Chapter XI

CONSTRUCTION OF CONSTITUTION

Liberal con,truction.
The constitution should b liberall construed in order that it
may accom.pli;h the high ~5le~t1ves ·or w 1c 1 II was enactc, and
to ca_!!Y ~ ll_! the _generilprinciples of government. A ~ and
technical construction has[ii'-:i» plac:cmthe construction of the con-
stitution which has been framed by rhe people for their own benefit.
Furthermore, a constitution is an organic law and has to deal with
broader subjects. Of necessityit has to employ broader language
if it is to lay down completely the principles of government. It
cannot provide nor presume to provide with )llinute precision for
all the rules of conduct it aims to establish; it does not venture
into the fine details like legislative ,enactments or statutes. ( Black
on Interpretation of Laws, pp. 17-19).
It has sometimes been argued that constitutions, being a grant
of powers, and in derogation of the inherent and natural rights of
the people, should be strictly construed. In this point, it should
he observed that all governments are founded u on a surrend r
by the ople of some of their natura · · e.Jor...the
:..benefits o orgamzed socie!Y. And since construction of constitu·
tions is likewise a question of intention, a strict or iberal inter re-
tatiorris equally worth the intention ·of the people. ither of them
inay1,e aclopieclas would promote or secure their rights to life,
liberty or property. (Ibid.).
Intent of the framers to be given effect.
Th?cardinal rule"in the construction of the constitution is to
ek out the ii.tent of the frame thereof and to give effect thereto.
e intent o t e ramers s ou d b e ~ in the constitution itself.
The ~ t meaning of the words employed shou@ be taken as
expressing such intent, unless that assumption would lead to ab-
surdity, ambiguity or contradiction. (Ibid., p. 10) .
To ascertain the intent expressed in the constitution, resort
should first be made to the .!).lll.11t•I of rhe words used-

210
 CONS11l UC'l1 0 N OF CON8' 1 1'11J'M O N ;,, 11

The inrent, once •• 11sccr111incd , 111 ,he: only on( which ih,· judt4. IMry
can enforce . ( I ( .ooh-y, ( .u111t J.111111a,11111 i , pp JJ.1 , 121)

Uniform con,truct lon.

The consrrur tum ol II co 1 . · • I 1.
form. The Com111111i . . l!illlU IJoWI p1rw1~m:1 8rlflultl he uni
different t illlc3. It :. Ho n_,C:ln ll.0 1 be h1·l,I l o 11\Cfl/l d1 ffo rcn1 1~11 n g1 :11
l . ~- llc l_Ptct:.1L1~ !11udd 11 u1 d1,111gc hmc d 1cr with
the If uct1 ~ 1011~ 111 mlil ll' :.c11 iime11 1, nJ vary w if11 rh'I" mnrlrunm
o_r t l~ cx1u_c11~1cs o~ cs. !1c fr:11 iu:r~ 117 rhc LfJI J'l rir,tt'ivn
fixed II S mcimm_~ :II 1hc tim~ thcy a,l11p1cd lJ, :rnd rhc court ~. when
called upon I ~ int erpre t i i , cnn nv1 hold t/ i;1 1 ir mean,. diHcrcndy
The cuns1ruc11011 ol a rnnsrltu rion :-.hnu ld be , in su for :11 least as
hu man _in fi rmi~y will all ow, indcpcndcnr of 1hc p:1ssiuns of p:inics
of pnrt icul :ir 11mcs. Ir shou ld he fixcJ, uni fo rm and permanen t.
(Black on I,11erpretation of Laws, p. 22) .
The duty of the cou rt is ID Jcclarc the law as written, lea ving
it 10 l'hc people to ma ke such ch:mgcs in 1hc consri1 ution as 1hcy
deem necessa ry or c:xpc:d ien1 . ( 1 Cooley's Consl . Limitations, 8th
( Black on I nlerpre/ation o/ La41s, p. 22) .
The construction of the constitution should he independent
of the passion of parties at particular times.
Case: The question here involves an analysis and construction
of Act No. 2868i in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General
to fix the price at which rice should be sold. Section one of said
Act authorized the Governor-General, for any cause resulting in an·
extraordinary rise of the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and
promulgate temporary rules and emergency measur.es for carrving
out the purposes of the Act. He1d: Act 286'8 is unconstitutional
and void being an undue delegation of legislative power. That
there was an extra-ordinary rise in the price of rice and profiteer-
ing which worked a severe hardship on the poorer classes, and that
an emergency existed is no argument for or against the consdtu-
tionaHty of the law. The Constitution is something solid, per-
manent and substantial. Its stability protects the life, liberty and'
property rights of the rich and the poor alike, and that protectfon
ought not to change with the wind on any emergency condition.
The fundamental question involved in this case is the right of the
people of the Philippines to be and live under a republican form
of government. We make the broad statement that no state or
 •u BrATVTORY CONSTRUCTION

