Yale Law Journal

Volume 12
Article 1
Issue 7 Yale Law Journal

1903

THE EXERCISE OF THE PARDONING

POWER IN THE PHILIPPINES

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THE EXERCISE OF THE PARDONING POWER IN THE PHILIPPINES, 12 Yale L.J. (1903).
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 YALE
LAW JOURNAL
VOL. XII MAY, 1903 No. 7

THE EXERCISE OF THE PARDONING POWER IN

THE PHILIPPINES.

The general amnesty proclaimed by President Roosevelt at the

close of the insurrection in the Philippines was confined to offenders
who had not been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Persons undergoing punishment pursuant to the sentence of a
judicial tribunal were invited by the amnesty proclamation to make
application for individual pardon. A large number of such ap-
plications were filed with the civil and militar r authorities. The
military authorities declined to consider these applications, taking
the position that the establishment of civil government, pursuant
to Congressional legislation, deprived the military administration
of jurisdiction in such matters. The civil authorities were not
certain of their authority to deal with these applications, for the
Act of Congress providing for civil government in the Philippine
Islands did not specify by whom or in what way the power to
pardon should be exercised.
The questions involved were referred to the War Department,
and Secretary Root determined the several questions involved as
follows. (Unpublished letter from Secretary Root to Gov. Taft,
filed, Insular Bureau, War Department.)
i. The Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands is authorized
to exercise the power to grant pardons, reprieves and commutations
 YALE LAW JOURNAL.

of sentence in cases involving offenses against the laws of the

Civil Government of the Philippine Islands.
2. The Civil Governor is authorized to exercise a like authority
as to convictions and sentences imposed by military commissions
and provost courts in the Philippine Islands in all cases wherein
the record does not disclose affirmatively, that the offense on which
the conviction was secured was an offense against the laws of war.
3. The Civil Governor in the exercise of said authority shall
act-By Authority of the President of the United States.
4. The authority of the Civil Governor to exercise said power
does not extend to offenses tried by courts-martial; nor to offenses
against any of the general statutes of the United States which
may be in force in the Philippine Archipelago.
5. All pardons granted by the Civil Governor shall be reported
to the Secretary of War for presentation to the President.
These conclusions of Secretary Root are so manifestly in har-
mony with common sense and judgment, that they do not need
to be sustained by argument when considered from the standpoint
of a layman. Their justification in law arises from a sequence
of events and continued operation of governmental powers, the
recital of which is not without interest to the student of law.
The termination of the Philippine insurrection being accom-
plished and proclaimed the government of the islands is no longer
to be administered by exercise of the rights of a belligerent. The
authority derived from the laws of war and the fact of military
occupancy of hostile territory terminated when the conditions of
peace were officially proclaimed as existing in the archipelago.
In the absence of Congressional legislation, the government in-
stituted by exercise of the war powers of the nation would continue
as a de facto government, but would not continue to exercise the
unlimited authority eminating from military necessity or belligerent
right. In Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, the court held
(Syllabus) :
"Duties upon imports from the United States to Porto
Rico, collected by the military commander and by the
President as Commander-in-Chief. from the time posses-
sion was taken of the island until the ratification of the
treaty of peace, were legally exacted under the war power.
As the right to exact duties upon importations from Porto
Rico to New York ceased with the ratification of the treaty
of peace, the correlative right to exact duties upon imports
from New York to Porto Rico also ceased at the same
time."
 PARDONING POWER IN THE PHILIPPINES. 407

Respecting the affairs of civil government of territory subject

to the sovereignty of the United States, the President, in time of
peace, does not exercise the authority of his powers as Commander-
in-Chief of the Army and Navy. He exercises the authority of
his powers as Chief Magistrate, conferred by our governmental
policy or by Congressional action. Among other powers possessed
by the President as Chief Magistrate is that of granting pardons
and reprieves for offenses against the national authority.
In United States v. Wilson, 7 Peters i6o, Chief Justice Marshall
said:
"A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the
power entrusted zcith the execution of the laws, which
exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed."
At present "the power entrusted with the execution of the laws"
in the Philippine Islands is the Civil Government provided by the
Act of Congress approved July i, 19o2.
The power to pardon is not created by constitutional provision
or legislative enactment. It is one of the constituent powers of
sovereignty. The agency by which it is to be exercised may be
created or designated by the constitution or statute, but the power
exists prior to adoption of means for its exercise. The existence
and exercise of this power are so universally recognized and re-
ceived as to have become part and parcel of our system of govern-
ment. The cases in which this power is exercised may be divided
into two general classes. The first class includes instances wherein
the exercise is had without regard to the merits or demerits of the
individuals affected, but is predicated upon the purposes and desires
of the sovereign: such, for instance, as the celebration of a festival;
or the promotion by grants of amnesty, of political and state en-
deavors. The second class includes those ir/stances wherein the
exercise of the pardoning power results in whole or in part from
the merits of rights of the individual affected; such, for instance, as
cases wherein the innocence of a convicted person is established;
or the injustice of a sentence, imposed by a court, is made to appear.
The grant of a pardon in a case included in the first of these
two classes is clearly an act of grace. Under the sovereignty of
the United States and as to offenses against the national authority,
the power by which the grace is conferred is to be exercised by
the President. The Constitution gives to the President, in general
terms, "the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences
against the United States."
 YALE LAW JOURNAL.

