The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

Volume 12
Article 4
Issue 3 September

September 1985

Defining the Concept of Crime: A Humanistic

Perspective
Ronald C. Kramer
Western Michigan University

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12 : Iss. 3 , Article 4.
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 DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF CRIME:
A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE
Ronald C. Kramer
Western Michigan University

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that the traditional definition

of crime is too narrow and unnecessarily constrictive
of criminological work. Definitions more in accord
with the objectives of a humanistic criminology must
be developed. The traditional debate over the
definition of crime has not been grounded within the
context of the more fundamental images of crime that
actually guide criminological work. By clarifying
these underlying images (paradigms) and displaying the
value questions and domain assumptions contained
within them, we are in position to develop first order
and second order definitions of crime which are more
suitable to the task of humanistic criminology.

The task of a humanistic criminology, in my view,

is to combine a theoretical concern with the
historically generated structural context within which
crime and social control are produced and constructed,
with a practical concern for human liberation and the
realization of social justice. 1 A humanistic
criminology must identify those features of historical
social formations that "...produce unnecessary social
constraints and to describe how human freedom is
constricted, thus indicating directions for social
change" (Thomas, 1982:314). The humanistic per-
spective in criminology must be concerned with the way
in which the structuring of crime and social control
affects the human rights, dignity, survival, and
material well-being of all people. In order to carry
out this task, a humanistic criminology must begin by
confronting a very basic, and yet troublesome and

469
controversial issue: how to define the concept of
crime. The definition of the concept of crime is
important, of course, because of the types of
questions it directs attention to and the order of
phenomena it leads one to investigate. A definition
of crime establishes the subject matter of the
discipline of criminology and sets limits on what is
to be considered criminological work. Therefore, a
humanistic criminology can only be developed if an
appropriately humanistic definition of crime is used
as its initial point of departure.

This paper argues that the traditional definition

of crime is too narrow and unnecessarily constrictive
of criminological work. Definitions more in accord
with the objectives of a humanistic criminology must
replace the traditional definition.

The debate over the definition of crime usually

centers on the relative advantages and disadvantages
of using a "social" as opposed to a "legal" definition
of crime. Most criminologists have traditionally
relied on a "legal" conception of crime which defines
it as behavior in violation of the criminal law and
liable for sanctioning by criminal justice agencies
under the political authority of the state. There
have been, however, repeated attempts by leading
criminologists to move beyond the narrow confines of
the criminal law and thus2 develop more inclusive
social definitions of crime.

This debate, however, has often obscured the most

important issues concerning the task of defining
crime. The problem is that the debate over the
definition of crime has not been grounded within the
context of the more fundamental images of crime that
actually guide theory and research in criminology
today. Thus, the value judgments and domain
assumptions which are involved in defining the concept
of crime are often hidden from view.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the

development of a humanistic criminology by clarifying
these underlying images (paradigms) and displaying the
value judgments and domain assumptions contained
within them. Once these issues are clarified, several

470
definitions of crime more suitable to the task of
humanistic criminology will be offered.

PARADIGMS IN CRIMINOLOGY

The reason that the debate over the definition of

crime has obscured the most important issues involved
in this task is because the criminologists who have
been engaged in the debate have failed to take into
account more abstract, more fundamental definitions of
crime. The arguments over social versus legal
definitions of crime must be grounded within the
context of these more fundamental images of crime or
paradigms. By distinguishing between the "behavioral"
paradigm and the "definitional" paradigm, we can
clarify the important value decisions and domain
assumptions involved in defining the concept of crime.

The historian of science, Thomas Kuhn (1962) first

advanced the general thesis that scientific
disciplines are guided by a dominant paradigm: the
entire constellation of beliefs, values and techniques
shared by the members of a scientific community.
According to Kuhn, a scientific paradigm serves as a
guide for most theoretical and empirical work in that
discipline during a period called normal science.
Kuhn went on to use the concept of a paradigm to
analyze the structure of scientific revolutions in the
natural and physical sciences.