nation, living under a rep_u~lic~ form of government, under the

rums and conditions specified ut Act No. 2868, has ever enacted
as law delegating the power to any one, to fix the price at which
rice should be sold. That power can never be delegated under a
n:publican form of government. (U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil.
l, l6) .
Effects to be given to the whole instrument.
When construction is propet,Jhc...whalc_ronstitutiwL is to be_ _
examined in order to deter~ ! ! l ~ g of an¥ provision. That
construction should be used which would give effect to the entire
instrument and not one which would raise any conflict between
provisions. A construction which raises a conflict between different
parts of the constitution is not permissible when by reasonable
construction, the parts may be made to harmonize. ( Black on
Interpretation of Laws, 2nd. ed., pp. 23-25).
Effect is to be given, if possible, to the whole instrument,
and to e~ery section and clause. If different portions seem to
conflict, the courts must harmonize them, if practicable, and must
lean in favor of a construction which will render every word opera-
tive, rather than one which may make some words idle and nuga-
tory. The framers of the constitution should be presumed to have
expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, correspond-
ing with the immense importance of the power delegated to the
Nies, leaving as little as possible to implication. ( 1 Cooley, Const.,
Limitatiotu, 8th. ed., pp. 127-129).
Where two provisions of a written constitution are repugnant
to ttt:h other, thlll which is last in order of time and in loc,u posi-
tion is to be pre/e"ed.
C.He: The bill of rights prohibits suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus except when public safety requires it, in case of
(1) invasion, ( 2) insurrection, or ( 3) rebellion; whereas An.
VIII, Section 20 authorizes the President to suspend the privilege,
when public safety requires it in case of ( 1) invasion, ( 2) insur-
rection, (3) rebcllion, or ( 4) imminent danger thereof. Held: The
difference between the two constitutional provisions would seem
to be: whereas the bill of rights impliedly denies suspension of
the writ in case of imminent danger, etc. , Art. VIII , section 10
e.xpreuly authorizes the President to suspend it when there is im-
 CONSTRUCTzo
. N 01" CONBTrrtrrzoN
Ill:1"~nt dang~r. of invasion, etc 213
flictmg prov1s1ons the S · To reconcile the
of construction that wh upreme Court •dopted thappfarently con-
. , ere two p . . e an:uliar rul
uon are repugnant to ea h th rov1s1ons of a writt . c
d . I I c o er that h' h en constuu
an m oca position is to be w ic is last in order f . .
Constitution, therefore should P:~ferred. Art. VII, Sec. 10 0 fu;::; °
91 Ph,/. 882). P vail. (Montenegro vs. Castaneda,

Construction of •mend
An d ments to the constitution.
amen ment to the canst' .
part thereof, as much as if it we,auuo~ once_ adopted becomes a
It should therefore be constru d e orig'."ally mcorporated therein.
be harmonized with all the eh accord ingly. If possible, it must
01
but if this cannot be don th erhprovisions of .the constitution
e, en sue amendment will prevail
.If two amendments adopted on the same day cannot .be re
conctled thru all reasonable means both ·11 be . .
(1 C I ' C
00 ey s
L
onst.
• w1 not given effect
imitations, 8th Ed., pp. 129.lJ0). ·

Refere!lce to previous legislation and construction.

A cons!itution should be construed with reference to previous
doctrmes laid down by the courts and previous legislation. The
terms used in a constitution should be given the meaning which
had been put upon them, and which they possessed at the time
of the framing and adoption of the constitution. Where a word
has acquired a fixed technical meaning in legal and constitutional
history, it is presumed to have been used in that sense by the fra-
mers of the constitution. (McKinney vs. Barber, 203 S.W., )03).
In th, case of Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil., 461, the
Supreme Court in interpreting the term "public agricultural_ lands"
used in Section I of Article III of the Phihppme Constitution,
construed the same as including residential lands inasmuch as at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution, "residential lands"
were included in the term uagricultural lands."

