G.R. No.

L-5275 August 25, 1953

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUANITO DASIG, BALBINO GABUNI and MARCELINO DAYAO, defendants-appellants.

.FACT

The record discloses that in the evening of December 23, 1949, at about midnight, while Norberto
Ramil and his wife, Jacinta Galasinao, and their daughter and son, Segunda and Domingo,
respectively, were sleeping in their house situated not far away from the municipal building of Antatet
(now Luna), Province of Isabela, the said spouses were suddenly awakened by the barking of dogs
and the grunting of pigs. Ramil got up and walked quietly towards a window, to find out what the
dogs were barking at, but just then two persons who had entered the house faced him. The wife
heard these persons talking in whispers and saw them in front. She lighted a lamp, and as she did
so the two intruders levelled their guns at her husband and demanded from him to produce his
pistol. As the husband could not produce any pistol and said he had none at all, they fired at him. He
used his two hands to protect himself, but to no avail. As he received the shots, he fell down in a
stooping position and then slumped on the floor, face downwards. The wife and her two children,
who had already been awakened, cried for help, but the intruders levelled their guns at them,
commanding them to keep quiet and threatening to kill if they did not do so. For fear, they had to
stop. The intruders then went inside the bedroom and ran-sacked the contents of the trunk which
contained their valuables. P10 in cash and jewels worth P180 were taken away.

ISSUE

Upon which the judgment of conviction is based, consists of the testimony on one, Jose Mallillin,
that of Andres Bumanglag, which in part corroborates Mallillin's testimony, and the findings of a
ballistic expert of the Philippine Constabulary to the effect that the empty .32 caliber cartridges found
under the house of Ramil had been fired from the Llama auto-pistol possessed by, and licensed in
the name of, Mallillin, and that the .32 caliber slug, Exhibit C, which was found inside the trunk, had
also been fired therefrom. These findings were based on the fact that the striations found in the said
bullet are identical with and congruent to those which he fired from the same Llama auto-pistol, and
the pin marks at the empty .32 caliber cartridges are identical with and congruent to that found at an
empty cartridge fired from the same pistol.

The trial court gave credit to the testimonies of Mallillin and Bumanglag as above outlined, and
together with the identification made by the wife of Ramil of one of the appellants by the latter's
stature, and on the further ground that the cartridges and some of the bullets found in the premises
had been fired from the Llama pistol of Mallillin, held that the crime of robbery with homicide had
been committed by the accused-appellants herein, and sentenced them as above indicated.

HELD

It has been stated that the rule (Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus) invoked is not a mandatory rule of
evidence, but rather a permissible one, which allows the jury or the court to draw the inference or not
to draw it as circumstances may best warrant. (70 C.J. 783.) The unbelievable allegation of Mallillin,
that he was forced into joining the band against his will, arises from the natural desire of an
accomplice to shift the blame to his co-conspirators and exculpate himself; while his assertion that
the gun Gabuni carried was his service pistol maybe an innocent mistake on Mallillin's part. His claim
that it was Bumanglag who indicated where access to the victim's house may be had may also be
untrue, be-cause Mallillin had been said to have been in the house. Do these flaws and defects
render his testimony wholly inadmissible under the rule invoked?

We take advantage of this opportunity to explain the true scope of this much invoked and abused
rule of (Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus.) Professor Wigmore states that this rule ceased to be the
rule in England as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century. He criticizes the board rule as
unsound, because not true to human nature; that because a person tells a single lie, he is lying
throughout his whole testimony, or that there is strong possibility that he is so lying. The reason for it
is that once a person knowingly and deliberately states a falsehood in one material aspect, he must
have done so as to the rest. But it is also clear that the rule has its limitations, for when the mistaken
statement is consistent with good faith and is not conclusively indicative of a deliberate perversion,
the believable portion of the testimony should be admitted. Because though a person may err in
memory or in observation in one or more respects, he may have told the truth as to others. (III
Wigmore, Secs. 1009-1015, pp. 674-683.) There are, therefor, these requirements for the application
of the rule, i.e., that the false testimony is as to a material point, and that there should be a
conscious and deliberate intention to falsify.

With the above limitations of the rule in mind, it is clear that the maxim should not apply in the case
at bar for three reasons. First, there is sufficient corroboration on many grounds of the testimony.
Second, the mistakes are not on the very material points. Third, the errors do not arise from an
apparent desire to pervert the truth, but from innocent mistakes and the desire of the witness to
exculpate himself though not completely.
G.R. No. 137281 April 3, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VIRGILIO LUCENA y SANTIAGO, accused-appellant.

FACT

For the fatal hacking of Urbano U. Dulay and Lazaro U. Dulay, Sr., accused-appellant Virgilio
Lucena y Santiago was charged with Double Murder in an Information 1 which alleges:

That on or about the 18th day of July 1995 in the Municipality of Aringay, Province of La Union,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill and being armed with a bolo, did then and there, by means of treachery and with evident
premeditation and taking advantage of his superior strength, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and use personal violence on one URBANO DULAY y ULAT and LAZARO DULAY,
Sr. y ULAT, by hacking them to death with the said bolo and inflicting upon them mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of their deaths, to the damage and prejudice of their
heirs.

ISSUE

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. 2 The case thereafter proceeded to trial.
Subsequently, the court a quo rendered judgment as follows:

This Court finds accused VIRGILIO LUCENA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER for killing Lazaro Dulay and Urbano Dulay on July 18, 1995. This Court appreciated the
presence of alevosia as an aggravating circumstance in the killing of Lazaro Dulay. This court could
have appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling but it was not alleged in the Information.

Accused-appellant had a different story. He testified that in the morning of July 18, 1995, he was at
his house in Sta. Cecilia, Aringay, La Union, repairing its roof since 7:00 o'clock. 9 At noon, he went
to the house of Rosalina Dulay, which was about 100 meters away, to have lunch. 10 He usually ate
lunch at Rosalina's house. 11 He reached the house at around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon. 12
Rosalina was outside the house. 13 When accused-appellant entered the house, he found the
brothers, Urbano and Lazaro Dulay, hacking each other with bolos. 14 Since Urbano, who was
older, was being attacked by the younger Lazaro, accused-appellant intervened to restrain the latter.
15 While accused-appellant was pacifying Lazaro, Urbano was able to run away. 16 Lazaro,
however, turned to accused-appellant and hacked him with the bolo five (5) times, hitting him in the
head and on his left foot above the ankle. 17 Accused-appellant ran away but was pursued by
Lazaro. In order to defend himself, accused-appellant picked up Urbano's bolo and hacked Lazaro
with it. 18 Accused-appellant then left the Dulay residence, 19 leaving Lazaro lying on the floor, and
went home. He brought with him the bolo which he used to defend himself. 20 Accused-appellant
was seen by his brother and was brought to the Health Center in Agoo to have his bloodied head
treated.
Evident premeditation qualified the killings to Murder. Taking advantage of his superior strength was
also present considering the ages of the victims and the perpetrator.Evidently, the Prosecution is of
the view that this incident presents a continuous offense on the theory that there was only one
criminal resolution on the part of the accused. Hence, the charge is double murder. This is a heinous
crime.

HELD

Accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the killing of
Lazaro U. Dulay, Sr., and is sentenced to serve the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

Accused-appellant is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for
the killing of Urbano U. Dulay, and is sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) Years
and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of
Reclusion Temporal, as maximum.

The Decision under review, insofar as it orders accused-appellant to pay the heirs of Lazaro Dulay
the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 for expenses in connection with this
death, and to pay the heirs of Urbano Dulay the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P15,000.00 for expenses in connection with his death, is AFFIRMED.

This Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of death (Art. 63, par. 1, Revised Penal Code).
G.R. No. L-37945 May 28, 1984

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
ADRIANO CAÑETE and JOSE BILOG alias BOY,

FACT

Accused Jose Bilog and Douglas Bilog were brothers. They were owners of adjoining ricelands
adjacent to the Inagawan-Sub Colony at Puerto Princess, Palawan (p. 10, tsn, Jan. 4, 1973,
Anonas). They were not in good terms and always quarrelled because Jose resented the fact that
Douglas has received a bigger share of the lands inherited from their parents. (pp. 12, 20, tsn.,
Anonas).

The ire of Jose against his brother became unbearable that on or about April 28, 1971, he got his
father's shotgun and waylaid Douglas at the bridge leading their house. A tragic incident was averted
only when Concepcion the wife of Douglas, informed her uncle, Cervancia, of Jose's evil scheme.
Cervancia immediately went after Jose and succeeded in retrieving the gun from the latter and tried
to settle their differences (p. 10, tsn, Anonas).

Through the intercession of Mr. Aniceto Gamo, a Chief of Section in the Inagawan-Sub Colony, Jose
Bilog had allowed his farm to be worked by Nicasio Dayao, a prisoner at the Colony (pp. 4-5, 13, tsn,
Duero). Sometime in May, 1971 while Dayao was working in the ricefield, Jose Bilog offered him
P300.00 if he (Dayao) would kill Douglas. Dayao asked Jose Bilog why he wanted his brother
liquidated. Jose replied that Douglas poisoned their mother and if Douglas would not be liquidated
he (Douglas) would eventually kill all of them in the family (p. 7, tsn., Duero). Dayao rejected the
proposal and offer of reward. He explained to Jose that he could not kill Douglas because he has
many children to think about (p. 8, tsn., Duero).

On April 19, 1972, at about 5:00 p.m., Concepcion Bilog saw from the window of their house in the
ricefield, Jose Bilog riding on a bicycle going towards the ricefield. On that occasion she saw Jose
Bilog converse with two colonists (pp. 6-7, 10, tsn., Jan. 4, 1973, Anonas).