Although there has been considerable controversy

over what Kuhn himself meant by the term (Eckberg and
Hill, 1979), social scientists have frequently used
the concept to analyze their own disciplines. The
notion of paradigm seems to be most helpful in makino
sense of the structure of theoretical thought in .
discipline when used at a fairly abstract level,
although many sociologists who use the concept seem to
equate it with a general theoretical perspective or
orientation. George Riter's rather abstract notion of
paradigm will be used in this paper. Ritzer (1975:7)
defines a paradigm as follows:

A paradigm is a fundamental image of the subject

matter within a science. It serves to define
what should be studied, what questions should be

471
 asked, how they should be asked, and what rules
should be followed in interpreting the answers
obtained. The paradigm is the broadest unit of
consensus within a science and serves to
differentiate one scientific community (or
sub-community) from another. It subsumes,
defines and interrelates the exemplars, theories,
and methods, and instruments that exist within
it.

As Ritzer points out, various theoretical

perspectives may be grouped or subsumed under one
paradigm, and of course, from these perspectives or
models more rigorous and specific systems of
theoretical propositions may be developed and later
tested. The important point is that a paradigm
provides an abstract definition of the subject matter
within a discipline while theoretical models and more
rigorous systems of propositions (theories) attempt to
explain and predict more specific aspects of that
subject matter.

Within criminology there are two major paradigms

- the behavioral and the definitional. The behavioral
paradigm takes as its subject matter the behavioral
realities of crime. The focus of this paradigm is on
criminal behavior. The phenomenon of interest is the
behavior itself, whatever criteria are used to define
the behavior as criminal. Criminologists working with
this paradigm attempt to describe the nature, extent,
and the distribution of criminal behavior and most
importantly, they attempt to explain the causes of
this behavior in order to predict and control it.
From the rise of the positivistic school of
criminology in the late 19th century to the present,
most of the theory and research within criminology has
been guided by the behavioral paradigm.

While the search for the causes of criminal

behavior has been the dominant focus of much of the
theoretical and empirical work of criminologists under
the behavioral paradigm, the definitional paradigm
pays little or no attention to this question. The
definitional paradigm, often called the "labeling"
paradigm, takes as the fundamental image of its
subject matter the definitional realities of crime.

472
This paradigm focuses on the process whereby certain
actions and persons are selected out and defined as
criminal by political authorities. The definitional
paradigm asserts that no behavior is inherently
criminal (Becker, 1963). Criminality is not a quality
which resides within the behavior or the person;
rather, criminality is an ascribed social status
attached to behavior and persons by various legal
control agents in a process of social interaction.

Criminologists working within the definitional

paradigm attempt to describe and explain the process
and conditions of criminalization. In the early
1960's this perspective was developed and popularized
by the "labeling theory" of deviance (Schur, 1971).
Other theoretical traditions within this paradigm are
the pluralistic conflict and radical or critical
approaches to criminology. Whatever the specific
theoretical perspective, the focus of attention is
quite different from that of the behavioral paradigm.
Hartjen (1978:7) points out that "these approaches
shift the focus of emphasis from the violations of
rules to the designation of specific behavior as
rule-breaking conduct. Whereas behavioral definitions
lead one to investigate rule-breaking activity, the
labeling perspective leads one to study the responses
of legal authorities."

Theoretical and empirical work within the

definitional paradigm, thus, shifts the attention of
criminology from criminal behavior to the criminali-
zation process and the operation of the criminal
justice system, where the social reality of crime is
actually created. This involves the study of the
processes by which laws are created and enforced.
Research within the definitional paradigm, therefore,
includes the study of how criminal laws are made, how
legal categories are created, how these categories are
applied by legal control agents (such as police,
prosecutors, and judges) and finally how persons who
are ascribed the legal status of convicted criminal
are handled by the correctional system.

While many criminologists recognize that the

discipline of criminology includes within its scope
"the processes of making laws, of breaking laws, and

473
of reacting toward the breaking of laws" (Sutherland
and Cressey, 1978:3), few have appreciated the
radically different nature of these topics as subject
matter for the study of crime. It is important for
criminologists to make the distinction between the
behavioral and definitional paradigms because, in a
more fundamental way than the participants in the
traditional debate, they define crime in different
ways, they ask different kinds of questions and, they
focus attention on different aspects of the reality of
crime.

It is obvious that either paradigm could be used

by criminologists to guide their work, and that both
have their strengths and weaknesses. In this paper I
wish to go beyond the limitations of these two
approaches by outlining the key features of a human-
istic perspective on crime which will incorporate
aspects of each of the conventional paradigms but
which will transcend both of them. This will be done
by outlining a first order and a second order defini-
tion of crime within a humanistic perspective.