Words used in the Cons/ruction should be given the meaning

they possess at the time of its adoption.
al' b ht a residential lot from the
Case: Krivenko, an Jen, oug he registration of
941
Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December ' ; 945 he sought to
which was interrupted by the war. d In d
accomplish said registration but was erue
::-the Re~ster of Deeds
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
214
. n the ground that, being an alien, be cannot acquire
0
of Manila _ . . di t'on Krivenko brought the case to the 4th
d • this 1ur1s c 1 ·
Ian m f th C I of first Instance of Manila by means of a
Bancho e our d ·· th
r d h ourt rendered ju gment sustauung e refusal
consul/Ra, an Ife Dceeds Hence, this appeal. Held: The Constiru-
0 f the eg1stero · .. b Id f
und • _· I XII Sec. 1 classifies t e an s o the public
uon, er ,,.uc e ' ' . I 1 . b d .
domain into three main groups: agncu_tura, :1m
er _an ~era}
lands. The land purchased herein by Knve'.".'o 1_s a res1~en11al land
which falls neither under the general clas~1ficat10n_ of. llm~er land
or mineral land, which is in conformity wllh _a l~g1sla11ve mterpre-
cation given after the adoption ~f the Constlt~llon. Words used
· th Constitution should be given the mearung they possess at
:e ti':ne of ·its adoption. ( Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, G.R.
No. L-630, 44 O.G. No. 2, p. 471, Feb. 48).

Constitu-tiona! provision should not be construed retrospectively.

A constitutional provision should net be construed retrospec-
tively, unless that is the obvious and clear intention of the words
used or the unmistakable intent of the framers. Such intention in
favor of a retrospective construction must be so clear as to be free
from any doubt. ( Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd, ed., p.
26; 1 Cooley's Const. Limitations, 8th Ed., pp. 136-137). Certain
provisions of the Philippine Constitution are expressly made re-
troactive such as that embodied in Section 1, paragraphs 3 and 4,
of Article XVIII, providing for the assumption of the obligations
of the Commonwealth Government by the Republic of the Pbilip-
pines; and also in Section 1, Article IV, referring to citizens of
the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.

Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution should apply

prospectively.

Case: For the death of two persons, Magtoto was accused of

~urder t~? informations. When these cases were jointly tried,
hi~ extraJ~clic1al confession of November 15, 1972 was admitted in
evidence ID a court order on June 18, 1973. Objection was made
on the ground that the confession was taken while the accused was
ID. the_ preventive custody of the Constabulary and without him
bemg 1Dformed of his _rights under Section 20, Article IV of the
New Constttunon .. Satd_ co~stitutional provision grants the right
to a person under mvesttgauon for the com.mission of an offense,
 CONSTRUCTION OF' CONSTITUnON 215

~he ri~ht_ to counsel and to be informed of such right and renders

madm1ss1ble any confession obtained in violation of said rights.
Th: second paragraph of Article 125, of the Revised Penal Code
which was added by R.A. No. 1083 enacted in 1954, which reads:
"In every case, the pe rson deta ined shall be informed of the cause
of h!s detent ion and shall be allowed, upon his request, to com-
mu nicate and confer at an y time with his attorney or counsel" is
c!tcd also as to be an implied grant to a detained person of the
right to counsel and to be informed of such right. Held: Section
20, Article IV of the New Constitution granted fo r the first time
the rights mentioned therei n. The inadmissibility of evidence ob-
tained in Yiolation of said righ ts mentioned in said provision" should
be given effect only when the right :ilready existed and had been
violated." The confession of the accw,ed herein was taken before
the New Constitution took effect in accordance with the rules then
in force, thu s no right had been violated for none then existed.
"x x x this constitutional mandate has and should be given a pros-
pective and not a retrospective effect." In its historical perspective,
it could be seen that this provision was included having in mind
the Miranda-Escobedo rule adopted in the United States holding
that an extra-judicial confession . given without the assistance of
counsel is inadmissible in evidence. This Court had previously
rejected the Miranda-Escobedo rule. Thus when the draft of Sec-
tion 20, Article IV was submitted, Delegate Leviste expressly
made of record that "we are adopting here the rulings of US
Supreme Court in the Miranda-Escobedo cases." The history of
this constitutional provision will thus show that the right granted
therein did not exist before its inclusion in the New Constitution
and so should apply prospectively.
The only right granted by Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code on the other hand, is for a detained person to be informed
of the cause of his detention, "but he must make a request for
him to be able to claim the right to communicate and confer with
counsel at any time.'' Article 22 of the Revised Penal. ~e can-
not apply in this case because, the retroactive effect It gives to
penal laws refer only to substantive penal laws and not to. a
"procedural rule of evidence involving the incompetency and ID·
admissibility of confessions like Section 20, Article IV of the New
Constirution. ( Magtoto vs. Mang11era, L-37201-02, March 3, 1975,
63 SCRA 4) .