The Philippine Islands are now governed by the national au-

thority of the United States operating directly, that is, without an
intermediary governmental authority, within the territory and upon
the inhabitants. The existing Government of the Philippine Islands
is an instrument wherewith the United States exercises certain
of its powers in that locality. The laws in force in the islands
whether of Spanish origin or not, are now laws of the United
States for that territory; and the enacting clause of the laws enacted
by the present government of the islands is required to be-"By
authority of the United States be it enacted by the Philippine
Commission."
It follows that a violation of any of these laws, since the date
the military occupancy was established, is an offense against the
United States. The authority to exercise the pardoning power
respecting such offenses is conferred upon the President by the
Constitution.
If all pardons are to be considered acts of grace granted by
exercise of prerogative right and without reference to the merits
or demerits of the beneficiaries, the question arises-Must the
President exercise the power personally or may the will of the
President be determined and declared by a subordinate official of
the Executive branch of the Government of the United States?
In Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 217, the court say:
"The power, conferred on the President of the United
States by section i of the Act of Congress of 1856, to
determine that a guano island shall be considered as
appertaining to the United States, being a strictly execu-
tive power, affecting foreign relations, and the manner in
which his determination shall be made known not having
been prescribed by statute, there can be no doubt that it
may be declared through the Department of State, whose
acts in this regard are in legal contemplation the acts of
the President."
In Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S. 543, the court considered
the authority of the Secretary of War to declare the will of the
President respecting the proceedings, findings and sentence of a
court-martial. Therein the court say (p. 557):
"There can be no doubt that the President. in the
exercise of his executive power under the Constitution,
may act through the head of the appropriate executive
department. The heads of departments are his authorized
assistants in the performance of his executive duties, and
their official acts, promulgated in the regular course of
PARDONING POWER IN THE PHILIPPINES. 409

business, are presumptively his acts. That has been many

times decided by this court. Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet.
498, 513; United States v. Eliason, i6 Pet. 291, 302; Con-
fiscation Cases, 20 Wall. 92, io9; United States v. Farden,
99 U. S. io, i9; Wolsey v. Chapman, 101 U. S. 755, 769.
"Here, however, the action required of the President
is judicial in its character, not administrative. As Com-
mander-in-chief of the Army he has been made by law
the person whose duty it is to review the proceedings of
courts-martial in cases of this kind. This implies that he
is himself to consider the proceedings laid before him and
decide personally whether they ought to be carried into
effect. Such a power he cannot delegate. His personal
judgment is required, as much so as it would have been
in passing on the case, if he had been one of the members
of the court-martial itself. He may call others to his
assistance in making his examinations and in informing
himself as to what ought to be done, but his judgment,
when pronounced, must be his own judgment and not that
of another. And this because lie is the person, and the
only person, to whom has been committed the important
judicial power of finally determining upon an examination
of the whole proceedings of a court-martial, whether an
officer holding a commission in the army of the United
States shall be dismissed from service as a punishment
for an offence with which he has been charged, and for
which he has been tried. In this connection the following
remarks of Attorney-General Bates. in an opinion fur-
nished President Lincoln, tinder date of March 12, 1864,
ii Opinions Attorneys-General, 21, are appropriate:
"'Undoubtedly the President, in passing upon the sen-
tence of a court-martial, and giving to it the approval
without which it cannot be executed, acts judicially. The
whole proceeding from its inception is judicial. The trial,
finding, and sentence are the solemn acts of a court organ-
ized and conducted under the authority of and according
to the prescribed forms of law. It sits to pass upon the
most sacred questions of human rights that are ever
placed on trial in a court of justice; rights which, in the
very nature of things, can neither be exposed to danger
nor subjected to the uncontrolled will of any man, but
which must be adjudged according to lazc. And the act
of the officer who reviews the proceedings of the court,
whether he be.the commander of the fleet or the President,
and without whose approval the sentence cannot be exe-
cuted, is as much a part of this judgment, according to
law. as is the trial or the sentence. When the President,
then. performs this duty of approving the sentence of a
court-martial dismissing an officer, his act has all the
 YALE LAW JOURNAL.