FIRST ORDER DEFINITION:

CRIME AS A SOCIO-LEGAL CONSTRUCTION

The definitional paradigm is organized around the

assumption that crime is not a type of behavior, but a
socio-legal definition or construction. Criminolo-
gists who work within this paradigm do not study the
causes or etiology of harmful (criminal) behavior, but
rather the process by which some types of behavior
come to be socially defined as criminal while others
do not. They do not study individuals who are
criminal, but instead the legal process whereby some
individuals come to be labeled as criminal while
others do not. Criminological work within the
definitional paradigm, therefore, can be characterized
as the sociology of criminal law and criminal justice.
To operate within this paradigm is to make a decision
that it is more important or more useful to study the
way in which political authorities use the state's
power to criminalize, than it is to study "criminal
behavior" or "criminals."

With the definitional paradigm, the only possible

474
definition of crime is a legal definition, although it
is a very different type of legal definition from that
used within the behavioral paradigm. Criminologists
who work within the definitional paradigm contend that
crime is a legal category which is created by the
state. Criminality is a legal status ascribed by
legal actors in a legal process governed by specific
procedural (legal) rules. No behavior or person is
inherently criminal. They become criminal only when
they are defined as such by political authorities.

This conception of crime in my view, must be the

first order definition used by a humanistic crimino-
logy. Before we study criminal behavior, we must
understand why the behavior has been defined as such.
Before we study officially defined criminals, we must
understand the legal process by which they were so
designated. In both of these cases we are led to
focus our attention on the state and political
authorities. We are led to critique the state and its
use of the power to criminalize. This critical,
questioning view is the hallmark of humanistic
criminology. As Hartjen (1978:226-227) has noted:

The humanistic criminologist ... must be someone

who questions the social world, its operations,
and even one's own and the views of others
regarding that world. Insofar as that which is
defined as crime is a function of the actions and
reflects the interests of those who control
political authority, a humanistic-critical
criminology is fundamentally oriented to a
questioning and critique of the political state,
no matter what its form.

A humanistic criminology must be one which

questions and critiques the political state. It must
seek to understand the historical evolution of the
state and the hierarchical structuring of power in
state societies. The humanistic perspective must seek
to understand how the state and its legal order are
both shaped by and reflect the interests of a parti-
cular socio-economic order. It must evaluate the
manner in which political authorities do or do not
protect individual human rights. This involves the
right to be protected from criminal harms, and also

475
the right to be protected from legalized oppression by
criminal justice agents who have been granted the
responsibility of protecting our lives and our
property.

A humanistic perspective on crime, therefore,

must, as a first order of business, define crime as a
socio-legal construction. It must direct our atten-
tion to the social process whereby some acts (but not
others) and some people (but not others) become
defined officially as criminal. It must direct our
attention to the historical and structural context in
which the state's power to criminalize is exercised.
As Hartjen (1978:228) notes, "...a criminology that
neglects to keep a sharp eye on those who hold the
power of political office (or those who work for them)
cannot call itself humanistic."

Although I have argued that a humanistic crimino-

logy must begin by defining crime as a socio-legal
construction, I do not believe that behavioral
questions must be excluded from the humanistic
perspective. Humanistic criminologists must describe
and explain those actions which cause willful social
harm - whether those harmful acts are engaged in by
lower class youths, middle class businessmen, cor-
porate organizations, or ruling elites. Thus, we need
a second order definition of crime that directs our
attention to these harmful social behaviors.

SECOND ORDER DEFINITION:

CRIME AS WILLFUL SOCIAL HARM

Criminological work within the behavioral

paradigm has had one central concern: the etiology of
criminal behavior. For the past one hundred years
now, the majority of criminologists have been rather
single-minded in their pursuit of the causes of crime.
The ostensible purpose of this quest was the develop-
ment of a body of scientific knowledge concerning the
etiology of crime. But, this is only the means to an
end; for the ultimate aim of this kind of criminolo-
gical work has always been, quite openly, correctional
in nature. Criminologists study the causes of crime
in order to control criminals and criminal behavior.