1
r 218 STATUTORY CONBTRucnoN

Mandetory and directory provisions.

The provisions of a constituti~n are almost invariably tl'l.an.

datory. It is only in extremely plam cases, or under _the Pressure
of necessity that they can be construed as merely directory. It
would be nn extremely dangerous doctrine to_hold that any of the
constitutional provisions may be obeyed or d1Sregarded at the wi]]
or pleasure of the legislature, unless It IS clear beyond all doubt
that such was the intention of the framers . of. the consutution. It
would even amount to a lowering of the digmty befitting a funda.
mental Jaw to say that it prescribes rules of order in matters un-
essential which may be followed or disregarded at pleasure. Thu,
prohibitions contained in co_nstitutions should be construed ..;
positive and unequivocal proh1b1t1ons and a grant of power therein
should be construed as a mandate and not a mere direction. ( Black
on Interpretation of Law,, 2nd. Ed. , pp. 2728) .
There are cases, however, where the doctrine of directory sta-
·tutes has been applied to constitutional provisions; but they are
so plainly at variance with the weight of authority on the point
that it ·would be ~e to sa~ that the judicial decisions, as they
now stand, do not sanction the application. (1 Cooley', Conit.
Limitation,, 8th Ed., p. 169).

What is necessary to render effective any provision is deemod

implied.

Whatever is necessary to render effective any provision of a

constitution, whether the same be a prohibition, or a restriction,
or the grant of the power, must be deemed implied and intended
in the provision itself. (Black on Interpretation of Law,, 2nd. Ed.,
pp. 29-)0) .

. Where a general power is 1conferred or duty enjoined, every

parucular power necessary for the exercise of the one or tbe per-
form~~ of tbe otber is also conferred. This is necessary for a
const1tut1on from its very nature cannot enter into a minute speci-
~ica6on of all tbe minor powers naturally and obviously included
10
It and flowing from tbe great and important ones which are
:1'res,ly granted. The implication under this rule must, however,
necessary and not merely conjectural or argumentative. (I
Cooley', Const. Limitation,, 8th Ed., p. 1JB).
 CONSTRUcr'ION OF CONSTITUTION 217

Grants of power construed.

The grant of !-'°wers in general terms in the constitution shall
be understood to mclude all such particular and auxili en
•• ar~ necessary to make it effectual. Where the me: k
ei:erctse of a granted power are specified., all other means are
the

