J. GUIDANCE VOL. 6, NO.

History of Key Technologies

The History of Apollo Onboard Guidance,

Navigation, and Control
David G.Hoag
The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts

Introduction by torquing small momentum wheels using the solar pressure

force on adjustable sun vanes to drive the average' speed of
W HEN Apollo astronauts finally walked on the moon,
thousands of engineers, scientists, managers, and
technicians of many varied disciplines and specialties shared
these wheels toward zero. Overall autonomous operation was
managed onboard by a small general purpose digital com-
in the glorious accomplishment of an extraordinary national puter configured by its designer, Dr. Ramon Alonso, for very-
goal. This is the story of an essential part of that en- low-pQwer drain except at the occasional times needing fast
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deavor—that of the development and execution of the computation speed. A special feature of this computer was the
guidance, navigation, and control systems which, onboard prewired, read-only memory called a core rope, a con-
Apollo along with the astronauts, made essential figuration of particularly high storage density required only
measurements of the spacecraft motions and directed one magnetic core per word of memory.
necessary maneuvers for the mission. A four-volume report of this work 1 was published in July
1959, and presented to the Air Force sponsors. However, the
Air Force was then disengaging from civilian space
The Beginnings development, so endeavors were undertaken to interest
The forerunner of the Apollo guidance, navigation, and NASA. Dr. H. Guyford Stever, then a professor at MIT,
control system is found in an unmanned spacecraft and arranged a presentation for Dr. Hugh Dryden, NASA Deputy
mission study started in 1957 by the Instrumentation Administrator, which took place on September 15, 1959.* On
Laboratory at MIT under a contract with the Air Force November 10, 1959, NASA sent a letter of intent to contract
Ballistic Missile Division. The small Instrumentation the Instrumentation Laboratory for a $50,000 study to start
Laboratory team for this study, led. by Milton Trageser and immediately. The stated purpose was that this study would
supported by AVCO Corporation, the MIT Lincoln contribute to the efforts of NASA's Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, and Thiokol' Chemical Corporation, designed a Laboratory in conducting unmanned space missions to Mars,
small autonomous spacecraft weighing 150 kg which would Venus, and the Earth's moon scheduled in Vega and Centaur
take a close-up high-resolution photo of Mars. This Mars, missions in the next few years. A relationship between MIT
probe had several novel features, later incorporated in the and JPL did not evolve. JPL's approach to these deep space
Apollo system, including a space sextant- to make periodic missions appeared to be primarily ground base control with
navigation angle measurements between pairs of celestial their large antenna tracking and telemetry systems, con-
objects: the sun, the-near planets, and selected stars. The siderably different from the onboard self-sufficiency method
guidance technique utilized original formulations designed by which the MIT group advocated and could best support.
Dr. J. Halcombe Laning and Dr. Richard Battin to operate a The Instrumentation Laboratory report on the NASA study
small rocket at the appropriate times to put the spacecraft on appeared in four volumes2 in April 1960. It described the
• a corrected trajectory which would utilize the Martian gravity design of a 35-kg pod comprising a self-contained guidance,
during the close passage such as to send the spacecraft with its navigation, and control system intended for mounting on
Mars picture on a return path back to Earth for physical Centaur vehicles to support a variety of space missions. A
recovery. Spacecraft attitude control would be accomplished space sextant, similar to but improved over the Mars probe

David G. Hoag was graduated in 1946 from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with an SB degree in
electrical communications and received in 1950 an SM degree in instrumentation from the MIT Department of
Aeronautics. His early career at the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory involved engineering on Navy fire control
systems for guns and missiles. From 1958-1961 he was Technical Director of the Instrumentation Laboratory's
development of the guidance system for the Navy's Polaris submarine launched ballistic missile. From 1962 to
1973, he was first Technical Director, and later, Program Manager of MIT's development and operational
support of the guidance, navigation, and control systems for the Apollo Command Module and lunar landing
spacecrafts. He became Head of the Advanced Systems Department in 1973 when the Instrumentation
Laboratory became independent of MIT as The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc. In that role he now leads
activities in precision pointing and tracking for directed energy weapons and space based surveillance systems.
He is a corresponding member of the International Academy of Astronautics and serves on the advisory board
of its journal, Acta Astronautica. He is a member and Past President of the Institute of Navigation. He was
elected Fellow of AIAA in 1974 and is a past Chairman of the New England Section, AIAA. In 1979 he was
elected to the National Academy of Engineering. He has received several awards for his work on Apollo in-
cluding the NASA Public Service Award, the Thurlow Award of the ION, and (with Richard H. Battin) the
Louis W. Hill Award of AIAA.

Received Feb. 8, 1982; revision received Oct. 12, 1982. Copyright © American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 1982. All rights
reserved.
* Dryden himself did not hear their talks. The MIT Laboratory team was upstaged by the presence of Premier Kruschev that day visiting in
Washington.
EDITORS'S NOTE: This manuscript was invited as a History of Key Technologies paper as part of AIAA's 50th Anniversary celebration. It is
not meant to be a comprehensive study of the field. It represents solely the author's own recollection of events at the time and is based upon his own
exneriences. ' *
 JAN.-FEB. 1983 APOLLO ONBOARD GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL

study, would make autonomous navigation measurements. use to incorporate each navigation measurement of any type
Two single-axis gyroscopes and an accelerpmeter were in- as it was made, such as the star occultation or a sextant
cluded in the design for angle and velocity change measurement, so as to update and improve in an optimum
measurement. A wide-ranging examination of deep space least-squares sense the estimate of spacecraft position and
trajectory studies reported by Laning and Battin showed velocity. Several navigation measurement schemes were
needed injection velocities, transfer times, and target planet proposed as experiments in hopes that they could be studied
approach paths. A variable time-of-arrival guidance scheme and verified by the astronauts soon to fly in Mercury.
was formulated by Battin to minimize the usage of maneuver Organization of the various NASA centers in Apollo was
fuel. He also worked out strategies for optimum navigation underway in November 1960 in Apollo Technical Liaison
measurement schedules with the sextant. Other features Groups coordinated by Charles J. Donlan of the NASA
showed the development of ideas started in the Mars probe. Space Task Group. The Guidance and Control Technical
Particularly, the configuration of the digital computer was Liaison Group first met in January 1961 under Richard
refined by Alonso and Laning. Carley of the Space Task Group. The contract then being
negotiated with -the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory in the
Early Apollo3 guidance and control area was acknowledged as being
The frustration of the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory essential to augment the Convair, General Electric, and
team to find a place in the unmanned deep space missions Martin feasibility studies; At the second meeting in April 1961
continued through the summer of 1960. In November, Dr. this group started the preparation of the guidance,
C.S. Draper, Director of the Instrumentation Laboratory, navigation, and control 'specifications for the Apollo
had conversations about this and about possible participation spacecraft.
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in manned space missions with Dr. Harry J. Goett, Director The following month, on May 25, 1961, President Kennedy
of NASA's Goddard Laboratories and Chairman of the in a special message to the Congress urged the nation to
NASA Research Steering Committee on Manned Space "commit itself to achieving the goal, befpre this decade is out,
Flight. • of landing a man on the moon...."
The manned lunar mission had been under NASA con- With the impetus of the presidential challenge, the efforts
sideration for some time and was being examined by Goett's at the Instrumentation Laboratory changed character. The
committee. The Space Task Group at Langley Field formed in role the Laboratory would play depended not only on its
October 1958 was working on Project Mercury but was by this earlier space studies but also on the fact that another team was
time considerably involved in the proposed moon mission. in place at the Laboratory, which had just accomplished a
The name Apollo was announced in July 1960, and in August, similar task to develop the Navy's Polaris missile guidance
NASA stated its intent to fund six-month feasibility study system on an extremely tight schedule. Ralph Ragan, who led
contracts which were awarded later in the year to General that effort, immediately joined with Trageser, to work with
Dynamics/Convair, General Electric Company, and the Chilton in defining an Apollo guidance, navigation, and
Martin Company. control system to support a flight test as early as 1963. By July
After the Draper and Goett conversation, a meeting at 1961 a task statement had been written and on August 10, by
Goddard was held on November 22, 1960 to discuss a six- letter, NASA contracted the Laboratory for the first year's
month $100,000 contract with the Instrumentation development of the Apollo guidance and navigation system.
Laboratory for an Apollo study and preliminary design. The This was the first major Apollo contract awarded by NASA.
details were proposed by Trageser of MIT and Robert G. The early start was justified by the central role this function
Chilton, of the Space Task Group at Langley. A technical would necessarily have. Key personnel from the Laboratory's
proposal was submitted on December 22, and the contract Polaris' Team joined Trageser, who was named by Dr. Draper
started in February. as Director of Project Apollo. Ragan became Operations
Trageser and Chilton developed the basic configuration of Director, and David Hoag, having been Technical Director of
the proposed trial design which prevailed throughout the Polaris, became Technical Director of Apollo.
program. They determined that the system should consist of a - That same August, James Webb, NASA Administrator,
general purpose digital computer, a space sextant, an inertial invited Dr. Draper and members of the Instrumentation
guidance unit (gyro stable platform with accelerometers), a Laboratory Apollo Team to Washington for discussions: The
control and display console for the astronauts, and sup- meeting took place on the 31st at NASA Headquarters and
porting electronics. The in-flight autonomy of the earlier Air continued at Webb's home for dinner that evening. In
Force and NASA studies seemed appropriate to the manned acknowledging the difficulty of guiding the lunar mission,
mission, particularly since some urged that the mission should two things concerned Webb. First, he wanted to know when
not be vulnerable to interference from hostile countries. It the guidance system could be ready. Draper provided the
was judged important to utilize the man in carrying out his accurate forecast: "You'll have it when you need it." Second,
complex mission rather than merely to bring him along for the he wanted assurances that the equipment would really work.
ride. In addition, a certain value of self-contained capability In reply, Draper volunteered to make the first flight and run
was envisioned for future deep space programs for other the system himself. Hardly anyone doubted his •.sincerity and
reasons: First, the transmission and feedback times are too in letters to NASA officials he repeatedly reminded them of
long for fast reaction remote control due to the finite elec- his long experience of over 30 years in instrumentation design,
tromagnetic signal propagation velocity. Second, it was as a pilot, and as a flight engineer. It was Draper's contention
envisioned that the United States would eventually have many that although he himself was both a pilot and an engineer, it
missions underway at the same time, and it was important to would be easier to train an engineer to be a pilot than to train
avoid expanding the need for more large, expensive ground a pilot in the necessary engineering.
stations. The early conceptual work on the guidance and navigation
The initial Apollo contract at the Instrumentation proceeded rapidly. Trageser, Chilton, and Battin had worked
Laboratory studied certain navigation measurements easily out the overall configuration which was to hold to the end.
made by a human, such as the timing of star occultations by The many maneuvers both in orientation and in translation
the moon and Earth during the circumlunar voyage. Of would require a full three-axis inertial measurement unit with
significant importance, however, Battin devised a generalized gyros and accelerometers. An optical system would be needed
recursive navigation formulationt for small flight computer to align the inertial system periodically to the stars. The
fThis and other related space navigation and guidance formulation optical system would also be used to make necessary
techniques are described by Battin in Ref. 4. The implementation navigation measurements in a sextant configuration by ob-
technology used in Apollo was derived from a legacy described by serving from the spacecraft the direction of-the Earth and
Draper in Ref. 5. moon against the background stars. A general purpose digital
 D.G. HOAG J. GUIDANCE

computer would be required to process all the data, and an the Lunar Module was initiated in July and on November 7,
arrangement of display and controls for the astronaut to Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation was chosen to
operate the system would be needed. Considerable extension design and build the vehicle.
of navigation and guidance theory, trajectory analysis, With this, the Instrumentation Laboratory and t^ie in-
phenomenological and human limitations to visual sightings dustrial support contractor tasks were expanded to include the
of celestial objects, electronic packaging options, materials guidance and navigation for the Lunar Module. Two ad-
characteristics, reliability and quality assurance procedures, ditional guidance and navigation sensors would be required,
and management methods all were identified for early study. however, and these were assigned to Grumman. They were the
It was recognized from the start that the Instrumentation landing radar to measure the altitude and velocity of the
Laboratory would utilize industrial support contractors to Lunar Module with respect to the lunar surface, and the
augment its engineering team and to produce the designs rendezvous radar to track a transponder on the Command
coming from the engineers. This followed the successful and Service Modules and provide relative direction and range.
pattern utilized in the development of the Polaris missile Specifications for these radars were written by the In-
guidance system. strumentation Laboratory since the signals were to be used by
Meanwhile, NASA started the procurement process for the the guidance and navigation computer in the Lunar Module.
spacecraft principal contractor. The request for proposal was It had been determined somewhat earlier that the first flight
issued on July 28, 1961. North American Aviation was test, being scheduled for Earth orbit exercises starting in the
selected on November 29 for the Apollo Command Module, fall of 1963, and soon to be rescheduled to 1965, were too
Service Module, and boost vehicle adapter. Their contract soon to be conducted with a full guidance and navigation
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excluded the guidance and navigation, which was to be system design capable of a lunar landing mission. For this
government furnished by the industrial support contractors of reason, a Block I design was identified for the guidance and
the Instrumentation Laboratory. navigation equipment to support the first Earth orbital
In early 1962, briefings to industry were made for the in- flights. A Block II design was to follow for the later lunar
dustrial support to the Instrumentation Laboratory for the flights. With the engineering help of the industrial support
guidance and navigation systems. Twenty-one .bidders contractors, the Instrumentation Laboratory started release
responded and three awards were made on May 8. The A.C. of production drawings for manufacture in July 1962, using a
Spark Plug Division, of General Motors, was given formal design review, release, and revision procedure which
responsibility for the production of the inertial system, was followed throughout the program. (The last design
ground support equipment, and systems integration, release drawing, numbered 38,868 was made in 1975, and
assembly, and test. Kollsman Instrument Corporation was the defined the erasable memory load for the guidance and
industrial support for the optical subsystems, and Raytheon navigation computer in the last Command Module used to
Company for the computer. Earlier, the A.C. Spark Plug rendezvous with the Soviet Cosmonauts in the Apollo-Soyuz
Division had been selected for the gyro production and Sperry mission.)
for the accelerometer production, both to produce the MIT
designs for these inertial system components. System Design and Development
During this early 1962 period, the mission and its hardware Although initial design pushed the then current state-of-the-
were being further defined by NASA, North American art, the early decisions on configuration and the technology
Aviation, and the Instrumentation Laboratory. The Space used were essentially frozen except to fix problems. Many
Task Gro'up had evolved into the Manned Spacecraft Center engineering improvements were proposed on an otherwise
the previous October, and the selection of the Houston, working design. Design and configuration controls necessarily
Texas, site for the new'center had been made. The Apollo rejected most of these changes so that a stable set of hardware
Spacecraft Program Office was formed and managed by and software eletnents could be well checked out, delivered on
Charles Frick and Robert Piland. But a controversy was schedule, and safely support the mission. Thus by the time of
underway which had strong implications on the whole design the lunar flights, the system was not (and of course could not
process. • . ', be) demonstrating the latest technology available in the
A mission plan favored by many included two or more guidance and control art.
Saturn booster launches from Earth, with an orbital ren- The remaining part of this narrative is partitioned into
dezvous to assemble a large spacecraft in Earth orbit for the sections covering the inertial sensing, optical sensing, com-
lunar trip. This spacecraft would then be injected towards the puter, displays and controls, other hardware, software, and
moon and would in its entirety land the three astronauts in the flight experience. More technical details than are given here
Command Module on the lunar surface using.the propulsion can be found in Refs. 7-10.
of a large lunar landing stage. The guidance and navigation of
this maneuver being studied at MIT utilized a large periscope- Inertial Sensing System
range-finder so that an astronaut could view the lunar surface The inertial measurement unit borrowed its technology
during maneuvers as he landed in the awkward position 25 m heavily from the Polaris missile guidance experience at the
up on top of the stacked spacecraft. The lunar landing stage Laboratory. John Miller assembled a Laboratory team and
would be abandoned on the moon and the Command Module was supported by Hugh Brady and others from A.C. Spark
would be lifted on the ascent and return by the Service Module Plug in the inertial system design. The mechanical design was
propulsion. undertaken by John Nugent, who had done that work for
The alternate mission configuration, called Lunar Orbit Polaris. In order to simplify the mechanism considerably and
Rendezvous, had been discussed for some time, particularly to achieve more accuracy in the alignment to the stars, the
by John Houbolt and his colleagues at Langley.6 In this case, inertial measurement unit was provided with only three
a single Saturn launch would inject a smaller spacecraft degrees of freedom in its gimbals, although four gimbals
assembly towards the moon which included a relatively small would have imposed no limitations on spacecraft attitude.
Lunar Module for the actual landing, along with the Com- With' the natural choices for aligning the system for flight,
mand and Service Modules, which would remain in lunar only some unusual orientations of the spacecraft would put
orbit. The return, of course, required a rendezvous in lunar the gimbals into lock where the alignment would be lost. The
orbit which was considered by the critics of this scheme as resulting constraint in the design irritated the astronauts,
particularly difficult and dangerous. although, in retrospect, they had no particular trouble with
Finally in June 1962, the decision was made by NASA in the attitude limitations during missions.
favor of the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mission with its real It was the alignment to the stars of the inertial measurement
advantages in weight and cost. The procurement process for unit which made this design significantly different from that
 JAN.-FEB. 1983 APOLLO ONBOARD GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL

of the Polaris system which was erected with gravity and point the sextant star line approximately to the selected star.
gyrocompass action. The gyro drift was small enough so that the star would always
The Apollo computer compared precision angle readouts of appear brightly in the sextant field of view. The astronaut
the inertial gimbal angles with the precision celestial sighting would then center the image, thereby giving the necessary data
angles of the optics and provided alignment corrections to the to the computer to realign the inertial unit. In this way ac-
gyros. The design of the inertial and optical angle interfaces to curate inertial alignment was maintained throughout the
the computer was undertaken by Jerold Gilmore. The sub- mission. Similarly, the computer could orient the spacecraft
system, called the coupling data unit, included analog and and point the optics towards any targets suitably specified by
digital converters in an elaborate arrangement of system the astronaut.
operational modes among the inertial, optical, and computer The scanning telescope, in spite of the scattered light
hardware. problem with stellar targets, provided an excellent tracking
As the inertial system design'developed, it came under instrument for navigation sightings to the Earth or moon
attack as not having sufficient inherent or proven reliability to while in low orbit around these bodies. For this required
support Apollo in spite of considerable attention to this function, line-of-sight rates were too fast to use the sextant.
important issue. If a single gyro wheel stopped running or if a (Indeed, the precision of that instrument was not needed.) The
single gyro developed excessive drift instability, the mission navigation angle was measured by the computer between the
could fail and the astronauts would be endangered. Many prealigned inertial measurement unit and the line-of-sight to
design, test, and operational techniques evolved to achieve the the surface target being tracked by the astronaut with the
final reliability record: over 2500 h of in-flight operations of scanning telescope.
the inertial measurement unit supporting all Apollo missions The orientation relationships between the inertial unit and
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(over 7500 gyro unit flight hours in addition to ground test the optical lines-of-sight demanded strict attention to the
time) without any failures. stability of alignment between these instruments. Bo wditch
designed a lightweight but stiff and stable structure called a
Optical System navigation base as a common mounting support for both
Philip Bowditch, Alex Koso, and others at MIT, along with instruments. It was secured to the spacecraft with kinematic
Thornton Stearns and others from Kollsman, undertook the mounts so as to isolate it from spacecraft strains which could
design of the optical system. The team examined a number of otherwise induce unwanted twisting. A complicating factor
configurations before a satisfactory sextant design was was that the optics penetrated the spacecraft pressure hull, the
achieved, r This instrument was configured with one of its objectives being in the hard space vacuum, while the eyepieces
lines-of-sight fixed along the axis of penetration of the were in the /3-atm cabin pressure. The total force of this
spacecraft hull. This line was associated with the Earth or pressure was about 3500 N and careful consideration of the
moon side of the navigation angle. The other line-of-sight location of the force center with respect to the mounts was
associated with the reference star was split from the first and required. Relative motion was accommodated by a doiible-
tipped away by an articulating mirror in such a fashion that walled metal bellows which at the same time provided the seal
the navigation angle could be measured in any plane. The of cabin pressure.
angle of tilt of the mirror, in conventional sextant fashion, Associated with the optics design was the question of the
was the .desired measurement and was encoded for use by the suitability of the Earth and moon as navigation targets.
computer navigation and alignment algorithms. The Considerable theoretical and experimental work was un-
astronauts' task was to orient the spacecraft so that the Earth dertaken early by Dr. Max Peterson, William Toth, and Dr.
or moon was satisfactorily in the field of view, and then Frederic Martin. The moon,, without an atmosphere, had
adjust the mirror and the measurement plane to get the star crisp visual features and horizon when illuminated by the sun.
image superimposed in his view on the selected Earth or moon The Earth/on the other hand, might have most, if not all, of
feature. In order to acheive the necessary 10-arc-s ac- its suitable landmarks obscured by clouds at the critical time.
curacy of this measurement the instrument was provided with In addition, the sunlit Earth horizon, owing to intense
a 28-power eyepiece. However the field of view was thereby so scattered sunlight in the atmosphere, is invisible from space
severely limited that a second independent, articulating in- and no distinct visual locator can be identified. Photometric
strument at unity power and wide field called the scanning equipment to measure the systematic change in brightness
telescope was provided to serve as a finder for the sextant and with altitude above the true limb in the blue part of the
to which the sextant articulating line-of-sight could be slaved. spectrum was designed into the sextant along with an
Much attention went into the design of this wide field automatic star tracker to solve this problem. Later, for
scanning telescope so that the astronaut would have a good reasons of cost and complexity, these were removed. The
chance of recognizing constellations and identifying stars. visual sightings of the Earth horizon were re-examined for
The enormous problem of scattered light in the instrument navigation use. A simulator with photometric fidelity of the
washing out the visibility of dimmer stars was never com- situation was devised. It appeared that the human was capable
pletely solved. A really satisfactory engineering compromise of choosing some locator in the fuzzy horizon which he could
among such things as the degree of articulation, the field of duplicate with considerable accuracy. Before each mission the
view, light traps, and sun shields was not found. Only with the navigator astronaut would come to the Instrumentation
optics objectives in the shade and without the sun illuminated Laboratory to train on this simulator. With practice he could
Earth, moon, or other spacecraft in the field of view could a duplicate his sighting point within a few kilometers over the
good view of the stars be obtained. This problem lessened in desired range of distances to the Earth. (Later, early in his
importance as actual mission techniques developed. An early actual mission, he made several sightings to calibrate his
concept required that the inertial system be turned off most of horizon locator in the real situation.)
the mission time in order to conserve spacecraft power. It was
to be turned on, aligned, and used only during the guidance
and control of rocket maneuvers. For a number of reasons the Digital Computer
operations policy changed so as to leave the inertial system The computer design was undertaken by Eldon Hall, who
active throughout the mission. The procedure then became has designed the Polaris missile computer. Laboratory
one in which periodically, perhaps twice a day, the inertial members assisting him included Dr. Ramon Alonso, Dr.
measurement unit drift in orientation was corrected to the Albert Hopkins, and Hugh Blair : Smith. In addition, they
stars using the sextant whose small field of view prevented were supported by Jack Poundstone and other engineers from
problems from scattered sunlight. To do this, the computer Raytheon, who had worked with Hall earlier on the Polaris
would use the inertial measurement unit gimbal angles to missile computer.
 D.G. HOAG J. GUIDANCE