ISSUE

On April 27, 1972, police investigators received information about the persons seen at the scene of
the crime prior to its commission. They took into custody Adriano Cañete and Angel Rebong and
brought them to Puerto Princess for interrogation. When they reached Puerto Princess, Adriano
Cañete informed Angel Rebong that he killed Douglas Bilog (p. 57, tsn., Duero). Upon investigation,
appellant Cañete readily admitted that he together with Jose Bilog, Pedro Macabihag and Ramon
Dealogo killed Douglas Bilog. Cañete then voluntarily gave a written statement. (Exhibit "C"; pp. 157,
158-159, tsn. Duero). Later, he led Sgt. Maduro to his quarters in the Colony and surrendered the
fatal knife (pp. 162, 180, tsn., Id.). On June 22, 1972 Cañete gave another statement. This time he
stated that only he and Jose Bilog had a hand in the killing of Douglas (p. 177, tsn., Duero).
HELD

Aside from the fact that courts exercise great caution in accepting alibi because it is easily
concocted, it may be proper to repeat what one author said about alibi as a defense: "it is a reason
with a bad reputation."

Again, We agree with the findings of the trial court that "while Jose Bilog tried to shift the blame at
Cañete, Cañete too wanted the Court to believe that it was Jose Bilog who did the heinous act.
Repudiating his confession, Cañete tried to convince the Court that he was simply offered P1,000.00
in consideration of his admission of the crime. On cross- examination, however, Cañete slipped and
admitted that the P1,000.00 consideration was offered for him to execute the killing. It is therefore
evident that Cañete's testimony disowning the crime is but a last minute attempt at exculpation."

The killing of Douglas Bilog was qualified by treachery because the attack was unexpected and
sudden, and the victim had no chance to defend himself. Likewise, the aggravating circumstance of
price was present in the commission of the crime and this affects not only the person who received
the money or the reward but also the person who gave it. (People vs. Talledo, 58 Phil. 539).

The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED but, for lack of necessary votes, the sentence is
modified in that both appellants shall each suffer Reclusion Perpetua only, and shall indemnify,
jointly and severally, the heirs of Douglas Bilog in the sum of P30,000.00. Costs against both
appellants.
CASE DIGEST

PEOPLE V. PAYOT, PEOPLE V. FLORO, PEOPLE V. JOSE, and PEOPLE V. GALLEGO

FACT

That on or about the 18th day of August, 1994 at around 7:30 o’clock in the evening, in
Barangay San Roque II, Municipality of San Jose, Province of Occidental Mindoro, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being then armed with sharp
bladed instruments, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring
and confederating together with two others whose true names and identities are still unknown,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said
weapons one Nelson Soro, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious wounds which caused his
untimely death.

ISSUE

Before us is an appeal from a judgment dated August 27, 1996 rendered by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 45, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, in Criminal Case No. R-3744 entitled "People of
the Philippines v. Jesemiel Mosquerra and Jimmy Mosquerra," finding accused-appellant Jimmy
Mosquerra guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing him to life imprisonment
and to pay the heirs of the victim civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

RULING

From the record, it appears that the victim, Nelson Soro, and accused-appellant’s brother,
Jesemiel Mosquerra, had an altercation in the late afternoon of August 18, 1994. Jesemiel and
several others were then playing basketball in the neighborhood basketball court when Soro on
board his tricycle passed by. Whether intentionally or by accident is unclear, but Soro was hit
on the face by a basketball thrown by Jesemiel. As a result, Soro lost control of his tricycle,
hitting a fence. Incensed, Soro alighted from his tricycle, arming himself with a screwdriver with
which he attempted to stab Jesemiel. The latter, however, managed to avoid being hit. Before
the fight could escalate, Soro fled on foot and proceeded to the house of Eusebio Surilla, a
policeman, to seek the latter’s assistance in recovering his tricycle which he left near the
basketball court. Surilla accompanied Soro to the basketball court, whereupon he admonished
the feuding pair to cool off. Soro was able to get back his tricycle. On the other hand, Jesemiel
was heard to mutter as he was leaving, "Mamaya ka lang putang ina mo."
The court a quo erred in failing to award actual damages in favor of the heirs of the victim. They
incurred funeral expenses amounting to Nineteen Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P19,500.00)
which are duly evidenced by receipts. 41 Moreover, the victim’s heirs are entitled to moral
damages in the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro finding the accused-appellant,
Jimmy Mosquerra, guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that said accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua (not life
imprisonment) and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Nelson Soro, aside from the civil
indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), the sums of Nineteen Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P19,500.00), as actual damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages. Costs against Accused-Appellant.
CASE DIGEST

PEOPLE VS BARO, G.R. Nos. 146327-29 June 5, 2002

SUMMARY: Baro was charged by 3 counts of rape by Roda. He pleaded not guilty and
interposed the alibi that he was in Catubig, Northern Samar when the alleged rapes were
committed. Based solely on the complainants testimony, RTC convict him 3 counts of rape and
sentence him reclusion perpetua for each count. SC reversed the RTC decision acquitted Baro. It
held that complainants testimony was not credible, unable to proved accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The accused defense of alibi is valid.

DOCTRINE: An alibi is a plea of having been somewhere other than the scene of the crime at a
time of its commission. To prosper it must be demonstrate that the person charged with the
crime was not only somewhere else when the offense is committed, but that was so far away
that it would have been physically impossible to have been at the place of the crime or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.

FACTS

* December 17, 1997 Roda Ongatan file a complaint of 3 counts of raped against Ernie Baro.

* It was alleged that he raped her on January 5, 1995, March 5, 1995 and April 6, 1996 in her
bedroom ( 2 armslength wide and 1 1/2 armslength long ). Roda along with her parents, 8 other
siblings and 1 uncle occupied the 2nd floor of the house.

* Complainant described each rape as follows: the appellant enter her room, covers her mouth
with handkerchief, threaten to kill her if she shouted, pulls down her underwear, pokes a
balisong at her, and insert his penis into her vigana and she couldn’t remember how long the
appellants penis was inside her.

* Medico Legal Officer Dr. Freyra found lacerations in Roda’s hymen, opined that these
lacerations could have been cause a hard blunt object like an erect male organs.

* Accused appellant Baro pleaded not guilty to all charges. His alibi he was engaged in Copra
farming in Catubig Northern Samar prior to November 15, 1996, when he came into manila
with his wife and 3 kids to find work upon request and invitation of his niece ( Roda’s mom).
They stayed Montessori, Manila before transferring to the house of his niece where they stayed
for 1year.

* RTC: Baro guilty of 3 counts of raped, reclusion of perpetua for each count. Medico- legal
report and testimony of Dr. Freyra bolstered Roda’s claimed that she has experienced violent
sexual intercourse at young age. Accused alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive
testimony and identification of complain.

RULING: Appeal granted. The guilt of appellant was not proven beyong reasonable doubt. RTC
decision REVERSE and appellant ACQUITTED.

WoN the complainants testimony is credible- NO.

* While it is true that the complainants testimony maybe the sole basis for convicting the
accused in the rape cased, the complaining witness testimony must be credible.

* In reviewing rape case, this Court will always been guided by the following principles: (a) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility- while it maybe difficult for the prosecution to
prove, it usually more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove: (b) in view
of the intrinsic nature of the crime in which only two person are usually involved the testimony
of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution: and (c) the evidence for the
prosecution must be stand or fall on its merits- it cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.

In review of the records of the case create reasonable doubt as to accused guilt because of: 1)
delay in filing the complainant,2) failure of the prosecution to prove accused moral ascendancy
over complainant 3) lack of support from the records for the RTC’s finding of violent sexual
intercourse and 4) discreparcies in the complainants testimony.

The complainant was filed more than 2years after the first raped and more than a year after the
third one allegedly occurred. Her explanation for the delay was the threat of the appellant to
kill her, but she reported the incident while she is still residing with her family.

He was not much older than her brothers. It was not shown whether he was her benefactor or
whether he exercised discipline over her. Presumptions of moral ascendancy cannot and should
not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence.
CASE DIGEST

People vs Larranga, et al, G.R.Nos. 138874-75

FACTS

On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong failed to come home on
the expected time. Two days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff. Her
pants were torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face
and neck were covered with masking tape and attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The
woman was identified as Marijoy.

•After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced and admitted before the police
having participated in the abduction of the sisters. He identified appellants Francisco Juan
Larranaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cano, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy,
and James Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime.

•Rusia stated that at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen and Josman and they
rode a white car. following them were Larranaga, James Anthony and James Andrew who were
in a red car. Josman stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed and here the sisters
Marijoy and Jacqueline were standing and, together with Rowen, forced them to ride the car.
Jacqueline managed to get out of the car after 14 meters but Josman chased her and brought
her back to the car. Rowen elbowed Jacqueline in the chest and punched Marijoy in the
stomach. Then both women fainted, Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen handcuffed them
jointly.

•That after stopping by a safe house, the women were molested in separate rooms. The
women were again brought to the white car and the group thereafter headed to the South Bus
Terminal where they met the van driver Alberto and conductor Ariel, and hired the white van
driven by the former. They traveled towards south of Cebu City, leaving the red car at the South
Bus Terminal.

•That after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot session. Later, they
started to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped Jaqueline. Josman intructed
Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and push her into the ravine. The claims of Rusia
were supported by other witnesses. He was discharged as an accused and became a state
witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was never found.

The RTC found the other appellants guilty of two crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention and sentenced them to suffer the penalties of two a reclusion perpetua each, that
court erred in finding that there was conspiracy.
CASE DIGEST

Cacao vs. People

Julius Cacao y Prieto vs. People of the Philippines
[G.R. No. 180870, 610 SCRA 636, January 22, 2010]

Doctrines:

Essential in a drug-related case is that the identity of the dangerous drug

be established beyond reasonable doubt Since the dangerous drug constitutes
the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment
of conviction, it behooves upon the prosecution to establish and prove with
certainty that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the
accused is the same item recovered from his possession.

The failure to establish the chain of custody is fatal to the prosecution’s

case. There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when
nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen
examined and established to be the prohibited drug.

Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by

itself override the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent
unless overcome by strong, clear and compelling evidence.

Facts:
On October 14, 2004, at around 7:45 in the evening, Police Officer 3 (PO3)
Celso Pang-ag of the Intelligence and Operation Section of the Laoag City Police
Station received a telephone call from an informant about a drug session being
held inside Room 5 of the Starlight Hotel located at Barangay 5, Ablan Avenue,
Laoag City.

Acting on the information, PO3 Pang-ag, together with PO2 Jonel

Mangapit, went immediately to the Starlight Hotel to determine the veracity of
the report. Upon arrival at the target area, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit
approached the lady clerk manning the information counter of Starlight Hotel
and inquired about the alleged drug session at Room 5 of the hotel.

The lady clerk informed PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit that the roomboy
of the hotel was about to deliver a softdrink to Room 5 and they could follow him
if they [so wish]. Thus, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit followed the roomboy to
Room 5. Upon arrival, the roomboy knocked at the door and a woman, later
identified as Mylene, opened the door wide enough to enable the police officers
to look inside.
 PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit saw petitioner seated on top of the bed
sniffing shabu while Joseph Canlas was on the floor assisting petitioner sniffing
shabu. At this juncture, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit arrested petitioner and
Joseph and confiscated from them the drug paraphernalia, glass tooter, scissors,
lighters and plastic sachets.

PO2 Mangapit frisked petitioner and recovered from him one plastic
sachet containing shabu.

After informing petitioner and Joseph of their constitutional rights, PO3

Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit brought them to the Laoag City Police Station and
turned them over to the police officer on duty while the confiscated items were
turned over to SPO3 Loreto Ancheta.

The Philippine National Police (PNP) laboratory conducted an examination

on the specimen recovered from appellant and his companion which tested
positive for shabu.

On October 15, 2004, two separate informations were filed against Joseph
Canlas y Naguit and Cacao indicting them for violation of Section 11, Article II
of RA 9165 before the RTC of Laoag City.

Both RTC and CA convicted petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the lower courts gravely erred in ruling that the guilt of
the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Held: As a general rule, factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and
the CA are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal. However, if there is any indication that the trial court overlooked certain
facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of the
case, the Supreme Court will not hesitate to review the same. In this case, the
Court finds it imperative to review the factual findings of the trial court because
of certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on
material points.

A. The testimonies of the prosecutions principal witnesses are inconsistent

as to who delivered the prohibited drug to the evidence custodian.

In this case, PO3 Celso Pang-ag (Pang-ag) and PO2 Jonel Mangapit
(Mangapit) both testified that it was the latter who brought the item confiscated
from petitioner to the evidence custodian, SPO3 Loreto Ancheta (Ancheta).
However, the foregoing assertions are totally at odds with the testimony of
Ancheta, the evidence custodian. The latter denied that it was Mangapit who
delivered the item allegedly recovered from Cacao. Instead, he repeatedly and
 categorically declared that it was SP03 Balolong (Balolong) from whom he
received the plastic sachet of shabu.

Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, The Court is of the

considered view that this contradiction is not so inconsequential or minor but a
discrepancy touching on substantial and significant matter which could well
affect the credibility of the witnesses.

B. The prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish that the item presented in

court was the same item confiscated from Cacao.

The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of Mangapit and Pang-

ag, on one hand, and the testimony of Ancheta on the other hand, necessarily
leads us to doubt that the plastic sachet of shabu identified in court is the same
item that was allegedly seized and confiscated from petitioner. If the version of
Mangapit is to be believed, then the most lamentable aspect pertains to his
failure to identify the seized item with certainty. For sure Mangapit, who is the
most competent person to make the proper identification being the officer who
confiscated the item from Cacao, never actually identified the same.

The only other person who could have identified the subject drug is Pang-
ag. However, the Court cannot lend credence to his supposed identification, the
same not being also positive, certain and unequivocal. Besides, there is no
showing that this witness actually saw the shabu at the time it was allegedly
seized from petitioner. In fact, Pang-ag is even incompetent to make the
identification since from all indications, he has never been in possession of it.

Moreover, considering the testimony of Ancheta, it was Balolong who

forwarded the seized item. It must be noted that Balolong was never presented
to testify in this case. Thus, there is no evidence to prove that what was turned
over to the evidence custodian by Balolong and later presented in court was the
same substance recovered from petitioner. The failure to establish the chain of
custody is fatal to the prosecution’s case.
CASE DIGEST

SIMON FLORES V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 181354

FACTS

Jesus Avenido was shot in his residence by Simon Flores, Barangay Captain
of San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, with an M-16 armalite rifle. According to the
prosecution, Flores suddenly shot Avenido while they were talking, and that
he continued shooting even as Avenido was laying flat on the ground. On the
other hand, Flores claims self-defense. He reasoned that he went to
Avenido’s home to ask Avenido and his guests to cease firing their guns and
to save these for the next day’s Fiesta. Also, Flores claimed that Avenido
appeared drunk when he was approached by him, then he was suddenly fired
at by Avenido, prompting him to fire back. Flores claimed that he was hit twice
with a magnum handgun by Avenido.

Avenido suffered 4 gunshot wounds in the different parts of the body: the left
shoulder, abdomen, left buttocks, and right flank. Flores was found guilty of
homicide by the Sandigan bayan.

ISSUE

Whether the elements of self-defense are present in the case.

RULING

No, the elements of self-defense are not present in the case. To successfully
claim self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove the concurrence of
the elements of self-defense. Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, any
person who acts in defense of his person or rights does not incur any criminal
liability provided that the following circumstances concur: (1) unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.

First, the accused claims that Avenido shot him on his right shoulder with a
magnum handgun from a distance of about one (1) meter. With such a
powerful weapon, at such close range, and without hitting any hard portion of
his body, it is quite incredible that the bullet did not exit through the accused’s
shoulder.

Second, Flores executed an affidavit on September 2, 1989. Significantly, he

did not mention anything about a bullet remaining on his shoulder.

Third, in his feverish effort of gathering evidence to establish medical

treatment on his right shoulder, the accused surprisingly did not bother to
secure the x-ray plate or any medical records from the hospital. Such valuable
pieces of evidence would have most likely supported his case of self-defense,
even during the preliminary investigation, if they actually existed and had he
properly presented them. The utter lack of interest of the accused in retrieving
the alleged x-ray plate or any medical record from the hospital militate against
the veracity of his version of the incident.

Fourth, the T-shirt presented by the accused in court had a hole, apparently
from a hard object, such as a bullet, that pierced through the same. However,
the blood stain is visibly concentrated only on the area around the hole
forming a circular shape. The blood on the shirt was not even definitively
shown to be human blood.

Fifth, Both parties claim that the shooting incident happened more or less
12:00 midnight. Hence, it is very possible that Jesus Avenido was not yet
drunk when the incident in question occurred. Defense witnesses themselves
noted that the victim Jesus Avenido was bigger in built and taller than the
accused. Moreover, the victim was familiar and very much experienced with
guns, having previously worked as a policeman. In addition, the latter was
relatively young, at the age of 41, when the incident happened. The Court
therefore finds it difficult to accept how the victim could miss when he
allegedly shot the accused at such close range if, indeed, he really had a gun
and intended to harm the accused. They found it less acceptable to believe
how the accused allegedly overpowered the victim so easily and wrestled the
gun from the latter, despite allegedly having been hit earlier on his right
shoulder.

Finally, it hardly inspires belief for the accused to have allegedly unlocked,
with such ease, the armalite rifle (M16) he held with one hand, over which he
claims to have no experience handling, while his right shoulder was wounded
and he was grappling with the victim.33 (Underscoring supplied citations
omitted)
The foregoing circumstances indeed tainted Flores’ credibility and reliability,
his story being contrary to ordinary human experience. “Settled is the rule that
testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but must foremost be credible in itself. Hence, the test to
determine the value or credibility of the testimony of a witness is whether the
same is in conformity with common knowledge and is consistent with the
experience of mankind.”

The Supreme Court affirmed the affirmed the decision of Sandigan Bayan.
CASE DIGEST