deemed excluded. Wh~re the means are not specified, any means
may be resorted_ to which are fairly and properly adopted to ac-
~mphs~ the ~h1ec1 of the grant, unless they necessarily interfere
with eXIst~ mterests or vested rights. (Black on Interpretation
of Laws, Ibid.) .
In any cas~, howe~er, no consrruction of a given power should
be allowed which plainly defeats or impairs its avowed objects.
This rule proceeds from common sense for every instrument should
be construed at magis valeat quam pereat.
Power of CFI to conduct preliminary investigation, derived
from our Constitution; power includes conduct of preliminary i#·
vestigatio11 of criminal actions for written defamation despite silence
of Art. 360 of Rev. Penal Code.
The power of the Court of First Instance to conduct a pre•
liminary investigation is derived from the constitutional provision
that "no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be de-
termined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce" ( Sec. 1 [ 3] ,
Art III, now Sec. 3, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution; Collector of
Customs vs. Villaluz, L-34038, June 18, 1976 and five other cases,
71 SCRA 356). Implicit in that provision is the constitutional
grant of power to the judge to hold a preliminary examination and
to i,sue warrants of arrest and search warrants. That which is
plainly implied in the language of a law is as much a part of it
as that which is expressed (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41,
45, 90). The term "judge" embraces a judge of the Court _of
First Instance. Its coverage is not restricted to judges of infenor
courts. Hence, the silence of article 360 ( Revised Penal Code)
on the power of a judge of the Court of First Instance to conduct
a preliminary investigation of criminal actions for wt1tten_ defam;
tions does not preclude a judge of that court from holdmg suth
. . . h . f h power IS ued up w1
1nvest1gat10n. However, t e exercise o _t a~ w itten defomnrion .
the rules on ~he venue ~f a criminal acno~ .o\n:umce of the ciry
That power ts lodged m the Court of first
 STATUTORY CO!ISTRUCTION'
118
. h l"bclous article was printed or first
or province where t e 1 ·d d h h ff
her the offended party actually res, c ' or w ere _t _e o ended
or w_ e . . 1 h Id Office at the rime of the commrssron of the
public off,(cE••scr,_beano vs. Avila, G.R. No. L-30375, September 12,
offense.
1918).
How popular and technical sense of words construed.
The words employed in a constitution should be understood
· their natural or popular sense, unless they are technical legal
:rm,, in wh ich case, they should be taken in their tec_hnical sig~ifi-
cation. "Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical
subtleties for niceties of expression, for critical property, for ela-
borate sh~dcs of meaning, or for the exercise of the philosophical
acuteness or judicial research. Having been made by the people,
adopted by the people, the people must be supposed to read them
with the mere aid of their common sense. ( Black on lnterpre1a-
tio11 of Laws, pp. 33, 34) .

Preamble and titles.

The preamble of a constitution and the titles of its several
mbjects may furnish evidence of its meaning and intention; but
the arguments drawn therefrom are entitled to very little weight.
(Ibid., p. 34).
A preamble is a key to open the mind of the authors of the
con,ritution as to the evil sought to be prevented and the objects
sought to be accomplished by the provision thereof. (1 Willough-
by on the U.S. ConSI., p. 62). However, only in the most general
way can the preamble influence the construction of the constitution.
(Endlich, Interpretarion, Sec. 511).

Injustice and inconYenience.

. In the construction ~f a constitution, it is not permissible to
~sobey, or to. construe mto nothingness, any of its provisions
11mply because II may appear to work injustice or to lead to hanh
or obnoxious consequences or discriminations. ( Black Inter•
prelalion of Laws, 2nd. Ed., p. 35) . 011

If a const.itutionaI provision is clearly unjust, the remedy is

not to be supplied by the courts but by ,he people themselves, thru
an amendment. ( I Cooley's Const. limilations 8th Ed 152-
153) . , . ., pp.
 CONSTRUCTIO N OP C'ONBTJ"TOTtON

Ewtrin1ic aid, in the con.truction of con,t itutlon.

...
Con.1tructio11 giv<'n by executive of/iet:rJ· 10 he given weigh/.
ConSl~u<.· tion given by executive officers to a particular law
for_ n cons1dcrnb lc period shou ld be given weight by the courtt.
This rule.' however, is limited in the se nse thttt con1emporancou1
construction should be resorted to on ly in cases of ambiguity and
doubt , nnd thot, canno t prevail ovc.r judicial interpretation.

1n conrlruing co11.11itutionr, r~fercnet: may he given lo existi,rg

conditions and history al lhe lime of it1 adoption .
The court should look into 1hc hi sto ry of the times and ex-
amine the state of things existing when the cons titution was framed
and adopted in order 10 ascertain the old law, the mi schief an<l
the remedy. Cons 1i1u1ions should be expounded in 1he light of
conditions existing at the time of their adop tio n and the general
spirit of the times and the prevailing sentiments among the people.
Reference may be made to the hi storjcal . facts relating cons ti tuti<ffls
of the community and to prior well-known practices and usages.
(11 Am. fur., p. 676).
Reference may be made to the proceedings in the convention.
In construing constitu tions, recourse may be had to the pro-
ceedings in the convention which drafted the instrument. ( 11
Am. fur., p. 707 ).
Ill construing the Philippine Constitution reference may be
made lo American and English Constitutions. ( Kepner vs. U.S.,
195, U.S.).
Self-executing provisions of the constitution.
Provisions of the constitution are .self-exec~ting w~en they
su I sufficient rule by means of which the right which they
pp y be enjoined and protected or where. the_ duty they ,m-
grant may f d . h t the aid of legJSlauve enactment.
pose may be en orce w1 t ou
(11 Am. fur. p. 691) .