A Concise History of the

Communist Party of China was

compiled by the Party History
Research Centre of the CPC
Central Committee, with Hu (Continued from the front flap)
Sheng serving as chief editor. The
book provides a systematic account tion, the War of Resistance Against
of the CPC’s first seventy years Japan and the War of Liberation.
since its founding in July 1921, The final four chapters address
recounting the great achievements Party history during the socialist
of the Chinese people under the period after the founding of the
leadership of the Communist Party People’s Republic of China, the
in the new-democratic revolution, ups and downs in the progress of
the socialist revolution and socialist socialist construction, the ten years
construction, as the narrative, of civil strife accompanying the
seeking the truth from the facts, “cultural revolution,’’ and
appraises the important events and China’s socialist modernization
people in the Party’s history. The construction. The book also
historic experiences of the the introduces the objectives of the
Party are scientifically summarized CPC for the future, the theory of
and the lessons learned clearly the primary stage of socialism and
spelled out. A great deal of new the principles and policies for
analysis and information are building socialism with Chinese
brought to the subject, particularly characteristics.
regarding Party history during the The CPC was the leading party
socialist period (1949 to the in the Chinese revolution and
present). Accurate and dependable, remains in power today, playing
the history sources the original a decisive role in modem China’s
archives, confirming facts with social development. Accordingly,
files and other original documents, this book serves not only as
providing the reader with the most the authoritative source for
authoritative and unbiased history understanding the CPC and its
of the CPC currently available. history, but also as an essential
The first five chapters introduce tool for the comprehension of the
the tortuous but successful progress development of modem Chinese
of the CPC in its early years, the history.
triumphs of the Agrarian Revolu-

(Continued on the back flap)

A CONCISE HISTORY OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF CHINA
(Seventy Years of the CPC)
Hu Sheng (chief editor)
Party History Research Centre of the CPC Central Committee
Translated by Central Translation Bureau
Beijing Review

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS BEIJING

 First Edition 1994

PUBLISHER S NOTE

The originaJ Chinese edition of this book was published in

August 1991 to mark the 70th anniversary of the founding of the
Communist Party of China. Publication was approved by the
CPC Central Committee’s Leading Group for Work on Party
History, headed by Yang Shangkun, then president of the Peo¬
ple’s Republic of China. The deputy head of the Leading Group,
Hu Qiaomu, appraised the book:
I was very pleased to receive the manuscript of this book. It
is a reasonably substantial book giving a comparatively com¬
plete history of the Party, a book that we have been long
awaiting.
Hu Qiaomu noted in particular chapters Seven, Eight and Nine
dealing with the Party’s more recent history:
These three chapters addressed difficult topics. During
the ten years following the Party’s 8th National Congress
[1956-66], there were many convolutions in Party history. The
ten-year “cultural revolution” [1966-76] was tragic, though not
everything in that period was bad. In the ten years of reform
and opening to the outside world [1979-89], we scored great
Hardcover: ISBN 7-119-01601-6 achievements, but two general secretaries of the CPC Central
Paperback: ISBN 7-119-01669-5
Committee made serious mistakes. A history must be objective.
© Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, China, 1994 Having read these three chapters, I think I can say that this
Published by Foreign Languages Press book is reliable and well worth reading, particularly because it
24 Baiwanzhuang Road, Beijing 100037, China
realistically presents both historical events and the root causes
Printed by Beijing Foreign Languages Printing House
19 Chegongzhuang Xilu, Beijing 100044, China
of those events. Readers will find this to be a book devoid of
propagandists intent, that honestly recounts the history of the
Distributed by China International Book Trading Corporation
35 Chegongzhuang Xilu, Beijing 100044, China Party, giving food for thought. This book may be considered
P.O. Box 399, Beijing, China unique in its presentation of Party history. It is certainly
Printed in the People’s Republic of China unparalleled in its quality of writing.
 The chief editor of A Concise History of the Communist Party
oj China (Seventy Years of the CPC) is Hu Sheng, director of the
Party History Research Centre of the CPC Central Committee,
and president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He is
also the author of Imperialism and Chinese Politics and From the
Opium War to the May 4th Movement (both published by the CONTENTS
Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1985 and 1991, respectively).
1 his English edition is a translation of the first Chinese edi¬
tion, published in August 1991 by the Press of the History of the
Communist Party of China. Some textual modifications have
Chapter One
been made for the English version and explanatory notes at the
end of each chapter and an index have been added. The Founding of the Communist Party of China 3
I. The Success and Failure of the Revolution of 1911 3
II. The Early Stage of the New Cultural Movement and
the Initial Dissemination of Marxism 8
Foreign Languages Press
III. The May 4th Movement and the Rise of Socialist
July 1993
Ideas 15
IV. The Founding of the Communist Party of China 24
V. Formulating the Programme of Democratic Revolution 39
Chapter Two
In the Torrent of the Great Revolution 52
I. The Establishment of the First Period of Cooperation
Between the KMT and the CPC 52
II. New Developments in the Revolution After the
Establishment of Cooperation Between the KMT
and the CPC 59
III. The May 30th Movement and the Unification of the
Guangdong Revolutionary Base Area 65
IV. The Triumphant Progress of the Northern Expedi¬
tion and the Rise of the Workers’ and Peasants’
Movements 77
V. Before and After the Coup of April 12, 1927 86
VI. The Failure of the Great Revolution 97

Chapter Three
The Agrarian Revolution 108
I. The Revolution at a Low Ebb and Armed Resistance
by the Communists 108
ii
 UGF:Z Meeting88'6 * I. Ihe Postwar Political Situation and the Party’s
HI. The “Left” Mistakes During the Resurgence of Re- ^ Struggle for Peace and Democracy 309

volution and the Red Army’s Victory in fhe Counter- 11 DT.hf ^CC NeS°ll'ati°ns in Chongqing and the
TV ^?PaignS Agamst “Encirclement and Suppression” 143 Political Consultative Conference 325

III. Smashing the Kuomintang’s Offensive by a War of

GwTdZ? T P°lilieal Situation and
Self-Defence ^
Grave Damage Brought About by “Left” Errors in the
V Prnty 7fterthe September 18th Incident ' ,fi0 IV. The Opening of the Second Front 339

Vl PeopJe’s Liberation Army Shifts to the Strategic

Offensive ^

vUtSLS; “ “ “ " VI. The Party’s Programme to Overthrow Chiang Kai-

shek and Liberate All China 354
Chapter Four VII. Consolidation and Expansion of the People’s Demo¬
cratic United Front ^ ,
The Mainstay in the War of Resistance Against Japan 212
VIII. The Great Decisive Battles 370
Proved I™ R“ « Principle of ^ DC Carrying the Revolution Through to the End 381
X. The Great Victory of the Chinese Democratic Revolu-
II Lfne^1118 OU‘ GUCrrilla Waffare Behind the Enemy ^ tion
387
III Overcoming Right-deviationist Mistakes and Main- ^ Chapter Six
The Founding of the People's Republic of China and
mth^
Transition to Socialism
IVProgPressIding ^ °f Resista»<*’ Unity and 235 I. The Early Period of New China and the Party’s
1 asks

V b^he KMT16 Anti'C°mmunist Onslaughts Launched ^ II. The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea
Relorm of Land System and Other Democratic Re¬
VI The Arduous Struggle Against “Mopping-Up” 252
forms 409
theeEnemy Mnef * ** A™y a"d the People Behmd TV1' TighDf°r «C Restoration of the National Economy 424
IV;. lhf Party Proposes the General Line for the Transi¬
VKMTe Dem°CratIC Movemem in Areas Ruled by the 2“ tional Period

VIII- The Rectification Movement aoo V. Planned Economic Construction and the Start of
Socialist Industrialization 44S
DC The 7th National Party Congress and the Chinese
Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan 297 VIWorktUraI an<J P°litiCal Construction and Diplomatic
Chapter Five
VJl. Socialist Transformation of Agriculture, Handicraft 454
ThRevolutfon ^ Nati°nwide Victory in the Democratic and Capitalist Industry and Commerce 47I
10n 309 IIL Establishment of the Socialist System in China and
Completion of the First Five-Year Plan
488
Chapter Seven the 11th Central Committee 730
Socialist Construction Advances Tortuously Through III. Setting Things Right and Starting China’s Reform
Exploration 499 and Opening to the Outside World 738
I. The 8th National Party Congress and China’s Probing IV. The 12th National Party Congress and Full-Scale
of Its Own Road for Socialist Construction 499 Reform and Opening to the Outside World 760
II. The Rectification Campaign and the Anti-Rightist V. The 13th National Party Congress, Beginning of
Struggle 518 Economic Rectification and Quelling of Turbulence in
III. Emergence of the “Great Leap Forward” and 1989 781
People’s Communes 532 VI. Advance Further in Economic Improvement and
IV. Initial Efforts to Correct “Left” Mistakes 545 Rectification and Deepening the Reform 797
V. Errors in “Anti-Right Deviationist” Struggle and VII. Readjustment in Foreign Relations and Progress in
Continuation of the “Great Leap Forward” 555 Reunification 819
VI. Further Investigations While Readjusting Policies
Conclusions
and Overcoming Difficulties 566 Advance Along the Road of Socialism with Chinese
VII. Maintainning Independence and Sovereignty, Characteristics 836
Combating Hegemonism 588
VIII. Further Development of “Left” Deviationist Politi¬ Index 854
cal Mistakes and Successful Completion of Economic
Readjustment 600
IX. Ten Years of Achievements and Two Development
Tendencies in the Exploration 616
Chapter Eight
The “Cultural Revolution”: Ten Years of Nationwide
Chaos 627
I. The “Cultural Revolution” Initiated 627
II. “Overthrow Everything” Brings On All-Round Civil
Strife 647
III. The Downfall of the Lin Biao Clique and Frustration
in Correcting “Left” Errors 663
IV. Creating a New Situation in Diplomatic Work 684
V. The Downfall of the Jiang Qing Clique and the Con¬
clusion of the “Cultural Revolution” 694
Chapter Nine
Dawn of a New Prospect in Socialist Construction 718
I. Two Years of Hesitant Progress 718
II. A Great Turning Point—the 3rd Plenary Session of
 Seventy years have passed since the Communist Party of China
came into being. Over these seventy years, the Party has rallied
the Chinese people around it and waged an unremitting and
heroic struggle for national liberation, social progress and the
people’s well-being.
The struggle has never been easy. To make a victorious revo¬
lution and build a new society in a poor and backward country
comprising a quarter of the earth’s population, the Communist
Party of China performed feats that astonished the world, en¬
countering seemingly overwhelming difficulties and at times suf¬
fering major setbacks. But difficulties or setbacks of any kind
could never hold back its advance; they only made the Party
more steadfast and more mature.
The Chinese people have gained historic victories in revolution
and socialist construction under the leadership of the Communist
Parly, and today they are forging confidently ahead towards the
great goal of socialist modernization. The record of the past shows
that the Party serves the people heart and soul and that it can
provide the leadership that will enable them to master their own
destiny and to make the country strong and prosperous.
Looking back over the past seventy years, the Chinese people
are more convinced than ever that their choice of socialism as
their goal and of the Communist Party to lead them there has
been correct. Indeed, it is the inevitable product of China’s
modern historical development. The rich store of experience
embodied in these last seventy years of history was accumulated
by pioneers who sought the truth under the most difficult circum¬
stances with no precedent to guide them, and it was paid for in
the blood of innumerable martyers. They deserve our ever endur¬
ing remembrance.

1
 CHAPTER ONE
THE FOUNDING OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

I. THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF THE

REVOLUTION OF 1911
In the middle of the 19th century, China was plunged in untold
suffering and humiliation under the oppression of foreign capi¬
talist and imperialist powers and of domestic feudal forces. The
country was deprived of its sovereignty, and its economic lifelines
were in the hands of foreigners. Faced with aggression by the
Western powers, the feudal and autocratic Qing Dynasty, which
had reigned over China for two hundred years, took no effective
measures to defend the country. On the contrary, it suppressed
all trends towards political and social' progress and let the impe¬
rialist powers carve the country up at will. The Qing regime at its
final stage, traitorous and corrupt, was detested by the people,
because it strangled the country’s vitality and kept them in
misery. The Chinese entered the 20th century with the national
humiliation of seeing their capital city, Beijing, occupied by the
Eight-Power Allied Forces sent by Britain, the United States,
Germany, France, Russia, Japan, Italy and Austria. The Chinese
nation seemed to be on the verge of extinction.
The Chinese people, who had created a glorious and ancient
civilization, could not endure such humiliation for long. In 1902,
when the great writer Lu Xun was studying in Japan, he wrote
these lines expressing the grief and indignation that filled the
hearts of a great many Chinese patriots:
“My heart cannot evade the arrow of the god of love.

3
 4
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC
“A great storm is sweeping over my homeland in the darkness
sponsored the founding of the Chinese Revolutionary League
standmeCe ^ ^ ^ ^ stars’ but d° not nnder (Zhongguo Tong Men Hui). The League put forward a compre¬
I offer my heart’s blood to my dear homeland ” hensive political programme for the establishment of a bourgeois
It was the double oppression of imperialism and feudalism that democratic republic and worked hard to carry it out by revolu¬
tionary means. It pledged to “drive out the Tartars, revive the
misery ofThern SUffT"8 of lhe Cllinese nation and The Chinese nation, establish a republic and equalize ownership of
mtsery of the Chinese people. That is what hindered all social
development and political progress. How could the country com- land.” The immediate objective of the revolution was to over¬
throw the government of the Qing Dynasty, which had already
mnld fhg" aggressi011 and wi" "“(“"a! independence’ How
become a tool of the imperialist powers for the domination of
ed bv ; efe’ Td f0m *he darkness and France perpetuat¬ China. Thus, the revolution was essentially anti-imperialist It
ed by the feudal, autocratic regime? How could it be lifted out of
poverty and backwardness and made prosperous and strong’ called for the overthrow of the feudal monarchy that had reigned
These were the principal questions that confronted semi-colonial in China for two thousand years. Before this time, some people
semi-feudal China, the principal questions that the Chinese pro- had been so influenced by European and American ideas that
gressives kept turning over in their minds. they questioned the monarchy, but they had never dared envisage
Many brave men and women devoted themselves to the cause its overthrow and the dismantling of the social system it repre¬
sented. Sun Yat-sen, however, held up the ideal of a democratic
of b °rC thC foUnding of the Communist Party republic and set a new objective for the Chinese people. From
1118 fhlnese bad ^ver ceased trying to change
the destiny of then motherland. However, their repeated struggles then on, they began to struggle consciously for the establishment
the wars of resistance against foreign aggression the peasants’ ol an independent, democratic state. In Mao Zedong’s words
Strictly speaking, China’s bourgeois-democratic revolution
Klngdom in middle of the against imperialism and feudalism was begun by Dr. Sun Yat-
TV . century the Reform Movement of 18981 and the Boxer
Upnsmg (the Yi He Juan Movement) at the turn of the century
which started from the lower strata of society and grew into a
Recalling it in 1924, the Manifesto of the 1st National Congress
large-scale anti-imperialist patriotic movement — had all ended
ot the Kuomintang of China stated: “The objective of the revo-
Sufd not bfattaiPnedn0tS that ,he" ideats luuon was not merely to overthrow the Manchus, but to carry out
Nevertheless, the wheel of history rolled on, constantly bring¬ the transformation of China after their overthrow,” that is, “to
ing new developments. As the national crisis deepened and new achieve in the political domain the transition from an autocractic
social forces, especially modern capitalist industry, began to grow system to a democratic system and in the economic domain the
in Chinese society, a new revolutionary movement was started transition from handicraft production to capitalist production.”3
t is important to note that while many Chinese were eager to
Chfn^ eadership ot Sun Yat-sen, the forerunner of the learn from the West, Sun Yat-sen had become aware of certain
Chinese democratic revolution.
drawbacks in the capitalist system of the Western countries. His
wn™uYat:S“,WaS.f great Patriot as well as a great democrat conclusion was that “Europe and America are strong, but their
When he established the small revolutionary group Society for
he Revival of China (Xing Zhong Hui) in Honolulu in 1894 he people are impoverished” and that “a social revolution will take
issued a clarion call for “the revival of China.” In 1905’ he place before long.” Influenced by the socialist movement rising
in the West, Sun Yat-sen tried to add some colour of socialism to
 6
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 7
his programme, but whatever his intent, his proposal to “equalize
fully lead it to its logical conclusion. This was because the
"He"” ^ “ the dCTCl°pme"1 «Pi- bourgeoisie in China was too feeble. It had ties with the imperi¬
For several years following its establishment, the Chinese alist and feudal forces that could not be completely severed, and
Revoluuonary League, together with other organizations under it was almost totally divorced from the labouring masses. The
its influence, earned out revolutionary propaganda and agitation. bourgeois revolutionaries therefore had neither the courage nor
the strength to carry the struggle against imperialism and feudal¬
Wiifa8u? alhe]d Itself Wlth secret societies (especially the Triad
ism to the end.
Society and similar organizations in southern China) and with the
New Army (a modernized force organized by the government of The Revolution of 1911 ended in a compromise with the old
forces. The imperialist forces in China were as strong as ever, and
894095?and'!aSty IT ^ ddeat *" the Sin°-JaPancse War of there was no great social upheaval in the countryside. The Repub¬
4 95) and launched a series of armed uprisings. The failure of
each uprising expanded the influence of revolutionary ideas lic of China was founded, but the fruit of revolution fell into the
hands of the Northern warlords headed by Yuan Shikai, who was
hatred ,hr0ughout the »nd deepened their favoured by the imperialists. China was still a semi-colonial,
hatred of the Qmg government. A revolutionary situation was
taking shape across the country. semi-feudal society, still a country of dire poverty and backward¬
The outbreak of the Revolution of 1911 and the success it ness. Sun Yat-sen said bitterly, “The political and social darkness
attamed proved that the imperialist powers could not arbSi* and the corruption of every description are even worse than in
control the destiny of China after all. The revolution was signifT the Qing Dynasty, and the people are becoming increasingly
cant not only because it overthrew the Qing Dynasty, but because impoverished.”4 The revolution had not attained its desired goal,
t put an end to the autocracy that had reigned in China for so in that sense it was a failure.
“dtS of years and awakened the people to the concept of a Nevertheless, the Revolution of 1911 holds an honoured place
democratic repubhe. One should never underestimate the role in modern Chinese history. As historical materialists who uphold
Marxism, members of the Communist Party of China will never
Chimf byithe ^V0lutI0n of 1911 in Promoting social progress in
China and in liberating the thinking of the Chinese people The torget the contributions made by all the revolutionary pioneers
Qing Dynasty had been not only the chief representative of the before the founding of the Party and as a matter of fact, the
domestic feudal forces but also a tool employed by the foreign Revolution of 1911 was the most important revolution preceding
imperiahsts to dominate China. The people’s triumph over this the people’s revolution led by the CPC. Looking back over the
teudal monarchy that had betrayed them destroyed the old entire course of China’s modern revolutionary history, we can see
reactionary order and paved the way for revolutionary struggles that the Revolution of 1911 did bear fruit after all. The success
in the days to come. In this sense, the victory achieved in the of that revolution encouraged the Chinese people to keep up their
Revolution of 1911 was tremendous. struggle. On the other hand, its failure taught the progressives
However, the Revolution of 1911 also had obvious weaknesses, among them that it was impossible to build a bourgeois republic
it 1 ailed to set forth an explicit and comprehensive political under the historical conditions of the time. They came to realize
programme to combat foreign imperialist aggression and the that to win the independence and prosperity of the country and
the freedom and happiness of the people, they had to explore a
weUreaihe0Cr! ? arouse lhe lab°uring masses who new path.
h t r ^ maJ°nty °f the Chinese Population; and
it failed to form a strong revolutionary party that could success- Mao Zedong made clear the importance of the Revolution of
1911 when he said, “While studying the history of the Communist
 8
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 9
Party of China, wc should study materials concerning the Revo-
lution of 1911 and the May 4lh Movement before the founding mands” in a bid to obtain exclusive control of China. Yuan
Shikai, the chief of the Northern warlords, restored the monarchy
of history1”^ °thcrwise’ we cannot understand the development
and proclaimed himself emperor. Zhang Xun, a former senior
It was only ten years between the outbreak of the Revolution official of the Qing Dynasty, supported an attempt by the de¬
ot 1911 and the founding of the Communist Party of China throned Emperor Xuantong to stage a comeback. While the
A most all of the first generation of CPC revolutionaries had imperialist powers were in bitter rivalry in China, the domestic
taken part in the Revolution of 1911 or been deeply influenced warlords were intensifying their internecine warfare to set up
y it. These veteran Communists and many democrats who later separatist regimes. Going against the trend of the times, certain
cooperated with the Communist Party took that revolution as intellectuals advocated the worship of Confucius and the study of
their point of departure. Recalling his own ideological evolution the Confucian canon. One after another, dramatic events succeed¬
the Communist Lin Boqu wrote: ed each other on the Chinese stage. Describing the circumstances
Before the Revolution of 1911,1 believed that there would be of the time in broad outline, Mao Zedong wrote: “Their repeated
peace and tranquillity across the land if only we overthrew the struggles, including such a country-wide movement as the Revo¬
monarchy. But after I took part in the revolution and experienced lution of 1911, all ended in failure. Day by day, conditions in the
setbacks over and over again, the goal of democracy I had been country got worse, and life was made impossible. Doubts arose,
trying to attain was still far away. It was through bitter experience increased and deepened.”7
that I gradually came to realize I was in a blind alley and that I The reality was grim. The people carried out hard struggles and
finally chose communism. This is not the experience of only one made great sacrifices, but they did not obtain what they had
PerSL°n4?uany Pte0pie like me can be fouild in the revolutionary anticipated. A bourgeois democratic republic was not a panacea
ranks. Thus, the victories of the new-democratic revolution and for all the ills of China. Multiple political parties, the parliamen¬
, socialism in China can be regarded as the continuation and tary system and other institutions copied from the West were
development of the Revolution of 1911. tried out in the early years of the Republic of China, but they
failed to solve any practical problems and only became instru¬
ments employed by different factions of warlords, bureaucrats
II. THE EARLY STAGE OF THE NEW and politicians in their scramble for power and profit. Utter
CULTURAL MOVEMENT despair replaced the previous hopes. Yet this bitter experience
had its positive side for the progressives. Since they found the old
AND THE INITIAL DISSEMINATION OF road impassable, they began to look for a new way out. A greater
MARXISM revolutionary storm was brewing and would soon descend upon
the land.
After the failure of the Revolution of 1911, Chinese progres¬ The early stage of the new cultural movement — the period
sives were in despair, at a loss what to do. Their dreams were before the May 4th Movement of 1919 — presaged the coming
shattered, because the founding of the Republic of China did not storm.
ring about the desired national independence, democracy and In September 1915 Chen Duxiu, who had participated in the
social progress. In 1915, when World War I was at its height Revolution of 1911, founded the magazine Youth (later renamed
Japan seized the opportunity to put forward “Twenty-One De- New Youth) in Shanghai, touching off a new cultural movement.
In January 1917 Cai Yuanpei became the President of Beijing
 10
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 11

University. He advocated the assimilation of all schools of dered feudal ideas. They failed to reveal the social roots of
thought, engaged Chen Duxiu as the Dean of Liberal Arts and Confucianism and the necessity of transforming China’s basic
invited many scholars with new ideas to join the faculty. The
social system. They did not express genuine sympathy for the
editorial board of New Youth moved to Beijing, and Li Dazhao, misery of the workers and peasants who were the overwhelming
Lu Xun, Hu Shi, Qian Xuantong and Liu Bannong became majority of the population or wait patiently until they had been
members of the board and principal contributors. Thus Beijing aroused to revolutionary action. And they followed a formalistic
University and New Youth became the main bastions of the new methodology that led them to affirm or negate everything abso¬
cultural movement.
lutely. Nevertheless, their criticism of Confucianism shook the
The ideologists active at the beginning of the movement dominant position of the orthodox feudal ideas. It lifted the sluice
summed up the experience of the Revolution of 1911 and reflect¬ gate that had checked the current of new ideas, releasing a tide
ed on its failure. They came to the conclusion that the struggles of mental emancipation in Chinese society. This tide was vig¬
tor national salvation waged by earlier revolutionaries had all orous, progressive and revolutionary.
ended in failure simply because the Chinese people, as the saying The cardinal slogan of the new cultural movement was, “De¬
goes, had looked on indifferently as the house across the river mocracy and science.” At a time when feudalism was dominant
went up in flames. Accordingly, they believed that to establish a in society, it was historically progressive to advocate democracy
republic worthy of the name, it was necessary to thoroughly as opposed to dictatorship and science as opposed to blind faith.
remould the national character, and that if problems of ethics However, according to Chen Duxiu, the proponent of the slogan,
were not solved, politics and academic learning would be of no democracy referred to the bourgeois democratic system and bour¬
avail hey put forward the slogan, “Do away with supersti- geois democratic ideas, and science referred to “natural sciences
tions!”, calling on the people to “break through the net of histo¬ in a narrow sense and social sciences in a broad sense.”8 He
ry,” “cast off the yoke of outworn doctrines” and “emancipate emphasized the need to study society with the same scientif¬
their thinking.”
ic spirit and methodology applied to the study of the natur¬
The ideologists of those days directed their main attack against al sciences. However, he also regarded as science the ideological
the doctrines of Confucius, which had been the orthodox beliefs system of idealism (with certain borrowings from the natural
of feudalism. Rallying around New Youth and using the theories sciences), including William James’s pragmatism, Henri Berg¬
of evolution and individual emancipation as their major weapons, son’s theory of creative evolution and Bertrand Russell’s new
they mounted an assault on the “sages of the past,” represented realism.9 He advocated democracy and science because he be¬
by Confucius, and vigorously advocated a new ethics and a new lieved that “in order to survive in the present world,” China had
literature. Since the leaders of the Reform Movement of 1898 had to “build a new state of the Western type and organize a new
departed from the classics and ’rebelled against orthodoxy under society of the Western type” — that is, to build a bourgeois
the cloak of Confucianism, and the revolutionaries of 1911 had republic and develop capitalism.10 This showed that during its
never struck a direct blow against it, the ideologists of the new first stage the new cultural movement was essentially a struggle
cultural movement were the first to consciously challenge feudal of the new culture of the bourgeoisie against the old culture of
ethics. They had their own weaknesses. For instance, they be¬ the feudal class. The proponents of the movement emphasized the
lieved that it was possible to thoroughly remould the national “independent personality” and “equal human rights,” striving
character through struggle in the ideological and cultural fields only for the liberation of the individual instead of for the libera¬
alone, without transforming the social environment that engen¬ tion of the working people as a whole. They were therefore unable
12 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 13

to show the Chinese people the real way out of their misery. they themselves did not believe had any connection with reality.
In fact, the defects of capitalist civilization were becoming Others held that the theory of socialism was of no practical
increasingly apparent. Shortly after the outbreak of World War significance outside the developed capitalist countries. They were
I, Chen Duxiu wrote that when capitalism had replaced feudal¬ of the view that certain “socialist” measures could be adopted in
ism, “political inequality turned into social inequality, and mon¬ the course of developing capitalism in China so as to “prevent” a
archical and aristocratic repression turned into capitalist repres¬ socialist revolution. At the same time, there were also people who
sion.” There was no denying these defects of modern Western introduced Marxism into China as a school of socialist thought.
civilization.11 After a British missionary made the first mention of Marx and
World War I disclosed the inherent contradictions of capital¬ his theories in the Globe Magazine in Shanghai in 1899, both
ism in an incisive way. The unprecedented brutality of the war bourgeois reformists like Liang Qichao and revolutionaries like
and the social chaos that followed shocked the world and cast Zhu Zhixin wrote about them. However, until the October Revo¬
doubts on the value of Western civilization. It was the first time lution, Marxism was not correctly interpreted in China, and it
that the general public felt that the capitalist system no longer was not considered important. Conditions were not yet ripe for
had bright prospects and had lost its original attraction. Towards Chinese society to embrace Marxism, and its influence was neg¬
the end of the war, Li Dazhao said, “The war threw much doubt ligible.
on the authority of European civilization, and the Europeans It was the October Revolution that for the first time turned the
theories of socialism in books into a living reality. The Russian
themselves have to reflect on its true value.”12 In May 1916 he
revolution held particular interest for the Chinese people because
said: “Representative government is still the subject of experi¬
it had taken place in a country where conditions were very similar
ments. It is difficult to ascertain whether it is good or not and to
to those in China: severe feudal oppression combined with eco¬
predict whether it will survive or change.”13 In August 1917 Mao
nomic and cultural backwardness. This demonstrated that “a low
Zedong also said it was true that Oriental ideas did not conform
level of material civilization could in no way hold back the
to reality, but that Western ideas did not necessarily do so either.
progress of socialism,”15 and that when capitalism offered no
He concluded that most Western ideas should be remoulded along
solution, one could turn to socialism. The October Revolution was
with Oriental ideas.14 These doubts on the part of Left-wingers in
also a call to resist imperialism, a call that sounded “especially
the new cultural movement led them to seek a new means of
penetrating and especially significant”16 to the Chinese people,
national salvation and prepared the ground for their acceptance
who had been so bullied and humiliated by the imperialist pow¬
of Marxism.
ers. This gave a powerful impetus to those Chinese progressives
Why did the October Revolution that broke out in Russia in
who were inclined towards socialism, encouraging them to make
1917 call forth such vigorous response in China? Basically, it was
a serious study of the theories of Marxism that had guided the
because of the changes taking place in Chinese society. At a time
revolution. Furthermore, the mobilization of the Russian worker
when the Chinese people were groping desperately in the dark,
and peasant masses under the banner of socialism and the historic
the Russian revolution illuminated a path for them, furnishing
victory they had gained inspired the Chinese progressives to try
new and reasonable replies to the questions they were so anxious¬
new methods of revolution. In short, the October Revolution
ly studying.
aroused a new hope of national liberation in China. Under these
Earlier, even before the Revolution of 1911, certain Chinese
circumstances, a group of intellectuals who supported the Russian
intellectuals had begun to talk about socialism. However, some of
revolution and embraced the rudiments of communist ideas came
them only indulged in empty talk about anarchism, talk that even
 14
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 15
into prominence in China.
contradictions between labour and capital, caused ever greater
,hf.Lo^ahha°DWaS,the firSt *° hold aloft in China 'he banner of popular concern, providing an objective basis for the acceptance
he October Revolutjon. In 1918 he became professor and chief
librarian at Beijing University and emerged as a prominent of Marxism. The rapid increase in the number of students en¬
rolled in various new types of schools and the emergence of many
be! lTlTaftlr .t* T h"'"1™1 m0vement' In July and Novem- teachers in such schools and of journalists helped to form a larger
1 18, after shrewd observation of the October Revolution and
careful reflection upon it, he published a series of articles whh contingent of intellectuals than there had been in the period of
such titles as A Comparative Study of the French and Rushan the Revolution of 1911. The anti-imperialist and anti-feudal
Revolutions, The Victory of the Common People” and “The democratic revolution of the bourgeoisie had a new and much
stronger body of supporters. The rise of a great new people’s
ODments°h ^ W"h keen insight int0 historical devel- revolution was inevitable.
pments he declared that the victory of the October Revolution
a revolution based on socialism, a social revolution known to the
world tor its revolutionary colours, was a triumph for the labour
movement a harbinger of world revolution in the 20th century III. THE MAY 4TH MOVEMENT AND
and a new dawn for all mankind. He predicted that the tide set THE RISE OF SOCIALIST IDEAS
in motion by the October Revolution was irresistible and that the
future would surely see “a world of red flags ” In an article It was China’s diplomatic failure at the “peace conference” in
entitled “The New Era,” published on New Year’s Day 1919 he Paris that touched off the May 4th Movement.
wrote that the October Revolution had opened a new era in In the first half of 1919, the Allied countries held a “peace
uman history, that it would bring forth a new life a new conference in Paris. Actually, the conference was manipulated
by a few powers that had emerged victorious from World War I.
takeTheT
take ^
the same road as the Russians. the Chinese should
Since China had joined the Allies during the war, it too sent
While radica1 changes were taking place in the thinking of the delegates. However, the conference rejected its seven demands
hinese ideologists, profound changes were also quietly taking (including the liquidation of the foreign spheres of influence in
place in China s social structure. During World War I the coun¬ China and the withdrawal of foreign troops) and its call for the
try s national capitalist economy developed rapidly, because the annulment of Japan’s “Twenty-One Demands” and of the related
estern imperialist countries, busy fighting at close quarters on notes exchanged between the two countries. Moreover, the con¬
e European battlefield, had temporarily slackened their eco¬ ference ruled that Germany should transfer to Japan all the
nomic aggression against China. (Japan and the United States privileges it had obtained in Shandong Province. The “peace
were exceptions, continuing to expand their economic influence conference gave China nothing but some astronomical instru¬
ments that had been seized by Germany when the Eight-Power
1919 antao*°l In the six years froi" 1914 through
1919 a total of 379 factories and mines were built, or an average Allied Forces had stormed into Beijing in 1900. Nevertheless, the
of 63 a year. In connection with this development, the Chinese delegates from China’s Northern warlord government were pre¬
working dass and national bourgeoisie grew in strength On the pared to sign the “peace treaty.” When the news reached home, it
aroused the indignation of people of all social strata. The patriotic
nib 7 £y 4th M°Vement °f ,919' the Industrial workers
numbered about two million and were becoming an increasingly May 4th Movement, pioneered by the students, erupted like a
important social force. All sorts of social problems incTudh'g volcano.
On May 3 students from Beijing University, together with
 16 CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 17
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

representatives of students from other universities and secondary Chinese working class entered the political arena as an indepen¬
schools in Beijing, held a rally and decided to send a telegram to dent force. On June 5 in Shanghai, while students were kneeling
the special envoys in Paris, demanding that they refuse to sign down along the streets to appeal to the shopkeepers to go on
the “peace treaty.” One of the students cut his finger and wrote strike, about 70,000 workers spontaneously began a sympathy
in blood the four Chinese characters Huan Wo Qing Dao (Return strike. They were followed by workers in Beijing, l'angshan,
Qingdao to China).17 On May 4 more than 3,000 students from a Hankou, Nanjing, Changsha and other places. Shopkeepers in
dozen universities and schools assembled in front of the Tian’an- many large and medium-sized cities joined the strikers. Like a
men gate-tower and held a demonstration. They shouted such prairie fire, the struggle spread to more than twenty provinces
slogans as “Annul the Twenty-One Demands!”, “Return Qingdao and over a hundred cities across the country. Ihe May 4th
to China!” and “Punish the traitors Cao Rulin, Zhang Zongxiang Movement was no longer restricted within the narrow limits of
and Lu Zongyu!” (three pro- Japanese bureaucrats in the North¬ the intelligentsia: it had turned into a nationwide revolutionary
ern warlord government). They wrote in a declaration: “The land movement with the participation of the working class, the petty
of China may be conquered, but it must not be forfeited! The bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. The focus of the struggle shifted
people of China may be killed, but they must not bow their heads! from Beijing to Shanghai, and the workers gradually replaced the
The country has been subjugated! Compatriots, arise!” When the students as the main force.
demonstrators reached the west entrance of the foreign embassy On June 10, under the pressure from the people, the Northern
quarter their way was blocked, so they changed course, marching warlords were compelled to release the arrested students and to
towards the residence of Cao Rulin. There they found Zhang announce the dismissal of Cao, Zhang and Lu. On June 27 in
Zongxiang and beat him black and blue. Unable to find Cao Paris hundreds of Chinese — workers, students and other resi¬
Rulin, they set his house on fire. The government called out dents — went to the hospital where Lu Zhengxiang, the chief
troops and police to suppress the students, thirty-two of whom Chinese delegate, was staying for medical treatment and demand¬
were arrested. ed that he refuse to sign the “peace treaty.” The following day,
Closing ranks in the struggle, the university and middle-school the Chinese delegation did not attend the ceremony for the
students established a federation. Twenty-five thousand of them signing of the Treaty of Versailles.
staged a general strike. They also made patriotic speeches in the The May 4th Movement was an epoch-making event in the
streets, calling on the public to boycott Japanese merchandise and history of the Chinese revolution, marking the great beginning of
buy Chinese-made goods. Under the brutal repression of the the new-democratic revolution.
reactionary authorities, the students’ struggle ebbed for a time. Looking back on it, Mao Zedong wrote, “Its outstanding his¬
Then on June 3, as the government openly commended Cao Rulin torical significance is to be seen in a feature which was absent
and once again strictly banned any patriotic movement, they from the Revolution of 1911, namely, its thorough and uncom¬
resumed their campaign in the streets. The students spoke tear¬ promising opposition to imperialism as well as to feudalism.”18
fully, while the audiences sobbed, their hands covering their And according to Zhang Wentian, another prominent leader of
faces. Some 170 students were arrested on the first day, and some the CPC, “The greatest merit of the May 4th Movement lay in
700 on the second. On the third day, when more than 2,000 arousing the political consciousness of the masses and achieving
students turned out into the streets, they were attacked by mount¬ the unity of the revolutionary forces.”19
ed troops and police. In the beginning of the movement, the students emerged in the
It was at this juncture that an important event took place: the vanguard of the struggle, while at a later stage the working class
 18
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 19
became the main force, displaying its special sense of organiza¬
New Youth devoted to Marxism in May 1919. In his own article,
tion and discipline and its staunch revolutionary spirit. In the
“My Marxist Outlook,” he gave a comprehensive and systematic
words of Deng Zhongxia, an outstanding leader of the workers’
introduction to Marxism. Marxism, he wrote, was the integration
movement, “Thus the Chinese working class began a political
of the study of history, economics and politics; that is, historical
strike. Later, it managed to develop independent strength and an
materialism, economic theory and socialist doctrine, and “class
independent struggle of its own, on which this strike obvious¬
struggle [ran] through all three, like a gold thread.” Unlike the
ly exercised a great influence.”20 As they witnessed the great
vague and fragmentary explanations of Marxist theories that had
strength displayed by the working class in the struggle, “some of
appeared earlier, Li Dazhao’s introduction to Marxism was rela¬
the student leaders in the May 4th Movement set out to ‘join
tively precise and complete.
the public ,’ running schools for workers and organizing trade
Certain young people who had come into contact with Marxist
unions. Later they became the backbone of the newly founded
Communist Party of China. theories while they had been studying in Japan also played an
important role in the early propagation of Marxism in China. For
Around the time of the May 4th Movement, the Chinese
example, in November and December 1919, Yang Pao’an pub¬
progressives came to realize from the experience of the Paris
lished in New China Daily in Guangdong Province a series of
“peace conference” that the imperialist forces had joined together
articles entitled “Marxism (Also Known as Scientific Socialism)”
to oppress the Chinese people. This was the main cause of the
in which he gave a systematic account of Marxist historical
further dissemination of socialist ideas in China. Qu Qiubai a
materialism, economic theory and scientific socialism. Li Da,
prominent Communist and writer, wrote, “The cutting pain of
another student back from Japan, published his translations of
imperialist oppression awakened the public from the nightmare
such books as Explanations of Historical Materialism, A General
of vague democracy.... Therefore, the students’ movement swiftly
Survey of Social Problems, and Marxist Economic Theory. He
turned to socialism.”22 The study and propagation of socialism
also wrote articles for the press, including “What is Socialism?”
gradually became the main concern of the progressives. This was
and “The Objectives of Socialism.”
a salient feature ol the new cultural movement after the May 4th
Movement. Before the May 4th Movement, many intellectuals of differ¬
ent ideological persuasions had participated in the new cultural
It took time for people to understand socialism. At first they
movement, but since they concentrated their criticism on Confu¬
felt an obscure yearning for it, as if, Qu Qiubai continued, “they
cianism and promoted science and democracy, their differences
viewed the morning mist through a screened window. The differ¬
of opinion were not very evident. Now that Marxism was being
ent schools of socialism were confusing and its meaning was not
widely disseminated, however, distinct splits began to appear in
clear.”23 For the time being, people could hardly distinguish
the movement. Hu Shi, for example, had a passion for the
between scientific socialism and other schools of socialism. Mag¬
bourgeois civilization of the West, believed in pragmatism and
azine articles reflected every variety of socialist thinking —
advocated reformism. He had declared his determination “not to
anarchism, utopian socialism, cooperativism, pan-labourism,
talk about politics for twenty years.” At this juncture, however,
guild socialism, social democracy and so on. It was only after
he felt he “could no longer keep his eyes closed and hold his
repeated comparison and judgement that the Chinese progressives
tongue.” In an article entitled “More Discussions on Questions,
chose Marxist scientific socialism.
Less Talk about ‘Doctrines’!” published in July 1919, he stated
Li Dazhao played a major role in the early stage of the Marxist
that “every doctrine is a remedy applied by men of high ideals at
movement in China. He was the chief editor of a special issue of
a given time and place for a society at that time and place,”
 20
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 21

^!Zin! tkf !*ai?iSm WaS applicable t0 China. Instead, he advo-

d gradual reform and maintained that the search for “a public, breaking the news blockade imposed by the reactionaries.
^ anient3! solution” was “absolute proof of the bankruptcy of When the Chinese people, who had been bullied by the capitalist
logical circles in China.” He asserted that he had “tried to powers for so long, learned the content of the declaration, they
-how people the correct path so that they would not be misled” were overjoyed. New Youth carried comments from its readers
nd to prevent them from being “led by the nose” by Marx and and stated that the declaration embodied the spirit of the Consti¬
Lenin.24 In other words, he did his utmost to discourage the tution of Russia, that it demonstrated the will to eradicate capi¬
Chinese from embracing Marxism-Leninism and from trying to talist aggressiveness and that the Chinese should study and up¬
make a revolution. y s hold the doctrines of the worker-peasant government in Russia.
Jo meet the challenge from Hu Shi, the following month Li The Soviet declaration gave a fresh and powerful impetus to the
further dissemination of Marxism in China.
Doctrine,Heied an article entitled “More on Questions and
Doctrines. He pointed out that socialism was a banner of the Under these circumstances, many progressive intellectuals of
hmes and that the propagation of doctrines and the study of different backgrounds came to Marxism by different routes, after
prac ical questions were not conflicting endeavours but rather careful consideration of the alternatives.
upplemented each other. On the one hand, he said, the study of As an ideological leader during the initial stage of the new
practical questions must be guided by a doctrine. On the other cultural movement, Chen Duxiu declared after the May 4th
hand a socialist, if his doctrine is to have some influence in the Movement that since militarism and money-worship had caused
world must study how to apply his ideal, insofar as possible to endless crimes, it was high time to discard them. He said he had
hi real surroundings.*’ “As long as we apply a doctrine as a toS come to realize that republican politics was manipulated by the
or an actual movement, ’ he continued, “it will bring about bourgeoisie, which was in the minority, and that it was an illusion
changes that will be suited to the surroundings in accordance with to think it could be used to achieve happiness for the majority.
the time, the place and the nature of the matter.” In this wav Li He warned that China should not take the path followed by
Europe, the United Sates and Japan. In his article “On Politics”
3 prellminary “Position of the idea that the general
tenets of Marxism must be integrated with the actual conditions published in September 1920, Chen stated explicitly that it was
of the country and developed in the course of this integration He the prime necessity for a modern society to establish a stale of the
also rebutted Hu Shi’s arguments for reformism. In view of the labouring classes (the productive classes), by means of revolution,
and to institute politics and laws that would prohibit plundering
would65 °! ChT 3t the tlme’ hC declared’ Piecemeal reform at home and abroad.
°d work and fundamental social problems had to be
solved before specific issues could be addressed. At this juncture, a group of prominent young Left-wingers who
The debate on “questions and doctrines” had tremendous re- had emerged from the May 4th Movement also began to turn
towards Marxism. In the Xiangjiang Review, of which he was the
trCUv.SSi°uS' Many y°Ung people in different parts of the country
who had begun to embrace Marxist ideas wrote magazine articles editor-in-chief, Mao Zedong, then a well-known leader of the
expressing their support for Li Dazhao’s views. student movement in Hunan Province, enthusiastically praised
the victory of the October Revolution, declaring that it would
m„ThM f°vlctR.f1sian Government issued a declaration renounc-
ng al! the privileges formerly enjoyed by Czarist Russia within spread worldwide and that the Chinese should follow its example.
the borders of China. During March and April of 1920, The East After he came to Beijing for the second time, he eagerly sought
and other journals made this declaration known to the Chinese out books about communism and about conditions in Russia and
these helped to establish his faith in Marxism. Many years ’later
 22 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 23

he recalled, “By the summer of 1920 I had become, in theory and

found content. Democracy no longer meant narrow bourgeois
to some extent in action, a Marxist.”25 Other noted student
democracy but democracy for the majority; that is, for the
leaders, such as Deng Zhongxia, Cai Hesen and Zhou Enlai, one
labouring classes. For this reason they stressed the need to root
after another, set out on the same road.
out the class privileges of the minority and, in the words of Chen
As has been said above, some veteran members of the Chinese
Duxiu, to change the state of “the majority of proletarian labour¬
Revolutionary League also began to turn to proletarian socialism.
ers, who live in hardship, without freedom,” which did not
Many years later, Dong Biwu recalled how he and others had
conform to democracy.29 Science includes both natural and social
joined Sun Yat-sen in the revolution. “The revolution forged
sciences, but the Chinese Marxists believed that the study of
ahead, but Sun Yat-sen failed to get hold of it and, as a result, it
society could become a true science only when it was based on
was snatched by others. We therefore began to study the Russian
historical materialism. As far as science was concerned, therefore,
pattern” and to read Marxism.26 Wu Yuzhang, another veteran
prime importance should be given to the Marxist scientific world
revolutionary, said that at that time, from what he had experi¬
enced since the Revolution of 1911, he had come to realize that outlook, methodology and theory of social revolution.
“the old methods of revolution used in the past must be changed.” The dissemination of Marxism did not negate the ideological
“In the light shed by the October Revolution and the May 4th struggle against feudalism. On the contrary, it provided an even
Movement,” he added, “the idea that we must rely on the people sharper weapon for that struggle. Applying historical material¬
of the lower social strata and take the path of the Russians ism, the first group of Marxists in China revealed the social
became increasingly clear in my mind.”27 causes of feudal ideology and culture. They set a higher goal for
That these men with different experiences came to Marxism by their struggle against feudalism, elevating the struggle for libera¬
different routes indicates that it was the historic choice of a tion of the individual to a struggle for liberation of the masses.
considerable number of Chinese progressives to abandon the As for the form of the struggle, propagation of the new ideas by
capitalist programme for national construction and to take the a small number of people changed into revolutionary practice by
road illuminated by Marxist scientific socialism. This was the the masses, thus deepening their ideological liberation.
most essential feature of the new cultural movement after the From the very beginning, the Chinese progressives looked upon
May 4th Movement. Marxism not simply as a doctrine but as an instrument for
It is important to note that the first group of Marxists in China studying the destiny of the country. Although they were not
had been fervent fighters for bourgeois democracy. They forsook adequately prepared theoretically, they took the basic principles
their faith in bourgeois democracy and turned to Marxism. They of Marxism as their guide and participated enthusiastically in the
made this choice of their own accord, in light of their own mass struggle. At the beginning of 1920, a number of revolution¬
experiences and after careful consideration. This was because ary intellectuals in Beijing, at the urging of Li Dazhao, went to
Marxism, as a well-knit scientific theory, was more convincing to the living quarters of rickshaw men to investigate their miserable
them than any other doctrine and because, as Shi Cuntong put it, conditions. Deng Zhongxia and others went to Changxindian, a
“it can solve our problems and bring us benefits.”28 locomotive repair centre in the suburbs of Beijing, to conduct
After they accepted Marxism, the Chinese progressives did not revolutionary propaganda among the workers and begin to forge
discard the respect for science and democracy fostered by the links with them. From the very beginning, the participants in the
May 4th Movement. On the contrary, under the guidance of Marxist ideological movement saw to it that they integrated their
Marxism they infused those concepts with fresh and more pro¬ revolutionary ideas with practice and joined the masses in their
struggle. This was one of the characteristics and strong points of
 24 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 25

the Marxist ideological movement.

them prepare for the founding of such a party. (Shortly after the
At first, however, the dissemination of Marxism was confined
May 4th Movement began, Chen Duxiu had been thrown into
mainly to a small number of intellectuals. Communist groups in
prison by the warlord government in Beijing. After his release, he
various parts of the country, embryonic organizations of the
had moved to Shanghai, where he continued to publish New
Communist Party of China, made it their principal task to
Youth.)
disseminate Marxism and to integrate it with the workers’ move¬
China’s first Communist group was established in Shanghai,
ment.
the major centre of the Chinese working class. In May 1920, Chen
Duxiu sponsored the establishment of a society for the study of
Marxism, the purpose of which was to examine theories of social¬
IV. THE FOUNDING OF THE <*OMMUNIST ism and the question of how to transform Chinese society. In
PARTY OF CHINA July, socialists in Shanghai met to discuss the establishment of a
Communist party. In August, the Shanghai communist group was
In view of the dissemination of Marxism in China, its prelimi¬ organized. Among the members were Chen Duxiu, Li Hanjun, Li
nary integration with the workers’ movement, and the emergence Da, Chen Wangdao and Yu Xiusong. The group drafted a docu¬
of progressives who had embraced Marxism, the task of establish¬ ment along the lines of a party programme or constitution. As Li
ing a new type of revolutionary party of the working class was Da later recalled in his autobiography, “At its first meeting the
placed on the agenda. This was an objective trend of historical group elected Chen Duxiu secretary and decided to write to
development. In January 1920 an article entitled “Labour Organ¬ socialists in various parts of the country about organizing branch¬
izations and Political Parties” published in the press urged that es.” After consulting Li Dazhao in Beijing, Chen Duxiu decided
the labour organizations should create a large political party of to adopt the name Communist Party, instead of Socialist Party.
their own. in March the same year, Li Dazhao, after repeated In November 1920, the Shanghai Communist group drew up the
consultations with Deng Zhongxia and others, set up at Beijing “Manifesto of the Communist Party of China,” which stated that
University a society for the study of Marxist theories. This was “the aim of the Communists is to create a new society in accord¬
the first such body established in China and the first attempt ance with the communist ideal.” Therefore, the Manifesto contin¬
made by Li Dazhao to assemble those who were interested in ued, it was necessary to overthrow the political power of the
studying the theories of the Marxist school. bourgeoisie and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat
Help in establishing the political party of the Chinese working through revolutionary class struggle. According to an introduc¬
class came from the Third International (the Communist Inter¬ tion to the Manifesto signed on December 10, 1921, with the
national) led by Lenin. In April 1920, with the approval of the pseudonym “Chang,” “The Manifesto only covers some of the
Communist International, the Vladivostok Department of the principles of communism, so it has not been made public and only
Far East Bureau of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)
serves as a criterion for admitting Party members.” As the spon¬
sent Visinsky and others to China to acquaint themselves with the
soring group and liaison centre, the Shanghai group played an
revolutionary movement there and forge links with revolutionary
important role in founding the united revolutionary party of the
organizations. During his stay in Beijing, Visinsky met with Li working class in China.
Dazhao and discussed with revolutionaries from Beijing Univer¬
In October 1920, Li Dazhao, Zhang Guotao and others formed
sity the possibility of establishing a Communist Party. Then he
a Communist group in Beijing, the birthplace of the new cultural
went to Shanghai to meet with Chen Duxiu and others and help
movement. Li Dazhao became the secretary. The Beijing group
26 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 27

helped the socialists in Tianjin, Tangshan, Taiyuan, Jinan and nist Party, a semi-clandestine monthly, to spread elementary
other cities in northern China to establish Party and Youth knowledge about a potential Communist Party and to give news
League organizations. Between the autumn of 1920 and the spring of the Communist International and of Communist parties in
of 1921, Dong Biwu, Chen Tanqiu, Bao Huiseng and others in other countries, thus preparing the ground for the founding of
Wuhan; Mao Zedong, He Shuheng and others in Changsha; such a party in China. The Communist groups in various parts of
Wang Jinmei, Deng Enming and others in Jinan; and Tan Ping- the country propagated Marxism through newspapers and period¬
shan, Tan Zhitang and others in Guangzhou also established icals, including those published by themselves, such as Awaken¬
Communist groups, propagating communist ideas and carrying ing, a supplement to the Republican Daily in Shanghai, the
out organizational activities. Most such groups were established Wuhan Weekly Review in Hubei, the fortnightly Encourage the
in key cities, where the new cultural movement and the patriotic New in Jinan and the Mass Journal in Guangdong. Thanks to
May 4th Movement had had a profound influence, where large these journals, scientific socialism became a strong trend of
communities of industrial workers were located and where there thought in China.
were the first groups of intellectuals who believed in Marx¬ The Communist groups in Shanghai and Beijing also published
ism. Communist organizations were also formed by progres¬ many translations of Marxist works. The Chinese translation, by
sives among the Chinese students in Japan and France. Chen Wangdao, of The Communist Manifesto was published in
These early organizations had different names. The Shanghai August 1920. About one thousand copies were printed for the
group, for example, was known as the Communist Party of China first edition, and the work was reprinted in many other cities. The
from the very beginning. The Beijing group called itself the same month saw the publication of the Chinese translation of
Beijing Branch of the Communist Party of China. In later years Socialism: Utopian and Scientific by Engels. Also translated and
all these local organizations, which were soon to form the Com¬ published were writings on Marxism such as The ABC of “Capi-
munist Party of China, were commonly known as Communist taC by Marx, An Explanation of Historical Materialism, Class
groups. Struggle and The History of Socialism. The publication of these
books made it possible for the progressives in China to have a
Work of the Communist Groups systematic understanding of Marxism. In their initial propagation
of Marxism, the Communist groups gave paramount importance
Once established, the Communist groups in various parts of to the theories of scientific socialism and class struggle, and these
China disseminated Marxism in a planned way, doing propagan¬ theories had widespread influence in ideological circles.
da and organizational work among the workers and promoting In the original or newly established Marxist societies and other
the integration of Marxism with the workers’ movement. This was organizations, some of the Communist groups organized progres¬
ideological and organizational preparation for the founding of the sive young people to learn the basic theories of Marxism and
Communist Party of China. Their main activities were as follows. study the practical problems of China. In this way they created
1. Studying and propagating Marxism. the earliest backbone force of the future Party. In particular, the
In September 1920 New Youth became the organ of the Shang¬ Society for the Study of Marxist Theories in Beijing University,
hai Communist group and began to propagate Marxism openly. under the guidance of Li Dazhao, served this function: many
The new column “Study of Russia” in the magazine dealt with of its members and corresponding members were revolutionary
the experience of the October Revolution and of Soviet Russia. young people who later became Communists.
In November of the same year, the group launched The Commu¬ 2. Conducting polemics against anti-Marxist trends of thought.
28 A CONCISE HISTORY OF TIIE CPC CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 29

While the influence of Marxist ideology was spreading, some the wrong path taken by Europe, the United States and Japan.”
factions that supported bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology They added that the existence of the proletariat in China was an
were also propagating their political views under the name of undeniable fact and that “the Chinese proletariat is suffering
socialism. At this time, not all progressives who were seeking the even greater misery than the proletariat in Europe, the United
truth were able to see the essential distinction between Marxism States and Japan.” “This state of affairs,” they concluded, “cannot
and these other forms of socialism. The Communist groups had be remedied unless the Chinese labourers unite and form revolu¬
to struggle to make a clear distinction between scientific socialism tionary organizations to transform the system of production.”
and other forms of socialism and to win over persons who were The first group of Marxists were not aware that, for the
patriotic and inclined towards progress but who had been influ¬ revolution in semi-colonial, semi-feudal China, the first step had
enced by other schools of thought. to be democracy, with socialism only as the second step. But from
At the end of 1920, Zhang Dongsun and Liang Qichao the very beginning they stressed that capitalism was an impasse
launched a debate about socialism. Although they stated that in China, that socialism was the only solution and that it was
capitalism was bound to fall and socialism was sure to rise, they necessary to found a party of the working class to lead the
emphasized that since China was industrially backward, there Chinese people in revolution. This understanding was absolutely
was no ground for the founding of a political party representing correct and of far-reaching significance. They expounded their
the labouring classes and that a real worker-peasant revolution views on a theoretical plane and tested them against the actual
would never take place. They believed that poverty was the major circumstances of Chinese society. This showed that scientific
problem in China and that the solution was for the gentry and socialism could take root in China.
mercantile class to vitalize industry and commerce and develop Among the various trends of socialist thought, anarchism
capitalism. They called for “a rectified attitude toward capital¬ was dominant for a period of time. Proceeding from ultra-
ists” in order to “bring about sound, gradual development under individualism, the anarchists preached absolute freedom of the
the present economic system.” They expressed their faith in the individual in his opposition to power, to any form of organization
guild socialism advocated by Bertrand Russell, a British scholar, and discipline, to any authority and to any type of government,
— bourgeois reformism under the guise of socialism. including the dictatorship of the proletariat. They also attacked
These views were firmly rejected by the first group of Marxists private ownership and advocated absolute egalitarianism. China
in China. The Marxists declared that one could not think about was a country with a large petty bourgeoisie. In essence, the
ways to solve China’s problems without taking into account the proposals of the anarchists, which centred around the interests of
conditions of the times, and that judging from international the individual and seemed to be immensely radical and thorough¬
conditions and the state of society at home, it was impossible for going, echoed the sentiments of the small producers, who were
the country to develop capitalism independently. “The Chinese dissatisfied with the status quo because they had been reduced to
people’s position in the world economy,” they pointed out, “has bankruptcy, and of the petty-bourgeois intellectuals, who had
been secured in the mounting tide of the labour movement, and been reduced to despair politically. A number of young people
it is theoretically impermissible and practically impossible to who were discontent with the old society and looking for a way
institute a system that protects capitalists.” It was necessary, they out, were also influenced by this ideology because they knew little
felt, for China to develop education and industry, but it should about socialism. Before the May 4th Movement, Shi Fu and
do so by means of socialism so as to “uproot the plundering classes others had preached anarchism in China. During the period of
at home and resist international capitalism,” instead of “following the movement, anarchism had found many adherents, especially
30 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 31

in Guangdong Province, and more than 70 periodicals and books should be employed for the elevation of the workers’ status and
were published to propagate their ideas. As anarchism was essen¬ the shift of political power” in China, they pointed out that
tially antagonistic to Marxism, they increasingly directed their “social democrats try to make use of the parliament as a means
attacks at Marxism, which was being disseminated on an ever- of transformation, but in reality, parliamentary legislation invar¬
wider scale. Huang Lingshuang and others wrote articles with iably protects the propertied classes.” They also declared that as
such titles as “Criticism of Marxist Theories” and “We Are a result of the misrepresentations of the Second International, the
Against ‘Bolshevism,’ ” posing an open challenge to Marxism. It “cream” of Marxist socialism had disappeared completely. The
became an important task for the Marxists to expose the true social democrats’ socialism, they said, had degenerated into liber¬
nature of this school of petty-bourgeois socialist ideology. alism, and their revolutionism had degenerated into reformism.
During the polemics against the anarchists, the Marxists This revisionist thinking, they continued, found little support in
argued that while the power of the bourgeoisie should undoubt¬ China, because the class contradictions were extremely acute and
edly be opposed, the power of the proletariat should not. Revolu¬ the Chinese parliament had long since become a toy in the hands
tionary means must be adopted to seize political power and of the warlords. The Marxists’ criticism of the position taken by
establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. That was the only the Second International indicated that from the very beginning
way to protect the interests of the labourers and ultimately to the communist movement in China adhered to a revolutionary
eliminate classes and make the state wither away. Advocating orientation.
absolute freedom of the individual, the Marxists said, would only Actually, the polemics against the anti-Marxist trends of
make it impossible for the working class to close ranks and thought were a struggle to win over the masses. They helped
become a powerful combat force, and it would therefore make it progressives who were inclined to socialism to distinguish be¬
easier for the bourgeoisie to destroy the workers’ movement. tween scientific socialism and the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois
Social and economic chaos would result if the principle of distri¬ schools of socialism and to embrace Marxism. Many progressive
bution “from each according to his ability, to each according to young people who had been influenced by anarchistic ideas
his needs” were put into effect before the productive forces were became staunch Marxists later on.
highly developed. 3. Conducting propaganda and organizing the workers.
In reality, the social contradictions in modern China were so Once formed, the Communist groups in various parts of the
acute that only great unity and unremitting struggle could over¬ country took a direct and energetic part in the labour movement,
throw the old forces. Yet while the anarchists expressed opposi¬ organizing and educating the workers. This was something no
tion to power, they called for absolute freedom of the individual other political party had ever done in China.
and urged the elimination of all discipline and of any restraint by The Chinese working class displayed great strength in the later
the collective. In the end, however, this was all empty talk. The stage of the May 4th Movement, but it was still young, and a
anarchists could form only small, loosely organized groups with great many of its members came from among the impoverished
a tiny total membership, and they were unable to play an impor¬ peasants and urban vagrants, devoid of class consciousness. Ori¬
tant role in political life. Accordingly, when they encountered ginally they had had guilds and secret societies; later they had
scathing criticism from the Marxists, their influence quickly had so-called trade unions, which were only organizations manip¬
waned. ulated by hooligans or by employers.
The Marxists also rejected the revisionism of the Second Inter¬ To propagate Marxism among the workers and awaken their
national. Denouncing the assertion that “parliamentary tactics class consciousness, the Communist groups launched publications
32 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 33

addressed to them. These included Labour in Shanghai, The intellectuals were integrated with the workers.
Voice of Labour and the Workers' Weekly in Beijing and the 4. Founding the Socialist Youth League.
Jinan Labour Monthly in Jinan. At the same time, they estab¬ As a vigorous social force receptive to new ideas, young people
lished various types of workers’ schools, the most well-known of were, of course, highly valued by the Marxists. On the other hand,
which were the school for continuing education in Changxindian they were generally inexperienced and needed good leadership. To
in suburban Beijing, established by Deng Zhongxia and others of meet this need, in August 1920 the Shanghai Communist group
the Beijing group, and a similar one in western Shanghai estab¬ founded the Socialist Youth League. Yu Xiusong became the
lished by Li Qihan and others of the Shanghai group. Running secretary. After that, Youth League organizations were estab¬
such schools was the Party’s way of “starting its work among the lished in Beijing, Tianjin, Wuchang, Hankou, Changsha and
workers and of coming into contact with the masses to organize other cities, where they organized their members to study Marx¬
trade unions.”30 ism and take part in labour struggles, creating a reserve force for
As a result of these efforts at propaganda and education, the the future Party.
politically awakened workers demanded organization. In Novem¬ These four activities of the Communist groups gave a powerful
ber 1920 the Shanghai Machine-building Trade Union, the first impetus to the dissemination of Marxism and to its integration
trade union led by a Communist group, was founded with an with the workers’ movement. In the process, those intellectuals
initial membership of about 370. Soon after that, the Shanghai who had only recently come to believe in communism gradually
Printing Trade Union came into existence, with a membership of underwent profound changes in their thinking and in their atti¬
more than 1,300. On May 1, 1921, more than a thousand workers tude toward workers. At the same time, a number of workers
in Changxindian took part in a parade to mark International learned something about Marxism and raised their class con¬
Labour Day, and to announce the establishment of a “workers’ sciousness, becoming advanced elements of the proletariat. All
club” (trade union). One after another, trade unions were organ¬ this helped prepare the ground for the founding of a communist
ized by industrial workers and handicraftsmen in Wuhan, Chang¬ party.
sha, Guangzhou and Jinan. These trade unions began to call upon
the workers to strike.
The 1st National Congress of the Communist Party of China
Most of the members of the Communist groups were intellec¬
tuals. In order to carry out effective propaganda and organiza¬ In March 1921, Li Dazhao wrote an article calling for the
tional work among the workers, they put on workers’ clothes, founding of a political party of the working class. “In China
learned to speak their language and joined in their labour, doing today,” he said, “there is no organization that can really represent
everything possible to become one with them. Yu Xiusong, for the people. If friends of Faction C | the Communists] can establish
example, wrote to a friend that he had “changed his name and a solid and well-knit organization and see to the collective train¬
changed his clothes” to take a job at the Housheng Iron Works, ing of its members, there will be support for a great, thoroughgo¬
where he gave lectures to the workers.31 Li Zhong, a student from ing reform in China.”33 In March of the same year, representa¬
Hunan No. One Normal School and a member of the Socialist tives of Communist organizations throughout the country held a
Youth League, worked as a blacksmith at the Jiangnan Ship¬ meeting at which they issued a common statement of objectives
yard and helped Chen Duxiu and others organize the Machine- and principles and worked out a provisional programme.34
building Trade Union.32 So it was that from the very outset the On July 23, 1921, the 1st National Congress of the Communist
Marxist ideological movement in China was one in which the Party of China was convened at No. 106 Wangzhi Road (now. No.
 34 A CONCISE HISTORY OF TIIE CPC CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 35

76 Xingye Road), in the French concession in Shanghai. As the italism and ruthless oppression by foreign imperialists, the Com¬
meeting place caught the eye of plainclothes detectives and was munist Party of China could not clearly understand such ques¬
searched by foreign policemen, the delegates had to go to Jiaxing tions as whether it was possible to make socialist revolution
County in Zhejiang Province, where they held their final session on immediately and directly and what steps should be taken to
a pleasure boat on Lake Nanhu. Attending the 1st Party Congress realize socialism and then communism.
were twelve delegates representing fifty-three Party members in When the congress discussed the plan for practical work, it
seven localities. They were: Li Da and Li Hanjun (Shanghai), became clear that because the Party’s membership was so small,
Zhang Guotao and Liu Renjing (Beijing), Mao Zedong and He it would be difficult to organize the peasants and armed forces.
Shuheng (Changsha), Dong Biwu and Chen Tanqiu (Wuhan), Accordingly, it decided to concentrate the Party’s energy on
Wang Jinmei and Deng Enming (Jinan), Chen Gongbo (Guang¬ organizing factory workers. The Party’s first resolution adopted
zhou) and Zhou Fohai(residing in Japan). BaoHuiseng, designated by the congress provided that the basic task of the Party at the
by Chen Duxiu, who was then in Guangzhou, also attended the time would be “the establishment of trade unions of industrial
congress. Two representatives of the Communist International, G. workers,” that “the Party should imbue the trade unions with the
Maring and Nicolsky, attended as observers. spirit of class struggle” and that it should send members to work
The congress decided that the name of the new party would be in them. As the vanguard of the working class, the Communist
“the Communist Party of China” and that its programme would Party of China did not simply concern itself with propagating
be “to overthrow the bourgeoisie by means of the revolutionary Marxism but paid great attention to establishing close ties with
army of the proletariat ... to establish the dictatorship of the the working class. This was one of its chief merits.
proletariat in order to attain the objective of class struggle, that To ensure that the CPC would be an advanced party, the
is, the elimination of classes ... to abolish private ownership of congress sought to guarantee the quality of Party members. It
capital” and to ally itself with the Third International. From the decided to “admit new members only with particular caution and
day of its founding, the Communist Party of China set itself the after strict examination,” and since the Party was then composed
goal of socialism and, ultimately, communism, and advocated the almost entirely of intellectuals, to “make special effort in organ¬
attainment of that goal by revolutionary means. Thus it made a izing the workers and educating them in the spirit of commu¬
clear distinction of principle between itself and the social demo¬ nism.” The programme adopted by the congress also stipulated
crats of the Second International, who worshipped bourgeois that persons who applied for Party membership must not have
democracy and parliamentarianism. any inclination toward non-communist ideas. Before they were
The congress called for “cooperation with other political par¬ admitted, “they must sever relations with any other party or
ties in the struggle against the common enemy” — that is, the group which [was] opposed to the Communist Party programme.”
warlords but it failed to work out an explicit programme for Furthermore, it was stipulated that “the views of the Party and
the stage of democratic revolution. The newborn Communist the identity of Party members should be kept secret until such
Party of China had set socialism and communism as its goal and time as conditions are ripe for them to be brought into the open.”
was firmly determined to make a revolution, but it had little At a time when the Party had just been born, however, its ranks
understanding of the specific conditions of the country and did could hardly be totally pure. The twelve delegates to the 1st Party
not see the difference and connections between democratic revo¬ Congress split up later on. Most of them adhered unswervingly to
lution and socialist revolution. Under the social circumstances of their faith in socialism and communism and upheld the cause of
semi-colonial and semi-feudal China, with poorly developed cap¬ the Chinese revolution, for which some of them gave their lives.
36 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 37