PEOPLE VS. FONTANILLA G..R.No. 177743

Facts:
At around 9:30 p.m. on October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road
in Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the
head with a piece of wood called bellang.
Olais fell facedown to... the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of
stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and
Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away. Marquez
and Abunan rushed their... father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced
dead on arrival.
On April 25, 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union filed an information for
murder against Fontanilla in the RTC
The accused pleaded not guilty.
The State presented Marquez and Abunan as its witnesses. They claimed that they were
only several meters away from Olais when Fontanilla struck him; that they shouted at
Fontanilla, who fled because of them; and that they were able to see and to identify
Fontanilla as the... attacker of their father-in-law because the area was then well-lighted.
Dr. Felicidad Leda, the physician who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Olais,
attested that her post-mortem examination showed that Olais had suffered a fracture on the
left temporal area of the skull, causing his death. She opined that a hard object or a severe
force had... hit the skull of the victim more than once, considering that the skull had been
already fragmented and the fractures on the skull had been radiating.
At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had
been standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing
to be drunk, had boxed him in the stomach; that although he had then talked to Olais
nicely,... the latter had continued hitting him with his fists, striking him with straight blows;
that Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him with both his legs; that he had thus been
forced to defend himself by picking up a stone with which he had hit the right side of the
victim's... head, causing the latter to fall face down to the ground; and that he had then left
the scene for his house upon seeing that Olais was no longer moving
Fontanilla's daughter Marilou corroborated her father's version.
On June 21, 2001, the RTC declared Fontanilla guilty as charged,... The RTC rejected
Fontanilla's plea of self-defense by observing that he had "no necessity to employ a big
stone, inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death"... due to the victim
attacking him only with bare hands. It noted that Fontanilla... did not suffer any injury
despite his claim that the victim had mauled him; that Fontanilla did not receive any
treatment, and no medical certificate attested to any injury he might have suffered, having
been immediately released from the hospital;... that
Fontanilla's failure to give any statement at the time he surrendered to the police was
inconsistent with his plea of self-defense;... and that the manner of attack against Olais
established the attendance of treachery.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC
Fontanilla did not establish the indispensable element of unlawful aggression; that his
failure to report the incident to the police at the earliest opportunity, or even after he was
taken into custody, negated the plea of... self-defense; and that the nature of the victim's
injury was a significant physical proof to show a determined effort on the part of Fontanilla
to kill him, and not just to defend himself.
Issues:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE.
EVEN GRANTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT KILLED THE VICTIM, THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER WHEN THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WAS
NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE
SPECIAL PRIVILEGE[D] MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-
DEFENSE AND THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
Ruling:
We affirm the conviction.
Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove
by clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or... repel it;
and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful
aggression attributed to the victim is established,... self-defense is unavailing, for there is
nothing to repel.[20] The character of the element of unlawful aggression is aptly explained
as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing
in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the...
circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal
safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary
threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of
unlawful... aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b)
the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault
must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with
physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the... intent of
the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is
impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude,
nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming... a
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to
attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim,
such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by
an... angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that
caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or
homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden
to... prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that
would avoid his criminal liability.
Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did
not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla's act of hitting the
victim's head with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional... to, and
constituted an unreasonable response to the victim's fistic attack and kicks.
Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some injury
from the aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any kind or gravity was found on
the person of Fontanilla when he presented himself to the hospital; hence, the attending...
physician of the hospital did not issue any medical certificate to him. Nor was any
medication applied to him.
In contrast, the physician who examined the cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had been
hit on the head more than once. The plea of... self-defense was thus belied, for the
weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais
revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from Olais. We
consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds... manifested the determined effort
of the accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006 by the Court of
Appeals, subject to the MODIFICATION of the civil damages, by ordering accused Alfonso
Fontanilla y Obaldo to pay to the heirs of Jose Olais P25,000.00 as temperate damages...
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to the P50,000.00 as death indemnity
and the P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on such amounts
from the finality of the judgment.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Principles:
An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim must have mounted an unlawful
aggression against the accused. Without such unlawful aggression, the accused cannot
invoke self-defense as a justifying circumstance.
CASE DIGEST

MACALINO VS PEOPLE G.R. No. 121802

FACT

On January 5, 1987, Provincial Fiscal Victoriano L. Tizon filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Siquijor an Information charging Gil Macalino, Jr. with frustrated homicide, defined and penalized
under Article 249 in relation to Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code, which was allegedly
committed as follows:

That at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of March 23, 1986, at the wharf area of Larena, Siquijor,
situated at North Poblacion, Larena, Siquijor, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloneously stabbed
one Fely "Pono" Garcia, using a bladed weapon, hitting the victim at the mid clavicular line,
subcostal area (1) left; which injury would have caused the death of the victim had not been due to a
timely and expert medical attendance extended to him and not by virtue of the assailants
spontaneous desistance.

ISSUE

Is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 dated
August 31, 1995, in CA-G.R. CR No. 14513, convicting petitioner Gil Macalino, Jr. of the crime of
Frustrated Homicide.

RULING

With regards to damages, the Court of Appeals is correct in deleting the award of actual or
compensatory damages and moral damages. Moral damages cannot be awarded without factual
basis or proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury.Likewise, the court can only
grant actual or compensatory damages for such expenses if supported by receipts.

The assailed decision dated August 31, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14513 is
hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DENIED.
CASE DIGEST

PEOPLE VS GAMEZ G.R. No. 202847

FACT

That on or about the 21st day of August, 2004, in the Municipality of Burauen, Province of Leyte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack
and wound one APOLINARIO GAMEZ y AMORILLO, his father, with the use of a long bladed
weapon (sundang) and sickle (sarad) which the accused provided himself for the purpose, thereby
hitting and inflicting upon Apolinario Gamez y Amorillo multiple hacking and incised wounds on the
different parts of his body which were the direct and approximate cause of his death.

ISSUE

When arraigned, he entered a "Not Guilty" plea. He thereafter desired to amend his plea to "Guilty"
during the pre-trial conference held on September 26, 2005 but the RTC denied the said plea
bargaining. In view however of the accused-appellant's invocation of self-defense, an inverted trial
scheme ensued.

RULING

This Court has consistently adhered to the rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on
the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the
unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the
various indicia available but not reflected on the record. Hence, the corollary principle that absent
any showing that the trial court overlooked substantial facts and circumstances that would affect the
final disposition of the case, appellate courts are bound to give due deference and respect to its
evaluation of the credibility of an eyewitness and his testimony as well as its probative value amidst
the rest of the other evidence on record.

It must be emphasized, however, that the accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole pursuant
to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 which states that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of
this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.
CASE DIGEST

PEOPLE VS. VILLANUEVA, 242 SCRA 47

Facts:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with
the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Villanueva
was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in
the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his
appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The
condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he
would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his
services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel
for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al wherein it was ruled that "when
an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and
therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then
argued that entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above
ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of
City Attorney Fule. On January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal
Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35,
Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that
City Attorney Fule fall sunder this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right
of Fule to appear and further stating that Fule was not actually enagaged in private law practice. This
Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, in which the court ruled in favor of Attorney Fule.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Fule violated sec. 32 of Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rulesof
Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing

Held:

No. The court believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private
practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules .Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind.
In other words, it is frequent habitual. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and
demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not
conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. As the Solicitor General
stated in his observation, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services. For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule
had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the
complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative. CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING,
the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against
appellant.
CASE DIGEST

PEOPLE VS SABILLANO 198 SCRA 196

FACT

"That at about 9:00 o'clock, more or less, in the evening of August 18, 1989, at Sitio Luan-Luan
Barangay Canaway, Municipality of Siaton, Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually helping one another and acting under the same accord and purpose, armed with
deadly weapons, with intent of gain and with the use of force, intimidation and violence upon their
victims, spouses Enrique and Josefina Lastimado, and taking advantage of nighttime to avoid
identification, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the
house of Enrique Lastimado and Josefina Lastimado, husband and wife, respectively, and once
inside demanded money and guns from the couple and because they were not satisfied with the
victims' (accommodations) of the money and gun mentioned, (ransacked) everything inside the
house, got P2,000.00 and air gun and other personal belongings, then Rudy Abejero slapped
Enrique Lastimado and in a sudden, Victor Doe hacked the former's neck twice causing him to
instantly die and Rudy Abejero simultaneously stabbed the wife, Josefina Lastimado in the stomach,
thus Rudy Abejero performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime also of
robbery with homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is by timely medical attendance afforded her.

ISSUE

"In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the accused Rudy Abejero and Melenio
Cadalin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated
homicide.

RULING

We note that complainant had not been firm and consistent in her assertions. Her testimony in court
that she was stabbed by appellant Cadalin contradicts her previous statement before Municipal Trial
Judge Fe Bustamante that it was Rudy Abejero who had stabbed her. The trial court brushed aside
the discrepancy on the ground that the complainant was then in a serious condition with difficulty in
breathing and had just been administered anesthesia. We find such inconsistency not
inconsequential and should have alerted the trial court into examining more closely the
complainant's indictment of appellant Cadalin considering that her identification was likewise made
when she was under such circumstances.

We have time and again emphasized that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused upon
the strength of its own evidence rather than on the weakness of the defense. 10 In appellant
Cadalin's case, the prosecution miserably failed to come up with a credible, persuasive and strong
evidence for his conviction. His guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt or with that
moral certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon
it. The totally of the circumstances in this case point to appellant Cadalin's innocence. Accordingly,
his acquittal is in order.
CASE DIGEST

ANTONIO VS COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.100513

FACT

On July 25, 1988, an Information[7] was filed against both Severino Antonio and Carlito Antonio,
blood brothers, charging them with the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code,[8] before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 72, in Criminal Case
No. 6741-MN, committed as follows:

"That on or about January 20, 1988, in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, and confederating
together with one (1) alias Oryo and one (1) John Doe, whose true named (sic) and whereabouts are
still unknown and who are still at large, mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, armed with gun, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot with the said firearm one GONZALO GUTIERREZ, thereby inflicting upon the
victim gunshot wounds at the back and head, which directly caused his death."

Subsequently, a warrant of arrest was issued against both accused, but only Severino Antonio was
arrested on August 18, 1988 and subsequently tried. At that time, his co-accused Carlito Antonio, an
overseas contract worker, was abroad. Hence, the arrest warrant could not be served against him
and trial had to proceed without his participation.

ISSUE

The accused CARLITO ANTONIO and SEVERINO ANTONIO are the brothers-in-law of the victim,
Gonzalo Gutierrez, the latter being the husband of the accused' elder sister, Mrs. Priscilla Antonio-
Gutierrez x x x. The victim and his family together with Carlito and his family, Severino, Areng, Betty
and Erly lived in separate houses situated in the Antonio compound which is owned by the mother of
the Antonios.

RULING

Petitioner Severino Antonio moved to have the decision reconsidered, but the same was denied in a
Resolution[] dated June 20, 1991; hence, he filed the instant petition for review on certiorari with this
Court.

