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4 Mathematics of Election

4.1 Voting Systems

Groups of people often find themselves in situations where they need to make
a decision as one body and they need to identify which among several options
represents best the preference of the group. This action of determining group
preference may seem to belong mainly in the realm of social science, but math-
ematics has made significant contributions as well. In this section, we look at
di↵erent methods of identifying the group preference given the members’ individ-
ual preferences. The di↵erent voting systems will be discussed using an example.

Example 4.1.1 The discipline committee of a college is deciding on a cheating

case filed by an instructor against two students. The instructor accused a student,
who will be referred to as the “ copier”, of copying the answers of a fellow student,
now referred to as the “ source” in a midterm exam. After the evidences and
witnesses have been presented, there were three opinions among the members of
the committee:

Opinion 1: The source is completely innocent of cheating and was not aware of
the copier’s actions. Therefore, no sanction is necessary. (5 members)

Opinion 2: The source may not have known what the copier had done, but had
nevertheless been careless with his paper. Since students share this respon-
sibility of guarding their test papers against copying by their classmates, he
should be given a public reprimand and a warning. (4 members)

Opinion 3: The source knowingly and intentionally shared his answers with the
copier and therefore, like the copier, should get a failing mark for the course.
(3 members)

Plurality Voting The simplest and most commonly used voting system is the
plurality method. In this system, the option with the most number of votes
wins.
In Example 4.1.1, if each committee member votes according to his first choice,
then the source will not get any sanction. One flaw that often occurs in the
plurality system, especially if there are more than 2 options, is that the winner
might not be the first choice of the majority of the voters. Let us look more
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closely into the preferences of the committee members. We denote the options as
to what action to take regarding the source as follows:

Option a: no sanction
Option b: public reprimand and warning
Option c: failing mark in the course

The five members who prefer option a will be called group A. They will
logically prefer option b to option c. The three members who are of Opinion 3 will
be group C and they will naturally prefer c to b and b to a. The four members
of Opinion 2 will be group B and their second choice may not be the same. For
simplicity, let us assume that they all prefer a over c. The preference of the group
members can be represented in a table as follows:

Group A Group B Group C

First choice a b c
Second choice b a b
Third choice c c a

This summary is also referred to as the preference schedules of the group

members. The preference schedules can also be represented in a diagram as
follows:

As we have seen earlier, if each member votes sincerely (according to his first
choice), option a will win. As also seen in the above preference schedules, seven
committee members prefer b over a. If committee members happened to know
the way other members will vote, group C may opt to vote for option b rather
than their first choice, option a. In this way, they will at least get their second
choice. In fact, it will be beneficial for both groups B and C to vote for option b.
This tactic is called insincere or strategic voting. As seen in the above example,
this voting system is susceptible to manipulation by strategic voting. In fact, all
voting systems can be manipulated either by strategic voting or by the way the
voting is conducted. This will be seen in the succeeding example.
In a plurality vote, only the first choice of the voter is submitted. In the
desire to take into account the ranking of the options by the individual voters,
other voting systems were designed.
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Sequential Voting In sequential voting, several votes are taken to come up with
a winner. It can be done in such a way that the final outcome gets the majority of
the votes. There are two main variations of sequential voting: winners-runo↵ and
losers-eliminated. In winners-runo↵, the top two options are put on ballot against
each other to produce a majority winner. In losers-eliminated, the last-placer is
excluded in the succeeding ballot.
In example 4.1.1, a sequential voting may be done in the following manner.
The committee decides first on whether the source should be sanctioned or not.
In this first vote, the choices are a or not a. Sanctioning will win 7 to 5. Then a
second ballot is conducted to determine what sanction will be given, i.e., b or c.
Option b will win in the second vote, 9 to 3.
A standard winners-runo↵ in Example 4.1.1 will yield a and b as the top two
options, and b wins in the second ballot. In cases like this where there are only
three options, winners-runo↵ is the same as losers-eliminated.