People like Chen Gongbo and Zhou Fohai, however, were not secretly organized the Chinese Youth Communist Party and
genuine Communists, and they were expelled from the Party soon began to publish Chixin Pinglun (Sincere Review) as its organ.
after its founding. Others quit the Party, and some even betrayed Later this party abolished itself and urged its members to join the
the revolution. This was not surprising in a party that had only CPC as individuals.37 These facts show that the establishment of
just come into being. Even when the CPC grew into a mass party a political party of the working class to lead the Chinese people
composed for the most part of fine, staunch Communists, it was in their struggle had become the common demand of the most
inevitable that waverers, dissidents and turncoats should appear conscious revolutionaries in China and was an outcome of the
in its ranks. development of the objective situation. That the Communist
The congress elected Chen Duxiu and two others to form the Party of China was founded in the early 1920s was by no means
Central Bureau, the leading organ of the Party. Chen Duxiu was accidental.
to serve as secretary, while Li Da and Zhang Guotao were to be The CPC is a revolutionary Marxist party and the vanguard of
in charge of propaganda and organizational work respectively. the Chinese working class. It came into being under specific social
The 1st National Congress of the Party proclaimed the found¬ and historical circumstances. On the one hand, it was founded
ing of the Communist Party of China. after the October Revolution in Russia had been crowned with
The birth of the CPC was an inevitable outcome of the devel¬ victory and after the social-democratic trend of thought espoused
opment of the revolutionary movement in China. Almost at the by the Second International had been discredited during World
same time a number of progressives who had no links with the War I. It embraced Marxism, which was composed of a complete
Shanghai group, which initiated the founding of the CPC, were scientific world outlook and the theory of social revolution;
also preparing to found a party. In July 1920 a number of Chinese Leninism, which was Marxism developed in the era of imperial¬
students who were on a work-study programme in France gath¬ ism and proletarian revolution; and scientific socialism, which
ered at a meeting in College de Montargis. According to Li was clearly distinguished from bourgeois and petty-bourgeois
Weihan, one of those present, Cai Hesen “called for making a schools of socialism in the course of struggle. On the other hand,
radical revolution, organizing a Communist party and enforcing it was founded on the basis of the workers’ movement in semi¬
the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, following the path of colonial and semi-feudal China. The social contradictions in
the October Revolution in Russia.” He also consulted Li Weihan modern China were extremely acute. The working class was
and others about how to prepare for the establishment of a relatively new, and many workers had been small producers in
Communist party. This was never accomplished, however, Li the past, but it cherished a fierce desire for revolution, because it
recalled, “because Cai was busy leading the Chinese students’ was subject to ruthless oppression and exploitation by the foreign
struggle to secure opportunities to study.”35 In the summer of imperialists and by the domestic bourgeoisie and feudal forces.
1921, members of the Liqun Study Society met in Huanggang, Within this class there was no stratum of labour aristocracy such
Hubei Province, expressing support for the formation of a party as could be found in Europe, and no solid economic foundation
of the Bolshevik type and proposing that the organization be for reformism. China had not passed through a stage of “peace¬
named “Bo She” (for Bolshevik). Upon hearing of the founding ful” development of capitalism as Europe had done, so the
of the Communist Party of China, Yun Daiying, founder of the Chinese working class could not carry out peaceful parliamentary
society, immediately called on its members to disband it and join struggles and could have no illusions about bourgeois democracy.
the CPC.36 In the winter of 1923, more than twenty people in Therefore, the Party was not influenced by the Second Interna¬
Sichuan Province, including Wu Yuzhang and Yang Angong, tional. It was, from the outset, a party with Marxism-Leninism as
 38 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 39
its theoretical basis, a new type of revolutionary party of the the working class was the first requirement for the victory of the
working class.
Chinese revolution. With the birth of the CPC, the Chinese
Being different from the political parties of the past, the revolution took on an entirely new complexion.
Communist Party of China took a clear stand, analyzing prob¬ The Party had to operate in a semi-colonial, semi-feudal coun¬
lems in China from the Marxist point of view of class struggle try with a vast territory, a huge population, complicated condi¬
and carrying out mass work among the workers. By so doing, the tions and a backward economy and culture. It had to integrate
Party, despite its small size, threw all the decadent forces of the the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete prac¬
old society into a panic. When the communist movement in China tice of the Chinese revolution, a daunting undertaking for which
was only just stirring, it was criticized as “extremist” and re¬ its forerunners provided no experience to draw on. Inevitably, a
pressed jointly by the reactionaries at home and abroad. In April period of time would be required for the Party to grope its way
1920 the Northern warlord government, basing itself on a report¬ in the darkness and accumulate experience in the struggle. It
er’s despatch in the American newspaper The Chicago Sun that would be a slow hard task for the Party to gain strength and to
spoke of the need to guard against extremist preaching, sent work out a Marxist line, guiding principles and policies that were
telegrams to the military inspectors, governors and superintend¬ suited to the conditions of China.
ents of all provinces and regions, instructing them to keep a sharp
lookout for “extremists.”38 In December, at the request of Wang
Huaiqing, commander-in-chief of the infantry, the State Council V. FORMULATING THE PROGRAMME OF
of the Northern warlord government sent a letter to the Ministry
of Internal Affairs instructing it to draft special provisions for DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
punishing “extremists.” In his letter of request, Wang cried out
in alarm that the “scourge” of the propagation of communism was Before the founding of the Communist Party of China, the
“worse than fierce floods or savage beasts” and “should be strictly Chinese people had waged protracted struggles against foreign
guarded against so as to nip the trouble in the bud.”39 Under these aggressors and domestic feudal rulers. Yet these struggles had two
circumstances, which lasted many years, the CPC had to operate fundamental weaknesses. First, those who took part in them did
as an outlawed and clandestine party, whose members were not see clearly the targets of revolution, and they failed to unite
always in danger of being tracked down, arrested and executed with their real friends to attack their real enemies. The slogan
by the reactionary troops and police. Rarely had a political party “Support the Qing and exterminate the foreigners!” adopted by
in China had to function under such difficult conditions. the Yi He Tuan movement (the Boxers) and the actions they took
As the political party of the working class, the most advanced showed that the peasants did not understand the true nature of
class in the country, the CPC represented the interests not only the foreign aggressors and the ties between them and the feudal
of that class but of the vast masses of the people and the nation rulers at home. When the Chinese Revolutionary League, the
as a whole. Using Marxism to clarify its own understanding, the predecessor of the Kuomintang, had overthrown the monarchy of
Party was able to illumine for the Chinese people the goal of their the Qing Dynasty, it believed that it had accomplished its task
struggle and the path to victory. That is why it was able gradually and as a result, “the revolutionary army prospered while the
to take root in Chinese soil and to grow into an invincible force. revolutionary party waned.” For more than ten years after the
The founding of the Communist Party brought light and hope Revolution of 1911, the Kuomintang only sought to preserve the
Provisional Constitution promulgated in the first year of the
to the disaster-ridden Chinese people. A revolutionary party of
Republic of China (the so-called pro-Constitution campaign). It
40 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 41

failed to take a firm stand against imperialism and allied itself approved the principle of “equal opportunity in China for the
with the local warlords to counter the Northern warlords, thus commerce and industry of all nations” and the principle of the
proving that the bourgeois democrats, too, were incapable of “Open Door,” which had been proposed by the United States in
identifying the goal for which the Chinese people should struggle. a bid to curb Japan’s exclusive domination of China and to
This was the main reason why little had been achieved in the confirm the imperialist powers’ joint control of the country.
revolutionary struggles of the past. Manipulated by the imperialists, the warlords of various factions
Second, the earlier revolutionaries did not arouse the people on in China intensified their rivalry and fought each other again and
a broad scale and, in particular, did not go deep among the again in large-scale wars such as the Zhili-Anhui War and the
workers and peasants to launch organized, sustained mass move¬ Zbili-Fengtian War, throwing the political situation in China into
ments. The activities of the Chinese Revolutionary League were utter chaos. These events made it clear to the CPC that what the
conducted mainly by a small number of revolutionaries in alli¬ Chinese people suffered from most was not ordinary capitalist
ance with some secret societies or the New Army. They did not exploitation but oppression by imperialists and rule by feudal
integrate themselves with the peasants in the rural areas, and warlords. In January 1922 the Party sent representatives to Mos¬
their activities were divorced from the peasants’ spontaneous cow to attend the first congress of representatives from Commu¬
struggles. Neither did they integrate themselves with the workers nist parties and national revolutionary organizations of the Far
in the cities. After the Revolution of 1911, although the Kuo- Eastern countries, convened by the Communist International.
mintang waged a struggle against Yuan Shikai and opposed the The congress expounded Lenin’s theories on the national and
Northern warlord government, it did little mass work. As Zhou colonial questions and stated that, so far as China was concerned,
Enlai remarked years later, the ordinary workers and intellectuals the first thing to do at the time was to “free the country from the
“were not deeply impressed” by the Kuomintang.40 This was shackles of foreign countries, overthrow the military governors”
another main reason why little had been achieved in the revolu¬ and establish a democratic republic. These ideas were of direct
tionary struggles of the past. Shortly after the founding of the assistance to the CPC in working out a revolutionary programme
Communist Party of China, radical changes took place in these for that period.
two respects.
The CPC took an active part in revolutionary activities and The 2nd National Congress of
learned, in the course of the struggle, to apply the Marxist method the Communist Party of China
in observing and analyzing the problems China was faced with.
In January 1922, the introduction to The Pioneers, a magazine, The programme of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic
declared that the first task should be “to study assiduously the revolution in China was formulated at the 2nd National Congress
objective conditions of China so as to find the most appropriate of the CPC, held in Shanghai in July 1922. Twelve delegates
solution to the country’s problems.” attended the congress, representing 195 Party members (21 of
The Washington Conference convened by the imperialist pow¬ whom were workers) from various parts of the country.
ers towards the end of 1921 served as a practical lesson for the The congress analyzed China’s economic and political condi¬
young Communist Party of China. At the conference a treaty was tions and brought to light the semi-colonial and semi-feudal
adopted by the nine nations — the United States, Great Britain, nature of the society. On the one hand, the congress stated, China
Japan, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium and had been placed under the control of the imperialist powers both
China (i.e., the warlord government in Beijing). This treaty politically and economically and, indeed, had become “a semi-
 42 A CONCISE HISTORY OF TIIE CPC 43
CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC

independent country under the domination of international Hu Shi published in the weekly Endeavour an article entitled “In¬
capitalist-imperialist forces.” On the other hand, it said, China ternational China,” ridiculing the Party’s scientific thesis that the
remained under the political domination of the warlord and imperialists were sponsoring the feudal warlords as “a tall story told
bureaucratic feudal system, which constituted an immense obsta¬ by country bumpkins.” He held that the major problem of the time
cle to the development of the rising Chinese bourgeoisie. It was to form “a good government” composed of “good people,” and
concluded that the democratic revolutionary movement against that it was not necessary to “involve any problem of world imperi¬
the imperialist and feudal forces was of paramount importance. alism at this time.” However, it was impossible to establish any
While the Party’s maximum programme was to realize socialism really good government or to achieve any economic and political
and communism, the programme for the present stage should be progress unless imperialist oppression and the warlords’ regime
to overthrow the warlords, to cast off oppression by world imperi¬ were overthrown. What the Communist Party stated in scientific
alism and to unify the country as a genuine democratic republic. language was precisely what the Chinese people had dimly per¬
Given present conditions, the congress believed, this was a stage ceived from the realities of their own lives. For this reason, the
that could not be skipped over. Party’s programme quickly spread far and wide and was accepted
The congress went on to say that in order to attain the goal of by the public. “Down with the imperialist powers! Down with the
the revolutionary struggle against the imperialists and warlords, warlords!” became the demand of the people.
it was imperative to form a democratic, united front. After Nevertheless, the Communist Party also had some mistaken
making an elementary analysis of the conditions of all classes in views regarding the Chinese revolution. It believed that the
Chinese society, it noted that the masses of Chinese peasants, with success of the democratic revolution would only bring the prole¬
their tremendous revolutionary enthusiasm, were “the greatest tariat some freedoms and rights. In other words, the victory of
essential factor in the revolutionary movement.” A large section the democratic revolution would be a victory for the bourgeoisie.
of the petty bourgeoisie would also join the revolutionary ranks, The Chinese Communists reached this conclusion by judging
because they were suffering untold misery. To free themselves from what had happened in Western countries, but the Western
from economic oppression, the emerging bourgeoisie would have model was not applicable to the Chinese revolution. The Party
to rise and struggle against world capitalist imperialism. As for had understood the difference between democratic revolution and
the working class, it was a great force that would steadily grow socialist revolution, but not the difference between old democrat¬
into a revolutionary army that would overthrow imperialism in ic revolution and new democratic revolution. And it did not
China. realize that under the new historical conditions, the democratic
Thus, for the first time, the 2nd National Party Congress revolution should be a new democratic revolution led by the
proposed for the Chinese people a clearly defined programme of proletariat.
anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution. For a long Besides formulating an explicitly anti-imperialist and anti-
time, the participants in that revolution, launched in the previous feudal revolutionary programme, the Communist Party adopted
century, had had no clear idea of its targets and motive force and a brand-new method that had never been, and could never be,
had never come out openly against the imperialist and feudal adopted by the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois political parties and
forces. But just a year after the Communist Party of China was groups — the method of arousing the masses and relying on them
founded, these questions had been clarified. Only the CPC, armed to carry out the revolution.
with Marxism, could point the way for the Chinese revolution. As the vanguard of the working class, the Communist Party of
After the declaration of the 2nd Party Congress was made public, China was different from other parties. All its activities were
44 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 45

undertaken to serve the interests of the working class and the 162 representatives from trade unions in different parts of the
masses and to achieve their liberation. It dared therefore to trust country who belonged to different political parties and groups.
the people and rely on them. In its declaration, the Second Party “Because the Communist Party enjoyed extremely high prestige at
Congress stated: “Our Communist Party is neither a Marxist the conference,” wrote Deng Zhongxia, “the different parties and
academic society organized by intellectuals nor a utopian revolu¬ groups expressed no objections” to the three slogans put up at the
tionary organization of a few Communists who are divorced from conference hall — “Down with imperialism!”, “Down with the
the masses.... Since ours is a party fighting for the proletariat, we warlords!” and “Long live the Communist Party of China!” “The
should go among the masses and form a large mass party.” It went conference adopted the proposal that until an all-China federation
on to say that the Party should have the organization and training of trade unions was established, the Secretariat of the Chinese
that would fit it for the revolution and that “all the Party’s Labour Organization should serve as the general liaison office for
activities should be conducted in the depths of the masses” and the workers’ organizations throughout the country, and, actually,
“must never be divorced from the masses.” The upsurge of the it was acknowledged as the only leader in this field.” This was a
Chinese workers’ movement in the early stage of the Party’s confirmation of the leading position of the Party in the labour
existence was an initial manifestation of the might of the Party’s movement. The success of the conference “led the working class
mass line. onto the road to national unity.”41
Around the time of the 1st National Labour Conference, there
came a first upsurge of the Chinese workers’ movement. It began
The Upsurge of the Labour Movement
with a strike by seamen in Hong Kong in January 1922 and culmi¬
To promote the labour movement, the Communist Party estab¬ nated in a strike by the Beijing-Hankou Railway workers in Fe¬
lished the Secretariat of the Chinese Labour Organization as a bruary 1923. Within those thirteen months, more than a hundred
headquarters openly directing the movement. The head office was strikes of different dimensions were staged in various parts of the
set up in Shanghai and later moved to Beijing. The director country, with the participation of more than 300,000 workers.
was Zhang Guotao, who was later replaced by Deng Zhongxia. The seamen’s strike in Hong Kong was the first organized
Branches of the organization were established in Beijing, Wuhan, battle of the Chinese working class against the imperialist forces.
Hunan, Guangdong, Shanghai and other places. The Secretari¬ It started in Hong Kong and spread to the Yangtze River Valley,
at published the journal Labour Weekly, ran workers’ schools, lasting about four months. In January 1922 seamen in Hong
formed industrial workers’ trade unions and organized strikes. Kong went on strike, demanding higher wages. Under the leader¬
These included strikes of workers at British and American ciga¬ ship of Su Zhaozheng, Lin Weimin and others, the strikers
rette factories in Shanghai, of workers on the Wuchang-Changsha persisted in their struggle for 56 days, overcoming every sort of
section of the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway and of rickshaw men obstruction and sabotage by the Hong Kong British authorities.
in the foreign concessions in Hankou. The political influence of The strike paralyzed all shipping, urban traffic and production in
the Party was growing among the workers and in society as a Hong Kong, and the authorities were compelled to cancel the
whole. order declaring the seamen’s union illegal and to increase their
In May 1922 the Secretariat of the Chinese Labour Organization wages by 15-30 percent. In the words of Deng Zhongxia, “The
convened the First National Labour Conference in Guangzhou to British imperialists, who had been self-assured and awe-inspiring
discuss a number of questions, including ways of strengthening the for seventy years, yielded to the power of Chinese seamen at
unity of workers all over the country. Present at the conference were last.”42 The anti-imperialist strike won the support of Sun Yat-sen
 46 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 47

and the Kuomintang. The Secretariat of the Chinese Labour meet most of the workers’ demands, so the three-day strike at
Organization also helped the striking sailors along the Yangtze. Anyuan came to a victorious conclusion. The membership of the
The victory of the strike strengthened the courage and confidence workers’ club, which had been 700 before the strike, grew rapidly
of the working class in their struggle and fostered the growth of to more than 10,000.
the labour movement all over the country. Shortly thereafter, a major strike took place in northern China.
Another of the major strikes staged in southern China in this On October 23, the workers at the Kailuan Coal Mines near
upsurge of the labour movement was the strike of the workers of Tangshan in Hebei Province struck for higher wages and recog¬
the Anyuan Coal Mines in Jiangxi Province and of the railway nition of their workers’ club. Fifty thousand miners at Kailuan
leading from the mines to Zhuzhou in neighbouring Hunan joined in the strike, placing pickets to keep order. The Secretariat
Province. There were more than 17,000 workers at the Anyuan of the Chinese Labour Organization appointed Peng Lihe and
mines and on the railway. Mao Zedong went to Anyuan on a others to assume command of this struggle. Several miners were
fact-finding mission and then Li Lisan went there to organize the killed and fifty others were wounded in front of the office of the
workers. On May 1, International Labour Day, 1922, the Anyuan mine administration by troops and police who had been called out
Mine and Railway Workers’ Club (trade union) was established. to suppress the strikers. This bloodshed did not dampen the
Early in September, Mao Zedong returned to Anyuan to organize morale of the strikers, and none of them returned to work. After
a strike; he was followed by Liu Shaoqi. On September 14, to more than twenty days, considering that the strike had been going
press the authorities for recognition of the club and a wage on for quite a long time and that it was difficult to keep it up any
increase, the workers went on strike. They put forward seventeen longer, the strikers accepted mediation and, when the mine au¬
demands, including protection of their political rights and im¬ thorities increased their wages somewhat, reluctantly returned to
provement of their material benefits. The mine and railway work.
authorities tried to buy over the workers’ leaders and to assassi¬ The strike of the Bcijing-Hankou Railway workers was de¬
nate Li Lisan, but their schemes ended in failure. Then they sent signed to win recognition of the General Beijing-Hankou Railway
a telegram to the local warlords, asking them to set up a martial Trade Union. Zhang Guotao, Luo Zhanglong and other Commu¬
law enforcement headquarters in Anyuan. When Liu Shaoqi nists were the principal leaders. The Beijing-Hankou Railway, a
walked to the headquarters to negotiate with the authorities, major north-south artery, was controlled by Wu Peifu, chief of
thousands of workers encircled the building to ensure the safety the warlords of the Zhili faction, for whom it was an important
of their representative. The Communist Party employed good source of revenue with which to finance his troops. The inaugural
tactics in this strike. Liu Shaoqi said, “We should tell the cadres meeting of the General Beijing-Hankou Railway Trade Union
and Party members beforehand that the aim of the revolution is was scheduled for February 1, 1923, in Zhengzhou, Henan Prov¬
to seize political power. The workers cannot be thoroughly liber¬ ince. Wu Peifu, who in an open telegram had promised to “protect
ated before we gain political power. Therefore we can only put the workers,” suddenly turned hostile and ordered his troops to
forward limited demands in the strike. The results of negotiations prevent the meeting from being held. On February 1 the troops
will surely be limited, too. So long as wages are raised and the and police took control of the entire city of Zhengzhou and
workers’ club is recognized, we should declare the strike victo¬ cordoned off the union headquarters. Representatives of the
rious and end it.”43 Thanks to the valiant struggle of the workers workers broke through the lines and crowded into the hall,
and the sympathy and support they gained from people of all shouting “Long live the General Beijing-Hankou Railway Trade
walks of life, the mine and railway authorities were compelled to Union!” and other slogans. However, the meeting could not be
 48 CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC 49
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

held because the hall had been wrecked and the temporary recruit more members from among the workers. With the growth
residence of some of the representatives was under siege. The of the labour movement, a number of outstanding figures emerg¬
union called on workers all along the railway to go on strike “to ing from the ranks — such as Su Zhaozheng, Shi Wenbin, Xiang
fight for freedom and human rights.” On February 4, thirty Ying, Deng Pei and Wang Hebo — joined the Party one after
thousand workers held an orderly general strike. Within three another. Grassroots organizations of the Party were also estab¬
hours, the entire 1,000 kilometre-long Beijing-Hankou railway lished in industrial and mining enterprises. For example, a Party
was shut down. On February 7, Wu Peifu, with the support of the branch was set up in the area of the Anyuan mine and railway in
imperialist forces, assembled troops and police to shoot down the February 1922, and by May 1924 it already had more than 60
striking workers in cold blood. In Hankou the reactionaries tied members.
Lin Xiangqian, president of the Hankou Branch of the union (a The struggles of this period provided important lessons. First,
Communist Party member), to an electricity pole and tried to the enemies of the Chinese revolution were extremely strong. To
force him to call the strikers back to work. Lin refused to defeat such formidable enemies, it was not sufficient for the
surrender and died a hero’s death. Shi Yang, legal consultant to proletariat to fight alone, and every opportunity had to be used
the General Beijing-Hankou Railway Trade Union (also a Com¬ to win over all potential allies. Second, in semi-colonial and
munist Party member), who had gone to Zhengzhou to attend the semi-feudal China, the workers were not permitted any democrat¬
inaugural meeting of the union and had now returned, was ic rights whatsoever, and almost all their large-scale struggles
murdered in nearby Wuchang. Struck by three bullets, he shouted were suppressed by the reactionary troops and police. It was
“Long live the workers!” three times before he died. During this therefore impracticable to rely on strikes and legal battles to bring
massacre, 52 people were killed and more than 300 were wound¬ about victory, without waging revolutionary armed struggles. In
ed. Afterward, some 40 were thrown into prison, and more than a statement issued after the February 7th massacre, the Secretari¬
1,000 others were dismissed or went into exile. at of the Chinese Labour Organization made this point when it
After the February 7th massacre, trade union organizations in asked, “Would the workers have let themselves be slaughtered
all parts of the country, except those in Guangdong and Hunan like this if they had had weapons?”44 Bearing these lessons in
provinces, were banned. The workers were demoralized, and for mind, the young Communist Party of China entered a period of
some time the labour movement across the country remained at great revolution based on cooperation with the Kuomintang.
a low ebb.
During this period, the workers’ struggles were organized
mainly under the leadership of the Communist Party. These NOTES
struggles demonstrated the revolutionary steadfastness and com¬
bat capability of the Chinese working class and expanded the 1. The leaders of the movement tried to use the Emperor’s authority to adopt
political influence of the Party as the vanguard of that class. This reforms to save the nation from extinction and develop capitalism without
provided favourable conditions for cooperation between the Party basically changing the feudal system.
2. “The Orientation of the Youth Movement,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong,
and other revolutionary forces and for the launching of a great Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1975, Vol. II, p. 243.
nationwide revolution. 3. Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen, Chin, ed., Zhonghua Book Company, Beijing,
Through the struggles of this period, the Communist Party 1981, Vol. I, pp. 288-89.
4. Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen, Chin, ed., Zhonghua Book Company, Beijing,
forged closer ties with the working class and increased its own 1986, Vol. IX, p. 99.
strength. In June 1922 the Party’s Central Committee planned to 5. Mao Zedong, “How to Study the History of the Communist Party of China,”
 50 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC 51
CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC

March 30, 1942.

1953.
6. Lin Boqu, “The Elapse of Thirty Years,” Liberation Daily, October 10, 1941. 37. Reminiscences ofWu Yuzhang, Chin, ed.. The China Youth Publishing House,
7. “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong Beijing, 1978, pp. 156, 160.
Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1975, Vol. IV, p. 413. 38. Archives of the Patriotic May 4th Movement, Chin, ed., China Social Sciences
8. Chen Duxiu, “A Plea on the Charge Against New Youth," January 15, 1919. Publishing House, Beijing, 1980, p. 620.
9. Chen Duxiu, “What Is the New Cultural Movement?”, April 1, 1920.’
39. Ibid., p. 623.
10. Chen Duxiu, “The Constitution and Confucianism,” November 1, 1916. 40. “Comrade Zhou Enlai on His Own Experience and the History of the
11. Chen Duxiu, “The French and Modern Civilization,” September 15, 1915. Revolution: Minutes of a Talk with an American Correspondent”, September
12. Collected Works of Li Dazhao, Chin, ed., The People’s Publishing House
l 7*ru.
Beijing, 1984, Vol. I, p. 565. 41. Collected Works of Deng Zhongxia, Chin, ed.. The People’s Publishing House,
13. Ibid., p. 168.
Beijing, 1983, pp. 481, 485.
14. “A Letter to Li Jinxi,” August 23, 1917.
42. Ibid., p. 476.
15. Reports of the Proceedings of the Xin Min Society, No. 2, January 1921. 43. Quoted in the Preface to Collected Works of Lu Dingyi, published in People s
16. Collected Works of Li Dazhao, Chin, ed., The People’s Publishing House Daily on March 13, 1991.
Beijing, 1984, Vol. II, p. 577. 44. “The Whole Story of the February 7th Massacre” by the Secretariat of the
17. Qingdao, a port city in Shandong Province, was occupied by Germany in 1897 Chinese Labour Organization, February 27, 1923, in Selected Data Concerning
and seized by Japan during World War I. It was recovered by China in 1922. the Great February 7th Strike, Chin, ed., The Workers’ Publishing House, Beijing,
18. “On New Democracy,” in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed., Foreign 1983, p. 206.
Languages Press, Beijing, 1975, Vol. II, p. 373.
19. Zhang Wentian, The History of Contemporary Revolutionary Movements in
China, Chin, ed., The Chinese People’s University Press, Beijing, 1987, p. 133.
20. Collected Works of Deng Zhongxia, Chin, ed., The People’s Publishing House,
Beijing, 1983, p. 430.
21. Ibid., p. 431.
22. Selected Poems and Essays of Qu Qiubai, Chin, ed., The People’s Literature
Publishing House, Beijing, 1982, pp. 34-35.
23. Ibid., p. 35.
24. New Treatises of Hu Shi, Chin. cd„ Book Series of the Republic of China.
Part I, Book 96, Shanghai Bookstore, 1989, Vol. 1, p. 645.
25. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, Random House, New York, 1938, p. 139.
26. “Dong Biwu on the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China
and the Communist Group in Hubei,” August 4, 1971.
27. Reminiscences of Wu Yuzhang, Chin, ed., China Youth Publishing House
Beijing, 1978, pp. 109, 110, 112.
28. Shi Cuntong, “Who Is our Archenemy?”, September 28, 1920.
29-^Chen Duxiu, “Labour Dictatorship: A Reply to Ke Qingshi,” November 1,

30. Collected Works of Deng Zhongxia, Chin, ed., The People’s Publishing House
Beijing, 1983, p. 436.
31. Letter to Luo Zhixiang, April 4, 1920.
32. Letter from Mao Zedong to Luo Xuezan, November 26, 1920.
33. Collected Works of Li Dazhao, Chin, ed.. The People’s Publishing House
Beijing, 1984, Vol. II, p.444
34. “Zhang Tailei’s Report to the Far East Secretariat of the Communist Interna¬
tional” in spring 1921, in The Young Communist International and the Youth
Movement in China, Chin, ed.. The China Youth Publishing House, Beijing 1985
p. 42. ’ ’
35. Li Weihan, Reminiscences and Study, Chin, ed.. Historical Data Press of the
CPC, Beijing, 1986, Vol. I, pp. 16, 19.
36. Liao Huanxing, The Whole Story of the Liqun Study Society in Wuchang,
 CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 53

weak, it clearly articulated the goal of a national democratic

revolution and, moreover, waged a courageous struggle for that
goal. The initial victories in this revolution resulted from political
cooperation between the Kuomintang and the CPC.
The outbreak of the Revolution of 1911 and the founding ot
CHAPTER TWO the Republic of China had kindled hope in the hearts of many
Chinese. However, their hope had been quickly extinguished, and
IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT now they were anxiously groping in the dark, seeking a way out
REVOLUTION of their intolerable situation.
By the early 1920s, the people were confronted with two major
problems. First, after the European powers and the United States
had gone through the economic crisis following World War I,
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FIRST they had staged a comeback and were now redoubling their
PERIOD OF COOPERATION efforts to plunder China. They played out their conflicts and
BETWEEN THE KMT AND THE CPC alliances on Chinese soil and controlled the country politically
and economically. The conditions under which the national in¬
From 1924 to 1927, a great revolutionary movement swept dustries had expanded successfully during the war no longer
across the country. This movement was unprecedented in modern existed, and most people were directly experiencing, great pres¬
Chinese history, because vast numbers of people were mobilized sure from the imperialist powers, so that there was widespread
to participate in it. In China it is known as the “Great Revolu¬ resentment against them. Second, fighting between the warlords,
tion.” As expressed in the lyrics of a popular song of the lime, the each backed by a different imperialist power and each trying to
aim of this revolution was to “overthrow the great powers and control the whole country, had become a salient feature of the
eliminate the warlords.” “The great powers” was a reference to socio-political landscape. At this lime the Northern warlords, who
the imperialist powers, and of course, even if the revolution were controlled the central government in Beijing, were divided into
successful, that would not rid the world of them. But this slogan three principal factions in three different provinces: the Zhili
expressed the people’s determination to combat the invasion and (present-day Hebei) clique, the Anhui clique and the Fengtian
oppression by the imperialist powers, to liberate the country from (present-day Liaoning) clique. These factions engaged in constant
their rule and to gain independence. The imperialists governed warfare. In 1920 war broke out between the Zhili and Anhui
China indirectly through the feudal warlords, of which the warlords. In 1922 and 1924 there were two wars between the Zhili
Northern warlords were the most powerful at this time. Accord¬ and Fengtian warlords. Some of the warlords in southern China
ingly, the objective of the Great Revolution was to overthrow the cooperated with or maintained ties with the Kuomintang, which
regime of the imperialists and the Northern warlords; thus, it was was led by Sun Yat-sen. A constant state of war persisted between
to be a national democratic revolution. them and the Northern warlords. In 1917 the number of soldiers
The Great Revolution gave vent to the people’s pent-up hatred involved in this internecine fighting was about 55,000. By 1924 it
and rage against the imperialists and feudal warlords. That it took had reached 450,000. Military expenditures rose sharply, placing
place in the mid-1920s can be attributed to the existence of the an unbearable tax burden on the people. The nation was disinte¬
Communist Party of China. Although the CPC was still small and grating. In provinces that had experienced several years of con-

52
54 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 55

tinuous civil war, the lives and property of the people could generalissimo of the army and navy. He also gained control of the
hardly be guaranteed. People of all social strata were hoping for rich Pearl River Delta and central Guangdong and secured the
a great revolution that would change these conditions. loyaty of tens of thousands of soldiers. Although most of these
However, it would be extremely difficult to fulfil such hopes. soldiers were commanded by local warlords, they supported the
The imperialist powers and the feudal warlords were deeply national revolution in the areas controlled by Sun s government
entrenched, and it would be impossible for an isolated minority and permitted the revolutionary forces to be active openly. In no
or scattered individuals to overthrow them. From the failure of other place in China was this allowed. Third, having experienced
the Beijing-Hankou Railway workers’ strike, the Communists had setbacks over and over again. Sun Yat-sen had become keenly
learned that in semi-colonial, semi-feudal China, although the aware that many members of the Kuomintang were increasingly
working class was resolutely revolutionary, it was too small to corrupt and that new tactics had to be adopted tor the Chinese
prevail alone. The only way for the Communist Party to ensure revolution. So he began to establish contacts with the CPC with
the victory of the revolution would be to form the broadest a view to cooperation between the two parties. He also welcomed
possible united front. The peasant masses were naturally the most the Soviet Union’s offer to support the national revolution in
reliable allies for the working class. The national bourgeoisie and China. In June 1922, the CPC issued a statement on the current
the urban petty bourgeoisie were also potential participants in the situation, in which it pointed out that “among the many political
united front, because they too had felt the bitterness of imperial¬ parties in China today, only the Kuomintang is comparatively
ist and feudal oppression. The alliance of all these classes would revolutionary and democratic and is relatively sincere in its
be an important characteristic of the Chinese national democratic commitment to democracy, but there is a real need to change its
revolution. Basing itself on this judgement, the Communist Party vacillating policy.” Thus, when the CPC prepared to establish a
decided to form an alliance with the Kuomintang. united front, naturally it first considered reaching out to the
On the whole, the Kuomintang led by Sun Yat-sen represented KMT.
the interests of the bourgeoisie and the urban petty bourgeoisie.
Having experienced setbacks over the years, it was quite weak. The 3rd National Congress of the Communist Party of China
Moreover, its members came from different backgrounds and
were divorced from the masses. Nevertheless, the Kuomintang In July 1922 the 2nd National Party Congress had tentatively
had strengths that could not be overlooked. First, it still enjoyed raised the possibility of “extra-party” cooperation as one form of
widespread prestige, thanks to Sun Yat-sen, who had led the a united front. Another proposal they had discussed was for
Revolution of 1911 that had overthrown the government of the “intra-party” cooperation, under which Communist Party and
Qing Dynasty and established the Republic. Afterwards, under Youth League members would join the KMT, turning it into an
extremely difficult circumstances, Sun had continued to fight alliance of the revolutionary classes. This proposal had been made
relentlessly against foreign aggressors and domestic warlords. He by G. Maring, the representative in China of the Communist
had become a symbol of national democratic revolution. Second, International, and had its support. In August of the same year,
the KMT had already established a valuable revolutionary base several leaders of the Central Committee of the CPC had met in
area in southern China. In February 1923 armed forces loyal to Hangzhou. When Maring made his proposal at this meeting, most
Sun Yat-sen drove general Chen Jiongming, who had betrayed of the participants had at first opposed it, but it was evenually
Sun, out of Guangzhou [Canton]. Sun Yat-sen returned to accepted. In January 1923, the Executive Committee of the
Guangdong Province and established his headquarters there as Communist International had adopted a “Resolution on the Re-
 chapter two in the torrent of the great revolution 57
56 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

quite right.
lationship between the Communist Party of China and the Kuo- However, the congress was wrong in some respects. For exam¬
mintang” that was based on Maring’s proposal. During June ple, it failed to point out that the democratic revolution should
12-20, 1923, the CPC held its 3rd National Congress in Guang¬ be led by the working class. It stated that the Kuomintang should
zhou and made a formal decision on policies and methods for provide the main impetus for the national revolution, and should
cooperation between the CPC and the KMT. occupy the position of leadership in it. Furthermore, the congress
The participants at the congress correctly assessed Sun Yat- underestimated the complexity of the Kuomintang’s internal
sen’s revolutionary stance and the possibility of reorganization of situation, and it did not foresee that relations between the KMT
the KMT. They decided that the best way to establish cooperation and CPC would change in the years to come. To some degree,
between the two parties was for CPC members to join the KMT
these oversights were later responsible for Chen Duxiu’s Right
in their individual capacity. This was the only form of coopera¬ opportunist deviation. They also reflected the inexperience and
tion acceptable to Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang at the time. immaturity of the Party at this early stage.
When Sun Yat-sen’s wife Soong Ching Ling asked, “Why do we
need to have Communist Party members join the Kuomintang?”
The Establishment of Cooperation Between the Kuomintang
her husband replied, “The Kuomintang is degenerating; to save
it, we need an infusion of new blood.”'
and the Communist Party
When Communists joined the Kuomintang, it helped both
After the 3rd National Congress of the CPC, cooperation
parties develop and advanced the Chinese revolution. In this way,
between the KMT and the CPC progressed rapidly. Communist
the CPC was able to have more influence over the policies of the
Party organizations at all levels did much propaganda work,
Kuomintang, promote its regeneration and encourage the bour¬
mobilized Party members and revolutionary youth to join the
geois and petty bourgeois who were under its influence to join the
Kuomintang and actively promoted the national^ revolution
revolutionary ranks. In addition, by taking advantage of the
throughout China.
Kuomintang organizations, the CPC was able to mobilize the
In early October 1923, at the invitation of Sun Yat-sen, Soviet
workers and peasants and secure mass support for the KMT,
representative Mikhail Markovich Borodin arrived in Guang¬
giving it a new lease on life. This also gave the Communist Party
zhou. The Soviet government also provided military and material
an opportunity to expand its previously limited operations, to be
assistance to the Guangzhou government. As Borodin was a
tempered in revolutionary struggles on a broader scale and to
politically experienced and capable organizer, Sun asked him to
bring about an upsurge in the Great Revolution. The decision
serve as the Kuomintang’s organizational instructor (later as its
adopted at the 3rd National Congress of the CPC was therefore
political adviser). Not long after this, Sun Yat-sen wrote a letter
of major historical significance.
to Chiang Kai-shek in which he categorically stated, “Our party’s
The congress made it clear that while Party members were to
revolution will never succeed without the guidance of Russia.”
join the Kuomintang as individuals, the Party itself should main¬
The Kuomintang soon began a reorganization.
tain its political, ideological and organizational independence. It
During January 20-30, 1924, in Guangzhou, Sun Yat-sen pre¬
emphasized that the interests of the workers and peasants could sided over the 1st National Congress of the Kuomintang. Of the
never be forgotten, that it was the special responsibility of the
165 delegates who attended to opening ceremony, more than 20
Party to organize them and carry out propaganda among them,
were from the Communist Party. They included: Li Dazhao, Tan
and that encouraging the workers and peasants to participate in Pingshan, Lin Zuhan (Lin Boqu), Zhang Guotao, Qu Qiubai and
the national revolution was the Party’s central task. All this was
58 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THF. CPC
CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 59

Mao Zedong. Sun Yat-sen designated Li Dazhao as a member of the beginning of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the
the presidium of the congress, and Tan Pingshan delivered a work Communist Party.
report on behalf of the Kuomintang Provisional Central Execu¬
tive Committee.
The congress approved a manifesto giving a new, updated II. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
interpretation of the Three People’s Principles that had been
enunciated years before by Sun Yat-sen. “Nationalism” now
REVOLUTION
meant anti-imperialism; “democracy” stressed the democratic AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
rights shared by all the common people, and the “people’s liveli¬ COOPERATION BETWEEN
hood” included the “equalization of land ownership” and the
“regulation of capital.” Addressing the congress, Sun Yat-sen
THE KMT AND THE CPC
declared, “Now it is time for us to put forward an explicit
After cooperation between the two parties was established, the
revolutionary programme against imperialism and to arouse the
country’s revolutionary forces gathered at Guangzhou, quickly
masses of the people to fight for the freedom and independence
creating new prospects for the revolution against the imperialists
of China! To do otherwise would mean staging an aimless, mean¬
and the feudal warlords.
ingless revolution, which would never succeed.”2 Not long after
As soon as Communists began to join the Kuomintang, they
the congress, Sun Yat-sen also put forth the slogan: “Land to the
worked to help form KMT organizations throughout the country.
tiller.” The political programme adopted at the 1st National
Until this time, Kuomintang branches had existed in only a few
Congress of the KMT was essentially compatible with some of the
areas, such as Guangdong, Sichuan and Shandong provinces,
basic principles in the political programme of the Communist
Shanghai and overseas, and their work had been limited to the
Party at the stage of democratic revolution, and it became
upper social strata. Although some progressives within the Kuo¬
the common programme for the first period of Kuomintang-
mintang wanted to change this situation, they had no experience
Communist cooperation.
of mass work among the lower classes. The Communists, in
In fact, the 1st National Congress of the KMT adopted three
contrast, placed great importance on such work and had acquired
great revolutionary policies — alliance with Russia, cooperation
considerable experience in it. CPC members who joined the
with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and
Kuomintang made a point of doing propaganda and organization¬
workers. It also elected a Central Executive Committee. Ten
al work among the masses in areas where warlords ruled, encour¬
Communists, including Li Dazhao, Tan Pingshan, Mao Zedong,
aging them to support the national revolution. Nineteen years
Lin Zuhan and Qu Qiubai, were elected members or alternate
later, looking back on the relations between the two parties, Zhou
members of the Committee, representing one-fourth of its to¬
Enlai said:
tal membership. After the congress, Communist Party mem¬ At that time, the Kuomintang relied on us not only ideologi¬
bers holding important posts in the headquarters of the Kuomin¬
cally, to revive and develop its Three People’s Principles, but also
tang included Tang Pingshan, director of the Department of organizationally, to set up its headquarters and expand its mem¬
Organization; Lin Zuhan, director of the Department of Peas¬
bership in the provinces.... Most of the leading members of the
ants; and Mao Zedong, acting director of the Department of Kuomintang in the provinces at the time were our comrades....It
Propaganda. was our Party that drew the revolutionary youth into the Kuo¬
The success of the 1st National Congress of the KMT marked mintang and it was our Party that enabled it to establish ties with
60 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF TIIE GREAT REVOLUTION 61

the workers and peasants. Members of the Kuomintang left wing

finally put an end to this....This strike caused a stir in Guangzhou
predominated in all its local organizations. The places where the
and Hong Kong, and its influence spread to central and northern
Kuomintang expanded most rapidly were precisely those where
China.”4
the left-wingers were in the dominant position and where there
The peasant movement also continued to grow. As early as
were the largest numbers of Communists.3
1922, Peng Pai had begun to organize peasant associations in
In January 1926, after two years of hard work the Kuomintang
Haifeng County, Guangdong Province, mobilizing the peasants to
convened its 2nd National Congress. By this time, it had estab¬
demand reductions in land rents. Now peasants all over Guang¬
lished twelve provincial headquarters, four special municipal
dong began organizing associations and self-defence corps to
headquarters and nine provisional provincial headquarters. The
struggle against local tyrants, evil gentry and corrupt officials. To
de facto leading members of many of these provincial or munici¬
train personnel to form the core of the peasant movement, the
pal headquarters were Communist Party members. These includ¬
KMT Central Executive Committee inaugurated the Peasant
ed Li Dazhao in Beijing, Lin Zuhan in Hankou, Dong Yongwei
Movement Institute in July 1924, at the suggestion of the Com¬
(Dong Biwu) and Chen Tanqiu in Hubei, He Shuheng and Xia
munists. At various times Communist Party members, including
Xi in Hunan, Xuan Zhonghua in Zhejiang, Yu Fangzhou and Li
Peng Pai, Ruan Xiaoxian and Mao Zedong, served as director of
Yongsheng in Hebei and Hou Shaoqiu in Jiangsu. The labour
the institute.
movements led by the Communist Party, like the workers’ schools
The cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist
they organized, were all launched in the name of the Kuomin¬
Party made it possible to establish a revolutionary military force.
tang. Therefore, although conditions in the Kuomintang were
Sun Yat-sen had depended on the armies of the old regime to
quite complicated, it had allied itself with the workers, peasants,
undertake revolutionary action and had suffered repeated defeats
urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie to fight for
as a result. This had taught him a bitter lesson. At the suggestion
democratic revolution.
of the Communists, at its 1st National Congress the Kuomintang
With the establishment of cooperation between the Kuomin¬
decided to found an army academy. The Whampoa Military
tang and the CPC, the workers’ movement, led by the Commu¬
Academy — it was located on Whampoa Island near Guangzhou
nists, revived and progressed. For example, the workers’ and
— opened in May 1924 with Sun Yat-sen as chairman. To serve
peasants’ movements were legalized in Guangdong, which was
as president of the academy, Sun appointed Chiang Kai-shek,
under the jurisdiction of the revolutionary government, and
chief of staff of the Guangdong Army, who had just returned
thereafter developed even more rapidly. In July 1924, in the
from a tour of investigation in the Soviet Union. Liao Zhongkai,
Shamian Concessions in Guangzhou which were inhabited by
a well-known Kuomintang left-winger, was named the represent¬
many foreigners, several thousand workers staged a political
ative of the KMT. General Vasily Blucher (who assumed the
strike in protest against a new police regulation, issued by the
name of Galen during his stay in China) and other generals of
British and French authorities, denying the Chinese free access to
the Soviet Red Army were invited to serve as military advisers.
the concessions. Chinese police also participated in the strike,
In November the chairman of the Guangdong Regional Commit¬
which lasted for more than a month and ended in victory. Deng
tee of the CPC, Zhou Enlai, who had just returned from Europe,
Zhongxia, a respected early leader of the workers’ movement led
was appointed director of the academy’s political department.
by the Party, praised this strike, saying, “Ever since the failure
The CPC also selected a large number of Communist Party and
of the great strike of February 7, 1923, the workers’ movement
Youth League members and other revolutionary young people to
had been at a low ebb. In 1924 the great July strike in Shamian
study there. In the first group of students who registered at the
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 63
62

academy were 56 Communist Party and Youth League members, called for the convocation of a national assembly and the abroga¬
representing one-tenth of the total enrollment. They included Xu tion of all unequal treaties with the imperialists. In Shanghai,
Xiangqian, Chen Geng, Jiang Xianyun, Zuo Quan and Xu Jishen. Zhejiang, Guangdong, Hunan, Hubei and other provinces, asso¬
What distinguished the Whampoa Military Academy from all ciations for the convocation of the national assembly were estab¬
military schools of the old type was that it attached equal impor¬ lished. Mass organizations everywhere sent him telegrams ex¬
tance to military training and political education. It emphasized pressing their support for the assembly. This became a political
the cultivation of patriotism and revolutionary spirit among the propaganda movement.
students. Zhou Enlai and other Communists were particularly At the time, the political climate in China was good. The
instrumental in this. The system of military training combined country seethed with activity and there was a great wave of
with political work was later introduced to other military units anti-imperialist and anti-warlord sentiment, but contradictions
under the Guangzhou Revolutionary Government. Not long after were becoming apparent within the revolutionary camp.
the War of Resistance Against Japan broke out in 1937, Mao The Kuomintang was a complex organization, and its members

Zedong said: included representatives of the big landlord and comprador class¬
“In 1924-27 the spirit of the Kuomintang troops was broadly es. In June 1924 right-wingers in the KMT ranks, such as Deng
similar to that of the Eighth Route Army today.... A fresh spirit Zeru, Zhang Ji and Xie Chi, began hostilities against the CPC by
prevailed among these forces; on the whole there was unity presenting to the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee a
between officers and men and between the army and the people, “Proposal to Impeach the Communist Party.” On the pretext
and the army was filled with a revolutionary militancy. The that the Communist Party had its own organizations within the
system of Party representatives and of political departments, Kuomintang, they declared that the KMT absolutely could not
adopted for the first time in China, entirely changed the complex¬ permit “a party within the party” and called for a split with the
ion of these armed forces.”5 Communists. To counter this attack, the Central Committee of
Thanks to the joint efforts of the Communist Party and the the CPC issued an inner-Party circular on July 21, asking Party
Kuomintang, the idea of national revolution spread from south organizations at all levels to expose the reactionary activities of
to north and throughout the country. In October 1924, during the the right-wingers in the Kuomintang. Chen Duxiu, Yun Daiying,
second Zhili-Fengtian war, Feng Yuxiang of the Zhili clique Qu Qiubai and Cai Hesen, among others, wrote a stream of
staged a coup d’6tat and overthrew the Beijing government con¬ articles defending the political programme adopted at the 1st
trolled by the chief Zhili warlords, Cao Kun and Wu Peifu. Feng National Congress of the KMT and blasting the Right-wingers for
Yuxiang thus gained control over the Beijing-Tianjin area. He undermining unity in the revolutionary ranks.
then reorganized his troops into the National Army and sent a On August 20, before leaving for Beijing, Sun Yat-sen presided
telegram to Sun Yat-sen inviting him to come north to discuss over a meeting of the Political Committee of the Kuomintang
important matters of state. As Feng encountered many difficul¬ Central Executive Committee, which forcefully rejected the
ties after the coup, he had to invite the veteran chief of the right-wingers’ position. It issued a directive stating: “Those who
Northern warlords, Duan Qirui, to preside over the discussions. say that our party has been changed ideologically because the
Duan Qirui and Zhang Zuolin, chief of the Fengtian clique, who Communists have joined are mistaken and entirely unreasonable.
was preparing to go to Beijing from the Northeast, also sent There is no need to debate this point.... Those who say that our
separate telegrams to Sun Yat-sen inviting him to go north. In party will split because the Communists have joined it are simi¬
November, Sun left Guangzhou for Beijing. Along the way, he larly entertaining groundless fears.”6 Because of Sun Yat-sen’s
 64 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 65
high prestige in the Kuomintang, his firm support for coopera¬
become more apparent as the revolutionary movement pro¬
tion between the two parties thwarted the Right-wingers’ anti¬
gressed.
communist activities and their attempt to split the KMT.
Less than two months after the congress, Sun Yat-sen died of
As the revolution progressed, the left and right wings of the
liver cancer in Beijing. In his testament, he wrote:
Kuomintang grew further apart and relations between the KMT
“For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the
and the CPC became increasingly strained. There were many new
national revolution with the aim of winning freedom and equality
problems in the revolutionary movement. From January 11 to 22,
for China. My experience during these forty years has convinced
1925, the Communist Party of China held its 4th National
me that to achieve this aim we must arouse the masses and unite
Congress in Shanghai. By this time the Party had 994 members.
in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat
The historical significance of this congress can be summed up as
us as equals.” Naturally Sun believed that the Soviet Union
follows. First, it raised the question of the leadership of the
would be the first nation to treat China as an equal and that to
Chinese proletariat in the democratic revolution, declaring that
arouse the masses, the Kuomintang should cooperate with the
unless the proletariat, which was the most revolutionary class,
CPC and assist the peasants and workers. These were the two
participated vigorously in the national revolutionary movement
basic conclusions reached by Sun Yat-sen, a great patriot and
and exercised leadership over it, the movement would not suc¬
revolutionary, as he summed up the political experience of his
ceed. Second, it raised the question of the alliance between
lifetime. Sun’s death caused great sorrow throughout China. The
workers and peasants, pointing out that the revolution needed the
KMT and CPC organized mourning ceremonies involving people
extensive participation of the workers, the peasants and the urban
from all walks of life, so as to disseminate throughout the country
petty bourgeoisie. The peasants, it said, were important, since
the message of Sun’s testament and his revolutionary spirit. The
they were the natural allies of the working class. If the proletariat
national revolutionary movement rose to a new height.
and its party did not mobilize the peasants to participate in the
struggle, it would be unable to lead the revolution, and the
revolution would fail. Third, the congress added to the content of
the democratic revolution, stating that while opposing interna¬ III. THE MAY 30th MOVEMENT AND THE
tional imperialism, the Party should simultaneously oppose feu¬ UNIFICATION OF THE GUANGDONG
dal warlord politics and feudal economic relations. This last
REVOLUTIONARY BASE AREA
statement demonstrated that the Party, having reviewed the
events since its founding and particularly since the beginning of
The upsurge of the nationwide Great Revolution began in May
its cooperation with the KMT one year earlier, had made major
1925 with the anti-British and anti-Japanese strike of workers in
progress in its understanding of the issues involved in the Chinese
Shanghai.
revolution. They also demonstrated that the Party had already
At this time Shanghai, China’s largest industrial city, had
elucidated the basic concept of the new-democratic revolution.
800,000 workers, almost one-third of the national total. The city
Nevertheless, the 4th National Party Congress offered no
was an important base for the imperialist powers’ aggression in
concrete solution to the complex problem of how the proletariat
China. There were the “International Settlement,” controlled by
was to win the struggle with the bourgeoisie for leadership of the
the British, and the “French Concession,” and many Japanese,
revolution. Also, it did not fully understand the vital importance
British and other foreign-owned factories were located in Shang¬
of political power and armed struggle. These weaknesses were to
hai. The imperialists cruelly wrung every ounce of sweat and
 66 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 67

blood out of the Chinese labourers, arousing their hatred.

hai University student and Communist Party member He Bingyi.
Shanghai was also the seat of the Central Committee of the
For several days after this, there were instances of British and
CPC, and the Party was active among the workers there. Using
Japanese police killing Chinese civilians in Shanghai and other
Shanghai University as their main base, Party members went out
cities.
to do propaganda and organizing among the workers. They had
These incidents enraged the people of Shanghai and through¬
established night schools for workers in seven districts. In the
out the country. All their pent-up fury against the imperialists
summer of 1924, under the leadership of Deng Zhongxia, Xiang
suddenly poured out. Students, workers and shopkeepers all went
Ying and others, they had founded the West Shanghai Workers’
on strike. On June 11 more than 200,000 people gathered at a
Club, a mass organization with nearly 2,000 members that did
mass rally in Shanghai. Approximately 17 million people partici¬
much to advance the workers’ movement in Shanghai. In Feb¬
pated in this movement nationwide. From the great commercial
ruary 1925 the workers at the Japanese-owned Naigai No.8 Cot¬
cities to the most remote areas of the countryside, people cried
ton Mill had gone on strike because a Japanese overseer had
angrily “Down with imperialism!” and “Abolish the unequal
beaten a Chinese woman worker. The ranks of the strikers swelled
treaties!” The wave of anti-imperialism swept the nation with
to more than 35,000, as workers from 20 other Japanese-owned
astounding speed.
textile mills joined the strike. Victory in this struggle had greatly
While leading the May 30th Movement, the Communist Party
inspired workers throughout the country. On May 1, the 2nd
greatly increased its membership. At the time of the Party’s 4th
National Labour Congress opened in Guangzhou, and the All-
National Congress in January 1925, it had only 994 members. By
China Federation of Trade Unions was formally established.
October of the same year, it had 3,000. By December, the number
Communist Party members Lin Weimin and Liu Shaoqi were
was 10,000. In one year the Party had grown tenfold. As the
elected president and vice-president of the federation.
movement spread across the country, new Party organizations
were established in many provinces where there had been none
The Nationwide May 30th Movement before, such as Yunnan, Guangxi, Anhui and Fujian. The Parly
was tempered well in the struggle.
On May 15, a Japanese capitalist of the Naigai No.7 Cotton
On June 3, after news of the May 30th massacre had reached
Mill in Shanghai killed Gu Zhenghong, a worker who was a
Guangzhou, people from every section of the city’s population
Communist. The Central Committee of the CPC met several
took to the streets in a mammoth demonstration. On June 19
times to discuss an appropriate response. Cai Hesen urged that the
members of the seamen’s, trolley workers’ and printers’ unions
economic struggle of the workers be turned into a national
went on strike. Other unionized workers soon joined them, and
struggle. On May 28 the Central Committee called an emergency
the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions was established. One
meeting at which it decided to mobilize students and workers to
slogan of the strike was, “Fight the imperialists to the death!”
launch a large-scale anti-imperialist demonstration in the Inter¬
Within a fortnight the number of strikers swelled to 250,000. Of
national Settlement on May 30. On that day the Shanghai workers
these, more than 100,000 left Hong Kong and returned to Guang¬
and students marched and spoke on street corners in support of
zhou. On June 23, the Hong Kong strikers joined 100,000 people
the textile workers. Suddenly, the British police in the Interna¬
from all walks of life in Guangzhou to hold a rally and a
tional Settlement opened fire on the crowd marching along Nan¬
demonstration. Led by Zhou Enlai, 2,000 instructors, cadets and
jing Road, killing 13 and wounding many others. The martyrs
soldiers of the Whampoa Military Academy also participated in
who sacrificed their lives at this demonstration included Shang-
the demonstration. As the marchers passed through Shaji, a street
 CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 69
68 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
Liu Zhenhuan (the Guangxi Army). These troops dominated
on the opposite bank of the Pearl River, the British troops and Guangzhou, levying exorbitant taxes and committing outrages.
police from the Shamian Concession suddenly opened fire, killing
Sun Yat-sen had once sorrowfully told them, “You operate in my
52 people and seriously wounding some 170.
name, but you ravage my hometown.”
After the Shaji massacre, the Guangzhou Revolutionary Gov¬
Early in 1925, when Sun Yat-sen was away in the north and
ernment immediately severed all economic relations with Britain
seriously ill, Chen Jiongming took advantage of the opportunity
and blockaded the Guangzhou harbour. Workers from Hong
to attack Guangzhou. The Guangzhou government organized the
Kong and Shamian convened in Guangzhou a conference of
Eastern Expeditionary Army, which was divided into three col¬
representatives of the Guangzhou and Hong Kong strikers and
umns taking three different routes, and sent it on a punitive
established a Strike Committee, with Communist Party member expedition against Chen Jiongming. However, the forces that
Su Zhaozheng as chairman. The committee had subcommittees in
were to take the north and central routes were led by Yang Ximin
charge of armed self-defence, picketing, legal affairs and so on.
and Liu Zhenhuan and refused to go into battle. Two recently
The strikers managed to blockade the port of Hong Kong. The
established officers’ training regiments from the Whampoa Mili¬
Guangzhou Revolutionary Government supported them and sub¬ tary Academy and the Guangdong army commanded by Xu
sidized the Strike Committee with 10,000 yuan a month. Commu¬ Chongzhi took the south route and swiftly routed Chen Jiong¬
nist Party members Xu Chengzhang, Chen Geng and others
ming’s main force, gaining control of the Dongjiang area. By
served as chairman of the picketing committee, general instructor
April, the first eastern expedition had proved victorious.
and instructors of the armed pickets. The simultaneous strikes in
In May, Yang Xiwen and Liu Zhenhuan’s troops staged a
Guangzhou and Hong Kong lasted for 16 months. They were an
rebellion in Guangzhou in an attempt to overthrow the Guang¬
important component of the May 30th Movement and an unprec¬
zhou Revolutionary Government. Although Yang and Liu com¬
edented feat in the history of China’s labour movement. They
manded a substantial number of troops, their plundering and
gave a powerful impetus to the Great Revolution, and the several
corruption had turned the people against them and weakened
hundred thousand strikers in Guangzhou became a pillar of the their combat effectiveness. The Eastern Expeditionary Army
Guangzhou Revolutionary Government.
quickly returned to Guangzhou and quelled their rebellion.
The KMT and the CPC then began to reorganize the Guang¬
The Unification of the Guangdong Revolutionary Base Area zhou government and the armed forces. On July 1 the National
Government was founded in Guangzhou to replace the former
The vigorous development of the May 30th Movement created Revolutionary Government. Wang Jingwei, who was regarded as
favourable conditions in which the KMT and CPC cooperated to
a member of the Kuomintang left, was elected president. M. M.
create a revolutionary base area in Guangdong.
Borodin was invited to serve as senior adviser to the government.
Although the Guangzhou Revolutionary Government had
However, because the CPC did not fully understand the impor¬
been established two years earlier, it was internally unstable and
tance of political power, it decided not to participate directly in
had never been able to control all of Guangdong Province. The
the government and instead opted for a supervisory role. Af¬
major threat to the government was Chen Jiongming’s hostile
ter the National Government was established, the army of the
troops, who were entrenched along the Dongjiang River in east¬
Whampoa Military Academy, along with the Guangdong, Hunan
ern Guangdong. Furthermore, there were government troops who
and Yunnan armies stationed in Guangdong, were reorganized
nominally supported national revolution, but who were in fact
into six armies of the National Revolutionary Army, with a total
loyal to the local warlords Yang Ximin (the Yunnan Army) and
70 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 71

of 85,000 troops. The army of the Whampoa Military Academy warlord, Deng Benyin, that had been entrenched in southern
was expanded to become the First Army. Many Communists were Guangdong and on Hainan Island. In the end, the entire province
given responsibility for political work in the National Revolution¬ of Guangdong was unified, which created a solid base for the
ary Army. Zhou Enlai, Li Fuchun, Zhu Kejing and Luo Han coming Northern Expedition against the Northern warlords.
served respectively as deputy Party representative and director of
the political department of the First, Second, Third and Fourth The Emergence of the New KMT Right Wing
Armies, and Lin Zuhan served as Party representative and direc¬ and the CPC’s Countermove
tor of the political department of the Sixth Army. Command over
these armies, however, still rested with Chiang Kai-shek and the The revolution was progressing rapidly, but at the same time
other members of the old military. A major mistake made by the a reactionary faction was emerging within the Kuomintang. The
Communists was to underestimate the importance of military Kuomintang had long been divided, and after the death of Sun
command. It was only in the beginning of 1926 that Communist Yat-sen, that resolute supporter of KMT-CPC cooperation, the
Party member Ye Ting became commander of the Independent divisions became increasingly apparent. Because the dilferent
Regiment of the Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary factions in the KMT represented the interests of different classes,
Army. The Independent Regiment was directly under the com¬ their goals in the forthcoming Northern Expedition were also
mand of the Communist Party, but it represented only a small different. The Left-wingers, who represented the interests of the
fraction of the National Revolutionary Army. workers, the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie, wanted to elimi¬
On August 20, 1925, Liao Zhongkai, leader of the KMT’s Left nate the imperialist forces and the feudal warlords and establish
wing, was assassinated in Guangzhou. This was a heavy blow to a state governed by an alliance of all the revolutionary classes.
cooperation between the KMT and the CPC. Xu Chongzhi, The middle-of-the-roaders, who represented the interests of the
Minister of Military Affairs of the National Government and national bourgeoisie, sought to overthrow the Northern warlords
commander-in-chief of the Guangdong Army, was forced out by and then build a state governed by the national bourgeoisie. The
Chiang Kai-shek. The forces under Xu’s command were then Right-wingers, who represented the interests of the landlord and
taken over and reorganized by Chiang, which further strength¬ comprador classes, plotted to use the strength of the workers and
ened his power and influence in the military. peasants to overthrow the Northern warlords and then build a
In September 1925 the remaining troops of Chen Jiongming regime of the landlord and comprador classes. These three fac¬
took advantage of the Eastern Expeditionary Army’s return to tions were at odds over the political programme laid out at the
Guangzhou to reoccupy the Dongjiang area. The National Gov¬ KMT’s 1st National Congress and Sun Yat-sen’s “Three Great
ernment decided to launch a second eastern expedition, with Policies” — alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Commu¬
Chiang Kai-shek as commander of the expeditionary forces and nist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers. The con¬
Zhou Enlai as director of the General Political Department. By flicts within the KMT intensified day by day. In June and July
the end of November the expeditionary army, with the support 1925, Dai Jitao, a new Right-winger and a close friend of Chiang
of the peasant associations in the Dongjiang area, had wiped out Kai-shek, wrote several pamphlets, including “Philosophical
Chen Jiongming’s forces, thus bringing to a successful conclusion Foundations of Sun Yat-senism,” and “The National Revolution
the second eastern expedition. At the same time, another detach¬ and the Chinese Kuomintang.” In these works he advocated
ment of the National Revolutionary Army launched a southern compromise between opposing classes and criticized the Marxist
expedition and wiped out all the forces commanded by the local theory of class struggle, while demanding that all Communists
 72
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF TIIE GREAT REVOLUTION 73
who had joined the Kuomintang “separate themselves from all
other Party organizations in order to become true members of the munist Party. Naturally it was of vital importance to maintain
Kuomintang.” In November of the same year, the old Right¬ cooperation with the Kuomintang. However, in the face of grow¬
wingers of the Kuomintang, including Zou Lu and Xie Chi, ing tensions with the old and new Right-wingers in the Kuomin¬
illegally convened the so-called 4th Plenary Session of the 1st tang, the Party needed to find an appropriate response. It was just
Central Executive Committee of the KMT at the Biyun Temple as Mao Zedong wrote in an article on the united front in 1940:
in the Western Hills outside Beijing. They pronounced the expul¬ “If unity is sought through struggle, it will live; if unity is sought
sion of Communist Party members from the Kuomintang and through yielding, it will perish.”7
announced that Borodin would no longer be an adviser. This At this time many Communist Party members believed that
group of old Right-wingers became known as the “Western Hills since the Kuomintang Right wing (especially the new Right) was
clique. Even more ominously, after the two eastern expeditions openly trying to split the two parties, the Communist Party
and the suppression of the rebellion by Yang Ximin and Liu should fight back vigorously and appropriately so as to maintain
Zhenhuan, Chiang Kai-shek expanded his forces and increased KMT-CPC cooperation. In December 1925 Mao Zedong wrote an
his power in the revolutionary ranks. He began to reveal his true essay in which he emphasized the importance of distinguishing
anti-Communist character, using the Society for the Study of Sun between friends and enemies of the revolutionary struggle, lo
Yat-sen’s Doctrines, controlled by the new KMT Right-wingers, make this distinction, he proceeded to analyse the economic
to carry out anti-Communist activities. status of various classes in Chinese society and their respective
Chiang Kai-shek was a two-faced careerist. For a time, to political attitudes. He pointed out that the staunchest and numer¬
strengthen his own position, outwardly he supported alliance with ically the largest ally of the proletariat was the peasantry, thus
Russia and cooperation with the Communist Party. Inwardly solving the major problem of finding allies in the revolution.
however, he was rabidly anti-Communist, and his ultimate aim Moreover, he reminded people that the national bourgeoisie held
was to take the place of the Northern warlords himself. To attain contradictory and vacillating attitudes: on the one hand, they felt
this goal, he needed to use the Communist Party and the workers the need for revolution; on the other hand, they were suspicious
and peasants under its leadership to bolster his strength and of it. He predicted that the Right wing of the national bourgeoisie
expand his influence. At the same time, however, he was afraid might become the enemy of the revolutionary forces, while its
that the workers and peasants might become strong enough to Left wing might become their friend, but concluded that “we
obstruct his climb to power. Therefore, while ostensibly cooper¬ must be constantly on our guard and not let them create confu¬
ating with the Communist Party, he worked to restrain it, so that sion within our ranks.”8
the people’s forces could not grow substantially and independent¬ However, in the face of the combined attack of the imperialists
ly. In fact, he protected and organized the Rightist forces. That and the warlords, Chen Duxiu, general secretary of the CPC
is, he simultaneously adhered to two policies, cooperating with Central Committee, felt that the Party’s strength was inadequate.
the Communist Party and at the same time restraining it. After He was afraid that struggle against the new Right wing of the
the May 30th Movement, the revolutionary mass movement Kuomintang would impair the relations between the two parties
reached a peak throughout the country. When Chiang Kai-shek and lead to the isolation and ultimate failure of the revolution in
saw that the people’s forces had grown stronger, he gradually Guangdong. He hoped that unilateral concessions would help
intensified his anti-Communist activities. alleviate the contradictions within the camp of the national
This situation posed a formidable new problem for the Com- revolutionary forces. This course of action was supported by the
Comintern representatives, and therefore carried the day within
74 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER TWO IN TIIE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 75

the CPC. story that the Communists were secretly moving the Zhongshan
From January 1 to 19, 1926, the Kuomintang held its 2nd Warship to Whampoa near Guangzhou in an attempt to kidnap
National Congress in Guangzhou. Among the representatives him and take him out of Guangdong. Using this as a pretext, he
elected from different parts of the country, the majority were enforced martial law in Guangzhou. He put Communist Party
Communists and KMT Left-wingers. As a result, the Kuomin¬ members under surveillance or hou~°. arrest and disarmed the
tang officially continued to oppose the imperialists and warlord picket corps of the Guangzhou-Hong Kong Strike Committee. He
forces, adhering to the Three Great Policies of alliance with had troops surround the Soviet consulate and put the Soviet
Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party and assistance to advisers under surveillance. At a meeting on March 22, the
the peasants and workers. Furthermore, the congress decided to Central Executive Committee of the KMT adopted a resolution
take disciplinary measures against the old Right-wingers who had proposed by Chiang to exclude CPC members from the Whampoa
attended the Western Hills meeting. In this sense, the congress Military Academy and from the First Army of the National
was a success. Revolutionary Army. Wang Jingwei, president of the National
When the congress opened, the leaders of the Communist Party Government and chairman of its Military Commission, was
organization in Guangdong were in favour of attacking the Right forced to resign on account of “illness,” clearing the path for
wing of the Kuomintang, isolating the middle-of-the-roaders and Chiang to advance to the highest and most powerful position in
expanding the Left wing, while preparing to repel Chiang’s attack. the Kuomintang. This series of events became known as the
However, under the influence of Chen Duxiu and Zhang Guotao, Zhongshan Warship Incident.
no action was taken against the new Right wing. The Communists The CPC Central Committee was not prepared for such a
and the KMT Left-wingers were definitely in the minority on the drastic turn of events, and had no experience as a guide in coping
Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and its Central Super¬ with it. In fact, Chiang Kai-shek still had only limited power and
visory Committee. As for Chiang Kai-shek, his standing in the had taken these actions partly to see how the CPC would respond.
Kuomintang was not particularly high to begin with. At the 1st No sooner had he completed the manoeuvre than he released all
National Congress, he had not been elected to the Central Execu¬ those he had arrested and returned the guns he had captured. He
tive Committee. But at the 2nd congress he became a member of apologized for the incident, calling it a “misunderstanding” for
it and soon after a member of its Standing Committee as well. which he asked to be “severely punished.” Mao Zedong, Zhou
Similarly, at the time of the 1st National Congress, he had been Enlai and Chen Yannian, among others, called for a counter¬
only the commander of one of the six armies in the National attack. Because only one of the six armies of the National
Revolutionary Army. At the second congress, he became chief Revolutionary Army was directly under Chiang’s command, and
inspector of the NRA. Thus, his status both in the KMT and in because even in that army there were many who were Commu¬
the army rose considerably. nists or who sympathized with the revolution, Chiang’s position
The concessions made by the Communist Party did absolutely had not been completely consolidated and such a counter-attack
nothing to moderate the conflicts within the revolutionary camp. was feasible. However, Chen Duxiu and the Soviet adviser N. V.
On the contrary, they only helped encourage the new KMT Kuibishev were overwhelmed by Chiang’s display of strength,
Right-wingers. For every inch offered, the new Right-wingers and they were afraid of a split between the KMT and the CPC.
seized an ell. On March 20, only two months after the 2nd They believed that only further concessions would persuade
National Congress of the KMT ended, Chiang Kai-shek suddenly Chiang to participate in the Northern Expedition. In the end,
took grave actions against the Communists. He concocted the their yielding stance encouraged Chiang to proceed confidently
76 CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF TIIE GREAT REVOLUTION 77
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

with his activities to restrain the Communist Party. aligned with the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. In analys¬
On May 15 the Kuomintang held the 2nd Plenary Session of ing class relations, several leaders of the Communist Party turned
its 2nd Central Executive Committee. On pretext of avoiding a blind eye to this new development. They did not understand
“disputes” within the KMT and of finding “a concrete method of that the representatives of each class could change their political
removing misunderstandings,” Chiang Kai-shek proposed a “Re¬ stance. While Chiang was openly taking steps to launch an
solution on Rectification of Party Affairs.” This resolution stipu¬ anti-Communist attack, they still did not dare to mount a resolute
lated that members of the Communist Party must not exceed counter-attack, for fear of a split between the two parties.
more than one-third of the members of executive committees of Nevertheless, Chiang’s power was still limited. To achieve
KMT organizations at or above the municipal or provincial level. victory in the Northern Expedition he still needed the support of
It also provided that CPC members could not serve as directors the Communist Party of China and the Soviet Union. As a result,
of departments of the KMT Central Executive Committee and he did not immediately split with the CPC publicly. As late as
that the list of all CPC members who had joined the Kuomintang May 1926, he still stated, “Not only am I not opposed to Com¬
should be made public. The KMT Left-wingers, including Liu munism, but I very much approve of it.”9 For the time being, the
Yazi and He Xiangning, all voted against this draft resolution. KMT continued to cooperate with the CPC. But the fact that
Chen Duxiu and Zhang Guotao, however, still believed that the command over the Northern Expeditionary Army was largely in
reason for the strained relations between the KMT and the CPC Chiang’s hands made it clear that while the revolution was
was that the “Communist Party had taken on too many responsi¬ progressing rapidly, it was already in a serious crisis.
bilities” and accordingly advocated further concessions. Thus
Chiang’s resolution was adopted. At this point, all directors of
departments of the KMT Central Executive Committee coming IV. THE TRIUMPHANT PROGRESS OF THE
from the CPC had no choice but to resign, and the Communist NORTHERN EXPEDITION AND THE
Party had no further say in the affairs of the Kuomintang.
RISE OF THE WORKERS’ AND
Chiang, on the other hand, was appointed director of the Organ¬
ization Department of the Central Executive Committee and PEASANTS’ MOVEMENTS
minister of Military Affairs. He then became chairman of the
Standing Committee of the KMT Central Executive Committee The immediate objective of the Northern Expedition was to
and commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army. topple the Northern warlords who were supported by the imperi¬
Thus, he became the most powerful figure in southern China. alists.
The 2nd National Congress of the Kuomintang, the Zhongshan The Northern warlords seemed a colossus far mightier than the
Warship Incident and the adoption of the “Resolution on Recti¬ Northern Expeditionary Army. For more than ten years they had
fication of Party Affairs” all took place less than six months controlled the internationally recognized central government and
before the Northern Expedition was to begin. At this critical possessed vast financial and material resources. They directly
moment, Chiang Kai-shek did not hesitate to launch one attack commanded an army of 700,000 men, while the National Revo¬
after another against the Communists, gaining positions of lead¬ lutionary Army had only about 100,000. At the beginning of the
ership as they made concessions. He gathered all available power Northern Expedition, this total included both the original six
into his own grip and prepared for an anti-Communist coup. armies in Guangdong and two new ones: the Seventh of Guangxi,
After the Zhongshan Warship Incident, Chiang was already commanded by Li Zongren, and the Eighth of Hunan, command-
78 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 79

ed by Tang Shengzhi. However, the Northern warlords had two Northern warlords. It would try to keep Zhang Zuolin and Sun
fatal weaknesses. First, the Chinese people had long felt a deep Chuanfang neutral for a time; then, after the troops sent to
hatred for their rule and hoped for an early end to their interne¬ Hunan and Hubei had achieved victory, they would turn east to
cine fighting that had lasted for more than ten years. They longed wipe out Sun Chuanfang’s army. Finally, they would move north
for the day when China would be independent and unified, and to attack the most powerful forces, those of Zhang Zuolin.
thus increasingly placed their hopes in the National Government In accordance with this plan, in May 1926, a part of the
in the South. The will of the people would surely play a decisive National Revolutionary Army’s Seventh Army and Ye Ting’s
role in the coming struggle. Second, the Northern warlords were Independent Regiment of the Fourth Army moved as advance
internally divided, principally into three factions. The chief of the forces to Hunan Province to assist Tang Shengzhi’s Eighth Army,
already declining Zhili faction, Wu Peifu, still controlled Hunan, which had been defeated by Wu Peifu and was retreating to
Hubei and Henan provinces and the area around the city of Hengyang in southern Hunan. On July 9, the National Revolu¬
Baoding in Zhili (now Hebei Province). His forces totalled ap¬ tionary Army took a mass pledge in Guangzhou and formally
proximately 200,000 and were still concentrated in the Nankou launched the Northern Expedition. Two days later, after the main
area of north China, where they were attacking a part of the body of the Fourth and Seventh Armies joined forces with the
National Army commanded by Feng Yuxiang whose main forces Eighth Army, they succeeded in taking Changsha. On August 22,
had already retreated to the Northwest. Sun Chuanfang, whose they occupied Yuezhou, and thereafter they entered Hubei Prov-
forces occupied Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi and Fujian ince.
provinces, was known as the “commander-in-chief of five prov¬ The Northern Expedition was enthusiastically supported by
inces.” He led 200,000 troops who operated as an independent the people in both the battle areas and the rear. CPC organiza¬
force and whose combat effectiveness had surpassed that of Wu tions at all levels did effective work in mobilizing the workers and
Peifu’s army. The most powerful of the warlords was Zhang peasants. At this time, Hunan and Hubei were suffering from
Zuolin of the Fengtian clique, who with 300,000 troops at severe food shortages, and as construction of the Wuhan-
his command controlled the three provinces of the Northeast Guangdong Railway was not yet completed, it was a major
(present-day Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang), Rehe, Chahar, problem to keep the troops supplied. Under the leadership of
Beijing, Tianjin and Shandong. Deep contradictions persisted as the Guangdong Regional Party Committee, the Hong Kong-
these three forces intrigued against each other. They were unable Guangzhou Strike Committee of Guangdong organized 3,000
to coordinate their military operations, and this made it easier for men into transport, propaganda and medical teams to follow the
the Northern Expeditionary Army to destroy them one by one. troops north. The Hunan Regional Party Committee had always
been a strong organization. According to statistics compiled in
The Northern Expedition Launched August 1926, the province had 2,699 Party members, a figure
Jointly by the KMT and the CPC second only to Guangdong’s. The Party counted 400,000 peasants
and 110,000 workers in Hunan under its leadership. When the
It was at the suggestion of the Soviet military advisers led by Northern Expeditionary Army advanced toward Changsha, the
Galen that the National Revolutionary Army adopted a strategy Hunan Regional Party Committee mobilized these people to act
of massing its forces and annihilating the enemy armies one at a as guides, deliver letters, serve as scouts, help with transport,
time. First, it would send troops into Hunan and Hubei, quickly sweep mines, carry stretchers, give first aid, bring gifts to service¬
wiping out Wu Peifu’s main force, the weakest link in the men and create disorder in the enemy’s rear. They also organized
 CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 81
80 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
launched a fierce offensive along the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway.
peasant self-defence militias to participate directly in the fighting.
Finally, they wiped out Sun Chuanfang’s main force and cap¬
Such enthusiasm had rarely been seen in previous wars in China. tured Jiujiang and Nanchang. This brought about a complete
Knowing that the Northern Expeditionary Army was advanc¬ change in the military situation in Jiangxi. Two divisions of the
ing on Wuhan, Wu Peifu hurriedly recalled his troops from the First Army that had been stationed in the Guangdong-Fujian
North. He built defences at two strategic points along the railway, border area took this opportunity to launch an attack on Fujian
the Tingsi and Hesheng bridges near Wuhan. Wu personally Province, and in mid-December they took the city of Fuzhou
commanded his guards and organized a special corps to force the
without a fight. ,
soldiers at gunpoint to fight at the front. In late August, after an While the Northern Expeditionary Army was winning these
intense and bitter battle, the main force of the National Revolu¬ great victories, Feng Yuxiang’s National Army troops had with¬
tionary Army’s Fourth and Seventh Armies and a part of the drawn from Nankou, a strategic point near Beijing, to defend
Eighth Army finally captured the two railway bridges, routed Wu Suiyuan Province (now part of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Peifu’s main force and marched on Wuhan. Ye Ting’s Indepen¬ Region). On September 17, in Wuyuan County, Suiyuan, these
dent Regiment fought heroically in the fierce battle. Subsequent¬ troops took a mass pledge to fight the Northern warlords and
ly the main force of the Eighth Army crossed the Yangtze River started to move south with the help of the Soviet Union and the
and on September 6 and 7 occupied Hanyang and Hankou. On CPC. Feng Yuxiang, who had just returned from the Soviet
October 10 the main force of the Fourth Army and a part of the Union and joined the Kuomintang, became commander-in-chief
Eighth Army captured Wuchang, after laying siege to the city for of the combined forces of the National Army. Liu Bojian, a
more than a month. The men of Ye Ting’s Independent Regiment
Communist Party member, served as deputy director ol the
were the first to scale the walls. The rest of the armies then army’s political department. By November, the combined forces
entered the city, where they annihilated Wu Peifu’s main force.
already controlled Shaanxi and Gansu provinces.
After this, the Fourth Army, of which the Independent Regiment Thus, in six months after launching the Northern Expedition,
was a part, became known as the “Iron Army.” the National Revolutionary Army had made surprising progress.
After the great victories of the Northern Expeditionary Army By late 1926 it had already wiped out the main forces of Wu Peifu
in Hunan and Hubei provinces, Sun Chuanfang abandoned his and Sun Chuanfang and gained control of all the southern
neutral stand. In late August, he dispatched massive forces from provinces except Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui. Feng Yuxiang’s
Jiangxi Province, launching a flank attack on Hunan and Hubei forces controlled the Northwest and were preparing to move east
in an attempt to cut off the retreat of the Northern Expeditionary through Tongguan, a county of strategic importance in eastern
Army. During September the National Revolutionary Army’s Shaanxi Province, in coordination with the Northern Expedition¬
Second, Third and Sixth Armies and the First Division of its First ary Army’s operation. As most people could clearly see, the
Army, which had been ordered to keep watch on the movements victorious conclusion of the Northern Expedition was at hand
of Sun Chuanfang’s army, entered Jiangxi and captured Nan- and it was only a matter of time before the regime of the
chang for a time. Sun Chuanfang threw his main force into a Northern warlords would finally collapse. Even in the provinces
ferocious counter attack and recaptured Nanchang, inflicting they still controlled, the people cherished new hope. Everywhere
heavy casualties on the First Division of the First Army, which the people enthusiastically prepared to welcome the arrival of the
was commanded by Chiang Kai-shek. At this juncture, the Northern Expeditionary Army.
Fourth Army and then the Seventh Army entered Jiangxi, join¬ In the early stage of the Northern Expedition there were
ing forces with the other troops there, and in early November
82 A CONCISE HISTORY OF TIIE CPC CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 83