"In clear contrast with the case at bar, the prosecution has at least shown prima facie the guilt of the
accused, or as frequently stated, the essential element of the crime charged. The uncontroverted
facts remain that the deceased Gonzalo Gutierrez was shot three (3) times on the different parts of
his body at Navotas, Metro Manila in the 20th day of January 1988 at around 7:00 P.M. The doctor
who conducted the autopsy and postortem examination on the body of the deceased testified that
the cause of death was gunshot wounds. That the two (2) witnesses, namely: Reynaldo Gutierrez
and Jaime Robles testified that they saw the actual killing and pinpointed to the accused Carlito
Antonio as the triggerman. As to the motive of the killing, the Court took note that even the accused
admitted that there was existing family feud between the deceased and the accused-brothers,
Carlito and Severino Antonio.
CASE DIGEST

PEOPLE VS BERONDO G.R. No. 177827

Facts:
At around 11:30 p.m. of February 13, 1999, after joining the Miss Gay competition at New Danao,
Sinaysayan, Kitaotao, Bukidnon, Herbert Nietes, Jr. walked home to Puntian, Quezon, Bukidnon. While
on the way, he suddenly heard a gunshot from nearby. Feeling afraid, he ran towards the grassy area
by the roadside to hide. After about five minutes, he saw BERONDO, Julie Tubigon, and Jesus Sudario,
each holding a knife, walk towards the road and take turns in stabbing a person who was already
slumped on the ground. He recognized the three as they are his townmates. Thereafter, he ran away
from the area and went to Bato-Bato, Sinaysayan, Kitaotao, Bukidnon, where he spent the night. The
next day, he learned that the person stabbed was GENARO LAGUNA. He later testified that he did not
reveal what he had witnessed to anyone because he was afraid of getting involved.

Two years after the incident, Nietes and Tero (another witness) admitted to Dolores, Laguna’s widow,
that they had witnessed the crime.

Trial proceeded only against accused-appellant BERONDO for murder, because the two other accused
remained at-large, where he was convicted. The CA affirmed conviction, but ruled that BERONDO was
liable only for homicide.

ISSUES:

1. Does the belated reporting of Nietes of what he witnessed defeat his credibility as a witness?

2. Was the CA correct in holding that BERONDO was liable only for homicide?

HELD:

1. No. Delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair the
credibility of a witness, especially where sufficient explanation is given.No standard form of behavior
can be expected from people who had witnessed a strange or frightful experience. Jurisprudence
recognizes that witnesses are naturally reluctant to volunteer information about a criminal case or are
unwilling to be involved in criminal investigations because of varied reasons. Some fear for their lives
and that of their family; while others shy away when those involved in the crime are their relatives or
townmates. And where there is delay, it is more important to consider the reason for the delay, which
must be sufficient or well-grounded, and not the length of delay.

Despite the delay in reporting the identities of the malefactors, Nietes testified in a categorical,
straightforward, and spontaneous manner, and remained consistent even under grueling cross-
examination. Such bears the marks of a credible witness.

2. Yes. The Court finds error in the Trial Court’s finding that the killing of the deceased was committed
with abuse of superior strength, because no evidence was presented to prove that the accused purposely
took advantage of their numerical superiority. Absent clear and convincing evidence of any qualifying
circumstance, conviction should only be for homicide.
CASE DIGEST

EQUITABLE CARDNETWORK, INC VS. JOSEFA BORROMEO CAPISTRANO

FACT

Petitioner Equitable Cardnetwork, Inc. (ECI) alleged in its complaint that in September 1997
respondent Josefa B. Capistrano (Mrs. Capistrano) applied for membership at the Manila Yacht Club
(MYC) under the latter's widow-membership program. Since the MYC and ECI had a credit card
sponsorship agreement in which the Club would solicit for ECI credit card enrollment among its
members and dependents, Mrs. Capistrano allegedly applied for and was granted a Visa Credit Card
by ECI.

ECI further alleged that Mrs. Capistrano authorized her daughter, Valentina C. Redulla (Mrs.
Redulla), to claim from ECI her credit card and ATM application form.[1] Mrs. Redulla signed the
acknowledgment receipt[2] on behalf of her mother, Mrs. Capistrano. After Mrs. Capistrano got hold
of the card, she supposedly started using it. On November 24, 1997 Mrs. Redulla personally issued
a P45,000.00 check as partial payment of Mrs. Capistrano's account with ECI. But Mrs. Redulla's
check bounced upon deposit.

Answering the complaint, Mrs. Capistrano denied ever applying for MYC membership and ECI credit
card; that Mrs. Redulla was not her daughter; and that she never authorized her or anyone to claim a
credit card for her. Assuming she applied for such a card, she never used it. Mrs. Redulla posed as
Mrs. Capistrano and fooled ECI into issuing the card to her. Consequently, the action should have
been brought against Mrs. Redulla. Mrs. Capistrano asked the court to hold ECI liable to her for
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.

ISSUE

Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that, although Mrs. Capistrano failed to make an effective
specific denial of the actionable documents attached to the complaint, she overcame this omission
by presenting parol evidence to which ECI failed to object

Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that Mrs. Capistrano presented clear and convincing evidence
that her signatures on the actionable documents had been forged.

RULING

The defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and
whenever practicable set forth the substance of the matters on which he will rely to support his
denial.

When the defendant wants to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment in the complaint, he
must specify so much of the averment as is true and material and deny the remainder.

When the defendant is without knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state and this shall have the effect of a
denial.
CASE DIGEST G. R. No. 148919 - December 17, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. TERESA CORPUZ y VARGAS and MARCY SANTOS y JAVIER,

Facts

"On January 4, 1999, around 6 oclock in the evening, a confidential police informant, a.k.a. Josie,
went to the Special Anti-Narcotics Enforcement Team at Camp Gen. Pantaleon, Imus, Cavite and
informed team leader Inspector Nolasco Cortez of a transaction that involved appellants Teresa Corpuz
(alias Tess) and Marcy Santos (alias Mar) as sellers of three hundred (300) grams of shabu worth
P300,000.00. It appears that prior to Josies arrival at Camp Pantaleon, the information was already
relayed to Cortez through telephone.

Acting on the information, Inspector Cortez formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation
designating PO3 Albert Colaler as the poseur-buyer with SPO2 Joseph Yatco and PO1 Aldrin Agravante
as back-up arresting officers. Colaler was handed a marked P1,000-peso bill which he placed over a
bundle of boodle money. The plan was for Josie to introduce Colaler as an interested shabu buyer. As
a pre-arranged signal, Colaler would remove his white b[a]ll cap to signify that the evidence was

The buy-bust team arrived at the scene around 11:15 in the evening. The police back-up immediately
positioned themselves at a strategic location while Colaler and Josie waited. When appellants arrived,
Josie introduced Colaler who was asked by appellant Tess if he had the money with him. Colaler
showed her the boodle money but told Tess he would not give it to her unless he saw the shabu first.
Thereupon, appellant Mar[cy] took out from his belt three (3) transparent plastic containing white
substance and gave them to Tess. The exchange was then consummated. Mar was about to open the
plastic bag with the boodle money when Colaler immediately removed his white b[a]ll cap -- the pre-
arranged signal. The two (2) back-up officers showed up and introduced themselves as police officers.
They arrested appellants and recovered from them the boodle money. Appellants [were] thereafter
taken and booked at Camp Pantaleon.already with him.

Issue

Appellants argue that the buy-bust operation conducted was tainted with abuse of authority. They
aver that if indeed they were validly arrested after having allegedly been caught in flagrante delicto,
there was no reason for the police to ask Appellant Corpuz to single out a name from a list shown to
her in exchange for her freedom -- a scheme known in street parlance as palit ulo.

Many times, this Court has already ruled that a buy-bust operation is "a form of entrapment which has
repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs
Law."14 The elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are as follows: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor.

Ruling of the Trial Court

After a judicious assessment of the evidence submitted by both parties, the RTC ruled that the
prosecution had been able to prove with certainty all the elements of the illegal sale of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. It described as clear and straightforward
the poseur-buyers testimony, which was amply corroborated by the other members of the buy-bust
team.8 Further, the RTC rejected appellants defense of denial. Not only was it inconsistent and
contradictory, it also failed to achieve the intended purpose.9 It likewise held that the entrapment and
the arrest of appellants were not effected haphazardly. Furthermore, it held that no ill motive could be
attributed to the police officers who had conducted the buy-bust operation.
CASE DIGEST

PEOPLE VS CORTEZ G.R.No. 183819

Prosecution

October 26, 2003, at about 2 o clock in the morning, a confidential informant reported to the Pasig
City Police SDUE that a certain Archie was selling shabu in the vicinity of Brgy Buting, Pasig City
Upon being apprised of this bit information, SDUE Chief P/Insp. Melbert Esguerra held a briefing,
formed a four man team to conduct a buy bust operation, and designated SPO2 Zipagan to act as
team leader poseur buyer. Two Php 100 bills to be used as buy bust money were handed to SPO2
Zipagan who then put his initials DZ on the bill notes. A pre operation report was made and
submitted to the Philippine drug enforcement agency which then gave it control number 2610-03-01.

Thereafter, the team, composed of, among others, PO1 Espares and SPO2 Zipagan, with the
informant ,proceeded to the target area' SPO2 Zipagan and the informant proceeded ahead of the
group. At the corner of San Guillermo and E Mendoza streets, they located the target person Where
upon the informant introduced the poseur buyer to Archie then asked how much he wanted to buy,
SPO2 Zipagan replied Php 200 worth only and gave alias Archie the marked money. Thereafter,
Archie took out from his right pocket and handed to SPO2 Zipagan a heat sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing a white crystalline substance. Thereupon, SPO2 Zipagan executed the pre-
arranged signal, by removing his hat ,signifying the consummation of the transaction' SPO2 Zipagan
then introduced himself and announced the sellers arrest.

Meanwhile, the back up police operates, who were10 meters away, upon noticing the pre-arranged
signal ,rushed toward their team leader to help him hold Archie SPO2 Zipagan then directed Archie
to empty his pocket' from his left pocket, Archie brought out with his left hand the buy bust money'
PO1 Espares later testified having witnessed this particular episode.

Afterwards, the team hauled Archie to the Pasig City Police Station for investigation. The
investigator, PO1 Clarence Nipales, then prepared a request for laboratory examination on the white
crystalline substance subject of the buy bust operation' SPO2 Zipagan executed a sworn statement
in connection with the arrest of Archie, who has later identified as accused appellant Cortez.