476
 Given their overwhelming emphasis on correction-
alism, criminologists who work within the behavioral
paradigm make a moral judgment that certain types of
behavior are bad, wrong, harmful, or immoral and they
need to be controlled or prevented. The critical
question is, "who selects the behavior to be studied
(and controlled- and what are the standards or
criteria which are used to make the selection? Much
of the debate over the definition of crime, of course,
centered on this question. Criminologists working
within the behavioral paradigm have traditionally
allowed the state, or political authorities to decide
what types of behavior should be studied as criminal
by using a legal definition of crime. According to
this definition, crime is behavior which is in
violation of criminal law. By choosing this defini-
tion of crime, criminologists decide to use the legal
norms which are encoded in the criminal law as the
standards by which behavior will be classified as
criminal for purposes of scientific study. This
choice, however, requires a judgment on the part of
the criminologist that it is more appropriate for
legal authorities to select the behavior that crimino-
logists will study than to allow criminologists to set
up their own independent criteria. This results in a
loss of scientific autonomy.

Furthermore, the choice of a legal definition of

crime within the behavioral paradigm has important
moral and political implications. As radical crimino-
logists have pointed out, such a definition restricts
criminologists to the study of those acts which are
legally defined as criminal by the state, thus
excluding other types of socially harmful and morally
insensitive behavior, especially those engaged in by
the state and the ruling corporate elite. As Tifft
and Sullivan (1980:6) note, "By assuming definitions
of crime within the framework of law, by insisting on
legal assumptions as sacred, criminologists comply in
the concealment and distortion of the reality of
social harms inflicted by persons with power." They
go on to point out "that it is not the social harms
punishable by law which cause the greatest misery in
the world. It is the lawful harms, those unpunishable
crimes justified and protected by law, the state, the
ruling elites that fill the earth with misery, want,

477
strife, conflict, slaughter, and destruction." The
Schwendingers (1977:8) make much the same point:

...criminologists in their education of other

professionals and of the population at large,
claim that crime refers only to acts stipulated
by law and sanctioned by the state. Such
information, however, tacitly delegitimates
references to those crimes not stipulated by law
and not sanctioned by the state.

From their Marxian perspective, the Schewen-

dingers point out that the state is not a neutral
institution. Rather, the state is viewed as being
controlled by the dominant class, the bourgeoise.
Thus, bourgeois notions of criminality will find their
way into the law while those of other classes will be,
for the most part, excluded. The Schwendingers
(1977:9-10) note:

Doubtless, similarities exist between bourgeois

and proletarian notions of criminality and
justice... Nevertheless, there are many differ-
ences between these ideas which are related to
the definition of crime. There are various social
harms that are criminal and that vitally effect
the interests of the working class and its
allies, yet they are not designated as unlawful,
while those social harms that effect the general
interests of the bourgeois are made
illegal.. .even though the proletarian ideas about
criminality are important in the struggle for a
better life, very few of these conceptions are
given legal expression as long as state power
remains more or less in the hands of the
bourgeois.

In pursuing etiological questions solely within

the categories provided by the criminal law, and
helping to formulate public policies to more effect-
ively control legally defined criminals, criminolo-
gists (consciously or not) take a political stance.
By using a legal definition of crime within the
behavioral paradigm, criminologists become agents of
the state. As "experts" providing knowledge and
information to political authorities, they become

478
allied to the state and serve its interests. That
criminologists might serve as an arm of the political
authorities worries even those who are not identified
with the radical wing of the discipline. Emilio Viano
(19775:XIV) asks:

By emphasizing shoplifting, breaking and entering

offenses, muggings, etc., as being "the" criminal
acts, are we, as criminologists, simply acting as
academic or professional lackeys for politicians
who want law and order campaigns and issues in
order to submerge what one should call the real
criminal acts like pollution, poverty, misleading
advertising, worthless warranties, and corruption?

Contrary to the assertions of some radical

criminologists, this alliance between criminology and
the state is not the product of an explicit conspir-
acy, nor is it necessarily a "bad" thing. Most
criminologists have willingly signed an agreeable (and
profitable) contract with the political authorities.
They operate as political consultants for the state
because they largely agree with the state's correct-
ional aims (although often critical of the state's
means to achieve these ends). The majority of
criminologists do not view themselves as "ancillary
agents of political power" and they sincerely believe
that their work serves the public interest. Taking
for granted the neutrality of the state and leaving
unexamined the legal definition of crime, these
criminologists argue that they do not make value
judgments. They assume that the criminal law is
somehow objective and value free.