contradictions between the Kuomintang and the Communist Par¬ Army arrived there to January of the following year, the mem¬
ty. Nevertheless, in the face of a powerful common enemy, the bership of peasant associations rose from 400,000 to two million.
anti-Communist forces within the KMT temporarily ceased their A total of ten million people were active under the leadership of
active opposition and by and large, the two parties maintained the peasant associations; in other words, about half the peasants
their alliance. The Northern Expedition was launched under the in Hunan were already organized. In many counties almost all
anti-imperialist and anti-warlord slogans of the Communist Par¬ the peasants were members of peasant associations. Once organ¬
ty. In the course of the expedition, Party members made enor¬ ized, they went into action and brought about an unprecedented
mous contributions, both by spreading political propaganda in the revolution in the countryside. Their main targets were local
army and by mobilizing the peasants and workers. Soviet military tyrants, evil gentry and lawless landlords. They also attacked
advisers and material assistance also played an important role. patriarchal ideas and institutions, corrupt officials in the cities
Thanks to cooperation between the KMT and the CPC, the and bad practices and customs in the countryside. As Mao
Northern Expeditionary Army was able to achieve major victo¬ Zedong put it at the time, “In force and momentum the attack is
ries in a short space of time. tempestuous.... [T]he popular slogan ‘All power to the peasant
associations’ has become a reality.”'0 In Hubei, the total member¬
The Mass Movements of Workers and ship of the peasant associations swelled to 200,000 by November.
Peasants in Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi Provinces In Jiangxi, it reached 50,000 by October. A great rural revolution,
unparalleled in Chinese history, was beginning to develop in these
As the warlord regime collapsed before the advancing North¬ two provinces as well. Mao Zedong underlined its significance:
ern Expeditionary Army, the mass movements of workers and “[T]he national revolution requires a great change in the country¬
peasants expanded at an unprecedented rate. This was particular¬ side. The Revolution of 1911 did not bring about this change,
ly the case in Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi provinces. hence its failure. This change is now taking place, and it is an
In these provinces, the peasant movement was the first to gain important factor for the completion of the revolution.”11
momentum. On September 1, 1926, Mao Zedong published an As the great rural revolution unfolded, the urban workers’
article entitled “The National Revolution and the Peasant Move¬ movement also surged forward. In the autumn of 1926 federa¬
ment,” in which he pointed out the overriding importance of that tions of trade unions were formed in Hunan and Hubei. By the
movement: following January they had a total of 700,000 members. In
“The peasant problem is the central issue of the national Wuhan, union membership had risen tenfold, from about 10,000
revolution.... A large part of the so-called national revolutionary before the Northern Expedition to 100,000. Trade unions were
movement is the peasant movement.... Unless the peasants in the also formed in many counties. Shortly after this, a federation of
rural areas rise to overthrow the privileges of the patriarchal trade unions was established in Jiangxi Province. Following the
feudal landlord class, the warlord and imperialist forces will example of the Guangzhou-Hong Kong Strike Committee, the
never be brought down.” trade unions in Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi all formed armed
In November of the same year, Mao Zedong became the workers’ picket corps. In Changsha, Wuhan, Jiujiang and other
secretary of the CPC Central Committee’s Peasant Movement cities, the workers organized large-scale strikes, demanding high¬
Committee, which decided to make Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi and er wages, shorter working hours and better working conditions,
Henan provinces the centres of the movement. In Hunan, for and opposing feudal overseers and the indentured labour system
example, from July 1926 when the Northern Expeditionary under which the workers were exploited by both capitalists and
84 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 85

contractors. Most of these struggles were successful. However, in asked the CPC Central Committee, through Zhou Enlai, to re¬
certain cities, particularly Wuhan, there was some “Left” devia¬ solve the political question of whether the Communists should
tion in the labour movement. Some workers and shop assistants support or weaken Chiang Kai-shek in the course of the expedi¬
demanded wages that were too high and hours that were too short, tion. Chen Duxiu had Zhang Guotao hold a meeting on the
leaving certain middle- and small-scale industrialists and mer¬ question, but there was no real discussion. At the meeting Zhang
chants no profits. Furthermore, some workers took excessive Guotao uttered only one sentence: “Our Party’s policy during the
actions against such employers. Northern Expedition is to both support and oppose Chiang Kai-
As the revolution swept over Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi in the shek.” Accordingly, for a long time the Party’s policy remained
South, it also made headway in the North. Under the leadership unclear, and objectively this helped strengthen Chiang’s position.
of the Party, the people struggled to overthrow the Fcngtian As the Northern Expedition progressed, Chiang tightened his
warlords and topple Duan Qirui, chief of the Anhui warlords.
grip on the military and on political power. The Communists
Major victories were also achieved in the mass struggle against
should have, and could have, taken advantage of the favourable
imperialism, in January 1927 British sailors killed or wounded
situation to control some military units and local organs of
several Chinese civilians in Hankou and Jiujiang. Under the
political power. This would have made it possible to cope with
leadership of Communist Party members, including Liu Shaoqi
any eventualities. But with Chen Duxiu as general secretary, the
and Li Lisan, workers and other residents of Wuhan responded
Central Committee did not allow such a course of action. It sent
by entering and occupying the British concession in Hankou,
a letter to the members of the Hubei Regional Party Committee
while the National Revolutionary Army’s Second Independent
instructing them that “From now on, we must use our manpower
Division took over the British concession in Jiujiang. On Feb¬
exclusively in mass work; we must never participate in govern¬
ruary 9 the Foreign Ministry of the National Government signed
ment work.”13 Later, the Central Committee criticized the Hubei
an agreement with the British government by which China recov¬
Regional Party Committee for allowing Dong Biwu to participate
ered the two concessions. in the Hubei provincial government and asked those Party mem¬
bers who had participated in the Jiangxi provisional provincial
The CPC Central Committee Falls Behind the Events government, including Li Fuchun and Lin Zuhan, to leave their
posts. It ordered Party members who were magistrates in Jiujiang,
While the mass movements of the workers and peasants were
Yongxiu and other counties in Jiangxi to resign or be expelled
gaining momentum in Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi provinces, the
from the Party. It also sent a letter to Liu Bojian, deputy director
leading bodies of the Central Committee of the CPC stayed in
of the political department of the Combined Forces of the Na¬
Shanghai, far from the centre of the revolutionary storm. They
tional Army, asking him to see that all Party members and Youth
lagged far behind revolutionary developments in their under¬
League members serving as Party representatives in the Com¬
standing and action. At the time, it was important to launch mass
bined Forces devoted their attention to political propaganda and
movements to support the Northern Expedition, but basically it
did not interfere in military and administrative matters.14
was the army that fought the war. The Party leadership made a
Chen Duxiu believed that adopting a concessionary policy
major mistake. As Mao Zedong wrote a decade later, “During the
would make it clear that the Communists were not scheming to
Northern Expedition it neglected to win over the army but laid
seize power and would case Chiang Kai-shek’s concerns. This, in
one-sided stress on the mass movement....”12
turn, would prevent a rupture between the KMT and the CPC.
Before the Northern Expedition began, Soviet adviser Galen
But Chiang did not slacken his attempt to split the two parties,
86 A CONCISE HISTORY OF TIIE CPC CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 87

and when he suddenly launched a full-scale assault on the CPC, period of relative stability, they were prepared to intervene in the
the Central Committee was unprepared and unable to organize a Chinese revolution. The British, centred in the rich Yangtze
forceful resistance. This was a bitter and tragic lesson. valley, had the most special privileges. Not long after the North¬
ern Expeditionary Army entered Hubei, British warships pro¬
voked a series of incidents, using them as a pretext to shell
V. BEFORE AND AFTER THE COUP OF the county seat of Wanxian in Sichuan Province on the upper
APRIL 12,1927 Yangtze. More than a thousand soldiers and civilians were killed
or wounded in the Wanxian massacre. Sixty-three foreign war¬
ships were stationed on the Yangtze River, and more than twenty
The split in the southern revolutionary camp became increas¬
thousand foreign troops were mustered in Shanghai. Combined
ingly apparent after its decisive victory in Jiangxi in November
with the international business community and police force, the
1926.
total number of foreigners in Shanghai was over 30,000. The
In the autumn of 1926 the Northern Expeditionary Army had
foreign powers plotted to use violence and threats to prevent the
won victories in Hunan and Hubei, but Sun Chuanfang continued
to menace its flanks. Sun’s forces were more powerful than Wu continued advance of the Chinese revolution. At the same time,
Peifu’s. If they entered Hunan from Jiangxi, the Northern Expe¬ they saw that the fall of the Northern warlords was already

ditionary Army might find itself in the dangerous position of inevitable and intensified their efforts to split the revolutionary
being cut off from its rear areas. At the same time, however, camp by supporting new agents. The first to do this were the
actual control over the military forces in Hunan and Hubei was Japanese. At the end of 1926, the director of the Treaties Bureau
already in the hands of General Tang Shengzhi, and the worker of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs went to Wuhan and
and peasant movements were rapidly expanding there. If Chiang then Nanchang, where he met with Chiang Kai-shek. He reported
Kai-shek were defeated in Jiangxi, it would be hard for him to back to the Japanese government that there were sharp contra¬
survive. Under these circumstances, Chiang had no choice but to dictions between Wuhan and Nanchang and that in the future the
proceed cautiously in dealing with the relations between the rifts would inevitably become more apparent. In January 1927
KMT and the CPC. After Sun Chuanfang’s main force was Chiang met with the Japanese consul in Jiujiang, where he stated
defeated in Jiangxi, however, the situation changed drastically. clearly that far from planning to abolish the unequal treaties that
Chiang, who was stationed at Nanchang, was aware that this was China had been forced to sign with the imperialist powers after
not only a victory in Jiangxi but also the prelude to victory the Opium War of 1840, he would respect them to the greatest
throughout the Southeast. The political and military situation in possible extent. He also promised to recognize foreign loans to
southern China had totally changed. China and to repay them within the specified time. In short, he
assured the consul that the special privileges enjoyed by foreign¬
Reactionary Forces at Home and Abroad Gather Around ers in China would be completely protected. Thus, the imperialist
Chiang Kai-shek powers began to view Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of the
“moderate” faction within the Kuomintang. They began to court
At this time, the attitude of the imperialist powers toward him, maintaining that he and his group were the only forces that
Chiang Kai-shek underwent a subtle change. They had not ex¬ could prevent the Communists from controlling the vast area
pected that the Northern warlords would collapse so quickly. south of the Yangtze River.
Having weathered the crisis of post World War I and entered a As the political and military situation was increasingly favour-
88 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 89

able to the South, many of the military forces formerly loyal to Furthermore, by changing the system of leadership, they in effect
the Northern warlords or to local warlords were incorporated into dismissed Chiang Kai-shek from the chairmanship of the Stand¬
Chiang’s. Thus his strength increased rapidly. Politicians and ing Committee of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.
bureaucrats also came from the North to work for Chiang. One However, because Chiang controlled most of the military power,
of them was Huang Fu, who had close personal ties to him. When the resolution strengthening the party’s authority had no effect.
Huang Fu came through Shanghai on his way south, he went to Chiang accelerated his anti-Communist activities. Having gone to
see the vice president of the Bank of China, Zhang Gongquan, Jiujiang from Nanchang on March 16, he instigated thugs from
who promised him that Chiang would be permitted to overdraw the Green Band and the Red Band — secret, Mafia-style organi¬
his account by one million yuan. When this incident became zations — to destroy the Jiujiang KMT headquarters and the
known, it gave rise to the popular saying, “In the military there offices of the city’s Federation of Trade Unions, in which Left¬
is the Northern Expedition, while in politics there is the Southern wingers constituted a majority. Three people were killed at the
Expedition.” KMT headquarters, and at the federation one was killed and six
Against this background, Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-Communist were injured. Chiang then took a warship east to Anqing. On
stand became more and more evident. Suddenly, he proposed March 23, at his instigation, a gang of ruffians there destroyed
moving the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and the the Anhui KMT headquarters, which was dominated by Left¬
National Government from Guangzhou to Nanchang, where the wingers, and the offices of the Federation of Trade Unions and
headquarters of the Northern Expeditionary Army was located. of the peasant association. Again, many people were wounded.
This would place them under his direct control. On February 21, The thugs proudly said: “We have made all the arrangements
1927, he publicly announced his anti-Communist position in a with our leader. We will attack Red elements everywhere we go.”
speech at the Nanchang headquarters. He proclaimed himself the On April 9 the deputy director of the National Revolutionary
“leader of the Chinese revolution” and stated that “when Com¬ Army’s general political department, Guo Moruo, who had inves¬
munist Party members do something wrong or behave improper¬ tigated the violence in Anqing and Jiujiang, published a long
ly, I have the responsibility and the power to intervene and article entitled “Look at Today’s Chiang Kai-shek.” After re¬
punish them.” He began to openly suppress the revolutionary viewing the facts, he wrote, “Chiang Kai-shek is no longer the
forces of the workers and peasants. On March 6 he ordered the commander-in-chief of our National Revolutionary Army. He
New First Division of the National Revolutionary Army, sta¬ is the central force behind a broad spectrum of counter¬
tioned in Jiangxi, to trap and kill Chen Zanxian, a Communist revolutionaries, including thugs and ruffians, local tyrants and
Party member who was the chairman of the Ganzhou Federation evil gentry, corrupt officials and traitorous warlords.... Inside the
of Trade Unions and vice-chairman of the Jiangxi Provincial KMT he is more dangerous than enemies outside it.”15 It was only
Federation of Trade Unions. a matter of time before the Chiang clique would openly betray
During March 10-17, the 2nd Central Executive Committee of the revolution.
the Kuomintang held its 3rd Plenary Session in Wuhan. Because
several KMT leaders in Wuhan did not want Chiang Kai-shek to Different Opinions Within the Communist Party of China
exercise dictatorial rule, participants at this session rejected his
proposal to move the capital to Nanchang. They adopted resolu¬ There were two different opinions within the CPC as to how
tions reaffirming Sun Yat-sen’s Three Great Policies, strengthen¬ the Party should respond to the grave split that might occur in
ing the party’s authority and opposing military dictatorship. the revolutionary camp at any time.
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 91
90

The members of the Guangdong Regional Party Committee “Of all the dangerous tendencies, the most serious is that as the
had recognized the impending danger earlier. In November 1926 mass movements gain momentum, the people tend toward the
they had submitted a political report to the Central Committee ‘Left’ while the military regime, terrified of the mass movements,
of the CPC in which they pointed out that there could be no hope ends towards the Right. If these ‘Left’ and Right tendencies
of long-term cooperation with the new warlords. Therefore, they continue to develop, the united front will ultimately rupture, and
advised: that will endanger the entire national revolutionary movement.”
“We should prepare our forces, organize the masses and consol¬ In other words, the Central Committee declared that both the
idate power of the people.... We should try to avoid pointless Right tendencies of the military regime and the “Left” tendencies
struggle and prevent the eruption of large-scale struggle (of of the mass movements should be prevented. But the first half of
course, that is not to say we should avoid struggle completely). the statement was merely empty talk. There was certainly no
At the same time, we should do everything possible to prepare all practical, effective method of countering the rightward swing of
our forces for a great rebellion, and wc should have such great Chiang’s forces. In fact, the only course of action available was
forces. In the event of a large-scale struggle, they said, they hoped to prevent the “Left” tendencies in the mass movements, that
to be victorious.”16 On December 11 Zhou Enlai published an is, to suppress the vigorously expanding workers’ and peasants’
article entitled “The Chinese Communist Party in the Present movements. At a time when the Kuomintang new Right-wingers
Political Struggle,” in which he stated explicitly: had already resolved to oppose the Communists and cause a
“For if there were conflicts, they would be conflicts between rupture between the KMT and the CPC, and when almost all
the masses of revolutionary workers and peasants and a bourgeoi¬ military and political power was concentrated in their hands, the
sie that was compromising with the imperialist enemies; if there major force that the Communist Party could rely on was the
were a split, it would be a split between an alliance of the workers and peasants. If the CPC abandoned the policy of mob¬
revolutionary Left wing of the Kuomintang and the Communists ilizing and organizing the masses into an effective force, not only
on the one hand and the Right wing that was abandoning the would it be unable to counter a coup staged by the new Right
revolution on the other.”17 He also warned that the CPC should wing of the KMT, but it would be unable even to control the
prepare, mentally and in practical work, for the divisive activities vacillations of the upper petty bourgeoisie. Thus, at this special
of the new Right-wingers within the KMT. But the Central meeting the CPC Central Committee failed to resolve the ques¬
Committee of the CPC saw this view as “a major, dangerous, and tion of how the Party was to survive and persist in the struggle
essential error,” one that could “lead to terrible repercussions.”18 when faced with imminent danger. Worse, it adopted a mistaken
It demanded that this error be corrected. policy toward the mass movements, which led to even more
It was at this crucial juncture that, on December 13, 1926, the serious consequences. After the meeting, the capitulationist poli¬
Central Committee convened a special meeting. In his political cy of stifling the workers’ and peasants’ movements in order to
report, Chen Duxiu stated at the outset: “The important issue in appease the Right wing of the KMT began to be carried out in
the political report to be addressed at this meeting is still the the Party’s practical work. Chen Duxiu himself had a talk with
Kuomintang. Since the military victory in Jiangxi, there have the secretary of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, ordering
been many new changes in the relationship between the CPC and him to put a stop to the “extreme” actions of the peasants.
the KMT, and we need to discuss that question again.” The Some Party members opposed this Right capitulationist error.
resolution adopted by the meeting, in line with Chen Duxiu’s From January 4 to February 5, 1927, Mao Zedong spent thirty-
report, said: two days investigating the peasant movement in Hunan. In the
92 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 93

report he submitted to the Central Committee of the CPC, he than thirty hours of fighting, they defeated the troops of the
wrote: “The masses are now shifting to the Left. Our Party has Northern warlords stationed in Shanghai and occupied all dis¬
in many respects indicated that it is out of step with the revolu¬ tricts of the city except the foreign concessions. This was a heroic
tionary mood of the masses. The Kuomintang is even further out feat of the working class during the period of the Great Revolu¬
of step. This is something we should pay close attention to.” In tion.
March, an article entitled “Report on an Investigation of the It was only after the victorious workers had occupied Shanghai
Peasant Movement in Hunan” began to be published in the that the Northern Expeditionary Army, which had been stationed
weekly magazine Soldier. In this report, Mao sharply rejected the in the southern suburbs of Shanghai, finally entered the city
skepticism and criticisms heaped on the peasant movement from under the command of Bai Chongxi. Three days later, on March
both inside and outside the Party. He explained the great signif¬ 24, the Sixth and Second Armies of the National Revolutionary
icance of the revolution in rural areas and pointed out that all Army moved east from Anhui Province and occupied the city of
revolutionary comrades ought to march at the head of the peas¬ Nanjing. In the afternoon of the same day, British and American
ants and lead them, not trail behind them, gesticulating and warships cruising on the Yangtze River, on pretext of protecting
criticizing or worse, stand in their way and oppose them. He their nationals, suddenly bombarded Nanjing, killing and wound¬
emphasized that the Party should rely on the poor peasants, who ing many Chinese soldiers and civilians. The Nanjing Incident
were the “vanguard of the revolution” and should unite also with hastened Chiang Kai-shek’s decision to ally himself with the
the middle peasants and other forces that could be won over. The imperialist forces.
Party should work to establish peasant associations and peasant
armed forces so that the associations could take all power in the The Anti-Communist Coup of April 12,1927
countryside. Then they should reduce rent for land and interest
on loans and redistribute the land, and so on. This report was the Chiang Kai-shek had resolved to oppose the Communists. But
most important Marxist document of the Chinese Communist if he was to make a major move against them, he would have to
Party on leading the peasant movement. In February, Qu Qiubai have the support of the imperialist powers and financial assist¬
wrote an article entitled “A Controversy over the Chinese Revo¬ ance from the Zhejiang and Jiangsu plutocrats. He would also
lution,” in which he criticized the Right capitulationist mistakes need to rely on the gangs of Shanghai thugs. Having hurried from
that had emerged in the Party, and emphasized the need for the Anhui to Shanghai by warship on March 26, Chiang held a series
Chinese revolution to be led by the proletariat. of secret meetings with the imperialists, plutocrats and gang
At this time. Sun Chuanfang’s forces had already collapsed, leaders. He sent representatives to the Shanghai consulates of the
and Chiang Kai-shek had already essentially taken possession of five countries involved in the Nanjing Incident (Britain, the
the rich regions of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai. On March 21, United States, France, Japan and Italy), making an apology and
when the Northern Expeditionary Army was advancing from telling them that the incident would be resolved immediately,
Zhejiang to the suburbs of Shanghai, the workers in Shanghai, led that the workers’ armed forces in Shanghai would be disarmed
by a special committee that included Chen Duxiu, Luo Yinong, and that action would be taken to foil any attempt to recover the
Zhou Enlai and Zhao Shiyan, organized a general strike and then foreign concessions in Shanghai by armed force and rebellion.
staged an armed uprising. (The Shanghai workers had already The imperialists urged him to act quickly and decisively. The
launched two armed uprisings, both of which had ended in failure Jiangsu and Zhejiang tycoons gave him generous financial sup¬
because of incomplete preparations and bad timing.) After more port totalling several million yuan. Huang Jinrong, Du Yuesheng
 CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 95
94 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

tee of the CPC also moved its headquarters from Shanghai to

and other Shanghai gang leaders promised to use the thugs of the
Green Band and Red Band to disarm the worker’s armed picket Wuhan.
A few days later, Chiang Kai-shek suddenly staged a counter¬
corps on his behalf. Chiang also transferred all military units not
revolutionary coup in Shanghai. At dawn on April 12, a large
completely under his control away from Shanghai and brought
number of well-prepared, well-armed thugs of the Green Band
his own troops into the Shanghai-Nanjing area. In early April he
and the Red Band rushed out of the foreign concessions and
held a secret meeting in Shanghai with Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi,
Huang Shaohong, Li Jishen, Zhang Jingjiang, Wu Zhihui, Li launched a surprise attack on the workers’ picket corps stationed
Shizeng and other KMT right-wingers and pro-Chiang warlords, at the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions and elsewhere. The
at which they decided to “purge the party” by force, thus com¬ pickets immediately rose to resist them. At this time, the Twenty-
pleting Chiang’s preparations for a surprise attack on the Com¬ sixth Army of the National Revolutionary Army (the former
forces of the warlord Sun Chuanfang, which had been reorgan¬
munists.
The Central Committee of the CPC and the Shanghai Regional ized by Chiang) arrived, claiming that they were going to mediate
Party Committee were aware of some of Chiang Kai-shek’s plot, and would first disarm the thugs. The workers’ pickets believed
and tried to strengthen the workers’ picket corps to secure the this lie and opened the gates. Caught completely unprepared, they
gains of the revolution. But at that time the Comintern’s hopes were forced to hand over their arms. Some of the workers resisted,
still rested with Chiang Kai-shek, and it refused to support a split but because of the great disparity in numbers, they were defeated.
with him. In late March Chen Duxiu sent a letter to the Shanghai Wang Shouhua, a Communist Party member who was chairman
Regional Party Committee in which he declared that they should of the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions, had been tricked
“stop opposing Chiang.”19 On April 1 Wang Jingwei returned to and murdered by Du Yuesheng the day before. On the morning
Shanghai from overseas and soon afterward had secret talks with of April 13, over 100,000 Shanghai workers and other citizens
Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang advocated the immediate separation of held a mass rally and a protest march, demanding the release of
the Communist Party from the KMT. Concerned that such a those who had been arrested and the return of the weapons of the
workers’ picket corps. When the marchers reached Baoshan Road,
separation would enable Chiang to arrogate too much power to
himself, Wang proposed that a plenary session of the Central a unit of the Twenty-sixth Army, lying in ambush, suddenly
Executive Committee of the KMT be called to discuss his propo¬ opened fire on the crowd, killing more than one hundred people
sal. He also suggested that Chen Duxiu be notified of the session and wounding countless others.
and asked to order Communist Party members nationwide to After the coup of April 12 in Shanghai, in the name of
“temporarily suspend their activities and await the decision of the “purging the party” large numbers of Communists and other
revolutionary people were killed in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui,
session.” On April 5 Chen Duxiu and Wang Jingwei released a
joint declaration dismissing as rumours the assertions that the Fujian, Guangdong and Guangxi. In Guangdong alone, more
“KMT leaders would expel the CPC and crack down on the trade than 2,000 people were arrested and executed, including outstand¬
unions and the workers’ picket corps” and asking everyone to ing Communist Party members such as Xiao Chunti and Xiong
“forget their suspicions, ignore the rumours, respect each other Xiong. On April 18, Chiang Kai-shek established in Nanjing a
and sincerely discuss all their concerns.” This declaration led “National Government” representing the interests of the big
some Communist Party members to relax their vigilance, think¬ landlord class and the big bourgeoisie, in opposition to the Na¬
ing that the tension had been dissipated. After this, Chen Duxiu tional Government in Wuhan. Yan Xishan, the warlord of Shan¬
and Wang Jingwei left for Wuhan together. The Central Commit¬ xi, and Liu Xiang, the warlord of Sichuan, also began to “purge
96 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 97

the party” in their domains and expressed their support for the telegram denouncing Chiang. “If,” they wrote, “our people and
Nanjing government. At the same time, the Fengtian warlord, comrades, especially those in the military, do not want the revo¬
Zhang Zuolin, executed a large number of Communists and other lution to be destroyed by Chiang, they must act in accordance
revolutionary people in northern China. On April 28 Li Dazhao, with the orders of the Central Executive Committee and over¬
one of the founders of the Communist Party of China, was throw this traitor to Sun Yat-sen, the party and the people. All
hanged in Beijing. The Great Revolution suffered a major set¬ forces of the National Revolutionary Army should erase this deep
back. disgrace.”20
The counter-revolutionary coup of April 12 was proof that At this time, the KMT was still cooperating with the CPC m
Chiang Kai-shek had already become the rallying point for the Wuhan. The KMT leadership there, including Wang Jingwei, did
anti-Communist forces dependent on the imperialists and consist¬ not wish to see all power in Chiang’s hands. On April 17, the
ing of big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. Outwardly, however, Central Executive Committee of the KMT in Wuhan issued an
he continued to espouse bourgeois reformism in order to deceive order expelling Chiang from the party and stripping him of all
the public. posts.
Chiang Kai-shek’s counter-revolutionary coup won the support
of the big bourgeoisie and of certain individuals from the upper
strata of the national bourgeoisie. The Shanghai Federation of VI. THE FAILURE OF THE GREAT
Commerce sent a telegram expressing its “backing for the govern¬
ment authorities’ effort to purge the party.” Individual represent¬
REVOLUTION
atives of the bourgeoisie were drawn to Nanjing to participate
in the government and became ornaments of the counter¬ After the coup of April 12, the political situation in China
revolutionary military dictatorship of the big landlord class and underwent a fundamental change. There were now three centres
the big bourgeoisie. of power: two counter-revolutionary governments — one in Bei¬
The angry people denounced the coup staged by the Chiang jing led by Zhang Zuolin and one in Nanjing led by Chiang
Kai-shek clique. On April 14 seven prominent persons in Shang¬ Kai-shek — and one revolutionary government — the National
hai, including Hu Yuzhi, Zheng Zhcnduo and Wu Juenong, Government in Wuhan, which still maintained cooperation be¬
signed a letter sharply criticizing the military brutality. In tween the KMT and the CPC.
Wuhan, Changsha and other cities, rallies of several hundred The Wuhan National Government had direct control over the
thousand people were held to express opposition to the imperial¬ provinces of Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi. It faced threats from two
ists and denounce Chiang. On April 20 the Central Committee of directions: the new warlord Chiang Kai-shek to the east and the
the CPC issued a delcaration on Chiang’s massacre of the people, old warlord Zhang Zuolin to the north. After the armies of Wu
exposing him as the “public enemy of the national revolution” Peifu and Sun Chuanfang were defeated, Zhang Zuolin had
and calling on the revolutionary people to overthrow the new transferred his troops south. His main force was stationed along
warlords and the military dictatorship. On April 22, thirty-nine the Beijing-Hankou Railway and controlled Henan, thus posing a
members and alternate members of the KMT Central Executive major threat to the Wuhan government. Also, the situation within
Committee, and its Central Supervisory Committee, including the Wuhan government was extremely complex. Wang Jingwei,
Soong Ching Ling, Deng Yanda, He Xiangning, Tan Pingshan, who had recently arrived in Wuhan and was acting under the
Wu Yuzhang, Lin Zuhan and Mao Zedong, signed an open pretence of opposing Chiang, quickly assumed leading positions
98 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAFTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 99

in the Central Executive Committee of the KMT and in the tion against the Fengtian warlords. This was in accord with the
National Government. At this time, he was posing as a leader of intentions of Wang Jingwei’s National Government in Wuhan.
the Left wing. He called on those who wanted to participate in There were four reasons that Borodin and Chen Duxiu proposed
revolution to come to the Left and those who did not to go away this plan. First, the Comintern and the CPC Central Committee
at once. At heart, however, he was eager to expel the Commu¬ naively trusted the combined forces of the National Army com¬
nists; the time, he wrote, was not yet right, but “people must make manded by Feng Yuxiang, who at the time was preparing to move
the necessary preparations.”21 Wang Jingwei joined forces with his troops from Shaanxi east into Henan. They believed that he
Tang Shengzhi, who controlled the KMT troops in the area of was a reliable ally and that by cooperating with him in a punitive
Wuhan. Together they began to restrict the activities of the expedition against the Fengtian warlords and joining forces at
workers’ and peasants’ movements, manoeuvred to take control Zhengzhou, capital of Henan Province, they could build a solid
of the situation in Wuhan and waited for the right moment to base in the Northwest, open up an international route between
betray the revolution. China and the Soviet Union and then advance to the east. Second,
After moving to Wuhan, the CPC Central Committee contin¬ they believed that the imperialist powers were too strong in the
ued to cooperate with Wang Jingwei’s faction of the Kuomintang. Southeast. They feared that if they launched an eastern expedi¬
The tasks the Communists faced were even more complex than tion immediately, they would come into direct conflict with the
before. How should they deal with their enemies outside the imperialists and would surely be defeated. Third, since the area
Wuhan government? How should they deal with their unreliable of Wuhan was surrounded on four sides by enemy forces, com¬
allies within the government? Should they and could they prepare merce and banking could not function normally and goods were
for the possibility of another sudden change? These were the in short supply. Borodin and Chen believed that if they did not
problems the Party had to consider. fight their way out, they would be unable to surmount the
economic difficulties. Outward expansion, they thought, was the
The 5th National Congress of the Party Convened at key to survival. Fourth, they believed that since the leaders of the
a Critical Moment National Government in Wuhan represented the upper petty
bourgeoisie, their support for the revolution tended to waver. If
Two heated disputes arose within the Party at this time: one the Communists initiated an agrarian revolution, it would drive
was about “deepening vs. broadening,” the other about “the them to abandon the revolution and make a compromise with
eastern expedition vs. the northern expedition.” “Deepening” Chiang Kai-shek. This line of reasoning was known at the time as
meant initiating an agrarian revolution in Hubei, Hunan and the “Northwest doctrine.”
Jiangxi provinces in order to consolidate the existing revolution¬ The advocates of the “Northwest doctrine” were afraid to
ary base areas and then expand them. “Broadening” meant ex¬ launch a thoroughgoing agrarian revolution and arm the masses
panding into other areas and taking Beijing before launching an of workers and peasants. Instead, they tried to keep the revolution
agrarian revolution. Advocates of an eastern expedition support¬ within the limits imposed by Wang Jingwei so as to stabilize the
ed a punitive expedition against Chiang, while advocates of a Kuomintang government in Wuhan. It was just as Zhou Enlai
northern expedition supported a military campaign against the later analysed it: “The central idea of the ‘go north’ group was to
troops of the Fengtian warlords in Henan. steer clear of the peasant movement in Hunan and Hubei....”22
These disputes were resolved in favour of a plan put forward Those who supported this plan thus expressed their lack of faith
by Borodin and Chen Duxiu, which called for a northern expedi¬ in the people’s forces and their fear of the enemy. They placed
 100 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 101

their hopes primarily on an alliance with Feng Yuxiang and not troops directly under the leadership of the CPC. Under these
on the mobilization of the workers and peasants. dangerous circumstances, when the entire Party expected emer¬
On April 19 the National Government in Wuhan held a gency measures to save the revolution, talk of “skipping over the
meeting and pledged to continue the Northern Expedition. Its capitalist stage of development” was simply irrelevant and unreal¬
main army marched north into Henan. Thus, there would be no istic. The congress criticized the Right opportunist errors, but
eastern expedition against Chiang and no thoroughgoing agrarian proposed no measures to correct them. Moreover, it reelected
revolution. Chen Duxiu general secretary. As a result, while the CPC hovered
At this critical moment in the Chinese revolution, the Commu¬ on the brink of disaster, the congress failed to determine an
nist Party held its 5th National Congress in Wuhan. There were appropriate course of action and provide powerful leadership
now many more Party members than before the Northern Expe¬ for the Party. Furthermore, having let this opportunity slip, it
dition: nearly 58,000. watched passively as the overall situation continued to deterio¬
The 5th National Party Congress was convened on April 27, rate.
1927, just two weeks after the coup of April 12. The entire Party
expected this congress to make a sober assessment of the situation The Right Capitulationism of the CPC Central Committee
and to answer the most pressing question: how to save the
revolution. It did not do so. The congress declared that although After the 5th National Party Congress, the situation in the area
the bourgeoisie had already betrayed the revolution, the revolu¬ under the jurisdiction of the National Government in Wuhan
tion had entered the stage of a democratic dictatorship of the became increasingly critical. Because this area was surrounded
workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie. The Party, it said, should and blockaded by reactionary forces, business stagnated, factories
use a programme ol agrarian revolution and democratic govern¬ closed, everyday necessities became extremely scarce, prices skyr¬
ment to mobilize the peasants and the petty bourgeois; it should ocketed and currency depreciated. The government ran up a huge
make the revolution skip over the capitalist stage of development. deficit. Many workers and shop assistants lost their jobs. Local
But statements like that were only empty talk, far removed from tyrants, evil gentry and reactionary officers fished in the troubled
the actual situation of the time. The congress viewed Chiang’s waters. Wang Jingwei and his government increasingly spoke and
betrayal of the revolution as a betrayal by the national bourgeoi¬ acted in ways destructive to the workers’ and peasants’ move¬
sie as a whole. This view was unrealistic and later led to ultra-Left ments. On May 13, 1927, Xia Douyin, commander of the Four¬
actions against the bourgeoisie. It saw Wang Jingwei as a repre¬ teenth Independent Division of the National Revolutionary
sentative of the petty bourgeoisie and his Wuhan government as Army, stationed in Yichang, sent an open telegram denouncing
a reliable ally an alliance of the workers, peasants and petty the Wuhan government. On the 17th, he attacked Zhifang, near
bourgeois. This misconception led to the adoption of Right con¬ Wuchang. The attack was repulsed by Ye Ting, commander of
cessionary policies towards Wang and the Wuhan government. the Wuchang garrison. On May 21 Xu Kexiang, commander of
Furthermore, because of it, the Party did not anticipate their the 33rd Regiment of the National Revolutionary Army’s 35th
possible betrayal and consequently failed to prepare for it. The Army, which had been reorganized from warlord troops, staged
proposal for agrarian revolution was sound, but the emphasis on a counter-revolutionary coup in Changsha. His troops disarmed
winning the support of the petty bourgeoisie — or, in effect, the the workers’ pickets and arrested and killed more than one
support of Wang Jingwei and his clique — rendered it meaning¬ hundred Communists and other revolutionaries. The city of
less. At the congress there was no talk of expanding revolutionary Changsha was overwhelmed by White terror. On June 6 Zhu
 102 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 103

Peide, the governor of Jiangxi Province and commander-in-chief solutions. They continued to pursue a concessionary policy, be¬
of the National Revolutionary Army’s Fifth Front Army, ex¬ lieving that in this way they could avoid providing Wang and
pelled a large number of Communists and Kuomintang Left¬ Tang with further pretexts for a split. They cancelled the plan to
wingers from the province. He began to close down revolutionary stage an armed uprising in Hunan and disbanded the workers’
organizations and to arrest leaders of the workers’ and peasants’ picket corps in Wuhan. These actions did nothing to stabilize the
movements. National Government in Wuhan and only encouraged further
Under these circumstances, Borodin and Chen Duxiu, among displays of arrogance by the reactionary forces. A.B. Bakulin, a
others, still pinned their hopes on the junction of the National Soviet adviser, wrote in his diary: “Wuhan is becoming more and
Revolutionary Army carrying on the Northern Expedition and more like Nanjing.”23 A counter-revolutionary coup in Wuhan
Feng Yuxiang’s troops. The National Revolutionary Army’s was becoming increasingly likely.
troops marching north fought bloody battles, suffering 14,000 At this critical juncture, the Executive Committee of the
casualties. (The Fourth and Eleventh Armies, which had the most Communist International adopted a resolution on China, and
Communists, lost the most men, including the talented comman¬ issued a directive (known as the “May Directive”) to the Central
der and Party member Jiang Xianyun.) The National Revolution¬ Committee of the Communist Party of China. This directive
ary Army routed the Fengtian warlords’ main force in Henan, urged the CPC to transform the Kuomintang by encouraging
enabling Feng Yuxiang’s troops, who had marched east through large numbers of workers and peasants to join it; to turn the
Tongguan, to capture Zhengzhou on May 31. From June 10 to peasant associations into organs of village government and con¬
12, the leaders of the Wuhan National Government, including fiscate the land held by the landlords; and to organize an army
Wang Jingwei, Tan Yankai and Sun Ke, held talks with Feng of 70,000 men, of which 20,000 should be Communist Party
Yuxiang in Zhengzhou. They decided to give Feng complete members. Although the Comintern had made a series of errors in
military and political control in Henan and the Northwest and to its advice to the Chinese revolutionaries, this particular directive
send the Northern Expeditionary Army back to Wuhan. Feng’s correctly addressed the crucial question of the time: how to save
political attitude had changed substantially: he now proposed the revolution. Of course, this is not to say that the revolutiona¬
putting an end to the conflict between the Wuhan and Nanjing ries could have easily achieved victory, but if the CPC had
governments. On June 20 he went to Xuzhou to hold talks with resolutely followed these recommendations, it would have been
Chiang Kai-shek and openly sided with him. After this he sent a well prepared to struggle effectively against the Wang Jingwei
telegram to the National Government in Wuhan demanding that clique and in a stronger position to confront the reactionaries in
Borodin be removed from his post and sent back to the Soviet all eventualities. Thus it could have prevented a crushing defeat.
Union. He further demanded that all Communist Party members However, the Central Committee of the CPC believed that it
and large numbers of political officers in the combined forces of would be too difficult to accomplish the tasks proposed in the
the National Revolutionary Army be dismissed. Comintern’s “May Directive,” and it still hoped that at the last
Consequently, the “Northwest doctrine” advocated by Borodin minute its capitulationist tactics would succeed in winning over
and Chen Duxiu came to nothing, and the Wang Jingwei clique the Wang Jingwei clique.
intensified its anti-Communist activities. Dissatisfaction with Chen Duxiu’s Right capitulationist errors
The situation was growing more ominous. Chen Duxiu and the was growing within the Party. Ren Bishi, the secretary of the
Soviet advisers, lacking confidence and afraid of provoking Wang Central Committee of the Communist Youth League, wrote a
Jingwei and Tang Shengzhi, were unable to offer any practical letter criticizing Chen Duxiu. Chen Duxiu ripped the letter to
 104 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 105

shreds in front of him. On July 4 the Standing Committee of the tive Committee at which a formal decision was made to break off
Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held an enlarged relations with the CPC. This action definitively ended the first
meeting at which Mao Zedong proposed that the peasant armed period of cooperation between the KMT and the CPC and
forces go to the mountains or join military units connected to the marked the failure of the Great Revolution of 1924-1927.
Party. “Unless we preserve our own armed forces,” he said, “we Launched during the first period of cooperation between the
shall be helpless to cope with emergencies.” In mid-July, the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, the Great Revolution
Central Committee of the CPC was reorganized in accordance was an unprecedented revolutionary movement in which workers
with an instruction of the Comintern Executive Committee. Its and peasants played the major role. Essentially, it overthrew the
Provisional Standing Committee was now composed of Zhang rule of the hated Northern warlords and struck heavy blows
Guotao, Li Weihan, Zhou Enlai, Li Lisan and Zhang Tailci. On against the imperialist and feudal forces. Through this movement
July 13 the Central Committee issued a statement declaring that people came to have their first understanding of the meaning of
China had reached a critical moment when the revolution was at revolution. Even though it failed, it exerted an enduring influ¬
stake. It condemned the KMT Central Executive Committee and ence. It marked a new starting point for subsequent advances in
the National Government in Wuhan for “recently and publicly the Chinese revolution.
preparing for a coup,” for “acting against the interests of the vast There were two reasons for the failure of the Great Revolution.
majority of the Chinese people and against the basic principles First, at that time the strength and political experience of the
and policies of Dr. Sun Yat-sen” and for “destroying the national combined imperialist and feudal forces far surpassed those of the
revolution.” It therefore decided to recall all Communist Party revolutionary camp. Furthermore, the Kuomintang suddenly be¬
members serving in the National Government. At the same time, trayed the revolution and launched a surprise attack on the
it proclaimed that it would continue to support the revolutionary Communist Party and on the workers’ and peasants’ movements
struggle against imperialism and feudalism and that it wished to under its leadership. Second, the CPC Central Committee, repre¬
continue to cooperate with revolutionary elements in the Kuo- sented by Chen Duxiu, committed Right capitulationist errors.
mintang. Even though this announcement was released rather During the early stages of the Great Revolution, the Party’s
late, it helped heighten the revolutionary spirit within the Party. line was by and large correct. Party members, both cadres and
On July 14 Soong Ching Ling (Mme. Sun Yat-sen), a promi¬ rank and file, all played active roles and as a result achieved great
nent representative of the left wing of the KMT, wrote a “State¬ successes. However, the Party was still immature and inexperi¬
ment Issued in Protest Against the Violation of Sun Yat-sen’s enced and did not fully understand either Chinese history and
Revolutionary Principles and Policies,” which was later published society or the special characteristics and laws of the Chinese
in Hankou. In this statement she said: “Sun Yat-sen’s policies are revolution. Moreover, it still lacked a deep understanding of
clear. If leaders of the party [the KMT] do not carry them out Marxist-Leninist theory and of the concrete practice of the
consistently, then they are no longer Sun’s true followers, and the Chinese revolution. Therefore, its leading bodies vacillated on
Party is no longer a revolutionary party, but merely a tool in the certain key questions, and at the later stage of the Great Revolu¬
hands of this or that militarist.” “Feeling thus,” she declared, “I tion they failed to lead the Party in taking appropriate action.
must disassociate myself from active participation in the carrying Instead, they were tricked by the counter-revolutionary forces,
out of these new policies of the party.”24 and this led to the failure of the Great Revolution.
On July 15 in Wuhan, Wang Jingwei called an enlarged As a branch of the Communist International, the Communist
meeting of the Standing Committee of the KMT Central Execu¬ Party of China received direct guidance from it. While actively
 106 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER TWO IN THE TORRENT OF THE GREAT REVOLUTION 107

contributing to the Great Revolution, the Comintern and its 9. Chiang Kai-shek on the Zhongshan Warship Incident, Speech to All Party
representatives in China ultimately failed to understand the Representatives, May 1926.
actual conditions in China. Some of their ideas were correct, but 10. “Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” Selected
others were wrong, and these were partly responsible for the Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed.. Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1975, Vol. I.
Right capitulationist errors made by the leadership of the CPC. p. 25.
It was difficult for the immature Chinese Party to reject the 11. Ibid., p. 27.
mistaken guidance of the Comintern. 12. “Problems of War and Strategy,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed.,
Although the Great Revolution failed, it still had enormous Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1975 Vol. II. p. 222.
significance. Through this revolution, the anti-imperialist, anti- 13. Letter of September 27, 1926.
feudal programme put forward by the CPC came to be resound¬ 14. Letter sent by the Central Committee on November 9, 1926 to Comrade Liu
ingly supported by the masses. The Party rapidly spread its Bojian, Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
political influence among the people and greatly expanded its China, Chin, ed., compiled by the Central Archives, Publishing House of the
organizations. Millions upon millions of workers and peasants Party School of the CPC Central Committee, Beijing, 1989, Vol. IT, p. 455.
were organized under the leadership of the Party, and the Party 15. Materials for Modern History, 2nd Issue, 1954.
began to control part of the troops. In addition, the ordeals the 16. Political Report by the Guangdong Regional Party Committee, No. 2, No¬
Party went through during this period served to temper it, and its vember 23, 1926, Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Communist
victories and defeats provided it with valuable experience. All of Party of China, Chin, ed., compiled by the Central Archives, Publishing House
this helped to prepare the ground for the next stage, when, with of the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, Beijing, 1989, Vol. II, pp.
the leadership of the Party, the Chinese people would push their 656-57.
struggle to a higher plane. 17. Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Eng. ed.. Foreign Languages Press, Beijing,
1981, Vol. I, p. 14.
18. Letter from the Central Committee to the Guangdong Regional Party Com¬
NOTES mittee, December 4, 1926, in Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China, Chin, ed., compiled by the Central Archives, Publish¬
1. Selected Works of Soong Ching Ling, Chin, ed.. The People’s Publishing House, ing House of the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, Beijing, 1989, Vol.
Beijing, 1966, p. 109. II, pp. 472-73.
2. Huang Jilu, “Thirteen Epoch-making Years of the Republic of China.”
3. “On the Relations Between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang 19. Minutes of the meeting of the presidium of the Shanghai Regional Party
from 1924 to 1926,” in Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Eng. ed.. Foreign Lan¬ Committee, March 28, 1927.
guages Press, Beijing, 1981, Vol. I, pp. 130-31. 20. Republic of China Daily, Hankou, April 22, 1927.
4. Collected Works of Deng Zhongxia, Chin, ed., The People’s Publishing House,
Beijing, 1983, p. 526. 21. Wang Jingwei, “Separation of the CPC from the KMT in Wuhan”, November
5. “Interview with the British Journalist James Bertram,” Selected Works of Mao 5, 1927.
Zedong, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1975, Vol. II, p. 54. 22. “On the Sixth Congress of the Party,” Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Eng. ed.,
6. Directive on Admitting Communists into the KMT, issued by the Kuomintang
Central Executive Committee in August 1924. Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1981, Vol. I, p. 191.
7. “Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front,” Selected 23. A.B. Bakulin, A Record of China’s Great Revolution in Wuhan, Chin, ed.,
Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1975, Vol 11,
p. 422. China Social Sciences Publishing House, Beijing, 1985, p. 185.
8. “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, 24. Soong Ching Ling, The Struggle for New China, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages
Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1975, Vol I, p. 19. Press, Beijing, 1952, pp. 5-6 and 1.
 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 109

loss what to do. Trade unions and peasant associations, which had
thrived throughout the country, were outlawed or disbanded.
Under the White terror, the worker-peasant movement sank to a
low ebb.
CHAPTER THREE A great number of people took a middle course, constantly
shifting their political allegiance. When the revolution was devel¬
THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION oping successfully, they would turn to the Left; when it suffered
setbacks or was in decline, they would turn to the Right. In these
dark days, although some political activists outside the Party and
other persons of integrity persisted in their revolutionary stand
I. THE REVOLUTION AT A LOW EBB AND and refused to side with the Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-shek
ARMED RESISTANCE BY and Wang Jingwei, many of those taking the middle course
THE COMMUNISTS distanced themselves from the Communist Party. Some of them
were frightened by the KMT’s bloody slaughter and had been
driven to despair; others still had unrealistic hopes for the KMT,
Following the betrayal of the revolution by Chiang Kai-shek
seeing it as a party that had a revolutionary history, that was still
and Wang Jingwei, the political situation in China took a sharp
flying the banner of Sun Yal-sen and that was continuing the
turn for the worse. The Great Revolution came to a premature
end. The southern part of the country, where the revolutionary Northern Expedition.
The stark reality was that the Chinese revolution was at a very
movement had been vigorous, descended into bloodshed.
The Communist Party of China was subjected to the severest low ebb. The counter-revolutionary forces far surpassed the revo¬
test since its founding. According to incomplete statistics provid¬ lutionary forces led by the Party, and the Party itself was in
ed by the 6th National Congress of the Party, during the period danger of disintegrating or of being wiped out.
from March 1927 to June 1928, some 310,000 people had been In this time of savage repression, when the future of the
killed, of whom more than 26,000 were Parly members. Chen revolution seemed so bleak, when to be a revolutionary meant
Yannian, Zhao Shiyan, Luo Yinong, Xiang Jingyu, Chen Qiao- risking death, it was not easy to remain steadfast in one’s belief
nian, Xia Minghan, Guo Liang and other respected Party activ¬ and to carry on the struggle. Yet the Communist Party of China
ists who had been much loved by the people were killed by the was indomitable. As Mao Zedong said more than ten years later,
Kuomintang reactionaries. Communist organizations had no “The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people were
choice but to go underground, and the Party suffered great losses. neither cowed nor conquered nor exterminated. They picked
Many local Party organizations were broken up, and many mem¬ themselves up, wiped off the blood, buried their fallen comrades
bers lost contact with the Party. Those without firm commitment and went into battle again.”1 Unlike those who left the Party in
quit the Party or the Youth League, some openly announcing the time of danger, some staunch revolutionaries, including Peng
their departure in the press and expressing their repentance for Dehuai, He Long and Xu Teli, chose this moment to join it. Many
having joined, some even leading the way for enemy agents in workers and peasants rallied around the Party again and contin¬
their search for Communists. Party membership, which had ued the fight. When the reactionaries hung Guo Liang’s head at
reached nearly 60,000 at the height of the Great Revolution, the gate of the city wall of Changsha, Lu Xun, a true friend of
dropped to 10,000. Those who remained in the Party were at a the Party, said, “Revolutions have seldom been defeated by
110 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC charter three the agrarian revolution in

hanging a head.... It was precisely because there was darkness and Expeditionary Army under the control or influence of the Party,
no future that the revolution was begun.”2 declared an armed uprising in Nanchang. After four hours of
Faced with the reactionaries’ policy of butchering all revolu¬ fierce fighting, the insurgent forces took the city. Then, they
tionaries, the Communists had only one choice. If they were not promptly pulled out and headed for the Chaozhou-Santou area of
simply to wait for death and allow the whole country to be Guangdong Province via southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, as
plunged into darkness, they must hold high the revolutionary planned. The purpose of this move was to join forces with the
banner and carry out armed resistance. But the question re¬ militant peasants of the Dongjiang area of Guangdong, which had
mained: under such difficult circumstances, how was that to be a revolutionary tradition, so as to start the agrarian revolution.
done? Then the plan was to march to Guangzhou, re-establish the
Guangdong revolutionary base area, occupy an outlet to the sea
The Nanchang Uprising, the August 7th Meeting, to obtain assistance from the Communist International and con¬
the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the Guangzhou Uprising tinue with the Northern Expedition. By the end of September the
revolutionary forces had occupied Chao’an County and Shantou
The Nanchang Uprising represented the Party’s first unequiv¬ City in Guangdong Province, and the main units had marched to
ocal reply. Jieyang County and then westward to Tangken Town in the same
Because when the Great Revolution was forging ahead, the province. Their numbers were now greatly reduced because of
CPC Central Committee had failed to recognize the vital impor¬ battlefield casualties, desertions and the fatigue of constant
tance of controlling armed forces, the overwhelming majority of marching under a blazing summer sun. In early October the
the troops in the South were in the hands of the Kuomintang. troops stationed in the Chaozhou-Santou area and those heading
Those that the Party could control or influence were mainly west were encircled, attacked and eventually defeated by a super¬
among the Second Front Army of the Fourth Group Army led ior enemy force. Some of the remaining troops made their way to
by Zhang Fakui of the Kuomintang, including the units under the Haifeng-Lufeng area, where they joined forces with the local
the command of He Long and Ye Ting, which at this time were armed peasants; others, led by Zhu De and Chen Yi, moved
stationed in northern Jiangxi Province. These forces attracted the to southern Hunan, by way of southern Jiangxi and northern
attention of both the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary Guangdong, and started guerrilla warfare there.
sides. On July 15, 1927, the Wuhan government officially adopted The Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927, marked the begin¬
the policy of “separating from the Communists” and immediately ning of a new era in the history of the Communist Party of China.
sent troops to encircle this area. Also Zhang Fakui declared that Zhou Enlai said later that the August 1st uprising led by the
“senior officers, like Ye Ting, who are Communists must with¬ Communist Party had fired the first shot at the Kuomintang
draw from the army or leave the Communist Party.” The situa¬ reactionaries and that overall, it had been a correct move. For
tion had become so critical that the slightest hesitation would millions of revolutionary people, after repeated defeats, this
bring about the doom of the small revolutionary armed forces. uprising was a torch held aloft in the darkness. I he people’s
Under these circumstances, the Central Committee of the CPC armed forces under the leadership ot the CPC were born during
decided in mid-July to stage an armed uprising in Nanchang, this uprising.
Jiangxi Province. A Front Committee was formed, headed by However, there were important lessons to be learned trom the
Zhou Enlai. On August 1 Zhou Etilai, He Long, Ye Ting, Zhu De Nanchang Uprising. As Zhou Enlai put it, at that time the
and Liu Bocheng, leading twenty thousand troops of the Northern purpose of the armed uprising was not to go straight into the
 113
112 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION

surrounding countryside, mobilize and arm the peasants, start the oroblem of land. Of course, Chen Duxiu alone could not be
agrarian revolution and establish rural base areas. Rather, the blamed for the failure of the Great Revolution, and not all the
plan was to go south to Guangdong, rely on foreign aid and attack criticism of past policies that was made at the August 7th Meeting
was justified. However, without that shrewd criticism, it would
the big cities in the name of a national revolutionary government
of the Left. This, said Zhou, was the basic policy mistake. Such not have been possible to rapidly reinvigorate the whole Party
and to bring about a fundamental change of guiding ideology.
a mistake was natural enough. Up until this time the CPC had
only had experience of regular battles to occupy key cities during It was at this meeting that the Central Committee formulated
the Northern Expedition, when revolutionary armed forces in the the general principle of agrarian revolution and armed resistance
rural areas were considered merely supplementary. In the history to the Kuomintang reactionaries. The Party had arrived at the
of the international Communist movement, there had been no correct conclusion at the cost of much blood. Speaking at the
precedent for taking the rural areas first. It was inevitable that meeting, Mao Zedong emphasized the importance of military
the Party should handle new problems according to the experi¬ affairs. “From now on,” he said, “we must be aware that political
ence it had already had. power is to be obtained by the gun.”3
At this time it was imperative for the Party to criticize and Thus, the August 7th Meeting pointed out a new road tor the
rectify the serious mistakes of the past and to decide on new lines CPC, which had been mired in ideological contusion and organ¬
and policies. Six days after the Nanchang Uprising, the CPC izational disintegration, making a great contribution to saving the
Central Committee held a secret emergency meeting in Hankou, Party and the revolution. It was the historic turning point from
Hubei Province, to deal ith the problem. B. Lominadze, a Russian the failure of the Great Revolution to the rise of the agrarian
who was the newly arrived representative of the Communist revolutionary war.
International, made a report entitled “The Past Mistakes and Nevertheless, owing to the “Left” ideas of the Communist
New Line of the Party.” Qu Qiubai delivered a work report on International and its representatives and to the “Left” tendency
behalf of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee. A within the CPC, while the Central Committee corrected Right
number of resolutions were adopted, including a “Message from mistakes at this meeting, it did nothing to prevent ‘ Left mis¬
the CPC Central Executive Committee to Members of the Whole takes. On the contrary, adventurism and commandism were al¬
Party,” and a new Provisional Political Bureau was elected, lowed and even encouraged. Although the “Left” tendency within
headed by Qu Qiubai. the Party was only of secondary importance at the meeting, its
At the August 7th Meeting, the mistakes of the Right oppor¬ later development was to cause enormous damage to the Chinese
tunist line represented by Chen Duxiu in the later stage of the revolution. . , „ „
Great Revolution were unequivocally criticized. One of the reso¬ After the August 7th Meeting, the Provisional Political Bureau
lutions adopted at the meeting stated that in handling relations of the CPC Central Committee dispatched many cadres to differ¬
with the Kuomintang, the opportunist leaders abandoned the ent places to disseminate the decisions taken at the meeting and
independent political stand of the CPC and made one concession to reestablish and rebuild the Party organizations. Earlier on
after another. The resolution criticized these leaders who had August 3, the Central Committee had already drawn up a Plan
never thought of arming the workers and peasants and forming for the Autumn Harvest Uprising of the Peasants in the Prov¬
them into a truly revolutionary army. It also pointed out that inces of Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong and Jiangxi,” where the
intimidated by the leaders of the KMT, the Right opportunists peasant movements had been well organized during the Great
had proposed no programme of revolutionary action to solve the Revolution. As soon as the meeting ended, Mao Zedong was sent
 114 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 115
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

to Hunan as a special envoy of the Central Committee to reor¬ city of Hunan Province. The key elements of the plan were as
ganize the CPC Hunan Provincial Committee and to lead the follows: the regiments were to set off separately and join with the
uprising there. At a meeting of the Hunan Provincial Party local peasant forces to encircle Changsha; then, when all the
Committee held in Changsha, two main subjects were discussed: detachments were in place, they were to capture Changsha in a
the question of the uprising and the question of land. Mao single attack, combined with a simultaneous rising of the workers
Zedong made important remarks on both questions. So far as within the city. The uprising was launched on September 9. At
staging an uprising was concerned, he argued that it was not one point the revolutionary forces took over some towns, includ¬
enough to rely on the peasants alone; they must have help from ing the county seats of Liling and Liuyang. But as the reactionary
the military. “One of the Party’s mistakes in the past,” he said, forces were far superior, the different columns of insurgents
“was that it neglected the military. Now we must pay sixty per approaching the city by different routes suffered major setbacks
cent of our attention to the military movement. We must seize one after another.
and build political power by means of the gun.” As for the It was then that Mao Zedong showed his outstanding ability to
question of land, he held that the needs of the peasants could not learn from practice. Realizing that Changsha could not be cap¬
be met by confiscating the land of big landlords alone. “We must tured, he promptly decided to change the plan. On September 19
confiscate the land of all the landlords,” he said, “and give it to the Front Committee held a meeting in Wenjiashi, Liuyang
the peasants.”4 The Provincial Party Committee decided that County, at which, after heated debate, the idea of attacking
instead of staging an uprising in the whole province as originally Changsha via Liuyang was rejected. At Mao Zedong’s urging, it
planned, it would do it in the seven counties around Changsha in was decided to withdraw immediately from Pingjiang and Liu¬
central Hunan. A Front Committee was established with Mao yang, enter Jiangxi Province and move south through the Luox-
Zedong as its secretary. The main forces to take part in the iao Mountains. The revolutionary forces would seek a foothold in
Autumn Harvest Uprising included two sections. One was the the mountain areas, where the enemy’s control was relatively
former Guards Regiment of the General Headquarters of the weak, in order to preserve their strength for future development.
Second Front Army of the Fourth Group Army of the National This was another decisive turning point in the history of the
Revolutionary Army. This unit had not been able to participate people’s revolution: the change from attacking big cities to adv¬
in the Nanchang Uprising, but it included many Communists. ancing into the rural areas.
The other was the First Division of the Workers’ and Peas¬ After the revolutionary forces arrived at the village of Sanwan
ants’ Revolutionary Army, composed of armed peasants from in Yongxing County, Jiangxi, the tamous “Sanwan reorganiza¬
Pingjiang and Liuyang counties in Hunan and from Chongyang tion” was accomplished under the leadership of Mao Zedong. The
and Tongcheng counties in southern Hubei, and workers’ armed Front Committee reorganized the former division, which now
forces from the Anyuan Coal Mines in Jiangxi Province, totalling had fewer than one thousand men, into a regiment, established a
about five thousand. Party branch for every company and founded soldiers’ commit¬
Thus, the Autumn Harvest Uprising was to differ from the tees at various levels, so that the officers and men were politically
Nanchang Uprising in that it was to be an action involving not equal and democratic management was practised. This was the
only the military but also a huge number of armed workers and beginning of a new type of people’s army under the leadership of
peasants. For the first time, the flag of the Workers’ and Peasants’ the proletariat. Mao Zedong also sent men to contact the peasant
Revolutionary Army was to be publicly raised. However, the armed forces under Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo in the Jinggang
objective of the uprising was still to take Changsha, the central Mountains. On October 7 he led the Workers’ and Peasants’
 116 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER thrf.e the agrarian revolution 117

Revolutionary Army to Maoping in Ninggang County at the Guangzhou. Because of the great disparity in strength between
north foot of the Jinggang range and began the struggle to set up the enemy and the insurgents, it was impossible for the latter to
a revolutionary base area in the mountains. hold on in Guangzhou. Ye Ting argued that the revolutionary
Following the Nanchang Uprising and the Autumn Harvest forces should withdraw from the city before Zhang Fakui’s troops
Uprising, the CPC launched an uprising in Guangzhou. arrived. But this wise proposal was severely criticized by Heinz
At this time the lorces led by Zhang Fakui had already come Neumann, the German representative of the Communist Interna¬
south and were stationed in Guangzhou. They included the tional, who held that the uprising could only centre around cities,
Training Regiment led by Ye Jianying, an undercover Commu¬ that the insurgent forces had to “attack, attack and attack again"
nist. The worker-peasant movement in Guangzhou and the sur¬ and that any retreat represented “wavering.” As a result, the
rounding area had built a good foundation during the upsurge of insurgents lost the chance of evading an attack by superior enemy
the Great Revolution. In November, a war broke out between forces. Greatly outnumbered, they were defeated on the third day
Zhang Fakui on one side, and Li Jishen and Huang Shaohong on of the uprising. Zhang Tailei and many other revolutionaries died
the other lor control of Guangdong. Zhang sent most of his troops a heroic death.
to fight in Zhaoqing and Wuzhou, leaving only a few in Guang¬ The Guangzhou Uprising was another valiant counterattack
zhou. The Training Regiment and other revolutionary units in against the Kuomintang reactionaries’ policy of butchery. The
Guangzhou had already aroused the suspicion of the enemy. insurgent forces took full advantage of the internecine warfare
Unless they took immediate action, they were likely to be dis¬ among the new warlords of the Kuomintang. But, once again,
banded or wiped out. On December 11, on the instructions of the events showed that the enemy armies were too strong for the
CPC Central Committee, the Guangdong Provincial Party Com¬ revolutionaries to achieve victory by staging armed urban upris¬
mittee launched an uprising. ings or trying to take big cities. When the insurgent forces were
1 his uprising was led by Zhang Tailei, secretary of the Provin¬ outnumbered by the enemy, even if they gained control of the big
cial Party Committee, Ye Ting and Ye Jianying. The forces cities, they would be unable to hold on to them and would suffer
participating were the Training Regiment and part of the Guards crushing defeat.
Regiment of the Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Besides these large-scale uprisings, by early 1928 the CPC had
Army, seven detachments of the Guangdong Workers’ Red initiated quite a few smaller armed uprisings in other parts of the
Guards and some groups of armed peasants from the suburbs of country. The major ones were as follows:
Guangzhou. After more than ten hours of heavy fighting, the —In Guangdong, the Dongjiang Uprising, centred around
insurgent forces occupied most of the urban area of Guangzhou, Haifeng and Lufeng, and the Qiongya Uprising;
where they set up the Guangzhou Soviet Government — the —in Jiangxi, the Southwestern Jiangxi Uprising, centred around
Russian word soviet means a council of representatives — with Donggu in Ji’an County, the Northeastern Jiangxi Uprising,
Su Zhaozheng as chairman. (As Su was ill and did not assume centred around Yiyang and Hengfeng, and the Wan’an Uprising;
office, Zhang Tailei served as acting chairman). They put forward —in Hunan, the Southern Hunan Uprisings led by Zhu De and
such political slogans as “Down with imperialism!”, “Down with Chen Yi, who had brought the surviving forces of the Nanchang
warlords!” and “Suppress landlords and despotic gentry!”, and Uprising from Guangdong into the area and who, with the
announced that an eight-hour day would be instituted for workers cooperation of the CPC Southern Hunan Special Committee and
and that all land distributed among the peasants. At this time, local peasant armed forces, succeeded in occupying seven coun¬
however, the main forces under Zhang Fakui hurried back to ties including Yizhang and Chenxian;
 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 119
118 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