A compelling necessity was to design a reliable computer The computer display and keyboard permitted the crew to
with sufficient capacity and speed, yet with a very limited size, operate most guidance, navigation, and control functions. In
weight, and power drain. addition the left-hand translation command controller and
The machine configuration chosen wawa 16-bit, parallel, the right-hand rotational command controller were used
general purpose, real-time digital control computer. Initially appropriately for these maneuvers when commanded
configured with magnetic core-transistor logic, the change manually for computer action. Those operations associated
was soon made to an integrated circuit logic using technology with the use of the optics in manually tracking Earth, moon,
just then in the early stages of being developed by the and stellar targets and in making the navigation angle
semiconductor industry. The deliberate choice was made to measurements were accomplished with appropriate con-
use only one type of integrated circuit logic, a three-input trollers near the eyepieces.
NOR gate. Although wider variety could have substantially
reduced the number of devices per computer, the dedication in Other Hardware Design
manufacture and quality control to the single-circuit type gave Many of the hardware design decisions were easily made in
important gains in reliability. tradeoff among members of the design team. The experience
The fixed memory was the high-density read-only core rope of the industrial support contractors and their concern for
developed in connection with the Mars probe. This meant that manufacturing producibility strongly influenced these
the contents of this indestructable memory had to be deter- decisions. Accommodations had to be made to recognize test,
mined early in order to allow time for manufacture. Rather checkout, and mission operations of the'astronauts and the
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than a disadvantage, risky last minute changes of the program Ground Mission Control. The largest problem, however, was
just before flight were physically prevented. A rope memory reaching agreement on those design features which were
program was necessarily well tested before it flew on an affected by and influenced the hardware design of the
Apollo mission. spacecrafts. This was embodied in the negotiations of the so-
A coincident-current magnetic erasable memory provided called interface control documents which were to be agreed
for temporary storage. The size was kept to a minimum both upon and signed off. Then each party could proceed with the
in the number of words and in the 16 bits per word, for low- confidence that he was protected against changes on the other
power consumption. The initial decision in the Block I design side of the interface from affecting his design.
was 1024 words of erasable, but this was doubled for Block II Numerous "coordination meetings* were held starting in
based upon the experience in programming the earlier 1962 between the Instrumentation Laboratory and North
machine. Without changing the computer volume, the fixed American with NASA participation in order to negotiate these
memory likewise grew from an initial 12,288 words to 24,576 decisions affecting both parties in the design of the Command
words in Block I to 36,864 in Block II. To the programmers, and Service Modules. In early 1963, coordination meetings
even these large numbers were to seem inadequate as the with Grumman concerning the interacting decisions on the
functions to be performed in the computer on the lunar Lunar Module started.
missions expanded substantially over original forecasts. One complicating factor, which in the end returned
Both memories, operating on a 12-jits cycle time, were enormous savings/was the self-imposed groundrule of the
configured to look identical to the program. A very limited designers that as much as possible identical guidancej hard-
basic instruction repertoire was expandable by powerful ware elements would be used in both the Command and
interpretive routines written by Charles Muntz which saved Lunar Modules. The difficulty with this was that a successful
program word use. at the cost of speed. Over 200 input and agreement with North American for the Command Module
output circuits for numerous interfaces with other hardware interface could be upset by a second negotiation with
were provided to perform the real-time control function. Grumman for the same piece of guidance hardware in the
Certain discreet input and timing signals could be arranged to Lunar Module. The effort paid off in manufacture, test, and
interrupt the program underway so that urgent tasks could be astronaut training. The expensive guidance items, the inertial
serviced in real time without the need of continuously measurement unit, and the computer, as they came off the
scanning inputs. production line, could then go to either spacecraft. Most of
the small hardware components of the guidance were similarly
Displays and Controls11 interchangeable when the same function was accomplished in
A most important input/output function was provided by a each spacecraft. The guidance turned out to be the only
display and keyboard and associated software control significant hardware that had this interchangeability. Most
ingeniously designed by Alan Green. The keyboard allowed other spacecraft elements of the Command and Service
the input of the 10 digits and seven other coded functions on Modules were not usable on the Lunar Module and vice versa.
separate keys. The display included three 5-digit numbers plus The first important interface to be negotiated was the
sign to indicate numerical data, and three 2-digit numbers to location of the guidance equipment in the spacecraft. North
identify the function being performed by numeric codes for American and the Instrumentation Laboratory first examined
"verbs," "nouns," and "program." The verb-noun format wall space to the left of the left-hand couch where the
permitted a sort of language of action and object such as astronaut could use the eyepieces to make sightings. The final
"display-gimbal angles" or "load-star number." The location was on the lower wall at the foot of the center couch.
program number identified the major background com- This required that the astronaut using the equipment would
putation underway in the machine. have to leave the couch and stand in the lower equipment bay.
With this display and keyboard the astronaut had enor- For those stressful times when the crew were constrained to
mous flexibility and power in communicating with and their couches, all the guidance equipment except the optics
directing the computer's operation. Many hours of study and could be operated through the computer from the main panel
training time on real equipment were required by the within reach using a main panel computer display and
astronauts. An early reticence by crew members was in time keyboard. A particular worry about the lower wall location
replaced by enthusiasm and confidence in their ability to use for the guidance and navigation was that the optics there
the computer to manage many aspects of their mission. Dr. penetrated the hull on the hot side of the Command Module
Draper's early statement about training engineers vs training during return through th& atmosphere. Initially a door
pilots might have been true, but the astronauts with their pilot covering these optics with a heat shield was provided for
(and engineering) background^eveloped a competence in the
guidance and navigation of Apollo which could not have been JFrom this point on, "guidance" will mean guidance, navigation,
surpassed. and control.
 JAN.-FEB. 1983 APOLLO ONBOARD GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL

protection but was later removed from the design when independent panel instrument with a single accelerorrieter
analysis showed the hardware could tolerate the stress with which was called an Entry Monitor. Although never needed
suitable additional design changes. for backup use, it was useful to the astronauts as an in-
Once the guidance equipment was located in the spacecraft, dependent means to watch the velocity change of maneuvers
James Nevins, Nugent, and Bowditch immediately started in being made by the primary system. Similarly in the Lunar
overall configuration design and mockup so that quite early Module, Grumman provided through TRW and Hamilton
the astronaut operations with the equipment could be tested Standard an independent abort guidance system for a safety
and revised as needed. backup and also used as an independent monitor of the
Because of the operational complexity of the mission, the primary Lunar Module system.
first mockup included a film projector tq display procedures, As the program entered 1964, it appeared that necessary
maps, and charts to the astronaut. However, as the design of interface decisions between the guidance hardware and the
the whole operation progressed and the logic of the crew spacecrafts were lagging. To meet this problem Dr. Robert C.
operation with the computer evolved, the film viewer was Duncan, the Chief of the Guidance and Control Division at
removed from the design. Hand-held notebooks such as used Houston, instituted and chaired a series of Guidance Im-
in Mercury and Gemini would suffice. plementation Meetings. The first meeting which involved
The exercise of the mockup with a pressurized space suit North American in the design. decisions concerning the
emphasized a problem. With his helmet on, the astronaut Command Module guidance system took place in June.
could not get his eye close enough to the eyepieces to perform Subsequent meetings were held approximately biweekly until
his sighting tasks. The solution was to design special February 1965. A second set of meetings with Grumman on
eyepieces, necessarily bulky but with sufficient eye relief, the Lunar Module guidance and navigation occurred at the
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which could be attached in place of the regular eyepieces when same pace between September 1964 and April 1966. These
sightings in the helmet were required. The storage of these meetings followed a tight agenda of technical issues to be
large units was found conveniently in the space recently resolved and involved presentations by the spacecraft
vacated by the film viewer. designer, the Instrumentation Laboratory, and occasionally
The design verification of the guidance hardware was other involved parties. Following this, Duncan either made a
initiated by Ain Laats in his systems test laboratory using decision which was then incorporated in the appropriate
specialized test equipment to examine the first production Interface Control Document, or he requested further study
units of the assembled system. Of particular concern were the and scheduled new presentations at a future meeting.
interactions among the inertial and optical sensors, the A very significant decision took place early in this period
computer, the computer software, and astronaut functions concerning the implementation of the spacecraft attitude
when working all together. One of the earliest computer control autopilots. Prior to this time, this function was to be
programs called SUNRISE was coded for this function. performed by analog hardware under design responsibility of
Special computer control program routines, hardware test the spacecraft manufacturers. These analog autopilots, which
code, and prelaunch systems functions were developed in this flew the Block I spacecrafts, were satisfactory, but lacked
activity by Thomas Lawton, Ain Laats, Robert Crisp, and flexibility and required extensive specialized hardware.
others. It was Duncan who directed in June 1964 that the autopilot
The early apprehension concerning equipment reliability functions would be done digitally utilizing the hardware of the
produced requirements for in-flight fault diagnosis and guidance system. To accommodate these new tasks, the speed
repair. The Block I design carried spare plug-in modules of the computer was doubled and a much larger instruction
which could be used to replace failed modules. However, an repertoire was provided. Input and output interfaces were
event in the last Mercury spacecraft flight in May 1963 expanded in order to send appropriate signals to the in-
changed this in-flight repair policy. On the 19th orbit the dividual attitude jets, to the main engine gimbals, and to the
Mercury automatic control system failed so that astronaut thrust level servos, and to receive the appropriate feedback
Gordon Cooper had to fly the last three orbits of the mission signals from some of these elements. The memory capacity
manually. The fault was due to corrosion of electrical con- had been increased earlier for the lunar mission and was
nections from the high humidity and contamination ac- considered adequate for the autopilots.
companying the human in his cabin. From then on Apollo Duncan's decision came with considerable controversy. The
hardware designs in the cabin were required to be sealed from antagonists had shown that even expanded, the computer
moisture. This effectively eliminated plug-in modules since in- memory was insufficient and the computer was too slow to
flight usable connectors could not be satisfactorily sealed perform the necessary wide bandwidth control. They were
without unacceptable weight penalties. However, even for right if one used the digital computer to perform digitally the
fixed modules, the sealing led to weight increases because the same functions handled by the earlier analog circuits. The
packages had to withstand the large cabin pressure changes advocates argued that the proposed implementation would
without buckling. capitalize upon the flexibility, and nonlinear complex
Without the in-flight repair, the concern for reliability computations, natural to a digital computer. It was the right
remained so that the initial Block II design concept provided decision. \Ey skillful design only 10% of the computer
for two identical computers in the Command Module memory was devoted to the autopilots and only 30% of
operating in parallel for redundancy. This seemed to be ex- computer computation time was needed during times of high
cessively conservative to Cline Frasier, of the Guidance and autopilot activity. A significant amount of complex hardware
Control Division in Houston, and he directed the return to the was eliminated, and moreover, the flexibility of the digital
single computer concept. The wisdom of his decision was computer delivered better control performance and con-
borne out in that no in-flight computer hardware failures siderable improvements in efficiency in conserving the
occurred. The combined failure rate, both preflight and on spacecraft fuel. The digital autopilot designs were the
missions, was a small fraction of that of any other computer products of Dr. William Widnall, Gilbert Stubbs, and George
designed then or since for aerospace application. Such near Cherry at the Instrumentation Laboratory and Dr. Kenneth
perfect reliability was achieved at considerable effort, at- Cox at the Manned Spacecraft Center.
tention to design, a deliberate constraint to a minimum With the satisfactory conclusion of the hardware Im-
number of different parts, a detailed engineering qualification plementation Meetings, the designers were able to complete
of design and components, and 100% stress testing of the their tasks with reasonable assurance that the requirements
parts to be used in manufacture. would not change. This turned out to be true for the most
The concern for safety identified backup hardware. In the part. The significant event affecting this was the January 1967
Command Module, North American provided a simple, fire on the launch pad and the tragic loss of three astronauts.
 io D.G. HOAG J. GUIDANCE