Humanistic criminologists, however, must point

out that to use a legal definition of crime that is
relative and arbitrary, which is shaped by powerful
interests, which includes some social harms while
excluding others, is to take a political stance and
make moral judgments. Any designation of behavior as
criminal requires a value judgment. Criminologists do
not escape the necessity to make such judgments in
their work by using a legal definition of criminal
behavior, they simply allow others (political author-
ities) to make those judgments for them. And, as
Galliher and McCartney (1977:10) point out:

479
 If sociology makes no moral judgments indepen-
dent of criminal statutes, it becomes sterile and
inhumane--the work of moral eunuchs or legal
technicians. Recognizing that cultural defini-
tions of crime are a product only of powerful
interest groups in government, the analyst of
crime should not necessarily be tied to the moral
judgments reflected in those statutes.

In my view, a humanistic criminology must move

beyond the traditional legal definition of crime as
used within the behavioral paradigm. If humanistic
criminologists are truly concerned with the dignity,
survival, and material well-being of all people, I
believe that they must reformulate the definition of
3
crime so that it includes all willful social harms.
Such a definition would, of course, force criminolo-
gists to openly confront the moral and political
choices involved in defining any social act as
criminal.

Social definitions of crime have been proposed in

the past in the discipline of criminology. These
definitions usually define crime as behavior which is
"anti-social", "socially harmful", or "socially
injurious". If humanistic criminologists are to adopt
such a definition, they must face up to the question
of who decides what behavior will be classified as
criminal based on what standards or criteria. Those
who would advocate expanding the definitions of crime
beyond the categories of criminal law must face up to
the vital task of delineating a moral and scientific
basis for correctly applying the category of crime to
harmful social behavior (Schwendinger, 1977).

While the logic of my argument perhaps suggests

that each individual criminologist should be free to
classify behavior as criminal for the purpose of
scientific investigation, I would hope that humanistic
criminologists would be able to formulate a more
general set of moral standards to be used. These
standards would hopefully center around the notion of
willful social harm. Crimes are those willful social
acts that cause serious harm - physical, economic, or
psychological - to human beings.

480
 Now different individuals will, of course, have
different ideas about what constitutes social harm.
But, perhaps, humanistic criminologists can come to
some consensus about what serious social harms are.
The notion of basic human rights may serve as a useful
starting point in this attempt. The Schwendingers
(1970 were the first to propose a social definition of
crime based on the notion of fundamental, historically
determined, human rights. They argued (1970:145) that
"all persons must be guaranteed the fundamental
prerequisites for well being," which includes, food,
shelter, clothing, medical services, challenging work,
recreational experiences, security from predatory
individuals and repressive social elites. To the
Schwendingers these material requirements, basic
services, and enjoyable relationships are not to be
regarded as rewards or privileges but, as basic human
rights whose violation constitutes crime. Recently
others have followed their lead. In an introductory
text, Galliher and McCartney (1977:3) state:

Unlike many social science textbooks dealing with

crime, this text openly acknowledges a specific
ethical orientation toward social life. Its
position is that an ethical social ordering
within any society, or among societies, requires
that all men, women, and children have equal
chances for personal freedom and physical
survival. Such an ethical stance seems required
to avoid an unreflective acceptance of the
criminal justice system, official crime statis-
tics, and criminal statutes as they are, and it
mirrors the charter of the United Nations...the
U.S. Declaration of Independence... (and) the
Bill of Rights.

Tifft and Sullivan (1980:112) also advocate a

social harms approach to crime based on a notion of
human life rights:

One must consider social harms in a context not

restricted by legal institutions. One must
consider the institutions, ideas, and actors who
deny food, shelter, clothing, health, life, and
economic opportunity as perpetuating, generating,

481
 and committing social harms. These are the human
life rights of all individuals.

Another approach to the identification of social

harms comes from Leslie Wilkins (1982). In an
excellent discussion of crime statistics and their
relationship to social policy, Wilkins makes a case
for transforming the concept of crime. He suggests
that data on "harms" could be "more useful" than data
on "1crimes" legally defined, as a basis for an
"informed social policy." He (1982:28) argues that
"focusing upon the concept of the Quality of Life and
the problems of reducing 'social harms' increases the
range of our thinking and makes possible some new
procedures." Wilkins (1982:29) goes on to propose a
new definitional base for social control data:

A "crime" might be defined as a "crime" according

to its impact upon the victim, rather then in
accord with a legal concept. We should become
interested in the public's view of what events,
persons, or organizations have prevented them
from doing that which they want to do.