—in the Honghu Lake area of Hubei and the Sangzhi area of Revolution, it was not easy for uprisings to take place or to
Hunan, the Western Hunan-Hubei Uprising led by Zhou Yiqun survive for any length of time. In the rural areas, however, where
the reactionary forces were relatively weak, and especially in
and He Long;
places where the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers had
—in the Hubei-Henan border region, the Huang’an and Ma-
been actively involved in the Great Revolution, there was still
cheng Uprising led by the CPC Huang’an-Macheng Special Com¬
room for the Communists to manoeuvre. At this time there could
mittee;
be no question of their launching another movement like the
—in Fujian, the Western Fujian Uprising led by Guo Diren,
Northern Expedition, that is, of attempting to take key cities and
Deng Zihui and Zhang Dingcheng;
—in Henan, the Queshan Uprising led by Ma Shangde (Yang areas, which would immediately bring about a revolutionary
Jingyu); and situation all over the country. Instead, they had to withdraw to
the rural areas that did not attract much attention, so as to
—in Shaanxi, the Weinan and Huaxian Uprising led by Liu
preserve and nourish the sparks of revolution. The peasants
Zhidan.
All these uprisings demonstrated that the fire of revolution wanted a revolution, but it was not easy to organize them into
could never be put out by military suppression by the counter¬ fighting units because they were reluctant to leave their homes,
revolutionaries, because the uprisings were just and corresponded and because the villages were widely scattered. Still, the revolu¬
to the demands of the people. Many of them were organized by tionary forces could survive and gradually develop, as long as
Communists and other revolutionaries who had gone through the they relied closely on the suffering people and pursued correct
storms of the Great Revolution, adhered to their political belief policies. Because of the realities of semi-colonial, semi-feudal
and returned to their hometowns where the reactionary regime China, if they had not kept firmly to this road, the revolution
was relatively weak. Making use of their former social connec¬ would have failed.
tions, they mobilized the oppressed masses of workers and peas¬ At the time, the members of the CPC Central Committee did
ants, gradually building forces for the uprisings. Some of these not have a correct assessment of the situation and failed to
uprisings soon failed, either because wrong policies were followed identify tasks appropriate for the struggle. They held that as the
or because the enemy forces were far superior. Others were fundamental contradictions in Chinese society had not been
continued, mainly in areas bordering several provinces, or in resolved, the tide of revolution could only continue to rise. They
mountain areas remote from the key cities under Kuomintang did not take into consideration the political and economic reali¬
rule. In such places, the insurgent forces conducted guerrilla ties of Chinese society and the uneven development of the revo¬
warfare on a growing scale, laying the foundation for the later lution. They made no effort to distinguish between places where
large-scale development of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army there were conditions for staging an armed uprising and places
and the establishment of rural revolutionary bases. where it was only possible to organize an orderly retreat. Instead,
they ordered Party members, who were few in number, and the
masses to organize armed rebellion everywhere, regardless of the
Left Putschism strength of the enemy or the discouragement of the people after
the failure of the Great Revolution. They even staged hopeless
The revolution had virtually come to a standstill. The key
cities were under the powerful economic, political and military uprisings in some areas that were strictly controlled by the enemy,
control of the imperialists and of the reactionary Kuomintang hoping to astonish and hearten the whole nation. They claimed
regime. In those places, which had never experienced the Great that the idea of refraining from any rash move so as to preserve
120 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 121

the Party’s forces was “a manifestation of opportunism that of the country, the revolutionary tide, far from rising, had come
would eventually obstruct the development of rebellion among to a low ebb.
the masses.”5 Disciplinary action was taken against cadres who How was it, then, that at such a time the Party could make the
were accused of such opportunism. The representative of the mistake of “Left” putschism? It was wonderful that so many
Communist International, B. Lominadze, who did not know Communists were able to carry on the struggle under extremely
much about the realities in China, gave much misguided advice difficult conditions, but they did not have enough experience to
of this nature and put forward the proposition of “uninterrupted deal with complex problems. Their outrage at the massacres
revolution,” which confused democratic revolution with socialist perpetrated by the enemy, their desire for revenge and their
revolution. abhorrence of Right opportunism, like a fire burning in their
Through an enlarged meeting of the Provisional Political hearts, drove them to desperate acts. They could see only one side
Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held in November 1927, of the picture and went to extremes, mistaking the awareness of
“Left” putschism came to dominate the Party for a period of time. advanced elements for the awareness of the masses. These “Left”
In the resolution adopted at that meeting the Bureau declared attitudes were very common among revolutionaries at the time.
that “the present situation of China is a situation ready for direct Indeed, they were a historical phenomenon that could not have
revolution.” On the basis of this assessment, it formulated the been completely avoided.
general strategy of a nationwide armed uprising, with urban Nevertheless, the dismal failure of the premature uprisings had
uprisings as the “central and guiding element.” Further, the a sobering effect and led the Party to give second thought to the
Bureau predicted that “the present revolutionary struggle will problems. In February 1928 the 9th Enlarged Session of the
certainly go beyond a democratic revolution and develop rapid¬ Executive Committee of the Communist International adopted a
ly.” At the meeting, leaders of the Nanchang Uprising and the
resolution on China that criticized putschism and Lominadze’s
Autumn Harvest Uprising, including Zhou Enlai and Mao Ze¬ mistakes. In April the Political Bureau of the CPC Central
dong, were accused of having made opportunist mistakes and Committee issued a circular endorsing that resolution and admit¬
were disciplined. ting that “Left” mistakes of putschism had been made. By this
Both before and after this meeting, reckless actions were un¬ time, most of those mistakes had been eliminated in the Party’s
dertaken in places where the Party organization was weak and
practical work throughout the country.
where the enemy was militarily strong. Ill-considered armed
uprisings were staged, for example, in Wuxi and Yixing. Most of
The 6th National Congress of the Communist Party of China
them were quickly suppressed. Thus, the limited revolutionary
forces that had survived after the failure of the Great Revolution
With the help of the Comintern, the CPC held its 6th National
again suffered heavy losses. Congress in Moscow from June 18 to July 11, 1928. This congress
Nevertheless, it was clear that although none of the fundamen¬
was of major historical significance. It reviewed the Party’s
tal contradictions in Chinese society had been resolved, the reac¬
experience since the failure of the Great Revolution and gave
tionary forces could not establish a lasting and stable rule, and
basically correct answers to a series of essential questions concern¬
that the people would not give up fighting. But there was another
ing the Chinese revolution over which there had been heated
side of the story. After the failure of the Great Revolution, the
controversies. Thus, by and large, the congress unified, the think¬
reactionary forces were strengthened, while the revolutionary
ing of the whole Party, which had been in ideological chaos.
forces were seriously weakened. In view of the overall situation
The line of the 6th National Congress was basically correct. It
122 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CFC
CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 123

stated that since China was still a semi-colonial, semi-feudal

emphasis on work in the cities, without taking into account how
country and since none of the basic contradictions that had given
long and complex the revolution would be or recognizing the
rise to the revolution had been resolved, it was still a bourgeois-
special importance of the rural areas. Second, because it did not
democratic revolution. At the time, quite a number of Party
correctly assess the important role played by the middle-of-the-
members believed that since the bourgeoisie had already with¬
roaders and the internal contradictions among the reactionary
drawn from the revolution, it was no longer a bourgeois-
forces, it continued to regard the national bourgeoisie as an
democratic revolution. Addressing this question, the congress
enemy of the revolution. Thus, the Party lost the opportunity to
decided that the nature of the revolution was determined by its win over another force and gain its cooperation.
mission rather than by its motive force. The congress also made
At this time the CPC was in a period of major historical
a correct assessment of the situation of the Chinese revolution
change, a period in which it was faced with many complicated
and the tasks ahead. The first wave of revolution, it said, had
problems new to Marxism. In the early stage of the revolution, it
passed with the failures, and the new wave had not yet come. The
was not possible for the Party to reach a correct understanding of
forces of counter-revolution were stronger than those of the
all these problems at once. The problem of the relations between
workers and peasants, and the Party’s general line at this stage
urban and rural areas was an example. In the classic works of
must be to win over the masses. Putschism and commandism were Marxism, the focus of revolutionary activity had always been the
identified as the most dangerous tendencies, as either of them urban proletariat. But China was a country in which the over¬
would divorce the Parly from the people. In short, at the 6th
whelming majority of the population were peasants. Class con¬
National Congress the Party decided to shift its efforts from tradictions were very acute in the rural areas, and it was impos¬
organizing uprisings by every possible means to undertaking sible for the reactionary rulers to maintain tight control over
patient, long-term work among the masses, while guarding against every part of the vast countryside. Under these circumstances, the
“Left” tendencies. These were major changes in the work of the Party had to shift the focus of its revolutionary activity first to
Party, and when the congress’s resolution was made known to all the rural areas. Only through repeated trial and error in concrete
members for implementation, it produced far-reaching effects. practice could the Party come to a clear understanding of the
The 6th National Congress elected a new Central Committee. special rules of the Chinese revolution, and only then could it
Xiang Zhongfa, a dock worker from Wuhan, was selected to be begin to resolve the problems one by one.
chairman of the Political Bureau and of its Standing Committee,
while Zhou Enlai was elected member and secretary-general of
the Standing Committee and head of the Central Committee’s
Organization Department. The election of Xiang Zhongfa as the
II. FROM THE STRUGGLE IN THE
principal leader of the Party was due to the influence of the JINGGANG MOUNTAINS TO
Communist International, which in selecting cadres put undue THE GUTIAN MEETING
emphasis on the workers’ class status. In reality, Xiang Zhongfa
did not have the ability to play the principal role in the Central
After the failure of the Great Revolution, the struggle in the
Committee. For a period of time after this, the actual leader of
Jinggang Mountains revolutionary base area, under the leader¬
the Party was Zhou Enlai.
ship of Mao Zedong and Zhu De, represented the correct orien¬
There were other shortcomings in the work of the congress,
tation of the Chinese revolution.
especially the following. First, the congress still placed primary
How was it that in the Jinggang Mountains an independent
124 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 125

revolutionary regime, although surrounded by areas under White new splits were occurring within the ruling class. In southern
terror, was able not only to survive but to expand greatly? In a China, Li Zongren’s forces were at war with those of Tang
report to the Central Committee dated November 25, 1928, Mao Shengzhi. Warlord forces in the locality were busy moving north,
Zedong gave the answer: leaving the border region between Hunan and Jiangxi empty.
“We find on analysis that one reason for this phenomenon lies Mao took advantage of the situation, doing everything possible to
in the incessant splits and wars within China’s comprador and build up the Party, the army and political power there. In early
landlord classes. So long as these splits and wars continue, it is November 1927, chairing a meeting of leading Party members
possible for an armed independent regime of workers and peas¬ from the various border counties, he urged them to establish or
ants to survive and grow. In addition, its survival and growth reestablish Party organizations as soon as possible. The previously
require the following conditions: (1) a sound mass base, (2) a existing ones had all been destroyed after the May 21st Incident;
sound Party organization, (3) a fairly strong Red Army, (4) only some Party members had survived, gone into hiding and
terrain favourable to military operations, and (5) economic re¬ were living dispersed. Without an organized Party leadership, it
sources sufficient for sustenance.”6 would not be possible to open up a revolutionary base area. After
three months of work, Party organizations in the region were
The Establishment of the Revolutionary Base Area gradually restored. Mao Zedong called on the worker-peasant
in the Jinggang Mountains revolutionary army to change the old tradition of undertaking
only military operations. The army, he said, must not only fight
The Jinggang Mountains are situated at the middle section of the enemy, but also expropriate funds from the local tyrants and
the Luoxiao Mountains in the border region between Hunan and do propaganda work among the people. In this way, the army
Jiangxi provinces. Mao Zedong had chosen this place to set up would be able not only to win battles, but also to mobilize the
the first revolutionary base area for a number of reasons, includ¬ masses and to solve the problem of economic resources. After
ing the following: reviewing the army’s experience in doing mass work, Mao Zedong
—There was a good mass base. During the Great Revolution, set down Three Rules of Discipline and Six Points for Attention.
Party organizations and peasant associations had been established The three rules were:
in various counties in the border region. 1. Obey orders in your actions.
—Local peasant forces of the old type led by Yuan Wencai and 2. Don’t take anything from the workers and peasants.
Wang Zuo were ready to unite with the worker-peasant revolu¬ 3. Turn in all things taken from local tyrants.
tionary army. The six points for attention were:
—It was strategically located, easy to defend but hard to 1. Put back the doors you have taken down for bed-boards.
attack. 2. Put back the straw you have used for bedding.
—The self-supporting agricultural economy in the surrounding 3. Speak politely.
counties made it easy for the army to raise funds and grain. 4. Pay fairly for what you buy.
—It was relatively far from the centre of the Kuomintang 5. Return everything you borrow.
regime. Also there were contradictions between the warlords of 6. Pay for anything you damage.
the two provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi, and their control over Later two more points were added: Don’t bathe within sight of
the area was fairly weak. women, and don’t search the pockets of captives.
When Mao Zedong arrived in the border region with his forces, These regulations demonstrated the nature of the people’s
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter three the agrarian revolution 127
126

army, and because they were strictly enforced, the army was able forces.”7 After this, the CPC established a Special Committee for
to establish close ties with the local people and to win their trust the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Region and a Worker-Peasant-Soldier
and support. The revolutionary army also reorganized the peasant Soviet Government of the Border Region.
armed forces led by Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo and helped At this time there was a temporary lull in the war between the
organize the Red Guards and other local units for the border new Kuomintang warlords. The reactionary rule in the South
counties and townships. It defeated the “suppression campaign” was relatively stable. Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Kuomintang
of the Kuomintang army units sent against it and took the county troops in Hunan and Jiangxi to mount one “suppression cam¬
seats of Chaling, Suichuan and Ninggang counties, setting up paign” after another against the base area in the Jinggang Moun¬
worker-peasant-soldier governments there. Thus, the revolution¬ tains. In response, the Special Committee of the Border Region
ary base area in the border region of Hunan and Jiangxi began to and the Army Committee of the Fourth Red Army laid down the
lake shape with Ninggang as its centre. following policies:
Just at this time, the less than ten thousand troops that had —The army should stand firm against the enemy and not flee;
survived the Nanchang Uprising, led by Zhu De and Chen Yi, —The Party should deepen the agrarian revolution in the
were moving towards the Jinggang Mountains after the Southern border region;
Hunan Uprising. In late April of 1928 the troops under Zhu De —The Party organizations in the army should help develop
and Mao Zedong joined forces in the Jinggang Mountains and Party organizations in the localities, and the regular army should
were reorganized into the Fourth Army of the Chinese Worker- help develop local armed forces;
Peasant Revolutionary Army (shortly thereafter renamed the —The army should take a defensive position toward the com¬
Fourth Army of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army), with paratively strong ruling forces in Hunan and an offensive posi¬
Zhu De as commander and Mao Zedong as Party representative tion toward the comparatively weak ruling forces in Jiangxi;
and secretary of the Army Committee. —The army should concentrate its forces to fight the enemy,
This joining of forces was a momentous event. It raised the confronting him when the time is opportune, and not divide its
number of troops in the Jinggang Mountains revolutionary base forces, lest they be destroyed one by one; and
area from two thousand to over ten thousand. The backbone of —The base area should be expanded by advancing in a series
the forces that had survived from the Nanchang Uprising, now of waves and not by making adventuristic thrusts.
under the leadership of Zhu De and Chen Yi, was the Indepen¬ Thanks to these proper tactics, to the terrain of the border
dent Regiment led by Ye Ting, a well-armed, well-trained unit region, which favoured the operations of the revolutionaries, and
that had distinguished itself during the Great Revolution. Tan to the inadequate coordination between the different Kuomin¬
Zhenlin, a senior officer who had taken part in the joining of tang forces invading from Hunan and Jiangxi, the Red Army, in
forces, recalled it in these words: four months of fighting, was able to break up three successive
“With the joining of the forces led by Zhu De and Mao “suppression campaigns,” despite the fact that the superior enemy
Zedong, the army was expanded, and we were then able to take forces numbered from eight to 18 regiments. The biggest victory
Yongxing County. Of course, we had already attacked Chaling was won in the Battle of Longyuangou on June 23, when one
and Suichuan counties and occupied the seat of Ninggang Coun¬ enemy regiment was wiped out and two more were routed. After
ty. But we had not dared to go too far afield, as we would not this victory, the revolutionary base area in the Jinggang Moun¬
have been able to win if the Kuomintang had sent two regiments tains was extended to cover all of Ninggang, Yongxing and
against us. We became much stronger after Zhu and Mao joined Lianhua counties and parts of Ji’an, Anfu, Suichuan and Ling-
 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 129
128 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

xian counties. This was the period of greatest expansion of the our army and the Kuomintang army are worlds apart. They feel
base area. spiritually liberated, even though material conditions in the Red
The Front Committee attached great importance to the build¬ Army are not equal to those in the White army. The very soldiers
ing of the revolutionary army. Members of the Fourth Red Army who had no courage in the White army yesterday are very brave
were drawn mainly from two sources: the peasants and the old in the Red Army today; such is the effect of democracy.”''
army. The first concern was to strengthen Party-building and So far as military operations were concerned, Mao Zedong and
political work among the new troops in order to turn them into a Zhu De summed up the Red Army’s practice as follows: “The
people’s army of a new type under the leadership of the Commu¬ enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the
nist Party. The Party organization was divided into four levels: enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.” These
the company branch, with a group in each squad; the battalion were the simple and basic principles for guerrilla warfare. They
committee; the regimental committee; and the army committee. corresponded to the circumstances of the time and proved an
The number of Party members rose until they represented about excellent guide for the Red Army’s operations.
a quarter of the army. In his November report to the Central The military struggle could not be separated from the agrarian
Committee, Mao Zedong summed up the results of this policy: revolution. The Jinggang Mountains base area was situated in an
“After receiving political education, the Red Army soldiers agricultural region cut off from other parts of the country, where
have become class-conscious, learned the essentials of distributing the overwhelming majority of the residents were peasants. Their
land, setting up political power, arming the workers and peasants, fundamental interest lay in the land, and the land question was
etc., and they know they are fighting for themselves, for the their primary concern. In the Hunan-Jiangxi border region, over
working class and the peasantry. Hence they can endure the 60 percent of the land was in the hands of the landlords, while
hardships of the bitter struggle without complaint.”8 Such men the peasants owned less than 40 percent. The peasants who had
took every opportunity to serve the masses and were ready to no land, or very little, had to rent land from the landlords to
sacrifice their lives for the revolution. survive. They had to turn over more than half of the harvest to
Another means of building the Red Army was to ensure the landlords as rent, in addition to providing them with various
democracy in the ranks. In the same report, Mao explained the corvfee services and suffering from exploitation by tradesmen and
importance of this policy: usurers. This land system was the very foundation of the feudal
“Apart from the role played by the Party, the reason why the system in China. For generations it had been the dream of poor
Red Army has been able to carry on in spite of such poor material peasants to acquire land. In the new-democratic revolution there
conditions and such frequent engagements is its practice of de¬ would be no agrarian revolution without victory in the armed
mocracy. The officers do not beat the men; officers and men struggle, and there could be no victory in the armed struggle
receive equal treatment; soldiers are free to hold meetings and to without an agrarian revolution to secure the full support ol the
speak out; trivial formalities have been done away with; and the peasants. In the early stage of the founding of the Jinggang
accounts are open for all to inspect. The soldiers handle the mess Mountains base area, the masses were mobilized to strike down
arrangements and, out of the daily five cents for cooking oil, salt, local tyrants and evil gentry, while the distribution of land was
firewood and vegetables, they can even save a little for pocket carried out in only a few places on a trial basis. From May to July
money, amounting to roughly six or seven coppers per person per 1928, when the situation in the base area had become more stable,
day, which is called ‘mess savings.’ All this gives great satisfaction a movement for general distribution of land swept across the
to the soldiers. The newly captured soldiers in particular feel that counties in the border region.
 130 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 131
At this time, the method of distributing land was as follows.
government was established in Chaling County, with Tan Zhenlin
Land committees composed of poor peasants at the county, dis¬
as chairman. In May 1928 a worker-peasant-soldier Soviet gov¬
trict and township levels were established to take charge of the
ernment of the Hunan-Jiangxi border region was set up at Mao¬
process. Officers of the Red Army were also sent to help in the
villages. In general, the township was taken as the basic unit, but ping in Ninggang County. At the time of greatest expansion there
in a few hilly places where there was little farmland, three or four were six such county governments in the border region. These
townships were taken as one unit. All the inhabitants, men or governments enjoyed high prestige among the people. In a report
women, old or young, were given equal shares of land, and fertile to the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, Du Xiujing, the
and less fertile land was equally apportioned. Then the distribu¬ Committee’s representative, wrote: “Since the toppling of the
tion was examined to ensure that it had been done fairly. The title local tyrants, the people believe in Commander Mao, and since
deeds for land owned by the landlords were burned in public. the distribution of land, they believe in the Party and the Soviet.”
Bamboo slips with names were set up along the demarcation lines There was one setback in the development of the Jinggang
of the various households’ plots, and a land tax was then levied. Mountains revolutionary base area. In June 1928, the Provincial
In December 1928 a Land Law was promulgated in the Jing- Party Committee of Hunan, under the influence of putschism,
gang Mountains. This was of greal significance, because it was the sent a representative to the Jinggang Mountains instructing the
CPCs first experiment in land rclorm in so large an area as Fourth Red Army to go immediately to southern Hunan. Now, it
several counties. This first Land Law, however, had some weak¬ happened that the 29lh Regiment of the Fourth Red Army was
nesses. First, it provided that all the land was to be confiscated composed mainly of peasants from Yizhang County in southern
and redistributed, not just that of the landlords. This encroached Hunan. While they had proved resolute in the Southern Hunan
upon the interests of the middle peasants. Second, it provided that Uprising, they still had the weaknesses of small peasant producers
the land was to be owned by the government, not by the peasants, who felt a great nostalgia for their home villages and were not
who had only the right to use it and were forbidden to sell it’ used to the hard life in the Jinggang Mountains. When these
Nevertheless, since they were given the land, the poor peasants peasants learned of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee’s
became aware that the Red Army was struggling on their behalf, instructions, they insistently demanded to return to southern
and they began to support it enthusiastically. This was the social Hunan and, despite persistent opposition by Mao Zedong and
foundation for the survival and development of the revolutionary repeated attempts by Zhu De and Chen Yi to dissuade them,
base area in the Jinggang Mountains. prepared to move off on their own. Fearing that if they moved
If the revolutionary forces were to wage a long-term struggle independently they would be wiped out by the enemy, Zhu De
it was essential for them to have a reliable base area and to build and Chen Yi had no choice but to lead the 28th Regiment on the
the people’s political power. The slogan for the rural areas put march to southern Hunan along with them. By this time the
forward by the Central Committee at its meeting of August 7, reactionary rule in that area had become relatively strong. When
^^’„was Political power belongs to the peasant associa¬ the Red Army took Chenxian County, the enemy started a
tions.” Later, Party documents called for the establishment of counterattack. At this juncture, the soldiers of the 29th Regiment
revolutionary committees or of worker-peasant Soviets. Soviet deserted and returned to their home villages. The surviving forces
governments were set up in Lufeng and Haifeng counties in were led by Zhu De and Chen Yi to eastern Guangxi, where they
Guangdong. On November 28, 1927, after the Jinggang Moun¬ were met by Mao Zedong, who had arrived at the head of part of
tains base area was founded, a worker-peasant-soldier Soviet the 31st Regiment; then they all returned to the Jinggang Moun¬
tains base area. During this operation, the Fourth Red Army and
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 133
132

the Jinggang Mountains base area suffered heavy losses. The Nevertheless, the Jinggang Mountains area had disadvantages
whole episode, known as the “August defeat,” showed that it was as a revolutionary base. First, although easy to defend and
not easy to transform peasant armed forces into a new type of difficult to attack, the area had fewer than two thousand people
people’s army under the leadership of the CPC. It was inevitable and produced less than 500 tons of grain a year. As the Red Army
that such losses should occur in the early days of the people’s grew rapidly in numbers, and as the Kuomintang army carried
out repeated “suppression campaigns” and tightly blockaded the
army.
After the main forces of the Fourth Red Army returned to the region, economic difficulties became so serious that even daily
Jinggang Mountains, they won several battles in succession, re¬ requirements of the army and the people for food, clothing and
covering most of the territory they had lost. They defeated the other necessities could not be met. Second, the Jinggang Moun¬
enemy’s “suppression campaigns” and largely restored the base tains were situated in a long, narrow strip of land between the
area. The CPC Central Committee decided to reestablish a Front Xiangjiang River to the west and the Ganjiang River to the east,
Committee, with Mao Zedong as secretary, to take charge of the both of which were too deep to be forded. And it was not easy to
work of the Border Region Special Committee and the Army expand toward the north or south, so the army did not have
Committee of the Fourth Red Army. In October 1928 the Second enough room for manoeuvre. These disadvantages were not so
Party Congress of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Region was con¬ prominent in the beginning, but as the Red Army grew, they
vened. The congress adopted a resolution drafted by Mao Zedong, became increasingly evident.
the first part of which dealt with the question of why it was During July 1928, part of the Kuomintang troops staged a
possible for Red political power to exist in China. Mao analysed rebellion in Pingjiang County, Hunan, under the leadership of
the conditions under which a small, independent worker-peasant Peng Dehuai, Teng Daiyuan and Huang Gongliie, and formed the
regime had been able to emerge and survive, discussed its signif¬ Fifth Army of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. For several
icance and answered the question, which had been raised by some months the troops of this new branch of the Red Army fought
the enemy in the border region of Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi, east
people in the Red Army, of how long such a regime could last.
In November, in his report to the CPC Central Committee, Mao of Pingjiang. Then, on December 11, Peng Dehuai and Teng
Daiyuan led more than seven hundred of them to the Jinggang
pointed out the importance of proletarian leadership: “The Party
Mountains and joined forces with the Fourth Army of the Red
organizations in the border area counties,” he wrote, “which are
Army. Before long, six brigades of the KMT army in the two
composed almost exclusively of peasants, will go astray without
provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi, totalling about 30,000 men,
the ideological leadership of the proletariat.”10 This showed that
started to attack the Jinggang Mountains by five different routes.
the leaders of the Fourth Red Army clearly understood the
A joint meeting of the Front Committee, the Special Committee
distinction between the people’s revolution led by the CPC and
of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Region, the Army Committee of the
peasant warfare of the old type.
Fourth Army and the Army Committee of the Fifth Army was
At a time when the revolution throughout the country was at a
held at Bailu Village in Ninggang County. At this meeting it was
low ebb, the establishment of the Jinggang Mountains revolution¬
decided that a part of the Red Army, led by Peng Dehuai and
ary base area represented a remarkable achievement. By founding
Teng Daiyuan, should stay to defend the Jinggang Mountains,
a revolutionary army, by advancing the agrarian revolution and by
while the main forces of the Fourth Army, led by Mao Zedong,
building a political power, the area not only set an example and
Zhu De and Chen Yi, should march to southern Jiangxi to launch
provided comprehensive experience for insurgent forces elsewhere,
an attack there.
but also kindled new hope among the masses of revolutionaries.
134 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter three the agrarian revolution 135

The March to Southern Jiangxi and Western Fujian there. On March 14, at Changlingzhai, they wiped out Guo
and the Gutian Meeting Fengming’s brigade of the KMT’s Fujian Provincial Defence
Army and occupied the important town of Changting, capturing
Conditions in southern Jiangxi were much better for the large quantities of arms and supplies. After that, they returned to
Fourth Red Army. The undulating hills and thick forests of southern Jiangxi and on April 1 in Ruijin joined up with the main
the area were favourable for guerrilla warfare, it was rich in forces of the Fifth Red Army, which had broken out of an
natural resources and it was linked to the mountainous regions encirclement in the Jinggang Mountains. From May to October,
of western Fujian and northern Guangdong, providing a large when the main forces of the local warlord army of Fujian had
space for manoeuvre. Party organizations had a good founda¬ gone to participate in the war between the warlords of Guangdong
tion there, and the masses were politically aware. After the and Guangxi, the Fourth Red Army made two more sorties into
failure of the Great Revolution, the 2nd and 4lh Independent western Fujian. There, with the support of the local workers’ and
Regiments of the Red Army of Jiangxi were formed under the peasants’ armed forces, it eliminated the two brigades led by Chen
leadership of Li Wenlin and others, and a small, secret Soviet Guohui and Lu Xinming. Soviet governments were established
area was established in Donggu, Ji’an County. The reactionary successively in southwestern Jiangxi and in western Fujian, and
troops stationed there were weak and did not have much the local armed forces of the two regions were greatly expanded.
fighting capability. In particular, most of them came from other Thus, a foundation was laid for the establishment of a central
provinces and therefore had no close links with the local revolutionary base area.
landlords and despotic gentry. The area was remote and far At this time, a difference of opinion appeared in the Fourth
from big cities, transportation was poor and it would be hard Red Army’s Party organizations and among the leaders. On June
for enemy troops to concentrate there. These were favourable 22 at the 7th Party Congress of the Fourth Red Army, held in
conditions for developing guerrilla warfare. Longyan, Fujian, an argument broke out regarding the establish¬
On January 14, 1929, the main forces of the Fourth Red Army, ment of an Army Committee. Jiang Hua, who was then secretary-
numbering 3,600, came down from the Jinggang Mountains. general of the Political Department of the Fourth Red Army later
They encountered great difficulties in the beginning. On more recalled the outcome:
than one occasion they were in danger, because they had left the “Although the argument as to whether an Army Committee
original base area and were being pursued and attacked by strong should be set up was resolved, the difference of opinion on the
enemy forces. On February 11, however, they laid an ambush at relationship between the Party and the army, which was behind
Dabaidi in Ruijin County in southern Jiangxi and at one stroke the argument, was not finally settled.... During the argument,
wiped out most of the enemy brigade led by Liu Shiyi, which was certain elements of non-proletarian thinking, such as the purely
following closely. This great victory enabled them to regain the military viewpoint, the ideology of roving rebel bands, ultra¬
initiative. They went north to Donggu, where they joined forces democracy and vestiges of warlordism gained some ground in the
with the 2nd and 4th Independent Regiments of the Red Army army.”11 These ideas persisted because most members of the Red
of Jiangxi, led by Li Wenlin and others, and began to gain a Army had come from the peasantry and from old armies. It
foothold in southern Jiangxi. would take time and effort to change their old concepts and
The leaders of the Fourth Red Army analysed the situation habits. Since no agreement was reached on these questions at the
and used their forces in a flexible way. First, they took advantage 7th Party Congress of the Fourth Red Army, Mao Zedong, who
of the enemy’s weakness in western Fujian to make a swift move had originally been appointed secretary of the Front Committee
 136 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 137
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

by the CPC Central Committee, was not reelected to that post; that the charge of “patriarchalism” must not be made
nevertheless, he remained a member. Then he left for Jiaoyang indiscriminately to weaken it and to serve as a cover for
in Shanghang County, where the Special Committee of Western ultra-democracy. At the same time, it said, the Front Commit¬
Fujian was located, to help guide the Party’s work there. tee should not concern itself with everyday administrative
On August 21 the CPC Central Committee sent to the Front affairs, which should be handled by the administrative organs.
Committee of the Fourth Red Army a letter, drafted by Zhou Thus, the Central Committee put an end to the argument
Enlai, in which it criticized the 7th Party Congress of the Fourth within the Party organizations of the Fourth Red Army. It also
Red Army. The Central Committee emphasized that the Red urged the Front Committee and all officers and men to support
Army was not only a fighting organization but also had a great the leadership of Zhu De and Mao Zedong and asked that Mao
role to play in propaganda and politics. It pointed out that the Zedong be reinstated as secretary of the Front Committee.
Red Army must have a relatively centralized leadership, that it In late December the 9th Party Congress of the Fourth Red
was by no means patriarchal for the Party secretary to have more Army was held in Gutian, Shanghang County, Fujian Province.
responsibilities, and that demanding that everything be discussed At the meeting, Mao Zedong delivered a report, and a number of
within the Party branch was an expression of ultra-democracy.12 resolutions were adopted. The most important of these was one
Soon, Chen Yi went to Shanghai to report in detail to the Central drafted by Mao on correcting mistaken ideas in the Party. This
Committee on the work of the Fourth Army. On September 28 resolution stated that the Chinese Red Army was “an armed body
the Central Committee again sent a directive to the Front Com¬ for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution” and that it
mittee. “Now we have the Red Army in the countryside,” the must subject itself to the absolute leadership of the Party. It
Central Committee wrote, “and later we will have political power criticized Party members who were exclusively concerned with
in the cities. This is the characteristic of the Chinese revolution. military affairs and who argued that military affairs and politics
It is a product of the Chinese economic base.” The directive went were opposed to each other. It reiterated that the Red Army must
on to list the basic tasks of the Red Army: be integrated with the people and take up the combined tasks of
(1) lo mobilize the masses in struggle, accomplish the agrarian fighting, raising funds and doing propaganda and organizational
revolution and establish Soviet regimes. work among the masses. It criticized those who wanted only to
(2) To carry on guerrilla warfare, arm the peasants and expand move from city to city to seek an easy life and engage in roving
the Red Army. guerrilla actions, refusing to do the hard work of building revo¬
(3) To extend guerrilla areas and our political influence lutionary political power. It also criticized manifestations of
throughout the country.13 ultra-democracy and the disregard of organizational discipline,
The directive analysed conditions within the Party organiza¬ pointing out that its root causes were petty-bourgeois individual¬
tions of the Fourth Red Army and pointed out that “the only ism and aversion to discipline. The danger of ultra-democracy,
way to combat peasant ideology [among the soldiers was] to the resolution said, was that it could weaken or even completely
build up proletarian ideology and make it predominate.”14 The undermine the Party’s fighting capacity, rendering the Party
reason for the combat effectiveness of the Party and the incapable of fulfilling its fighting tasks and thereby causing the
peoples army was that ideological and political unity was defeat of the revolution. The resolution emphasized the impor¬
guaranteed by a strong sense of organization and discipline. tance of strengthening ideological education in the Party, ana¬
The directive stressed that all the Party’s power must be lysed the various expressions of non-proletarian ideas in the
centralized in the Front Committee as the leading organ, and Fourth Red Army’s Party organizations and insisted that the
 138 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 139

Party and the army must be built on proletarian ideas. Jiangxi with the local authorities at which it was decided that the
The resolution of the Gutian meeting was a programme for the agrarian revolution must be deepened in Jiangxi as well. Accord¬
building of the Communist Party of China and the Red Army. It ingly, land distribution was carried out in the whole area of
answered the fundamental question of how to turn a revolution¬ Xingguo and five other counties and in parts of Yongfeng and
ary army that was mainly composed of peasants and operating in other counties. A year later, following a decision by the CPC
an environment of rural warfare into a people’s army of a new Central Committee, Mao Zedong directed governments at differ¬
type. Never in the history of China had there been such an army. ent levels to issue a proclamation making it clear that, once the
The resolution of the Gutian meeting was implemented not only land had been distributed (according to the principles of “taking
by the Fourth Red Army but also by other units of the Red Army from those who have a surplus and giving to those who have a
to some extent in other parts of the country. It was a milestone shortage, and taking from those who have better and giving to
in the history of the people’s army of China. those who have worse”), the distribution was final. Anyone who
At the Gutian meeting a new Front Committee was elected had been given land was to manage it himself. The land belonged
with Mao Zedong as secretary. In June 1930 the Red Army units to him, other people must not encroach upon it and he could rent
in southwestern Jiangxi and western Fujian were merged into the it out or sell it as he pleased. Produce from the land belonged to
First Army Group of the Red Army, with Zhu De as commander- the peasant, except that he was expected to pay a land tax to the
in-chicl and Mao Zedong as political commissar and secretary of government. This policy represented a reversal of the Land Law
the Front Committee. The new First Army Group comprised of the Jinggang Mountains, which had provided that land be¬
more than 20,000 troops and was thus the strongest Red Army longed to the government and not to the peasant, who had the
force in the country. right to use it but not to sell it. Through repeated trial and error,
In the revolutionary base areas in southern Jiangxi and western the Party gradually developed a complete programme for land
Fujian, the agrarian revolution loo developed to a new stage. In reform that corresponded to the realities of the Chinese country¬
April 1929 Mao Zedong, who was in charge of drafting the Land side.
Law lor Xingguo County, Jiangxi, initiated a major change of Following the land reform in the revolutionary base areas of
principle. While the Land Law for the Jinggang Mountains had southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, a fundamental change took
stipulated that “all the land” was to be confiscated and redistrib¬ place in the social structure and the relations between classes. In
uted, in the new law this provision was changed to read “all the October 1930 Mao Zedong conducted a one-week survey of the
public land and the land of the landlord class.” In July the 1st rural areas in Xingguo, after which he concluded that the situa¬
Party Congress of Western Fujian adopted a resolution providing tion with regard to the struggle for land throughout southern
that land held by peasants was not to be confiscated and that the Jiangxi was more or less the same as in Xingguo. In his report on
principle of “taking from those who have a surplus and giving to this survey he wrote that the poor peasants had benefited from
those who have a shortage” was to be introduced. After this the land reform in twelve respects:
congress, land distribution was carried out in an area of nearly 1. They had been given farmland, which was the fundamental
40,000 square kilometers in western Fujian. As a result, more benefit.
than 600,000 poor peasants received land. Following the Gutian 2. They had been given the hills.
meeting in December, the main forces of the Fourth Red Army 3. The grain of the landlords and counter-revolutionary rich
returned to southern Jiangxi. On February 7, 1930, the Front peasants had been distributed to them.
Committee of the Fourth Red Army called a meeting in Ji’an, 4. All the debts owed before the revolution had been cancelled.
140 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 141

5. Rice was cheaper. same token, it greatly mobilized their support for the revolution¬
6. It was no longer necessary to have money in order to take a ary war and their eagerness to defend and build the revolutionary
wife. base areas. As small producers, the peasants naturally had weak¬
7. It was no longer necessary to pay funeral expenses to bury nesses, such as short-sightedness and aversion to discipline; there¬
the dead. fore, they had to be educated and remoulded. However, they had
8. The price of an ox was lower than before. a vast reservoir of hatred for imperialism and feudalism, far
9. They no longer needed money for ritual gift-giving and exceeding the resentment of other classes in society. It would be
superstitious practices, as both had been done away with. a mistake to stress the negative aspects of the peasantry at that
10. Drugs, gambling, thieves and bandits had disappeared. time without recognizing its positive aspects. After the failure of
11. They could now afford meat. the Great Revolution, the national bourgeoisie withdrew from the
12. Most important, political power was now in their hands. revolution, and the urban petty bourgeoisie wavered a great deal.
The middle peasants too, Mao wrote, had benefited from the If the Chinese revolution was to continue to develop into an
agrarian revolution both economically and politically. Most of irresistible force, it was essential for the Communist Party to rely
them had received land, and they were no longer under the firmly on the peasants, who accounted for the overwhelming
rule of the landlords and rich peasants, ordered about in majority of the population, winning their support through a
everything. Now they too had the right to speak out, along thoroughgoing agrarian revolution.
with the poor peasants and farm labourers. Thus, the over¬ The people’s revolution led by the Communist Party followed
whelming majority of the peasants supported the agrarian a unique strategy: to encircle the cities from the countryside and
revolution and the Communist Party. Everywhere their enthu¬ seize state power by armed force.
siasm for the revolution ran high, and major successes were This unique strategy, developed by the collective efforts of
being achieved in the struggle against feudalism. At about this the Party and the people, took shape only after serious setbacks,
time, the agrarian revolution was also begun in other revolu¬ through repeated trial and error and constant reviewing of
tionary base areas, one after another. experience. Mao Zedong made the most outstanding contribu¬
The agrarian revolution was one of the basic components of tion to this process. He was the first to advocate shifting the
the Chinese democratic revolution. Without changing the feudal focus of armed struggle to the countryside and to insist on
land system it would be impossible to dismantle feudalism. In developing rural revolutionary base areas; moreover, it was he
China there was no political party that represented solely the who explained the theoretical basis for the strategy of the
peasants. The political parties of the national bourgeoisie and Chinese revolution. He criticized the idea that there was a
the petty bourgeoisie and their representatives either were not contradiction between adhering to the leadership of the prole¬
concerned with the peasants’ land problem or only talked about tariat and relying on the peasants as the main force of revo¬
it and did nothing. Only the Communist Party took practical, lution. “For in the revolution in semi-colonial China,” he wrote,
resolute action. Only the Communist Party led the masses of “the peasant struggle must always fail if it does not have the
poor peasants in a fierce struggle to overthrow the feudal leadership of the workers, but the revolution is never harmed
system that had ruled Chinese society for thousands of years. if the peasant struggle outstrips the forces of the workers.”15
The peasants were realistic about their own interests. The fact He emphasized the importance of persisting in the struggle in
that the CPC was leading the agrarian revolution helped them rural revolutionary base areas:
understand the difference between it and the Kuomintang. By the “Only thus is it possible to build the confidence of the revolu-
 142 CHARTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 143
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

tionary masses throughout the country, as the Soviet Union has III. THE “LEFT” MISTAKES DURING
built it throughout the world. Only thus is it possible to create THE RESURGENCE OF
tremendous difficulties for the reactionary ruling classes, shake
their foundations and hasten their internal disintegration. Only
REVOLUTION AND THE RED ARMY’S
thus is it really possible to create a Red Army which will become VICTORY IN THE COUNTER-CAMPAIGNS
the chief weapon for the great revolution of the future. In short, AGAINST “ENCIRCLEMENT AND
only thus is it possible to hasten the revolutionary high tide.”16 A
few years later, Mao pointed out in more explicit terms that in
SUPPRESSION”
semi-colonial, semi-feudal China, the Communist Party had to
proceed differently than communist parties in capitalist coun¬ During the two years immediately following the 6th National
tries. “Basically,” he said, “the task of the Communist Party here Congress of the CPC in 1928, the revolution revived across the
is not to go through a long period of legal struggle before country. Through arduous struggle, the CPC, which seemed to
launching insurrection and war, and not to seize the big cities first have fallen into hopeless straits after the failure of the Great
and then occupy the countryside, but the reverse.”17 Revolution, reemcrged as an important political force.
After the decision was made at the meeting of August 7, 1927, There were both objective and subjective reasons for this.
The objective reasons were as follows. A period of relative
to resist the murderous policies of the Kuomintang reactionaries
stability prevailed after the founding of the KMT government
with armed struggle, the Party was faced with the fundamental
in Nanjing, but after war broke out between Chiang Kai-shek
question of how to win that struggle. For a time the Party
and the Guangxi clique in March 1929, the country relapsed
continued to focus its work on the cities. The first three famous
into incessant tangled warfare between the new warlords. Many
insurrections in key cities after the defeat of the Great Revolution
of the troops that had previously been engaged in attempts to
had failed to achieve their goals. But the idea of trying first to
encircle and suppress the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army
gain control of the cities did not quickly disappear. Instead, as
were moved to other battlefields to take part in that warfare,
will be seen, it continued to emerge, bringing repeated losses to leaving a vacuum in certain areas and an opportunity for the
the revolution. If the Chinese Communists, instead of turning to Red Army to grow. Moreover, under the rule of the KMT
the rural areas, where the reactionary forces were weak, had government, the national crisis was aggravated. Every one of
merely adhered to the dogma in books, blindly copied the model the fundamental contradictions in Chinese society became in¬
of other countries and continued to concentrate on the cities, the tensified, and the Nanjing government grew increasingly fascist.
revolution would have soon failed. The ordinary workers and peasants and even the national
But the Chinese Marxists represented by Mao Zedong persisted bourgeoisie had won not an iota of emancipation, political,
in proceeding from the realities in the country and in learning economic or ideological. Discontent was growing even among
through practice and from the masses. Thus, displaying admira¬ those who had cherished illusions about the KMT. The subjec¬
ble initiative at a critical moment when the revolution was at tive reason for the revival of the revolution at this time was
stake, they were able to determine the correct strategy of sur¬ that the CPC Central Committee adhered to a basically correct
rounding the cities from the countryside and seizing state power line and did a great deal of fruitful work by proceeding from
with armed force, something that had never been done before. the actual conditions in the country.
144 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter three the agrarian revolution 145

The Resurgence of Revolution in 1929 and Early 1930 organizations in every locality should use all means (including
legal and semi-legal means) to get in touch with workers and
In its political resolution, the 6th National Congress of the peasants, so as to truly understand their hardships and demands
CPC wrote: “Since the revolution has suffered serious defeats, it and to patiently mobilize them and lead them in daily struggles.
is essential to shift from direct armed uprisings on a broad scale Thus gradually, over a long period of time, the Party would
to the day-to-day work of organizing and mobilizing the masses.... accumulate strength and fulfil its objective of “winning over the
The general line of the Party is to win over the masses.” A sharp
masses.” Third, Party cadres should have regular jobs and social
change in the Party’s work was effected in the wake of the
relations with people in different milieus, so as to be able to make
congress. full use of the cover provided by their professional and social
The Party faced a grim situation in the areas under KMT
connections.
rule. The “Left” putschism that had emerged in November 1927
While endeavouring to rectify the “Left” mistakes, the Party
brought further heavy losses to the forces that had managed to
also struggled resolutely against the Right views and actions. At
survive the failure of the Great Revolution. For a time, the
this time Chen Duxiu and others, despairing of the future of the
Central Committee regarded Hunan, Hubei and Guangdong
revolution, gradually turned liquidationist. Embracing Trotskyite
provinces as centres from which to relaunch struggles, but it was
views, they held that after the defeat of the Great Revolution in
precisely those areas that suffered the heaviest losses. Local Party
1927, the Chinese bourgeoisie had triumphed over the imperialist
organizations were ill adapted to the new and perilous environ¬
ment, since they had mushroomed when the revolutionary activ¬ and feudal forces and stabilized its rule over the people; capital¬
ity was at its height and had had only two kinds of experience. ism had gained the upper hand in Chinese society and would
Either they had engaged in open or semi-open activities during enjoy peaceful development. They concluded that since the
the period of the Great Revolution, or following the instructions bourgeois-democratic revolution in China had ended, the Chinese
of putschist leaders, they had relied only on a small number of proletariat could not bring about a “socialist revolution” until
people who acted recklessly, without regard for consequences or some time in the future. Meanwhile, it could only engage in a
even for their own lives. Things had begun to change around the legal movement, which would centre around the call for a nation¬
time of the 6th Party Congress, but there was no fundamental al conference, attended by representatives from all walks of life,
turn for the better. Most of the key Party members were concen¬ to seek a political solution to the country’s problems. They
trated in provincial Party committees, special committees and advocated abolishing revolutionary movements and slandered the
certain major cities and townships, forming a huge secret organ¬ Red Army’s military operations as the actions of “roving rebel
ization. The Party was estranged from the masses. Many Party bands.” Instead of accepting criticism, they tried to split the Party
branches had become inactive and existed in name only. by secretly setting up small opposition factions. This led to their
Under these difficult conditions, many outstanding Party expulsion from the Party.
members immersed themselves in hard, solid work. After the 6th In the face of the cruel White terror, the arrests and massacres
Party Congress, the Central Committee laid down the following in the vast areas under the reactionary KMT regime, it was
principles for the Party’s work. First, it was essential to go into extremely hard to keep the Party organizations there intact, let
the midst of the masses and start work from the grassroots. Only alone to consolidate and expand them. It took not only courage
when the organizations at lower levels had been consolidated and and tenacity but also resourcefulness and correct guidance.
become active could organizations at higher levels be set up. After a year’s preparation, the 2nd Plenary Session of the 6th
Second, secret work should be integrated with open work. Party Central Committee of the CPC was held in June 1929. It made
146 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER THREE THF. AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 147

the following judgement on the condition of the Party: “The Corps. Together, the two armies formed the Second Red Army
Party has been rescued from weakness and inactivity and has Group, totalling more than 10,000 men, with He Long as
regained its unity. At the same time, the Party has made progress commander-in-chief and Zhou Yiqun as political commissar.
in its work, gaining ground in its relations with the people, Soon after that, a Soviet government was set up in the western
increasing its political influence among the masses and expanding Hunan-Hubei base area.
its capacity to lead struggles.”18 According to statistics, Party The Red Army guerrilla forces also grew rapidly in the Hubei-
membership grew from a little over 40,000 in July 1928, at the Henan-Anhui base area. At first they were divided into three
time of the 6th Party Congress, to 69,000 in June 1929, at the time parts, one in the Hubei-Henan border base area, formed after the
of the 2nd Plenary Session of the 6th Central Committee, and to Huang’an-Machcng Uprising; one in the southeastern Henan base
100,000 in March 1930. In spite of some grave setbacks during area, formed after the Southern Shangcheng Uprising; and one
this time,, the Party gained much valuable experience in under¬ in the western Anhui base area, formed after the Lu’an-Huoshan
ground work in areas strictly controlled by the reactionary forces. Uprising. The Military Commission of the Central Committee
This experience was of great importance for the Party’s future assigned Xu Xiangqian to command the Hubei-Henan border
work in such areas. base area. In January 1930, seeing the necessity of unifying the
More important, the strengthening of the CPC Central Com¬ leadership of the Party organizations and the command of the
mittee’s leadership of the Red Army and the rural base areas Red Army units, the Central Committee decided to set up a
brought about a tremendous expansion of the revolutionary Special Committee for the entire Hubei-Henan-Anhui border
forces. By March 1930, the Red Army had grown to 13 armies base area and appointed Guo Shushen as secretary. It also merged
with over 62,000 men. And in addition to the base areas in the three separate units into the First Army of the Red Army
southwestern Jiangxi and western Fujian led by Mao Zedong and with Xu Jishen as commander, Xu Xiangqian as deputy comman¬
others, there were major bases in the border regions of western der and Cao Dajun as political commissar. The Special Commit¬
Hunan-Hubci, Hubei-Henan-Anhui, Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi, tee and the First Army were the predecessors of the Hubei-
Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi and Hunan-Jiangxi, as well as in certain Henan-Anhui Bureau of the Central Committee and the Fourth
areas of Guangxi and Guangdong. Front Army of the Red Army.
Early in 1928, He Long, Zhou Yiqun and others arrived in the Having returned to the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border region
Honghu Lake area of Hubei and the Sangzhi area of Hunan. from southern Jiangxi, the Fifth Army of the Red Army, led by
Using his social connections in his hometown of Sangzhi, He Peng Dehuai and Teng Daiyuan, joined with local guerrilla forces
Long built a new revolutionary force by merging several peasant to form the Third Army Group of the Red Army. Peng Dehuai
guerrilla units and reorganized them into the Fourth Army of the became commander-in-chief of the group and secretary of its
Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army. On March 19, 1929, Front Committee, and Teng Daiyuan was named political com¬
the CPC Central Committee wrote to He Long and the other missar. This army group opened up the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi
leaders of the Front Committee of the Fourth Army, instructing Revolutionary Base Area.
them to concentrate on mobilizing the rural population to deepen In the western part of Guangxi Province, Deng Xiaoping,
the agrarian revolution, rather than on taking big cities. In July representative of the CPC Central Committee, and Zhang Yunyi,
1930 the newly formed Fourth Army joined forces in Gong’an Wei Baqun and others led part of the Guangxi army and local
County, Hubei Province, with the Sixth Red Army, which had peasant forces influenced by the Party in the Bose Uprising of
been established by expanding the Western Hubei Guerrilla December 1929 and the Longzhou Uprising of February 1930.
 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 149
148 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

“The pace at which the revolution develops,” the resolution went

They founded the Seventh and Eighth armies of the Red Army,
on, “depends on the pace at which the reactionary regime is
with Li Mingrui as commander-in-chief and Deng Xiaoping as
overthrown directly through armed rebellion.... We should act on
political commissar of both armies, and established the Zuojiang
the instructions of the Communist International, start at once to
and Youjiang Rivers Revolutionary Base Area.
prepare the masses to fulfil this task and energetically initiate and
Thanks to these events, the Chinese revolutionary movement
expand revolutionary forms of class struggle.”
soon took on a very different aspect. In an article written in April
In 1928, when the revolution had suffered grave setbacks, it
1930, Zhou Enlai declared: “Peasant guerrilla warfare and the
had been easy to see that the “Left” tendencies in the Party were
agrarian revolution are the main features of the Chinese revolu¬
wrong and to quickly put an end to putschist mistakes. But at this
tion today.”19 This was a highly important new assessment, based
time, when the KMT warlords of different factions were fighting
on the Party’s practice during the nearly two years since its 6th
among themselves, and when the revolutionary movement ap¬
Congress.
peared to be reviving, many Party members overestimated revo¬
lutionary developments, and this fostered a more intense and
The Emergence of “Left” Adventurism sustained growth of “Left” impetuosity.
The war in the Central Plains that broke out in May 1930
As the situation improved, “Left” impetuosity gradually grew
between Chiang Kai-shek on one side and Yan Xishan and Feng
within the Communist Party. The renewal of the warfare between
Yuxiang on the other marked a struggle between new warlords on
new warlords representing various KMT factions, triggered by
an unprecedented scale. At the time, Zhou Enlai was in the Soviet
the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Guangxi clique, and
Union reporting to the Communist International. Li Lisan and
the Chinese Eastern Railway Incident20 led the CPC Central
others, who were actually in charge of the work of the Central
Committee to a wrong assessment of the situation and encouraged
Committee, considered that the revolutionary crisis had come to
a resurgence of “Left” thinking. More important, in 1929 the
a head nationwide. On June 11 the Political Bureau adopted a
Communist International sent the CPC Central Committee a
resolution, drafted by Li Lisan, entitled “The New Revolutionary
series of four letters stressing the “struggle against Right tenden¬
High Tide and Winning Victory First in One or More Provinces.”
cies.” The most influential of these, dated October 26, asserted
“Left” adventurism (later known as the Li Lisan line) thus
that the time was ripe for decisive action:
became dominant in the Central Committee.
“China has entered a period of profound national crisis....It is
In this resolution “Left” adventurism manifested itself in sev¬
now possible and necessary to prepare the masses for the revolu¬
eral ways. First, the Political Bureau made a totally incorrect
tion that will overthrow the political power based on the alliance
assessment of the situation, maintaining that the decisive battle
between the landlord class and the bourgeoisie and establish the
not only for the Chinese revolution but for the world revolution
dictatorship of the workers and peasants in the Soviet form, to
was just around the corner. “The fundamental economic and
engage energetically in the revolutionary forms of class struggle
political crisis in China,” the Bureau wrote, “continues to sharpen
(political strikes by the masses, revolutionary demonstrations,
in an identical manner in every part of the country without the
guerrilla warfare, etc.) and to keep expanding them.” The letter
slightest essential difference.... The general situation shows that a
added that by and large, the putschist mistakes had been correct¬
new revolutionary upsurge in China is upon us.... The situation
ed. On January 11, 1930, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central
for direct revolution is already in existence on a national basis
Committee adopted a resolution concurring with the view of the
and is very likely to be turned into nationwide victory of the
Communist International that the country was in profound crisis.
 150 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 151

revolution.” Moreover, the outbreak of the Chinese revolution, it

said, would immediately “set off a great revolution worldwide a National General Action Committee was set up as the supreme
and give rise to the possibility of the final decisive class battle the commanding body for the armed uprisings and the general strike.
world over.” The leading bodies of the CPC, the Youth League and the trade
Second, the Political Bureau argued that it was no longer unions were merged into action committees at various levels, and
necessary to gradually accumulate and prepare the subjective the normal activities of those organizations were suspended. A
forces of revolution, since the masses, who aspired to large-scale detailed plan was put forward to prepare for nationwide upris¬
action, would be content with nothing less than a nationwide ings, and appeals for cooperation were sent to Mongolia, which
armed uprising. was asked to send troops, and to the Soviet Union, which was
asked to prepare for war.
Third, the Political Bureau continued to espouse the mistaken
“city centre theory.” “The great struggle of the proletariat is the Although the mistaken “Left” line held sway for only a little
decisive force,” the resolution declared. “Without an upsurge in more than three months (from June to September 1930), the
working class strikes and without armed uprisings in key cities, it Party paid dearly for it. In the areas under KMT rule, many local
is absolutely impossible to achieve victory in one or more prov¬ Party organizations, impatient to organize uprisings, exposed
inces.” It rejected “encircling the cities from the countryside” as their few members in open actions. This led to the destruction of
a grossly incorrect concept and called for “a drastic change in the eleven provincial Party committees and to nearly total disintegra¬
guerrilla tactics of the past.” tion of the Party organizations in Wuhan, Nanjing and other
Fourth, the Political Bureau again confused the bounds of the cities. In addition, the Red Army suffered huge losses during its
democratic revolution and the socialist revolution. It maintained attacks on large cities.
that the bourgeoisie had become part of the reactionary alliance An important feature of “Left” adventurism was that its ad¬
and that if the revolution succeeded fixst in one or more prov¬ herents were divorced from reality — that is, they proceeded
inces, “the factories, enterprises and banks owned by the Chinese purely from subjective thinking or imagination and were impa¬
bourgeoisie should be confiscated” and “the workers’ and peas¬ tient for success. Naturally, this attitude was resisted by those
ants’ dictatorship must be turned into the dictatorship of the Party cadres who knew the actual situation and looked the facts
proletariat.” in the face. For example, He Mengxiong, a member of the
Guided by this sort of thinking, Li Lisan and his followers standing committee of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee,
formed an adventuristic plan to launch armed uprisings in all the at a meeting sharply criticized Li Lisan’s mistake of neglecting
key cities of China with Wuhan as the centre and to concentrate both subjective and objective conditions; he was silenced and
all the Red Army forces to attack major cities. The plan empha¬ attacked. In June the Central Committee ordered the First Army
sized the importance of uprisings in Wuhan and Nanjing and of Group of the Red Army, led by Mao Zedong and Zhu De, to
a general strike in Shanghai, and instructed all Red Army units attack Nanchang and Jiujiang. As they approached Nanchang,
to “join forces in Wuhan” and “water their horses in the Yangtze however, recognizing that their forces were greatly outnumbered
River.” In late July the lhird Red Army Group, taking advan¬ by the enemy, they decided against an attack. By this time, the
tage of the enemy’s weak defence, captured Changsha, the pro¬ Third Army Group had already pulled out of Changsha. The
vincial capital of Hunan, and occupied it for a time (pulling out First and Third Army Groups joined forces and formed the First
on August 5). Li Lisan was so delighted with this victory that he Front Army of the Red Army, totalling over 30,000 men. Zhu De
considered it a vindication of his views and plan. In early August became the commander-in-chief and Mao Zedong the general
political commissar and secretary of the General Front Commit-
 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 153
152 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

to an extent and wrongly criticized He Mengxiong who had

tee. They were ordered to retake Changsha but failed after fierce
opposed Li Lisan. Still, those mistakes, which were the main
fighting. Flexibly changing tactics according to circumstances,
reflection of the Li Lisan line in practical work, were rectified,
Mao Zedong decided to withdraw from Changsha and enter
the problem was basically solved and the work as a whole grad¬
Jiangxi. In other revolutionary base areas, some leaders of the
ually returned to normal.
Party and the Red Army were also doubtful about the Li Lisan
But soon there was a sudden change. In October the Commu¬
line and resisted it in varying degrees. Thus, it was not imple¬
nist International wrote a letter to the CPC Central Committee
mented in an all-round way in practical work, especially in the
declaring that the Li Lisan line was opposed to that of the
army and the base areas. International. At this time, Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu) and Bo
Li Lisan’s “Left” adventurism had also gone beyond the toler¬
Gu (Qin Bangxian) had just returned from Moscow, where they
ance of the Communist International. In late July, the Executive
had been studying and where they had won the confidence of
Committee of the Comintern adopted a resolution on the question
Pavel Mif, deputy head of the Comintern’s Far Eastern Bureau.
of China stating, “For the time being, we have not yet achieved
Through abnormal channels, Wang and Bo learned the contents
an objective situation of revolution throughout China.” Zhou
of the letter before the Central Committee did. They immediately
Enlai and Qu Qiubai were sent home to rectify Li Lisan’s mistake,
called for “opposing conciliation” and violently attacked the
which they started to do as soon as they returned.
Central Committee as constituted at the 3rd Plenary Session.
During September 24-28, 1930, in Shanghai, the CPC held the
Wang Ming also distributed his programmatic pamphlet Two-
Enlarged 3rd Plenary Session of the 6th Central Committee. In
Line Struggle (later revised and renamed Strive to Make the CPC
his report transmitting the resolution of the Communist Interna¬
More Bolshevik). He and Bo Gu exaggerated the proportion of
tional, Zhou Enlai pointed out the uneven development of the
capitalism in the Chinese economy and the importance of strug¬
Chinese revolution and concluded that “the present situation is
gling against the bourgeoisie and the rich peasants at the present
not yet a situation for direct armed uprising throughout the
stage of the revolution, and they denied the existence of a camp
country.” He criticized Li Lisan for having made the mistake of
of intermediate forces. They insisted that there was a nationwide
“Left” adventurism in planning the Party’s work. Li Lisan made
revolutionary upsurge and, eager for quick victory in one or more
a self-criticism, and Qu Qiubai delivered a summary of the
major provinces with key cities, urged that the Party launch
political discussion at the session.
nationwide attacks. A “true” Red Army and a government
The 3rd Plenary Session corrected the ultra-Left assessment of
formed by a conference of workers, peasants and soldiers, they
the revolutionary situation in China made by Li Lisan and others,
said, should already have been established in China, and the main
and after the meeting Li left his leading position. The programme
dangers within the Party were Right opportunism in its line, and
for urban uprisings was canceled, and after the failure of the
in its practical work and the defence of the interests of rich
second attack on Changsha, the Red Army discontinued its
peasants. They called on Party members to form a provisional
attacks on big cities. Action committees for the central and local
central leading organ and demanded that leading organs at dif¬
levels were dismantled, and the Party, Youth League and trade
ferent levels be transformed, consolidated and staffed with “mil¬
union organizations were rehabilitated. Work in the rural revolu¬
itant cadres” who vigorously supported and implemented their
tionary base areas and the Red Army was given an increasingly
line. The statements and activities of Wang Ming and Bo Gu
important position. Nevertheless, the 3rd Plenary Session failed
threw the Party into ideological disarray. Some local Party cadres
to make a thorough ideological and theoretical criticism of the
and organizations that had been criticized by Li Lisan and the
“Left” mistake, represented by Li Lisan. It tolerated his thinking
 155
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION
154

throughout the country are growing and developing at different

3rd Plenary Session demanded that the Central Committee be
.needs ” Accordingly, he called for efforts to achieve victory in
reorganized. With the National Federation of Trade Unions in
the provinces of Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi, which would pave
their hands, Luo Zhanglong and others manoeuvred to split the
the way for nationwide victory. He and his supporters demanded
Party. Amid this chaos, the Central Committee found it impossi¬
continued attacks on the intermediate forces and the launching
ble to carry out its normal work.
of a nationwide offensive. Generally speaking, Wang Ming and
The 4th Plenary Session of the 6th Central Committee of the
his faction were more determined and more arrogant than Li
CPC was convened in Shanghai on January 7, 1931. It was
Lisan and those who had followed his line of “Left” adventurism,
dominated by Pavel Mif, who had come to China. The main
and clothed their arguments in more theoretical verbiage. There¬
theme of the session was criticism of the 3rd Plenary Session’s
so-called conciliatory attitude towards the Li Lisan line. “Right fore they caused greater damage.
After the 4th Plenary Session in 1931, the Party’s work in the
deviation” was identified as the chief danger within the Party,
areas under Kuomintang rule was completely disrupted. A num¬
and it was decided that “leading organs at different levels should
ber of outstanding Party cadres, including He Mengxiong, Lm
be transformed and consolidated.” Qu Qiubai, Zhou Enlai and
Yunan and Li Qiushi, were arrested and executed because rene¬
others were severely criticized at the meeting. With the support
gades informed against them. Luo Zhanglong and others formed
of Mif, Wang Ming, although he was only 26 and had little
an “Extraordinary Central Committee” in opposition to the poli¬
experience in struggle, was elected not only to the Central Com¬
cies of the 4th Plenary Session and attempted to organize a
mittee but also to the Political Bureau. Nothing positive came out
separate party; they were therefore expelled from the CPC. In
of the 4th Session of the 6th Central Committee. For four long
late April Gu Sh unzhang, an alternate member of the Political
years afterwards, the Central Committee was dominated by the
Bureau who had assisted in running the Party’s security work and
“Left” dogmatism represented by Wang Ming.
had access to many of the Central Committee’s top secrets, was
How was it that Wang Ming was able to gain such ascendancy?
arrested in Wuhan and betrayed the Party. He proposed that the
There were several reasons. Ever since the August 7th Meeting,
Kuomintang authorities wipe out the headquarters and principal
there had been heavy “Left” tendencies in the Party, which had
leaders of the CPC Central Committee at one blow in a surprise
never been eliminated from its guiding ideology. Many Party attack. This highly confidential piece of information was made
cadres were enthusiastic about revolution but ill prepared with known to Qian Zhuangfei, an underground Communist who had
theory and practice. When Wang Ming and his followers tried to made his way into the Investigation Section of the KM Fs Central
intimidate them with a lot of Marxist terms and received full Organization Department and worked there as a confidential
support from the representative of the Communist International,
secretary. He immediately sent a courier from Nanjing to Shang¬
many of them were unable to judge his position correctly and
hai to report to Li Kenong, who was in charge of the Section of
resist it. Special Tasks of the CPC Central Committee and who would then
Wang Ming and his faction argued that the Li Lisan line was
convey the information to the Central Committee. At this critical
not a “Left” deviation but a Right deviation that denied the moment, Zhou Enlai, assisted by Chen Yun and others, calmly
possibility of winning victory first in one or more provinces. acted to protect the Central Committee and thus averted disaster.
Wang Ming had written in his pamphlet, “At present we have not In late June Xiang Zhongfa, who was then chairman of the
yet achieved a situation of direct revolution in the whole country, Political Bureau, was arrested because of his imprudence, and
but such a situation could be achieved in one or more ma¬ soon he too betrayed the Party. Under these circumstances, Wang
jor provinces soon, as new waves of revolutionary movement
156 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 157
Ming left Shanghai for Moscow, and Zhou Enlai was forced to
leave for Ruijin, Jiangxi, in the Central Revolutionary Base Area. Party organizations and revolutionary political power. It conduct¬
Because both the Central Committee and the Political Bureau in ed a struggle for the distribution of land, winning the support of
the masses. Stable revolutionary base areas were established,
Shanghai had lost more than half their members, a Provisional
Central Political Bureau was set up in accordance with instruc¬ providing broad combat theatres for the Red Army and plenty of
tions from the Communist International. Bo Gu, Zhang Wentian room for them to manoeuvre. These conditions had not been
(Luo Fu) and Lu Futan became members of the Standing Com¬ available to the Red Army in the past. Thus, in its counter¬
mittee of the CPC Central Committee, Bo Gu being given overall campaigns against the KMT troops’ “encirclement and suppres¬
responsibility, and they continued to follow the “Left” adventur¬ sion” during this period, the Red Army fought on a larger scale
ist line represented by Wang Ming. and gained greater victories than ever before.
The main target of the Kuomintang army’s “encirclement and
suppression” campaigns was the First Front Army of the Red
The Red Army’s Victories in the Counter-
Army, led by Mao Zedong and Zhu De. Beginning in October
Campaigns Against “Encirclement and Suppression”
1930, Chiang Kai-shek gathered over 100,000 troops and mounted
The Central Committee formed at the 4th Plenary Session sent the first “encirclement and suppression” campaign, directed by
representatives, representative organs or new leading cadres to Lu Diping, Governor of Jiangxi. As they underestimated the Red
the various revolutionary base areas to carry out the struggle Army, the KMT forces adopted the tactic of driving straight into
against what it called Right deviation. However, in many of them, the revolutionary base area and making a concerted attack by
especially the Central Base Area under the leadership of Mao converging columns, hoping to wipe out the main forces of the
Zedong, there was no time to carry out the “Left” policies First Front Army at one blow. On October 30 the General Front
promoted by these emissaries before the KMT began launching Committee and the Jiangxi Action Committee held a joint meet¬
its “encirclement and suppression” campaigns. For this reason, it ing in Luofang. Noting that the 40,000 men of the First Front
was still possible for the Red Army to defeat the enemy on several Army were greatly outnumbered and that the enemy forces in
occasions. Hunan were strong while those in Jiangxi were weak, they decid¬
The Kuomintang ruling clique was shocked by the growth of ed to retreat to the centre of the base area and look for a
the Red Army and the base areas, and particularly by the Red favourable opportunity for combat. The plan was to lure the
Army’s adventurist attacks on key cities during the period when enemy troops in deep, wait for them to wear out their strength
the Party was following the Li Lisan line. By October 1930 the and then eliminate them in mobile warfare. And indeed, when
six-month war on the Central Plains between Chiang Kai-shek on the KMT army had penetrated deep into the revolutionary base
one side and Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang on the other, involv¬ area, it found that its battle line was overextended and its forces
ing more than a million men, was over. Immediately after he had were spread too thin. On December 30 the division headquarters
won, Chiang turned back and concentrated large forces to “encir¬ and two brigades led by Zhang Huizan, commander of the 18th
cle and suppress” the Red Army in the revolutionary base areas Division of the “encirclement and suppression” army, entered the
in southern China. By this time the Red Army had expanded to narrow mountain paths in the Longgang area and were ambushed
more than 100,000 men. It was now possible to make the major by the Red Army. In just one day of heavy fighting, the Red
change from waging chiefly guerrilla warfare to waging chiefly Army wiped out some 10,000 enemy troops and captured Zhang
mobile warfare. Wherever the Red Army went, it established Huizan. It followed up this victory with an attack to the east that
eliminated half of Tan Daoyuan’s division in Dongshao. The first
 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 159
158 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

Xingguo in southern Jiangxi. By this time, the enemy forces were

large-scale “encirclement and suppression” campaign was
dosing in on them by different routes. Suddenly, however, the
smashed.
Red Army broke through a gap in their lines and won three
Before long, the Kuomintang regime sent He Yingqin, Minister
successive battles, eliminating more than ten thousand enemy
of War and concurrently director of the Nanchang provisional
troops. Chiang immediately ordered all his units to turn east in
headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the army, navy and
pursuit. The Red Army disguised a small number of troops as its
air force, to command 200,000 forces in a second “encirclement
main force to lead the Kuomintang army far to the northeast,
and suppression” campaign. Drawing the lesson from the failure
while its real main force again moved west, making its way
in the previous campaign, he changed tactics, advancing by
through a mountain pass between concentrations of enemy
stages, attacking only when sure of success and consolidating his
troops. Then they returned to Xingguo to hide, rest and regroup.
position at every step. He also imposed a light economic blockade
By the time the enemy discovered the deception and turned west,
on the Soviet base area. The Soviet Area Bureau of the Central
the Red Army had already had a fortnight’s respite. The enemy
Committee held several meetings to consider counter-measures.
troops were so hungry, tired and demoralized that they had to
A proposal to withdraw from the area and another to divide the
withdraw. The Red Army took advantage of this and wiped out
Red Army forces in an attempt to push back the enemy were both
another thirty thousand of them. In this way, the KMT’s third
rejected in favour of the former tactic of luring the enemy in
attempt at “encirclement and suppression,” personally directed by
deep. Utilizing the favourable conditions of the base area, the
Chiang Kai-shek, was defeated like the first two.
First Front Army concentrated its main forces, identified the
After this campaign, the two revolutionary base areas of south¬
enemy’s weak links and made sure that it had superior forces for
ern Jiangxi and western Fujian were linked up to form the
every battle. First it attacked where the enemy was weak, then
Central Revolutionary Base Area, an area of fifty thousand
moved rapidly from west to east, wiping out the enemy units one
square kilometres with twenty-one county towns and a population
by one. During the period of May 16-31, starting from Futian,
the Red Army won five battles in succession, sweeping across 350 of two and a half million.
kilometres from the Ganjiang River in Jiangxi to Jianning in Not long after, on December 14, over 17,000 men of the KMT’s
26th Route Army (formerly part of the Northwestern Army
Fujian and eliminating over 30,000 enemy troops. Thus, the
under Feng Yuxiang) staged a mass defection in Ningdu, Jiangxi
KMT’s second “encirclement and suppression” campaign was also
smashed. Province, under the leadership of Zhao Bosheng, the army’s chief
As soon as the campaign was over in June, Chiang Kai-shek of staff who was an underground Communist, and generals Ji
Zhentong, Dong Zhentang and Huang Zhongyue. These troops
personally took up the post of commander-in-chief of the “encir¬
clement and suppression” army, making He Yingqin front line were reorganized as the Fifth Army Group of the Workers’ and
commander, and gathered 300,000 troops for a third attempt. Peasants’ Red Army. This was the first time that a big regular
army unit of the Kuomintang, with strong fighting capacity, had
Counting on their tenfold numerical superiority, Chiang and He
defected on the battlefield and gone over to the Red Army. This
reverted to the tactic of driving straight into the base area in an
showed that the KMT’s policy of civil war was unpopular and
attempt to force the Red Army back to the east bank of the
Ganjiang River, disperse it and then “mop up” the smaller units. that the Red Army had grown much stronger.
At about this time major victories were also achieved in the
Mao Zedong and Zhu Dc decided to avoid the main forces of
struggle against “encirclement and suppression” in the revolution¬
Chiang’s army and attack its weak spots. Accordingly, they led
ary base areas of Hubei-Henan-Anhui and western Hunan-Hubei.
the main body of the Red Army on a 500-kilometre detour to
160 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 161

The Red Army and the base areas in those regions had likewise
terms of an unequal treaty, was stationed in northeast China,
grown enormously.
attacked Beidaying, where the Northeastern Army was garri¬
The basic reason that the Red Army was able to defeat one
soned, and the city of Shenyang. The next day the Japanese
KMT “encirclement and suppression” campaign after another in
army, encountering only light resistance, occupied Shenyang,
extremely difficult circumstances, even though greatly outnum¬
Changchun and some twenty other cities. In four months’ time,
bered, was that it had the enthusiastic support of the masses of
the three provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang fell into
poor peasants in the base areas. These peasants had been given
enemy hands, and the people of northeast China sank into the
land in the agrarian revolution, and they vied with each other to
miserable life of slaves in a conquered land. On January 28, 1932,
join the army and to help in the revolutionary war in every way
the Japanese army launched a fresh attack in Shanghai. On
possible. Without that support, the Red Army’s victories would
March 9 it declared the founding of a puppet Manchukuo regime
not have been possible. The able leadership of Mao Zedong and
with Pu Yi, the last emperor of the Qing Dynasty, as the “Execu¬
others was also indispensable. In essence, their strategy was to
tive” (a title that two years later was changed to Emperor).
concentrate the revolutionary forces and destroy the enemy units
one by one. Tactically, this meant finding the enemy’s weak links
while he was on the move and engaging him in quickly decided The Awakening of the Nation After the
battles, fighting only when the Red Army could win and retreat¬ September 18th Incident
ing when it could not. These strategic and tactical principles
solved the complex and difficult problem of defeating a strong The September 18th Incident was a natural result of the
enemy by means of inferior forces with backward weapons. They expansionist policy of aggression against China that had long
took shape gradually in practice, in response to the specific been followed by the Japanese militarists. It was a major step
conditions of the revolutionary war in China. A few years later toward turning China into a colony exclusively occupied by
Mao Zedong was to explain them systematically in his “Problems Japan. China had been subjected more than once to the threat of
of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War.”21 being divided among imperialist powers, but this time it was in
imminent danger of being conquered. “The Chinese nation laces
its greatest danger; from each one the urgent call for action comes
forth.” The words of the “March of the Volunteers” expressed the
IV. CHANGES IN THE DOMESTIC indignation in the hearts of hundreds of millions of Chinese.
POLITICAL SITUATION AND As a result of the Japanese imperialists’ invasion of China, the
GRAVE DAMAGE BROUGHT ABOUT BY national contradiction between the two countries became the
principal one and brought about major changes in the relations
“LEFT” ERRORS IN THE between different classes in China. The Chinese workers and
PARTY AFTER THE SEPTEMBER peasants wanted to resist the aggression. After having remained
18TH INCIDENT inactive for more than four years, the student youth and the
urban petty bourgeoisie also began to call for resistance. Cities
that had been quiet for some time were again the scene of
Late in the night of September 18, 1931, an event took place
indignant protests. In Beiping,22 Shanghai, Nanjing, Guangzhou
that shocked the whole country and changed the destiny of China.
and Wuhan, students, workers and other residents organized
The Japanese Kwantung Army, which, in accordance with the
demonstrations and strikes and published open telegrams to the
 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 163
162 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

government demanding that it resist Japanese aggression. On attacked Shanghai, the 19th Route Army under the command of
September 28, 1931, several thousand students from Shanghai Jiang Guangnai and Cai Tingkai fought them heroically. As
and Nanjing went to the Kuomintang government and the central Shanghai and Nanjing were the heart of the Kuomintang regime,
headquarters of the Kuomintang in Nanjing to demand a decla¬ and as the Japanese were receiving large-scale reinforcements, the
ration of war against Japan; some of them even beat Wang government also sent into battle troops of the Fifth Army under
Zhengting, the Foreign Minister. The national bourgeoisie also the command of Zhang Zhizhong. However, its basic principle
began to change its attitude and take an active part in the protests. was still to sue for peace. On May 5, through the mediation of
The Sheri Bao and Xin Wen Bao, two newspapers in Shanghai, Britain and the U.S.A., the government signed the Wusong-
carried a students’ manifesto of resistance. Businesses in Shang¬ Shanghai Armistice Agreement with the Japanese aggressors,
hai, Hankou, Tianjin and other cities boycotted Japanese goods surrendering the country’s sovereign rights under humiliating
and asked that economic relations with Japan be severed. In terms. The following year, when Rehe Province had fallen into
northeast China under Japanese occupation, large numbers of enemy hands and the battle of resistance along the Great Wall
volunteers rose in resistance. Under conditions of extreme hard¬ had failed, it signed the Tanggu Agreement, which similarly gave
ship and difficulty, they carried out guerrilla warfare in the area away sovereignty over north China. In Zhangjiakou, Feng Yu-
between the Changbai Mountains and the Heilongjiang River, xiang organized the Chahar People’s Anti-Japanese Allied Army,
winning the admiration of the whole country. but he met with only obstruction and sabotage from the Nanjing
In the face of the Japanese invasion, the government in Nan¬ government.
jing made repeated concessions. At the time of the September From the time of the September 18th Incident, the Communist
18th Incident, the Japanese Kwantung Army had only 10,000 Parly of China stood firmly for resistance against Japan. On
men, while the Chinese Northeastern Army had 165,000 troops September 20 the CPC Central Committee issued a “Declaration
stationed in northeast China, in addition to 70,000 who had on the Brutal Occupation of the Three Northeastern Provinces by
moved into the area south of Shanhaiguan, the east end of the the Japanese Imperialists,” in which it unequivocally demanded
Great Wall, before the conclusion of the Central Plains campaign. opposition to the seizure, immediate withdrawal of all the Jap¬
But two months earlier, Chiang Kai-shek had already announced anese ground, naval and air forces occupying the three Northeast¬
the policy of “internal pacification before resistance to foreign ern provinces and nullification of all unequal treaties. On Nov¬
invasion,” and he insisted on using his main forces to “encircle ember 27 the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese
and suppress” the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, which stood Soviet Republic, which had just declared its founding in Ruijin,
for resistance to the Japanese. When the September 18th Incident Jiangxi, issued a statement calling on the people of the whole
took place, the Nanjing government telegraphed the Northeastern country to mobilize and arm themselves to combat Japanese
Army: “This act of the Japanese Army is merely an ordinary act aggression and the reactionary regime of the Kuomintang. The
of provocation. To prevent the incident from developing further, CPC Provincial Committee of Manchuria instructed local Party
you must keep to absolute non-resistance.”23 This attitude of the organizations to strengthen their contacts with the people’s vol¬
Nanjing government allowed the Japanese imperialists to launch unteers and to organize armed resistance forces under the Par¬
large-scale attacks recklessly. But as the national crisis came to a ty’s leadership. The Central Committee sent Yang Jingyu, Zhao
head, divisions appeared within the Kuomintang. Ma Zhanshan, Shangzhi, Zhou Baozhong and Zhao Yiman to the Northeast to
Li Du and other generals of the Northeastern Army resisted the strengthen the leadership of Party organizations there. By early
Japanese in northeast China. In January 1932, when the Japanese 1933, guerrilla units had been founded successively in Bayan,
 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 165
164 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
conflict in China was “a life-and-death struggle between counter¬
Hailong, Ning’an, Tangyuan and Hailun and in southern and revolution and revolution.”26
eastern Manchuria; these were eventually to become the main ]n leading workers’ movements in cities, the Provisional Cen¬
armed forces resisting Japan in northeast China. tral Committee followed adventuristic policies. For example, it
In this unprecedented national crisis, the Party faced the demanded that in Shanghai and other cities the workers do
questions of how to understand the profound changes in class everything possible to prepare for general strikes, declared that
relations in the country and how to advance the national demo¬
the most pressing task was to arm the workers and peasants to
cratic revolution. At this time, “Left” adventurism represented by
resist Japanese imperialism and refused to organize legal workers’
Wang Ming was already dominant in the Provisional Central
struggles. Ignoring objective conditions, it insisted that Party
Committee. The Committee failed to understand and deal with
organizations in Shanxi, Henan and Hebei should immediately
these questions correctly. It adopted a series of resolutions that
create “a Soviet area in the north” by organizing mutinies by
only reinforced the tendency towards “Left” adventurism in
KMT soldiers and insurrections by workers and peasants.
practical work.
Having made these arbitrary decisions, the Provisional Central
The Communist International held that the Japanese occupa¬
Committee wrote with full confidence, “the Central Committee is
tion of northeast China was to be regarded chiefly as “a further
absolutely convinced that the various Party organs will accom¬
step towards war against the Soviet Union.”24 Following its in¬
structions, the CPC Provisional Central Committee raised the plish these urgent tasks one hundred percent in the shortest
slogan, “Defend the Soviet Union with arms.” This demand was possible lime!”27
far removed from reality and naturally unacceptable to the In the areas under KMT rule, these much advertised policies,
Chinese people. which were based on “Left” adventurism and closed-doorism and
The Provisional Central Committee did not understand the showed no regard for objective reality, were criticized and resist¬
changes in class relations in China that had been touched off by ed by leading cadres who had practical experience. These includ¬
the Japanese aggression. It failed to see the positive change in the ed Liu Shaoqi, head of the Workers Department of the CPC
attitude of the middle-of-the-roaders, who were demanding resist¬ Central Committee and secretary of the Leading Party Group of
ance, or to recognize the splits that were taking place in the the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and Li Tiefu, secre¬
Kuomintang. On the contrary, they held that the middle-of-the- tary of the Leading Party Group of the Beiping Anti-Imperialist
roaders would help the Kuomintang maintain its rule and prevent Alliance and Head of the Propaganda Department of the Hebei
the masses from overthrowing it. Therefore, it said, “these sec¬ Provincial Party Committee. Liu Shaoqi maintained that in work
tions are the most dangerous enemy, and we should use our among the masses, open and legal means should be used as much
main forces to fight these counter-revolutionaries who seek as possible, so that underground Party organizations could grad¬
compromise.”25 In this way, some middle-of-the-roaders who ually accumulate strength and consolidate themselves. These
might have been friends were pushed into the arms of Chiang leading cadres published articles in Red Flag, the weekly organ
Kai-shek. of the CPC Central Committee, criticizing the policy of having
In the new situation, instead of calling for a national united Party members quit the “yellow trade unions” controlled by the
front against Japan, the Provisional Central Committee emphas¬ Kuomintang, but their position was not accepted. On the con¬
ized the antagonism between the Kuomintang regime and the trary, they were accused of making opportunist mistakes and
Soviet political power. It declared that the collapse of the Kuo¬ dismissed from their leading posts.
mintang regime was imminent and that the central political
 166 167
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION

Work in the Areas under Kuomintang Rule standing firmly for resistance to Japanese aggression, demanding
in the Early 1930s a democratic politics and working for the benefit of the toiling
masses. For this reason, they drew closer and closer to the Party.
It was extremely difficult for the CPC to operate in the areas Second, the “Left” theories of the Provisional Central Commit¬
under Kuomintang rule. And “Left” adventurism and closed- tee did not work in practice. Although it had imposed those
doorism led to foolhardy acts that inflicted heavy losses on the theories in many places, some Party organizations and many
Party, making things even more difficult. During 1931 and 1932 individual members, taught by objective realities, consciously or
the Hebei Provincial Party Committee was decimated on three unconsciously broke away from them for the sake of advancing
separate occasions by arrests of its members. By January 1932 the revolution. They gradually adjusted their practical work,
membership in the Red trade unions had been reduced to 3,000. adopting flexible and effective measures. When the Provisional
By early 1933 it had become too dangerous for the Provisional Central Committee had moved to the Central Soviet Area and the
Central Committee to stay on in Shanghai, and it was obliged to Shanghai Bureau had been repeatedly sabotaged, some Party
move to the Central Soviet Area. The Shanghai Bureau of the organizations in Shanghai — for example, the Commission for
Central Committee was established to lead the Party’s work in the Cultural Work of the CPC Central Committee and the Provision¬
KMT-controlled areas and to maintain contact with the Commu¬ al Party Committee of Jiangsu Province — lost contact with the
nist International. Between March 1934 and February 1935, this higher levels. In the extremely complicated circumstances, they
Bureau was nearly wiped out no less than six times, and the did some exploring on their own and blazed a few new trails,
following July it was forced to suspend operations. By that refusing to be guided by the subjectivism of a few leaders.
time, all but a handful of the Party organizations in the KMT- Their abandonment of “Left” thinking manifested itself chiefly
controlled areas had been destroyed. in a new concern for uniting with other social forces and for
It is worth noting that even under such harsh conditions, a making full use of legal means of propaganda. Although at the
number of Communists and progressives outside the Party still time people working in this way did not necessarily have a clear
continued their struggle in the KMT areas. They made a great understanding of the right political line, facts proved that they
contribution by promoting the movement for resistance to Japan were doing the right thing. Some leaders in the Provisional
and for national salvation, opposing Chiang Kai-shek’s dictator¬ Central Committee also showed signs of a change in their think¬
ship, disseminating Marxism and using literature and the arts to ing. In October 1932 Zhang Wentian published in Struggle,
expand the influence of the Party. How could this happen? another organ of the CPC Central Committee, two articles enti¬
Two factors were at work. First, even though after the Septem¬ tled “Closed-doorism in the Field of Literature and Art” and “On
ber 18th Incident the national crisis reached unprecedented pro¬ Our Propaganda and Agitation Work.” In these articles he de¬
portions, Chiang’s ruling clique stubbornly followed the traitor¬ clared that it was chiefly “Left” closed-doorism that had prevent¬
ous policy of “internal pacification before resistance to foreign ed the Left-wing movement in literature and art from expanding
invasion” and intensified its fascist dictatorship. This was ex¬ beyond the narrow confines of underground work. “It is absolute¬
tremely unpopular and could not but arouse growing indignation ly essential,” he wrote, “to combat “Left” phrase-mongering and
among the people and cause splits among the middle-of-the- closed-doorism, if the present Left-wing movement in literature
roaders and even within the KMT ruling clique. Despite the and art in China is to become a movement of the masses. Only a
serious “Left” mistakes made by the Provisional Central Commit¬ broad revolutionary united front can transform our underground
tee, many progressives could see that the Communist Party was activities within narrow confines, enabling us to work openly or
 168
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
chapter three the agrarian revolution 169
semi-openly and to reach a wide range of people.”28
In August 1931 Soong Ching Ling returned home from Europe Xun breached and stormed the enemy citadel; on the cultural
because her mother had died. She immediately threw herself into front he was the bravest and most correct, the firmest, the most
the international campaign to secure the release of Paul Noulens, loyal and the most ardent national hero, a hero without parallel
the leader of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Communist Interna¬ in our history. The road he took was the very road of China’s new
tional, who had been arrested in Shanghai. When Deng Yanda, national culture.”30
the former political director of the Northern Expeditionary Army The help that Communists gave to Zou Taofen, editor-in-chief
and her old friend, was murdered on orders from Chiang Kai- of Life Weekly, was a successful example of uniting with patriots
shek, in grief and indignation she issued a statement entitled, and developing progressive forces. Originally, the magazine was
“The Kuomintang Is No Longer a Political Power.” “I firmly devoted chiefly to self-improvement, a subject on which it offered
believe, she wrote, “that only a revolution built on mass support its readers “professional guidance.” Its political position was
and for the masses can break the power of militarists and politi¬ generally that of the patriotic national bourgeoisie. The Septem¬
cians, throw off the yoke of foreign imperialism and truly realize ber 18th Incident, however, had an enormous effect on Zou
socialism.”29 Soong Ching Ling played a leading role in the Taofen. With the help of Hu Yuzhi and other Communists, he
founding of the Society for Wiping Out National Humiliation soon espoused the cause of resistance and national salvation and
and for Self-Salvation, the China League for the Protection of drew closer to the Party. From then on. Life Weekly became a
Civil Rights (together with Cai Yuanpei and Yang Xingfo, who lively and popular publication with a circulation of over 100,000.
was later murdered by Kuomintang agents for his part in it) and Zou Taofen’s words gained great influence among young people.
the Chinese People’s Committee for Armed Self-defence. She In July 1932 he founded the Life Bookstore, which also published
served as the most prominent spokesperson for all these organi¬ a large number of progressive books on the social sciences,
zations, evoking much favourable response both at home and literature and the arts. The bookstore became an important
abroad. Certain Communists kept in close contact with her. bastion of progressive culture in areas under Kuomintang rule.
In many of his essays the great writer Lu Xun, who had Many Communists worked for the bookstore.
already become a Marxist and kept in close contact with the Notwithstanding the KMT’s policy of brutal repression, some
Party, ruthlessly exposed the dictatorial nature of the ruling Communists and progressives were able to make full use of legal
clique of big landlords and compradors, their subservience to means to conduct their propaganda. In the spring of 1929 Cai
foreign powers, their shameful failure to resist Japanese aggres¬ Yuanpei, one of the founding members of the Kuomintang,
sion and their brutal “encirclement and suppression” campaign president of the Central Research Academy and director of the
against writers and artists. He also sharply criticized manifesta¬ Social Sciences Institute, appointed the distinguished scholar
tions of ultra-Leftism in cultural circles. In March 1930, in a Chen Hansheng, a Party member, deputy director of the Institute.
speech at the inaugural meeting of the League of Chinese’ Left- To gain a better understanding of the nature of Chinese society,
Wing Writers, he said: “Our failure to form a united front shows Chen organized a Marxist survey group, which over a period of
that we do not have a common objective, or that our objective is six years carried out extensive, thoroughgoing investigations of
only to serve small groups or individuals. If our objective were to Chinese rural society. In 1933, together with Xue Muqiao and
serve the masses of workers and peasants, then the front would others, he founded the Society for Research on the Chinese Rural
naturally be united.” Years later, Mao Zedong w'as to pay him Economy and the monthly Chinese Countryside. This magazine,
this tribute: “Representing the great majority of the nation, Lu which was published openly, printed many survey reports and
treatises on the necessity of reforming the feudal land system,
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 171
170

supporting the agrarian revolution led by the Communist Party. thinking and promoting the anti-Japanese movement for national
Left-wing writers and artists also worked hard to cooperate salvation. It tempered a strong group of revolutionary intellec¬
with the middle-of-the-roaders. Articles by Lu Xun, Qu Qiubai, tuals, many of whom later became the backbone of the Party in
Mao Dun and Zhou Yang appeared in “Free Talk,” a supplement the fields of ideology and theory, literature and the arts.
of the daily newspaper Sheri Bao, edited by Li Liewen, and in the
monthly magazine Literature, edited by Fu Donghua. The fa¬ The Failure of the Central Red Army in the Fifth
mous novel Midnight by Mao Dun was published by the Kaiming Campaign Against “Encirclement and Suppression”
Bookstore in February 1933 and reprinted four times in three
months, which was rare at the time. Communists Xia Yan, Yang Since the CPC Provisional Central Committee was still in
Hansheng and Tian Han, through the Mingxing Film Studio and Shanghai in the early 1930s, it was some time before its “Left”
the Lianhua Film Studio, made many progressive films that policies penetrated the Red Army and the revolutionary base
attracted large audiences. The “March of the Volunteers” — the areas.
theme song from the film Heroes and Heroines, written by Xia During November 1-5, 1931, the Party organizations in the
Yan and produced by the Diantong Film Studio — swept the Central Soviet Area held their first congress (known as the
country. This stirring song, with music by Nie Er and words by southern Jiangxi meeting) in Ruijin, Jiangxi. At this meeting,
Tian Han, did much to mobilize the people for national salvation. which was presided over by the delegation sent to the Central
Left-wing social scientists translated many Marxist works. The Soviet Area by the Central Committee after its 4th Plenary
first complete Chinese translations of volume I of Marx’s Capital, Session, Mao Zedong’s correct views were denounced as reflecting
Engels’ Anti-Duhring, Marx’s A Critique of Political Economy, “narrow empiricism,” “the rich peasants’ line ’ and extremely
Lenin’s Materialism and Empirio-Criticism were all published in serious and consistent Right opportunism,” and stressed that
the early 1930s. Progressive social scientists took part in debates concentrated efforts should be made to fight against Right oppor¬
on the history and nature of Chinese society, using the tools of tunism. Immediately after this meeting, the 1st National Con¬
Marxist analysis and criticizing views that did not correspond to gress of the Chinese Soviet was held in the same city from
the realities. Guo Moruo’s Studies of Ancient Chinese Society, November 7 to 20. At this congress the Provisional Central
written while the author was in exile in Japan and published in Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic was founded, Mao
1930, was the first book on Chinese history written from a Zedong was elected chairman of the government and Xiang Ying
Marxist viewpoint. More and more, Left-wing social scientists and Zhang Guotao vice-chairmen. The congress also established
were introducing dialectical-materialist and historical-materialist the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, with Zhu De as
viewpoints into their studies of China and the world. They chairman and Wang Jiaxiang and Peng Dehuai as vice-chairmen.
propagated Marxism in a number of ways, making it easily At this time the different Soviet areas were separated from each
accessible to young people. other. The establishment of the Provisional Central Government
Although many of the members of the League of Chinese and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission helped to
Left-Wing Writers, the League of Chinese Social Scientists and centralize command over them and over units of the Red Army.
similar organizations were affected at this time by “Left” ideas, However, the Provisional Central Committee based its policies on
the cultural movement they championed made a great contribu¬ the directives of the Communist International, which put undue
tion to China’s modern ideological development. In particular, emphasis on the antagonism between the Soviet political power
the movement played a historic role in disseminating progressive and the Kuomintang regime and demanded that the separate
 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 173

172 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

by one; .... „ ,
Soviet areas be linked up to form a whole, as if national victory —under special conditions, take the initiative and attack the
of the revolution were at hand. This assessment was not realistic. enemy, and thwart the enemy’s scheme of “encirclement and
Accordingly, some “Left” policies were laid down in the docu¬ suppression.”
ments drafted by the Provisional Central Committee and adopted However, Zhang Guotao, whom the Provisional Central Com¬
by the 1st National Congress of the Chinese Soviet — for exam¬ mittee had sent to the area after the 4th Plenary Session as
ple, the policy of giving no land to landlords and only poor land secretary of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Sub-Bureau of the Central
to rich peasants, which hampered the development of the base Committee and chairman of the Military Commission, to fulfil
areas. In the second half of 1930, in the complicated struggle his own ambitions, got rid of dissidents and dismissed Zeng
in the Central Soviet Area, the need to eliminate counter¬ Zhongsheng, the former leader of the border region. Before long,
revolutionaries was greatly exaggerated. Confessions were elicited during the campaign to eliminate counter-revolutionaries, he had
by force and then given credence, with the result that many Xu Jishen, an outstanding general of the Red Army, executed,
cadres and soldiers loyal to the revolution were executed as along with many other loyal cadres and soldiers. Some time
members of the A-B Group31 or the Social Democrats. This was afterwards, Zeng Zhongsheng was also executed. This produced
a bitter lesson for the Party. chaos in the ranks of the revolution. When the Kuomintang was
In the summer of 1932, as soon as it had signed the Wusong- preparing to launch a large-scale attack on the base area, Zhang
Shanghai Armistice Agreement with Japan which humiliated the Guotao underestimated the enemy and made no preparations tor
Chinese nation and betrayed its sovereignty, the Kuomintang defence. On the contrary, he ordered the Red Army to press south
regime dispatched a large number of troops for a fourth “encir¬ over a long distance. Although the Fourth Front Army fought
clement and suppression” campaign against the revolutionary heroically and inflicted heavy casualties on the Kuomintang
base areas. Their strategy was to proceed in two stages: an attack troops, it suffered heavy losses and was exhausted from contin¬
on the Hubei-Henan-Anhui and Western Hunan-Hubei revolu¬ uous fighting. A large KMT force bore down upon the border,
tionary base areas, followed by a concerted attack by all forces reducing the Red Army to a passive position and repeatedly
on the Central Revolutionary Base Area. defeating it. Zhang Guotao was alarmed by these events and
First, in July 1932 Chiang Kai-shek massed more than 300,000 decided that more than 20,000 of the main forces of the Fourth
troops under his personal command to attack the Hubei-Henan- Front Army should cross the Beiping-Hankou Railway and move
Anhui Revolutionary Base Area. The main forces of the Red west. After more than two months of marching they entered
Army in that area were the Fourth Front Army commanded by northern Sichuan and established the Sichuan-Shaanxi Revolu¬
Xu Xiangqian. Through long, hard struggle, the Fourth Front tionary Base Area.
Army had grown to 45,000 seasoned men. It had worked out a set In July 1932 when an attack was launched on the Hubei-
of effective principles for combat, including the following: Henan-Anhui Revolutionary Base Area, more than 100,000 KMT
—when the enemy is strong and the revolutionary forces are troops attacked the Western Hunan-Hubei Revolutionary Base
weak, keep the initiative and lure him deep into Red territory; Area. Beginning in the winter of 1930, the Second Army Group
—avoid engagement with strong enemy units and attack the of the Red Army (with He Long as commander-in-chief and Zhou
weak; Yiqun and Deng Zhongxia, successively, as political commissar),
—encircle and outflank the enemy; had won several battles in the counter-campaign against “encir¬
—besiege a point to annihilate an enemy relief force; clement and suppression.” In the region of Honghu Lake, they
—concentrate a superior force to eliminate enemy units one
 175
174 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter three the agrarian revolution

had utilized the advantageous terrain for guerrilla warfare, in¬ iurge-scale offensive, to attack cities, strike enemy reinforcements
flicting heavy casualties on the enemy. However, after the 4th and win quick victories. Zhou, Mao, Zhu and Wang, who were
Plenary Session of the Central Committee, Xia Xi was sent to be responsible for command at the front, telegraphed the Soviet
secretary of the Western Hunan-Hubei Sub-Bureau of the Central Area Bureau in late September, arguing that under present con¬
Committee and political commissar of the Second Army Group ditions if they followed such a plan there would be no assurance
(now reorganized into the Third Army of the Red Army), and he of victory. “If,” they said, “we are itching to fight and act rashly,
too followed the policies of “Left” adventurism and sectarianism. we shall waste our efforts, tiring out the troops and achieving
Duan Dechang and many other outstanding generals were nothing. It will be a case of more haste and less speed, and will
wrongly executed in the movement to eliminate counter¬ only put us at a greater disadvantage.” In early October the Soviet
revolutionaries. At first the Third Red Army underestimated the Area Bureau held a plenary session in Ningdu, Jiangxi. At the
enemy and advanced too rapidly; then, it was forced onto the meeting, the plan of the leaders at the front was heavily criticized
defensive, suffered heavy losses and eventually had to withdraw as “a purely defensive line” and a Righl-deviatiomst policy that
from the western Hunan-Hubei region (Xia Xi died during the “focuses on making preparations and waiting for the enemy to
march). After protracted fighting, it was finally able to open attack.” A heated argument took place about whether Mao Ze¬
the Eastern Guizhou Revolutionary Base Area. Then, the Sixth dong should remain at the front. Zhou, Zhu and Wang insisted
Army Group led by Ren Bishi (with Xiao Ke as commander-in¬ that he should be kept there, but most of the participants did not
chief and Wang Zhen as political commissar) came there to join agree. After the meeting, Mao was translerred to the rear, on the
forces. The Third Army resumed its designation as the Second excuse that he should preside over the work of the Central
Army Group and was reorganized with He Long as commander- Government. He was relieved of his post as general political
in-chief, Ren Bishi as political commissar and Guan Xiangying commissar of the First Front Army, and it was given to Zhou
as deputy political commissar. The merger of the Second and Enlai as an added responsibility.
Sixth Army Groups greatly strengthened them. Together they At the end of 1932, the Kuomintang concentrated more than
opened the Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan-Guizhou Revolutionary Base thirty divisions and in February 1933 launched the fourth “encir¬
Area. clement and suppression” campaign against the Central Revolu¬
The CPC Provisional Central Committee, which was still in tionary Base Area, approaching in three converging columns. I he
Shanghai at this time, sent instructions to the Central Revolution¬ twelve divisions under the command of Chen Cheng served as the
ary Base Area: “At present, you should go on the offensive to central army of 160,000 men, who were to carry out the mam
eliminate the enemy’s armed forces, expand the Soviet area and attack. At this time, the First Front Army had about 70,000
take one or two key cities, so as to bring the revolution to victory troops The Soviet Area Bureau repeatedly sent telegrams to the
in one or more provinces.” In August 1932 the First Front Army front, urging the First Front Army to launch its own attack and
of the Red Army, under the command of Zhou Enlai, Mao quickly occupy Nanfeng and Nancheng. Zhou Enlai replied that
Zedong, Zhu Dc and Wang Jiaxiang, took first Le’an County and the present conditions were not good for attacking cities and that
then Yihuang County, both in Jiangxi, wiping out three enemy the Red Army should rather seek to wipe out the enemy through
brigades. At this time, however, a difference of opinion arose in mobile warfare. This view was based on a correct assessment ol
the Central Committee’s Soviet Area Bureau between leaders at the situation, but it was rejected by the Soviet Area Bureau.
the front and in the rear. Leaders of the rear wanted the First Having failed to take Nanfeng, Zhou Enlai and Zhu Dc imme¬
Front Army to take the initiative in the face of the enemy’s diately decided that their main forces should move elsewhere
 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 177
176 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
on politics.” He imposed a tight economic blockade on the Central
secretly and wait for an opportunity to attack. In two ambushes Soviet Area and utilized the new tactic of building blockhouses
in Huangbei and Caotaigang, they were able to wipe out three and advancing one step at a time. He had already sent a total of
divisions of the well-equipped main force of Chen Cheng and one million troops to attack the Red Army in different places.
capture more than 10,000 guns. By so doing they smashed the Now, beginning in late September, he sent half a million to attack
Kuomintang army’s fourth “encirclement and suppression” cam¬
the Central Soviet Area.
paign against the Central Soviet Area and set an example of By this time, the number of Red Army troops in the Central
ambush by a large force that was unprecedented in the history of Soviet Area had grown to more than 80,000. Bo Gu, the leader of
the Red Army. the Provisional Central Committee, relied for military command
It was during this campaign that the CPC Provisional Central on Li De (the Chinese name of the German Otto Braun), a
Committee moved to the Central Soviet Area. More than a year military adviser associated with the Communist International.
before, it had already declared: “We must achieve victory first in Braun had experience only of the formal positional warfare of
several key provinces (Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi and Anhui). This World War I and knew nothing of the characteristics of the
revolutionary task is not for the future but for the present. All revolutionary war in China. Under his guidance, the Provisional
our work must be focused on accomplishing it.”32 After moving Central Committee abandoned the policy of active defence, which
to the Central Soviet Area, the Provisional Central Committee had been effective against the earlier “encirclement and suppres¬
implemented its “Left” adventuristic policies throughout the Par¬ sion” campaigns. It called the impending conflict “a war to decide
ty, the Red Army and the base area. To overcome resistance, between two opposing visions of China’s future” and raised the
organizationally it took a sectarian approach, regarding all cadres slogans, “Don’t give up one inch of the base area!” and “Engage
who disagreed with its policies as “opportunists,” attacking them the enemy outside the gates!” It ordered the main forces of the
mercilessly. Luo Ming, acting secretary of the CPC Fujian Pro¬ Red Army to march north to fight, with the result that they were
vincial Committee, and Deng Xiaoping, head of the Propaganda obliged to move between the main forces of the enemy and his
Department of the Jiangxi Provincial Committee, opposed this blockhouses and were reduced to passivity. When the Red Army
“Left” line of going on the offensive. However, they were de¬ failed to launch an attack, the Provisional Central Committee
nounced as followers of a Right opportunist line who were pessi¬ shifted to a policy of passive defence. It maintained that the Red
mistic about the revolution and were trying to flee before the Army should be divided for defence purposes and fight a war of
enemy. The Provisional Central Committee struggled first against short, swift thrusts, attempting to substitute positional warfare
the “Luo Ming line” in Fujian, and then against the “Jiangxi Luo for guerrilla and mobile warfare and to fight the well-equipped
Ming line” of Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zetan, Xie Weijun and Gu KMT forces in a war of attrition. Thus, as the war progressed,
Bai in Jiangxi. Its main target was the views of Mao Zedong. This the Red Army found itself increasingly at a disadvantage.
suppression of dissenting opinion threw everyone into a state of One good opportunity did arise for the Red Army to smash the
anxiety and created an abnormal political atmosphere in the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign. In November
Central Soviet Area. 1933 the generals of the KMT’s 19th Route Army, which the year
In the second half of 1933, after six months of preparation, before had tried to defend Shanghai against the Japanese, found¬
Chiang Kai-shek launched a fifth campaign of “encirclement and ed the People’s Revolutionary Government of the Chinese Repub¬
suppression” against the Central Soviet Area, with himself as lic and appointed Li Jishen as its chairman. They openly declared
commander-in-chief. He had learned from previous failures and that they would resist Japanese aggression and oppose Chiang
now relied “thirty percent on military means and seventy percent
 179
178 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter three the agrarian revolution

Kai-shek and sent representatives to negotiate cooperation with Rjeht opportunism and warning against any compromise with it,
the Red Army. The two sides signed an initial agreement. On thr Provisional Central Committee continued to be torn by fac¬
January 17, 1933, the Provisional Central Government of the ial strife. Even under the attack of a strong enemy, it intensi¬
Chinese Soviet and the Revolutionary Military Commission of fied the “Left” policy of giving no land to the landlords and only
the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army had issued a noor land to the rich peasants, broadening the struggle unneces¬
statement that they were ready to sign an agreement on joint sarily and creating social disorder. But the w'orst consequence of
operations to resist Japanese aggression with any armed forces on the Provisional Central Committee’s continued “Left” adventur¬
the following three conditions: ism was the failure of the Red Army in the fifth counter¬
1. they must immediately stop attacking the Soviet areas; campaign against “encirclement and suppression,” which led to
2. they must immediately guarantee the democratic rights of the abandonment of the Central Soviet Area.
the people (freedom of assembly, association and speech, the right In mid-April 1934 the KMT army gathered a superior force to
to strike and the right to publish); attack Guangchang, the northern gateway to the Central Soviet
3. they must immediately arm the people and establish armed Area. Bo Gu and Otto Braun decided to concentrate the main
volunteers to defend China and strive for its independence, unity forces of the Red Army and build fortifications to hold the town,
and territorial inlcgrity. regardless of the enemy’s numerical superiority, and they person¬
This statement was enormously important. However, Bo Gu ally went to the front to direct operations. At the end of eighteen
and others continued to regard the middle-of-the-roaders as the days of bloody battle, the Red Army had suffered heavy casual¬
most dangerous enemy. They refused to accept the advice of Mao ties and Guangchang had fallen. In early October the KMT army
Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian and Peng Dehuai. They pushed into the heartland of the Central Soviet Area. The main
held that the action taken by the leaders of the 19th Route Army forces of the Red Army were compelled to start a strategic shift
to resist Japan and oppose Chiang was merely designed to deceive of position. The Provisional Central Committee and the Central
the people, and they refused to cooperate with them in military Red Army (the First Front Army of the Red Army), totalling
affairs. As a result, in January 1934, isolated and cut off from more than 86,000 men, withdrew from the Central Soviet Area
help, the Fujian People’s Government was defeated by Chiang’s and marched west to break out of their encirclement. This was
military attack and political trickery. Since the Red Army let slip the beginning of the Long March.
this golden opportunity, Chiang, having defeated the Fujian In July 1934 the Seventh Army Group of the Red Army was
People’s Government, was able to complete his encirclement of ordered to reorganize as the Vanguard Detachment to Resist the
the Central Soviet Area. Japanese Invaders in the North and entered the border area of
In that same month, the CPC Provisional Central Committee, Fujian-Zhejiang-Anhui-Jiangxi. There it joined forces with the
acting for the 6th Central Committee, held the 5th Plenary Tenth Army of the Red Army, led by Fang Zhirnm, to form the
Session in Ruijin, Jiangxi. At this meeting the “Left” adventuris¬ Tenth Army Group, which continued the march north in two
tic line was pushed to an extreme. The Provisional Central columns. However, in January 1935, intercepted and pursued by
Committee reaffirmed that the fifth counter-campaign against greatly superior forces of the KMT army, the newly formed army
“encirclement and suppression” was to be a “struggle for the group was routed. Fang Zhimin was captured and executed.
complete victory of Soviet China,” a struggle that would decide As we have seen, in the grim aftermath of the failure of the
whether the country would take “the road of the Soviet or the Great Revolution, the Party, learning lessons paid for in blood
road of colonialism.” Once again identifying the main danger as and going through trial and error, had begun to revitalize the
 180
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 181
revolution. In the early period of the Kuomintang’s large-scale
encirclement and suppression” campaigns against the Soviet made up of the Guangdong Army, the Hunan Army and the
areas and the Red Army, thanks to correct policies, the Party and Guangxi Army, each of which tried to obstruct and intercept the
army were still able to win great victories, even though the enemy Red Army. Although the Red Army broke through the four block¬
was much stronger. After the September 18th Incident, national ade lines one after another, it suffered heavy losses. When it was
contradictions were intensified and great changes took place in going to break through the last line along the Xiangjiang River,
the relations between different classes, creating excellent condi¬ conflicts between the Hunan and Guangxi warlords brought about
tions for the Party and the Red Army to unite with the over¬ a breach in the line. On November 27,1934, vanguard troops of the
whelming majority of the people and to advance the national Red Army occupied the major ferry point at Jieshou on the east side
democratic revolution. However, at this time the leadership of the of the Xiangjiang River. If the troops had been marching with light
CPC Central Committee fell into the hands of “Left” dogmatists packs, they might have been able to cross the river quickly, but
who understood nothing about conditions in China but who were because they were so heavily laden, they advanced too slowly.
trusted by the Communist International. This almost led to the Leading organs of the Central Committee were not able to reach the
failure of the revolution. ferry for two days. By this time, the KMT’s Hunan and Guangxi
armies were already mounting a rapid pincer attack on the ferry,
with air support. The Xiangjiang River battle was the fiercest yet
V. THE ZUNYI MEETING AND fought by the Central Red Army since it had begun the Long March
and involved the heaviest losses. The Red Army troops entrenched
THE TRIUMPH OF at the ferry made a tremendous sacrifice to cover the other troops
THE RED ARMY’S LONG MARCH crossing the river. By December 1 the main body of the Red Army
had crossed the river, but it had lost on the east bank the entire 34th
The Long March of the Red Army was a heroic feat unprece- Division of the Fifth Army Group and the 18th Regiment of the
dented in history. Third Army Group. The Red Army and the detachment from the
In October 1934 the Central Red Army (the First Front Army) Central Committee had been reduced from more than 80,000 men
began the Long March as the forced response to its defeat in the to just over 30,000. After this bitter experience, the troops began to
fifth counter-campaign against the enemy’s “encirclement and feel that the current leadership was no longer satisfactory and that
suppression. In trying to break out of the encirclement and effect it needed to be changed. Some leaders who had supported the
a strategic shift of position, the leaders of the CPC Central mistaken “Left” line also began gradually to change their attitude
Committee, who had already made “Left” errors, made the fur¬ in the light of harsh realities.
ther mistake of allowing the troops to flee in disorder, trying to
take everything with them. The army carried with it printing The Zunyi Meeting
equipment, machinery for manufacturing munitions and other
cumbersome gear. The entire force of over 80,000 had to travel At this time Chiang Kai-shek, realizing that the Red Army was
through mountains along winding trails so narrow that often they advancing towards western Hunan Province to join forces with
could file through only a single pass in one night. the Second and Sixth Army Groups, shifted the concentration of
The KMT army of “pursuit and suppression,” consisting of 77 his troops, arranging them in a pocket-formation to await the
regiments from 16 divisions deployed on four blockade lines, was entrance of the Central Red Army and then draw the net tight.
At this critical juncture, Mao Zedong suggested that, under the
 182 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC 183

circumstances, it would be best to give up the plan to join forces After the Zunyi Meeting, it was as though the Central Red Army
with the Second and Sixth Army Groups and, to march instead had suddenly obtained a new lease on life. Under the command of
to Guizhou Province, where the enemy was relatively weak. This Mao Zedong and the others, it became more flexible, changing the
proposal was approved. After occupying the county of Tongdao, direction of battle as the situation changed, turning first east, then
on the southwest border of Hunan Province, the troops entered west and moving circuitously to go around areas of heavy enemy
Guizhou. On November 18 the Political Bureau of the CPC troop concentration. It took the initiative everywhere. West of
Central Committee held a meeting at Liping, where it formally Zunyi, on the border of Sichuan and Guizhou provinces, the Red
abandoned the plan to advance towards western Hunan and Army crossed the Chishui River four times, confusing the enemy
decided to march to northern Guizhou instead. On January 7, and tiring him out by keeping him on the move. Late in March, it
1935, the Red Army captured Zunyi, a town of strategic impor¬ crossed the Wujiang River in the south to feign an attack on Gui-
tance in northern Guizhou. Because the Red Army suddenly yang. Chiang Kai-shek, who was supervising operations at Guiyang
changed direction, it was able to elude the enemy who had been at the time, hurriedly moved his Yunnan troops up as reinforce¬
in hot pursuit, and to have 12 days to rest and regroup in Zunyi. ments. Mao Zedong had said long before, “If we can just get the
From January 15 to 17 the CPC Central Committee held an Yunnan troops moved out of the province, it will be a victory.”33 As
enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau in Zunyi. The meeting soon as this had happened, the Red Army launched a long-range
focused on rectifying the “Left” errors in military and organization¬ raid on Yunnan, its vanguard troops pressing on the provincial
al matters of decisive importance. Major speeches were made by capital, Kunming. At this time Kunming was only lightly defended,
Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang, all of whom so reinforcements were hastily called up from the forces defending
sharply criticized two mistakes — the purely defensive action un¬ the Jinsha River, which were thus seriously weakened. The Red
dertaken during the fifth counter-campaign against the enemy’s Army again suddenly changed direction to head north, moving
“encirclement and suppression” and the flight carried out during rapidly so that by May 9 the entire force had crossed the Jinsha
the Long March. After heated debate, most of those present came River. In this way it got neatly away from the encirclement, pursuit,
to agree with the opinions expressed by Mao and the other two and obstruction and interception of the KMT army, a force hundreds
rejected the views presented in the report by Bo Gu concerning the of thousands strong, and attained a decisive victory in its strategic
fifth counter-campaign. The Political Bureau elected Mao Zedong shift of position.
to its Standing Committee and assigned Zhang Wentian to draft for
the Central Committee a resolution evaluating the fifth counter¬
The First and Fourth Front Armies Join Forces
campaign. Not long after this meeting, the Standing Committee
decided that Zhang Wentian should take over all responsibility After the Central Red Army crossed the Jinsha River, it rested
from Bo Gu, and it set up a group of three persons — Mao Zedong, in Huili County in Sichuan for five full days and then continued
Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang — to take command of all the Red north. When the army entered the Yi minority area in the
Army’s military operations. Daliang Mountains, Chief of Staff Liu Bocheng, in accordance
The Zunyi Meeting actually established the correct leadership with the Party’s policy on nationalities, participated in a sacrifi¬
of the Central Committee with Mao Zedong at the core. In this cial ceremony to form an alliance with Xiao Yedan, leader of the
critical situation, the meeting saved the Communist Party, the Guji tribe of the Yi nationality. He persuaded the other tribes to
Red Army and the Chinese revolution. It was a life-or-death remain neutral, so that the army was allowed to pass without
turning point in the history of the Party. hindrance through the Yi nationality area and to reach the ferry
 CHAPTER three the agrarian revolution 185
184 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

at Anshunchang on the south bank of the Dadu River. In the area chief problem they confronted now was where to establish a new
around Anshunchang the river was swift and the mountains one. In his report Zhou suggested that the new base area should meet
steep; it was here that in 1863 during the Taiping Revolution, Shi three conditions: 1) it should cover a wide area and allow for highly
Dakai’s troops were unable to cross to the north and finally met mobile operations; 2) it should have a large population and a fairly
their downfall. Led by seventeen brave men, a part of the Red sound mass base; and 3) it should have good economic conditions.
Army successfully crossed the river. But the main body of troops The conclusion was that they should go to the Sichuan-Shaanxi-
would have been unable to cross at this point in a reasonable Gansu border region. No one at the meeting made a counter¬
amount of time. It was therefore decided to make a race for the proposal, and this strategic principle was adopted unanimously.
Luding Bridge 170 km. upstream, which the enemy had not yet Accordingly, the Political Bureau made a decision stating, “Our
had time to destroy. The troops covered the distance in two days. strategic principle is to concentrate the main forces to attack to the
A shock force composed of 22 soldiers braved intense enemy fire north, wipe out large numbers of the enemy in mobile warfare and
to climb across the cables of bridge and wipe out the defenders, seize southern Gansu first in order to build a Sichuan-Shaanxi-
allowing the Central Red Army to cross. Gansu Soviet Base Area.”34
Having overcome this obstacle, the army had to cross the first With the joining up of the two main forces, the Red Army’s
great snow-capped mountain it was to encounter on the Long strength was greatly increased, and with the correct strategic prin¬
March — Jiajin Mountain, south of Maogong. To climb this ciple the situation seemed very favourable. But the Fourth Front
mountain and descend on the other side required a trek of 35 Army had over 80,000 men, while the First Front Army had only
kilometres. And at an altitude of more than 4,000 metres, the around 30,000, and the numerical superiority of the men under his
concentration of oxygen was low on the high peaks, causing the command fed Zhang Guolao’s ambition. At the Lianghekou meet¬
men to gasp for breath and feel light-headed; some who sat down ing he had nodded his head and indicated that he agreed with the
to rest could not get up again. By June 12 an advance party of principle of moving north. Afterwards, however, he raised all kinds
the Central Red Army had crossed the Jiajin Mountain and of objections, putting pressure on the Central Committee to appoint
reached Dawei, southeast of Maogong, where they were met by him the general political commissar of the Red Army, while all the
Li Xiannian, the political commissar of the 30th Army of the while secretly considering a move south to the border between
Fourth Front Army. (The Fourth Front Army, after emerging Sichuan and Xikang provinces. On August 3 the General Head¬
victorious from the Jialing River campaign in April, had left the quarters of the Red Army reorganized the army into left and right
Sichuan-Shaanxi Soviet Area and shifted to the west.) Then the columns to march north for the Xiahe River-Taohe River cam¬
First Front Army (the Central Red Army) and the Fourth Front paign. The right column consisted of the First and Third armies of
Army joined forces at Lianghekou, north of Maogong. Present at the First Front Army (at this time, the First, Third, Fifth and Ninth
this meeting were Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai and Zhang Army Groups of the First Front Army had become the First, Third,
Guotao, leader of the Fourth Front Army. Fifth and Thirty-second Armies) and the Fourth and Thirtieth
With the joining of these two major forces, the concentration of Armies of the Fourth Front Army, accompanied by the detachment
Red Army troops in the area reached more than a hundred thou¬ from the Central Committee and the Front Command. The left
sand. On the second day after they had come together, the Central column was composed of the Ninth, Thirty-first and Thirty-third
Committee called a meeting of the Political Bureau at Lianghekou. Armies of the Fourth Front Army and the Fifth and Thirty-second
Zhou Enlai gave a report on the current strategic principle. At this Armies of the First Front Army, led by Zhu De, commander-in¬
time, the two front armies had left their former base areas, and the chief, Zhang Guotao, general political commissar and Liu Bocheng,
186 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC. 187
chapter three the agrarian revolution

chief of staff. the Red Army that was marching north, the Shaanxi-Gansu
On August 21 the right column began to cross the grasslands Detachment.
in northern Sichuan. The great stretches of grassland were wild
and uninhabited, full of weedy swamps and black, stinking sludge The Red Army Marches North and
pits. The weather changed unpredictably; sometimes fierce winds Its Three Main Forces Join Together
would blow from all sides with torrential rain, at other times
there would be whirling snow and sudden hail. If a man made the After the Ejie meeting, the Central Committee led the Shaanxi-
slightest miscalculation when approaching a quagmire, he would Gansu Detachment rapidly north. On September 17, 1935, they
be swallowed up. The cadres and soldiers had to trek over long reached Lazikou, a natural barrier of steep cliffs and overhanging
distances with little food and salt, and the cold and hunger sapped rocks on the Sichuan-Gansu border. Scaling the cliffs, the vanguard
their strength; in the end many died on the grasslands. Nev¬ troops made a surprise attack on the rear of the defending KMT
ertheless, after marching six days and nights, the right column troops and in one stroke broke through to the wide-open terrain of
emerged at last to wait for the pre-arranged meeting with the left southern Gansu. Immediately after that they occupied the town of
column. Hadapu. Here they learned from a newspaper that in northern
At this point, however, unexpected news arrived: Zhang Guo- Shaanxi there was a very large Soviet area and a big contingent of
tao, giving all kinds of pretexts, refused to march north and, the Red Army. On the 27th the Standing Committee of the Political
instead, wanted the right column to march south. Attempting to Bureau held a meeting at Bangluo Town and decided to press on to
split the Central Committee and endanger its safety, on Septem¬ northern Shaanxi. On October 19 the Red Army that was marching
ber 9 Zhang sent a telegram without the knowledge of the north reached Wuqi Town in the Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area. At
Committee to Chen Changhao, the right column’s political com¬ the beginning of November, in Ganquan, it joined up with the
missar, ordering him to lead the column south. When Ye Jian- Fifteenth Army Group, led by Xu Haidong, Cheng Zihua and Liu
ying, who was serving as chief of staff of the right column, saw Zhidan, which had been active in the Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area.
the telegram, he immediately reported it to Mao Zedong. Mao, The Long March of the Central Red Army, which had covered
Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian and Bo Gu held an urgent discussion 12,500 kilometres and crossed eleven provinces, finally came to an
and decided that to avoid possible internal conflicts in the Red end, bringing victory for the Communist Party of China and the
Army, they should set out that very night to lead the First and Red Army and defeat for the enemy.
Third Armies and a detachment of the Military Commission Late in September Zhang Guotao, still persistently moving
north, in accordance with the strategic principle. Some cadres of south in his split with the Central Committee, ordered the former
the Fourth Front Army did not understand the true situation left column and part of the former right column to recross the
and advocated the use of force to bar their way. However, Xu grasslands, planning to head for the area of Baoxing, Lushan and
Xiangqian, commander-in-chief of the Fourth Front Army, for¬ Tianquan counties in western Sichuan, where grain was fairly
bade any such action, preserving the unity of the Red Army. plentiful. On October 5 he openly established a separate “Central
The next day the Central Committee sent a telegram to Zhang Committee,” of which he appointed himself chairman. Zhu Dc
Guotao demanding that he immediately lead his troops north, and Liu Bocheng resolutely struggled with Zhang, patiently
which he still refused to do. On September 12 at Ejie, the Political trying, along with Xu Xiangqian and others who opposed the
Bureau held an enlarged meeting at which it adopted a “Decision split, to convince the officers and men that he had misled them.
On Comrade Zhang Guotao’s Errors” and renamed the part of On January 22, 1936, the Central Committee adopted the “Deci-
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 189
188 CHAPTER

sion on Comrade Zhang Guotao’s Establishment of a Second Late in October a part of the Fourth Front Army received
‘Central Committee,”’ instructing Zhang to immediately dissolve instructions from the Central Military Commission to cross the
his “Central Committee” and to stop all anti-Party activity. Yellow River to the west and begin a campaign in Ningxia. In the
Zhang Guotao’s attempt to split the Party was not popular in the first half of November, in accordance with a decision of the
Fourth Front Army. The troops who moved south again suffered Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, the
heavy casualties in battle, and by April only about 40,000 men troops crossing the river changed their name to the West Route
were left, less than half the original number. At this time, the Army. Under conditions of extreme hardship, they fought alone
Central Committee again sent one telegram after another urging for four months, annihilating more than twenty thousand enemy
the Fourth Front Army to head north. Meanwhile, the Second troops, until in March of 1937, being greatly outnumbered, they
and Sixth Army Groups were about to arrive in western Sichuan were defeated.
Province. Zhang Hao, in the name of the CPC’s delegation to the After the main forces of the Red Army set out on the Long
Communist International, also sent a telegram to Zhang Guotao, March, the part that had remained behind, both north and south
asking him to dissolve his “Central Committee” and establish a of the Yangtze River, under the leadership of Xiang Ying, Chen
Southwest Bureau of the Central Committee instead. Under these Yi and others, together with guerrilla forces, independently car¬
circumstances, Zhang Guotao had little choice but to announce ried out three years of guerrilla warfare in fifteen areas spread
the dissolution of his “Central Committee” on June 6, 1936. over eight provinces. Although they met with great hardship —
Meanwhile, in November 1935, the Second and Sixth Army they lost contact with the CPC Central Committee, and the
Groups led by Ren Bishi, He Long and others, which had been enemy broke them up and blockaded them — with the support
active in the Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan-Guizhou Revolutionary Base of the masses they were able to overcome one difficulty after
Area, had also set out for the north from Sangzhi County, Hunan. another, maintaining their own strength, holding their ground
They too experienced many hardships and perils, crossing the and making a great contribution to the Chinese revolution.
Jinsha River and snow-capped mountains to join up at last, on Meanwhile, the anti-Japanese armed forces in northeast China,
July 2, 1936, with the Fourth Front Army at Ganzi in western under the leadership of the Communist Party, continued the
Sichuan. The Central Committee ordered the Second and Sixth struggle in extremely difficult circumstances. They included the
Army Groups to combine with the Thirty-second Army to be¬ First, Second, Third and Sixth Armies of the Northeast People’s
come the Second Front Army, with He Long as commander-in- Revolutionary Army, the Fourth Army of the Northeast Anti-
chief and Ren Bishi as political commissar. Japanese Allied Army, the Fifth Army of the Northeast Anti-
Through the efforts of Zhu De, Ren Bishi, He Long and others, Japanese United Army, the Tangyuan Guerrilla Corps, etc. Later
and with the support of many of the officers and men of the these units became the main armed strength of the Northeast
Fourth Front Army, the Second and Fourth Front Armies finally Anti-Japanese United Army.
marched north together. On October 9, the staff of the Fourth The triumph of the Long March of the Workers’ and Peasants’
Front Army headquarters reached Huining County in Gansu to Red Army was the turning point for the Chinese revolution. 1 he
join forces with the First Front Army. On the 22nd the staff of officers and men of the Red Army maintained unswerving faith
the Second Front Army headquarters arrived at Jiangtaibu, north in the victory of the revolution. Eluding pursuit and breaking
of Jingning County, Gansu, where it too joined up with the First through blockades by large numbers of KMT troops, overcoming
Front Army. This marked the victorious completion of the Long the natural barriers of snow-capped mountains and the grass¬
March for the Second and Fourth Front Armies as well. lands, suffering cold, hunger, wounds and sickness, surmounting
 CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 191
190 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

the Japanese, have no desire to fight them and, furthermore, have

the crisis of the internal split in the Party and victoriously
h need to do so.”35 However, the deep penetration of the country
completing the Long March, all under conditions of extreme
hv a heavily armed enemy raised a nationwide wave of resistance
hardship, they demonstrated amazing stamina, courage and re¬
to the invaders, going against the will of Chiang Kai-shek s
sourcefulness. The legendary stories of the Long March, which
have circulated both in China and abroad, show that the Com¬ Kuomintang.
munist Party of China and the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’
Red Army were invincible. Before the KMT’s filth “encirclement The North China Incident and the December 9th Movement
and suppression” campaign, the Red Army had grown to 300,000
Shortly before the Red Army, marching north under the
men. Because of the errors made by the Party leadership, the
leadership of the Central Committee of the CPC, reached the
revolution suffered a grave setback, and when the three main
Shaanxi-Gansu Border Region, the Japanese militarists took ad¬
forces of the Red Army joined together at the end of the Long
vantage of the KMT’s policy of non-resistance to intensify their
March they numbered less than 30,000. However, these troops,
efforts to take north China. Their first step was to use the June
which were what remained after rigorous testing, were the cream
1935 He-Umezu Agreement (an agreement between the KM1
of the Communist Party and of the Red Army, and they were to
commanding officer in Beiping, He Yingqin and the commander
become the core force in the War of Resistance Against Japan
of the Japanese troops stationed in north China, Yoshijiro Ume
and the People’s War of Liberation. During the Long March they
zu) to force the KMT Central Army to evacuate Beiping, Tianjin
had spread the seeds of revolution everywhere along the way. Just
and Hebei Province. The second step was to instigate the auton¬
as the flames of war with Japan were about to ignite across the
omy” movement in the five provinces of north China (Hebei,
country, the three Red Army contingents joined forces in north¬
Chahar, Shanxi, Shandong and Suiyuan). In October the director
ern Shaanxi, not far from the anti-Japanese battlefront. The
of the Japanese secret service in Shenyang, Kenji Dohihara, in
historic importance of the victory of the Long March cannot be
the name of the Japanese Kwantung Army that had occupied the
overestimated. city, made several demands of Song Zheyuan, commander of the
29th Army, which was garrisoned in Beiping, Tianjin, Hebei and
Chahar. These included that he announce the establishment of a
VI. THE PARTY’S STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH North China Autonomous Government in an open telegram and
AN ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL dismiss all the north China officials appointed by Nanjmg^On
November 6 Kenji Dohihara even insolently ordered Song Zhe-
UNITED FRONT yuan to announce autonomy before November 20 or the Japanese
would send five divisions to take Hebei and six to take Shandong.
After the September 18th Incident of 1931, the Japanese The Japanese army then began shifting large masses of troops to
invaders incessantly attacked in an effort to occupy the whole of north China. At the instigation of the Japanese secret service, Yin
China exclusively. The KMT authorities, while devoting all their Rugeng, the supervisory commissioner of the KM 1 government s
strength to “encircling and suppressing” the Workers’ and Peas¬ Jimi Prefecture in Hebei Province, set up a separatist regime
ants’ Red Army on the Long March, steadily retreated before the
consisting of 22 counties in eastern Hebei and established the
Japanese. In February 1935 Chiang Kai-shek, speaking to a Eastern Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Administration in
Japanese reporter, said, “China and Japan need to cooperate with Tongxian County on the outskirts of Beiping. In December the
each other.... The Chinese people have taken no action to fight
 193
192 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter three the agrarian revolution

KMT established the Hebei-Chahar Political Council in Beiping forty students were injured. The next day, the student body of
with Song Zheyuan as chairman, imposing a special administra¬ every school in Beiping boycotted classes en masse.
tion in north China. Dark clouds gathered over the skies of The storm quickly swept the whole country. Beginning on
Beiping and Tianjin, and all of north China was in imminent December 11, student gatherings and demonstrations took place
danger. in Tianjin, Baoding, Taiyuan, Hangzhou, Shanghai, Wuhan,
The reaction of the people in north China was naturally Chengdu, Chongqing, Quangzhou and other large and medium¬
intense, particularly among the students, who were closely follow¬ sized cities. Factory workers in many areas went on strike. 1 a-
ing the development of the political situation. Beiping students triotic societies and individuals in Shanghai and other places
shouted with grief and indignation, “North China is vast, but established national salvation committees, sent open telegrams
there is no room in it now for quiet study!” At a time when almost and launched publications calling for an end to the civil war and
all the Party organizations in the KMT area had been destroyed, for the despatch of soldiers to fight the Japanese. Late in Decem¬
one provincial Party committee in Hebei survived and over thirty ber the Students’ Union of Beiping, under the leadership of the
Party members no longer connected with an organization re¬ Party, organized a propaganda team for the area south of
mained in Beiping. In late spring and early summer of 1935, Li and Tianjin. This team went out into the countryside ol Hebei
Changqing, a special representative from the Hebei Provincial Province to spread anti-Japanese propaganda, thus joining in
Party Committee went to Beiping to establish a CCP Interim solidarity with the workers and peasants. The propaganda team
Work Committee there. The committee, composed of Peng Tao was expanded into the Chinese National Liberation Vanguard
and others, appointed Zhou Xiaozhou to take charge of the work Corps. The students of Shanghai, Wuhan, Jinan and other cities
of the Beiping branch of the Chinese National Armed Self- also went to the countryside to spread the word. Some prolessors
defence Council. With the people’s anti-Japanese sentiment grow¬ and scholars who had formerly been unwilling to participate in
ing stronger every day, students in Beiping, led by the CPC political activities wrote articles supporting resistance to the
Interim Work Committee and organized and directed by Huang Japanese and nationwide cooperation. The struggle against the
Japanese and for national salvation grew into a turbulent nation¬
Jing, Yao Yilin, Guo Mingqiu and other Party members, raised
a cry of protest in a demonstration held on December 9. Students wide mass movement. _
The December 9th Movement, as it came to be called, not only
of Qinghua, Yanjing and other universities in the suburbs started
marching downtown but were blocked by military police, and a raised the people’s awareness of the crisis lacing the nation but
conflict broke out at Xizhimen Gate at the northwest corner of demonstrated to them their own strength. It showed that only by
the city wall. At Xinhuamen, in the centre of town, one or two uniting all forces within the country could the Japanese invasion
be defeated, and it increased the people’s determination to light
thousand students broke through the military police lines, shout¬
ing, “Down with imperialism!” “Stop the civil war!” “Unite to save China. . o1
These events demonstrated that in the winter of 1935 the political
against the enemy!” and other slogans as they tried to present a
petition to the government. Because they got no response, they situation in China was on the eve of a great change. The KMT was
began a protest march. By the time the procession reached Wang- neither willing nor able to lead the anti-Japanese forces among the
fujing Street, the crowd had increased to 3,000. The military people; instead, it stood in their way. The KM 1 with its many
police suddenly turned a water cannon on the demonstrators and internal factions all jockeying for supremacy, which often led to
charged them from both sides, brandishing whips, gunstocks and large-scale internecine strife, was also incapable of effecting nation
billyclubs. The demonstrators were dispersed, and more than wide unity. Under the KMT, the feudal land relations had not
 194
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 195

changed one iota. Since it could not alter China’s semi-colonial

Shortly after the Red Army finished its 12,500-km Long
semi-feudal status, it could not turn China into a capitalist country!
March to northern Shaanxi and gained a firm foothold there, an
At this time China’s heavy industry was negligible. In 1933 total
enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau was held at Wayaobu
output of steel was only 35,000 tons, and the most developed light
from December 17 to 25 to discuss military strategy, the political
industry was cotton textiles. However, between 1927 and 1936, the
situation in China and the Party’s tactical line. At this meeting,
number of spindles owned by foreign capital increased from 42.9
Mao Zedong asserted that the strategic principle should be to
percent of the total to 46.2 percent, while the share held by capital
wage a resolute national revolutionary war, first of all subordi¬
of the national bourgeoisie dropped from 57.1 percent to 53.8.
nating the civil war to the national war and the entire war effort
During the same period, the share of looms owned by foreign capital
to the fight against the Japanese invaders. He believed that
increased from 54.8 percent to 58.1, with a corresponding drop from China’s national bourgeoisie had a dual nature and could be won
45.2 percent to 41.9 in the share owned by capital of the national
over. The Political Bureau adopted the Central Committee’s
bourgeoisie. When the KMT authorities began to take over politi¬
“Resolution on the Present Political Situation and the Tasks of
cal power throughout the country, the middle class expected they the Party,” drafted by Zhang Wentian. This resolution staled in
would develop China’s capitalist economy, but instead they brought part:
the country to the brink of national subjugation. The mission of “Changes have taken place or are taking place in the relations
ringing together the various forces calling for resistance to Japan between all classes, strata, political parties and armed forces in
and organizing an anti-Japanese national united front fell to the China’s political life.... Therefore, the Party’s tactical line is to
Communist Party. Whether the Party could carry out this mission arouse, unite and organize the revolutionary forces throughout
would determine whether it could introduce the next stage of the the country and among all the nationalities to oppose the chief
Chinese revolution.
enemy confronting them, namely, Japanese imperialism and the
arch-traitor Chiang Kai-shek.”36 It added that the main danger
The Wayaobu Meeting within the Party was “closed-doorism.”
Two days later, at a meeting of Party activists, Mao Zedong
On July 25, 1935, the Communist International held its Sev¬ made a report in the spirit of the Wayaobu meeting. In a report
enth Congress. At this meeting General Secretary Georgi Dirni- entitled “On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism,” he began by
-fru’ t renownecl Bulgarian activist, delivered a report entitled asking, “What is the present situation?” and answering, “Its main
1 he Tascist Attack and the Communist International’s Task for characteristic is that Japanese imperialism wants to turn China
the Unity of the Working Class in Its Anti-fascist Struggle,” in into a colony.”37 “This,” he said, “faces all classes and political
which he raised for the worldwide communist movement' the groups in China with the question of what to do.”38 Mao pointed
question of creating a united front to combat fascism. On August out that the workers and peasants were all demanding resistance,
1 the CPC delegation to the Communist International drafted as was the petty bourgeoisie, and that even the attitude of the
An Appeal to All Fellow-Countrymen for Resistance Against national bourgeoisie was likely to change in the new circum¬
Japan and lor National Salvation” in the name of the Chinese stances. “When the national crisis reaches a crucial point,” he
Soviet Central Government and the CPC Central Committee added, “splits will occur in the Kuomintang camp.”39 Summing
Soon afterwards this document was publicly promulgated and up the question of class relations, he said, “The basic change in
became commonly known as the “August 1st Declaration ” the situation, namely, the Japanese invasion of China south of the
Great Wall, has changed the relationship among the various
 197
chapter THREE the agrarian revolution
196 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
hv the KMT authorities, was flagging. After arriving m Tianjin,
classes in China, strengthening the camp of national revolution Liu Shaoqi began publishing articles in the spirit of the Wayaobu
and weakening that of counter-revolution.”40 Therefore, the Par¬ meeting with such titles as “Eliminating ‘Closed-doorism and
ty’s basic tactical task was to form a broad revolutionary national Adventurism,” systematically explaining the Party s line and
united front. Rejecting the closed-door tactics advocated by policies. He emphasized the need to expand the revolutionary
some, he declared, “In order to attack the forces of the counter¬ Ces in preparation for a decisive battle, as well as the need to
revolution, what the revolutionary forces need today is to organ¬ build long-term relations with the masses. This last would enable
ize millions upon millions of the masses and move a mighty the Party to carry out intensive propaganda work, consolidate and
revolutionary army into action.”41 enlarge the anti-Japanese national united front, increase its own
The Wayaobu meeting was one of the most important held in strength and improve its position. Referring to the problems
the turbulent period between the Second Revolutionary Civil relating to the Beiping and Tianjin students movement, he called
War and the War of Resistance Against Japan. It showed that the for a correct implementation of the united front policy in han¬
Party, having overcome the “Left” adventurism and “closed- dling relations with the teachers and school officials as well as
doorism” that had dominated the thinking of the leadership in the with the 29th Army and General Song Zheyuan, encouraging
period before the Long March, had lost no time in formulating them to move in the right direction. Liu worked hard to rebuild
the policy of a national united front against Japan, thus gaining and strengthen Party organizations in north China which had
the political initiative in the period to come. It also showed that been seriously damaged, opening a new chapter in their work
the Party had matured through the lessons it had learned from The Central Committee of the CPC and its delegation to the
its victories and defeats, and that it was capable of adapting to a Communist International sent Feng Xuefeng and Pan Hanman
new situation and creatively carrying out its work. to Shanghai to reestablish connections with Party organizations
After the Wayaobu meeting, the troops of the First Front there that had lost contact with the Central Committee and to
Army, called the “Anti-Japanese Vanguard Corps of the Chinese expand united front work. In May 1936 a number of patriots,
People’s Red Army,” prepared to march east to directly engage including Soong Ching Ling, Shen Junru, Zou Taolen, Tao Xing-
the Japanese army in battle. Their purpose was to expand the base zhi and Zhang Naiqi, announced in Shanghai the establishment
areas and the anti-Japanese armed forces. Led by Mao Zedong of the All-China Federation of All Circles for Resisting Japan
and Peng Dehuai, they crossed the Yellow River in northern and Saving the Nation, which called for cessation ot the civil war
Shaanxi and entered Shanxi, beginning the Eastern Expedition and united opposition to the Japanese. One after another, anti-
campaign. Meanwhile, practical measures were taken to strength¬ Japanese national salvation associations in Shanghai, Nanjing,
en the united front. The work was done between two groups, the Beiping and many other cities joined the new federation. Later,
general civilian population and the high-ranking KMT military the All-China Students’ Federation was founded, giving further
officers. impetus to the nationwide patriotic movement of youth working
First, the Party did all it could to foster the anti-Japanese
to save the nation. , •
national salvation movement, which had begun to grow after the Second, the Party did everything possible to persuade senior
December 9th students’ movement. In the spring of 1936, the KMT officials and army generals to support the anti-Japanese
Central Committee of the CPC sent Liu Shaoqi to Tianjin to serve national salvation movement. Mao Zedong and Zhou
as secretary of the Party’s Northern Bureau and strengthen Party many letters to them. In the case of the KM f s Northeastern
leadership of the national salvation movement there. This move¬ Army headed by Zhang Xueliang, this work was notably success-
ment of the students of Beiping and Tianjin, severely suppressed
 199
198 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter three the agrarian revolution

nti-Japanese national salvation movement. It reported directly

ful. The majority of the officers and men of the Northeastern
an h Northern Bureau and was kept strictly separate from t
Army, already appalled to see their hometowns fall into enemy
Party’s^nderground Shanxi Interim Provincial Committee, with
hands and eager to return there to fight, had no wish to combat
, . v, it had no horizontal connections.
the Red Army, which supported resistance to the Japanese. Their
WhAt this time there was an important anti-Japanese gr°uP in
attitude had an effect on Zhang Xueliang and the senior officers.
Qhfnxi called the “League of Self-Sacrifice for National Salva¬
Progressives who were born in northeast China, such as Du
tion ” or the “Self-Sacrifice League” for short. Because ot opposi
Zhongyuan and others, also did a great deal of work to convince
■ from the KMT authorities, within a month after the found-
Zhang Xueliang. The CPC Central Committee twice sent Li
Xof the orgfnTzaUon. it essentially ceased to function In the
Kenong, chief of the Liaison Bureau, to talk with Zhang about
first half of November, however, after he arnved in Shanxi, Bo
cooperating to resist the invaders. On the evening of April 9,
1936, Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang had a secret meeting in a Yibo took over as secretary of the League and assumed resP°n^
church in Yan’an. They agreed on the need to stop the civil war bility for its activities. After that, the League evo ve in
anti-Japanese national united front organization under he lead
and work together in the resistance, exchanged ideas on a number
ershin of the CPC. The organization spread from Taiyuan to
of issues and finally reached an agreement. The Party’s efforts to
every county in the province, and with its encouragement the
achieve a united front were also effective with Yang Hucheng,
national salvation movement flourished throughout Shanxi. In
who, as commander-in-chief of the KMT’s Seventeenth Route
"he early months of 1937, the CPC Shanx, Working Committee
Army and head of the Pacification Headquarters in Xi’an, was
began to train military and government cadres with a view to
the leader of those who were in actual control of Shaanxi Prov¬
ince. Yang was in favour of resistance to Japan, had certain other building a revolutionary armed force in the province.
progressive ideas and was friendly with some members of the
CPC. The Central Committee sent a succession of people to see The Approach of KMT-CPC Cooperation
him, including Wang Feng and Wang Shiying, and concluded a
The attitude of Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Executive
preliminary agreement of cooperation with him. In this way, by
the summer of 1936 hostilities between the Red Army and Committee of the KMT towards resistance to Japan began to
Change after the North China Incident. Under ,he . usion that
the Northeastern and Seventeenth Route Armies had virtually
ceased. This was the first major victory of the Party’s united front the problems between the two countries could t*^before the
policy in northwest China. dinlomacv Chiang had backed down time after time before the
A similar victory was achieved in Shanxi. In October 1936 the Japanese But the illusion was destroyed as the invaders steadily
pressed on When the North China Incident took place, direcUy
Northern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee sent Bo Yibo
and four other Party members (later increased to a total of 16) threatening the very existence of the Nanjing government, the
Kuomlntang1 had no choice but to consider changing its policy
to Taiyuan, in response to an invitation from Yan Xishan. Yan,
who was the leader of those who were in actual control of Shanxi
t°'c)nNovember 19, 1935, the 5thNationalCongre^of the KMT
Province, had asked for the Party’s help in preparing for armed
resistance. The Northern Bureau decided to establish the CPC adopted a resolution proposed by Ch,ang Kai-shek. Chiang s
statement recommending this resolution contained a key sent
Shanxi Working Committee, with Bo Yibo as secretary. This
committee was set up especially to direct overt, legal activities, ence- “While there is still some hope of peace, we must under no
circumstances' give up on peace, and while the time for self-
carrying out high-level united front work and developing the
 201
200 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter three the agrarian revolution

sacrifice is not yet at hand, we must not speak lightly of self-

sacrifice.” This sentence implied that when the time was at hand, JaP2anA government of national defence and a united anti-
there would be no choice but to “give up on peace” and resolutely
face “self-sacrifice.” In January of the following year Japan’s
foreign minister, Hirotake Hirota, announced three principles,
’TV'S S forces 5 ffSU «,™*™ «
hould be allowed to concentrate without delay in Hebei, so that
which, among other demands, called for “coordination of the thev can first of all resist the advance of the Japanese invader .
economies of China, Japan and Manchuria.” This meant recogni¬ 4 All political prisoners should be released, and the people
tion of Manchukuo, which Chiang found it hard to accept. Later
he wrote, “The situation of the time was very clear: if we rejected *—* »«■-
his principles it would mean war, and if wc acceded to his nalaffairsand the «;onomy.” back t0 Nanjing.
demands it would mean extinction.”42 The voracious appetite of
the Japanese militarists left Chiang Kai-shek less and less room iS- the KMT and the CPC which had
to manoeuvre. Faced with this situation, at the end of 1935 the been broken off more than eight years earlier, had been reestab
Nanjing government began to look for a way out, asking for
assistance from the Soviet Union and even seeking ways to make '^'rtfshow their sincerity, the entire Anti-Japanese Vanguard
contact with the Communist Party of China. Chiang later ex¬ Corns of the Chinese People’s Red Army, which had crossed the
plained his policy this way: “War between China and Japan was Yellow River from Shaanxi into Shanxi, crossed back and sent an
now inevitable and, while the National Government was negotiat¬ open telegram to the Nanjing government. ln_,this ,tele.®”
ing with the Soviet Union, it was also looking for ways to solve P abandoned its anti-Chiang Kai-shek stand and called upon
the problem of the Chinese Communist Party.”43 the KMT to enter into peace negotiations to stop thet civd war: a d
After this, the KMT and the CPC made secret contacts to ioin the CPC in fighting Japan. On August 25 the CPC Centra
through a variety of channels. With the help of Soong Ching Ling, Committee sent an open letter to the Kuomintang t
the leadership of the KMT sought out Dong Jianwu, a Protestant the current peril facing the whole nation had been brought about
minister and a Communist Party member. On February 27, 1936, by the wron" P°licy pursued by the KMT a policy that must be
Dong secretly made a trip to Wayaobu to see Bo Gu, carrying the radically changed. In the letter the CPC declared.
message that the KMT authorities wanted to negotiate with the “We are ready to form with you a solid, revolutionary, united
CPC Central Committee. On March 4 Zhang Wentian, Mao front like the one against imperialist a"d feudal oppression ha
Zedong and Peng Dehuai, who were at the front lines in Shanxi existed during the great revolutionary period of 1925 2/, tor tnat
at the time, sent a telegram to Dong Jianwu through Bo Gu ^the onN way today to save the nation from subjugation and
expressing the Party’s eagerness to negotiate. “We enthusiastically ensure ^survival.... Only if the Kuommtang and the Chinese
welcome this wise and sensible gesture from the Nanjing author¬ Communist Party once again work together and cooperate with
ities,” they said, “and wc should like to begin concrete, practical every11political party, group and sector across the country will it
negotiations with them in order to bring together all forces in the be possible to save the country and ensure its survival.
country to resist Japan and save the nation.” In addition, they b On September 1 the CPC Central Committee issued an internal
made five concrete demands:
1. All civil war should stop and there should be no distinction dir^%Tetp:n^mperialists continuing their attack and the
between Red and White troops in the armed forces: all must resist national revolutionary movement growing across the country.
 202 A CONCISE HISTORY OF TIIE CPC chapter three the agrarian revolution 203

is possible that Chiang Kai-shek’s entire army, or at least the this movement came the Xi’an Incident.
greater part, may join in resisting Japan. Our general policy
should be to force Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan.... We are now The Peaceful Resolution of the Xi’an Incident
informing [the KMT] that to facilitate negotiations, the CPC
Central Committee is prepared to send representatives imme¬ The KMT general Zhang Xueliang had on many occasions
diately or to receive representatives from the Kuomintang and strongly urged Chiang Kai-shek to stop the civil war and join in
Chiang Kai-shek in the Soviet Area.” The Central Committee was the fight against Japanese aggression, but each time Chiang had
now considering the possibility of holding high-level negotiations refused. On December 4, 1936, he mustered the army of approx¬
with the KMT, perhaps sending Zhou Enlai as its representative. imately 30 divisions directly under his control and prepared to
The shift from opposing Chiang Kai-shek to forcing him to set out from Henan for Shaanxi and Gansu to “suppress the
resist Japan, made in accordance with the changing class relations Communists.” Chiang flew to the city of Xi’an in Shaanxi Prov¬
in the country, was an important change of policy for the Party. ince. There he ordered General Zhang Xueliang and General
But it did not prove easy to carry out the new policy. Chiang Yang Hucheng to lead all their troops to the front line in northern
was still committed to opposing the Communists. When he spoke Shaanxi to fight the Red Army. Zhang and Yang pleaded with
of “solving the problem of the Chinese Communist Party,” what him for several days on end, but he harshly rebuked them. On
he actually wanted was that the CPC should surrender to the the afternoon of December 7 Zhang went to Huaqingchi in
KMT and accept reorganization, meaning, in particular, that the Lintong County on the outskirts of Xi’an, where Chiang was
Party’s armed forces would have to be dissolved to “effect a staying, and tried once more to explain to him the gravity of the
solution by political means.” Naturally, this was impossible. He Japanese threat. The two men argued for two or three hours, until
therefore continued to seek such a solution by force. Thus, in Zhang was in tears. Finally Chiang pounded the table and shout¬
the autumn of 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek had settled ’the ed, “Even if you were to take a gun and shoot me dead, it
Guangdong-Guangxi Incident, he moved swiftly, concentrating wouldn’t change my policy of suppressing the Communists.”45
his troops in preparation tor a new attempt to suppress the This forced Zhang and Yang to the conclusion that the only way
revolutionary base area in northern Shaanxi.44 The steadily to convince him was to start a mutiny.
mounting tide of the anti-Japanese national salvation movement Before dawn on December 12, a contingent of the Northeastern
in the country was also causing Chiang great anxiety. In Shang¬ Army under Zhang’s command, acting on the plan worked out by
hai, on the night of November 22, the KMT government arrested Zhang and Yang, swiftly surrounded Huaqingchi and seized
seven leaders of the All-China Federation of All Circles for Chiang Kai-shek. Meanwhile, the KMT’s Seventeenth Route
Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation, Shen Junru, Zhang Army was moving to take control of the entire city of Xi’an, and
Naiqi, Zou Taofen, Li Gongpu, Sha Qianli, Wang Zaoshi and Shi had taken Chen Cheng, Wei Lihuang, Jiang Dingwen, Zhu Shao-
Liang, and took them to a jail in Suzhou. This created a stir for liang and other important KMT officers and officials into custo¬
a while, and the case became known as “the jailing of the seven dy. Zhang and Yang also sent an open telegram explaining the
patriotic leaders.” Shortly thereafter the KMT government arrest¬ reasons for the mutiny and making eight proposals, as follows:
ed the leaders of the Nanjing National Salvation Society, Sun 1. The Nanjing government should be reorganized to accom¬
Xiaocun and Cao Mengjun. These arrests aroused the indignation modate all parties and groups and make saving the nation their
of people from every sector across the country and provoked a common responsibility.
vast movement calling for the prisoners’ release. In the midst of 2. The civil war must stop altogether.
 205
204 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC cHAPTER THREE the agrarian revolution

hv all the people in the country, and especially by all parties,

3. The patriotic leaders imprisoned in Shanghai should be
immediately released. amuDS sectors and armies who were in favour of resistance. For
these reasons, the CPC Central Committee supported a peaceful
4. All political prisoners in the country should be released.
5. The ban on mass patriotic movements should be lifted. settlement of the Xi’an Incident.
When the KMT authorities in Nanjing understood that neither
6. All political rights including freedom of assembly and
association should be guaranteed. Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng nor the Communist Party
had any intention of harming Chiang Kai-shek and that they
7. Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Testament should be executed to the letter.
8. A national salvation meeting should be convened without wished to resolve the incident peacefully, they sent T.V. Soong
delay. and Soong Mei-ling to Xi’an on December 22 to negotiate. Zhou
This was the Xi’an Incident, which shook China and the rest Enlai participated in the negotiations with Zhang and Yang
of the world. After two days of discussion, Soong Mei-ling issued a series ot
Naturally, it came as a great shock to the Nanjing government. statements promising, among other things, that the KMT would
Among the authorities two views emerged as to how to handle the cease its suppression of the Communists, and that in three months
incident. Some supported sending a punitive expedition against it would launch a war of resistance against Japan. On the evening
Zhang and Yang, while others advocated negotiations to free of December 24, Zhou Enlai, accompanied by the two Soongs,
Chiang. He Yingqin, the pro-Japanese Minister of War, having went to see Chiang Kai-shek. Once again Chiang told Zhou to his
obtained authorization to conduct a troop transfer, mustered the face, “The suppression of Communists will stop, there will be an
East and West Column Armies in preparation for an assault on alliance with the Red Army to resist Japan....
Xi’an. In the meantime, Soong Mei-ling (Madame Chiang Kai- The next day Zhang Xueliang, without notitying Zhou Enlai,
shek], H. H. Rung, T.V. Soong and other relatives of Chiang who accompanied Chiang on a flight back to Nanjing. As soon as they
belonged to a faction aligned with Britain and the United States, arrived, Chiang placed Zhang under arrest. When the news
in spite of opposition from He Yingqin, worked to find a peaceful reached Xi’an, there was pandemonium, and once again the
resolution of the Xi’an Incident and to secure Chiang’s release. danger of civil war seemed imminent. In this most dillicuit
The Communist Party had no prior knowledge of the Xi’an situation, Zhou Enlai carefully set to work, preserving the peace¬
Incident. Immediately after Chiang’s arrest, Zhang Xueliang sent ful resolution of the incident at last.
a telegram to the CPC Central Committee asking for suggestions. After this the civil war basically ceased, and relations between
In response, the Central Committee despatched Zhou Enlai to the Communist Party and the Kuomintang developed rapidly.
Xi’an, where he arrived on December 17. The Central Committee The Xi’an Incident showed how intense the demand tor a united
completely approved of Zhang and Yang’s stand and of their resistance had become throughout the country, even within the
purpose in detaining Chiang. After careful analysis of the situa¬ ranks of the KMT. The CPC, instead of taking advantage of
tion, it came to the following conclusion. If Xi’an were put in a Chiang Kai-shek’s predicament, had done everything possible to
position antagonistic to Nanjing, it might prove extremely dan¬ see that the incident was settled peacefully, thus showing the
gerous for the Chinese nation, igniting a new, large-scale civil sincerity of its intentions to unite with the rest of the country to
war, which would be welcomed only by Japan and the pro- resist Japan. The Xi’an Incident took place just as the objective
Japanese faction. At present it was still possible to work for a conditions for renewed KMT-CPC cooperation were ripening,
peaceful solution, thus ending the civil war and creating condi¬ and its effect was to push those conditions to fruition. At a
tions for a unified effort to resist Japan. This would be welcomed meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee
 207
206 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter three the agrarian revolution

on December 27, 1936, Mao Zedong said, “The Xi’an Incident Making these four pledges meant yielding a great deal to the
was the key to the transformation of the KMT. If not for that KMT but it was a principled and necessary step. It was the on y
incident, the transformation might have taken longer, since a to stop the confrontation between the two political powers in
certain degree of compulsion was definitely needed to force the country and bring about their cooperation in the resistance
transformation upon it.... What put an end to the civil war after
ten years? It was the Xi’an incident.” ag WEen^he five demands and four pledges of the CPC became
In an effort to ensure that cooperation between the KMT and known they received widespread support, including support rom
CPC was actually carried out, on February 10, 1937, the CPC STfaction of the KMT that favoured resistance. At the 3rd
Central Committee sent a telegram to the Third Plenary Session Plenary Session of the 5th Central Executive Committee of the
of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT. In this telegram KMT it was proposed that the KMT should return to the Three
the CPC asked that the KMT make it the national policy to do Great Policies” of Sun Yat-sen: alliance with Russia, cooperation
the following: with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and
(1) end all civil wars and concentrate the country’s strength in workers The group calling for this move included not only Soong
a united effort to meet the foreign aggression; Ching Ling, He Xiangning and others who had always taken a
(2) guarantee freedom of speech, assembly and association, and revolutionary stand, together with Feng Ynxiang and others who
release all political prisoners; had vigorously supported resistance ever since the September
(3) call a conference of representatives of all political parties, 18th Incident, but also founding members of the Kuomintang
people of all walks of life and all armies, and concentrate the like Zhang Jingjiang, Li Shizeng, Sun Ke and Li Liejun This
nation’s talents in a common endeavour to save the country; broad spectrum of supporters reflected the great popularity the
(4) speedily complete all preparations for resisting Japan; and proposal had already achieved.
(5) improve the livelihood of the people. In January 1937 the leading organs of the CPC Central Com
If the KMT adopted this policy, the telegram said, the CPC mittee moved from Bao’an in northern Shaanxi to Yan an. In
would pledge the following: May the Party held a National Conference there (known then as
(1) the policy of armed insurrection to overthrow the National the Representative Conference of the Soviet Areas) which was
Government will be discontinued throughout the country; attended by representatives from the Soviet areas, the White areas
(2) the Workers’ and Peasants’ Democratic Government will and the Red Army. Mao Zedong gave a report entitled The
be renamed the Government of the Special Region of the Repub¬ Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resist-
lic of China and the Red Army will be redesignated as part of the ance to Japan” and a concluding speech entitled Win the Masses
National Revolutionary Army, and they will come under the in Their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front.
direction of the Central Government in Nanjing and its Military Afterwards, the representatives from the White areas held a
Council respectively; separate meeting. In July and August Mao Zedong eemred on
(3) a thoroughly democratic system based on universal suf¬ philosophy at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in
frage will be put into effect in the areas under the Government Yan’an and wrote his celebrated essays “On Practice and
of the Special Region; and Contradiction.” These two essays were written to counter the
(4) the policy of confiscating the land of the landlords will be dogmatism rampant in the Party at the time, but they are also
discontinued and the common programme of the anti-Japanese Marxist philosophical works of permanent importance.
national united front resolutely carried out.47 On various occasions the CPC sent Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying,
 209
CHAPTER THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION
208 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

nation and the foreign invaders and between the various classes
Lin Boqu, Bo Gu and others to Xi’an, Hangzhou, Lushan and
, home the Party was able to adopt correct policies that would
Nanjing to meet KMT leaders. Although there were ups and
preserve’the
major gains from the period of the agrarian revolu¬
downs in the development of the situation, the civil war had
already been stopped, high-level talks between the two parties had tion.
begun and the tide of history would irreversibly turn in favour
of a united resistance to the Japanese invasion.
During the ten years between the defeat of the Great Revolu¬ NOTES
tion and the eve of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the
Communist Party of China persisted in its struggle under condi¬ j Selecled Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed.. Foreign Languages Press, Beijing,
tions of extreme hardship, maturing politically along the way. Tcompl^'worll'of Lu Xun, Chin. ed„ The People’s Literature Publishing
During this period the CPC passed through two great trials — the
onhe^e^enly Meering of the CPC Central Committee on August
defeat of the Great Revolution and the defeat of the fifth counter¬
campaign against “encirclement and suppression.” These two
defeats greatly weakened the Party, bringing it to the very brink
of extinction. Some members, who were less determined, pan¬
icked and became utterly dejected, even defecting to reactionary
forces. Enemies both in China and abroad believed that the CPC
would be thoroughly defeated. The steadfast Party members, “suuggleTn Motmains"Selected Works of Mao Zedong,
however, consistently maintained their revolutionary optimism,
indomitable will and complete faith in the future, under condi¬
L'Scctton "eoneerning ihe Party's history and a semmar held to mark
tions of unimaginable peril and hardship. They kept their heads
and focused on the task at hand, surviving through the darkest “weSrt°he tgg^'MounlatW’ Se/ee,ed Works of Mao Zedong,
hours. Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1975, \ol. L p. 81.
This ten-year experience also demonstrated that the strength of 9. Ibid., p. 83.
the Chinese Communists came from combining the universal if -An Argument on the Building of the Red Army,” Documents of the Party,
truth of Marxism-Leninism with the specific practice of the
l?“bkectiv°e of 'thfcemral Committee to^ Fnmt Qmimlttee of the Fourth
Chinese revolution, from working closely with the great majority
of the people, seeking truth from facts, adhering to the mass line r&TSm 1&5Z Committee^of ti^L^Communis, Party to
the Front SmSee of the Fourth Army of the Red Army,” Setectea1 Works of
and maintaining the principle of independence. It demonstrated Zhou Enlai, Eng. ed„ Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1981, Vol. I, p. 45.
that any method that ignored realities, dogmatically copied the
experience of other countries, relied simply on subjective hopes 15. "AStogRSpark Can Start a Prairie Fire,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong,
Eng. cd., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1975, Vol. I. p. 123.
or prematurely sought quick result was doomed to fail. During
these ten years, although several times the Party leadership made n 'problems of war and Strategy/; Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed„
“Left” mistakes in thinking that resulted in serious setbacks for
the revolutionary cause, the Party finally corrected these mis¬ rf-tSS^h2sQSS^
takes. Thus, as the new period of war with Japan approached, tTLfuZuMtteCemZtolZ of Z Communis, Party of China,
despite the complexity of the contradictions between the Chinese Chm ed^rapdcd by the Central Archives, Publishing House of the Party
, 10 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter THREE THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 211