solemnity and significance of the judgment of a court

of law."
The rule laid down by Bouvier's Law Dictionary is as follows
(see Executive Power, Vol. 2, p. 720):
"Executive acts, as to the manner of doing which there
is no provision of law, may be done through the head of
the proper department whose acts are the acts of the Presi-
dent in contemplation of law. . . . With respect to
certain executive functions which spring from the legis-
lation of a law, the authority of the legislature is ended,
and the uncontrolled discretion of the executive attaches
and is exercised independently of the other departments
of the government. In the exercise of such powers the
discretion of the subordinate officer, within his sphere, is the
discretion of the President. Of this character are the
control of the military resources of the government; the
pardoning power and the power of appointment, all of
which are dormant until legislation has been enacted for
creating an army and navy or defining crimes and punish-
ment and the creation of offices."
Under the foregoing rule, since Congress has not prescribed a
procedure to be followed in determining as to grants of pardon, it
would be competent for the Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands
to determine and declare the will of the President in the exercise
of "the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against
the United States" committed in the Philippine archipelago; pro-
vided, the President assents to such action by the Civil Governor.
The assent of the President was evidenced by the following
official communication passing from the Secretary of War to the
Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands while the island continued
subject to the laws of military occupancy:
Taft, "July 5, 1901.

Manila:
" * * * Power to pardon offenders convicted by civil courts
is vested in Civil Governor. ELIHu ROOT,
"Secretary of War."
Under Spanish sovereignty in the Philippine Islands the pardon-
ing power resided in the Spanish Crown. If we consider the right
to exercise that power as being a crown prerogative, it follows that
said prerogative did not pass to the United States nor to its officers
by virtue of the military occupancy.
In his opinion as to the construction of sewers and pavements
in Havana, communicated to the Secretary of War, July io, 1899,
Attorney-General Griggs said (22 Op. 527) :
 PARDONING POWER IN THE PHILIPPINES. 4 rr

"By well settled law, upon cession of territory by one

nation to another, either following a conquest or otherwise
those laws which are political in their nature
and pertain to the prerogatives of the former government
immediately cease upon transfer of sovereignty. Political
and sovereign rights are not transferred to the succeeding
nation. Such laws for the government of municipalities
in said territory as are not dependent on the will of the
former sovereign remain in force. Such laws as require
for their complete execution the exercise of the will, grace
or discretion of the former sovereign would probably be
held to be ineffective under the succeeding power . ..
The authority of the power of the Crown and of the Crown
officers in such instances did not pass to the officers of the
United States, because royal prerogatives and political
powers of one government do not pass in unchanged form
to the new sovereign, but terminate upon the execution of
the treaty of cession or are supplanted by such laws and
rules as the treaty or the legislature of the new sovereign
may provide."
In Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 225, the court say:
"It cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could,
by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United States any of
his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted
that they have capacity to receive or power to execute
them."
In the cases included in the second class, being instances wherein
the pardoning power is exercised with reference to the rights and
merits of the beneficiary, the grant of a pardon is not an act of
grace, it is an act of justice. It is not predicated on the wish or
whim of the sovereign, but is based on the right of the individual
to even and exact justice; a right which no sovereign is at liberty
to deny. There is no court of equity in criminal jurisprudence;
yet the criminal law and procedure, by reason -of its general character
and want of flexibility, often work individual injustice. The exer-
cise of the pardoning power is the only means available for meeting
this constantly recurring evil, and its exercise for that purpose is
so universally recognized and established as to give it a quasi-.
judicial character. Viewed in this light, the exercise of the power
becomes a part of the procedure by which justice is attained in the
administration of the criminal laws, and may be provided for by
the authority which prescribes the laws and the means and methods
for their enforcement. In harmony with this doctrine, is the action
of Congress in adopting the 1 12th Article of War, which is as
follows (U. S. Rev. Stats. p. 240) :
 YALE LAW JOURNAL.