The seized transparent plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance was forwarded to
the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office on St. francis St. Mandaluyong City P/Insp
Joseph M Perdido Forensic Chemical Officer, conducted a qualitative examination on the said
specimen weighing 0.04 gram. The examined specimen tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
CASE DIGEST

PEOPLE v. MANUEL APLAT Y SUBLINO G.R.No. 191727

FACT

That on or about the 12th day of April 2006, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and
deliver one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves with fruiting tops wrapped in
a newspaper weighing 950 grams, more or less, for [P]1,500.00 to PO3
PHILIP R. FINES, a bonafide member of the Drug Enforcement Unit of the
Baguio City Police Office, who acted as poseur-buyer, knowing fully well
that said drug is a dangerous drug and that the sale and delivery of such
drug is prohibited without authority of law to do so, in violation of the
aforementioned provision of law.

ISSUE

The sole issue presented for the Court's consideration is whether

appellant's guilt for the illegal sale of marijuana, a dangerous drug, was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING

In its Decision dated November 5, 2007, the RTC found appellant and
Danglay guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision
with its corresponding amendment[12] reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding both the accused GUILTY

beyond any reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 26080-R and both are
hereby sentenced to suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENT and each to pay a fine of
P500,000.00 and the costs.
CASE DIGEST

ALFELOR V. HALASAN

Facts:

The children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor filed a Complaint for
Partition. Among the plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and her two children, Joshua and Maria
Katrina, who claimed to be the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of the
deceased Alfelor Spouses.
Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for Intervention alleging that she has legal interest in the
matter of litigation for partition, she being the surviving spouse and primary compulsory heir of
Jose. Josefina attached to said motion her Complaint-in-Intervention wherein she alleged that the
second marriage to Teresita was void ab initio for having been contracted during the subsistence
of a previous marriage. Josefina further alleged that Joshua and Maria Katrina were not her
husband’s children. Josefina attached to her pleading a copy of the marriage contract which
indicated that she and Jose were married.

Since petitioners opposed the motion, the judge set the motion for hearing. Josefina presented the
marriage contract as well as the Reply-in-Intervention filed by the heirs of the deceased, where
Teresita declared that she knew of the previous marriage of the late Jose with that Josefina.
However, Josefina did not appear in court.

Teresita testified that she and Jose were married. While she did not know Josefina personally,
she knew that her husband had been previously married to Josefina and that the two did not live
together as husband and wife. She knew that Josefina left Jose in 1959. Jose’s relatives
consented to her (Teresita’s) marriage with Jose because there had been no news of Josefina for
almost ten years.

Judge denied the motion and dismissed intervenor’s complaint, ruling that respondent was not
able to prove her claim. The trial court pointed out that the intervenor failed to appear to testify
in court to substantiate her claim. Moreover, no witness was presented to identify the marriage
contract as to the existence of an original copy of the document or any public officer who had
custody thereof. Teresita and her children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, were the legal and
legitimate heirs of the late Jose, considering that the latter referred to them as his children in his
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, among others.

Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. CA reversed the ruling of the trial
court. It held that Teresita had already admitted (both verbally and in writing) that Josefina had
been married to the deceased, and under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, a
judicial admission no longer requires proof. Consequently, there was no need to prove and
establish the fact that Josefa was married to the decedent.
Issues:

1. Was there need to prove the existence of Josefina's marriage to Jose?

2. Should Josefina be allowed to intervene in the action for partition?

Held:

1. No. The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners herein, admitted
the existence of the first marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention filed in the RTC. Teresita
admitted several times that she knew that her late husband had been previously married to
another. This admission constitutes a “deliberate, clear and unequivocal” statement; made as it
was in the course of judicial proceedings, such statement qualifies as a judicial admission. A
party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a
waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an
admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings
cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party,
and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading
are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or
inconsistent with what was pleaded.

2. Yes. Intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the matter in
litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or
when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in
the custody of the court or an officer thereof.

Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners’ mother, the Court rules that respondent
Josefina Halasan sufficiently established her right to intervene in the partition case. She has
shown that she has legal interest in the matter in litigation. (Alfelor vs. Halasan, G.R. No.
165987, March 31, 2006)
CASE DIGEST

BEBERISA RIÑO vs. ECC and SSS, G.R. No. 132558, May 9, 2000

Facts:

Virgilio T. Riño Sr., was a stevedore at Allied Port Services since July 1982. In 1992, he died
of “Uremia secondary to chronic renal failure” three days after he was rushed to the hospital
after collapsing at work. Virgilio’s widow claimed for death benefits from the SSS. The claim
was denied by the system and, subsequently, by the ECC for failure to present proof of causal
connection between the decedent’s illness and his work as a stevedore.

Issue:
Whether or not Riño’s Death was compensable under PD626 by virtue of the increased risk
theory.

Ruling:
The Court held that the decedent’s death was non-compensable.

The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio Riño’s death are not listed as occupational
diseases. Hence, petitioner should have presented substantial evidence, or such relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, showing
that the nature of her husband’s employment or working conditions increased the risk of
uremia, chronic renal failure or chronic glomerulonephritis. Bare allegations do not ipso facto
make the death compensable. Since the petitioner failed to must adduce evidence to prove
work-connection, the denial of claim was held proper.
CASE DIGEST

Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan vs. Alberto Comorposa, et al G.R.No. 152807

Facts:
A [C]omplaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by [petitioners] against
[respondents] before the
Municipal Trial Court.
The [C]omplaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of Lot No.
845, Land 275
In 1960, he died leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren.
In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was terminated from
his job. The termination of his employment caused a problem in relocating his house. Being
a close family friend of [Marcos] Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the late Marcos
Saez's son,... [Adolfo] Saez, the husband of Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem. Out of
pity and for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the
land of Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his neighbors and transferred to a
portion of the land... subject matter of this case. Such transfer was witnessed by several
people, among them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza. Francisco Comorposa occupied a
portion of Marcos Saez' property without paying any rental.
Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by the
respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises through
petitioners' tolerance.
On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the premises
but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they [were] the legitimate
claimants and the actual and lawful possessor[s] of the premises.
The Municipal Trial Court... rendered judgment in favor of petitioners but the Regional Trial
Court
, on appeal, reversed and set aside the said decision.
Affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA upheld the right of respondents as
claimants and possessors. The appellate court held that -- although not yet final -- the Order
issued by the regional executive director of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources
(DENR) remained in full force and effect, unless declared null and void. The CA added that
the Certification issued by the DENR's community environment and natural resources
(CENR) officer was proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still
alienable and... was not yet allocated to any person.
According to the CA, respondents had the better right to possess alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, because they have suffiently proven their actual, physical, open,
notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960. The
appellate... court deemed as self-serving, and therefore incredible, the Affidavits executed
by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel Oboza and Paulina Paran.
Issues:
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in sustaining the Regional Trial
Court's ruling giving weight to the CENR Officer's Certification, which only bears the
facsimile of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda
Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham document,
because the signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile.
Ruling:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of
printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and
representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric... current.
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies.
As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether
they are genuine or authentic.
The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the
signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as
that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile
signature,... which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but recognized
as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.
Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional
director has acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order
If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not
have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or directed
the CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter was under the former's direct...
control and supervision.
Principles:
The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative value. Just because
a piece of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the fact
in dispute.
CASE DIGEST
ESCAMILLA V. PEOPLEG.R. No. 188551 February 27, 2013

HOMICIDE

FACTS:

1.Around 2am of 01 August 1999, a brawl ensued at the comer of Estrada and Arellano
Streets, Manila. Mendol was about toride his tricycle at this intersection while facing
Arellano Street.

2.Petitioner, who was standing in front of his store, 30 meters away from Mendol, shot the
latter four times, hitting him once inthe upper right portion of his chest.

3.The victim was brought to Ospital ng Makati for treatmentand survived because of timely
medical attention.

4.Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Informationcharging petitioner with frustrated

homicide.

5.During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Mendol, Joseph Velasco
(Velasco) and Iluminado Garcelazo(Garcelazo), who all positively identified the petitioner as
the shooter of Mendol.

RTC: foundpetitionerguiltyoffrustratedhomicide.

CA: affirmed the conviction.

CASE DIGEST

People vs Rarugal G.R.No.188603

People of the Philippines vs. Ramil Rarugal alias “AMAY BISAYA”

Facts:

Accused Ramil Rarugal stabbed Arnel Florendo while the latter was cycling along Sampaguita street
with the use of a longdouble-bladed weapon. Florendo bleeding and under labored breathing was
able to reach home and told his brother Renato that it was accused who had stabbed him. The
victim was then brought to the hospital and died seven days after the stabbing incident.

Issue:

Whether the dying declaration is admissible in evidence.

Ruling:

Yes, the dying declaration is admissible. Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court provides that the
dying declaration made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any
case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and the surrounding
circumstances of the case. Clearly, the statement made was an expression of the cause and the
surrounding circumstances of his death, and under the consciousness of impending death.There
being nothing in the records that show that Florendo was incompetent, he would have been
competent to testify had he survived. It is enough to state that the deceased was at the time
competent as a witness. Lastly, the dying declaration is offered in an inquiry the subject of which
involves his death.