School of the CPC Central Committee, Beijing, 1990, Vol. V, p. 147. ii “The Strategic Principle now that the First and Fourth Front Armies Have
19. Zhou Enlai, “Message Before the Convocation of the First Congress of the inined Forces — A Decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee ol
Soviet Regime in China,” Die Rote Fahne, organ of the Communist Party of fhe Communist Party of China,” June 28, 1935, Selected Documents of the Central
Germany, April 27, 1930. y Committee of the Communist Party of China, Chin, ed compiled by the Cen ral
20. The Chinese Eastern Railway Incident was one of a series of anti-Soviet Archives Publishing House of the Party School of the CPC Central Committee,
incidents created by the Kuomintang after 1927. The railway, in northeast China Roiiine 1991, Vol. X, p. 516.
had been built by the Russians after the Qing Dynasty government concluded a 35. Interview with a reporter for the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shinbun on
secret pact with Czarist Russia in 1896. It had been operated by Russia until 1924
U ??wel agrcement had brought it under joint management. On July 36bSelected Wolks of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing,
10 1929 the KM 1 government unilaterally tore up the agreement, took over the
1975, Vol. I, p- 277, note 3.
railway by force and expelled the Soviet personnel. A week later the Soviet Union
37. Ibid., p. 153.
severed diplomatic relations with the KMT government. In October Chiane
38. Ibid., p. 154.
Kai-shek ordered 80,000 men of the Northeastern Army to march to Suifenhe in 39. Ibid., p. 157.
Heilongjiang Province on the Sino-Soviet border and launch an attack on the
40. Ibid., p. 159.
Soviet Union. The attack was repulsed by Soviet troops.
Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed.. Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 41 ChiangKai-shek, Soviet Russia in China -A Brief Account of Thirty Y ears’
1975, Vol. I, pp. 179-254. Relations Between China and Communist Russia, Chin, ed., Taipei, 1981, p.
22. Beijing was known as Bciping between 1928 and October 1949
23. Republic Daily, September 27, 1931. 44 In June 1936 Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi, warlords of Guangxi and Chen
24. "Oppose Japan’s Occupation of Manchuria,” The Communist International’s Jit'ang, warlord of Guangdong, jointly declared their opposition to Chiang Kai-
Documents Concerning the Chinese Revolution (1929-1936), Chin ed China shek on pretext of “resisting Japan and saving the nation.” In August, however,
Social Sciences Publishing House, Beijing, 1982, Vol. II, p. 167. their opposition melted away before Chiang Kai-shek’s bribery and his divide
25. The Central Committee’s Resolution on Winning Victory First in One or
and rule” tactics. . _ . . n , ,
More Provinces ” adopted on January 9, 1932, Selected Documents of the Central 45. Shen Bochun, The Story of the Xi’an Incident, Chin, ed., The Peoples
Committee of the Communist Party of China, Chin, ed., compiled by the Central Publishing House, Beijing, 1979, p. 105. , r 7,
Archives, Publishing House of the Parly School of the CPC Central Committee 46 “Three Telegrams Relating to the Xi’an Incident, Selected Works of Zhou
Beijing, 1991, Vol. VIII, p. 41.
Enlai, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1981, Vol. I P: 89.
26. "The Party’s Urgent Tasks Resulting from the Success of the Workers’ and 47. Reproduced in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed., Beijing, 1975, Vol.
Peasants Red Army in Its Third Counter-Campaign Against “Encirclement and I, pp. 281-282.
Suppression and from the Gradual Ripening of the Revolutionary Crisis,”
September 20, 1931, Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Com¬
munist Party of China, Chin, ed., compiled by the Central Archives, Publishing
House of the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, Beijing, 1991 Vol VII
p. 406.
27. Ibid., p. 415.
28. Selected Works of Zhang Went/an, Chin, ed., The People’s Publishing House
Beijing, 1985, pp. 7-8, 12-13.
29. Soong C'hing Ling, “The Kuomintang Is No Longer a Political Power,” The
Struggle for New China, Eng. ed.. Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1952 p 30
30. “On New Democracy,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed , Foreign
Languages Press, Beijing, 1975, Vol. II, p. 372.
31. The A-B (Anti-Bolshevik) Group was a counter-revolutionary organization of
undercover KMT agents in the Red Areas.
]}■ “A Message of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to
Comrades on the Current Situation,” December 11, 1931, Selected Documents of
the Communist Party of China, Chin, ed., compiled by the Central Archives,
ToUo 1Swn,g^USC ?^the Party Sch(X)| of lhe CPC Central Committee, Beijing,
1991, Vol. VII, p. 547.
33. Liu Bochcng, “Reminiscence of the Long March,” Recollections of the Lone
March, Chin, ed., lhe People’s Publishing House, Beijing, 1985, p. 7.
 CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN 213

The Formal Establishment of an

Anti-Japanese National United Front

Tanan’s full-scale invasion brought the Chinese people face to

faCe with the grave peril of national extinction. The situation
CHAPTER FOUR Store them was clear: the only way for the country to survive
the crisis threatening its very existence was for the whole nation
THE MAINSTAY IN THE WAR OF to join together in a war of resistance. Every class and every
RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN political group must put aside its own interests m favour of the
interest of the nation as a whole, which was to resist the Japanese
aggressors. Otherwise, there would be no future for any oftherm
This was recognized both by the Communist Paity an >
I. THE LINE OF TOTAL RESISTANCE AND vast number of patriots throughout the country.
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROTRACTED WAR The day after the incident at the Marco Polo Bridge, the CPC
Central Committee issued a manifesto that was a call to arms:
On the night of July 7, 1937, near the Lugouqiao (Marco Polo “Beiping and Tianjin are in peril! North China is in peril. The
Bridge) southwest of Beiping, the Japanese aggressor troops, Chinese nation is in peril! A war of resistance by the whok nation
nominally conducting a military exercise, suddenly attacked the is the only way out.” The Central Committee called upon the
local contingent of the KMT’s 29th Army stationed there. The people of the whole country, the government and the armed
Chinese troops fought back, and thus began the War of Resistance forces to unite and build the national united front as a Great Wall
Against Japan. of resistance to Japanese aggression.” It called upon the Kuomin-
The Japanese attack on the Marco Polo Bridge marked the tang and the Communist Party to “cooperate closely and resist
long-premeditated launching of all-out war on China. This war the§new attacks of the Japanese aggressors.” “The whole nation
was the largest imperialist invasion ever experienced by China. from top to bottom,” it said, “must at once abandon any idea
By the end of July the Japanese army had occupied Beiping of being able to live in submissive peace with the Japanese
and Tianjin. Three hundred thousand troops traveled along the aggressors.”2 _ _ , . .
Beiping-Suiyuan, Beiping-Hankou and Tianjin-Pukou rail lines, That same day Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai and other
expanding their attack on north China. On August 13 they turned leaders of the Red Army sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-sheK
their guns on Shanghai, hoping to fight a war of quick decision. saying that the officers and men of the Red Army wished to
Relying on their highly developed industry and superior military “engage the enemy to defend the country and save the nation.
might, the Japanese believed they were fully capable of forcing Next, Ye Jianying was sent to Xi’an, where he issued a statemen
China to surrender within a short time and with little cost to on July 14 on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPU Ihe
themselves. In the “Outline Guide to the Use of Armed Force in statement, addressed to the Nanjing government, carried the
North China in the War on China,” drawn up by the headquarters following message: “Desiring to resist the enemy vigorously un¬
of the general staff of the Japanese army, two months were der the command of Chiang Kai-shek, the main force of the Red
allotted for “mopping up” the KMT’s 29th Army and three Army is preparing to set out as soon as possible to resist the
months for defeating its Central Army.1 Japanese. All armies have been ordered to complete preparations

212
 CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN 215
214 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE C1>C

within ten days and await orders to move to the Beiping-Suiyuan Shanghai was an even more direct threat to the heartland of the
defence line.” On July 15 Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu and Lin KMT’s ruling clique and to the interests of Britain and the
United States in China. On August 14, under pressure of a flood
Boqu presented to Chiang Kai-shek an “Announcement of
Kuomintang-Communist Cooperation by the Central Committee of demands from all over the country to take up the war of
resistance, the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the National Govern¬
of the CPC.” In this announcement the Central Committee em¬
ment released a statement declaring, “Forced by the unrelenting
phasized the need for national unity: “As we all know, with our
invasion of Japan, China must now act in self-defence and resist
nation facing extreme peril today, it is only through internal
unity that we can defeat Japanese imperialist aggression.”4 The this violence.”
announcement set forth three basic objectives — to launch a The leaders of the KMT had been hoping that the Japanese
national war of resistance, to put democracy into effect, and to aggressors would stop before they went too far. The Japanese had
improve the lives of the people. It reaffirmed the Communist been urging them to join in “mutual defence against the Commu¬
Party’s four pledges for KMT-CPC cooperation.5 On July 17 the nists,” and the KMT leaders had been ready to succumb to their
representatives of the Central Committee held negotiations with wiles. However, the facts showed that the purpose of the Japanese
Chiang Kai-shek, Shao Lizi and Zhang Chong at a summer resort invasion was to take over the whole ol China. If that happened,
in the Lushan Mountains in Jiangxi. The CPC representatives it would be a death blow not only for the Chinese nation but for
proposed using the announcement as the political basis for coop¬ themselves. They had no choice but to change their tune and
eration between the two parties, and it was agreed that the accept the proposal of the CPC and other Chinese patriots that
document would be released through the Central News Agency they work together to resist Japan.
of the KMT. Chiang Kai-shek very much wanted the Red Army to move to
That same day, under pressure of the swelling nationwide the front, and during the KMT-CPC negotiations he began to
movement to resist Japan and of the CPC’s insistence on cooper¬ express his desire for unity and cooperation with the CPC, agree¬
ation, Chiang Kai-shek gave a speech calling for a united resist¬ ing not to send KMT personnel into the Red Army. In August of
ance. “Once war breaks out,” he said, “every person, young or old, 1937 the two sides agreed to redesignate the main force of the Red
in the north or in the south, must take up the responsibility of Army, currently in northern Shaanxi, as the Eighth Route Arm>
resisting Japan and defending our homeland and should be re¬ of the National Revolutionary Army, to set up liaison offices of
solved to sacrifice everything for the cause.” But Chiang still the Eighth Route Army in various cities in KMT-ruled areas and
cherished illusions of making peace with the Japanese and con¬ to publish the newspaper New China Daily. On August 22 the
tinued to view the attack at the Marco Polo Bridge as a “local Military Council of the National Government issued an order
incident.” Song Zheyuan, chairman of the Hebei-Chahar Govern¬ redesignating the Red Army as the Eighth Route Army of the
ment Administration Council, continued negotiations with the National Revolutionary Army. Three days later the Military
Japanese army in north China. On July 19 the Foreign Affairs Commission of the CPC Central Committee issued an order to
Ministry of the National Government proposed to the Japanese reorganize the Red Army as the Eighth Route Army of the
embassy that the two governments cease military operations and National Revolutionary Army, which consisted of the 115th,
return all troops to their former locations, then find a peaceful 120th and 129th Divisions.6 Zhu De was designated commander-
settlement through diplomacy. This proposal was rejected. The in-chief with Peng Dehuai as his deputy, Ye Jianying was named
occupation of Beiping and Tianjin shocked the entire country and chief of staff with Zuo Quan as his deputy and Ren Bishi became
made it difficult to continue any negotiation. The attack on director of the political department with Deng Xiaoping as his
 217
216
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter FOUR the war of resistance AGAINST JAPAN

deputy. Lin Biao was appointed commander and Nie Rongzhen rVat-sen 1 realized that without the keen support and cooperation
deputy commander of the 115th Division, which was made up Lf these classes, the mission of completing the national revolution
chiefly of the former First and Fifteenth Army Groups of the ronld not easily be carried out.... During the present crisis, all
First Front Army of the Red Army. He Long was appointed former differences should be forgotten. The whole nation must
commander and Xiao Ke deputy commander of the 120th Divi¬ ioin together in opposing Japanese aggression and fighting for the
sion, which was composed mainly of the former Second Front final victory.”7 The National Revolutionary League of China, led

Army; and Liu Bocheng was appointed commander and Xu hv Li Jishen and other high-ranking KMT officers and officials
Xiangqian deputy commander of the 129th Division, mainly who stood for resistance, had originally opposed Chiang. Now it
composed of the former Fourth Front Army. All these divisions, changed its position and supported him. The National Socialist
with a total of more than 45,000 men, were sent to join the KM T Party the Chinese Youth Party, the Chinese Vocational Educa¬
army in combating the enemy. In September of 1937 the Shaanxi- tion Society, the Rural Construction Party and others all indicat¬
Gansu-Ningxia Revolutionary Base Area was redesignated the ed their support for the resistance effort. Workers, peasants
Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Area Government. It included 23 intellectuals and other patriotic persons added to the flood of
counties with a total population of 1.5 million, and the CPC- anti-Japanese sentiment. Capitalists engaged in industry and com¬
Central Committee was located there. It can be seen that the merce also joined in the struggle, buying national salvation
second cooperation between the KMT and the CPC started with bonds, donating money and supplies to the front and organizing
the military. At the urging of the Communist Party, on Septem¬ factories and firms to move to the interior. In Singapore the
ber 22 the KMT Central News Agency published the “Announce¬ General Association of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia for
ment of Kuomintang-Communist Cooperation by the Central Aid to Refugees of the Motherland was established with Jan Kah
Committee of the Communist Party of China,” and the next day Kee as chairman, and branches were set up in various countries
Chiang Kai-shek made a statement recognizing the legality of the in Southeast Asia. Ethnic Chinese living in Europe, the United
Communist Party. The CPC’s announcement and Chiang’s state¬ States and other countries set up national salvation groups to
ment proclaimed the intention of the two parties to cooperate for spread anti-Japanese propaganda, collect money and materiel and
the second time and the formation of an anti-Japanese national organize young men to return to China and join the army. Mass
united front. The acceptance by the top leader of the KMT ot a participation in the resistance grew to a scale unprecedented in
second period of cooperation with the CPC and his agreement to modern Chinese history. The Japanese invaders suddenly discov¬
undertake a war of resistance against Japan represented a great ered they were facing a united front composed ot the entire
service to the people of the country. At this time the KMT was Chinese nation.
the ruling party and had at its disposal an army of two million
men. The shift in its policy made it possible to launch a total war The Conflict Between the Line of Total
of resistance. Resistance and the Line of Partial Resistance
The renewal of cooperation between the KMT and the CPC
was welcomed throughout the country. In November of 1937 the Because of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the situation
great patriot Soong Ching Ling issued a statement calling for at home and abroad was complex.
unity: Internationally, there were several forces with differing atti¬
“The Communist Party is a party which stands for the interests tudes towards the war. The Japanese imperialists intended to
of the working classes, both industrial and agricultural. Sun annex China and pretended to be preparing an attack on the
 218 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN 219

Soviet Union in an attempt to induce the anti-Soviet British and understand the situation. The Kuomintang was the ruling party
U.S. imperialists to make concessions to Japan. The German and and had an internationally recognized legitimate government as
Italian fascists supported Japan’s invasion of China. The Soviet well as an army of two million men. Accordingly, most of the
Union, although it explicitly supported China, considered the middle-of-the-roaders recognized the legitimacy of the Kuomin¬
Kuomintang to be the most important force in the country and tang and, though they resented its corruption and undemocratic
the main force in the resistance. On August 21, 1937, the govern¬ practices, pinned their hopes of resistance on it. Inside the Kuo¬
ment of the Soviet Union and the National Government of China mintang, some members were democratic advocates of resistance
signed a treaty of mutual non-aggression. After that, Soviet to Japan, others were hidden traitors and still others — the
national defence minister K.Y. Voroshilov declared that the majority, who had real power in their hands and worked in the
Soviet Union would never sit idly by as an indifferent observer interest of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie — belonged
of the war between China and Japan. The Soviet Union sent to to the pro-British, pro-American Chiang Kai-shek clique. The
China first military advisers and then a team of air force volun¬ members of this clique had a dual character. On the one hand,
teers. In addition, it provided the Chinese government with the country was under full-scale invasion and in danger of being
financial and materiel aid. As for Britain and the United Slates, subjugated. If they refused to resist, the people would not tolerate
they had a two-sided policy with regard to the China question. As them, and it would be impossible for them to remain in power.
Japan’s war of aggression encroached on their interests in China Furthermore, there were contradictions between them and Bri¬
and in the East as a whole, their conflicts with Japan increased. tain and the U.S., as well as contradictions between them and
At the same time, they were busy dealing with the tense situation Japan. For these reasons, they resisted Japanese aggression quite
in the West caused by Germany and Italy, and they feared the actively in the initial period of the war. On the other hand, they
rise of the Chinese revolutionary force. Thus, on the one hand continued to oppress the people, were reluctant to see them
they hoped that China would resist Japanese aggression and gave mobilized on a broad scale and hoped to win the war by relying
China some support; on the other hand, they appeased Japan and on international aid. They even tried to take advantage of the war
tried to alleviate their contradictions with that country by sacri¬ to eliminate, or at least weaken, the people’s revolutionary forces
ficing China’s sovereignty over some of its territory. They also led by the Communist Party. Throughout the war, the National
encouraged Japan to attack the Soviet Union, in the hope that Government was controlled solely by the Kuomintang and was
this would be to their benefit. not based on a national, democratic united front. It was because
In China, too, there were several forces with differing attitudes of this dual character of those in power in the Kuomintang that
towards the Japanese aggression. The people were firmly in even though the KMT and the Communist Party had agreed to
favour of resistance and determined to defend their motherland. cooperate in the War of Resistance, it was very difficult to
Faced with the threat of national subjugation, not only the consolidate and expand that cooperation.
workers, peasants and the urban petty and national bourgeoisie From the very beginning, the two parties had serious differ¬
but also some landlords, the enlightened gentry of the landlord ences over how to conduct the war, and they followed two
class in particular, favoured resistance to Japan and refused to be completely different lines.
slaves of a foreign power. Many of them, however, were at a loss The Kuomintang, representing the interests of the big land¬
how to resist and had no understanding of the Communist Party. lords and the big bourgeoisie, prosecuted the war only to the
The middle-of-the-roaders, who constituted the bulk of the popu¬ extent it judged necessary to hold on to its position in power after
lation, favoured the resistance, though they still did not fully the Japanese aggressors were defeated. Therefore, it pursued a
 chapter four the war of resistance against japan 221
220 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

line of partial resistance. That is to say, adhering to its one-party “Will the proletariat lead the bourgeoisie in the united front,
or the bourgeoisie the proletariat? Will the Kuomintang draw
dictatorship, it engaged only the government and its troops in the
over the Communist Party, or the Communist Party the Kuom¬
resistance, refused to carry out any fundamental reform that
would facilitate the war effort, denied the people democratic intang9 In relation to the current specific political task this
question means: Is the Kuomintang to be raised to the level of
freedoms and rights and refused to improve their living standards
the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the
so as to prevent them from taking part in the war and expanding
Nation to the level of the total resistance advocated by the
their strength. In its Programme for Resisting Japan and Rebuild¬
Communist Party? Or is the Communist Party to sink to the level
ing the Nation, adopted at a provisional national congress that
of the Kuomintang dictatorship of the landlords and bourgeoisie,
met from March 29 to April 1, 1938, the Kuomintang took a
positive attitude towards resistance, but it also imposed a number to the level of partial resistance?” He gave a straight answer to
this question: “The key to leading the anti-Japanese national
of restrictions on the development of the people’s movement.
On the other hand, the Communist Party, representing the revolutionary war to victory is to explain, apply and uphold
the principle of ‘independence and initiative within the united
fundamental interests of the Chinese nation, put forward a line
of total resistance. The Party maintained that China had the front’.”9 Events were to prove him correct.
strength to resist the aggression and would eventually triumph.
The ultimate source of that strength was the vast number of The Strategic Principle of Protracted War
people. Only by mobilizing and organizing the people could To mobilize and organize the people for an all-out war ot
China resist the powerful enemy. It was therefore necessary to resistance, the CPC had to formulate a strategic principle for the
introduce political and economic reforms nationwide, putting an war. Even before the Japanese attack on July 7, 1937, the CPC
end to the one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang, granting the Central Committee had predicted that the War ot Resistance
people full democratic rights to resist Japan and improving the would be long drawn out. At the meeting of Party activists held
living standards of the workers and peasants. Everything possible at Wayaobu in northern Shaanxi Province in December 1935,
had to be done to mobilize, organize and arm the people, so as to Mao Zedong had declared, “To defeat our enemies we must be
make the War of Resistance a true people’s war. The Ten-Point
prepared to fight a protracted war.” After the attack, at a meeting
Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation, adopted
on military affairs convened by the Nanjing National Govern¬
at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central ment in August 1937, the CPC representatives Zhou Enlai, Zhu
Committee held in Luochuan, in northern Shaanxi, August 22-25,
De and Ye Jianying stated that strategically, the nationwide War
1937, set forth this line of total resistance.8 of Resistance should be a long-term defensive war, but that
These two lines led to two different outcomes. If the Chinese
tactical offensives, or active defence, should be carried out within
people followed the line of total resistance, they would expel the
the strategic defensive. They also recommended that the war
invading Japanese imperialists and gain their freedom and liber¬
zones in north China increase their capacity to operate indepen¬
ation. But if they followed the line of partial resistance, they
dently for a long time to come by shifting from positional warfare
would never win the war, and China would remain occupied by
to mobile warfare. At the same time, they said, these zones should
Japan. mobilize the people on the flanks ol the enemy and in occupied
These two completely different lines inevitably gave rise to
conflicts throughout the War of Resistance. At the beginning of areas to engage in guerrilla warfare and to sabotage transport
the war, Mao Zedong made the basic contradiction clear: lines, in an effort to wipe out Japanese troops or pin them down.
 223
:HAPTER four the war of resistance against japan
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
222

However, these suggestions were not accepted by the leading body

of the Kuomintang. , . . .
r,Bssrisfss
It was not long before the Communist Party noted again, in its
Resolution on the Present Situation and the Tasks ot the Paity,
adopted at the Luochuan meeting, “It should be realized that the
war will be an arduous and protracted war.”10 How should such
a war be conducted? What tasks should the Red Army fulfil? At
ewiirtriistssis
, • the war to refute the prevailing ideas about its tuture

the same meeting, Mao Zedong declared that the basic tasks oi
the Red Army were as follows: to pursue independent guerrilla
Si'ESKSIKtSW
warfare, to undertake mobile warfare when conditions were fa¬
vourable, to establish anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy s Jclmmn ibU the W« of Resistance *«" S" ”K” wl,
rear, to pin down and wipe out enemy troops, to give strategic lone and that the final victory would be Chinas, lhe war
support to friendly armies and to preserve and expand its own between China and Japan,” he wrote, “is not just any war U is
ranks. The meeting decided that the strategic tasks ol the Red soecifically a war of life and death between semi-colonial and
Army were to freely carry out independent guerrilla warfare, semi-feudal China and imperialist Japan, fought m the Nineteen
mainly in mountainous areas in the enemy’s rear in support of Thirties In this war, China and Japan had four basic sets of
front-line battlefields, to open up new battlefields and to establish contrasting features. First, Japan was a powerful impertalts
anti-Japanese base areas behind the enemy lines. After the Luo¬ country while China was a weak semi-colonial and semi feudal
chuan meeting, Zhang Wentian, Peng Dehuai, Zhou Enlai and country' Second, Japan’s war of aggression was retrogressive
others published articles explaining both inside and outside the barbarous whereas China’s resistance was progressive and jus .
Party the principle of protracted war, in light ot the events since Third although it had great war capabilities, Japan was a com-
the Japanese attack of July 7. parafi'vely small country deficient tn manpower and in military,
Nevertheless, a great many people still believed either that Cnda and material resources, and it could not stand a long
China would be subjugated or that it would win a quick victory. W^r China on the contrary, was a big country with vast territory,
In the Kuomintang camp, some said, “China is inferior in arms rich resources, a large population and plenty of “^etS; and was
and is bound to lose. Continuing the war means subjugation.’ capable of sustaining a long war. Four*’ Jdp h chjna
Others said, “If we fight for just three months, the international meagre international support for its unjust war, whereas Ch
situation is bound to change. The Soviet Union will most prob¬ would find abundant support for its just resistance. Because of
ably send troops to China, and Britain and the United States may the;11first set of contrasting features, the Japanese invaders wou d
intervene in Shanghai.” Before the fall of Nanjing, Chiang Kai- run rampant for a time, and as Mao put it, China would not be
shek sent Stalin a telegram asking him to send troops as soon as able to oust the Japanese quickly” and would inevitably have a
possible In the Communist Party, meanwhile, some members hard stremh of road to travel.-’ Because of the other features
took the enemy lightly and held that China would achieve a quick however, China could not be subjugated and would win the find
victory by relying on the Kuomintang’s regular army of two
million men. Both Party members and non-Party members belit¬ V1Cln“On Protracted War” Mao predicted that for the Chinese,
tled the importance of guerrilla warfare and pinned their hopes the war would go through the three stages of strategic defensive,
for victory on regular warfare. But the course of the war during
 225
chapter four the war of resistance against japan-
224 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

unfolded, events were to prove that Mao’s analysis of the situa¬

strategic stalemate and strategic offensive. As far as the relative
tion had been sound and his predictions correct.
strength of the belligerents was concerned, in the three stages
China would inevitably move from inferiority to parity and then
to superiority, while Japan would inevitably move from superior¬
ity to parity and then to inferiority. The stage of strategic stale¬
II CARRYING OUT GUERRILLA WARFARE
mate would last quite a long time, and it would be the most trying BEHIND THE ENEMY LINES
period but also the pivotal one in the war as a whole. In this stage,
China’s form of fighting would be primarily guerrilla warfare The stage of strategic defensive in China’s War of Resistance
supplemented by mobile warfare. The fighting in this stage would Against Japan began with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on
be ruthless, but the guerrilla warfare would be successful. The Jalv 7 1957. and ended with the fall of Guangzhou and Wuhan
exponents of quick victory, Mao wrote, did not realize that war in October 1938. This stage had two major characteristics One
was a contest of strength and that before a certain change had was that the invading Japanese troops penetrated further into
taken place in the relative strength of the belligerents, there was China’s vast territory along separate routes and their °f ™sives
no basis for trying to fight strategically decisive battles. on front-line battlefields reached a peak. The other was that the
‘Whether China becomes an independent country or is reduced army of the Chinese people opened up new battlefields behind the
to a colony will be determined not by the retention or loss of the enemy lines and expanded rapidly. . ,
big cities in the first stage but by the extent to which the whole At this time the Japanese invaders directed their attack chiefly
nation exerts itself in the second. If we can persevere in the War against the Kuomintang. Both strategic!illy and “
of Resistance, in the united front and in the protracted war, naigns front-line battlefields were the mam battlefields lor re
China will in that stage gain the power to change from weakness sistLg the invasion. The Kuomintang was relatively eager to
to strength.’13 resist and had its troops wage the Beiping-Tianjin, Wusong
Mao emphasized that the army and the people were the foun¬ Shanghai. Northern Shanxi and Xuzhou campaigns and the ba
dation of victory and that the richest source of power to wage war tie to defend Wuhan. These troops won a victory in the Taier
lay in the masses. He made it clear that the only way to win the zhuang campaign in Shandong Province, frustrating the plan of
war with Japan was to mobilize and rely on them and make it a the Japanese imperialists to subjugate China in three months.
people’s war. Nevertheless, the situation on the front-line b^^ld^S Tas
In “On Protracted War” Mao set forth a programme for the unfavourable, because the enemy was strong whereas China was
Communist Party to follow as it led the people in the long War weak and because the Chiang Kai-shek clique followed the line
of partial resistance and implemented the principle of passive
of Resistance. He not only predicted that China would achieve
the final victory in that war but outlined the methods by which defence Even the great victory in the Tai’erzhuang campaign
failed to extricate the Chinese side from its passive potion in the
it could do so, constantly weakening the enemy and expanding its
war as a whole. Between July 1937 and October 1938, the Ja
own forces.
Written soon after the war began and at a time when many panese troops seized Beiping, Tianjin, Shanghai,
zhou and Wuhan and occupied a vast territory with a den
people could not foresee how it would proceed, “On Protracted
population, inflicting untold suffering upon the Chinese peopkn
War” presented a clear blueprint for the entire war and offered
For six weeks after they seized Nanjing he ^Ptta of the
answers to all kinds of questions about it. Few articles had been
Kuomintang government, on December 13, 1937, the Japanese
as convincing and inspiring as these lectures. And as the war
 CHATTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN 227
226 A CONCISF HISTORY OF THE CPC

Henushan its base. On September 22 some units of Japan’s Fifth

militarists carried out a shocking, bloody slaughter, shooting and
Division began to close in on Pingxingguan, a strategic P°‘n‘cl°f
burying alive more than 300,000 Chinese troops and civilians
. the Great Wall in northeastern Shanxi. The next day, Zhu De
there.
nnd Peng Dehuai sent a telegram to Lin Biao, commander of the
115th Division, ordering him to set out for the area between
The Eighth Route Army Marches to the Front Pingxingguan and Lingqiu County and launch flexible flank
attacks against the invaders. On September 25 a unit ol the 115th
After the Red Army was reorganized as the Eighth Route Army Division successfully carried out its first ambush wiping out
of the National Revolutionary Army in August 1937, it marched more than 1,000 troops of the 21st Brigade of the Itagaki Divi¬
to the front without delay. In order to exercise more effective sion destroying more than 100 Japanese vehicles and capturing
leadership over it, the Central Committee of the Communist Party a quantity of supplies and weapons. This was the first great
decided to establish a front-line military subcommission under the
victory of the Chinese army in the War of Resistance and it put
leadership of the Central Military Commission, with Zhu De as
an end to the myth that Japan’s Imperial Army was invincible. It
secretary and Peng Dehuai as his deputy. The Central Committee
enormously enhanced the confidence ol the army and the people
also set two strategic tasks for the Eighth Route Army. One was to
increased the prestige of the Communist Party and of the Eighth
support the Kuomintang troops in the front-line battlefields by
Route Army and convinced many people that the Communist
outflanking the Japanese troops invading Shanxi Province, so as to
Party was not only resolutely resisting the Japanese but also
check their advance and cover the retreat of friendly armies. The
capable of defeating them. After the Pingxingguan campaign, the
other was to seize all opportunities to penetrate the encmy-occupied
three divisions of the Eighth Route Army and the Kuomintang
areas and develop guerrilla warfare there.
troops fought together in the Xinkou campaign, which lasted over
Before the fall of Taiyuan early in November 1937, the Eighth
20 days. The Kuomintang and the Communist Party cooperated
Route Army mainly supported the Kuomintang troops in their
fairly well in this campaign, the fiercest and the largest ever
military operations, while dispatching a small number of its men
to mobilize and arm the masses. As a leader of the League of fought in north China. . , • •
After the fall of Taiyuan, in accordance with the decision
Self-Sacrifice for National Salvation in Shanxi Province, Bo Yibo
adopted at the Luochuan meeting of the CPC Central Committee
twice proposed to Yan Xishan, the warlord of Shanxi, that a new
in August 1937, the army under the leadership of the Party
army be organized there to expand the anti-Japanese armed
concentrated on penetrating the enemy’s rear areas to open up a
forces. Yan Xishan first approved the establishment of one regi¬
second battlefront and establish base areas there, so as to give
ment on a trial basis and later authorized Bo Yibo to organize
the Kuomintang armies strategic support. Thus two batllefronts
five brigades. The Shanxi New Army, also known as the Shanxi
emerged that supported each other in the War of Resistance: the
Youth Resistance “Daredevil” Corps, was a de facto revolution¬
front-line battlefront, for which the KM1 army was chiefly
ary army organized and led by the open Shanxi Working Com¬
responsible, and the battlefront behind enemy lines, for which the
mittee of the CPC. Later, the New Army expanded to 50 regi¬
ments under the leadership of the Party. This unit played an CPC army was chiefly responsible.
important role in the war by fighting in close cooperation with
the Eighth Route Army. Opening Up the Battlefront Behind Enemy Lines
In mid-September 1937, the 115th Division of the Eighth
Route Army marched to northeastern Shanxi and made Mount At this time something curious happened on the Shanxi front:
228 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CP(J 229
CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN

when the Japanese troops, taking advantage of their superior the landlords, were demanding that the invaders be repelled, so
forces, forged ahead, the Kuomintang armies staged one retreat there was a solid mass base for the resistance there. Moreover, the
after another, whereas the poorly equipped Eighth Route Army, hnsically self-sufficient economy in the occupied rural areas
in small groups, rapidly penetrated the enemy’s rear areas. nrovided favourable conditions for surviving the tight blockade
The policy of opening the batllefront behind enemy lines, imposed by the enemy. For these reasons, when the men ot the
adopted at the Luochuan meeting, was correct and essential. Eighth Route Army, tempered in the long revolutionary war
First, because the enemy was strong while the Chinese side was under the leadership of the Communist Party, moved into the
weak, the invading forces were able to seize vast areas in a very rear areas of the enemy, they were able to serve as the backbone
short period of time. If the Japanese troops were allowed to of the resistance, to mobilize and organize powerful people’s
remain in these areas undisturbed, they would make them their armed forces and to establish democratic anti-Japanese base
military bases and launch fiercer offensives elsewhere. Fighting areas. „ , ..
the enemy in his rear areas would make him lose some of his How should the Eighth Route Army fight the enemy once it
occupied territory, harass him and pin him down. It would pose had penetrated the occupied areas? The Communist Party formu¬
a serious threat to Japan, which had a shortage of troops. Second, lated the combat principle, “Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose
it would help mobilize and expand the people’s own anti-Japanese no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions.”14
forces. Having undergone the inhuman atrocities committed by This represented a major change in military strategy, a change
the Japanese aggressors who were burning, killing and plundering from the mobile warfare used in the later stage of the Agrarian
everywhere, the people in the occupied areas longed to avenge the Revolutionary War to guerrilla warfare, a form of fighting well
sufferings inflicted upon their families and on the motherland as suited to a weak nation resisting a powerful enemy.
a whole. However, as they were scattered, disorganized and To conduct guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines, the people’s
inexperienced in armed struggle, their spontaneous resistance was armed forces had to establish anti-Japanese base areas. Such
often short-lived. There was therefore an urgent need for a warfare had to be carried out without the support of the country’s
people’s army like the Eighth Route Army to penetrate behind general rear areas, so base areas must serve that function. It there
enemy lines and serve as a centre around which all anti-Japanese were no base areas behind enemy lines, it would be impossible to
forces could rally. Only by resisting the Japanese for a long time continue guerrilla warfare tor any length ol time. 1 here were two
could the people in the occupied areas enhance their understand¬ basic conditions for establishing and expanding base areas. 1) to
ing of the war, organize themselves effectively and gradually have armed forces and use them to organize the people to defeat
expand their forces. And only by waging a large-scale people’s enemy offensives, and 2) to mobilize the people for all the work
war in those areas could China win final victory. in the base areas, especially for the establishment and consolida¬
The conditions in occupied territory made it possible for the tion of democratic organs of political power.
Eighth Route Army to wage such a war. Having limited troops, In mid-November 1937 the three divisions of the Eighth Route
the Japanese could only lake control of cities and transport lines, Army and the Shanxi New Army began their strategic deploy¬
while in the vast countryside and small towns their rule was weak. ment in the occupied areas of Shanxi. In cooperation with the
In those places the original government organs of the Kuomin¬ local Party organizations, they organized working groups and
tang had collapsed because of the invasion, and anarchy pre¬ established battlefield mobilization committees and anti-Japanese
vailed. The masses in the occupied areas were determined to fight associations for national salvation in effect which exercised po¬
Japan. Except for a small number of traitors, all classes, including litical power.
 231
chapter FOUR the war of resistance against japan
230 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

cretary 0f both units and Chen Yi was named deputy secretary

After the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japan in
nf the subcommission. After the New Fourth Army was formed,
July 1937, many county magistrates in Shanxi Province fled or
the army units under the command of Chen Yi and Su Yu
were afraid to perform their duties. Taking advantage of the legal
marched into enemy-occupied territory to conduct guerrilla war¬
status of the League of Self-Sacrifice for National Salvation, Bo
Yibo and others sent a large number of cadres from the League fare and establish base areas.
For more than a year the Eighth Route Army and the New
and from the Shanxi New Army to replace them. Of the 105
Fourth Army successfully carried out guerrilla warfare mainly in
counties in Shanxi, 70 had Communists as their magistrates. Most
the mountains; then they gradually moved into the plains. By
of them were special representatives sent by the League. As a
October 1938 they had fought over 1,600 engagements with the
result, the League became an quasi-political organization. At a
Japanese troops, killing, wounding or capturing more than 54,000
meeting of representatives of the army, the government and the
of them As the people living under the occupation were eagei to
people of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hcbei Border Area, convened at
join the army to fight Japan, the Eighth Route Army expanded
Fuping in western Hebei on January 10, 1938, a Provisional
to over 156,000 men and the New Fourth Army to 25,000. In
Administrative Council of the Border Area was formed by dem¬
north China they established anti-Japanese base areas in Shanxi-
ocratic election.15 This was the first united front anti-Japanese
Chahar-Hebei, northwestern Shanxi, Daqing Mountain in Sui-
democratic government led by the Communist Party behind
yuan, Shanxi-Hebei-Henan, southwestern Shanxi, the Hebei-
enemy lines.
Shandong border and Shandong, and in central China they set up
In October 1937, when the Eighth Route Army was marching
bases in southern Jiangsu, central Anhui, eastern Henan and
to the front, the KMT and the CPC reached an agreement in
other places. Many people, including Chiang Kai-shek, had not
Nanjing on redesignating the Red Army units and guerrilla
expected that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army
forces that remained in the border areas of Hunan, Jiangxi,
could create such a situation behind enemy lines within so short
Fujian, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Hubei, Henan and Anhui prov¬
inces (not including the Qiongya Red Army Guerrillas in Guang¬ a period of time. ^ . ,
In the winter of 1938 the CPC Central Committee made
dong) as the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary
another strategic decision: it sent the three main forces of the
Army. In December the headquarters of the New Fourth Army
Eighth Route Army from the mountainous areas ot Shanxi
was established in Hankou, Hubei, and soon thereafter it was
Province to the plains of Hebei and Shandong. Late in November
moved first to Nanchang, Jiangxi, and then to Yansi in southern
the main force of the 129th Division entered southern Hebei, the
Anhui. Ye Ting was appointed commander and Xiang Ying
main force of the 120th Division penetrated into central Hebei
deputy commander of this army, which consisted of four detach¬
and the headquarters staff of the 115th Division led its 343th
ments. The first three detachments comprised the Red Army
Brigade to the Hebei-Shandong-Henan border area and Shandong
units and guerrilla forces in provinces south of the Yangtze River,
Province to establish new base areas in those places. This impor¬
while the fourth detachment was made up of the Hubei-Henan-
Anhui, southern Henan and northeastern Hubei Red Army units tant strategic action did a great deal to strengthen anti-Japanese
guerrilla warfare in the plains. The units of the New Fourth
and guerrilla forces north of the Yangtze. The New Fourth Army
Army also took advantage of the varied terrain of mountains,
had a total of 10,300 men. At the same time, the Southeast
Sub-Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the New Fourth rivers lakes and branching streams to carry out guerrilla warfare.
Army Subcommission of the Military Commission of the CPC All this created a new situation in the war behind enemy lines.
When the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army
Central Committee were established. Xiang Ying was appointed
 233
chapter four the war of resistance against JAPAN
232 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
nivision to the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border area in November
marched to the areas behind enemy lines, the Northeast Anti- it began to snow on Mount Wutai. However, the troops were
Japanese United Army led by the Communist Yang Jingyu, *9j, wearing unlined clothes and straw shoes and camping at
which had long been engaged in armed struggle against Japan in
ni^ht in ruined temples. In spite of all this, they finally game
northeast China, became more active than ever before. Its soldiers ?irm control of the ground. The key element that enabled them
of the Han, Manchu and Korean nationalities dealt heavy blows
m do so was the support of the local people. As Nie Rongzhen
to Japanese and puppet troops.
nut it “The people, once mobilized, became ‘mountains and seas
The strategic general rear area of the Eighth Route Army and
?o check the Japanese aggressors.”16 It would have^been ummag
the New Fourth Army was the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border
inable for them to persevere in guerrilla warfare let alone
Region. To consolidate the region, the government there, which
expand it in such a difficult environment if they had not been
was under the chairmanship of Lin Boqu, suppressed bandits and
an army of the people and had not formed the closest ties with
fought traitors, secret agents, reactionary landlords and despotic
gentry. The Central Committee of the CPC and the government
th<The guernha warfare led by the Communist Party developed
of the region, both based in Yan’an in northern Shaanxi, opened
rapidly8and pinned down a great number of enemy troops. This
a variety of schools that trained a large number of cadres in
was an important prerequisite for the war to pass from the stage
different disciplines. They included the Chinese People’s Anti-
of China’s strategic defensive to the stage of strategic stalemate.
Japanese Military and Political College, the Northern Shaanxi
College, an institution for training young cadres, the Lu Xun Art
Academy, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Party School Strengthening the Party’s Work in the Kuomintang Areas
of the Central Committee of the CPC, the School for Workers and
After the establishment of the anti-Japanese national united
Staff Members, the Women’s University of China and the Public-
front the Communist Party did much to improve its work in the
Health School. Tens of thousands of patriotic young people jour¬
areas’under the control of the Kuomintang. During the ten year
neyed to Yan’an from every corner of the country. After studying
civil war, CPC members, hounded and repressed by ^ Kuomm
and being tempered in practical work, many of them became
tana authorities, had found it very difficult to make direct
staunch revolutionaries determined to fight the Japanese. The
contacts with non-Party people. In the J
consolidation and development of the general rear area enabled
only a few people had a good understanding of the Communist
the CPC Central Committee to concentrate on commanding
Party, and many middle-of-the-roaders had doubts about j
military operations behind enemy lines and made it possible for
was no easy job to help people of all strata acquire a bett
the Party to unite with the people of the whole country in
understanding of the Party and to establish close ties with them.
resisting Japanese aggression.
After the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the
The guerrilla warfare carried out behind enemy lines by the
Eighth Route Army set up liaison offices in Nanjing, u an an
armies under the leadership of the CPC was one of the most
difficult undertakings in military history. Confronted by the other cities. In Hankou the Communist Party °Penly
its weekly magazine The Masses and its newspaper New China
powerful Japanese invaders, the poorly equipped Chinese troops
DaZ This was the first tune the Party had a newspaper and a
received no replenishment of guns or ammunition from their rear
periodical published in the Kuomintang area. When the people
areas. Encircled by the enemy, they created anti-Japanese base
there directly heard the voice of the Party, they responded
areas in remote areas with strikingly poor material conditions.
enthusiastically. In December 1937 the Changjiang (Yangtze)
For example, when Nie Rongzhen led some units of the 115th
 235
chaPTER four the war of resistance against JAPAN
234 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

„ those in the army) exceeded 67,000.

Bureau of the CPC Central Committee was set up in Wuhan, the
C‘Generally speaking, the work done by the Party in the Wuhan
centre of resistance in the Kuomintang area. The representatives
times was effective. It opened up a new situation, and this hac
of the Communist Party stayed in contact with members of the
Kuomintang and consulted with them on important issues in the far-reaching effects.
relatively cooperative atmosphere that existed for a time. Later,
with the approval of the Central Committee of the CPC, Zhou
Enlai was appointed deputy director of the Political Department
Ill OVERCOMING RIGHT-DEVIATIONIST
of the Military Council of the National Government, and Guo MISTAKES AND MAINTAINING
Moruo was named director of the same department’s Third THE INDEPENDENCE AND INITIATIVE OF
Division, which was in charge of culture and propaganda. Com¬
munists also participated in the People’s Political Council con¬ THE PARTY IN THE UNITED FRONT
vened by the Kuomintang. The restrictions of the earlier period
having been lifted, they again had the opportunity to contact During the War of Resistance Against Japan, because ol the
people openly. They made friends and cooperated with persons complex international and domestic situation and because of the
who opposed the invasion but held political attitudes different two different lines followed by the Kuomintang and the Commu¬
from theirs. The Communists also made friends with a number nist Party, the key to the success of the resistance lay in the
of people from other countries, and to enhance their understand¬ Party’s correct handling, in the united front, of the relation,
ing of and sympathy with the Party, explained to them the Party’s between unity and independence, between solidarity and struggle.
principle of uniting to resist Japan. It was at this time that At the very beginning of the war, the CPC Central Committee
renowned foreign friends of the Party, such as Dr. Norman declared that the Party must follow the principle ol 'ndependence
Bethune of Canada and Dr. D. S. Kotnis of India, stopped over and initiative within the united front. This meant tha
would be both unity and independence, that the Party would both
in Wuhan on their way to the anti-Japanese democratic base
unite with the Kuomintang and struggle against it, seeking unity
areas. The Third Division of the Political Department of the
through struggle. The CPC would remain independent ideologi¬
Military Council of the National Government, which included
cally, politically and organizationally and follow its own political
Communists and progressives, mounted big propaganda cam¬
line of freely mobilizing the masses and leading the people of the
paigns against Japan. It launched the “Week of Anti-Japanese
whole nation in resistance to Japan. It would maintain its abso¬
Propaganda” and similar activities in Wuhan and formed ten
lute leadership over the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth
opera groups, four publicity teams and a children’s troupe to
Army and other people’s armed forces, break the restrictions
arouse popular feeling against the enemy.
imposed on it by the Kuomintang and work hard to expand the
Under the leadership of the CPC’s Yangtze Bureau, the Party
people’s armed forces. To uphold the principle of independence
organizations in southern China that had been seriously damaged
and initiative in the anti-Japanese national united front was, in
in the later period of the ten-year civil war gradually recovered
essence, to strive for leadership in the War of Resistance.
and expanded. Between September 1937 and September 1938,
When this principle was first formulated by the CPC Central
CPC provincial committees or working committees were estab¬
Committee, it was not fully understood by the whole Party. After
lished in Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Sichuan, Hunan, Guangxi,
the united front was established, certain Party members made
Guizhou, Anhui, Guangdong, Yunnan, Zhejiang, Jiangxi and
Right mistakes. For example, some ol them yielded to the Kuo
Fujian. By September 1938 the number of Party members (ex-
236 237
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE QPc chapter FOUR the WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN

mintang when it interfered in, and even suppressed, the mass w^nreeoisie and eventually bring about China’s defeat.
campaign for national salvation. When one unit of the Red Army Nevertheless, after he arrived in Yan’an, Wang Ming did
was being reorganized into the National Revolutionary Army, its ,vervthine possible to carry out this “new policy” of the Commu¬
commander lowered his vigilance against the anti-Communist nist International. At a meeting of the Politburo of the CPC
schemes of the Kuomintang, with disastrous results.17 Some Party rentral Committee held from December 9 to 14, 1937, he made
members in KMT areas, having too much faith in the Kuomin¬ , report entitled "How to Carry On the Nationwide War of
tang, tended to carry out all their activities openly. Others, who Resistance and Win It.” In this report he put forward some
were in the army, tried to secure appointments by the Kuomin¬ correct ideas on persevering in the war and continuing to cooper¬
tang government. When they succeeded, they refused to continue ate with the Kuomintang. But he also set forth a series of Right
to lead a hard life and to accept the leadership of the Party. Still capitulationist ideas on the question of how to consolidate and
others were not bold enough to struggle against the Kuomintang expand the anti-Japanese national united front. Denying the
secret agents who were sabotaging their base areas. This Right differences of principle between the CPC’s line ol total resistance
deviationism violated the Party’s principle of independence and and the Kuomintang’s line of partial resistance, Wang Ming
initiative and was detrimental to the preservation of the united maintained that the Kuomintang should be the leader in the war,
front based on cooperation between the KMT and the CPC. Party negating the leading role played by the Communist Party. He also
organizations at all levels struggled successfully to overcome it. rejected the principle of independence and initiative within the
At the end of November 1937, Wang Ming, the CPC’s repre¬ united front, saying that “everything must be submitted to the
sentative to the Communist International, member of the Inter¬ united front” and that “everything must go through the united
national’s Executive Committee and presidium and alternate front.” In this way, he confined the activity of the Party to the
secretary of its Secretariat, was sent back to China. Before he left, limits imposed by the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek and
the Secretariat of the International held a special meeting on the opposed the free mobilization and arming of the masses. He
situation in the Sino-Japanese war and on the tasks for the CPC. belittled the role of guerrilla warfare, the people’s armed lorces
The General Secretary of the Executive Committee, Georgi Dim¬ and the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines under the
itrov, maintained that as the CPC and the Chinese working class leadership of the Communist Party, and asserted that a quick
were relatively weak, in the War of Resistance China should rely victory could be achieved by relying on the Kuomintang armies.
on the Kuomintang with Chiang Kai-shek as its head. The CPC, Wang Ming confused many participants in the meeting when he
according to Dimitrov, should draw on the practice of the French said that in his report he was relaying the instructions ol the
Communist Party, summed up in the slogan, “Everything for the Communist International.
popular front and everything through the popular front,” and Towards the end of December 1937, Wang Ming went to
share responsibility and leadership with the Kuomintang. As a Wuhan as a member of the CPC delegation. There, without the
matter of fact, the practice of the French Communist Party had approval of the CPC Central Committee, he published “Manifes¬
not been successful. If the CPC were to give up its proletarian to of the Communist Party of China on the Present Situation,”
stand of independence and initiative, make no distinction be¬ “The Key to Saving the Present Situation” and other articles, and
tween the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, refrain from arousing he delivered a speech at Wuhan University entitled “On the
the masses and try to appease the bourgeoisie in all matters so as Anti-Japanese National United Front,” propagating his wrong
to maintain the united front, it would only weaken the position ideas At a meeting held by the Politburo of the CPC Central
of the proletariat, put the united front at the mercy of the Committee in Yan’an from February 27 to March 1, 1938, Wang
 239
chapter four the war OF resistance AGAINST JAPAN
238 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

C A n„ alternative but to listen to the KMT in all matters.

Ming presented the report “The Present Situation of the Anti-
tad in* the unhed front would collapse if the KMT were offend-
Japanese War and How to Carry On the War and Win It.”
Ff stressed the importance of unity to the neglect of struggle
Although he admitted that in his “Manifesto of the Communist
These ideas made him shift from “Left” to Right mistakes, which
Party of China on the Present Situation” he had made too many
were duplications of those the Party had made in the later stage
concessions to the Kuomintang, he compounded his mistakes by
setting forth the strategic principle that mobile warfare, support¬
°f Anodier' reason' for Wang Ming’s Right-deviationist mistakes
ed by positional warfare, was primary and guerrilla warfare
„ h . he worshipped the instructions of the Comintern and
supplementary. He also agreed with the Kuomintang proposal
Mindly followed the foreign policy of the Soviet Union There
that there should be only one army under unified command. He
was nothing wrong in the Soviet Union’s decision at the time to
demanded that the people’s armed forces led by the Communist
maintain foreign relations only with the Kuomintang governmen
Party come under the command of the Kuomintang and insisted
that they and the KMT armies have uniform organization, arms, in China. But some leaders of the Comintern and of the Soviet
Union overestimated Chiang Kai-shek’s enthusiasm for resisting
discipline and material treatment as well as unified operational
Janan while underestimating his determination to eliminate the
plans and combat operations. That the Kuomintang would ever
agree to the people’s armed forces having the same arms and CommlX. and their thinking had a great influence on Wang
material treatment as its own was only wishful thinking on Wang
MWang did some useful work in promoting cooperation between
Ming’s part. And if the Communist Party agreed that the two
the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and conducting pro£
armies would carry out unified combat operations under unified
aganda against the Japanese. However, he rejected the CPC
command in accordance with unified operational plans, it would
restrict itself in expanding the people’s guerrilla warfare. After Central Committee’s principle of independence ^d mUiaUve
the meeting, in violation of the Party’s principle of democratic within the united front, always acting withintheLT^For
centralism, and in defiance of criticisms by Mao Zedong, Zhang by the Kuomintang. As a result, he impeded the Party swork_For
Wentian and others, Wang Ming wrote “A Summary of the example in the winter of 1937 and the spring of 1938, he made
itImpossible for the Party to conduct more extensive guerrilla
March Meeting of the Politburo” and published it in the weekly
warfare and to establish more anti-Japanese base areas behinc
magazine The Masses.
Why did Wang Ming oppose the principle of independence and enemy lines in central China, as it should have done.
initiative within the united front? Why did he shift from his The Central Committee struggled determinedly to reject ^ang
“Left” deviation during the Agrarian Revolutionary War to Right Ming’s Right-deviationist mistakes. It insisted that m north China
deviation at the beginning of the War of Resistance? Because he the Party conduct guerrilla warfare independently behind enemy
never understood the Party’s policy regarding the united front. lines and that strategy was brilliantly successful. In central
When the Kuomintang suppressed the Communist Party militar¬ China, despite Wang’s interference, the Yangtze Bureau
ily, the “Left” forces, with Wang Ming at their head, emphasized Central Committee for the most part implemented the Cm111”11
struggle to the neglect of unity, negating the need for the Party tec’s principle of independence and initiative. It did much united
to unite with all kinds of middle-of-the-roaders. When the Kuo¬ frontwork, helped local Party organizations with their work and
mintang took a turn in favour of joint resistance to Japan, Wang provided leadership in the campaign for national salvation, whde
Ming put good relations with the Kuomintang above everything also expanding the armed forces. Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Z
else and thought that, for the sake of the war effort, the Party De and others reviewed the practical experience gained in guer-
 241
240 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE cpc chapter FOUR the war of resistance against japan

rilla warfare and made a theoretical generalization of the strateg¬ After 16 months of fighting, the Japanese troops had occupied
ic principles for such warfare, refuting Wang Ming’s erroneous major industrial cities and other economically developed
ideas. As the Party was determined to be independent within the ChJ" In terms of campaigns, Japan was the winner but it was not
united front, it confined the influence of those ideas to certain af strategically. The full-scale invasion had tailed to destroy China s
Stance forces, let alone the people’s determination to resist.
areas and was able to eradicate it in a comparatively short time.
After the Politburo meeting of March 1938, the Central Com¬ During the Wuhan campaign, the deputy chief of the Japanese
mittee sent Ren Bishi as its representative to the Soviet Union to General staff said that even if Wuhan and Guangzhou weret seized
explain to the Communist International the actual situation in China would not give up and the Japanese forces would be dragged
China’s anti-Japanese national united front. The leaders of the deener into the interior, which would be greatly to Japans
International, who now had a better understanding of China, said disadvantage.18 As the invaders occupied more and more territory,
they agreed with the political line of the CPC Central Committee a their front line extended and as they were increasingly worn
headed by Mao Zedong. This helped the Party to correct Wang down by protracted warfare, Japan’s fundamental weaknesses, such
Ming’s mistakes before too long. as its shortage of financial and material resources and of troops had
At the Enlarged 6th Plenary Session of the 6th CPC Central come to light As its difficulties increased daily, Japan was unable
Committee, held in Yan’an from September 29 to November 6, “wage any more large-scale strategic offensives. The guerrilla
warfare led by the CPC had expanded m the occupied areas, leaving
1938, Mao Zedong made a political report and summarized the
work of the session. Many other comrades delivered speeches about the Japanese troops in control of only major transport lines and key
their experience in the anti-Japanese war over the previous 15 cities. Their so-called security zones were actually restricted to on y
months. The session basically put an end to Wang Ming’s mistakes a few kilometres on either side of major transport lines. TheEighth
and reiterated that the CPC must independently lead the people in Route Army and the New Fourth Army were in control of the vast
the fight against the Japanese invaders. Thus, it further unified the rural areas and carried out constant attacks on the enemy, giving
thinking and action of the whole Party. This was a vital meeting in rise to a “jigsaw” pattern, in which the Chinese and Japanese troops
the history of the Party, as it upheld the principle of integrating encirclcd^each other. The Japanese aggressors had not anticipated
Marxism-Leninism with the realities of the Chinese revolution and such a pattern. As for the Chinese, in the stage of strategic defensive,
reaffirmed the leadership of Mao Zedong. If these problems had not the Kuomintang troops had retreated time after time from front¬
been solved at the beginning of the war, it would have been impos¬ line battlefields. And although the people s anti-Japanese forces
sible for the CPC to lead the people to victory. had expanded, they were far from being able to carry out a strategic
counter-offensive; before they were ready to do that they would still
have a long, hard struggle to go through. For these reasons, the war
IV. UPHOLDING THE PRINCIPLE OF had entered upon a stage of strategic stalemate.