Example 4.1.2 The executive board of an organization is choosing its president.

There are four candidates: Patrick (P), Ann (A), Claire (C) and Miko (M). The
preference schedules of the board members are given below:

1. (a) Determine the winner using the winners-runo↵ method.

(b) Use the losers-eliminated method to find the winner.

Solution.

1. (a) In the first ballot the results are

P C A M
6 5 4 3

The second ballot between Patrick and Claire will declare Patrick the
winner 13 to 5.
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(b) The first ballot, as shown in (a) above, will eliminate Miko. In the
second ballot, the three members who voted for Miko will vote for their
second choice, Ann. Hence the result

P C A
6 5 7

The third ballot between Patrick and Ann will declare Ann the winner
12 to 6.

Borda Count In some situations, a group ranking, rather than a single choice
candidate is required. The previous methods can be applied repeatedly, eliminat-
ing the winner at each stage to get the next in rank. The Borda count method
provides a way of coming up with a group ranking in just one vote. Instead of
the voters indicating their first choice, they give their ranking of the candidates.
Points are assigned to each position in the ranking, higher score to higher rank.
The scores are then tallied and compared.

Example 4.1.3 Consider Example 4.1.1. A simple Borda point system will as-
sign 3 points to first choice, 2 to second choice, and 1 point to third choice. The
Borda count for each option will be:

a : 5(3) + 4(2) + 3(1) = 26

b : 5(2) + 4(3) + 3(2) = 28
c : 5(1) + 4(1) + 3(3) = 18

Hence option b takes first place, followed by option a.

Example 4.1.4 If the following scoring is using in Example 4.1.2: first - 4 points,
second - 3 points, third - 2 points, fourth - 1 point, the Borda counts will be

Patrick : 6(4) + 5(1) + 4(3) + 3(2) = 47

Ann : 6(3) + 5(3) + 4(4) + 3(3) = 58
Claire : 6(2) + 5(4) + 4(91) + 3(1) = 39
Miko : 6(1) + 5(2) + 4(2) + 3(4) = 36

Hence Ann gets first place, followed by Patrick, Claire and Miko in that order.
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Pairwise Comparison or the Condorcet Method The Condorcet winner is

the candidate which wins over every other candidate in a pairwise voting.

Example 4.1.5 In Example 4.1.1, pairwise voting will result in

a vs. b : b wins 7 to 5
a vs. c : a wins 9 to 3
b vs. c : b wins 9 to 3
The Condorcet winner is b.

Example 4.1.6 In Example 4.1.2, the results of pairwise voting are:

Patrick vs. Ann : Ann wins 12 to 6
Patrick vs. Claire : Patrick wins 13 to 5
Patrick vs. Miko : Patrick wins 10 to 8
Ann vs. Claire : Ann wins 13 to 5
Ann vs. Miko : Ann wins 15 to 3
Claire vs. Miko : Claire wins 11 to 7
The Condorcet winner is Ann.

It is possible that in certain situations, there is no Condorcet winner.

Example 4.1.7 One hundred voters are to choose among candidates A, B and
C. The following are their preferences:

Pairwise voting yield:

A vs. B : B wins 60 to 40
A vs. C : A wins 75 to 25
B vs. C : C wins 65 to 35
In this scenario, A beats C, C beats B and B beats A. This is called the Condorcet
Paradox.
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Approval Voting If there is a large number of candidates and a group ranking is

desired, it is often expected that each voter should be asked to rank the candidates.
This is not an easy task for the voter. If in addition, there is a large number of
voters, then the task of coming up with a group ranking becomes even more
problematic. Approval voting is a simple way of obtaining a group ranking using
“approval votes”. In approval voting, each voter “approves” or “disapproves” each
candidate. The candidates are then ranked according to the number of approval
votes they obtained.

Example 4.1.8 Twelve members of an executive board are to select their officers.
They decided to use approval voting and appoint as president, vice-president, and
secretary the first, second, and third placer, respectively. The approval votes are
summarized in the table below. An X indicates an approval vote.