It is of no moment that the victim died seven days from the stabbing incident and after receiving
adequate care and treatment, because the apparent proximate cause of his death, the punctures in
his lungs, was a consequence of appellant’s stabbing him in the chest.
CASE DIGEST

People v. Gallerde

Facts:

In the evening of 26 May 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan in Brgy.
Trenchera,

Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors converged. Among them were Radel Gallarde, Francisco,
Renato, Edwin, all surnamed Fernandez, Romel Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon
Talen, Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses
Talan. After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime and Gallarde to dine in the kitchen. As they
partook of the meal, Gallarde suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped out of the kitchen to urinate. Outside
the house, he chanced upon Gallarde and Editha talking to each other. Jaime whistled at Gallarde
but instead of minding him, the latter sprinted towards the road leading to his house. Thereafter,
Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where
she was going. Editha answered that she would look for Gallarde. Soon Editha left enroute to where
Gallarde fled. By 10:00 p.m., the drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime, Francisco, Edwin and
Rose regrouped at Renato's place where they talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger arrived and
informed them that Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to help look for her. Elena Talan
informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her daughter's disappearance.
The latter, together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia and nephew Freddie Cortez wasted no time in
joining their neighbors search the houses, dikes and fields to look for the missing child. When Jaime
mentioned that Gallarde was the last person he sawtalking to Editha, the searchers went back to the
house of Gallarde. The searchers found Gallarde squatting with his short pants at the toilet about 6
meters away from Gallarde's house; his hands and knees covered with soil. Asked where Editha
was, Gallarde replied: "I do not know, I did not do anything to her." To the question, "where did you
come from since a while ago you were not yet in this toilet?" Gallarde answered "I was with Kiko, I
was asleep in their house. One of the searchers Mario Bado, got angry and countered that
Gallarde's statement was impossible because Kiko was with him drinking. After the confrontation at
the toilet, Ex-kagawad Fernandez brought Gallarde to Brgy. Captain Felicisimo Mendoza, informing
the latter that Gallarde was the last person seen talking with the missing child. Fernandez then
rejoined the searchers. Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. The searchers,
thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses, and a wide hole among the disheveled grass. When Ex-
kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside and then Editha's hand pitted out.
Fernandez screamed in terror. Meantime, Barangay Captain Mendoza heardshouts saying: "She is
here, she is now here already dead!" Mindful of Gallarde's safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to
bring Gallarde to the municipal building. On their way though, they met policemen on board a
vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person of Gallarde, saying: "Here is the suspect
in the disappearance of the little girl. Since you are already here, I am giving him to you." The
policemen together with Gallarde proceeded to where the people found Editha. One of the
policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was completely naked when she was
recovered. A picture of Gallarde was taken without any counsel present.
Gallarde was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide. The trial court rendered
a decision convicting Gallarde of the crime of murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with
homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the late Editha Talan in the negotiated sum of
P70,000.00. The trial court rejected the photographs (Exhibits "I," "J" and "K") taken of Gallarde
immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same were taken while he was already under
the mercy of the police." Gallarde appealed his conviction to the SC.

Issue:

Whether, The taking of pictures of an accused violates of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination.

Held:

The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely
mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not
required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the
giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman
charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her
pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a
substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from
gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline
of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or
measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the
foregoing things to be done. (People vs. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025. February 17, 2000).
CASE DIGEST G.R. No. 188969 February 27, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOHN ALVIN PONDIVIDA,

FACTS:

Pondivida was charged with the crime of murder. Rodelyn Bondoc testified thatPondivida together
with other two companions went to the house of the victim (GenerBondoc) at 3:30 am looking for
certain “Udoy” which is the brother of the victim. One of them entered the house through door and
asking the Rodelyn of Gener about “Udoy”, while having said conversation gunshots were heard by
Rodelyn. When she approach Gener, the latter was already sprawled on the floor with blood oozing
from wound in hishead. It was later found that Pondivida and the other one climbed a guava tree and
gain access through the window. The RTC found accused-appellant Pondivida guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder; imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and ordered him to pay
P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, P25,000 a sex emplary damages, P10,000
as actual damages, and the costs of suit.6 On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the
findings of the trial court, butclarified that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength
was absorbed in the element of treachery in murder. Accused-appellant comes before this Court
arguing that the prosecution’s case was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, and that there was
insufficient evidence to establish conspiracy among the accused.

ISSUE:

Whether it is sufficiently shown that Pondivida is guilty as such should be also civillyliable.

RULING:

YES. The Court said: x x x.

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not perse to that of being an eye
witness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A
witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an
eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There
may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of
commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the
perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen
with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime.

Jurisprudence dictates that "when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the
trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative
weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on the findings are accorded high respect, if not
conclusive effect. This dictum would be more true if the findings were affirmed by the CA, since it is
settled that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, these findings
are generally binding upon this Court. "In sum, we find no cogent reason to reject the Decision of the
CA. Appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, for which he is
sentence to.
CASE DIGEST

PEOPLE VS CANLAS G.R.No. 141633

FACTS:

Appellant was charged together with six other unidentified men who were designated in the
Information as Richard Doe, Peter Doe, Rommel Doe, Winston Doe, and Charlie Doe. The
Information allege.

That on or about the 14th day of June, 1998, in Brgy. Palat, municipality (sic) of Porac, province (sic)
of Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent of (sic) gain, and
with violence, did then and there will fully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away with
them merchandise consisting of assorted clothes worth P4,000.00 and cash money in the amount of
P1,000.00, belonging to the deceased, Jing Garcia Flores, with a total value of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00) Philippine Currency, and on the occasion of said robbery and for the purpose of
enabling them to take, steal and carry away the said articles, accused in pursuance of their
conspiracy, and taking advantage of their superior strength and with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
deceased, Jing Garcia Flores with the use of a lead pipe and a hunting knife, inflicting upon him
mortal and fatal injuries which caused his death.

Contrary to law.

The evidence of the prosecution consisted of the oral testimonies of SPO2 Henry Ayson
(for brevity SPO2 Ayson), Jose Tamayo (for brevity Jose), Willie Silva (for brevity Silva), IsmaelVictor
ia (for brevity Victoria), Dr. Olga Bausa (for brevity Dr. Bausa), and Dr. Lilia Panlilio, as well as
documentary and object evidence. The defense for its part presented appellant as its lone witness.

After trial, the trial court rendered the now assailed judgment convicting appellant.

ISSUE:

WON THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE EVIDENCE OF THEACCUSED-

APPELLANT IN ORDER TO ACQUIT HIM.
CASE DIGEST

ESPENELI VS. PEOPLE G.R.No. 179535

FACT

- Espeneli was murder was filed RTC

- RTC found petitioner guilty
- CA affirm with modification the findings of a trial court. It ratiocinated that since
none of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing of the victim was
perpetrated, the qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength cannot be
appreciated. Neither can nighttime serve as an aggravating circumstances as a
time of the commission of the crime was not even alleged in the information. In
view thereof, the CA found the petitioner guilty only of homicide instead of
murder. The decretal portion of the appellate courts decision reads:

ISSUE

Is circumstantial evidence to the rule for the conviction of the accused?

RULING

Yes truly, direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not only that basis from
which a court may draw its finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to
relay a circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial
evidence is that evidence which indirectly proves a fact in issue through inference which
the fact-finder draws from evidence establish. Under Section 4, Rule No. 133 of the
Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict the offender, if
there is more than one circumstance the fact from which the inference is derive proven.
CASE DIGEST

PEOPLE VS. ASIS, G.R.No. 142531 October 15, 2002

FACTS

Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y Saricon were charged in an

Information; the information stating "That on or about February 10, 1998 in the City of
Manila Philippines the said accused conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other did then and there wilfully unlawfully and feloniously with intent to
gain and by means of force and violence upon person to wit by then and there stabbing
one YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING with a bladed instrument on the different parts of
the body thereafter take, rob and carry away the following to wit cash money in the
amount of P20,000.00; 1wrist watch 1 gold necklace; and undetermined items; or all in
the total amount of P20,000.00 more or less belonging to said YU HING GUAN @ ROY
CHING against his will to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid
amount more or less of P20,000.00 Philippine Currency and as a result thereof he
sustained mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death.
When arraigned both accused pleaded not guilty Found to be deaf mutes they were
assisted not only by a counsel de oficio but also by an interpreter from the Calary
Baptist Church. The prosecution presented 9 witnesses. Although none of them had
actually seen the crime committed strong and substantial circumstantial evidence
presented by them attempted to link both accused to the crime.

After due trial both accused were found guilty and sentenced to death .RTC of Manila
held that the crime charged and proved is robbery with homicide under Article 249 ,No 3
of the RTC ruled that although no witnesses to the actual killing and robbery were
presented the circumstantial evidence including there recovery of blood stained clothing
from both accused definitely proved that the two committed the crime" and appreciated
the aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence superior strength and treachery
and thus sentenced both accused to the supreme penalty of death.

Hence the automatic review before the Supreme Court3 both the accused do not
question the legality of their arrest as they made no objection there to before the
arraignment but object to the introduction of the blood stained pair of shorts allegedly
recovered from the bag of Formento; arguing that the search was illegally done making
the obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal and taints them as in admissible. The
prosecution on the other hand contends that it was Formentos wife who voluntarily
surrendered the bag that contained the blood stained trousers of the victim and thus
claims that her act constituted a valid consent to the research without warrant.
ISSUE

Whether or not Formento a deaf mute! has given consent to the recovery of the blood
stained pair of short, in his possession during the warrantless search?

RULING

NO, Primarily the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures being
a personal one cannot be waited by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded
or who is expressly authorized to do so on his or her behalf. In the present case the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that at the time the blood stained pair of
shorts was recovered Formento Together with his wife and mother was present.

Being the very subject of the search necessarily he himself should have given consent.
Since he was physically present the waiver could not have come from any other person.
Lopez Commissioner of Customs does not apply as the accused therein was not
presented when the search was made.
CASE DIGEST

PEOPLE VS NOGRA G.R. No. 170834

FACT

On April 18, 1997, Teofila Lualhati applied for employment as hotel worker for Saipan
with Loran (pp. 1-3, 10, TSN, November 19, 1998). Appellant required her to submit an
NBI clearance and medical certificate and to pay the processing fee in the amount of
P35,000.00 so she could leave immediately. She paid the amount of P35,000.00 to
Loran's secretary in the presence of appellant. She was promised that within 120 days
or 4 months she would be able to leave (pp. 11-13, TSN, November 19, 1998). Despite
repeated follow-ups, Lualhati was unable to work in Saipan. She demanded the refund
of the processing fee. When the amount was not returned to her, she filed a complaint
with the NBI.