RESISTANCE, UNITY AND PROGRESS

Major Changes in Class Relations
After the Japanese troops seized Guangzhou and Wuhan in During the Stage of Stalemate
October 1938, the War of Resistance passed from the stage of
When the stalemate began, major changes took place in Japan’s
strategic defensive to the stage of strategic stalemate. This was
possible because changes had taken place in the relative strength policy for the conduct of the war. From the time they seized
of China and Japan. Wuhan in October 1938 to the beginning of 1944, the Japanese
 243
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter four the war of resistance against japan
242
- the Communist Party. After the meeting, a committee
ceased their strategic offensives on the front lines and began to “combating t specific methods of carrying out this
use more and more of their main forces to fight the Eighth Route eSllfctrtam”rrasfricSnbetween the KMT and the CPC
Army and the New Fourth Army in their rear areas. So far as the principle. In certain serjes of serious incidents took
Kuomintang government was concerned, the Japanese invaders became increasingly^ shenJ[ian> Pjngjian and Queshan. In
reversed their policy of making military offensives primary and place, sue Japanese troops and civilians and cadres work
political inducement to capitulate secondary. In the occupied thCSe of the Communist Party
areas the Japanese stepped up their efforts to prop up puppet
wem suddenly killed or attacked by Kuomintang troops and secret
governments and to establish traitors’ organizations.
At the time, the economic crises of the capitalist countries were
further aggravating world contradictions. War clouds hung over
the European continent. The fascists in Germany, Italy and
Japan exploited and collaborated with each other. To deal with
the war started by Germany and Italy in Europe, Britain and the
United States tried to appease Japan by sacrificing China to some to maintain the coop d the anti-Japanese national
extent, in the hope that the Japanese would not side with Hitler every effort to conso Centra) Committee issued a
against them. Accordingly, Britain and the United States also
“Manifesto oifthe^Present Situation, Marking the Second Anni-
tried to persuade the Kuomintang government to capitulate.
vmsary of the War of Resistance,” in whrch it put forward the
Under these circumstances, the capitulationist, divisive and ret¬
rogressive activities within the Kuomintang ruling clique became
more serious every day. In December 1938 the pro-Japanese Kuo-
mintang group, headed by Wang Jingwei, vice-president of the
KMT, chairman of the Central Political Council, vice-chairman of oppose retrogression. lhese g the partv to recog-
the Supreme National Defence Conference and chairman of the
People’s Political Council of the Kuomintang, openly capitulated
to the Japanese. In 1940, as directed by the Japanese military, Wang
Jingwei and other leading puppets from both southern and northern
China were to hold negotiations with each other and establish a moved to Chongqing. In vi ^ Central Committee
united puppet central government — the “National Government of the 6th Plenary Session of the Wuhan and
the Republic of China.” The pro-British and pro-American Kuo¬ decided to abolish its Yangtz , iq-iq the South
establish a South Bureau instead On January 13 1939 the Sou h
mintang group headed by Chiang Kai-shek continued to resist, but
Bureau was officially set up m Chongqmg. Ud by Zhou&da
without conviction, pursuing the policy of passively resisting Japan
and actively opposing the Communist Party. At the 5th Plenary the bureau did hard but very effective
Session of the 5th Central Executive Committee of the Kuomin¬ areas. It scored outstanding
underground and open), united front work (among pc P ^
tang, held in January 1939, the political situation in China took a
turn for the worse. The Kuomintang gradually shifted its focus
from external affairs to internal affairs and adopted the reaction¬ ™" ‘n<i 's'Siid "S's-w
SSS3S- >».
n,wBuicau
ary principle of “corroding,” “guarding against,” “restricting” and
 244 chapter four the war of resistance AGAINST JAPAN 245
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC.

publicized the proposals of the Communist Party, mobilized . intiy sabotaged railways and highways and developed guerrilla

workers and peasants, united people of all classes and supported warfare in the vast plains, taking advantage of irrigation ditches
the resistance against Japan behind enemy lines. Using flexible for concealment. Again in coordination with the local people,
tactics, it also waged a resolute struggle against the capitulation¬ army units travelled to different areas to spy on the regular
ists and die-hards who were against resistance, unity and progress movements of the Japanese troops and accumulate a superior
so as to ensure that the whole nation fought the Japanese. The force to ambush them. Immediately after a successful ambush,
bouth Bureau paid particular attention to work among the the army would leave the scene and begin to search for other
middle-of-the-roaders. While in the Kuomintang areas, Zhou opportunities to wipe out enemy troops and enlist more men.
Lnlai and others contacted representatives of democratic parties Early in November 1939, with the support ol the 120th Division
prominent persons without party affiliation, democrats in the of the Eighth Route Army, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei army unit
Kuomintang, members of regional power groups and outstanding ambushed and wiped out more than 900 Japanese and puppet
intellectuals. They discussed state affairs with these people and troops, including Lieutenant General Norihide Abe, commandei
gradually gained their understanding and trust, thus expanding of the Japanese Second Independent Mixed Brigade. In the pro¬
the anti-Japanese national united front. cess of fighting, the Shanxi New Army expanded to 50,000 men.
Meanwhile, in order to develop guerrilla warfare in central
Expanding Guerrilla Warfare Behind Enemy China, in February 1939 the CPC Central Committee sent Zhou
Lines and Building the Anti-Japanese Base Areas Enlai to southern Anhui Province to consult with the leaders of
the New Fourth Army. They agreed that the strategic tasks for
When the Japanese invaders began using their main armies to the army were to consolidate the south, light battles in the east
attack the resistance forces in the occupied areas, the CPC began and expand to the north. After this the New Fourth Army and
to shoulder the chief responsibility for fighting the aggressors. the guerrilla warfare in central China expanded considerably. In
The Japanese concentrated their “mopping-up operations” on May 1940 the Central Committee sent 12,000 men ot the Eighth
the base areas in north China. In spring 1939, they formulated a Route Army south to join the New Fourth Army in developing
plan for public security and the elimination of Communists” and the anti-Japanese base areas in central China. In November 1940,
launched a “total war” including the military, economic and in order to unify the leadership of the two armies in central
cultural domains and involving the help of secret agents. The China, the Central China General Headquarters was established
commander-in-chief of the invading Japanese forces proposed with Ye Ting as commander-in-chief, Liu Shaoqi as political
what he called a “butcher’s knife tactic,” meaning that although commissar and Chen Yi as deputy commander-in-chief. (Chen Yi
e army led by the CPC was small, it must be attacked with great was acting commander-in-chief until Ye ling came north ol the
force In the two years of 1939 and 1940, the Japanese launched Yangtze to take up his post.)
109 large-scale “mopping-up operations” in north China alone As for south China, after the fall of Guangzhou in 1938, the
using a total ot more than 500,000 troops, each operation involv¬ Guangdong Party organizations led the people in carrying out
ing more than 1,000. guerrilla warfare and establishing the Dongjiang Anti-Japanese
Following the instructions of the CPC Central Committee, the Base Area. The Red Army Guerrilla Corps that had been operat¬
Eighth Route Army persevered in guerrilla warfare in north ing on Hainan Island for a long time conducted guerrilla warfare
China, relying on the population and making use of the advanta¬ and later expanded to become the Qiongya Column.
geous terrain in the mountainous areas. The army and people also For more than twro years, from the winter of 1938 to 1940, the
 246
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter HOUR the WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN 247

war effort led by the CPC behind enemy lines pinned down a base area would be a united front led by the CPC. In other words,
great number of invading Japanese troops. In the vast rear areas it would be the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolu¬
of the enemy, guerrilla forces carried out countless small-scale tionary classes over the traitors and reactionaries.
surprise attacks, gradually wiping out Japanese effectives and at 2. In employing government staff, a “three thirds system” was
the same time increasing their own numbers and combat effec¬ to be implemented, with Communists, non-Party Left progres¬
tiveness. By the end of 1940, the armed forces under the leader¬ sives and middle-of-the-roaders each taking a third of the posts.
ship of the CPC had expanded from 50,000 men to 500,000, not This system included people from all backgrounds and helped to
counting a large number of local armed units and militiamen. In unite anti-Japanese elements of all classes.
north, central and south China, 16 new anti-Japanese base areas 3. The leading position of the Communist Party in the govern¬
had been established, in Shanxi-Chahar-Hcbei, Shanxi-Hebei- ment was to be maintained through the Party’s correct policies,
Henan, Shanxi-Suiyuan, Hcbei-Shandong-Henan, Henan-Hubei the exemplary conduct of its members and the support of the
Shandong, Northeastern Anhui, Eastern Anhui, Central Anhui,’
people.
Southern Anhui, Southern Jiangsu, Central Jiangsu, Northern 4. The government should constantly improve democratic sys¬
Jiangsu, Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu, Dongjiang and Qiongya. Togeth¬
tems in all spheres of work. Communists must cooperate with
er with the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, the base areas non-Party members in a democratic manner, listening to their
under the leadership of the CPC had a population of 100 million
opinions and discussing matters with them whenever possible.
and played an increasingly important role in the national war of
They should not act arbitrarily or monopolize all power.
resistance.
5. The policy measures of the government would be to oppose
To sustain the war for a long time, the base areas in occupied
the Japanese imperialists, protect the people who were resisting
territory had to be not only expanded but consolidated. To this
Japan, properly adjust the interests of all the anti-Japanese classes
end, the CPC attached great importance to promoting all under¬
and improve the life of the workers and peasants.
takings there.
In August 1940, in accordance with the directives of the
The first of these was to establish organs of political power. The CPC Central Committee, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Re¬
Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region set the example in this gion promulgated its own Administrative Programme. In the
respect. At the First Assembly of Representatives of the Border
autumn of the same year, a general election was held throughout
Region, held in Yan’an from the middle of January to the
the region. One after another, the other anti-Japanese base areas
beginning of February 1939, the “Administrative Programme of
established organs of political power based on the “three thirds
the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region During the War of
system.” The governments at the grassroots level were formed
Resistance Against Japan” was adopted, and a government coun¬
through direct, democratic elections and enjoyed the support of
cil for the region was elected, with Lin Boqu as chairman. The
the local people.
programme was of great importance, because it contained the
The main task of the Party in the War of Resistance behind
basic policies that would be implemented by the CPC in all
enemy lines was to mobilize and organize the peasants to resist
anti-Japanese base areas.
the Japanese. In essence, it was the peasants, led by the CPC, who
Later, the CPC Central Committee issued a series of directives
were the main force in the resistance. By the time the war broke
on the establishment of organs of political power in base areas.
out, the CPC had abandoned its agrarian policy of confiscating
These were as follows:
the land of landlords. To mobilize the peasants and improve their
1. The organ of democratic political power of an anti-Japanese
material life, the Central Committee decided to introduce the
 249
248 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC cHApter four the war of resistance against japan

ct lengthened the ties between the CPC and the local people and
policy of reducing land rents and interest and protecting tenants’
rights. The implementation of this policy could not solve the land S reased their confidence in the Party and the people s armed
problem once for all, but politically, it shook the feudal regime, forces. This was vital, if the resistance forces were to continue
and economically, it weakened feudal exploitation. Thus, during operating behind enemy lines, where the environment was ex¬
the national war, this policy gave consideration to the interests of tremely challenging, and to win final victory. Through its work
both peasants and landlords, integrating the need to maintain the in the base areas, the Party accumulated much experience m

united front with the need to deal with the peasant question. establishing organs of political power and promoting economic
From the winter of 1939 on, all base areas began to reduce rents development, culture and education. Later, this experience would

and interest. The original rents were cut by 25 percent, and the prove highly valuable in the building of New China.
general annual interest rate was fixed at ten percent (with a In northeast China, the Japanese aggressors repeatedly

maximum rate of 15 percent). Other miscellaneous rents, corvee launched merciless attacks on the Northeast Anti-Japanese Unit¬
and all forms of usury were brought to an end. Thanks to this ed Army. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the

policy, the peasants not only benefited economically but also army conducted guerrilla warfare and, in May 1939, was reorgan¬
enhanced their political status and became more enthusiastic ized into the First, Second and Third Route Armies. In 1940
about farming than ever before. On Lhc basis of the progress in Japan sent more troops to northeast China, making it even more
agricultural production, industrial production and all other eco¬ difficult for the United Army to operate than before. On Feb¬
nomic undertakings developed in the base areas. ruary 23, 1940, Yang Jingyu, commander-in-chief of the First
Route Army laid down his life heroically in a battle 1 ought m
The base areas also actively promoted culture and education.
Mengjiang County, Jilin Province. Towards the end of the same
The Central Committee proposed that as many intellectuals as
possible be encouraged to take part in the War of Resistance. The year, the United Army moved to the Sino-Soviet border to
reorganize and train and continue to fight the Japanese and
governments of base areas organized intellectuals to develop
education. In spite of the difficulties presented by the lack of puppet troops.
necessary materials, the poverty of the people and constant har¬ During 1939 and 1940 the Japanese troops launched some

assment by the enemy, the governments made full use of their small-scale offensives against the Kuomintang troops. These in¬
poor facilities to establish primary and secondary schools and to cluded the Nanchang, Suixian-Zaoyang, First Changsha, South¬
promote education in the society at large, so as to raise the ern Guangxi, and Zaoyang-Yichang campaigns. However, the
KMT forces put up strong resistance and the Japanese tailed to
educational level of the masses. At the same time, a number of
cadres’ schools were set up in Yan’an and in all base areas, the make great advances. During this period, when the Japanese

graduates of which became the backbone of the people’s armed invaders launched frontal attacks, fierce battles were fought.
forces and major contributors to the development of these areas. Many Kuomintang officers and men fought valiantly, but these
campaigns pinned down only a small part of the Japanese troops
The Central Committee also attached great importance to devel¬
oping science and technology in the base areas. In February 1940 and came to an end when the Japanese stopped their offensives.
the Research Association of Natural Sciences was formed in
Yan’an. In August of the same year, the Academy of Natural The 100-Regiment Campaign
Sciences was launched, the first of its kind in the history of the
CPC, to train scientific and technological personnel. In north China, behind enemy lines, as the people’s armed
The progress in all undertakings in the base areas greatly forces and the anti-Japanese base areas were rapidly expanding,
 CHAPTER FOUR, the WAR of RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN 251
250 A CONCISE HISTORY OF TIIE CPC

,he Zhengding-Taiyuan, Datong-Puzhou, Beiping-Hankou,

from August 20 to the beginning of December 1940 the General
chiiiazhuang-Dezhou, Beiping-Suiyuan, Bciping-Shenyang
Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army launched large-scale
Thmiin-Pukou and Baigui-Jincheng railways, annihilated a large
offensives against the Japanese troops. As more than 100 regi¬
lumber of enemy troops and even seized for a while the strategic
ments of the Eighth Route Army with a total of more than
200,000 men took part in these operations, they were called the Niangzi Pass, a fortified pass held by the Japanese on the border
between Shanxi and Hebei. Caught off guard and assar ed from
100-Regiment Campaign.
Why did the General Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army many sides at once, the Japanese and puppet troops had to acccp
MUle without preparation and suffered heavy losses. On Septem
launch these offensives? Mainly because there had appeared “the
gravest danger of capitulation and unprecedented difficulties in ber 20 in Yan’an the people held a rally to celebrate the victory
the War of Resistance.”20 In September 1939 Hitler had sent his of the 100-Regiment Campaign. They also sent a telegram to e
Eighth Route Army, encouraging it to “advance unremittingly
troops to attack Poland, and Britain and France had declared war
on Germany. The arrogance of the German fascists greatly en¬ from victory to victory.”
couraged the Japanese aggressors. They stepped up their efforts In the second stage (from September 22 to early October), the
to force or induce the Chiang Kai-shek clique of the Kuomintang Eighth Route Army continued to launch surprise attacks on both
to capitulate. In May and June 1940 they occupied Yichang in sides of railways, destroyed Japanese fortified points in the base
the Xiangyang-Yichang Campaign in Hubei Province, thus seiz¬ areas and attacked the county seats of Yushe, Liaoxian, Laiyuan
and Lingqiu. However, because the Japanese troops now re¬
ing the entrance to Sichuan Province from Hubei. Then they
imposed blockades on the transportation line from Yunnan Prov¬ mained on the alert and the Eighth Route Army was worn out
ince to neighbouring Vietnam. And on two occasions — in March from continuous fighting, the army suffered heav> casu® ^S' 0
1940 in Hong Kong and again in June in Macao — representa¬ seized only one county seat, Yushe, and was unable to clear all
tives of the Japanese army and representatives of the Chongqing the enemy fortified points in the base areas, as it^.^JiToOO
do. From early October, the Japanese dispatched all the 20,000
government held secret negotiations on the conditions for a truce.
troops that it could concentrate in north China, in addition to a
At the same time, in the occupied areas the invading troops
large number of puppet troops, to carry out des.perate retaliato:ry
stepped up the implementation of their “prisoners’ cages” poli¬
“mopping-up operations.” The army and people in the base areas
cy, using railways, highways and blockhouses, supplemented by
blockade walls and trenches, to divide the anti-Japanese base fought valiantly against them.
During the 100-Regiment Campaign the officers and men of
areas into small pieces and encircle them. Then they carried out
the Eighth Route Army fought the enemy courageously. By the
“mopping-up operations” against these areas and “nibbled at”
them. Under these circumstances, the general headquarters of the beginning of December, they had fought 1,824 battles, large an
small, killed or wounded more than 25,000 Japanese and puppet
Eighth Route Army concluded that to combat capitulationism,
inspire the army and people fighting the Japanese and temper its troops and captured more than 280 Japanese troops and 8,000
puppet troops, as well as guns, artillery and other matdriel The
own forces, it was essential to organize large-scale sabotage oper¬
Eighth Route Army itself suffered 17,00p casualties^ The: cam
ations against the enemy.21
paign dealt a heavy blow to the “prisoners cages policy that was
In the first stage of the 100-Regiment Campaign (from August
designed to carve up the armed units and people in the anti-
20 to September 10, 1940) transportation lines were sabotaged. At
Japanese base areas into isolated groups. The campaign also
the same time, army units, guerrillas and the militia launched
pinned down many Japanese troops and deflated their aggressi
offensives against the Japanese and puppet troops. They damaged
252 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN 253

arrogance. It not only tempered the people’s armed forces and Unlike Wang Jingwei, Chiang Kai-shek, the chief leader of the
enhanced the prestige of the Communist Party and the Eighth Kuomintang, never forgot to make a pretense of resisting Japan,
Route Army, but also inspired the nation at a time when the War but when the war was at a stalemate, he adopted a passive attitude
of Resistance was at low ebb. The fact that the Communist Party toward the War of Resistance and even went so far as to try
had persevered for so long in resisting Japan behind enemy lines secretly to reach a compromise with the invaders. He carried out
and had launched the 100-Regiment Campaign was a convincing an anti-democratic policy that damaged the efforts for unity and
refutation of the view, held by some, that in the War of Resist¬ resistance. Furthermore, in the KMT-controlled areas he began
ance the Party’s guerrilla warfare consisted of just moving around to actively oppose the Communist Party, strengthening fascist
without fighting. rule and the activities of secret agents, destroying Communist
In spite of the extremely difficult conditions, the army of the Party groups and other progressive organizations and jailing
Communist Party not only survived but kept a large number of Party members and other patriots. He instigated frequent provo¬
Japanese and puppet troops pinned down in occupied territory. cations of the Communist Party, attacking the people’s army,
The army and the people fought countless small engagements and arresting and killing cadres who supported the resistance, engi¬
also, when conditions were ripe, large-scale battles such as in the neering incidents of “friction” between the Kuomintang and the
100-Regiment Campaign. During that campaign, on September Communist Party and even launching armed attacks on the
11, 1940, Chiang Kai-shek sent Zhu De and Peng Dehuai a Communist-led anti-Japanese base areas.22 All these acts made the
telegram reading, “Your army has unhesitatingly seized this good class contradiction between the CPC and the KMT more acute.
opportunity to launch offensives and has dealt a heavy blow to How, then, was the contradiction to be handled? This was an
the enemy. I therefore send this telegram as a citation.” This important and complicated question. The CPC Central Commit¬
shows that the Kuomintang authorities officially recognized the tee held that during the war with Japan, the national contradic¬
achievements of the CPC’s Eighth Route Army in the War of tion between China and Japan was primary and the domestic class
Resistance. struggle should be subordinated to it. The class struggle should
not be denied, but it should serve the national struggle. Accord¬
ingly, while rallying the people around itself in the war effort, the
V. REPULSING THE ANTI-COMMUNIST CPC sought to maintain its cooperation with the Kuomintang and
ONSLAUGHTS LAUNCHED BY THE KMT to carry on the war to the end by following a policy of both
alliance with and struggle against the Chiang Kai-shek clique.
Alliance with Chiang Kai-shek meant that the Party would do
Throughout the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan everything possible to persist in the War of Resistance and to
there were contradictions that had an important bearing on secure unity and progress, and that it would support the patriotic
China’s destiny: first, the national contradiction between China forces both inside and outside the Kuomintang so as to keep it in
and Japan, which determined whether the Chinese nation would the anti-Japanese united front. The troops commanded by the
survive; second, the class contradiction between the Communist Communist Party behind enemy lines tied up a great number of
Party and the Kuomintang, which determined whether the people Japanese soldiers, which reduced the pressure on the KMT forces
would be able to carry the War of Resistance through to the end in the front-line battlefields. This was an important factor in
and afterwards build a new China. These two contradictions were persuading the KMT to continue its efforts in the War of Resist¬
closely interrelated. ance. Struggle against Chiang Kai-shek meant that the Party
 255
A CONCISE HISTORY OF TIIE CPC chapter four the war of resistance against japan
254

would resist any attempts by the KMT diehards to capitulate, ,forked the Communist-led armies. The New Army, supported
hv the Eighth Route Army, repelled these attacks. By January
cause splits or retrogress and that it would make no unprinci¬
1Q40 northwestern Shanxi had become an anti-Japanese base area
pled concessions. When the Kuomintang launched its campaign
•der the leadership of the Communist Party. In February and
against the Communist Party, the latter, upholding the principle
March the Kuomintang troops attacked the anti-Japanese base
of the anti-Japanese national united front, united firmly with the
areas in southern Hebei and the Taihang Mountains in southeast¬
democratic parties and with patriotic and progressive people
ern Shanxi where the General Headquarters of the Eighth Route
of all strata and waged the necessary and appropriate struggle
Army was located. The Eighth Route Army, subjected to a pincer
against it. The purpose of this class struggle was not to overthrow
movement by the Japanese invaders and the Kuomintang troops,
the KMT government, but to prevent it from capitulating to the
nevertheless repulsed the latter’s attacks. Soon after this demon¬
Japanese invaders and fighting the Communists and to keep it in
stration of its strength, the CPC Central Committee sent Zhu De
the united front.
to negotiate with Wei Lihuang in Luoyang, Henan Province and
The policy of uniting with the Chiang Kai-shek clique and at
Xiao lingguang and Wang Ruofei to negotiate with Yan Xishan
the same time struggling against it was based on the lessons the
at Qiulin Town in Yichuan County, Shaanxi Province. They
Party had learned from following a policy of alliance without
reached agreement on stopping the armed conflict between their
struggle during the period of the Great Revolution and a policy
forces, dividing up the areas where their respective troops were
of struggle without alliance during the period of the ten-year civil
to be stationed and where they were to resist the Japanese.
war. The formulation of the new policy represented a major
While repelling the Kuomintang’s first military onslaught, the
development of the Party’s thinking on the question of the united
Communist Party also frustrated its political and ideological
front. Bearing this policy in mind, the Party was able to approach
attacks. The Kuomintang set all its propaganda machines in
problems coolly and in an all-round way and to control the
motion, promoting the view that Communism did not suit C hina s
development of the overall situation.
reality and that there was no need for a Communist party in
China Ye Qing, a reactionary scholar, said: “The Three People’s
Repulsing the First Anti-Communist Onslaught Principles can satisfy all China’s present and future needs. If
these principles are implemented, there is no need for China to
In the winter of 1939 and the spring of 1940 the Kuomintang
practise socialism or to organize a political party to strive for
diehards launched their first onslaught on the Communists.
socialism.” The people were worried by the KM Vs attacks on the
At the 6th Plenary Session of its 5th Central Executive Com¬
Communist Party, and many of them raised the question of what
mittee, held in November 1939, the KMT established the policy
direction China should take. The representatives of the nation¬
of making the military restriction of the Communist Party its
al bourgeoisie were dissatisfied with the autocratic rule of the
principal objective and the political restriction of the Party sub¬
Kuomintang and its passivity in the War of Resistance, but they
sidiary. In December Kuomintang troops attacked the Shaanxi-
were skeptical about the Communist Party’s proposals. Some of
Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, took five county seats there and
them were under the illusion that after Japan was defeated, a
planned to attack Yan’an. The army led by the CPC resolutely
capitalist society of the European and American type would be
counter-attacked. In Shanxi, Yan Xishan used all his troops to
established in China.
attack the New Army (the Anti-Japanese Daredevil Corps) and At this crucial moment, the Communist Party had to make
the Eighth Route Army. In the Zhongtiao Mountains in Shanxi,
clear to the Chinese people its views on the revolution and to
several corps under the command of Chiang Kai-shek likewise
 257
cHAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN
256 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
. „„rnnra2ini! them to establish a cooperative economy,
answer the question, what direction should China take? In Octo¬ peasants, imefethe new-democratic republic would allow the
ber and December of 1939 Mao Zedong published two articles A‘ Tnment of a’national-capitalist economy and the existence
entitled respectively “Introducing The Communist” and “The de h neasant economy. Its cultural programme was to sweep
Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party.” In Jan¬ away'the feudal, comprador culture and develop a national,
uary 1940 he published another called “On New Democracy,” in
which he explicitly expounded the views of the Communist Party. The "demS'ratk 'revolution would ultimately lead to
He answered three fundamental questions: 1. What kind of state
socialism The new-democratic revolution and the socialist «
should be built in China? 2. What kind of political, economic and
m,on were two different revolutionary stages, and the latte
cultural systems should this state have? 3. What were the pros¬
M he carried out only after the former was completed. I
pects for this state? In essence, he replied as follows:
C°“ fd be impossible to accomplish the tasks of the two stages at
1. The basic contradictions in the semi-colonial and semi-
ne s«ok ^ ‘he second must follow immediately upon the
feudal society of China were the contradiction between imperial¬
first, whhout allowing any intervening stage of bourgeois dicta-
ism and the Chinese nation and the contradiction between feu¬
dalism and the great masses of the people. The first of these was
tOT5hThe new-democratic revolution was guided by the commu-
the principal one. Because of the society’s semi-colonial and
semi-feudal nature, the Chinese revolution must go through two
stages: first, a democratic revolution, and second, a socialist
revolution.
i-swna s
2. After the May 4th Movement of 1919, the Chinese dem¬
m and wi hout the guidance of the communist ideology the
ocratic revolution was no longer a general one but a new-
democratic revolution. It .was an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal
revolution of the masses, and it was led by the proletariat, this
being the essential difference between it and the old democratic
s-rrssss—
revolution. During the period of this revolution, which was based
on the worker-peasant alliance, the proletariat united the national tion was a major event in the nistory
■ _ Tt pnahled the whole membership to get a clear anu
bourgeoisie and, under special circumstances, a part of the big
bourgeoisie to form a broad united front, so as to isolate and
strike the main enemy. revolution, the taste it^ntai chinese people as they
3. The political programme of the new-democratic revolution
was to end the oppression by imperialism and feudalism and to KSiS—“on and played a grea’
establish a democratic republic under the joint dictatorship of all 'ynation of Marxism-
revolutionary classes, led by the proletariat and based on the
Lemnism with the practice of the ChmeserevolutiomBefore^
alliance of workers and peasants. Its economic programme was
first, to confiscate the big banks and the big industrial and
commercial enterprises that dominated the livelihood of the
people and convert them into state-owned enterprises, and second,
to confiscate the land of the landlords and distribute it to the
 259
258 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR of RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN

bourgeoisie.23 The Comintern declared that the bourgeois- lhe party would win the sympathy and support of the people of
democratic revolution would not necessarily lead China onto the he whole country. By fighting only when the sttuauon was to its
capitalist road, but that idea was not clearly explained. With the advantage and only with restraint, it would ensure victory and be
theory of the new-democratic revolution, many of the problems careful to stop at the appropriate time. By observing this pnncipte
that had arisen during that stage were solved satisfactorily. It . party would be able to develop the progressive forces, win
should be remembered, however, that the Party was able to set over the middle-of-the-roaders, isolate the diehards and carry the
forth this theory only after it had been through nearly twenty War of Resistance to the end.
1 In the period of the anti-Japanese united Iront, struggle was
years of arduous struggle and, especially, only after it had re¬
viewed what it had learned, both from its successes and from its the means to unity and unity was the aim of struggle. As Mao
failures in the Great Revolution, in the ten-year civil war and in Zedong put it, “If unity |was] sought through struggle it [would]
the anti-Japanese war. live' if unity [was] sought through yielding, it [would] perish.
4 While trying to improve the situation, the whole Party and
Having repulsed the first anti-Communist onslaught, the CPC
Central Committee made a serious analysis of the domestic the whole army should be on the alert for any eventualities on a
situation. It stated that at a time when the Japanese were invading local or national scale and prepared to deal with them, lhe
China, the principal contradiction was the one between China and mistake of 1927 must not be repeated.
Japan, and the domestic class contradiction was subordinate. These important tactical principles guided not only the united
There was still a possibility, it said, of preventing the situation front work at that time but also the long revolutionary struggle
from deteriorating and of changing it for the better, and the that came afterwards, enabling the Party to tackle all kinds ol
Party’s present task was to consolidate and expand the anti- thorny problems more skillfully and to achieve ever more suc¬
Japanese national united front. After reviewing its experience in cesses.
united front work, the Central Committee formulated several
important tactical principles for such work. These principles were Repulsing the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught
as follows:
1. In the period of the united front, the Party should develop Despite the failure of its first onslaught on the Communists,
the progressive forces, win over the middle-of-the-roaders and, as the Kuomintang did not give up. In September 1940 Germany,
far as possible, try to isolate the diehards. These three things were Italy and Japan signed a pact of alliance. Britain and the United
related, but the main emphasis should be on developing the States tried hard to win over the Kuomintang government. Thin -
progressive forces. The middle-of-the-roaders tended to vacillate ing this was a favourable moment, Chiang Kai-shek intensified
and were bound to break up as a group. They might often be a his anti-Communist activities, shifting the focus of his armed
decisive factor in the struggle between the progressive forces and attacks from north China to central China. In mid-September
the diehards, so it was very important for the Party to win them 1940, Han Deqin, the Kuomintang governor of Jiangsu Province
over. and deputy commander-in-chief of the Shandong-Jiangsu war
2. In the struggle against the Kuomintang diehards the Party zone, ordered his main force to attack Huangqiao in northern
should adhere to the principle of self-defence. That is, it should Jiangsu, an important base of the New Fourth Army, m an
not attack unless it was attacked. In that case, it should counter¬ attempt to wipe out the units stationed there. From October 4 to
attack, but only on just grounds, when the situation was to its 6 the northern Jiangsu command of the New Fourth Army fough
advantage and with restraint. By fighting only on just grounds, back in self-defence and annihilated 11,000 of Han Deqin s
 261
260 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN

troops. tive in the united front and the Central Committee’s policy of
After the Huangqiao campaign, Chiang Kai-shek launched the expanding the armed forces to the north and in occupied ternto-
second anti-Communist onslaught. In a telegram to Zhou Enlai rv He was reluctant to carry out the Central Committee’s direc¬
who was then in Chongqing, Mao Zedong warned that the CPC tive to move north, and when he finally did so he was not
should prepare for the most difficult and dangerous situation, sufficiently aware of the danger of attacks by the Kuomintang
making all arrangements accordingly. On January 4, 1941, in diehards. He was therefore not adequately prepared for an emer¬
accordance with orders from the Military Council of the National gency. Also, before the enemy’s attack he made some tactical
Government and with the consent of the Central Committee of mistakes. As a result, he was unable to avoid or reduce the grave
the CPC, the headquarters staff of the New Fourth Army and losses suffered by the New Fourth Army in the Southern Anhui
more than 9,000 New Fourth Army troops in southern Anhui Incident. . ......
began to move north of the Yangtze River. As they were ap¬ After this incident, some people both inside and outside the
proaching the area of Maolin in Jingxian County on the 6th, they Party thought that the situation would be a repetition ot the one
were ambushed by seven divisions totalling more than 80,000 in April 1927, that cooperation between the Communist Party
Kuomintang troops. Surrounded and greatly outnumbered, the and the Kuomintang would soon break down and that the civil
New Fourth Army troops nevertheless put up heroic resistance. war would expand. Indeed, the Southern Anhui Incident staged
After a bloody battle that lasted seven days, their supplies of food by Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang was quite similar to the coup
and ammunition were exhausted. Only some 2,000 of them broke of April 12, 1927. But the situation in 1941 was dillerent from
through the enemy lines, while the rest laid down their lives or the one in 1927. In 1941, facing the Japanese invasion, the people
were captured. Ye Ting, commander of the New Fourth Army, throughout the country opposed the civil war and demanded
was detained when he went to the headquarters of the Kuomin¬ unity and resistance to Japan. Also, the balance of strength
tang troops to negotiate. Xiang Ying, deputy commander of the between the CPC and the Kuomintang was different from what
Army, was murdered after breaking through the siege. it had been in 1927. More important, the Communist Party
Strictly speaking, this engagement was not a war but a trap laid already had a mature leadership that frequently reviewed the
by Chiang Kai-shek, who was taking advantage of his post of experience it had gained in revolutionary practice. This leader¬
supreme commander to get rid of dissidents. On January 17 he ship did not panic in the face of any eventuality; it did not make
even spread the rumour that the New Fourth Army had staged a unlimited concessions to the reactionary forces, nor did it take
mutiny. He cancelled its official designation and declared that Ye any adventurist actions that might serve them as a pretext for
Ting would be handed over to a military court for trial. This was sabotaging unity and the resistance. Confronting the grave situa¬
the Southern Anhui Incident, which shocked China and the tion after the Southern Anhui Incident, the CPC Central Com¬
rest of the world and was the culmination of the second anti- mittee still put the interests of the resistance above everything
Communist onslaught launched by the Kuomintang. else and upheld the policy of both unity and struggle and of
Before these events, Xiang Ying, the secretary of the Southeast seeking unity through struggle. So far as the KMT’s military
Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and one of the leaders of offensives were concerned, the CPC persisted in the policy of
the New Fourth Army, had made contributions to the revolution self-defence, and as for the political offensives, it resolutely
by carrying on guerrilla warfare for three years in southern China crushed them. . . n
and organizing the New Fourth Army. But he did not correctly On January 20, 1941, the Military Commission ot the CPC
understand the principle of maintaining independence and initia¬ Central Committee issued an order to reestablish the New Fourth
 262 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter four the war of resistance against japan 263

Army Headquarters. A week later this was done in Yancheng w_r of Resistance won widespread sympathy among the Chinese
County ot northern Jiangsu, Chen Yi being appointed acting Zlolc including the middle-of-the-roaders and patriotic mem-
commander, Liu Shaoqi political commissar and Zhang Yunyi £!rs of the Kuomintang, and also among people abroad. Many
deputy commander. The army was reorganized into seven divi¬ Iconic knew that it was the army led by the Communist Party of
sions and one independent brigade with a total strength of 90,000 rhina that was carrying on the resistance behind enemy lines. On
men. These forces carried on the War of Resistance on both sides the other hand, the Kuomintang diehards, confronted with a
of the Yangtze. In the meantime, the Central Committee made formidable enemy, the Japanese imperialists, nevertheless contin¬
public a host of facts exposing the Kuomintang’s scheme to ued to attack the Communists, thereby losing all popular support.
undermine the resistance, and it demanded that twelve steps be Soong Ching Ling, He Xiangning, Liu Yazi, Peng Zemin and
taken to solve the problems caused by the Southern Anhui others launched a protest campaign in Hong Kong writing letters
Incident.25 to Chiang Kai-shek and to the Central Executive Committee and
In Chongqing, Zhou Enlai lodged a strong protest with the Supervisory Committee of the KMT. They denounced the Kuo¬
Kuomintang authorities. In a phone call to He Yingqin, chief of mintang authorities for their encirclement and suppression of the
the KMT general staff, he denounced the KMT saying, “What New Fourth Army and demanded that they renounce their sup¬
you have done has grieved our friends and gladdened our ene¬ pression of the Communist Party and plan to cooperate with it,
mies. You have done what the Japanese invaders tried but failed instead, expand all the anti-Japanese forces and protect all the
to do. You will be condemned for all time as a traitor to the anti-Japanese parties. ,
Chinese nation.” New China Daily, defying the KMT’s press Huang Yanpei, a noted democrat, declared that the Kuomin-
censorship, carried two commemorative “inscriptions” by Zhou tang authorities were utterly wrong to have attacked the New
Enlai. One was: “Mourn for the martyrs of the Southern Anhui Fourth Army in Southern Anhui. Feng Yuxiang said that every¬
Incident. The other was: “It is as great a wrong as history has one knew the New Fourth Army had made great contributions to
ever known that Ye Ting has been thrown into jail. How brutal the resistance and that the Kuomintang government would be
some people are to have killed their own family members!” These condemned by the people for having annihilated that army
two inscriptions, written with grief and indignation, had wide Several hundred people in cultural circles issued a statement
repercussions in Chongqing and throughout the Kuomintang- denouncing the Kuomintang for having turned its guns against
controlled areas. Liao Chengzhi, a prominent Communist, ex¬ the people. Tan Kah Kee, a patriotic leader of the Chinese
posed the truth of the Southern Anhui Incident in a statement in community in Singapore, sent a telegram to the People s Political
Hong Kong. He made the following clear to the world: Council, appealing for unity and condemning Chiang Kai-sheks
‘The Communist Party of China has no intention of changing betrayal. The majority of the middle-of-the-roaders sympathized
its policy of resistance and unity after the Southern Anhui with the CPC. Internationally, the Soviet Union, the United
Incident, but it will have to remain on the alert for a possible States and Britain were dissatisfied with the Kuomintang and
anti-Communist military attack. It does not want to see a large- urged China to continue its resistance to Japan. In February 1941
scale civil war, and if those who have provoked a civil war form President Roosevelt sent his representative Laughlin Currie to
greater plots from which the Japanese will benefit, the future of China While in Hong Kong, Currie told Soong Ching Ling that
the War of Resistance in China will be jeopardized. We hope the he would warn Chiang Kai-shek not to continue to deceive: and
international community will join in averting this danger.”26 attack the troops of the CPC. In Chongqing he told Zhou Enlai
The Communist Party’s determination to give priority to the that the United States wanted to see China united against Japan.
264 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RES1STANCE AGA,NST JAPAN

up correctly the relations between the national struggle and

The Kuomintang diehards had not expected that the Commu¬
struggle. As if it had lifted a rock only to drop it on its
nist Party would be so uncompromising towards them and that
lhe feet Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang had failed in its cam-
the reactions to the Southern Anhui Incident would be so strong
both at home and abroad. As they were in an extremely isolated °Tenfto wipe out the troops under the leadership of the Com-
S, party More and more people had come to see clearly tha
and awkward position, they had no choice but to restrain their
!^ CPC worked not for the interest of a single party or group but
anti-Communist activities. On March 6, 1941, in a speech deliv¬
for that of the whole nation. Thanks to its correct policies the
ered at the second session of the People’s Political Council,
Party had been able to turn a bad situation around, to unite with
Chiang Kai-shek pledged that absolutely no further military
I nf-the-roaders and to make the ruling clique ol the
actions would be undertaken against the Communists. Then Dong
Kuomintang^think<twiceSabout giving up the War of Resistance
Biwu, a leading member of the CPC, was elected a non-voting
Thus U had succeeded in isolating the Japanese invaders and the
member of the Council. Chiang Kai-shek invited Zhou Enlai for
Chinese traitors to the greatest extent possible. The Communis
talks to solve the problems concerning relations between the two
Party had shown by its actions that it was the mainstay of the
parties. Thus, the second anti-Communist onslaught mounted by
Chinese nation in the War of Resistance, and for that reason its
the Kuomintang was repulsed. Far from achieving the object of
destroying the Communist Party, Chiang’s policy served only to political standing had greatly risen.
bring about his own isolation by revealing the truth to many
people who had formerly harboured illusions about him.
On May 8, 1941, the CPC Central Committee issued a directive
VI THE ARDUOUS STRUGGLE AGAINST
laying down the policy for Party organizations in the great rear ’ MOPPING-UP ’ OPERATIONS
areas: to have well-selected cadres working underground for a WAGED BY THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE
long period, accumulating strength and biding their time. In
January 1942 in Chongqing, at a meeting of the Southern Bureau
BEHIND THE ENEMY LINES
of the CPC Central Committee, Zhou Enlai stated that to build
a strong and militant Party organization, Party members in the In 1941 and 1942, the War of Resistance Against Japan fought
by the peo'e in the enemy's rear areas was at its most difficult
Kuomintang-controlled areas must work and study assiduously.
They should make more friends and hold regular jobs so as to
“The 100-Regiment Campaign of 1940 had been a shock to the
have a place in society as cover. Guided by these correct princi¬
ples, the Party organizations working underground in the KMT- aggressors. In Jan y di ” which aU possible measures
controlled areas managed to preserve, consolidate and expand
wPerae £‘"be ta°£nTnd all militafy capabilities used to maintain
themselves and strike deep roots among the masses, despite the
“nnblic order” in the occupied areas. The Japanese Expedition y
fact that the KMT authorities tried every means to undermine
them.
The ability of the Communist Party to repulse the two on¬ <%a fU Arm.He issued an
slaughts of the Kuomintang and its determination to persevere in
the policy of resistance, unity and progress proved that the
leadership of the CPC Central Committee had become politically
deki Tojof Japan’s Minister of War, declared that the Japanese
mature and that despite the complex circumstances, it could
266 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC ^pter four the war of resistance against japan 267

army would exterminate everyone in north China who refused to . nalling the formal establishment of an international anti-
yield and that it would establish a “Greater East Asia Co¬ racist united front. This created a favourable condition for the
prosperity Sphere” in a sea of blood. Accordingly, the Japanese rhinese people in their efforts to win the War of Resistance.
troops began massacring Chinese soldiers and civilians. In late During this period, China still had to resist the main strength
January, for example, 1,500 Japanese troops “mopped up” the nf Japan’s ground forces. By the end of 1941 Japan’s total forces
had increased to more than 2,400,000 men (300,000 in the navy
village of Panjiayu, Fengrun County, in eastern Hebei Province.
They burned more than 1,000 houses and, in a massacre of and over 2,100,000 in the army). About 400,000 troops were
unparalleled savagery, drove all the villagers — some 1,300, stationed in Japan, another 400,000 were fighting elsewhere m
including women, children and old people — into a courtyard Asia and in the Pacific and the remaining 1,300,000, including
and mowed them down with machine-gun fire. the Kwantung Army stationed in northeast China, were all de¬
On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany launched a full-scale inva¬ ployed in China. If Japan’s main ground troops, which made up
sion of the Soviet Union. The Soviet people immediately began a more than half of the country’s total military strength, had been
heroic defence of their country. Earlier, on April 13, 1941, the available for use elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific region, the
Soviet Union and Japan had signed a treaty of neutrality. The whole war would inevitably have presented quite a different
Soviet Union, which had to cope with a tense situation in Europe, picture The Chinese people’s effort to tie up the main forces ot
wanted to avoid fighting on two fronts. Japan hoped that if it the Japanese army was therefore a great contribution to the
marched into the area south of China, the treaty would remove worldwide anti-fascist war.
any apprehensions for the safety of its rear. In October Hideki
Tojo formed a new cabinet and expanded the aggressive war. In The Struggle Against Mopping-Up Operations
the small hours of the morning of December 8, 1941 (Tokyo
time), Japan made a surprise aerial attack on Pearl Harbour in To turn China into a rear base for the war in the Pacific, the
Hawaii, the U.S. naval base in the Pacific. Thus began the Pacific Japanese aggressors instituted a brutal colonial rule in the occu¬
War between Japan and the United States and Great Britain. pied areas and proceeded to plunder them economically, in
The outbreak of the Soviet-German war and the Pacific War addition, the Japanese and puppet armies were mustered to
greatly enlarged the scale of World War II, which eventually conduct repeated “mopping-up” operations against the anti-
involved 61 countries and regions. China’s War of Resistance Japanese bases in their rear areas led by the Communist Party.
Against Japan became an important component of the worldwide During 1941 and 1942, in the north China base areas, there were
anti-fascist war, coordinated with the efforts of other allied 132 such operations involving between 1,000 and 10,000 men
countries. On the second day of the war in the Pacific, the CPC each time and 27 operations involving between 10,000 and /U,-
Central Committee declared that the Eighth Route Army and the 000 men. Sometimes the “mopping-up” lasted for three or four
New Fourth Army, which were enduring great hardships, would months in a single area, with the Japanese following a policy ot
persist in their War of Resistance in the enemy’s rear in north and “burn all, kill all and loot all.” In some places they even used
central China, thwart his “mopping-up” operations and tic up poison gas and germ warfare to create depopulated zones.
large numbers of his troops. On January 1, 1942, in Washington, In central China, too, the Japanese army launched large-sccde
D.C., twenty-six countries involved in the fight against the Axis attacks against the army and the people in its rear. Alter the
powers, headed by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Pacific war broke out, the Japanese still had 290,000 troops m
Union and China, signed the Declaration of the United Nations, central China. They and the puppet troops set up blockade lines
 chapter four the war of resistance against japan 269
268 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC.
Resistance were difficulties encountered as the people were ad¬
around anti-Japanese base areas in an attempt to consolidate the
vancing and that they were only temporary, because victory was
occupied areas, ensure control over the main transportation lines
drawing near. They could be overcome by the revolutionary
and plunder strategic materials. They also targeted the central
spirit, the spirit that made one seek truth from facts and serve the
and southern parts of Jiangsu Province, “mopping up” the coun¬
people wholeheartedly, the spirit of self-reliance and hard strug¬
tryside again and again.
gle, of unity and solidarity, the spirit that later came to be called
Under the ruthless attacks of the Japanese, the army and the
people behind enemy lines suffered heavy casualties. By 1942 the the “Yan’an spirit.”
The Japanese army, reviewing its experience of fighting in its
Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army had been reduced
rear areas, concluded that it could not depend on force of arms
from 500,000 to about 400,000. Some organs of anti-Japanese
alone to suppress the Communist Party. Vigorous and tenacious
democratic political power in the North China Plain had been
efforts had to be made to combine military measures with civilian
destroyed. The base areas had shrunk, and their total population
ones. Using “mopping-up” as the main form of action, the Jap¬
had fallen from 100 million to less than 50 million. Much of the
anese troops also combed areas to find resistance fighters and
arable land in the enemy’s rear areas was damaged, so it was
“nibbled” at the territory controlled by the Communists, mounted
impossible to maintain normal production. Marauding Japanese
campaigns to “tighten public security” and employed other tac¬
troops also looted grain and domestic animals, causing a famine.
tics. From March 1941 to December 1942, the Japanese army,
This was done deliberately, to ruin the economy of the base areas
having undertaken to “wipe out Communism” and “establish a
and thus deprive the anti-Japanese forces of their means of
new order in East Asia,” carried out no less than five such
survival.
campaigns. They divided all of north China into three classifica¬
During this period, in the Zhongtiao Mountains of southern
tions: “secure zones” (the occupied areas), “quasi-secure zones”
Shanxi Province, in the city of Changsha in Hunan and in
(guerrilla areas where their control was contested) and “non-
Zhejiang and Jiangxi provinces and other areas, the Kuomintang
secure zones” (the anti-Japanese base areas). Different policies
troops also resisted the attacks of the Japanese army. In addition,
were adopted for each classification. Throughout the occupied
they organized a Chinese Expeditionary Army to march into
areas, Chinese traitors were formed into “associations for the
Burma in support of operations conducted by the anti-fascist
preservation of order,” the bao-jia system was tightened and
allies. After the Pacific war broke out, however, since the Chiang
villages were merged and stockaded.- The Japanese also organ¬
Kai-shek clique believed that it could rely on the United States
ized villagers into “self-defence corps,” “garrison forces” and
and Great Britain to fight the war against Japan, it continued to
“security forces.” They checked household registers, issued iden¬
increase the friction between itself and the Communist Party. The
tification cards to “disciplined citizens” and practised collective
Kuomintang government suspended the pay of the Eighth Route
punishment (if one household was found to be anti-Japanese, the
Army and withheld ammunition, bedding, clothing and other
members of ten neighbouring households would be killed as well).
supplies. Moreover, it gathered several hundred thousand troops
They arrested Communist Party members and anti-Japanese ac¬
to encircle the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and en¬
tivists and suppressed all anti-Japanese movements. At the same
force an economic blockade, cutting off support from the outside.
time, the Japanese controlled steel, iron, zinc and other strategic
Although the people in the Communist-led anti-Japanese bases
materials, monopolized or swallowed up Chinese iactoiics and
and the resistance fighters behind enemy lines faced serious
hardships, the Communists were not dismayed. The CPC Central commercial firms, compelled the peasants to plant opium, pil¬
laged great quantities of grain and introduced a rationing system.
Committee made it clear that these difficulties in the War of
270 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC nAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN 271

In addition, they organized “teams of labour for public service” waged to repel the enemy when he attacked the anti-Japanese base
to oppress and exploit the labourers. The Japanese aggressors also areas and to foil his campaigns to “tighten public security.”
spread lies and propaganda to justify the enslavement of the jn central China, the struggle in the enemy’s rear areas was as
Chinese people and their own brutal colonial rule. In the guerrilla intense as in north China. From the spring of 1942 to the end of
areas, the Japanese army built a network of roads and clusters of 1943. the New Fourth Army streamlined its troops, simplified
blockhouses and constructed ditches, walls and watchtowers to its administration and combined armed struggle with unarmed
prevent the people’s armed forces from gaining a foothold in the struggle. The main formations of the regular army watched for
guerrilla areas and the occupied areas. As for the anti-Japanese opportunities to move from one place to another or make a
base areas, the Japanese army unceasingly “nibbled” away at surprise assault on the enemy, while the regional armed forces
them and conducted ruthless and devastating “mopping-up” op¬ and the people’s militia kept up guerrilla warfare in the same
erations. areas. The local Party and government organizations were totally
In view of these ferocious attacks, the Communist Party held militarized, so that they were able to adapt to the circumstances
that the power of the people’s war had to be fully utilized in an of guerrilla warfare. They were dispersed and hidden in the local
all-out struggle against the enemy. The struggle should not consist areas, persisting in the struggle no matter what the situation was.
merely of reckless fighting but should be waged on the political, The New Fourth Army harassed the concentrated enemy troops,
economic, ideological, cultural and other fronts as well. Only while they surrounded and annihilated those that were scattered.
in this way could the enemy be constantly weakened and the The New Fourth Army also made it difficult for the puppet
strength of the resistance forces be preserved and accumulated. troops to return safely from the villages they had attacked to the
The key to achieving this goal was to practise unified leadership places where they were stationed. If the Japanese and puppet
and to coordinate the work in all areas. According to a decision armies concentrated their forces to “mop up’ an area, the people s
on centralized leadership in the base areas made by the CPC armed forces in neighbouring areas would strike simultaneously,
Central Committee on September 1, 1942, the agency of the so that the enemy could occupy one area only at the cost of losing
Central Committee (its bureau or sub-bureau) and the Party others. Thanks to these flexible tactics, the “mopping up” plan of
committees at all levels were to be the supreme leading organs in the Japanese and puppet troops was toiled, and the army and the
the base areas. Secretaries of the Party committees at all levels people in the anti-Japanese base areas became stronger.
were to serve concurrently as political commissars in army units In the course of this hard struggle behind enemy lines, the
at the same levels. In the meantime, the military system, which army and the people devised a number of very effective tactics.
consisted of the main formations of the regular army, the local They included “sparrow” warfare, tunnel warfare, land-mine
formations and the self-defence corps of the people’s militia, warfare, sabotage operations, guerrilla warfare on the lakes and
should be organized in such a way that the main formations of rivers and the use of armed work teams. I hese tactics represented
the regular army were the backbone of the armed forces and the a further development of the people’s war.
other two types of units were strong reserves. When the enemy “Sparrow” warfare was conducted mainly in the mountain
posed a serious threat, the main formations could be separated areas, where the terrain was rough and the paths rugged. Natu¬
and dispersed. When the situation took a favourable turn, the rally, the people’s self-defence armed forces (the people’s militia)
local formations and the people’s militia could be concentrated to were familiar with the local conditions. When the Japanese and
coordinate with, or act as, main formations carrying out large- puppet troops entered the anti-Japanese base areas, the people s
scale operations. In sum, various forms of struggle should be
 272 CHAPTER four the WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN 273
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPc

disperse the next, attacking them everywhere. The enemy, unfa¬ orth China. When the Japanese and puppet troops attacked the
miliar with the terrain, had to rush here and there and take a anti-Japanese base areas there, the soldiers and civilians would
beating on the roads. use a part of their forces to penetrate the enemy’s rear areas.
Tunnel warfare and sabotage operations were conducted in the There they would launch extensive military and political offen¬
plains. The army and the people in the base areas in the North sives, eliminating diehard Chinese traitors, persuading members
China Plain dug trenches in the roads to slow the advance of the of the puppet army and organizations like the “associations for
Japanese mechanized forces, thus protecting their own retreat. As the preservation of order” to cross over to the anti-Japanese side
the circumstances worsened, each household in a village would or educating them so they would work for the people insofar as
dig a cellar or burrow, and connecting tunnels would be built circumstances allowed. These people’s armed forces gradually
between them. These tunnels were later developed into extensive developed into armed work teams operating deep inside occupied
networks linking many villages and suitable for attacking, hiding territory. Each of them, not only a fighter but also a propagandist
and moving from place to place. The Japanese soldiers tried to and an organizer, was capable of functioning independently —
fill the tunnels with smoke, water and poison gas, but all these fighting, educating the masses and mobilizing them. By combin¬
methods were without avail. By depending on the tunnels, single ing military struggle with political struggle and overt struggle
villages and even individuals could effectively attack the enemy with covert struggle, they were able to conduct extensive educa¬
and protect themselves. tion among the masses, expose the enemy’s true colours, gather
In both mountain areas and plains, land mines were used. The information, eliminate traitors and combat spies. They disrupted
people made mines ot difterent kinds out of local resources such the order of the Japanese and puppet regimes, won over members
as scrap iron, glass bottles, clay pottery and even stones. They of the puppet army and organizations, built secret armed forces
would lay these mines at the entrance to a village or a road, at a and established dual regimes, or covert base areas. Thus, areas in
door or in the corner of a courtyard, endangering the lives of the the very heart of the territory controlled by the Japanese and
Japanese and puppet soldiers as soon as they entered a village or puppet armies were turned into torward positions tor attacking
a house. The army and the people even laid mines under the exits them. In the vicinity of the blockhouses, the enemy could hear
ot the Japanese blockhouses, otten killing or wounding enemies members of the armed work teams shouting political propaganda.
who came out and shaking the morale of the others. The members also called on the families of soldiers in the puppet
Guerrilla warfare on the water was waged largely on the river army, asking them to urge their men to give up evil and return
networks of central China. Thousands of soldiers and civilians, to good as soon as possible. When the Japanese and puppet troops
taking advantage of the varied terrain of rivers, lakes and branch¬ came to loot the grain in a village, the armed work teams would
ing streams, built dams and underwater barriers to make it appear in time to help the villagers resist and protect their stores.
difficult for the motorboats of the Japanese army to navigate. Under these circumstances, the Japanese army could have no
With small, silent wooden boats that could go everywhere in the sense of security even in the “secure zones.”
vast water areas, they themselves found opportunities to strike the Although the Japanese and puppet troops made desperate
enemy heavy blows. attacks, it was inevitable that they would be drowned in the vast
The armed work teams were organized by the army and people ocean of the people’s war. During 1941 and 1942 the Eighth
behind enemy lines in an attempt to gain the initiative in the Route Army, the New Fourth Army, the guerrilla forces and the
struggle against the mopping-up operations. In the spring of 1942, people’s militia fought more than 42,000 engagements with the
the policy ol advancing as the enemy advanced was initiated in enemy troops, killing, wounding or capturing 331,000 of them. In
 274 CHAPTER four the war of resistance against japan 275
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

particular, in their struggle against mopping-up operations be¬ last group of soldiers through the enemy lines, Zuo Quan was
hind enemy lines, the army and the people tied up or eliminated struck by a bullet and gave his life for his country. Thousands
a large number of Japanese troops, making a major contribution upon thousands of such national heroes emerged in the War of
to the protracted war of resistance against Japanese aggression Resistance. The revolutionary spirit of the Communist-led army
and giving great support to the anti-fascist war fought by the and people in the enemy’s rear areas — the spirit that bade them
Allies. unite as one, resist aggression and defy brute force — was the
In the struggle in occupied territory, soldiers and civilians alike source of strength that brought them victory in the struggle
fought indomitably and performed countless acts of heroism. On against the enemy’s mopping-up operations. The Chinese people
August 1, 1941, for example, puppet troops encircled Dongxin will always remember the great deeds performed by the heroes
Village in Xianxian County in central Hebei Province. They tried and martyrs in the War of Resistance Against Japan.
to force the villagers to identify the mother of Ma Benzhai, the
brave and capable commander of the Hui Nationality Detach¬ Overcoming Economic Difficulties and Initiating
ment. A few villagers who refused to inform against her were the Great Production Campaign
killed on the spot; others were cruelly tortured. Ma’s mother, who
could not tolerate seeing people beaten or killed for her sake, During that hard time, the CPC Central Committee adopted a
stepped forward bravely. The enemy alternated threats and in¬ number of effective policies to overcome difficulties and consoli¬
ducements to compel her to write a letter persuading her son to date the anti-Japanese base areas. To lighten the burden on the
surrender. She denounced them scathingly: “I am Chinese, and I people, the troops were streamlined and administration was sim¬
do not know the word ‘surrender.’” She remained unyielding and plified1. The “three thirds system” of political power and the
starved herself to death. In another incident, on September 25, policy of reducing land rents and interest rates were further
1941, on Langya Mountain near the Yishui River in western implemented to arouse the enthusiasm of the peasants and unite
Hebei Province, under attack by Japanese arid puppet troops, five people of all social strata in the War of Resistance. In addition,
soldiers of the Eighth Route Army — Ma Baoyu, Hu Delin, Hu to keep closer relations between the army and the government
Fucai, Song Xueyi and Ge Zhenlin — deliberately drew the and between the army and the people, a movement was launched
enemy fire on themselves to allow the members of Party and in the army to support the government and cherish the people and
government organizations and the people in the area to move to a movement was organized among the masses to support the army
a place of safety. They retreated to a steep cliff and from this and give preferential treatment to the families of revolutionary
vantage point repelled four successive assaults by the Japanese soldiers and martyrs.
troops. When their last bullet had been fired, they resolutely In the effort to overcome the grave difficulties in material lile
smashed their guns and leaped from the cliff. Three fell to their and to persevere in the War ot Resistance without unduly increas¬
death. The other two were caught on the branches of trees and ing the people’s burden, the great production campaign in the
eventually made their escape. The five soldiers became known as anti-Japanese base areas played a decisive role. The general
the Five Heroes of Langya Mountain. Again, on May 25, 1942, principle of this campaign was to develop the economy and ensure
in a critical situation in which the General Headquarters of the supplies. Bearing in mind that the rural economy was based on
Eighth Route Army stationed in Liaoxian County was encircled individual producers, that the countryside was divided by the
by the enemy, Zuo Quan, the deputy chief of staff, broke through enemy politically and that it was in a state of guerrilla warfare,
the encirclement at the head of his men. As he was leading the the CPC Central Committee formulated the following policies:
276 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC hapter FOUR THE war of resistance against japan

— On production: first priority should be given to agriculture lhe wasteland. At the same time, tens of thousands of people
but animal husbandry, industry, handicrafts, transportation and “P hthe Party government, army, schools and other circles in
commerce should also be developed; Wa!iid in the production campaign. Mao Zedong, Zhu De,
— On the relationship between the public and private sectors: Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi and other leaders took part in productive
both public and private interests, both the army and the people,
should be taken into account; 13 This campaign in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region
— On the relationship between the higher and lower economic and in the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines was
departments: leadership should be centralized and management highly successful. The output value of agriculture and industry
decentralized; and the volume of commerce increased rapidly, the tax burden
— On the relationship between production and consumption: ™ the people was greatly alleviated and the material conditions
the guiding principle should be to work hard in production and "^soldiers and civflians were markedly improved. During
practise strict economy in consumption; the three years from 1942 through 1944, more than two milion
— On organizing economic development: cooperation and mu¬
,nu (over 130,000 hectares) of wasteland were brought unde
tual help should be promoted, emulation should be encouraged in
cultivation in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Regiom By
production and rewards should be established for “heroes of
1945 the majority of peasants in the region had saved out of
labour.”
three years’ harvests enough grain to last them for an additio
Economic self-sufficiency of the army, government organiza¬
year. Some had even saved that much out of a Singhe years
tions and schools was a creation of the production campaign in
the anti-Japanese base areas. The idea that the army should be harvest In 1944 the 359lh Brigade ot the Eighth Route Army,
self-supporting appeared to go against the principle of the division which had done this and had been self-suffictcnt m other basic
of labour and to be a step backward. In essence, however, it was necessities as well, was declared a model for lhe whole army.
progressive. It enabled the army to relieve the scarcity of basic In 1941 the “public grain” collected Horn the peasants m the
necessities, to improve its living conditions, to lessen the burden region as a form of taxation made up 13.58 percent of the total
of taxation on the people and still to have sufficient resources to yield, but in 1942 the proportion dropped to 11.14 a"d
sustain a protracted war. The CPC Central Committee took the in 1943 to less than 9 percent. From 1943 on, most of the
lead in carrying out this policy in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Party and government organizations in all anti-Iapanese base
Border Region. At the beginning of 1941, it ordered the 359th areas behind enemy lines could grow enough grain and veget
Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army to ablcs to supply their own needs for three or even six momhs_
march into Nanniwan, a region not far from Yan’an, the seat of The tax burden on the people constituted onU about ^ percen
the CPC Central Committee, that was desolate and uninhabited of their total revenue. In terms of the standard of living a
but endowed with fertile soil. In March, after Zhu De had made
the time, the cadres had sufficient food and clothing and
a field investigation, Wang Zhen led the 359th Brigade into
had been provided mainly by the work of their own hands.
Nanniwan to reclaim the wasteland and plant grain. Under
The great production campaign was a paean to self-reliance. It
extremely difficult circumstances, lacking funds and tools for
supported the hard struggle in the enemy’s rear areas, and at the
production and relying only on themselves, the officers and men
samT time it served to train numbers of cadres m economic
of the brigade dug cave dwellings to live in, surveyed the areas to
be reclaimed, learned farming techniques, made tools and opened development and give the CPC some experience in this area.
278 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPc -hapter four the war of resistance against japan 279

VII. THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT Communist-led revolutionary forces so that they could maintain
their autocratic rule after the victory. In the spring of 1943, the
IN AREAS RULED BY THE KMT KMT launched the third anti-Communist onslaught. In his book
China’s Destiny, Chiang Kai-shek preached Chinese fascism and
From 1943 on, the Allies in the anti-fascist war advanced openly opposed Communists and liberals, implying that the Com¬
rapidly toward victory. On the European front, following its munist Party and all other revolutionary forces would be eradi¬
victory in the battle of Stalingrad, the Soviet army moved on cated within two years. Soon after this, the KMT diehards took
to an all-out counteroffensive, driving deep into the German- advantage of the dissolution of the Communist International in
occupied areas and into Germany itself. The British and Ameri¬ May 1943 to demand that the Chinese Communist Party be
can troops landed at Normandy, opening up the second front in disbanded and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region abol¬
Europe. On May 8, 1945, the German fascists surrendered uncon¬ ished. They secretly ordered a massive concentration of troops
ditionally. On the Asian and Pacific fronts, the United States
stationed in northwest China under the command of Hu Zongnan
launched a frog-hopping attack in the Pacific Ocean, while the
to prepare for an attack on the region.
Chinese and British troops organized the battle of north Burma
To halt this third anti-Communist onslaught by the Kuomin¬
and captured the city of Myitkyina. The CPC-led War of Resist¬
tang diehards, the CPC launched a vigorous political counterat¬
ance behind enemy lines entered a new stage of development. In
tack. Liberation Daily, the official newspaper of the CPC Central
1943 the army and the people in north China, having survived
Committee published in Yan’an, carried articles criticizing Chi¬
the difficult years 1941 and 1942, were able to launch an offen¬
na’s Destiny and exposing the KMT diehards’ plan to launch a
sive against the Japanese army. In 1944 all base areas in
civil war. On July 4 and 6, 1943, Zhu De telegraphed Hu
north, central and south China opened regional counteroffen¬
Zongnan and Chiang Kai-shek respectively to protest Hu’s armed
sives against the Japanese and puppet armies, extending the
provocation and to appeal for unity. On July 9, 30,000 people in
existing base areas and marching into the enemy’s rear areas to
Yan’an held a rally and adopted a statement opposing civil war
open up new ones in Henan, on the Hunan-Guangdong border
and calling for unity in the fight against Japan. On July 10, to
and on the Jiangsu-Zhejiang-Anhui border. By the spring of 1945,
conceal his plan to attack the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border
there were nineteen Communist-led anti-Japanese base areas,
Region, Hu Zongnan arranged a reception for Zhou Enlai, who
covering 950,000 square kilometres and having a population of
95.5 million. The Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and was returning from Chongqing to Yan’an via Xi’an. Zhou an¬
local people’s armed forces had increased to 910,000 and the nounced at the reception that he had asked Hu Zongnan person¬
people’s militia to 2.2 million. ally if he had sent his troops defending the Yellow River west to
prepare an attack on the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.
“Deputy Commander Hu told me,” he said, “that he had no
Halting the Third Anti-Communist Onslaught
intention of attacking the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region
While the CPC-led War of Resistance in the enemy’s rear was and that the troops under his command would take no such
entering a new phase, the Kuomintang authorities in the main action. I was very happy to hear this, and I believe everyone else
took a wait-and-see attitude, avoiding engagements with the Jap¬ will be happy, too.”28 Thus Hu’s scheme to attack the region was
anese. On the one hand, they hoped to rely on Britain, the United made known to the public. On July 12 Mao Zedong wrote tor
States and the Soviet Union to win the war; on the other hand, Liberation Daily an editorial entitled “Some Pointed Questions
they were still trying to eliminate, or at least weaken, the for the Kuomintang,” bringing to light the KMT’s moves to wreck
 chapter FOUR the war of resistance against JAPAN 281
280 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
nrruot and degenerate and eventually reached a grave crisis
unity and calling on the people of the whole country to prevent
ly The corrupt and reactionary nature of the KMT was manifest
a civil war. Eventually, the KMT’s third anti-Communist on¬
slaught was brought to a halt before it could develop into a
in politically,Cth°fI&iomintang persisted in one-party dictatorship
large-scale armed attack. , -lengthened the secret service and the bao-jia system. The
KMT secret agents, ignoring legal procedures, clandestinely ar-

The Rise of the Patriotic and Democratic Movement «fed many Communists, revolutionary young people and pa¬
in Areas Ruled by the Kuomintang triotic democrats, cruelly torturing them or killing them at wiU.
The people were deprived of their rights of free speech, assembly
Nevertheless, the KMT did not abandon its one-party dictator¬ Thi Sication and not even their lives and property were safe.
ship and, indeed, became even more autocratic. After the out¬ A commentary in the American newspaper Evening and Sunday
break of the Pacific war, Chiang Kai-shek was appointed supreme v"d that the Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-shek who
commander of the ground and air forces of the allied armies in
arrogated all power to himself and whose position was as high a.
the China theatre (which included Vietnam, Thailand and other
that of emperors in the past, was controlled by Chen Lifu andrins
countries). General Joseph W. Stilwell was sent by the United
brother Chen Guofu, who believed that the thinkingof rndtv d
States to serve as Chiang’s chief of staff. After his arrival in
uals should be dominated by the state, a view that might well be
China, Stilwell realized the role the CPC was playing in the war
with Japan and believed that the Kuomintang and the Commu¬ ^Economically, the four families of Chiang Kai-shek, foreign
nist Party should cooperate in the war effort. However, as the
Minister T V. Soong, Finance Minister H.H Kung and the Chen
anti-fascist forces worldwide were making good progress, the U.S.
brothers, which represented bureaucrat-capitalism in China con
government began considering what was to be done after the war.
trolled the country’s main lifelines by takmg advantage of tie
In accordance with its overall strategy for the postwar period of
privileges granted them. By monopolizing banking and com
contending for world hegemony and in line with its aim of
merce, grabbing land, swallowing up factories and mines con
replacing Japan as the dominant imperialist power in China, it
trolling transportation and increasing ahead y-exorbitant tax
adopted new policies towards China. In January 1943 the United
es they rapidly extended comprador and feudal bureaucrat
States signed a bilateral treaty with the KMT government abro¬
capitalfsm andmade huge fortunes in thenudst: of nationa
gating U.S. extraterritorial rights in China, so as to indicate U.S.
calamity. In 1944 the property of T.V. Soong in the United State
support for the KMT government and enhance the latter’s inter¬
alone exceeded U.S.S47 million. The expansion of bureaucrat
national standing. From then on, the United States’ China policy
capitalism greatly worsened the situation in the areas^ under
gradually changed from favouring cooperation between the KMT
Kuomintang rule, where the economy crumbled, pnces skyrock
and the CPC to supporting Chiang and opposing the Communists.
eted and the people, living in destitution, boiled with resentment
In the autumn of 1944, the U.S. government recalled Stilwell and
But it was in military affairs that the weaknesses of the
sent General Albert C. Wedemeyer to take over. Patrick J. Hurley
Kuomintang were even more evident. In the face of attacks
was sent to China as a personal envoy of the President and then
launched by the Japanese, the KMT army, whose morale was low
was made Ambassador to China. Hurley’s mission was to prevent
almost lost its capacity to fight. Beginning from April 944 in
the KMT government from collapsing and to help Chiang unify
order to open up north-south transportation lines, Japan renewed
the country. After the shift in United States policy, the KMT
its strategic attacks on Henan, Hunan, Guangxi and other prov
government, feeling secure with U.S. support, became increasing-
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN 283
282

inces along the Beiping-Hankou, Guangzhou-Hankou and of Resistance Against Japan; it could neither defend China's

Hunan-Guangxi railway lines. The Japanese army named these WHenendence nor promote its economic development^It was only
in Jfsmcle to progress. This disillusionment with the Kuomm-
attacks its No. 1 Operation. In these engagements, all but a few of
f was a major reason for the rise of a patriotic and democratic
the KMT troops were defeated at the first encounter or fled
without a battle. The KMT armies were utterly routed. During movement in the areas under its control.
Tnother reason was that the Communist Party had united with
April and May 1944 Japanese troops attacking Henan occupied
Zhengzhou and Xuchang, opening up the Beiping-Hankou Rail¬ the democratic parties and with unaff.liated patriotic de™°"a«
in the Struggle against the Kuomintang. During the period of the
way. In June and August those attacking Hunan took Changsha
and Hengyang and then went on to attack Guangxi, seizing
lend anticommunist onslaught, the KMT diehards persecuted
notonly Communists but also non-Commumst patriots Ma Yin
Guilin and Nanning in November. The Japanese pursued the
chu a well-known economist, was arrested and sent to jail fo
fleeing KMT troops as far as Dushan County, not far from
rebuking the wealthy families for their control of capital. The
Guiyang, capital of Guizhou Province. This posed a grave threat
KMT authorities also cancelled the membership in the Peoples
to Chongqing in neighbouring Sichuan Province. The KMT au¬
Political Council of Shen Junru, Zhang Bojun, Shi Liang and
thorities then sent the troops it had stationed in Burma and those
other prominent democrats. The contradictions between the
blockading the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region to rein¬
middle-of-the-roaders and the Kuomintang ruling clique became
force its army in Guizhou. In early December, Dushan was
increasingly acute. More and more middle-of-the-roaders began
recovered, but the Japanese plan to open up land transportation
to understand the CPC’s policies and to voice their support for
had been realized. In eight months, the Kuomintang authorities
the Party. After the Southern Anhui Incident, the high-handed
had lost more than 200,000 square kilometres of land and 146
policies of the Kuomintang diehards, instead of estranging t e
cities in Henan, Hunan, Guangxi, Guangdong and Fujian prov¬
great number of middle-of-the-roaders from the Communist Par¬
inces. Consequently, more than 60 million of their countrymen
ty, drew them closer. In the struggle to save the nation, the Cl C
were subjected to great suffering under the cruel oppression of
fought alongside these people through thick and thin. On Mart
Japanese imperialism.
19, 1941, the China Federation of Democratic Political Groups,
On October 31, 1944, when the KMT had been utterly defeated
whose social base was the middle bourgeoisie and the upper petty
on all fronts, some 4,000 men from the 359th Brigade of the
bourgeoisie, was founded in Chongqing. Because the KM 1 au¬
Eighth Route Army, with Wang Zhen as commander and Wang
thorities created various difficulties for the Federation, it was
Shoudao as political commissar, were organized into a detach¬
unable to function openly in Chongqing and had to send some o
ment to march south from Yan’an. Their mission was to enter
its members to work in Hong Kong, where they received support
enemy-occupied territory in Henan, Hubei, Hunan and Guang¬
from the local CPC office affiliated with the Southern Bureau of
dong and establish new anti-Japanese base areas there.
the Central Committee. On September 18 the Federation started
The defeat of the Kuomintang troops in Henan, Hunan and
publishing its official newspaper, the Guangming News?. On Octo¬
Guangxi, especially when compared to the victories of the Allies
ber 10 it published a summary of its views on the current
elsewhere, exposed the corruption and incompetence of the KMT
situation and a declaration of the establishment ot the Federation.
government and completely discredited it. The defeats at the
In these articles it maintained that the KMT government should
front also formed a sharp contrast with the situation in the
resolutely resist Japan, strengthen unity, put an end to one-party
enemy’s rear. People saw what was happening and drew their own
rule, introduce a constitutional system, practise democracy an
conclusions: the Kuomintang ruling clique was unable to win the
 285
284 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter FOUR the WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN

guarantee the people’s democratic freedoms. The cooperative paotiations with the Kuomintang. Starting on May 4, 1944, Lin
relationship between the Communist Party and the democratic rouu the Central Committee’s representative, held several taiks
parties was further strengthened as they struggled side by side. with Zhang Zhizhong and other representatives of the KMT in
In the first half of 1944, the struggle for democracy in the areas arld Chongqing. The Communist Party demanded that
under Kuomintang control became unprecedentedly dynamic. L Kuomintang acknowledge the democratic rights of the anti-
During January and February of that year Huang Yanpei, a Japanese base areas, enlarge the armies led by the CPC, give th
well-known figure in industrial and commercial circles, convened neople democracy and freedom and grant the democratic parties
in Chongqing a forum on democratic constitutional government. fegal status. Owing to the KMT’s unjustifiable obstructions, he
He advanced ten proposals, including that a provisional constitu¬ talks came to nothing. As the failed talks coincided with the
tion be adopted, that the freedom of the people be respected, that KMT’s crushing military defeat, popular indignation increased.
politics be renewed, that corrupt practices be abolished and that The withdrawal and defeat of the KMT troops, which started
the people be mobilized and supplied with arms. These proposals in Henan and Hunan provinces, fully revealed the corruption and
evoked a positive response from people of all walks of life. The incompetence of the Kuomintang government. People of all per¬
CPC Central Committee decided to participate in the movement suasions, including many middle-of-the-roaders * *
for constitutional government and asked Party members to unite to increase unity in the fight against Japan, the KMT s one-party
with all democrats so as to defeat the Japanese aggression and dictatorship be abolished and democratic politics introduced^
establish a democratic state. In May of the same year, the China This was something new. On September 15, 1944, at a meeting of
Federation of Democratic Political Groups published another the People’s Political Council, Lin Boqu, following instiuctions
statement on the current situation, denouncing the Kuomintang from the CPC Central Committee, submitted a formal proposal
for eliminating dissidents and for refusing to carry out democrat¬ for the establishment of a democratic coalition government:
ic reform. In September the Federation was renamed the China “We hope that the Kuomintang will immediately end the
Democratic League and admitted many people who had no party domination of a single party and that the National Government
affiliations. In the meantime, a group of writers and artists set will call a conference on state affairs, in which representatives of
forth three objectives for their colleagues, namely, to resist Japan, all parties, anti-Japanese armies, local governments and peoples
to unite and to advocate democracy. More than fifty writers and organizations will participate, to discuss the establishment of a
other intellectuals, including Zhang Shenfu and Cao Yu, held coalition government to be formed by all anti-Japanese parties.
a meeting demanding freedom of speech and publication. In The new government, by claiming the world’s attention, |nsP^S
Guangxi, Liu Yazi, Li Jishen and other enlightened members of the people of the whole country and raising the morale of the
the Kuomintang established the Anti-Japanese Association of army at the front, will help strengthen national unity, bring
Cultural Circles in Guilin, calling upon the KMT to mobilize the together all talented people and concentrate all the anti-Japanese
masses, resist the Japanese and uproot defeatism. forces. Thus, in coordination with the counteroffensive to be
launched by the Allied armies, we shall be able to defeat the
Japanese aggressors.”29 Lin’s speech to the Council was published
A Proposal for the Establishment of
in full in New China Daily. Afterwards, the CPC submitted in
a Democratic Coalition Government
written form the proposal for the establishment of a democratic
To persevere in the anti-Japanese war being waged by the coalition government. On October 10 in Yanan, Z ou n ai
entire nation, the CPC Central Committee decided to renew delivered a speech explaining the specific steps and methods tor
 287
charter FOUR the war of resistance AGAINST JAPAN
286 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
_ ,. a flexible approach to negotiations, the CPC also
carrying it out. I^TdetermSed struggle agatnst the U.S. policy of sup^rt-
This proposal produced strong repercussions at home and Chiang and opposing the Communists. When Hurley first
abroad. The Japanese army was continuing to attack Guangxi mE to China the U.S. government tried to prevent the KM T
from Hunan. The question of uniting the country to check the “ ™ent from collapsing. Realizing that the CPC had become
enemy attack assumed the greatest urgency and was of concern fhJ mo” dynamic force in China, while the Kuomintang and the
to everyone. During September and October 1944 the democratic N tS Government were falling apart day by day, it asked
movement in the Kuomintang-controlled areas expanded day by Hurley to mediate between the two parties. It also understock
day. More than 500 patriotic democrats from various circles in that the Communist Party led an army of high combat effective
Chongqing, including Zhang Lan, Shen Junru and Feng Yuxiang, ness and that, since the KMT government was corrupt, if a civil
held a meeting calling for democracy and the termination of the war with the Communists broke out before the Japanese were
KMT’s one-party dictatorship. Dong Biwu also attended the defeated the Kuomintang would face the danger of dtssolut
meeting. Seventy-two prominent people, including Soong Ching The United States therefore hoped that Chiang Kai-shek would
Ling, Guo Moruo and Zhang Lan, sponsored a memorial meeting ahow alittle democracy so as to induce
for the patriotic journalist Zou Taofen, who, being persecuted by hand over its army to the Kuomintang. It believed that if the CPC
the Kuomintang, had died in exile the previous summer. (Accord¬ did so, when the anti-Japanese war was over cl!iaI18 s dommant
ing to Zou’s wish, unrealized during his lifetime, the CPC Central position could be stabilized. In the meantime the United States
Committee admitted him posthumously as a Party member.) £u,d avoid conflict with the Soviet Union on tlxi China quesUom
Several thousand people from all walks of life attending the On November 7, 1944, Hurley flew to Yan an, where he indicated
meeting unanimously denounced the Kuomintang for trampling his consent to the CPC’s proposal to abolish the one-party dicta
on democracy and persecuting patriots and declared their deter¬ torship of the Kuomintang and to form a democratic coahtion
mination to struggle against its fascist regime. More than 2,000 government. After three days of negotiations. Hurley and the
people from five universities including West China Union Uni¬ CPC leaders drew up a draft agreement between the National
versity and Jinling University and twelve learned societies in the Government and the Kuomintang on the one hand andi the
city of Chengdu, Sichuan, held a symposium on state affairs and Communist Party of China on the other However, the^agreement
demanded that the Kuomintang government and its supreme was rejected by Chiang Kai-shek, and Hurley himself later aban
command be reorganized and a democratic coalition government doned his endorsement of a democratic coahuongovernmentm
established. On October 10 the China Democratic League pub¬ the various contacts and negotiations between the KMT and he
lished a declaration on the final stage of the anti-Japanese war, CPC Hurley’s position was that a measure of democracy could
demanding the immediate abolition of the one-party system, the be permitted only after the CPC had turned its troops over to the
establishment of a multiparty coalition regime and the institution KMT On April 2, 1945, when this political manoeuvring had
of political democracy. Under the influence of the Communist foiled, Hurley announced that the U.S. government would coop¬
Party, the progressive forces were uniting more closely, and the erate only with the KMT, not with the CPC. rmnneine
middle-of-the-roaders were becoming politically active and in¬ Now that the U.S. policy of supporting Chiang aI,d 0PP°sing
clined towards progressive views. The patriotic and democratic the Communists was openly avowed, the reactionary K g
movement in the areas under Kuomintang rule was increasingly ernment became even more arrogant, and the likelihood of civil
focused on a definite political objective — the establishment of a war”n China increased. From May 5 to 21, 1945, the Kuomintang
coalition government.
 288 289
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter four THE war of resistance against japan

held its 6th National Congress. At this congress, the KMT refused nnlvsed the kinds of thinking that were at the root of the “Left”
to form a democratic coalition government and decided to persist Right mistakes of the past. Accordingly, there were still
in its dictatorship and prepare for civil war. aHTerences of opinion with regard to the Party’s guiding ideology,
Neither the machinations of the U.S. imperialists nor the and these continued to be damaging to the revolutionary cause at
threats and deceit of Chiang Kai-shek could halt the advance of rertain times and places and in certain respects.
the Chinese people in their drive for independence, democracy if a mistake were not truly recognized as such, it would
and liberation. However, they foreboded another long and bitter inevitably be repeated in various forms under other conditions.
struggle to be waged after the victory over Japan. The CPC Central Committee therefore deemed it necessary to
conduct a rectification movement within the Party, using the
correct stand, viewpoint and method to overcome erroneous ones
VIII. THE RECTIFICATION MOVEMENT At the same time, the Party was in the midst ol the most difficult
period of the War of Resistance. A rectification movement was
In the spring of 1942, the Communist Party of China launched also indispensable to achieve ideological and political unity and
a rectification movement throughout the Party. Its purpose was ensure that the Party acted in unison to win final victory over the
to combat subjectivism in order to rectify the style of study, to Japanese. , _ . ~

combat sectarianism in order to rectify the style in Party relations In 1938 the 6th Plenary Session of the 6th Central Commit¬
and to combat Party stereotypes in order to rectify the style of tee of the CPC helped correct the Party’s ideological line by
writing. 1 he movement not only added an important page to the setting the task of “applying Marxism concretely in China. In
annals of the CPC but was also an innovation in the international May 1941 at a cadres’ meeting in Yan’an, Mao Zedong made
communist movement. a report entitled “Reform Our Study,” in which he said, The
Why did the Party need a rectification movement? Because it twenty years of the Communist Party of China have been
had to adapt to the actual situation in which it was leading the twenty years in which the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism
Chinese revolution forward. The movement was initiated against has become more and more integrated with the concrete prac¬
a specific historical background. tice of the Chinese revolution.”-0 He criticized incisively the
The Communist Party had existed for more than twenty years. “subjectivist style” of some Party members who were unwilling
During those years, the Chinese revolution had not only won to carry on systematic and thorough investigation and study ot
tremendous victories but also suffered grave setbacks; thus, the the specific conditions ... and issue orders on no other basis
Party had ample experience of both success and failure. The than their scanty knowledge and ‘It must be so because it seems
dogmatist errors made by Wang Ming and his faction had been so to me.’”31 He proposed that the Party should reform the
the most damaging. From the Zunyi Meeting in 1935 to the 6th method and the system of study. From September 10 to October
Plenary Session of the 6th Central Committee of the CPC in 1938, 22 1941, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee
the Party criticized and corrected the “Left” mistakes Wang had held an’enlarged meeting to study the Party’s history and
made during the later stage of the Agrarian Revolutionary War summarize its experience, so that the members could distin¬
and the Right-deviationist mistakes he had made in the initial guish between right and wrong political lines and achieve unity
period of the anti-Japanese war. However, the Party had not had of understanding. Thus, conditions for a rectification movement
time for the entire membership to make a systematic review of were gradually growing ripe. . — .
its historical experience and, in particular, it had not thoroughly The Party-wide rectification movement was launched in reo-
 291
290 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPc CHAPTER FOUR THE. WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN

ruary 1942, when Mao Zedong gave two speeches, “Rectify the means to study.... And in order to do that we must rely not
Party’s Style of Work” and “Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing.” ^subTective imagination, not on momentary enthusiasm, not on
The Central Committee set up a general study committee under Hfe ess books, but on facts that exist objectively; we must appro¬
Mao’s direction to provide guidance for the movement. The bate the material in detail and, guided by the general principles
movement had five stages: understanding the importance of the of Marxism-Leninism, draw correct conclusions from it. - In his
movement, examining the style of study, examining the Party’s snebh “Rectify the Party's Style of Work,” Mao called upon all
style of work, examining the style of writing and reviewing the Party members “to learn how to apply the Marxist-Leninist stand
Party’s historical experience. This was a Marxist-Leninist educa¬ viewpoint and method in the serious study of China s history, and
tional movement throughout the Party — in other words, a of China’s economics, politics, military affairs and culture and
movement in which the Party’s style of work was brought into to analyse every problem concretely on the basis of detailed
line with the guiding principles of Marxism-Leninism. material and then draw theoretical conclusions.
The most important task of the rectification was to combat According to Mao, stereotyped Party writing was an expression
subjectivism. of subjectivism. If it was not corrected, no vigorous ^vo'Htionary
Historically, subjectivism had dominated the Party for quite a thinking could be inspired, the spirit of seeking truth from facts
long time. The Right and “Left” opportunist mistakes that had could not prevail and subjectivism could still find a place to hide.
been repeatedly made all stemmed from subjectivism, which Therefore, if the Party wanted to root out subjectivism, it must
separated theory from practice and failed to conform subjective also put an end to stereotyped Party writing.
thinking to objective reality. The leading cadres who had made Another major task in the rectification movement was to
such mistakes did not truly understand the reality but tried to combat sectarianism. , . , . .
find solutions to problems in books, in their subjective wishes or To achieve unity in the Party, unity of thinking alone was not
in the experience of other countries. As a result, the Party had enough- it had to be guaranteed by unity of organization. When
been seriously damaged and the Chinese revolution had almost subjectivist thinking had been dominant in ‘he Party, sectarian¬
collapsed. Since for a long time the ideological roots of these ism had inevitably been practised organizationally, and dissidents
mistakes had not been recognized, the mistakes had been fre¬ who persisted in proceeding from reality had been attacked. After
quent. After the Zunyi Meeting, however, the CPC Central the Zunyi Meeting, sectarianism was no longer dominant u
Committee represented by Mao Zedong, acting firmly but flexi¬ remnants of it still existed and found expression in both the
bly in accordance with objective reality, formulated and put into Party’s internal and external relations.
practice lines, principles and policies suitable to the actual condi¬ The remnants of inner-Party sectarianism appeared in vari¬
tions. It soon enabled the Chinese revolution to enter a new phase. ous forms, such as the “mountain-stronghold” mentality and
These facts showed that it was a matter of life and death for the disunity.34 In his speech “Rectify the Party’s Style of Work, Mao
Party to correct the subjectivism that dominated its guiding Zedong first criticized the assertion of “independence, because
ideology. it was most harmful to the revolution:
In his report “Reform Our Study,” Mao Zedong emphasized in Some comrades, see only the interests of the part and not the
particular the importance of “seeking truth from facts.” He whole; they always put undue stress on that part ot the work lor
explained what this meant: which’they themselves are responsible and always wish to subor¬
“Facts” are all the things that exist objectively, “truth” means dinate the interests of the whole to the interests of their own
their internal relations, that is, the laws governing them, and “to part.... We should encourage comrades to take the interests ot the
 293
pour THE war of resistance against japan
292 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAP* ek