Voters
Candidates 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Tally
A X X X X X 5
B X X X X X X X X X 9
C X X X X X X X X 8
D X X X X X X X 7
E X X X X X X X X X X 10
F X X X X X X 6
G X X X X X X 6
H X X X X X X 6

The table shows that candidate E becomes president with 10 approval votes, B is
vice-president with 9 approval votes, and C is secretary with 8 approval votes.

The examples above and the exercises at the end of this section will show that
every voting system is subject to manipulation by insincere voting or by the design
of the system. A voting system can be chosen or modified to obtain the result
desired. The following example will illustrate how the system used can yield a
particular outcome.

Example 4.1.9 Sixty delegates attend a national convention of a political party

to elect their party chairperson. There are five candidates, A, B, C, D, and E.
Given below are the preference schedules:
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1. Plurality.
The plurality winner is candidate A with 17 votes.

2. Sequential Voting - Winner’s Runo↵

The top two candidates are A and B. The second vote between A and B will
yield B as winner.

3. Sequential Voting - Losers Eliminated

Candidate E is eliminated after the first vote.
A B C D
The second vote yields: and candidate D
17 18 13 12
is eliminated.
A B C
The third vote has results: . This eliminates candi-
17 18 25
date A.
Head-to-head voting between candidates C and B will make C the winner.

4. Borda Count
Assigning 5 points for first-place ranking, 4 points for second, 3 for third, 2
for fourth and 1 for fifth yields the following scores:

A B C D E
128 171 180 211 210

Hence D wins.
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5. Condorcet Method
Doing a pairwise comparison will show that candidate
E beats A 43 to 17
E beats B 38 to 22
E beats C 38 to 22
E beats D 31to 29

Hence the Condorcet winner is candidate E.

The mathematician Kenneth Arrow studied the possibility of an ideal voting

system. He first characterized a perfect voting system as satisfying the following
conditions:

The group ranking should take into consideration each individual ranking.

The group ranking should be logical in the sense that if the group prefers A to
B and B to C, then the group ranking should also prefer A to C.

The winner remains the same is any one of the other choices is removed.

Arrow then proved that it is impossible to device a voting system that will
satisfy all of the above conditions. His result is known as the Arrow Impossibility
Theorem.

Exercises 4.1
1. In Example 4.1.1, suppose that the four committee members who believe
the Source shares partly in the responsibility of guarding his paper against
the Copier are split such that two prefer option a to option c, while the
other two prefer c to a. The following preference schedule results

Assuming sincere voting on the part of each committee member,

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(a) What verdict would result if they used the sequential agenda of sanction
vs. no sanction first, then choosing the sanction second?
(b) What verdict would result if they used sequential voting by deciding
first on the sanction (b or c) before deciding on whether to sanction or
not?
(c) What verdict would result if they used a Borda count which assigns 3,
2, and 1 point(s) for a first, second, and third choice, respectively?
(d) What verdict would result if they looked for the Condorcet winner?

2. In Example 4.1.1, suppose that in doing the sequential voting, the committee
decided to choose the sanction first (b vs. c) and then decide on whether to
sanction or not.

(a) What would have been the verdict if the members vote sincerely?
(b) Is there any way for a group to vote strategically and obtain a more
preferable verdict?

3. (From: “For All Practical Purposes: An Introduction to Contemporary

Mathematics,” COMAP, 1991.) The ten members of a party’s platform
committee must pick one issue to receive the highest priority in the upcom-
ing campaign. The three contenders are defense D, education E, and health
H, and their preference schedules are as follows:

(a) Which issue wins if they first vote between E and H, and then vote
between this initial winner and D?
(b) Which issue wins if they first vote between D and E and then vote
between this initial winner and H?
(c) Could those who most prefer E vote insincerely in some way to change
the outcomes in (a) or (b) in a way that benefits them?
(d) Which issue wins if they use a Borda count that scores 3 points, 2
points, and 1 point for each first choice, second choice, and third choice,
respectively?
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(e) Could those who most prefer H vote insincerely in some way so as to
change the outcome in (d) to their advantage?