"Every officer who is authorized to order a general

court-martial shall have power to pardon or mitigate any
punishment adjudged by it, except the punishment of death
or of dismissal of an officer. Every officer commanding
a regiment or garrison in which a regimental or garrison
court-martial may be held, shall have power to pardon or
mitigate any punishment which such court may adjudge."
In exercising the authority conferred by the foregoing Article,
the act of the military commander is not declaratory of the will of
the President or the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.
It is the act of the officer who performs it and derives its authority
from the Congressional enactment. This enactment has never been
challenged as violating the constitutional provision giving to the
President "the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences
against the United States."
The doctrine that the pardoning power. when exercised with
reference to cases which turn on the rights or merits of the in-
dividual, may be considered as an instrumentality of criminal pro-
cedure, is evidenced by the laws and established usage of the States
of the Union. In a majority of our States the authority to exercise
the pardoning power is conferred upon the Governor by the State
Constitution; yet a number of these States have what is known as
.,good time" statutes, under which a convict may diminish the term
of his imprisonment, as fixed in his sentence, by good behavior in
prison. In a number of the States the Constitution permits the
authority to pardon to be exercised by a Board of Pardons; and in
some States the power is made operative by statutes providing for
indeterminate sentences, whereby the duration of the imprisonment
depends upon the conduct and character of the prisoner.
If the doctrine be accepted, that the pardoning power as to of-
fences in the Philippine Islands which are not military but are
violations of the penal laws regulating the relations which the in-
habitants sustain to each other and the communities in which they
live, is an instrumentality for the efficient administration of those
laws and of the civil government, then the authority to exercise
said power resides in the Civil Governor of the Islands as the chief
executive of the government entrusted with the execution of the
laws in that territory.
The government of the Philippine Islands is autonomous but
not sovereign. It is similar in character to that of a Territory. In
Talbott v. Silver Bow County, 139 U. S. 446, the court speaking by
Mr. Justice Brewer, with reference to a Territory, say:
 PARDONING POWER IN THE PHILIPPINES. 1'3