More stringent specifications of fire resistance in the cabin's long hours leading the design and coding of program
pure oxygen atmosphere turned out to be reasonably CORONA. Similarly, Daniel Lickly's great personal effort
straightforward to meet for the guidance equipment. produced the program SOLARIUM. Each of these was an
Except for this, the hardware design remained relatively amazing tour de force which was impractical for the more
stable after 1965. The year 1965, however, was the peak year complex manned missions. The computer program for each
of hardware activity in which almost 600 man years of effort of these later missions was the assigned responsibility of a
on guidance hardware was expended at MIT out of an MIT senior engineer who assumed a more technical management
total for the hardware part of the program of approximately role. The task first was to partition the job suitably for the
2000 man years. Hardware problems did arise after 1965, but analysts, specification writers, programmers, test engineers,
it usually turned out that the expense in dollars and time in and documentation specialists. The leader established
solving them by redesign could be avoided by putting the schedules and progress milestones, reassigned resources to
burden of adapting to the problem on the computer program solve inevitable problems, and generally was responsible for
software. This was also true of hardware problems in other the quality of the program. Names notable here are Dr. James
parts of the spacecraft. Miller for the first Lunar Module program SUNBURST, Dr.
Frederick Martin for the Command Module program
Software Design COLOSSUS, and George Cherry for the Lunar Module
Adapting to hardware problems was only one of the many program LUMINARY. These last two were the programs
things which made generating the computer program software used for the lunar landing missions. Martin and Cherry also
difficult. The primary complication was that the details of the did a substantial part of the design of the powered flight
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mission continually changed and indeed were difficult to get guidance steering functions for these programs. Alan Klumpp
defined in the first place. Then too, so many different made major contributions to the landing program in the
programs were needed—different programs for the Block I Lunar Module. Daniel Lickly established the atmospheric
and II computers, different programs for the unmanned and entry design for the Command Module.
manned flights, different programs for the Earth orbital and Much of the detailed code of these programs was written by
lunar missions, and different programs for the Command a team of specialists led by Margaret Hamilton. The task
Module and Lunar Module computers. assignments to these individuals included, in addition to
The effort needed for the software design turned out to be writing the code, the testing to certify that the program
grossly underestimated. Until the first lunar landing in 1969, element met requirements. Overall testing of the assembled
approximately 1400 man years of effort at MIT were applied collection of program elements necessarily required con-
to the task. The peak activity occurred one year earlier in 1968 centrated use of the considerable human and machine
with a man year total of 350. resources at the Instrumentation Laboratory. The programs
Parts of the computer programming were accomplished had to be as near error-free as possible and all anomalies had
early and were essentially independent of mission objectives. to be understood and recorded for possible affect on the
These included the basic code for the computer executive mission. Actually, no program errors were ever uncovered
system, sequence control, timing and interrupt structure, during the missions, but every program flew with some known
unchanged since originally designed by Dr. Laning, and the and documented problems.
management of the interfaces with the computer display and The highest level of testing was performed with a high-
keyboard unit, telemetry, etc. Also completed relatively early fidelity digital simulation of the computer, spacecraft hard-
were the complex but not time-critical data processing ware, and mission environment. The creation, development,
routines of navigation, guidance targeting, trajectory ex- and maintenance of this simulator by Dr. Miller, Keith Glick,
trapolation, and lunar ephemeris calculations. Much of the Lance Drane, and others included many diagnostic features
analytical and algorithmic foundation for these came from essential to its effective use. Testing of the programs with the
Battin's earlier work for the unmanned space mission studies. real hardware was done by Ain Laats in his systems test lab.
For Apollo, Dr. Battin, Dr. James Miller, Norman Sears, and Wide bandwidth aspects of the program were evaluated in a
other analysts made significant improvements in the ef- digital/analog hybrid simulator assembled by Phillip
ficiency and performance of these routines, many of which Felleman and Thomas Fitzgibbon. This hybrid simulator was
were of fundamental significance. also arranged to operate with the displays and controls of a
The digital autopilots, guidance steering, and other mission pair of cockpit simulators to exercise crew functions in
specific functions operating during the more stressful parts of operating the Command Module and Lunar Module. These
the flights required considerable coordination with external cockpit simulators were the responsibility of James Nevins
agencies—the spacecraft designers, the Manned Spacecraft assisted by Richard Metzinger, Ivan Johnson, and others. The
Center, and the astronauts. Several formal data exchange ill-fated crew who died in the fire used this Command Module
procedures were attempted, but the most effective in many simulator in Cambridge for their training of what would have
cases were the direct personal contacts the individual analysts been the first manned Apollo flight. The use of the Cam-
and programmers established with others who they learned bridge facility was necessary because neither of the mission
had the accurate information. simulators at Houston or Cape Kennedy was ready.
The computer program requirements were recorded for Another simulator using real guidance system hardware
each mission by the Instrumentation Laboratory in a and a surplus radar mount to simulate spacecraft motion was
multivolume document called the "Guidance System assembled around this time by Nevins and Albert Woodin.
Operating Plan" developed initially by John Dahlen and This was mounted on a roof at MIT using real stars and
James Nevins. However, the often tardy publication of these moon, weather permitting. Astronauts and managers who
plans made them more of a report of what was in the code might have been at first skeptical of the system were soon
rather than a specification of what should be coded. The enthusiastic in their ability to align the inertial system to the
individual programmers also generally drew their detailed stars and navigate the Cambridge rooftop.
flowcharts after the code was written. Standard format The content of the flight computer software very clearly
flowcharts were then prepared by a large special documen- determined specific capabilities and procedures in conducting
tation team and were used primarily for mission planning and the Apollo mission. As stated earlier, the original philosophy
real-time support. underlying the guidance design was onboard self-sufficiency
The very early programs for the first few unmanned Earth of the astronauts in managing their mission. Early software
orbital test flights were each assembled by a small dedicated was written with this crew-directed autonomy in mind,
group led by a chief engineer-programmer. For the first although it was based only intuitively on exactly how the crew
Command Module flight, Alex Kosmala spent many weeks of would perform their tasks. The issue became clearer as the
 JAN.-FEB. 1983 APOLLO ONBOARD GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL 11

