Republic of the Philippines The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment

pacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends

SUPREME COURT crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.9 Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province
Manila of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises
supportive of such factual determination.10 It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, 11 save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like
FIRST DIVISION when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties
to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or
G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006 when there is a misappreciation of facts,12 which are unavailing in the instant case.

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner, The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
vs. refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent. grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume.13 As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated
with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
RESOLUTION meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.14 It is for this reason that the Court relies
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained, 15 which petitioner failed to
convincingly demonstrate.
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution dated June
9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April
30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
committed any reversible error.
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases is the presence of
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision 1 denying the petition evidence that can adequately establish respondent's psychological condition. Here, appellant contends that
for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that
does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects"
insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order 2 dated April 20, 2001 were already present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.
where the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent
that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that respondent's alleged failure to
thereof. perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave,
permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couple's relationship before the marriage
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed3 in toto the judgment of the trial court. It held that the and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short
evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by
his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage. 4 The Court of Appeals also found petitioner's own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began
that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed when petitioner started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls
to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called
clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in marital obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioner's lack of trust in him and her constant
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and
obligations.5 jealousy. x x x.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on certiorari xxxx
with this Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied for failure of petitioner to show that the appellate
tribunal committed any reversible error. At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed
personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.7 The Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment8 but statement that one suffering from such mixed personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x
failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court directed the lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for reconsideration which it complied on March respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the
2, 2006. root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and
inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She stated that there
was a history of respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the supposed
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioner's motion for problematic history of respondent's parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate
reconsideration. that there was really "a natal or supervening disabling factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse
integral element" in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby
complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove that
respondent's supposed psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage. All these

Ferraris v. Ferraris 1
 omissions must be held up against petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the onus of establishing
nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the
indissolubility of the marital vinculum.16

We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled,
the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than his
family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his
wife regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were more of a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that
the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown
to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.

Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological
incapacity.

While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy
however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory
marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.19 No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage
and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.20

Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with,
although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that would likewise, but for different reasons,
render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 4525 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could
justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.26 Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. 27 Neither it is to be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and
the like.28

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying
the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed
any reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.

Ferraris v. Ferraris 2