EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR v.

LUIS BUNDALIAN
GR No. 149335, Jul 01, 2003

Statement of Facts:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR assails the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated April 18, 2001, affirming the decision of the Office of the President in
Administrative Order No. 12 ordering petitioner's dismissal as Regional Director of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for unexplained wealth.
Petitioner's dismissal originated from an unverified letter-complaint, dated July 15, 1995, addressed by
private respondent LUIS BUNDALIAN to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. Private respondent accused petitioner, then OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH, of
accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019. Private
respondent charged that in 1993, petitioner and his wife purchased a house and lot at 907 North Bel
Aire Drive, Burbank, Los Angeles, California, making a down payment of US$100,000.00. Private
respondent accused petitioner of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects.
Accordingly, the letter-complaint and its attached documents were indorsed by the Philippine
Consulate General of San Francisco, California, to the Philippine Commission Against Graft and
Corruption (PCAGC)[1] for investigation. Petitioner, represented by counsel, submitted his counter-
affidavit before the PCAGC alleging that the real owner of the subject property was his sister-in-law
Estela Fajardo. Fajardo offered to buy the Burbank property and put the title in the names of petitioner
and his wife to support their emigration plans and to enable her at the same time to circumvent the
prohibition in her mortgage contract.
In the course of the investigation, the PCAGC repeatedly required petitioner to submit his Statement
of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN), Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and Personal Data Sheet. Petitioner
ignored these directives and submitted only his Service Record. He likewise adduced in evidence the
checks allegedly issued by his sister-in-law to pay for the house and lot in Burbank, California.
After the investigation, the PCAGC, in its Report to the Office of the President, made the following
findings: Petitioner purchased a house and lot in Burbank, California, for US$195,000.00 (or P3.9M at the
exchange rate prevailing in 1993). It likewise found petitioner's explanation as unusual, largely
unsubstantiated, unbelievable and self-serving.

Statement of the case:

The PCAGC concluded that as petitioner's acquisition of the subject property was manifestly out of
proportion to his salary, it has been unlawfully acquired. Thus, it recommended petitioner's dismissal
from service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019.
On August 24, 1998, the Office of the President, issued Administrative Order No. 12,[4] ordering
petitioner's dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government benefits.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied. His appeal to the Court of Appeals was likewise
dismissed.

Issue:
1. Whether or not, petitioner was denied due process in the investigation before the PCAGC;
2. Whether or not, petitioner’s guilt was proved by substantial evidence;
3. Whether or not, dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case
before the PCAGC moot and academic.

Ruling:
On the issue of due process, petitioner submits that the PCAGC committed infractions of the cardinal
rules of administrative due process when it relied on Bundalian's unverified letter-complaint. He gripes
that his counter-affidavit should have been given more weight as the unverified complaint constitutes
hearsay evidence. Moreover, petitioner insists that in ruling against him, the PCAGC failed to respect
his right to confront and cross-examine the complainant as the latter never appeared in any of the
hearings before the PCAGC nor did he send a representative therein.
We find no merit in his contentions. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the
opportunity to explain one's side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As
long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands
of due process are sufficiently met. In the case at bar, the PCAGC exerted efforts to notify the
complainant of the proceedings but his Philippine residence could not be located.[7] Be that as it may,
petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of due process because he failed to confront and cross-
examine the complainant. Petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by
participating in the proceedings before it. He was duly represented by counsel. He filed his counter-
affidavit, submitted documentary evidence, attended the hearings, moved for a reconsideration of
Administrative Order No. 12 issued by the President and eventually filed his appeal before the Court of
Appeals. His active participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of
procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement. He cannot now be
allowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the investigation.
Neither can we sustain petitioner's contention that the charge against him was unsupported by
substantial evidence as it was contained in an unverified complaint. The lack of verification of the
administrative complaint and the non-appearance of the complainant at the investigation did not
divest the PCAGC of its authority to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. Under Section 3 of
Executive Order No. 151 creating the PCAGC, complaints involving graft and corruption may be filed
before it in any form or manner against presidential appointees in the executive department. The Court
Administrator of this Court investigates and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but even
anonymous complaints filed against court employees or officials for violation of the Code of Ethical
Conduct. This policy has been adopted in line with the serious effort of the government to minimize, if
not eradicate, graft and corruption in the service.
It is well to remember that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied.
On the second issue, in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government,
the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the
credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with
respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive
jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These
principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an
administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive
additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned.
Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioner's stance that the dismissal of similar charges against him before the
Ombudsman rendered the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic.
To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case
subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings,
not to the exercise of administrative powers. Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his
possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a
presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and
control of the President over him. As the PCAGC's investigation of petitioner was administrative in
nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar.
His liability was proved by substantial evidence.
Thus, the petition is DISMISSED.

Doctrine:
The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one's side or
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently
met.