4. (From: “For All Practical Purposes: An Introduction to Contemporary

Mathematics,” COMAP, 1991.) Eleven students must decide whether to
eat at McDonald’s (M ), Jollibee (J) or Shakey’s (S). Their preference
schedules are:

(a) What choice will the group make if they vote sincerely according to the
following methods:
i. plurality
ii. eliminating the restaurant with the fewest first-place votes and
having a runo↵ between the other two
iii. eliminating the restaurant with the most last-place votes and hav-
ing a runo↵ between the other two
(b) Is any restaurant a Condorcet winner?
(c) What choice will be made if they use a Borda count that assigns x
points to each first choice, y points to each second choice, and z points
to each third choice when
i. x = 3, y = 2, and z = 1?
ii. x = 4, y = 2, and z = 1?
iii. x = 5, y = 2, and z = 1?
(d) Is there a way to pick the points x, y, and z in (c) with x > y > z so
that Jollibee wins the Borda count?

5. (From: “For All Practical Purposes: An Introduction to Contemporary

Mathematics,” COMAP, 1991.) Ten board members vote by approval
voting on eight candidates for new positions on their board as indicated in
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the following table. An X indicates an approval vote.

Voters
Candidate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A X X X X X X X
B X X X X X X X X
C X X
D X X X X X X X X X
E X X X X X
F X X X X X X X X
G X X X X X X
H X X X X X

(a) Which candidate is chosen for the board if just one of them is to be
elected?
(b) Which candidates are chosen if the top four are selected?
(c) Which candidates are chosen elected if 80% approval is necessary and
at most four are selected?
(d) Which candidates are elected if 60% approval is necessary and at most
four are selected?

6. (From: “For All Practical Purposes: An Introduction to Contemporary

Mathematics,” COMAP, 1991.) The 45 members of a school’s theater
group vote on three nominees A, B, and C by approval voting for the year’s
“best stage actress” as indicated in the following table. An X indicates an
approval vote.

Number of voters
Nominee 7 8 9 9 6 3 1 2
A X X X X
B X X X X
C X X X X

(a) Which nominee is selected for the award?

(b) Which nominee gets announced as runner-up for the award?
(c) Note that two of the members “abstained”, i.e., approved none of the
nominees. Note also that one person approved of all three of the nom-
inees. What would be the di↵erence in the outcome if one were to
“abstain” or approve of everyone? Explain.

7. Consider Example 4.1.9. Determine the winning candidate if they used a

voting method that eliminates at each ballot the candidate with the most last
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place votes, and then continue with successive ballots with all 60 delegates
voting each time.

8. (From: “For All Practical Purposes: An Introduction to Contemporary

Mathematics,” COMAP, 1991.) Assume that A, B and C are members
of a three-person committee and have the following preference schedules for
outcomes a, b, and c.

Each voter can vote sincerely for one outcome, and the majority rules. Fur-
thermore, A is the chairperson and has the power to break tie votes.

(a) What would the result be if each member voted sincerely for his or her
most preferred outcome?
(b) What do you expect will actually happen in this situation?
(c) Can you explain why this example is often referred to as the chairman’s
paradox?

4.2 Weighted Voting Systems

In the voting systems we have studied in Section 4.1, each voter has one vote.
This means that the voters have equal chances of influencing the result of the
election. In some situations, certain voters are given more votes than others.
For example, in the business world, certain decisions are made by shareholders
and each shareholder is given the number of votes equal to the number of shares
the person holds. In the United States, the president is elected not directly by
the citizens but by an electoral college consisting of members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate. It is usual that the representatives of the same
state vote as one bloc. Hence each state enjoys a di↵erent number of votes. In
situations like the above, it is both interesting and important to study how much
each voter or bloc can influence the outcome of an election. It will be surprising