"It is not a distinct sovereignty. It has no independent

powers. It is a political community organized by Congress,
all whose powers are created by Congress, and all whose
acts are subject to Congressional supervision. Its attitude
to the General Government is no more independent than
that of a city to the State in which it is situated, and which
has given to it its municipal organization."
The exercise of the pardoning power in the organized Territories
of the United States was provided for in each of the several organic
acts. The rule thus established was incorporated into the Revised
Statutes of the United States as section 1841, as follows:
"Sec. 1841. The executive power of each Territory
shall be vested in a governor, who shall hold his office for
four years, and until his successor is appointed and quali-
fied, unless sooner removed by the President. .
He may grant pardons and reprieves, and remit fines
and forfeitures, for offenses against the laws of the Terri-
tory for which he is appointed, and respites for offenses
against the laws of the United States, till the decision of
the President can be made known thereon.
The Act approved April 12, 19oo, providing a civil government
for Porto Rico (13 Stats. 8I), contains the following:
"Sec. 17. That the official title of the chief executive
officer shall be 'The Governor of Porto Rico.' . .
He may grant pardons and reprieves, and remit fines and
forfeitures for offenses against the laws of Porto Rico,
and respites for offenses against the laws of the United
States, until the decision of the President can be ascer-
tained."
Conceding the proposition that the Government of the Philip-
pine Islands has no powers excepting those conferred upon it, it
becomes necessary to consider that the powers already conferred
are far reaching and extraordinary. That gpvernment was created,
installed and maintained for a period, by the United States in the
exercise of belligerent right in territory subject to military oc-
cupancy. Such a government possesses and may exercise all the
powers and functions of government essential to the maintenance
of peace and order and the accomplishment of the purposes for
which it is instituted.
In New Orleans v. Steamship Company, 20 Wall. 394, the court
say:
"In such cases the conquering power has the right to
displace ihe preexisting authority and to assume to such
extent as it may deem proper the exercise bv itself of all
the powers and functions of government. It may appoint
 YALE LAW JOURNAL.
all the necessary officers and clothe them with designated
powers, larger or smaller, according to its pleasure. It
may do anything necessary to strengthen itself and weaken
the enemy. There is no limit to the powers that may be
exercised in such cases, save those which are found in the
laws and usages of war."
Under the laws and usages of war, in territory subject to military
occupancy, the penal laws of the country continue in force, but the
administration of said laws devolves upon the occupying military
force and the authority by which such administration is effected
passes to the commander of the occupying forces.
The Spanish penal code and criminal procedure were continued
in force in the Philippine Islands under the American military
government, and remained in force until displaced by the recent
enactments of the Philippine Commission. The authority to ad-
minister and execute said laws, theretofore exercised by the Spanish
officials, passed to the Commander of the occupying forces to be
thereafter exercised by him or such persons as he should desig-nate.
The Spanish system of laws contemplates that mitigation of
sentences will be required in order to correct injustice resulting
from the inequitable operation of the criminal laws and provi:,;on
is made under which the courts participate in the exercise of the
power of commutation. The reviewing court in cases on appeal
"for violation of law or breach of form" in the trial proceedings, is
required to comply with the provisions of Article 953 of the Law
of Criminal Procedure:
"Art. 953. When it shall be declared that the appeal
does not lie upon any grounds, the chamber shall order
the record to be transmitted to the fiscal, and in view of
the opinion of the latter and the merits of the case, if it
should find any ground of equity to advise that the final
sentence be not executed, it shall recommend to His Majesty
through the Colonial Minister, the commutation of the
penalty."
The Spanish Law of Criminal Procedure provides for what is
called "The Appeal for Review." This is a proceeding to secure
the annulment of unjust sentences in certain cases, and con-
templates the exercise by the court of the authority by which
pardons are granted by reason of the rights of the individual
under sentence. From the Spanish Law of Criminal Procedure,
I quote as follows:
"Art. 954. An appeal for review shall lie from final
sentences in the following cases:
 PARDONING POWER IN THE PHILIPPINES. 4r5
"i. When two or more persons are serving a sentence
by virtue of contradictory sentences for the same crime
which could not have been committed by more than one
person.
"2. When a person is serving a sentence as the principal,
accomplice, or accessory to the homicide of a person whose
existence is established after the sentence.
"3. When a person is serving a sentence by virtue of
a judgment the grounds for which may have been a docu-
ment afterwards declared false by a final sentence in a
criminal cause."
"Art. 955. An appeal for review may be taken by
the persons punished and by their spouses, descendants,
ascendants, and brothers and sisters by applying to the
Colonial Minister with a petition setting forth the grounds
therefor."
"Art. 959. The appeal for review shall be conducted
by hearing the fiscal once only in writing and the persons
punished another time, who must be cited, should they not
first appear. When they request the attachment of docu-
ments to the record, the chamber shall order what it may
deem proper hereon. Thereupon the appeal shall follow
the procedure prescribed for an appeal for annulment of
judgment for violation of law, and the chamber shall,
with or without oral argument, as it may order in view of
the circumstances of the case, render sentence, which shall
be irrevocable."
"Art. 961. Even though the person punished shall have
died, his widow, ascendants or descendants, legitimate,
legitimized, or natural acknowledged, may request a review
of the action for any of the causes mentioned in article 954
for the purpose of rehabilitating the memory of the de-
cedent and for the punishment of the real culprit in a
proper case."
The authority to administer the foregoing provisions of the
Spanish Code passed to the Military Governor by virtue of the laws
of military occupancy. The Military Governor might exercise the
authority himself or confer the right to exercise it in his name
upon whom he saw fit. All the powers of the judicial branch
passed to the commander of the occupying force, who redistributed
the authority to exercise them and might authorize their exercise
by the courts or by other agencies, as his discretion determined.
The same is true in respect of the authority to exercise the
pardoning power. in so far as that authority is considered an instru-
ment for the efficient and proper administration of the penal laws
regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to each other
and to the communities in which they live. This authority con-
 YALE LAW JOURNAL.

