorney’s fees as computed.
Facts:
At around 6:00 P.M., October 13, 1994, Roberto Reyes or “Amay Bisaya”, attended
the celebration of the natal day of Hotel Nikko’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.
He claimed that he was invited by Dr. Violeta Filart, an officially inivited guest in
the party. He lined-up at the buffet table and was about to eat when Ruby Lim,
Hotel’s Executive Secretary for the past twenty years, approached and told him that
he could leave because he was not invited.
Roberto Reyes was embarrassed and claimed that the other guests have heard what
Lim said. Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos
moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney’s
fees. On Lim’s defense, she asked favour to tell Reyes to leave but he lingered and
did not leave. She only approached Reyes when he was about to eat and told him he
could leave after. Dr. Filart also added that she did not invite Reyes. Reyes
volunteered to help her carry the basket of fruits as gift for the celebrant.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, giving more credence to the testimony of
Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. However, the
Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding
of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud
voice within hearing distance of several guests.
Issue:
Whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes to leave the party
and if she is liable for the damages
Ruling:
No, in the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr.
Reyes and to ridicule and shame him, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at
him from a very close distance. Knowing that she’s been in the hotel business for
twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are to be emulated. She had no
intention to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the request
that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them.
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he
was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21
of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable
as its liability springs from that of its employees. Not being liable for both actual and
moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable
for exemplary damages especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals.
18. Spouses Quisumbing vs Meralco
Facts
Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a house in Quezon City,
The said house was inspected by Meralco officers, after asking permission from
plaintiffs through their secretary, which the secretary granted and witnessed. The
defendant's Inspector discovered that the meter was tampered and the secretary
was informed and then relayed it to Lorna Quisumbing which she denied the
liability of tampering, she was advised by the defendant's inspector that they had
to detach the meter and bring it to the laboratory for verification. In the instance
that the meter turned out to be tampered they had to temporarily disconnect the
plaintiff's electronic services. After an hour the defendant's inspector informed the
plaintiffs that their meter had been tampered unless they pay the amount of
₱178,875.01 representing the differential billing, their electricity supply would be
disconnected. The Plaintiffs were advised that result of inspection and
disconnection may be a violation of contract and may be settled with Mr. Manuson
of special accounts, legal service department. On the same day at 2 o'clock in the
afternoon the defendant's officer was instructed to reconnect the electric service
which the latter compiled.
Issue
Whether respondents observed the due process of law?
Ruling
No, There was no officer of the law or Electricity regulation board representative at
that time. Because of the absence of government representatives, the prima facie
authority to disconnect, granted to Meralco by RA 7832, cannot apply. The
respondent had no legal rights to immediately disconnect the electrical supply,
Petioners could have been able to controvert the initial finding of meter tampering.
Supreme court ordered to pay the respondent the billing differential of ₱193,332.96;
while the respondent is ordered to pay petitioners as moral damages, exemplary
damages, as attorney's fees. The petitioners claim for actual damages was not
granted because it was premised only on Lorna's testimony.
19. University of East vs Jader
FACTS:
Romeo A. Jader, respondent, was enrolled in the University of the East's College of
Law from 1984 to 1988. In the first semester of his last year, he was given an INC
grade in Practice Court 1 after failing to take the final examination. He enrolled the
next semester as 4th yr, and on February 1, 1988, filed an application for the removal
of his INC which was approved by the CLaw dean, Celedonio Tiongson. He took
the exam on March 28, 1988. However, on May 30, 1988, a grade of 5.0 was given to
him by, Prof. Carlos Ortega, his Prof in PC1.
Before graduation, respondent's name appeared on the tentative list of graduating
students. He was able to attend the 35th Investiture & Commencement Ceremonies
on April 16, 1988 at the F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, UE Recto Campus.
He thereafter filed for a leave of absence without pay from his work in order to
prepare for the coming BAR examination. He attended the FEU pre-BAR review
classes but had to drop the review classes after learning about his deficiency (in
PC1). In the end, he was not able to take that year's BAR exam. He then prayed for
damages to him to be paid by the UE. UE counterclaimed but lower court decided in
favor of Jader.
UE argued to the SC that it has no liability to Jader because it was the latter's
negligence in not verifying his grades from the professor concerned.
ISSUE: WON, an institution, in this case, UE, is held liable for damages for
misleading a student into believing that the latter has satisfied all the requirements
for graduation when such is not the same.
RULING: Yes. SC held that the petitioner is liable to the respondent for damages
since it was found guilty of negligence. Petitioner is ordered to pay the respondent a
sum of 35,470.00 pesos, 6% legal interest per annum computed from the date of
filing the complaint until fully paid. An amount of 5,000 pesos as attorney's fees and
costs of suit. Based on Articles 19 & 20 of the Civil Code, the negligent act of the
professor who failed to observe the rules of the school, in this case, by not promptly
submitting grades, thus leading the student to believing that he has satisfied all the
requirements for graduation, is not only reflective of the negligence on the part of
the professor, but also to the school, being his employee.
And since the institution caused damages to the student due to negligence, it must
indemnify the latter for the same.
20. Gashem Shookat Baskh vs CA