During the first week of November 1997, Annelyn Sarmiento and her husband, Oliver
Sarmiento, applied for overseas employment. For the application of Oliver Sarmiento,
they submitted his medical certificate and certification of previous employment. They
were also made to pay the amount of P27,000.00 as processing fee. Oliver Sarmiento
was promised that within 1 month, he would be able to leave. Initially, Oliver Sarmiento
was told that allegedly his visa was yet to be obtained. When he was not able to leave
and what he paid was not refunded, he filed a complaint with the NBI.

ISSUE

Appellant argues that the agency was under the management and control of Orciga,
and that he was a mere employee; that he could not be held personally liable for illegal
recruitment in the absence of any showing that he was validly issued special authority to
recruit workers, which was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA); that his non-flight is indicative of his innocence.

RULING

The penultimate paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 explicitly states that those
criminally liable are the "principals, accomplices, and accessories. In case of juridical
persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be
liable." Contrary to appellant's claim, the testimonies of the complaining witnesses and
the documentary evidence for the prosecution clearly established that he was not a
mere employee of Loran, but its Operations Manager. The license of Loran, the files of
the POEA and the nameplate prominently displayed on his office desk reflected his
position as Operations Manager. As such, he received private complainants' job
applications; and interviewed and informed them of the agency's requirements prior to
their deployment, such as NBI clearance, police clearance, medical certificate, previous
employment certificate and the payment of placement fee. He was also responsible for
the radio advertisements and leaflets, which enticed complaining witnesses to apply for
employment with the agency. Clearly, as Operations Manager, he was in the forefront of
the recruitment activities.
CASE DIGEST

PEOPLE VS. GULMATICO G.R. No. 146296

FACT

Petitioner was charged with the crime of Robbery in an Information dated January 2,
1997 which reads:

That on or about the 31st day of December, 1996, in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of
gain and by means of force, that is, by breaking the door, and without the knowledge
and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, rob and carry away one (1) AIWA VHS worth P8,000.00, one (1) BL Rayban,
worth P3,000.00, one (1) gold necklace worth P1,200.00, one (1) camera Fuji
worth P1,400.00 and one (1) leather wallet with cash money of P100.00 belonging to
one REBECCA HUERVA-LIPAYCO, to the damage and prejudice of the owner in the
total amount of P12,800.00.

ISSUE

Whether or not public respondent Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case against petitioner.

RULING

The RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by Michael and
Angelo, who testified with sufficient coherence and clarity. Thus, the RTC disposed of
this case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused EDUARDO GULMATICO

y BRIGATAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt and as principal of the crime of robbery
and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to a penalty of
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as
minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum. The
accused is further sentenced to pay complaining witness Rebecca Huerva-Lipayco the
amount of P12,800.00 representing the total value of the goods stolen without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Finally, the accused is sentenced to pay
the costs of suit.
CASE DIGEST

PEOPLE VS HASHIM G.R. No. 194255

FACT

The accused were charged as having been engaged in the recruitment and deployment
of workers without having previously obtained from the POEA a license or authority to
do so. They promised employment abroad particularly in Brunei and Malaysia thus
causing and prompting the persons of BBB and AAA to apply which employment
however did not materialize because in truth and in fact the promised employment is
non-existent in flagrant violation of the above mentioned law and causing damage and
prejudice to said complainants. instead of getting decent jobs they were forced to
become sex workers to earn money and became prostitutes. The lower court found
the accused guilty of illegal recruitment defined under Section 6 and penalized under
Section 7,b of Republic Act No. 0123 otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 as principals by direct participation! committed by a
syndicate against BBB and AAA! And SENTENCE each of said accused to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a P1,000,000.000 each to pay each of the
above victims P50,000.00 as moral damages P300,000.000 as exemplary damages
and to pay the costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification that the amount of
exemplary damages in favour of the victims ,private complain to reduced P25,000.00
each.

ISSUE

Whether or not the award of damages was proper.

RULING

The Supreme Court modified the ruling of the Court of Appeals. It held that Congress
passed RA 9208 or the Anti Tracking in Persons Act. Such law was approved on 26
May 2006. Ironically, Only a few days after victims found themselves in a situation that
the law had sought to prevent .In Lalli the Supreme Court increased the amount of
moral and exemplary damages from P50,000.00 to P500,000 and from P50,000 to
P100,000 respectively. Having convicted the accused therein of the crime of tracking in
persons.

The payment of P500,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary damages for
the crime of Tracking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in Article 3378 of the Civil
Code which states

Art. 3378. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:,7-
A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries.

Quasi delicts causing physical injuries.

Seduction abduction rape or other lascivious acts.

The criminal case of Tracking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the

crimes of seduction abduction rape or other lascivious acts. In fact! it is worse. To be
tracked as a prostitute without ones consent and to be sexually four to five times a day
by different strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita
experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety besmirched
reputation wounded feelings moral shock and social humiliation when she was tracked
as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Tracking in Persons was aggravated
being committed by a syndicate the award of exemplary damages is likewise
justified. The Supreme Court found no legal impediment to increasing the award of
moral and exemplary damages in the case at bar. Neither is there any logical reason
why we should differentiate between the victims herein and those in that case when the
circumstances are frighteningly similar. To do so would be to say that we discriminate
one from the other when all of these women have been the victims of unscrupulous
people who capitalized on the poverty of others. While it is true that accused appellant
was not tried and convicted of the crime of tracking in persons this Court based its
award of damages on the Civil Code and not on the Anti Trafficking in Persons Act as
clearly explained in Lalli.

Hence the Decision of the Court of Appeals in is affirmed with modifications .Accused
appellant Bernadette Pansacala a.k.a. Neneng Awid is ordered to pay AAA and BBB
the sum of P500,000 each as moral damages and P100,000 each as exemplary
damages and to pay the cost.
CASE DIGEST

HKO AH PAO V. TING

FACT

Arsenio Ting was the son of Teng Ching Lay by his first marriage. At the time of the
sale, Arsenio was a practicing lawyer and, being a Filipino, was qualified to acquire and
own real property in the Philippines. Arsenio was likewise the manager and controlling
stockholder of Triumph Timber, Inc. in Butuan City. Teng Ching Lay, on the other hand,
was a Chinese citizen, and although his name did not appear in the corporate records of
Triumph Timber, Inc., he was the one making business decisions for the company. 3 He
became a naturalized Filipino citizen on January 18, 1966.

According to petitioners, Teng Ching Lay purchased the property from the spouses
Aristeo Mayo and Salud Masangkay but it was made to appear in the contract of sale
that Arsenio was the vendee because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens
owning land in the Philippines. They claim that they became aware of the TCT in the
name of respondents only when the latter instituted an ejectment suit against them, and
notwithstanding the efforts on their part to settle the dispute, respondents refused to
recognize their ownership of the property.

ISSUE

The controversy involves two feuding families of the same clan battling over a piece of
property registered in the name of respondents. Petitioners claim that the property was
bought by their patriarch, the late Teng Ching Lay, who allegedly entrusted the same to
his son from a previous marriage, Arsenio Ting, the deceased father of herein
respondents.

RULING

At any event, the issues propounded by petitioners have been discussed lengthily and
ruled upon by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions. Hence, the Court does
not deem it necessary to further delve into these matters. The evidence on record
supports the assailed findings and conclusions specifically with regard to the ownership
of the property in question that is reflected in the Torrens title 20 which was issued in the
name of Arsenio pursuant to the deed of sale.

As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when adopted and affirmed by
the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal to this
Court.21 This Court is not a trier of facts and generally does not weigh anew the
evidence already passed upon by the CA.22 Absent any showing that some facts of
certain weight and substance were overlooked which, if considered, would affect the
outcome of the case, the Court, as in this case, will uphold the findings of the RTC and
the CA.
People v Hubert Webb

Facts:

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and xxx, seven,
were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested
a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and
eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery
especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred
to as the Vizconde massacre.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the
crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed
the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong"
Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and
Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after
the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an
information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.

The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only
seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.

The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These
included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong
Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former
girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.

Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United
States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object
evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for
truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.

But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court
found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank
testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations.

On January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the
accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and
Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years,
four months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying the penalty imposed on
Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro
Vizconde.

The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was
biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and
Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother
and sister.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting
the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver,
which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI.

The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence to give the accused
and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a
correct decision in the case.

Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen,
the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen
was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.

This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the
government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process.

Controlling Issues:

1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb, Lejano,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled
to belief; and

2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s testimony that
he led the others in committing the crime.

Other Issues:

1. Whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the government’s failure to produce the
semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would
prove his innocence; and

2. Whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez,
Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and sister.

Held:

The Right to Acquittal Due to Loss of DNA Evidence

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of
his right to due process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or
willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.

When Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not
yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its
admissibility as evidence.

Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for
DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of
preserving the specimen in the meantime.

Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding
to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court
to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused.

They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court
in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have
the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the
meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accused’s lack of interest in having such
test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the
semen specimen at some future time.

Suspicious Details

Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December 1994 as an "asset." She
supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this
information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando
Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader of the "Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer.
Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very special treatment" and she became its "darling,"
allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.

When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was piqued.
One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story behind the
Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell
his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as
well assume the role of her informant.

Webb’s U.S. Alibi

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi through (a) the travel preparations; (b) the two
immigration checks; (c) details of US sojourn; (d) the second immigration check; and (e) alibi versus
positive identification; and (f) a documented alibi.

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a) he was
present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel
documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from
airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines
after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to
the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower
courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.

Effect of Webb’s alibi to others

Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also
with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts
the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold
together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence against the others
must necessarily fall.

Conclusion

In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the
innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it
entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an
innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat lodged
immovable between teeth.

Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset
who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she
could not produce?

The Supreme Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and
Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS
accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez,
Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure
of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately
RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.