tinued to reside in the Military Governor until transferred to the

Civil Governor by the following order (see Report of the Sec. of
War 1901, PP. 58-59):
"War Department, Washington, June 21, I9OI.
"On and after the 4th day of July, 19O1, until it shall
be otherwise ordered, the president of the Philippine Com-
mission will exercise the executive authority in all civil
affairs in the government of the Philippine Islands hereto-
fore exercised in such affairs by the Mfilitary Governor of
the Philippines. and to that end the Hon. William H. Taft,
president of the said commission, is hereby appointed civil
governor of the Philippine Islands. Such executive au-
thority will be exercised under and in conformity to the
instructions to the Philippine Commissioners dated April
7, 19oo, and subject to the approval and control of the
Secretary of War of the United Slates. The municipal
and provincial civil governments whic:h have been or shall
hereafter ],-established in said islands, and all p'rsons
performing duties appertaining to the offices of civil gov--
ernment in said islands, will in rcspect of such duties r,'port
to the said civil governor.
*'The po.wer to appoint civil ,,FJ.,
_rs, he,'z ;,re .-tcd
in the Philippine Commission or :n the militar, .oV'.'rnor,
will be exercised by the civil governor wilh tie advice
and consent of the commission.
"The military governor of the I'hilippincs is herebv
relieved from the performance, on and after th, sai, 4th
day of July, of the civil duties hereinbefore described, but
his authority will continue to be exercised as heretofore
in those districts in which insurrection against the authority
of the United States continues to exist or in which public
.order is not sufficiently restored to enable provincial civil
governments to be established under the instructions to
the commission dated April 7, 1900.
"By the President.
"ELIHu ROOT, Secretary of War."
The Act of Congress, approved July I. 1902, entitled "An Act
Temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs of civil
government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes"
provides as follows:
"That the action of the President of the United States
• . . in creating the offices of civil governor and
vice-governor of the Philippine Islands, and authorizing
said civil governor and vice-governor to exercise the powers
of government to the extent and in the manner and form
set forth in the Executive order dated June twenty-first,
nineteen hundred and one . . . is hereby approved.
ratified and confirmed. .
 PARDONING POWER IN THE PHILIPPINES. 47

If the Military Governor of the Philippine Islands had authority

to pardon offences against the laws administered by the civil side
of the military government, then Congress authorizes the exercise
of that authority by the Civil Governor of the Islands.
A cursory reading of the 112th Article of War (ante), might
induce a belief that the military commander acting as military
governor exercises the pardoning power as to offences against the
laws of the civil side of the military government, by virtue of that
Article, in which event the authority would not pass to the civil
governor, but careful consideration induces the belief that the
authority conferred by that Article is confined to offences triable
by courts-martial, to wit: offences against the laws of war, the
Articles of War and the Rules for the discipline of the Army.
Under military government the commander of a belligerent force
may administer the affairs of that government as his judgment
approves and prudence dictates. This broad authority would not
pass to a civil governor and could not be exercised by the Civil
Governor of the Philippine Islands under the condition now existing.
Reference has been made, in another connection, to the declara-
tion of the Secretary of War that "power to pardon offenders con-
victed by civil courts is vested in Civil Governor." At the time this
declaration was made, July 5, i9OI, the government of the Philippine
Islands continued to be subject to the exercise of belligerent right.
While the national authority of the United States in the Philippine
Islands continued to be exercised by belligerent right, the legislative
powers of the nation respecting the internal and domestic affairs
of the islands were exercised by the President as Commander-in-
Chief of the Army and Navy, with equal authority and effect as
are the exercises of legislative authority by Congress in time of
peace. If this declaration of Secretary Root- is to be considered
as an executive exercise of the legislative power, verb sap. the
pardoning power is vested in the Civil Governor of the Islands. It
will be noticed that said declaration was communicated to Governor
Taft on July 5, I9 ° I . This was the day following the date when
the order of June 21, i9oi, became operative and completed the
transfer of the executive power in pacified districts from the Mili-
tary Governor to the Civil Governor. It is certainly proper to con-
sider said declaration as explanatory of the general terms of the
order of June 21, I9OI, and that said order as so explained is
"approved, ratified and confirmed" by the Act of Congress of July
I, 1902, and is now of the same binding force and effect as though
said declaration were recited in full in the Act of Congress.
 YALE LAW JOURNAL.

A large majority of the convicted individuals now seeking par-

don or commutation of sentence, were tried and convicted by
military commissions or provost courts created by the military gov-
ernment, but that does not interdict the exercise of the power to
pardon by the civil governor. Military commissions and provost
courts are created for the general purpose of enforcing the local
laws as to offenses committed outside of the territorial jurisdiction
of existing civil courts by the non-combatant inhabitants of the
country. They also possess jurisdiction over offenses against the
common law of war. They are agencies of the civil side of military
government and their jurisdiction does not extend to matters and
persons subject to the Articles of War and the rules adopted for
the discipline of the Army. Offences against those Articles and
rules are triable by courts-martial and as to sentences imposed by
courts-martial the pardoning power or the power of commutation
could not be exercised by the civil governor. The test of the right
to exercise the authority is the character of the offence and juris-
diction over the person of the offender, instead of the character
and jurisdiction of the tribunal by which the trial was had and
sentence imposed.
Charles E. Magoon.