Wilkins is proposing a "democratic definition" of

crime which allows the public, not political authori-
ties or criminologists, to make moral judgments
concerning which acts will be called criminal. He
argues (1982:30):

It is not the "reality" (legal definition) of a

crime which drives the person to call the police,
but the impact upon the victim or observers. The
first practical step is, therefore, to obtain a
listing of "complaints" from the general public.
The only way to define "social harms" or
'grievances" is in terms which the public
themselves will use.

Social definitions of crime, such as the human

rights based definition proposed by the Schwendingers
and others, and the democratic definition suggested by
Wilkins, are much better suited to a humanistic
criminology than the traditional legal definition.
These humanistic definitions direct our attention to
social acts and actors that cause enormous human

482
suffering. These behaviors are brought within the
boundaries of criminology so that they may be
described, explained and hopefully controlled. Many
traditional forms of crime (as defined legally), would
remain as the focus of criminological research from a
humanistic perspective. Most importantly, however,
such an approach would open up new areas for inquiry -
concerning social harms perpetuated by the state,
large corporations, and ruling elites - and raise
fundamental questions concerning the operation of
economic and political institutions in general.

In my view, therefore, a humanistic criminology

must adopt, as a second order definition, a definition
of crime as willful social harm. These social harms
can best be determined by using some combination of
basic human rights as standards, and democratic
surveys of what people regard as important social
harms. Such a definition of crime would not only
provide a measure of scientific, moral, and political
autonomy for criminologists, it would also allow the
most critical value decisions to be brought out into
the open and shifted from the state and political
authorities to criminologists themselves or to the
people. Most importantly, it would direct the
attention of humanistic criminologists to the
existence of social harms that need to be understood
and controlled, and yet are not included within the
legal boundaries of traditional criminology.

Finally, it should be pointed out that this

second order definition of crime can lead us back to
the first order definition. As we use the second
order definition to classify certain acts as criminal
for the purposes of study, we will often be moved to
ask why this particular social harm has not been
legally defined as crime. Thus, the two definitions
being proposed here complement each other well. Each
is derived, however, from a different paradigm and
directs our attention to fundamentally different
phenomena. Both, however, are necessary for the
development of a humanistic criminology.

483
Notes

1. This is essentially the same task as critical

(Michalowski, 1981), power-reflexive (Pfohl, 1984), or
dialectical (Thomas, 1982) approaches to criminology.

2. See Kramer (1982), for a full account of the

historical debate.

3. Now a great number of criminologists and

legal scholars will want to interrupt at this point
and protest that such a definition rides rough-shod
over constitutional guarantees and due process
principles. They would agree with Tappan (1947) that
such definitions "invite the subjective value judg-
ments of the individual" (P. 97) and are a "blight
upon either a legal system or a system of sociology
that strives to be objective" (P. 99). This
objection, however, fails to appreciate the crucial
difference between a scientific, theoretical
definition of crime and the particular legal process
by which individuals are defined as legal criminals.
In the words of Abraham Blumberg (1979:17) it fails
"to recognize that various institutional settings have
to employ different intellectual processes for
defining and ordering that segment of social reality
which is their concern." As Blumberg goes on to
observe:

As a lawyer defending a client in a criminal case,

I would be appalled by any concept of reality
other than the very strict, narrow construction of
the meaning of legal norms and their application
as required by common law usage, and the due
process safeguards of the Constitution...On the
other hand, as a criminologist I would be survey-
ing the same landscape with an entirely different
set of intellectual perspectives and purpose, and
I would be amused, if not horrified, to think that
I must be limited to the official statistics and
definitions of crime, and the official version of
what it is that the police, courts, prisons, and
correctional systems are doing.(P. 17).

As Blumberg concluded:

484
 A criminologist cannot be bound by the official
and conventional definitions of lawmaking,
lawbreaking, and law enforcement. It is the
essence of his job that he notes and accounts for
the disparity and differences between the official
world and the real world as it is revealed in
field research. (P. 17).

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