astronauts participated in the hardware and software design put to Malcolm Johnston, at MIT, to search out the needed
decisions and particularly on mockup and simulator detailed design data available from the engineers in Cam-
evaluations and the experience being gained in Gemini flights. bridge for the Data Priority activity in Houston. It was the
Initially the flight crew changed the software specifications so product of these meetings that finally tied together all mission
that they would participate step by step in the computer operations, with the guidance, navigation, and control.
decisions during the mission phases. This necessarily made a Crew training in these operations on the mission simulators
heavy workload for the astronaut at the computer display and required the detailed guidance system instructions provided
controls. As they gained more familiarity with the system and tirelessly by Russell Larson working with the astronauts at
more confidence in it, the philosophy was modified to allow Houston and Cape Kennedy.
the computer to flow through the normal mission logic
without the necessity for authorizing keystrokes from the Flight Experience
operator. However, the astronauts could watch, interrupt, The flight experience of the Apollo guidance system shows
and modify the functional flow if they so chose. a remarkable consistency with expectation punctuated with
Another decision from the crew resulted in configuring outright surprises.
details of the trajectories to be flown so that they could better The understanding of these surprises and the recom-
monitor their progress and, if a failure occurred, they would mending of appropriate courses of action fell in large part on
be in a simpler situation from which to take over with backup the Instrumentation Laboratory teams providing guidance
hardware and procedures. For example, the Lunar Module system mission support in place at Houston, Cape Kennedy,
guidance was easily capable of injecting the vehicle on the and Cambridge. During the quiet times of the flights, only
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ascent from the moon's surface onto a trajectory which would perhaps four lab engineers would be on duty, but the number
go directly to a rendezvous with the Command Module. rose at times to several dozen performing special analyses, lab
However, the actual procedure used involved a number of tests, and simulation during more active phases. Leaders of
more simple maneuvers called the concentric flight plan which this activity were Philip Felleman, Russell Larson, and
has been used in Gemini rendezvous exercises. Stephen Copps.
Gemini was flown for the last time in late 1966, and the The first mission carrying the guidance system was Apollo
attention of the astronauts and the ground controllers was put 3, which flew in August 1966. It was an unmanned, high-
fully onto Apollo. .By this time, however, the computer energy, suborbital trajectory with four separate guidance
programs were already straining the memory capacity. The controlled burns of the Service Module propulsion rocket.
Flight Operations Directorate at Houston had taken over the These were arranged such that the Command Module would
management of the MIT software contract in March 1966 enter the atmosphere with about 20% more specific energy
under Howard W. Tindall. One of TindaH's first actions was than that in normal returns from the lunar missions. This was
to hold a computer memory storage meeting with all involved planned in order to stress test the re-entry heat shield. The
parties to decide what computer capabilities should be in the landing east of Wake Island about 350 km short of the in-
limited program space. This occurred on Friday the 13th of tended target was due to an unanticipated error in the
May and was thereby nicknamed "black Friday" by those aerodynamic model of the Command Module. The actual lift
whose favorite program elements were eliminated. Two more available was less than design intent so that even though the
black Friday meetings were required and several "tiger guidance commanded full upwards lift, the vehicle dropped
teams" were assigned to keep the computer program within into the ocean early. The guidance indicated splash point was
its bounds. An outcome was. that some programs were within 18 km of the Navy's reported retrieval point—this after
eliminated that had provided the complete onboard self- an hour and a half of uncorrected all inertial navigation
sufficiency. The ground tracking facility and the Mission through high-acceleration maneuvers.
Control at Houston would be able to perform these functions Apollo 4, November 1967, also unmanned, was guided into
and would, furthermore, relieve the astronauts of some of a high apogee trajectory after two Earth orbits and was to be
their work burden. Enough was left in the onboard computer given an extra rocket burn on the way down to simulate the
programs, however, for the crew to rescue themselves and lunar return velocity. However, in this automatic maneuver, a
return to Earth in case communications were lost. ground controller in Australia, confused by a delay in
The management of the software effort, assigned at the telemetry, sent an engine turn-on signal from the ground just
time to Edward Copps, necessarily became far more struc- after it had already been initiated automatically by.the
tured. Tindall, supported by others from the Manned guidance system. This action transferred rocket cutoff
Spacecraft Center, held monthly Software Development Plan responsibility away from the onboard system. The ground
Meetings in Cambridge to watch progress and the allocation controller sent the cutoff signal 13.5 s later than required for
of resources to software tasks. After the programs were the planned entry test conditions. It was, therefore, a severe
essentially complete but still subject to revisions, these entry test for both the heat shield and the guidance system.
meetings changed character to that of a Software Control The latter controlled the entry into a range stretching skip out
Board held oftentimes in Houston. Even afterthe code in the of the atmosphere and a re-entry back into it with a splash
fixed memory for a given spacecraft was released for into the ocean 3.5 km different from the point intended as
manufacture, desired program changes were identified. The indicated by extrapolated ground tracking data.
logical similarity of fixed and erasable memory and the Apollo 5, in Earth orbit in January of 1968, was the only
flexibility of executive and software designs did allow the unmanned test with the Lunar Module. The mission went as
prelaunch or in-flight loading of special programs into the planned until the time of the first guidance controlled Lunar
erasable memory. This was done only under strict Module rocket burn. The system initiated ignition as planned
authorization of TindalPs Software Control Board. Many of and using the approved model for thrust buildup looked for
these so-called erasable programs were used in flight to handle the acceleration to rise as expected. A change in the rocket
miscellaneous problems. pressurization, not recognized by the software, delayed the
During the latter part of this period, Tindall also conducted thrust buildup longer than acceptable by a safety criterion
in Houston what were called Data Priority Meetings. These built into the computer program. The system, as designed,
were held to establish the specific trajectory characteristics, then immediately signalled shutoff. As a result, since the
operating timelines, and the interacting ground control and problem was not immediately understood, the remaining
astronaut procedures under all normal and unusual con- rocket burns were controlled by a simple backup system. All
ditions. The guidance hardware and particularly the computer primary mission objectives were met.
programs in the memory influenced strongly the specific paths Apollo 6, in April 1968, had a mission similar to Apollo 4,
possible in conducting the mission. Accordingly the task was but unfortunately the Saturn booster third stage could not be
 12 D.G. HOAG J. GUIDANCE

restarted for the lunar trajectory injection simulation burn. these firings disturbed the crew'.s sleep. During Apollo 10,
Consequently, the spacecraft Service Module was used for Joseph Turnbull, in Cambridge, exercised various methods on
this under guidance system control. Since the resulting burn a simulator for initiating the spin so that the residual fluid
was necessarily very long as targeted, not enough fuel was left motions in all the fuel tanks would not later on destabilize the
for the maneuver needed to drive the spacecraft back into the spacecraft motions. His procedures were radioed to the crew
atmosphere at lunar return velocity. With lower velocity the via Mission Control in Houston; on the second try it worked,
vehicle did not have enough specific energy to reach the and stability was achieved without further thruster activity.
planned target, and it fell short by almost 100 km, with the Finally on July 20 and 21, 1969, Apollo astronauts first
guidance indicating a splash within 4 km of that later reported walked the "magnificent desolation'* of the moon's surface.
by the recovery force. The actual landing was particularly exciting, however, due to
The first manned flight, Apollo 7, October 1968, exercised alarms in the computer during the descent. These alarms were
a rendezvous with the spent third stage of the Saturn booster caused by an erroneous mode switch position resulting in
from about 100 miles separation. The sextant was used by maximum pulse rate signals being sent to the computer from
astronaut Don Eisele to give direction information to the the rendezvous radar, which was, of course, not needed
computer referenced to the stellar aligned inertial system. No during the landing. The computer, already operating near
ranging data were obtained as the equipment was not yet capacity, was overloaded by these extraneous inputs causing it
available. Nevertheless, the computer converged upon a good to restart and display the alarms. The ground controllers and
rendezvous solution. Three times during the flight untested Neil Armstrong were on top of the problem. They knew well
procedures used by the crew caused the computer to "restart" that ,the computer, in restarting, \yould keep the essential
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successfully. Restart was a software feature provided in all programs running for the landing. However, Armstrong's
programs to protect against data loss and provide instant attention was diverted during the time he should have been
recovery from logically improper activity. Many times in later using the window display which would indicate to him what
flights, restart accommodated safely to computer logic and the lunar surface was like at the point where the guidance
operational problems. system was bringing hirri. When he finally looked, it was a
Apollo 8, with the first men to .orbit the moon, December young ray crater strewn with large rocks. It was too late to
1968. was a wonderful success of man and machine. All of the retarget the computer for the more efficient trajectory change
guidance features in the Command Module were exercised to a more suitable point. Instead, he selected a semiautomatic
with few problems. In the very first application of onboard altitude hold mode and maneuvered across the crater to a
autonomous navigation in space, astronaut James Lovell landing at "Tranquility Base."
made over 200 sextant sightings on the way out to the moon. Apollo 12, in November 1969, was hit by two lightning
His computer solution of the nearest approach to the backside strikes early in the boost to Earth orbit. The large current
of the moon agreed within 2.5 km of that later reconstructed pulses, passing through the innards of the Command Module
from ground tracking data. The critical return-to-Earth because of the electrical insulating properties of the external
maneuver, Christmas morning, -was so accurate that only a heat shield, caused power transients which forced the com-
single 1.5-m/s midcourse maneuver was required 5 h later. puter to restart both times. Although the computer did not
Lo veil's trans-Earth navigation with the sextant indicated lose any memory, the interface circuits to the inertial system
approach to the center of the entry corridor within 30% of the were temporarily affected and spacecraft commander Charles
normal tolerance. By this he showed that he could have Conrad reported a tumbling inertial platform. Fortunately,
returned safely without the help of the ground control. At one the Saturn booster guidance system, further distant from the
point early in the return, Lovell, thinking he was telling the current pulse, was not disturbed and completed its normal
computer that he was using star number 01, actually punched function. The crew was able to realign the inertial system to
in the command for the computer to go to the Earth prelaunch the stars while in Earth orbit, and continue the mission. They
program 01. This caused all sorts of mischief including the landed on the moon on the edge of the small crater in which
loss of the inertial system alignment. He had no problem had sat the unmanned Surveyor spacecraft since its arrival 2!/2
getting all this quickly and properly rearranged. years earlier.
Apollo 9, which flew a very complex mission in March The emergency and rescue of the Apollo 13 crew in April
1969. exercised almost all functions of the Lunar Module 1970, after the explosion and loss of oxygen and power in the
guidance in Earth orbit including the rendezvous with the Service Module, urgently depended upon a quick maneuver to
Command Module. The only in-flight guidance hardware get back on the Earth's return trajectory using the only
failure in the program occurred early in this mission. A tiny propulsion available, that of the Lunar Module. The Lunar
pin became dislodged from the scanning telescope angle Module autopilot was not designed to push the heavy
counter display, rendering the counter useless. The counter; Command and Service Modules through the limber docking
however, was only a backup to the normal readout of the joint as a normal control mode. However, for just a con-
computer display, so fortunately the problem had no impact tingency such as this, the necessary software had been
on the mission. At one point, astronaut David Scott loaded developed and was included in the computer program; but it
the celestial coordinates of Jupiter into the computer and was very little tested. The critical maneuver was accomplished
pked it to point the optics at the planet. He was rewarded with stable control. Without Service Module power and in
with a fine display of Jupiter and her moons in the 28-power order to conserve the limited life Command Module batteries
instrument. Later, he loaded the computer with the orbital for the entry, the guidance system there was shut down
parameters of the Lunar Module which had by then been completely. After three days of cold, rough treatment for the
abandoned and sent away intd a high orbit. There it was in the precision instruments, would the inertial system get reheated
eyepiece 5000 km away. without harm, get started and realigned, and retain its
Apollo 10, in May 1969, was a complete lunar mission, original calibration for guiding entry? The entry proceeded
except the actual touchdown on the moon was bypassed as normally and splash in the ocean was indicated within 1 km of
planned. All guidance functions were uneventful except that a the target.
new technique and program were developed during the flight The February 1971 mission of Apollo 14 was normal for the
to put the vehicle into a stable rotation of 3 revolutions per guidance system until about 3Yz h before the scheduled
hour during the long coast to the moon. This spin had been powered descent onto the moon. At that time the Lunar
used earlier in Apollo 8 to keep the thermal loads on the skin Module computer started receiving intermittent faulty signals
from the sun equalized, but on that mission occasional firings from the main panel abort button, which, if they occurred
of the attitude jets were commanded by the control system to during the descent to the moon, would irrevocably start the
hold the spin as required. Besides wasting fuel, the noise of abort sequence sending the vehicle back into orbit. As in every
 JAN.-FEB. 1983 APOLLO ONBOARD GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL 13

mission, the Instrumentation Laboratory§ support engineers reminiscences. An enormous amount of material has been left
in Houston, Cape Kennedy, and Cambridge were monitoring out for practical reasons, and many worthy names regretfully
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progress and immediately started working on a way of remained 'unmentioned. Technical details have been
preventing the mission from being terminated needlessly. deliberately played down; they can be found in the references.
Among the various ideas proposed, one suggested by a young One overall message is simple: In an incredible and audacious
engineer, Donald Eyles, was selected and after hurriedly being task, the landing of men on the moon, the guidance systems
tested on the simulators in Cambridge was sent over the for the spacecrafts were created out of the prolific
circuits to the Mission Control Center in Houston for their imagination and hard work of many people.
evaluation. This procedure, which was sent up to the crew as
soon as they came around from the back of the moon, in-
volved four sets of computer input keystrokes to be made References
onboard at appropriate times in the descent. The first of these 1
A Recoverable Interplanetary Space Probe, Kept. R-235, MIT
would fool the necessary part of the computer logic into Instrumentation Laboratory, Cambridge, Mass., June 1959.
2
thinking that it was already in an abort mode while the land- Interplanetary Navigation System Study, Rept. R-273, MIT In-
ing programs, nevertheless, would continue to bring the strumentation Laboratory, Cambridge, Mass., April 1960.
3
vehicle down to the lunar surface. The astronauts had only 10 , Ertei, I.D. and Morse, M.L., The Apollo Spacecraft, A
min after receiving this computer reprogramming procedure Chronology, Vol. I, NASA Historical Series, NASA SP-4009, U.S.
before they had to start their descent. They accepted it; and Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1969.
4
Battin, R.H., "Space Guidance Evolution—A Personal
the landing went flawlessly, exactly to the planned spot on the Narrative," Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, Vol. 5,
moon. March-April 1982, pp. 97-110.
There were three more lunar landing missions, three Earth 5
Draper, C.S., "Origins of Inertia! Navigation," Journal of
orbital visits to the Skylab, and the rendezvous with the Soviet Guidance and Control, Vol. 4; Sept .-Oct. 1981, pp. 449-463.
6
cosmonauts in Soyuz. Although the Apollo guidance, Houbolt, J.C., "Lunar Rendezvous," International Science and
navigation, and control system continued to get involved in Technology, Feb. 1963.
7
the unexpected, any further account would be anticlimactic to Miller, J.E., ed., Space Navigation Guidance and Control,
the dramatic saving of the Apollo 14 and its objective—the AGARDograph 105, Technivisions Limited, Maidenhead, England,
landing of men on the moon. 1966.
8
Hoag, D.G., Apollo Navigation, Guidance and Control Systems:
A Progress Report, Rept. E-2411, MIT Instrumentation Laboratory,
Cambridge, Mass., April 1969.
Acknowledgments 9
Sears, N.E., Lunar Mission Navigation Performance of the
This account is written from the point of view of one who Apollo Spacecraft Guidance and Navigation, Rept. E-2538, MIT
experienced these hectic but exciting years. The intent is to Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Cambridge, Mass., Sept. 1970.
10
underline significant events and everchanging design emphasis MITs Role in Project Apollo, Rept. R-700, Charles Stark Draper
Laboratory, Cambridge, Mass.; Vol. I, Oct. 1971; Vol. II, March
and to support this with limited anecdotal items and 1972; Vol. Ill, Aug. 1972; Vol. IV, April 1972; Vol. V, July 1971.
n
§Actually, a year earlier, the Instrumentation Laboratory had been NeYins, J.L., Man-Machine Design for the Apollo Navigation,
renamed The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory in honor of its Guidance, and Control—Revisited, Rept. E-2476, MIT In-
founder. strumentation Laboratory, Cambridge, Mass., Jan. 1970