H, we ought to welcome it. and we should learn from their

whole into account. Every Party member, every branch of work,
rlg ’ ™ints if it is wrong, we should let them finish what they
every statement and every action must proceed from the interests
^ny^and then patiently explain thtngs to them. A Commu-
of the whole Party; it is absolutely impermissible to violate this
r must never be opinionated or domineering, or think that he
principle. Those who assert this kind of “independence” are
" oT in everything while others are good in nothing, he must
usually wedded to the doctrine of “me first”.... Although in words
’ ever shut himself up in his little room, or brag and boast and
they profess respect for the Party, in practice they put themselves
" rd it over others... Affairs of state, are the public affairs of the
first and the Party second.... Whenever they are put in charge of
whole nation and not the private affairs of a single party or group.
a branch of work, they assert their “independence.” With this
Hence Communists have the duty to cooperate democratically
aim, they draw some people in, push others out and resort to
with non-Party people and have no right to exclude them and
boasting, flattery and touting among the comrades, thus import¬
monopolize everything. The Communist Party is a POU^'^rty
ing the vulgar style of the bourgeois political parties into the
which works in the interests of the nation and people and which
Communist Party. It is their dishonesty that causes them to come
has absolutely no private ends to pursue. It should be supervised
to grief. Mao was unequivocal in his condemnation of sectarian¬ S the people and must never go against their will. Its member
ism: “We must build a centralized, unified Party,” he said, “and should be among the people and with them and must not set
make a clean sweep of all unprincipled factional struggles. We
must combat individualism and sectarianism so as to enable '^iTthTrectification movement, the Central Committee paid
our whole Party to march in step and fight for one common great attention to strengthening the Party ideologically, es^aal
goal.”35 lv through ideological and political education of the members-
Sectarianism still manifested itself in the Party’s external rela¬ Among others, Chen Yun’s How to Be a Communist Party Mem
tions also. Some leading Party members had no respect for her and Liu Shaoqi's How to Be a Good Communist were regarded
non-Party people and refused to cooperate with them, showing a as important documents for study. They did much to heighten the
“closed-door” mentality that had emerged during the time when
members’ Party spirit. .
“Left” opportunism was dominant. In his “Speech at the Assem¬ The policy of the rectification movement was, as Mao put it,
bly of Representatives of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border to “learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones” and to cure
Region” in 1941, Mao Zedong stressed that the Communist Party the sickness to save the patient.- This was in sharp contra . to
should work in the interests not of just one section of society but the policy of “ruthless struggle” and “merciless blows pursued
of all the people. “Chinese society,” he said, “is small at both ends by leaders who had made “Left” mistakes.- The rectification
and big in the middle; that is, the proletariat at one end and the began with a serious study of relevant documents, followed by
landlord class and big bourgeoisie at the other each constitute criticism and self-criticism. By examining their own thinking,
only a small minority, while the great majority of the people work past records and the work in their areas or departments,
consists of the peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the other Party members were expected to ascertain under what- circum
intermediate classes.” It was therefore essential, he said, to give stances and for what reasons they had made mistakes and what
consideration to the interests of these classes. Mao held that Party the nature of those mistakes was. Thus they graduay achieved
members should pay careful attention to the opinions of non- unity of understanding and learned how to correct heir iti stakes.
Party people: In this process, particular emphasis was laid on self-criticism. ^
“Communists must listen attentively to the views of people In May 1942, the CPC Central Committee held the Yanan
outside the Party and let them have their say. If what they say is
294 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE Q»c; chapter four the war of resistance against japan 295

Forum on Literature and Art. Speaking at this forum, Mao remittee of the CPC adopted the “Resolution on Certain Ques-
Zedong declared that the basic function of revolutionary litera¬ Unns in the History of Our Party.” The conclusions set forth m
ture and art was to serve the masses and, first of all, the workers, resolution helped the entire Party membership, especially
peasants and soldiers. He clarified many hotly debated questions, Lor cadres, reach a common understanding, on the basis of
emphasizing that revolutionary literary and art workers had to Marxism-Leninism, of the fundamental questions regarding the
understand clearly the problem of class stand and to adopt the Chinese democratic revolution. The resolution stated that if the
correct attitude toward three different groups: the enemy, the Party hoped to win greater victories, it must take as its guide Mao
Party’s allies in the united front and the masses. After the forum, Zedong Thought, which integrated Marxism-Leninism with the
writers and artists too began to study as part of the rectification practice of the Chinese revolution. This meant that the Commu¬
movement. nist Party of China had truly chosen the correct course o
In March of 1943, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central remaining independent and of making the fundamental tenets ot
Committee adopted a “Decision on the Readjustment and Simpli¬ Marxism-Leninism applicable to the situation in China, the
fication of the Central Organs.” Mao Zedong was elected chair¬ resolution laid an ideological foundation lor the convocation o
man of the Political Bureau and of the Secretariat of the Central the 7th Party Congress and advanced the cause ol the Chinese
Committee. revolution. It marked the successful conclusion of the rectifica¬
In the rectification movement, the Party’s senior cadres re¬ tion movement. , ,QH
viewed and summed up the Party’s experience. The Central Between early September and the beginning of December 1943,
Committee held many forums to discuss the Party’s history, when the rectification movement was in its later stage, the crc
including forums on the experience of Party organizations in the Central Committee, wishing to analyse the Parly’s experience,
Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi, Hunan-Jiangxi, Hubei-Henan-Anhui and called three successive meetings of the Political Bureau to discuss
Fujian-Guangdong border regions, and in the northeastern Jiang¬ the “Left” mistakes Wang Ming had made during the Agrarian
xi, western Fujian and Chaozhou-Meixian areas. There were also Revolutionary War and the Right mistakes he had made at the
forums on the experience of the Seventh Army of the Red Army beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japan. At these
and the Fifth Army Group of the Red Army and of Party meetings, many comrades criticized Wang’s mistakes and some
organizations in north China. All these forums helped the cadres criticized themselves. Mao Zedong stressed that in examining
to understand through their own experience which Party lines Wang’s mistakes. Party members should take a historical view,
had been right and which wrong and to deepen their understand¬ proceed from reality, make self-criticisms and ensure the umty
ing of Marxism. In July 1942 Zhu De wrote: “Our Party has He said they should refrain from employing wrong methods ot
accumulated rich experience in struggle, correctly understood struggle that had been used in the past, “learn from past mistakes
Marxist-Leninist theory and established in practice a Chinese to avoid future ones” and “cure the sickness to save the patient.
theory of Marxism-Leninism to guide the Chinese revolution.”39 Wang Ming pleaded illness and did not attend the meetings. T e
On July 8, 1943, in his article “The Communist Party of China Party leaders made painstaking efforts to help him understand
and the Chinese Nation’s Road to Liberation,” published by his mistakes. Mao Zedong called on him several times and sent
Liberation Daily, Wang Jiaxiang presented for the first time the people to listen to his views. Zhou Enlai also visited him and had
concept of “Mao Zedong Thought,” which found wide acceptance a heart-to-heart talk with him. As a result, Wang Ming admitted
in the Party. On April 20, 1945, after a thorough review of the his mistakes and wrote to the Central Committee stating that he
Party’s experience, the 7th Plenary Session of the 6th Central fully agreed with the judgments expressed in the “Resolution on
 297
after four the war of resistance against japan
296 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

thp early 1930s. This debate had strengthened the positions of

Certain Questions in the History of Our Party.” At Mao’s urging,
Cxism-Lemnism inside and outside the Party. Moreover, he
Wang Ming was again elected to the Central Committee at the
rectification movement had greatly raised the ideological level of
7th Party Congress.
For a short time during the rectification movement in Yan’an, [he cadres and enabled the Party to become more mature and to
a mistaken campaign was conducted. On April 3, 1943, the CPC thieve unprecedented unity. It was therefore of profound sigmf
Central Committee issued a “Decision on Continuing the Recti¬ icance.
fication Movement,” stating that in the process of rectifying the
Party’s style of work, an in-depth investigation should be made
into the backgrounds of all Party cadres. In the decision the IX THE 7TH NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS
Central Committee overestimated the number of counter¬ AND THE CHINESE VICTORY IN THE WAR
revolutionaries hiding in the Party. On July 15 Kang Sheng, the
deputy director of the General Study Committee and director of
OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN
the Social Department of the Central Committee, made a report
at a cadres’ meeting in Yan’an, entitled “Redeem Those Who As victory in the war with Japan drew near, the Chinese people
Have Made Mistakes.” This report set off a so-called redemption were presented with a choice between two differentoffe
campaign in which confessions were obtained by coercion and postwar future, one bright, the other dark. The Communist Party
then given credence. For ten or fifteen days, a great number of was proposing the establishment of a new China that would be,
people were falsely accused and unjustly dealt with. This mistake in the words of Mao Zedong, “independent, free, democratic,
should never have been made in the rectification movement. But united, prosperous and powerful.”™ The Chiang Kai-shek clique,
since the anti-Japanese base areas were cut off from the outside on the other hand, was insisting on the perpetuation of the old
world, it was difficult to investigate the cadres’ backgrounds and, China - semi-feudal, semi-colonial, ruled by the big landlords
in fact, no real effort was made to do so. The result was that in and the big bourgeoisie, a China in which the people! would
eliminating counter-revolutionaries, some leading cadres failed to remain sunk in poverty. Communists would be I«rsei;uteci and
recognize the real number of counter-revolutionaries hiding in the nation would be split. In view of these ahematives the CPC
the Party, to proceed from the specific conditions in each unit, to believed it was its duty to lead the people toward the future that
seek truth from facts and to deal differently with different cases. offered hope.
Still, because the Central Committee soon put a stop to the
“redemption” campaign, it was only a minor aspect of the recti¬ The 7th National Congress of the Communist Party of China
fication movement as a whole. It cannot be cited to negate the
tremendous achievements of that movement. The 7th National Congress of the Party was held in Yan’an
from April 23 to June 11, 1945. Five hundred and forty-seven
Above all, the rectification movement had generated a great
regular delegates and 208 non-voting delegates attended the con¬
debate both inside and outside the Party on some major questions.
gress representing 1.21 million Party members. Seventeen years
These included how to apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism
by proceeding from reality instead of taking a dogmatic ap¬ had passed since the 6th Party Congress in 1928. Accordingly, the
proach; how to relate the fundamental tenets of Marxism- 7th Party Congress had both to review the experience of the
Leninism to the realities of the Chinese revolution and how to revolution and to prepare for victory in the war with Japan. Mao
understand the two-line struggle that had taken place in the Party Zedong made a political report entitled “On Coalition Govern
 298 chapter four the war of resistance against japan 299
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

ment,” Liu Shaoqi made a “Report on the Revision of the Party ed in detail the political, economic and cultural programmes to
Constitution,” Zhu De made a military report entitled “The be carried out. However, since the policy of the Kuomintang
Battlefront in the Liberated Areas,” and Zhou Enlai delivered an ruling clique was to maintain its dictatorship, betray the country
important speech entitled “On the United Front.” Ren Bishi, and launch civil war, the congress declared that the Party, while
Chen Yun and others also spoke. striving for the establishment of a coalition government, should
By the time the 7th Party Congress was convened, the Com¬ prepare for another eventuality: the outbreak of civil war. If the
munist International had been dissolved for two years. For the KMT waged a civil war, the people would respond by waging a
Chinese Party the congress was an opportunity to put an end to revolutionary war to overthrow the reactionary regime and build
the ideological trend, represented by Wang Ming, of making a new China.
Marxism-Leninism a dogma and worshiping the Soviet experi¬ 2. The congress criticized certain wrong ideological trends in
ence and the resolutions of the Comintern. It was also an oppor¬ the Party and enunciated the major elements of the Party’s fine
tunity for the Party to solve independently the problems of the traditions and style of work, enabling all Party members to unify
Chinese revolution in the light of Chinese conditions. their thinking on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Ze¬
The congress’s keynote was unity for victory. Its three major dong Thought.
achievements were as follows. The proceedings of the congress were highly democratic. In
1. The congress reviewed the experience gained over the 24 discussing the various reports and speeches, many delegates,
years during which the democratic revolution, led by the CPC, speaking their minds freely, analysed the mistakes made by
had been following a tortuous course, and especially the experi¬ certain Party members in the past, especially the “Left” adven¬
ence of the eight years of the War of Resistance. Then, on the turist mistakes made by Wang Ming and his followers during the
basis of that review, it worked out a strategy for defeating the Agrarian Revolutionary War. Many delegates, starting from the
Japanese aggressors and a programme for building a new China. desire for unity, criticized those who had made mistakes, and
The congress declared that at a time when victory in the War most of the persons criticized made self-criticisms as well. By
of Resistance Against Japan was at hand, the task for the Party summing up the experience and lessons of the past, the Party
was to boldly mobilize the masses, expand the people’s forces and strengthened its unity based on the programme adopted at the 7th
lead them to victory over the Japanese aggressors, liberate all the Congress.
people of China and establish a new China that would be inde¬ The congress noted that most Pary members were working
pendent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and powerful. The in the countryside and came from families of peasants or petty
new China could not, and should not, be a country of the old type, bourgeois. However, the nature of the Party was not defined
ruled by the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, it could not be made into by the family background of its members. Rather, it was
a socialist country all at once. It should be a country governed by defined by its political struggle, its inner-Party activities, its
a democratic alliance of all revolutionary classes, based on the ideological education it provided and its ideological and polit¬
united front of the overwhelming majority of the people and ical leadership. The congress defined the Party’s excellent style
under the leadership of the working class — that is, a new- of work, which had developed over the course of its long
democratic country. struggles, a style of work which, as Mao Zedong put it,
lo build such a country, the congress again called for the “essentially entails integrating theory with practice, forging
abolition of the Kuomintang’s one-party dictatorship and the close links with the masses and practising self-criticism.”41 This
formation of a democratic coalition government. It also expound¬ was the hallmark distinguishing the Communist Party Irom
 301
CHAPTER FOUR the WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN
300 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CH_ Not every member of the Central Committee need be
other political parties, and it ensured the smooth implementa¬
tile but the Committee as a whole should be composed ot
tion of the Party’s lines and policies.
«nns having a wide spectrum of knowledge and abilities.
The Party Constitution adopted at the congress stipulated that
Swing these principles, the congress formed a Central
the CPC should take as the guide for all its work Mao Zedong
„ mmittee of unprecedented prestige and unity, with outstanding
Thought, which was the integration of Marxist and Leninist
members bringing to it a great variety of experience gained in
theories with the revolutionary practice of China, and that it
different positions and in different localities. On June 19 at the
should correct any dogmatic or empirical mistakes. The congress
Kt Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the CPC 13
stated that Mao Zedong Thought provided a solid theoretical
Central Committee members were elected to the decision-making
basis on which all Party members could achieve unity in their
political Bureau; Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou En
thinking and in their action.
and Ren Bishi were elected to the Secretariat, which was in charge
The congress especially emphasized that the mass line was the
of the day-to-day work of the Central Committee; and Mao
basic political and organizational line of the Party. Party mem¬
Zedong was elected chairman of the Central Committee.
bers must serve the Chinese people heart and soul and oppose any
The 7th Party Congress was the last one held during the period
tendencies to enforce unquestioning obedience to authority, be
of the democratic revolution and the most important. It went
bureaucratic or act like warlords, which would alienate them
down in the annals of the CPC as a congress ot victory, a congress
from the masses. In internal affairs, the Party should adhere to
of unity. From that time on, the Party, rallying closely around
democratic centralism, integrating strict centralism with exten¬
the Central Committee headed by Mao Zedong, threw all its
sive democracy; by the same token, Party members should inte¬
energy into gaining a final victory in the War ot Resistance
grate a high sense of organization and discipline with individual
Against Japan and a nationwide victory m the new-democratic
enthusiasm and initiative. This would guarantee that the Party
could carry out its political tasks and take concerted action in its revolution.
struggle.
3. The congress selected a new Central Committee with Mao The Final Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan
Zedong as chairman, enabling the Party to achieve unprecedent¬
After mounting offensive operations against the Japanese
ed unity.
troops in the summer of 1945, the Eighth Route Army and the
Forty-four members and 33 alternates were elected to the
New Fourth Army tightened their encirciement of the
Central Committee at the congress. In the election process three
places Many scattered Liberated Areas were linked up which
principles were followed:
enabled the people's armed forces to take the initiative militarily.
— Persons who had gone astray would not be considered
Gradually, they turned guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare,
ineligible, so long as they recognized their mistakes and were
creating the conditions necessary for a full-scale counteroffensive
determined to correct them.
On July 26 1945, the United States, Britain and China issued
— Since the revolutionary forces had long been scattered in
the Potsdam Declaration, an ultimatum to Japan to surrender
the countryside, factions had inevitably formed. They should be
unconditionally. On August 8 the Soviet Union declared war on
acknowledged and given proper consideration, while at the same
Japan. The participation of the Soviet army dealt a heavy blow
time they should be weakened until they were eradicated. How¬
to the Japanese troops entrenched in northeast China, thus hast¬
ever, outstanding figures from various localities and different
ening the end of the war. At this point the anti-Japanese forces
fields of work should be elected to the Central Committee.
302 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC ^TER four THE war of resistance against japan

in China entered a period of full-scale counteroffensive. all the wars the Chinese people had fought over more
At the time, the main formations of the Kuomintang army °f hundred years for national liberation from capitalist and
were in the western part of the country, while most of the cities, tha" IhsUnvaders, this was the first that had ended in complete
imperialist mvaaers^ modern history> chlna, which had
towns, communication lines and the coastal areas occupied by the
victory. Tor th® . . distance to armed foreign invasion,
Japanese troops were in the East, surrounded by base areas under
the leadership of the Communist Party. The task of launching a was able to a\engc
i"SSlTulmm, *. A. is®-
. hen the Chinese nation
full-scale counteroffensive was therefore carried out mainly by
This victory j decline It laid the foundation for
the people’s armed forces in the base areas. On August 9, 1945,
independence and Uberation, and it greatly inspired
Mao Zedong made a statement entitled “The Last Round with the
Japanese Invaders.” On orders from the Yan’an headquarters, the :hri“ofPa?f“tionalities in China, enhancing their self-
people’s armed forces in the anti-Japanese base areas launched a
major counteroffensive against both the Japanese and puppet cause China’s resistance to the Japanese invaders
troops. gained support both from people all over the world and from the
gdincu . anti-fascist war support that was an
On August 14 the Japanese government sent a note to the
governments of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and
China, expressing acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. The
next day Emperor Hirohito publicly announced Japan’s uncondi¬
tional surrender. On August 16 the Japanese supreme headquar¬
ters ordered its troops to “cease military operations,” but at the contributed greaUy to the victory of the anti-fascists in other parts
same time it ordered them to “carry out military operations in
self-defence when they had no alternative.” Thus, although the °f DurinTte '^Resistance, the Communist Party mobilized
Japanese troops had officially surrendered, they had not laid yl lhf> rear from all walks of life, mainly peasants, and
down their arms. Consequently, the armed forces under the
leadership of the CPC continued their counteroffensive, which
had begun on August 11. In the course of these operations, the
Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the other peo¬
ple’s armed forces liberated 150 cities and counties.
On September 2 the Japanese representatives signed the act of anefe and puppet troops (including 527,000 Japanese troops) and
capitulation. The 1.28 million Japanese troops in China surren¬
dered. This brought to an end the War of Resistance Against "he Smettee1: the3 ^“nder the leadership of the
Japan and also the Second World War. Communist Party made great sacrifices in
The War of Resistance had been won through bitter fighting .. „ Ann non casualties. The people in the base areas oeiu
and at an extremely high price paid by the people of all nation¬
alities in China. The number of Chinese soldiers and civilians
killed and wounded during the war came to more than 21 million,
properly losses were estimated at U.S.$60 billion and the expense were in the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan base area. Th
of the war at U.S.$40 billion. ters and civdians behind enemy lines, persevering in the struggle
 PTER FOUR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
Party and the Kuomintang as the two major political forces^
with the greatest devotion, wiped out large numbers of Japanese nist
The '.vnmkt Partv’s influence^
CommumstParty^milue^ on the^
social
^and political
before iitc
the war.
troops and brought about a gradual weakening of the enemy’s
forces and a strengthening of their own. Eventually, this made it 0f In'the war of Resistance. Mao Zedong Thought the megra-
possible to shift to a full-scale counteroffensive against the Jap¬ • ‘ nf Marxism-Leninism with the revolutionary practice ot
anese aggressors, contributing greatly to the victory. The history uon of Marxism the Communist Party gained a
Chjna came to ma y,f of china,s democratic
of the War of Resistance clearly demonstrated that the Commu¬
nist Party and the people’s armed forces under its leadership were better grasp ot . rorrectlv the many complex
the staunchest defenders of the nation’s interests, the mainstay of
the alliance against Japan and the decisive factor in winning the W civil ».r. »» ».1|
war.
Thanks to the War of Resistance, a great change also took place
in the balance of forces between the domestic political factions.
This war was the third stage of the new-democratic revolution
under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, following
the Great Revolution and the Agrarian Revolutionary War. Dur
ing this stage the Party, combining resistance to imperialism with
the struggle against feudalism, correctly handled the relations
between the national struggle and the class struggle, safeguarded
the unity of the country and fought on tenaciously to win the War understanding of t J cpc managed politically and
of Resistance and obtain the liberation and independence of the
Chinese nation. In the course of the war, the majority of the
Chinese people came to have a correct understanding of the
Communist Party and to support it vigorously. A large section of
the national bourgeoisie and the upper petty bourgeoisie openly
historical experience in a scient y Adhering to
changed their views ot the CPC and even became friends of the
Party. During the eight years of the war, the Communist Party’s
line of resisting Japan on all fronts, although it was implemented
only in the democratic anti-Japanese base areas under its leader¬
ship and was rejected by the Kuomintang, became a call to the
people of China to fight on until victory. Responding to this call,

mmm-wm
the working class, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie, national
bourgeoisie, the overseas Chinese and part of the landlord-
comprador class all joined the anti-Japanese national united front
in different ways, turning the War of Resistance into a war of the
entire nation against the Japanese invaders. During this war, the
Communist Party assumed political leadership. For this reason,
when the war came to an end everyone recognized the Commu-
 307
chapter four the war of resistance against japan
306 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
. „ docans were replaced by “Persist in resistance and oppose capilula-
the war and to lay a solid foundation for later development of the Uonismr “Permit in unity and oppose a split!” and “Persist in progress and oppose
Chinese revolution. Stogrcssion; ^ prescnl SUuation> Marking the Third Anniversary of the
20. Man - gpiprted Documents of the Central Committee of the Commu
War of Resistance by (he Central Archives, Publishing

HouseTthfpafty School of the CPC Central Committee, Beijing, 1991, Vol XII.
NOTES
Autobiography of Peng Dehuai, Chin, ed., The People’s Publishing House,
1. Katsumi Usui and Masao Inaba, Contemporary Data, Jap. ed. Tokyo 1964
Vol. IX, pp. 17-18,

FtSS
2. Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
Chin, ed., compiled by ihe Central Archives, Publishing House of the Party
School of the CPC Central Committee, Beijing, 1991, Vol. XI dd 274-275
3. Ibid., p. 278. Boshan'rrfassacre^ in1 Shandong, the Shenxian massacre in Hebe,, the Pmgjtang

%%\%le\W°r9lS Zh°U Enl<li’ Eng' Cd'’ Foreign LanSuages Press, Beijing, SaT^r capitu.ahtoni^s
5. Ibid., pp. 93-94.
6. In September 1937 the Eighth Route Army was redesignated the Eighteenth
Group Army of the National Revolutionary Army.
7. Soong Ching Ling, “On the Reconciliation,” The Struggle for New China Eng
ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1952, p. 129.
8. “For the Mobilization of All the Nation’s Forces for Victory in the War of
Resistance,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press
Beijing, 1975, Vol. II, pp. 25-28.
9. “The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai
and Taiyuan,” Selected orks of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed.. Foreign Languages Press
2-ilSs
254S2ee Selected Works of Mao Zedong. Eng. ed.. Foreign Languages Press,
Beijing, 1975, Vol. II, pp. 65 and 68.
10. Reproduced in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed.. Foreign Languages
Press, Beijing, 1975, Vol. II, p. 71. ITS ^ House’
11. Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing
1975, Vol. II, p. 121.
12. Ibid., p. 140.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 173.
15. At the end of January 1938, Yan Xishan, the warlord of Shanxi, and the
Military Council and Executive Yuan of the National Government, officially
approved the dropping of the term “provisional.”
16. Nie Rongzhen, Inside the Red Star, Eng. ed., New World Press, Beijing 1988
p. 496. ’ ’ Beijing, 1991, p. 31. .
17. In July 1937 He Ming, leader of the Red Army Guerrilla Corps in the
30. Eng! ed.. Foreign Languages Press, Baling,
Fujian-Guangdong Border Area, signed an agreement to cooperate with the
KMT’s 157th Division against Japan. When his troops were being reorganized, he 1977, Vol. Ill, P- IT
was caught off guard and, in Zhangpu County, Fujian, allowed around 1,000 of 31. Ibid., p. 19.
his men to be encircled and disarmed by the Kuomintang troops. 32. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
18. Kumao Harada, Sir Saionji and the Political Situation, Jap. ed., Tokyo 1952
Vol. VIII, p. 103. 34 The ••mountain-stronghold" mentality was a tendency to form cliques, ft arose

19. Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of mainly out of the circumstances of the ^traf^^ other Most of these
China, Chin, cd., compiled by the Central Archives, Publishing House of the regions, and each tended to regard itself
Party School of the CPC Central Committee, Beijing, 1991, Vol. XII, p. 143.
308 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THF. CPC

as a compact, independent unit, like a single mountain stronghold.

35. Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. cd.. Foreign Languages Press, Beijing
1977, Vol. Ill, pp. 43-45.
36. Ibid., pp. 32-34.

►
37. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
38. “Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. CHAPTER FIVE
ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1977, Vol. Ill, p. 57.
39. Zhu De, “In Commemoration of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Party,”
Liberation Daily, July I, 1942. THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONWIDE
40. “On Coalition Government,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed..
Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1977. Vol. Ill, p. 205. VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC
41. Ibid., p. 264.
REVOLUTION

I. THE POSTWAR POLITICAL SITUATION

AND THE PARTY’S STRUGGLE FOR
PEACE AND DEMOCRACY

sassssja§=|
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the democratic partite had mcreased

310 A CONCISE HISTORY OF TIIE ci>c chapTER five victory in the democratic revolution 311

enormously, as had the number of unaffiliated democrats, and nt trust it, and militarily, its vast army had never fully and
they had established close ties with the CPC. In 1945, therefore, °ffectively participated in the war el fort. In contrast, having
the role of the CPC in Chinese society was quite different from Endured the hardships of war, the people’s armed forces under the
what it had been during the early years of the war. leadership of the Communist Party were able to gather some oi
During the War of Resistance, the Kuomintang ruling clique ‘ fruits of victory, although they were still unable to turn that
persisted in exercising autocratic control, and during the middle victory into a total triumph for the people. The fate ol China lay
and late phases of the war it followed a policy of passive resist¬ with both the CPC and the KMT, and as a direct result of their
ance to the Japanese while doggedly fighting the Communist actions during the war, one party was gaining strength, while the
Party. This policy alienated it profoundly from the masses. With other was beset with crises.
the approach of V-J Day, the KMT focused increasingly on the How, then, did events unfold after the war?
elimination of the CPC and other democratic elements. In May The CPC strove to avoid civil war and to build a new China
1945, at the KMT’s 6th National Congress, Chiang Kai-shek by peaceful means; it wanted to introduce social and political
announced: “Now our major goal is the elimination of the Com¬ reforms while strengthening the national economy. Alter eight
munist Party! Japan is our external enemy while the CPC is our cruel years of war, the Chinese people were eager for such
internal enemy! It is only with the elimination of the CPC that reforms. If the KMT had been willing to accept a peacelul
we shall complete our mission!”1 solution and cooperate with other parties and groups in the
Immediately after the victory over Japan, the KMT ruling process of reconstruction and reform, then despite the complicat¬
clique made plans to deprive the people of the rights they had just ed struggles which that effort would inevitably have entailed, the
gained and to turn China into the same kind of semi-colonial, CPC would have been willing to compromise, because, after all,
semi-feudal society it had been before the war. The Chinese that would have benefitted the people.
people, of course, would not tolerate this. Chiang Kai-shek, however, chose to maintain his policy ol
The U.S. government supported the anti-Communisl policy of autocracy and civil war. Failing to see his own political weakness,
the KMT. After World War II the United States relied on its he believed that since his military strength far exceeded that ol
great economic and military might for overseas expansion, at¬ the CPC, he could do whatever he liked. On August 11, 1945,
tempting to strengthen its dominant position in the world. Con¬ immediately after Japan announced its intention to surrender, the
trol over China was an important component of America’s global Supreme Command of Chiang’s government issued orders to all
strategy. As was stated in a report prepared by the National KMT officers and men in the various war zones “to step up the
Security Council, “The basic long-range objective of the United war effort and, in accordance with existing military plans and
States in China is the furtherance of a stable, representative orders, to actively push forward without the slightest relaxation.
government over an independent and unified China which is At the same time, a different order was issued to the Eighteenth
friendly to the United States,... however, the most important Group Army (also known as the Eighth Route Army) led by the
objective which it is practicable to pursue in the short run is the CPC: “All units of the Eighteenth Group Army should stay
prevention of complete communist control of China.”2 where they are, pending further orders” — in other words, they
In sum, the situation at the end of the War of Resistance should wait passively for the enemy to attack them. Puppet troops
Against Japan was as follows: With U.S. support, the KMT in enemy-occupied areas were ordered to “maintain order and
government was plotting to monopolize the fruits of victory, but were allowed to be incorporated only into the KMT iorces.
it was doomed to fail for two reasons: politically, the people did Chiang Kai-shek’s next step was going to be to launch civil war
 chapter five victory in the democratic revolution
312 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
0„ ,nd d would be difficult for them to advance swiftly into
in an effort to eliminate the Communist Party and to destroy the ciuI? ’ ml east China let alone northeast China. Lastly, since the
Liberated Areas and the people’s armed forces under its leader¬ rPC unequivocally Earned him of the consequences, he dared
ship. CPtCmke reckless action. He still needed more time to prepare
The CPC, however, was no longer what it had been in 1927, n°It was under these circumstances that Chiang sent three tele-
when it was unable to withstand adversity. It would not obtain Tto Yan’an inviting Mao Zedong to Chongqing to discuss
peace and national reconstruction at the expense of the people’s fm^ t ni que tions of the time. Chiang calculated that if Mao
fundamental interests, by allowing China to return to its prewar Xd to “me, he could accuse the CPC of rejecting peace
status. On August 13 the Xinhua News Agency issued a commen¬ Xiations and he could then blame the civil war on the
tary written by Mao Zedong, entitled “Chiang Kai-shek Is Pro¬ Communists. If, on the other hand, Mao did come, he could use
voking Civil War,” in which he stated point-blank that Chiang’s the peace negotiations to put the CPC off guard inducing it to
“orders” were from beginning to end “provocations to civil war.” handover the people’s armed forces and political power in the
“Can there be any doubt,” the commentary continued, “that the Liberated Areas and at the same time gaming the time he needed
grave danger of civil war will confront the people of the whole
to deulov his troops for civil war.
country the moment the War of Resistance is over? We now The Communist Party truly wished to pursue peace, but it was
appeal to all our fellow-countrymen and to the Allied countries also soberly aware of the situation. The CPC Central Committee
to take action, together with the people of the Liberated Areas, believed that no matter what happened, it was necessary to ent
resolutely to prevent a civil war in China, which would endanger into peace negotiations with the KMT for three reasons. First the
world peace.”3 On the same day, at a meeting of cadres in Yan’an, people desperately wished for peace, democracy and unity alter
Mao Zedong made a speech again warning of civil war: {he war. If :hcre was the slightest possibility of brmging about
“With regard to Chiang Kai-shek’s plot to launch a civil war, progress and development by peaceful means the Party should
our Party’s policy has been clear and consistent, that is, resolutely try to do so. Second, since Chiang Kai-shek could hardly complete
to oppose civil war, be against civil war and prevent civil war. In his military deployment for civil war within a short periodl o
the days to come, we shall continue, with the utmost effort and time, it was possible for the Party and the People to achieve peace
greatest patience, to lead the people in preventing civil war. even if only a temporary peace, and that would be usefuI t
Nevertheless, it is necessary to be soberly aware that the danger revolutionary forces, which also needed time to.prepare for any
of civil war is extremely serious because Chiang Kai-shek’s policy exigencies. Third, the peace negotiations would clearly dem
is already set.”4 “In short,” he concluded, “we must be prepared. strate to the nation whether the KMT reactionaries truly wanted
Being prepared, we shall able to deal properly with all kinds of peace and democracy or were only trying to bring about civil war
complicated situations.”5 and totalitarianism under cover of negotiations. Th‘s w<™ d gr“
Chiang Kai-shek had misgivings about immediately launching ly enhance the people’s revolutionary awareness But whie trying
full-scale civil war. After eight years of tenacious resistance and to achieve peace and democracy, the Party would never let down
such a costly victory, people across the land were longing to its guard or abandon its preparations for a war of self-defence
rebuild their country in peace. A civil war would be diametrically On the night of August 25, the CPC Central ““
opposed to their wishes. Furthermore, at that time, the United decided to send Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Wang Ruofei to
States, Britain and the Soviet Union were all opposed to civil war Chongqing for peace negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek.
in China. In addition, during the War of Resistance, most of The next day the Central Committee issued an inner-Party
Chiang’s crack troops had retreated to southwest and northwest
 chapter five victory in the democratic revolution
314 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
«Tf the Kuomintang still wants to launch civil war after our
circular, drafted by Mao Zedong, entitled “On Peace Negotia¬
_ r?v haS taken the above steps, it will put itself in the wrong m
tions with the Kuomintang.” It analysed the situation at the time
Par > eS of the whole nation and the whole world, and our Party
and outlined the Party’s position with regard to the negotiations:
m be justified in waging a war of self-defence to crush its
“At present the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain all
ntacks Moreover, our Party is powerful, and if anyone attacks
disapprove of civil war in China; at the same time our Party has
us and if the conditions arc favourable for battle, we will certain-
put forward the three great slogans of peace, democracy and unity
Iv act in self-defence to wipe him out resolutely, thoroughly,
and is sending Comrades Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Wang
wholly and completely (we do not strike rashly but when we do
Ruofei to Chongqing to discuss with Chiang Kai-shek the great
strike, we must win). We must never be cowed by the Muster^of
issues of unity and national reconstruction; thus it is possible that
reictionaries. But we must at all times firmly adhere to, and
the civil war plot of the Chinese reactionaries may be frustrated.
never forget, these principles: unity, struggle, unity through
The Kuomintang has now strengthened its position by recovering
struggle; to wage struggles with good reason, with advantage an
Shanghai, Nanjing and other places, reopening sea communica¬
with restraint; and to make use of contradictions win over the
tions, taking over the arms of the enemy and incorporating the
many, oppose the few and crush our enemies one by one.
puppet troops into its own forces. Nevertheless, it is riddled with
a thousand gaping wounds, torn by innumerable internal contra¬
dictions and beset with great difficulties. It is possible that after
the negotiations the Kuomintang, under domestic and foreign
II. THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
pressure, may conditionally recognize our Party’s status. Our IN CHONGQING AND THE POLITICAL
Party too may conditionally recognize the status of the Kuomin¬ CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE
tang. This would bring about a new stage of cooperation between
the two parties (plus the Democratic League, etc.) and of peaceful
On August 28, 1945, in accordance with the Central Commit¬
development. In that event, our Party should strive to master all
tee’s decision, Mao Zedong flew from Yan’an to Chongqing with
methods of legal struggle and intensify its work in the Kuomin¬
Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei for peace negotiations with the
tang areas in the three main spheres, the cities, the villages and
Kuomintang authorities. They were accompanied by the KM 1
the army (all weak points in our work there). During the nego¬
representative Zhang Zhizhong and by U.S. ambassador Patrick
tiations, the Kuomintang is sure to demand that we drastically
reduce the size of the Liberated Areas, cut down the strength of J. Hurley. , , , ,
This event attracted much attention both at home and abroad,
the Liberation Army and stop issuing currency. We on our side
enabling many people to see more clearly that the CPC was
are prepared to make such concessions as are necessary and as do
sincere in seeking a peaceful solution. Mao’s action was widely
not damage the fundamental interests of the people. Without such
praised and supported. The poet Liu Yazi wrote a poem extolling
concessions, we cannot explode the Kuomintang’s civil war plot,
it as an act of “overwhelming courage.” Zhang Zhizhong also said
cannot gain the political initiative, cannot win the sympathy of
that this was a major event in Chinese history.
world public opinion and the middle-of-the-roaders within the
country and cannot obtain in exchange legal status for our Party
and a state of peace. But there are limits to such concessions; the The Achievements of the Peace Negotiations in Chongqing
principle is that they must not damage the fundamental interests
of the people. While in Chongqing, Mao Zedong discussed matters of peace
316 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC JJAPTER FIVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 31

and national reconstruction several times directly with Chiang a to “actively carry out local self-government and conduct
Kai-shek. Most of the negotiations on specific issues were Lneral elections from the lower level upward.”
carried out by CPC representatives Zhou Enlai and Wang 8 during the course of negotiations, both sides agreed to convene
Ruofei, and KMT representatives Wang Shijie, Zhang Qun, _ nolitical consultative conference attended by representatives of
Zhang Zhizhong and Shao Lizi. Chiang Kai-shek’s plans for all parties and noted public figures, to discuss plans for peace and
this round of negotiations can be seen in a passage from his
national reconstruction. . . ,
diary written on August 28 and 29, 1945: “Political and The Liberated Areas and the army were the major points ol
military questions should all be resolved. With regard to po¬ contention. The CPC representatives took the initiative, offering
litical issues, however, we should adopt an extremely generous to move troops stationed in base areas in Guangdong, Zhejiang,
attitude, while making no concessions in military matters.” southern Jiangsu, central and southern Anhui, Hunan, Hu ci
Moreover, he wrote, “Government administration and military and Henan (excluding northern Henan) to the north. At the
command should be unified.” These political and military same time, they also stated that on condition of “an equitable
questions were, according to Chiang, “at the heart of the issue.” and rational reorganization of the armed forces ol the who e
In fact, however, Chiang was never extremely generous in
country,” they would be willing to reduce their troops from
political matters; he merely made a few empty promises of
1.2 million to 24 divisions or to a minimum of 20 divisions,
democracy. What he was actually interested in was “unifying”
if this represented one-seventh of the total number of reorgan¬
government administration and military command — in other
ized troops. Despite the willingness of the Communist Party to
words, eliminating the Liberated Areas and the people’s armed
make such major concessions, these two issues remained out¬
forces. On this point, Chiang would brook no concessions. The
standing, because the Kuomintang was determined to eliminate
CPC Central Committee realized beforehand what his attitude
would be. To force him to fulfil his promises of democracy, to the people’s armed forces and the people’s regnpe in the
secure the peace and democracy the nation needed and to Liberated Areas. . . . ~
disprove the rumour that the Communist Party did not want The result of the Chongqing negotiations was a victory lor
peace and unity, the CPC Central Committee was prepared, as the people’s forces. The day after the signing of the October
stated in its internal circular, to reduce the size of the Liberated 10th Agreement, Mao Zedong returned to Yan’an and made
Areas and the people’s armed forces, insofar as such concessions the following statement at a meeting of the Political Bureau:
did not harm the fundamental interests of the people. “The first positive aspect of the negotiations is that they were
On October 10, 1945, after 43 days of negotiations, the two conducted in an equal manner. For the first time in history
sides signed a “Summary of Conversations Between the Rep¬ both sides formally signed an agreement. Second, the six agree¬
resentatives of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of ments already signed are all beneficial to the people.” Through
China” (also known as the “October 10th Agreement”). the negotiations, the KMT had accepted the policy of peace
In this summary, the KMT authorities agreed with the “basic and unity. Even though the agreements were mere words on
policy of peace and national reconstruction”, accepted “long-term paper, if the KMT once again tried to provoke civil war, it
cooperation... resolute avoidance of civil war and the building of would put itself in the wrong in the eyes of the nation and
a new China, independent, free, prosperous and powerful.” They the world and would lose all political initiative. The agree¬
also agreed to bring the KMT’s political tutelage to an end, ments, therefore, could still give powerful impetus to the
acknowledged some of the people’s democratic rights and consent- democratic movement in the KMT areas.
 pR jtjvE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
cHApTbR Hvj-
318 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
^ /.nils succinctly stating its nationwide military strategy : Ex-
The KMT Launches a Military Offensive bur . ,0 the North, while taking a defensive position in e
During the Peace Negotiations C*’°The most important components of this strategy were to
S concessions in the South by shortening the line of defence
Even though the KMT authorities were holding peace negotia¬ ni’pre- to consolidate north China and the Liberated Areas in east
tions with the CPC, their main plan was still to use armed might and central China; and to gain control over Rehe and Chahar
to eliminate the people’s revolutionary forces. Furthermore, dur¬ provinces, while concentrating forces to capture the strategically
ing the negotiations in Chongqing, the KMT authorities secretly
imnortant areas in northeast China.9
reprinted Chiang Kai-shek’s Handbook on the Suppression of To implement this plan and lead the Party's work mno^east
Bandits written during his 1933 campaign to “encircle and sup¬ rhina the CPC Central Committee transferred 110,000 military
press” the Red Army. The October 10th Agreement was no sooner personnel and 20,000 political cadres there and established its
signed than Chiang secretly ordered his troops to attack the Northeast Bureau, with Peng Zhen as secretary and Chen Yun
Liberated Areas, calling upon his generals to act according to his and others as members. At the same time the KMT, wishing to
instructions in the handbook — that is, urge their officers and penetrate deep into north China and open a route to the North-
men to do their utmost to suppress the “bandits” with all speed. Mst dispatched three units to attack the Liberated Areas in north
The KMT’s strategy was to take complete control of the region China One unit attacked eastward along the Bciping-Suiyuan
south of the Yangtze River and to capture strategic areas and key Radway the second attacked northward along the Tianjrn-
communication lines in north China, thereby dividing the Liber¬ Pukou Railway, while the third pushed toward Beip‘ng “l0“g
ated Areas and reducing their size, while opening up a route to Datong-Puzhou, Zhengding-Taiyuan and fieipmg-Hankou rail
northeast China. After this, they would proceed to occupy the ways The people’s armed forces resolutely fought back. In the
whole of northeast China, taking advantage of the provisions of Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Liberated Area the pcop^
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.7 During the armed forces, under the command of Liu Bocheng and D "g
two months from the time of the Japanese surrender on August Xiaoping wiped out 35,000 men of the attacking troops under the
14, 1945, to October 17, 1945, KMT troops occupied thirty cities command of Yan Xishan in Shangdang, Shanxi Province. This
in the Liberated Areas. contained the KMT assault on the Liberated Areas and strength
While working hard for peace and democracy, the Communist Tned the position of the CPC at the Chongqing negotiations,
Party entertained no illusions about the Kuomintang authorities. facilitating the signing of the October 10th Agreement. Ip m d
In the inner-Party circular of August 26, the Central Committee to late October, the people’s armed forces m the Liber a tecAreas
had firmly stated: “You must definitely not hope that the Kuo¬ fought three battles along the Beiping-Suiyuan Railway the
mintang will be kind-hearted, because it will never be kind- Tianjin-Pukou Railway and the Beiping-Hankou Rai^ay^
hearted. You must rely on your own strength, on correct guidance Handan), annihilating 110,000 attacking tt~ps.By so
of activities, on brotherly unity within the Party and good rela¬ doing they delayed the KMT’s penetration of north China and
tions with the people.”8 Only then could the Party’s position be slowed its advance toward northeast China. °nMg the Hand^
invulnerable, only then could it lay a solid foundation for peace campaign, the CPC succeeded in winning over th: deputy^com
and democracy and for the building of a new China. mander of the KMT’s 11th War Zone and commander o its Ne
On September 19, to protect the fruits of the people’s victory Eighth Corps, Gao Shuxun, who, on the battlefield, ordered the
in the anti-Japanese war and to expand the people’s revolutionary 10,000 troops under his command to join the people s armc
forces, the CPC Central Committee issued a directive to all its
 320
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
chapter five victory in the democratic revolution 321

forces. The KMT was so unpopular for having started a civil war
n.dents and other people. The December 1st Movement, based
after the victory over Japan that even this high-ranking officer
s slogan “Oppose civil war and struggle for democracy!
broke with it. The event had tremendous repercussions through¬
oushed the KMT authorities, who clung to their policy of civil
out the country.
JL, still further into a passive position politically.
The people’s armed forces, acting on the CPC Central Commit¬
In September 1945 in Chongqing, as the democratic movement
tee’s directive, recovered territory from the Japanese and puppet
surged forward, intellectuals in the fields of science, technology,
troops. At the same time, they fought a war of self-defence against
culture and education turned what was originally the Democracy
the KM1 troops. By January 1946, the Liberated Areas covered
ind Science Forum into a formal political organization called the
an area of 2,391,000 square kilometres with a population of 149
September 3rd Forum. This was the forerunner of the Jiu San
million, and they included 506 cities.
(September 3rd) Society. In December of the same year, China
The KMT, hgwever, did not learn from its failures and stop its Democratic National Construction Association and China Asso¬
attacks on the Liberated Areas but continued to move large
ciation for Promoting Democracy were founded in Chongqing
numbers of troops to the civil war battlefront. By early December and Shanghai, respectively. China Democratic League, democrat¬
1945, the KMT had thrown against the Liberated Areas a total
ic factions within the KMT and other organizations intensified
of 1.9 million men, including 1.2 million regular troops, 350,000
their activities. They all called for democracy and an end to civil
puppet Troops and even 350,000 Japanese troops. Naturally, this
war. The patriotic and democratic movement in the KMT areas
aroused the fury of the people, who wanted peace and democracy.
was gaining momentum every day.
On November 19 in Chongqing, Guo Moruo, Shen Junru and
The KMT government dispatched a great number ot ofiicials
others staged a protest against the civil war and established the
to all the formerly enemy-occupied areas they could reach, par¬
Anti-Civil War Association of All Circles. On November 25 in
ticularly the cities, to resume control there. The people in such
Kunming, more than 6,000 university and secondary-school stu¬
areas, having just cast off the yoke of the Japanese invaders, at
dents assembled at Southwest Associated University (formed by
first welcomed the return of the KMT. But many corrupt officials
Beijing University, Qinghua University and Nankai University,
took advantage of their position to expropriate wealth as “booty.
which had all moved there at the beginning of the anti-Japanese
There was severe inflation and social chaos, and the masses lived
war) to discuss current affairs and protest the civil war. Faced
in dire poverty. The bureaucrat-capitalists waxed fat in the name
with pressure from reactionary soldiers, police and secret agents,
of the takeover, while the future of national industry became
30,000 students in Kunming went on strike. The CPC Working
increasingly hopeless. The people lost faith in the KMT.
Committee of Yunnan Province led the students in this struggle.
At this time, the U.S. government announced the recall of its
On December 1 a large band of armed thugs sent by the KMT
ambassador, Patrick Hurley, who had lost his credibility as a
attacked the campus of Southwest Associated University and
mediator by stating publicly that the U.S. would cooperate only
other schools with hand grenades, killing four students and
with Chiang Kai-shek, and appointed General George Marshall
wounding several dozen. This incident, which shook the entire
as President Truman’s special envoy to China to “mediate in the
nation, came to be known as the December 1st Massacre. The civil war. On December 15 General Marshall left for China. On
students of Kunming, supported by teachers and individuals from the same day, President Truman made a statement on U.S. policy
all walks of life, nevertheless continued their struggle. In Chong¬ toward China, expressing support for the convening ol a meeting
qing, Shanghai and other cities, there was an outpouring of of representatives of major political parties in China to work out
support for them in the form of strikes and demonstrations by an early solution to the internal strife — a solution that would
 CHAPTER five victory in the democratic revolution 323
322 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

bring about the unification of the country. But he also stated that and chaos — the hope that civil war might be averted.
On the same day that the cease-fire order was issued, the
the existence of autonomous armies such as the Communist army
was inconsistent with political unity and actually made it impos¬ political Consultative Conference opened in Chongqing. A total
0f 38 delegates attended, including representatives of the KMT,
sible. Accordingly, once a representative government was estab¬
lished, the autonomous armies and all other armed forces in the CPC, the Democratic League and the Youth Party and
China should be incorporated into the National Army. On De¬ individuals without party affiliation. The CPC and the middle-
of-the-roaders, represented by the Democratic League, had much
cember 27 the Soviet, U.S. and British foreign ministers published
an agreement on China they had reached at a meeting in Moscow, in common with regard to basic political questions: they all
stating, “In China unity and democratization must be realized supported peace as opposed to civil war, and democracy as
under the leadership of the National Government, democrats opposed to one-party dictatorship by the KMT. During the con¬
must be recruited into all organs of the National Government, ference, the CPC and Democratic League delegations and some
and the internal struggle must stop.”10 Marshall’s mission was to other representatives often discussed major issues among them¬
persuade the Chinese government to convene a national confer¬ selves so as to reach a consensus and act in concert.
ence attended by representatives of all major parties in order to The conference, which lasted twenty-two days and ended on
“bring about China’s unification,” a plan that deliberately denied January 31, adopted five agreements: on government organiza¬
the existence of the Communist-led people’s armed forces. At the tion, on a national assembly, on a programme for peace and
same time, he was to help the KMT move troops into northeast national reconstruction, on military affairs and on a draft consti¬
China and prepare to move others into north China. His main tution.
objective was to implement the established policy of helping the According to the first of these agreements, the one-party gov¬
KMT expand its authority in China as much as possible. ernment of the KMT was to be reorganized with a Government
Council as the supreme organ. Half of the councilors were to be
The Political Consultative Conference from other parties. During the transition period between the
termination of the KMT’s political tutelage and the formation of
Under these circumstances, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to hold a a constitutional government, the Council would be responsible for
political consultative conference as stipulated in the October 10th convening a national assembly to draft a constitution.
Agreement. According to the agreement on the draft constitution, a Legis¬
On December 16 Zhou Enlai arrived in Chongqing as the head lative Yuan would be the highest legislative organ and would be
of the CPC delegation to attend the Political Consultative Con¬ elected by popular vote. An Executive Yuan would be the highest
ference. To create better conditions for the conference, the CPC administrative organ and would be responsible to the Legislative
delegation first proposed an unconditional cease-fire. After re¬ Yuan. If the Legislative Yuan collectively lacked confidence in
peated negotiations, on January 5, 1946, it signed an agreement the Executive Yuan, the latter would have either to resign or to
with the KMT authorities on the cessation of hostilities. On request that the President dissolve the Legislative Yuan. This
January 10 both sides issued orders that from midnight of Janu¬ central government structure was equivalent to the parliamentary
ary 13, their armies should hold their positions and halt all or cabinet system in Britain and France; It could restrict Chiang
military activity. Thus, for a period of time the fighting truly Kai-shek’s dictatorial powers. The agreement also stipulated that
stopped (except in northeast China), kindling a new hope in the central and local government should be separate. The province
hearts of a people who had suffered through so many years of war would be the highest unit of local self-government, the provincial
 325
^ter five victory in the democratic revolution
324 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

■ttee issued an inner-Party directive repeating that the country

governor would be elected by the people, and the province would
entering upon a new stage of peace and democracy. _The
have a constitution, etc. This provided a potential safeguard for
principal form of revolution in China, it said, had shifted fro
the continued existence of democratic governments in the Liber¬
=rmedP struggle to unarmed mass struggle and parliamentary
ated Areas.
struggle Domestic problems would be solved by political means
The agreement on military affairs mandated that military
,1 of the Party’s work must be adapted to this new situation and
power should be separate from political parties, that military
the entire Party must work for the realization of agreements
authority should be separate from civil authority and that the
reached by the Political Consultative Conference. The CPC, the
military system should be reformed in line with a democratic
Central Committee said, was sincerely prepared to realize domes¬
system of government. It provided that a three-man military
tic peace, advance economic development and social and political
sub-committee (consisting of CPC representative Zhou Enlai,
reform and work for progress and prosperity, in accordance with
KMT representative Zhang Zhizhong and U.S. special envoy
the wishes of the great majority - provided it could protect^and
George Marshall) should reach an agreement on measures for
preserve the basic rights gamed by the people during the ar
reorganizing the troops of the CPC and that the troops of the
Resistance Against Japan. At the same time, it continued, Chiang
KMT should be reorganized according to the plan already
Kai-shek had accepted the agreement only under P^ure, and
worked out by the KMT’s Ministry of War.
Britain the U.S. and the big bourgeoisie in China still had many
The various agreements reached at the Political Consultative
hidden’sehemes. The road to democracy in China would be long
Conference did not represent new-democracy, but they did help
and tortuous, it warned, and people should be prepared for the
break up Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorship and promote democracy,
possibility of war. Because of this possibility, the Central Com¬
and they advanced the cause of peace and national reconstruc¬
mittee advised that it was important for the people s forces to
tion. In varying degrees, therefore, they were beneficial to the
remain on guard and to defend and expand their positions. The
people and were welcomed by them. These agreements aroused in
[hree most important tasks for the Liberated Areas it declared,
the hearts of hundreds of millions of the Chinese people the
fervent hope for nationwide peace, democracy, unity and unifi¬ were to train soldiers, reduce rents and increase Pr°du«™\
The KMT represented the interests of the big landlords and big
cation. Because the agreements embodied many of the opinions
bourgeoisie and was therefore based on a very narrow segment ot
of the middle-of-the-roaders, their response was particularly en¬
society. Consequently, it could not tolerate any democratic in¬
thusiastic. As a result, for quite a long time in the KMT areas the
forms The Chiang Kai-shek clique believed that neither people s
agreements served as the criterion by which people judged right
democracy nor Western-style bourgeois democracy could be real¬
and wrong: those who upheld the line of the Political Consulta¬
ized in China. The U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson later
tive Conference had the support of the people, while those who
mentioned this in his memoirs, noting that “more and more the
abrogated it were in clear opposition to them.
Kuomintang evinced the conviction that pursuit of a united and
The CPC was prepared to implement these agreements. When
democratic China meant that they would lose all.”1' Precisely for
issuing the cease-fire orders, Chairman Mao Zedong had said that
this reason, the KMT was never prepared to fulfil the agreements
a new stage of peace and democracy in China was about to begin
adopted at the Political Consultative Conference.
and that the entire Party should strive to consolidate domestic
While the conference was still in session, the Anti-Civi
peace, carry out democratic reform and build an independent,
Association of All Circles in Chongqing had held a senes ot
free, prosperous and powerful new China. The day after the
“ meetings at Cangbai Hall. The KMT had sent secret
Political Consultative Conference ended, the CPC Central Com-
 327
chapter five victory in the democratic revolution
326 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC.

agents to disrupt the meetings, beat people and prevent the

The Kuomintang Intensifies Preparations for
lectures from continuing. As soon as the conference was over, at Full-Scale Civil War
a meeting of the Standing Committee of the KMT Central
Executive Committee, many of the diehards angrily denounced r, was largely because Chiang could count on the support and
the agreements, complaining that they were not favourable to the distance of the U.S. government that he dared tear up the
KMT and, indeed, represented a failure for the party. Chiang agreements of the Political Consultative Conference and prepare

Kai-shek himself said, “I am not satisfied with the draft consti¬

tution either, but since the matter has already reached this point, f° To launch full-scale civil war, Chiang first needed to move his
there is no way to turn back. For the time being, we have to adopt rrick troops swiftly to north and east China to gam control over
it and see what we can do in the future.”12 On February 10, 1946, ch c ksPl4 Shanghai, Nanjing, Beiping and Tianjin. From
September 1945 to June 1946, the United States used military
in Chongqing, KMT secret agents disrupted a public meeting held
^ “and warships to transport 14 KMT corps 41 divisions
to celebrate the success of the Political Consultative Conference.
and eight regiments of the communications P0'1^
In March, at the Second Plenary Session of the Sixth Central
640 000 men in all, to north, east, northeast and south China. The
Executive Committee of the KMT, Chiang Kai-shek told his
United States also landed 90,000 marines in China and statlon^
followers to take remedial measures with regard to the main them in Shanghai, Qingdao, Tianjin, Beiping, Qinhuangd.ao iin
points of the agreements. He then intensified the civil war, other places, with’orders to hold those areas unt.l they could^
thereby turning them into mere scraps of paper. turned over to the KMT troops. In a short time, the KMT forces
took over military equipment from more than one million Jap
anese troops and several hundred thousand puppet troops. They
III. SMASHING THE KUOMINTANG’S a"so!ncor%rated a large number of puppet troops into their own
armies greatly increasing their military strength.
OFFENSIVE BY A WAR OF SELF-DEFENCE
Having gained control of all the major cities south of the Great
Wall, the KMT troops focused theu attack on no^ast Chta^
Despite the agreements, the KMT ruling clique still sought
to weaken and then destroy the people’s revolutionary forces
by military means. In the first half of 1946, a political storm
was brewing in China. On the surface, the truce agreement Union declarldwar onJ^panm August 1945,
signed in January was being carried out. To maintain the
cease-fire, the Executive Headquarters for Military Mediation,
consisting of representatives of the KMT, the CPC and the JinzhouPPChengde, etc. Other units also advanced into n°rtheast
United States, sent mediators wherever military clashes oc¬ China, recapturing broad areas, except ™
curred. Although the KMT troops never stopped nibbling away
at the Liberated Areas, no large-scale military confrontations
occurred except in northeast China. But this was merely the
ssstswss ss ss&iss'-
attack on northeast China. During November they reoccupied
Shanhaiguan Jinzhou and other places held by Communist-led
calm before the storm. Chiang Kai-shek was using the lull to
forces At the time of the signing of the truce agreement in
prepare for full-scale civil war.
 329
FIVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
328 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC;
chapteR

January 1946, the KMT government had excluded northeast

China on the pretext that “sovereignty had not yet been regained a°The actions by Chiang and the United States caused the
there.” In February the U.S. Seventh Fleet used transport vessels * anxiety among the people, including many democratic
to move crack KMT troops (five corps including the New First Arties and unaffiliated democrats. In mid-June the Federation
People’s Organizations of Shanghai formed a delegation to go
and Sixth Corps) to Qinhuangdao, from which point the troops
advanced to northeast China. In this way, the KMT military t Nanking with a petition to the KMT authorities appealing for
presence in the Northeast increased dramatically to 285,000 men. neace The group included well-known persons from the Associa

In early March the Soviet army, acting in accordance with the for Promoting Democracy, the Democratic National Com
Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty, began to withdraw from the cities struction Association and religious circles. On June 23 the CPC
and rail lines in northeast China. The KMT army immediately Central Committee’s Shanghai Bureau organized more than0°'
seized Shenyang and advanced against the Liberated Areas from nOO people from all walks of life to see the petitioners off at the

several directions. Beginning on April 18, the main forces of the railway station That night, when they arrived at Xiaguan Station
Communist-led Northeast Democratic Allied Army fought an n NaniS a group of Thugs dispatched by the KMT authorities
intense, month-long battle to defend Sipingjie. After annihilating surrounded them and beat them in a melee that lasted five hours.

10,000 enemy troops, they withdrew from the city. In late May, Ma Xulun leader of the delegation, and several other represent-
the KMT army captured Changchun and gained control over atives were seriously injured. Zhou Enlai hurried to the hospital
most of the area south of the Songhua River in Heilongjiang to express his sympathy and concern. Ma took Zhou s hand an
Province. said to him that the hopes of all Chma were pinned on the
Because the KMT government announced that it would move
the capital from Chongqing back to Nanjing in early May, the “"devetopments indicated that the full-scale avU war
site of the negotiations between the KMT and the CPC also sought by Chiang Kai-shek was already imminent. Despite the
moved to Nanjing. Zhou Enlai led the CPC delegation to Nanjing Communist Party’s many efforts to achieve peace, it could not
and Shanghai, continuing the arduous negotiations and trying prevent the outbreak of war. While doing its best to uphold the
hard to avert a full-scale civil war at the last moment. But since agreements of the Political Consultative Coherence, the Party
Chiang Kai-shek had already committed himself to his course of wL forced to prepare to defend itself. On April 16 Zhou Enlai
action, the negotiations were doomed to failure. sent a telegram to the CPC Central Committee warning of the
In the meantime, the U.S. government increased its aid to the grave danger. “To fool the people,” he wrote, “Chiang superficial¬
KMT. In March 1946 the United States successively organized ly seeks to reach a compromise, but he is covertly deploying his
army and navy advisory teams. On June 17 the two governments trips He is hatching formidable plots.” On May 21l the Centra
signed the Sino-American Lend-Lease Agreement, which trans¬ Committee issued a document telling all Party members that the
ferred U.S.$51.7 million worth of military equipment to the Kuomintang was preparing for nationwide civil war. We, for our
KMT. Secretary of State Acheson later admitted the importance part^the Central Committee directed, “should increase our own
of the U.S. role. In a letter to President Truman on July 30, 1949, preparations (and especially the training of soldiers) in order to
he noted: “Indeed during that period, thanks very largely to our stop him ” Earlier, on May 4, the Central Committee had issued
aid in transporting, arming and supplying their forces, they a direedve (known as the May 4th Directive) to solve the rural
extended their control over a large part of North China and land question 14 This was designed to increase the peasants enthu-
Manchuria.”13 These facts shattered the myth of U.S. “media- sism for revolution and production and to lay an even stronger
330 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE GPc CHAPTER FIVE victory in the democratic REVOLUTION 331

foundation for mass support in the impending war of self-defence rhina Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan, Shanxi-Suiyuan, the
On June 19, the eve of the outbreak of civil war, the CPc Northeast and Hainan Island. These attacks marked the outbreak
Central Committee issued an inner-Party directive assessing the of full-scale civil war. . •
situation: On July 11 KMT secret agents in Kunming assassinated Li
“Chiang Kai-shek is bent on launching a major attack, which Gongpu, a member of the Central Committee of the Democratic
will be hard to prevent. Once he starts, we judge that if, after League and an activist famous for his participation in the Patriot¬
about six months of fighting, we win a great victory, peace ic National Salvation Movement on the eve of the outbreak of the
negotiations can certainly be held. If it is a stalemate, peace talks war with Japan. On July 15 Wen Yiduo, a poet and scholar who
are also possible. If Chiang’s forces win a great victory, there will was a professor at Southwest Associated University, was assassi¬
be no peace talks. Therefore, to win peace our troops must defeat nated in the same city. At the end ol the anti-Japanese war,
Chiang’s attacking forces.” Subsequently, in a directive issued to outraged by the lawless acts of the KMT, Wen had taken an
the commanders of all military units, the Central Committee active part in the democratic movement. It was obvious that the
stated, “Even though our Party is doing everything in its power KMT reactionaries were aiming their guns not only at the Com¬
to arrive at a compromise, making major concessions at the munists but also at all people of good will who called for peace
negotiations in Nanjing, you should harbour no illusions.” Facts and democracy.
show that the CPC took action only when its very existence was As the KMT government overestimated its own strength, it
at stake and when it could no longer avoid defending itself. was confident of the outcome of the war and hoped to win a quick
Moreover, even after being forced into a war of self-defence, it victory. For the assault on the Liberated Areas it had assembled
was prepared to make concessions to stop the war. It was entirely 193 brigades (divisions), or 1.6 million of its regular troops,
due to the machinations of the KMT ruling clique that civil war representing 80 percent of its total strength of 248 brigades
broke out in China after the victory over Japan, and the KMT (divisions), numbering two million. The KMT’s principal strategy
should therefore bear full responsibility for it. was to follow the trunk rail lines, attack from south to north and
seize and control the cities and lines of communication of the
Full-scale Civil War Breaks Out Liberated Areas, wiping out the main elements of the people’s
armed forces or forcing them north of the Yellow River, where
As soon as they had completed their preparations for war, the they could then be rounded up and annihilated. Chiang Kai-shek
KMT authorities revealed their true nature — their contempt for claimed that in view of the KMT’s superior military strength,
the truce agreement and for the agreements of the Political with proper cooperation and flexible tactics the war could be
Consultative Conference — by launching a full-scale attack on brought to a speedy conclusion. His chief of staff, Chen Cheng,
the Liberated Areas. On June 26, 1946, two hundred and twenty estimated that the Communist-led people’s armed forces could be
thousand KMT troops began the assault by besieging the Central wiped out in three to five months at most.
Plains Liberated Area in the border region between Hubei and The situation of the people’s revolutionary lorces at the begin¬
Henan provinces. On the night of the same day, the main forces ning of the war was truly grim. In terms of military and economic
of the Central Plains Command, led by Commander Li Xiannian strength, the KMT was clearly superior. At the time, the people’s
and Political Commissar Zheng Weisan and divided into two armed forces consisted of 1.27 million men equipped basically
columns, broke through the enemy siege. Then the KMT forces with weapons captured from Japanese and puppet foot soldiers.
mounted major offensives against the Liberated Areas of east They had only a few pieces of artillery. The Liberated Areas
 333
CHAPTER five victory in the democratic revolution
332 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
thjs question, in April 1946 Mao Zedong wrote ani essay “Some
covered a region measuring approximately 2.3 million square Points in Appraisal of the Present International Situation^ He
kilometres, populated by 136 million people. Feudal forces within declared that while there was a danger of world war, the demo-
these areas had not yet been eliminated, and the rear areas were Stic forces of the people of the world were torging ahead and
not yet consolidated. Moreover, the Liberated Areas were geo¬ S they must and fould avert that danger. The United States
graphically separated from each other by KMT forces and were Britain and France and the Soviet Union would arrive at a
therefore unable to obtain material assistance from outside. compromise sooner or later. But, he added, “such compromise
With such a wide disparity between its own strength and that doesPnot require the people in the countries ot the capitalist world
of the enemy, the first question the Communist Party was forced to follow suit and make compromises at home, lhe people in
to answer was whether it dared to fight a revolutionary war those countries will continue to wage different struggles in ac¬
against the counter-revolutionaries. cordance with their different conditions.”15 In August of the same
As we have seen, one major reason that the KMT dared to vear, not long after the civil war broke out, when talking with the
launch a full-scale civil war was the support that it received from American correspondent Anna Louise Strong, Mao Zedong put
the U.S. government. At that time, the United States seemed forward his famous thesis, “All reactionaries are paper tigers
invincible, combining great economic strength with its monopoly “In appearance ” he said, “the reactionaries are terrifying but in
of the secret of the atomic bomb. The Chinese reactionaries reality they are not so powerful. From a long-term point of
invoked the power of their backer to intimidate others. At the view it is not the reactionaries but the people who arc really
beginning of the war, some middle-of-the-roaders were misled by powerful.”16 Mao’s views greatly strengthened the confidence and
the outward strength of the reactionaries and overcome by pessi¬ resolve of the entire Party membership, the army and the peop c,
mism and fear. Some people even went so far as to advocate that convincing them that the Chinese reactionaries could be defeated.
soldiers and civilians in the Liberated Areas, faced with attack, But, what would it take to repulse the KMT s military attack.
should compromise and make concessions. Internationally, the This was another question the CPC had to answer.
U.S. was escalating the “cold war.” At the time a clamour was The Centra] Committee enunciated this fundamental princi¬
raised that the United States and the USSR were bound to fight, ple- “In order to smash Chiang Kai-shek’s offensive we must
and many people believed that World War III was imminent. The cooperate closely with the masses of the people and win over all
Soviet leaders took a pessimistic view of the situation: they who can be won over.”1’ The people’s armed forces were m an
believed that if civil war broke out in China, the United States inferior position both in numbers and in equipment. If they were
and the Soviet Union might be drawn into the conflict. China to defeat Chiang, they had to rely on the people and fight a
would then be the battlefield in a world war, and the Chinese people’s war; there was no other alternative. This was the key to
nation would risk extermination. For this reason, they proposed victory. For this purpose, the Party had to solve the rural lan
that the CPC ought to join with Chiang Kai-shek’s government problem, rely on the poor peasants and farm labourers and unite
and disband its own army. with the middle peasants, while distinguishing the ordinary rich
Despite all this, the CPC remained calm and was determined peasants and middle and small landlords from the-traitors bdd
to fight back. After the outbreak of the civil war, all of the gentry and local tyrants. It had to consolidate the Liberated Areas
Communist-led people’s armed forces were compelled to fight in and obtain unending human and material resources to support
self-defence. The Party believed that Chiang’s offensive not only the war. In the cities, the Party should rely on the working class,
must but could be defeated. the petty bourgeoisie and all progressives and take care to unite
Could the Chinese civil war lead to a world war? To answer
 335
334 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC ER HVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

with the middle-of-the-roaders and isolate the reactionaries. _ the Northeast These victories dulled the edge of the
and from the Northeas . first experjence m
Among the KMT troops, it should win over all the possible
opponents of civil war and isolate the bellicose elements. In short,
the Party’s political principle was to mobilize the masses, unite
with all the forces that could be united with and build the
broadest possible people’s democratic united front. armed forces recaptured 48 wiping out cQuld use m
The Party’s military strategy was based on the principle of
concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by mc'tonnmes fttaduaUy decreased, their morale sank andrteir
one. Hence, the tactic of dispersing forces for guerrilla warfare,
which had been the one chiefly used in the anti-Japanese war, was
for the most part supplanted by the tactic of concentrating forces
for mobile warfare. And to implement a strategy of active de¬
fence, rather than trying to hold or seize a specific city or place, the peoples tioops recaP TJlc ^^T was weakening, be-
the CPC made elimination of enemy effectives its main objective.
blocking further'““effectives had been destroyed and because
During the period from June 1946 to June 1947, the people’s
prison duty ur the occupied areas
armed forces were in a stage of strategic defensive, fighting
mainly in the Liberated Areas. During the first eight months of abandoned by the people’s^anned forces .In h d t
this period, they repelled a general KMT attack on all fronts;
during the last four months, when the KMT troops launched
-«
concentrated attacks on key sectors, they repelled those as well.
At the beginning of the war the KMT, relying on its superior¬ "wwie the KMT was attacking the Liberated Are^ militarily,
ity in numbers and equipment, mounted fierce assaults on the
Liberated Areas in an attempt to wipe out the people’s armed U T alTyihe ZhouEnlai and
forces with one blow. The CPC Central Committee, however, had
always been prepared for two eventualities. While it had been tions with the KMT. 1 he , d the civji war but contin-
striving for peace, it had also been preparing to deal with any
surprise attack by the KMT. When the KMT troops advanced en
masse, the people’s troops in the Liberated Areas fought back
steadily, concentrating superior forces and trying to annihilate r ^ t't me"1 Marshall^and^the newly appointed US
the enemy in mobile warfare. Not long after breaking the siege ambassador to China, Leighton Stuart M ^
on the Central Plains, the Central China Field Army, under the
declaring that the d^th“aT“mfdiatmn” had already
command of Su Yu, won seven successive victories in central difficult to resolve and that ^ headed by Zh0u
Jiangsu Province, wiping out six enemy brigades and five battal¬ failed. On September 30 regard to the break-
ions of the enemy’s communications police corps, totalling more
than 50,000 men. Victories were also reported from the area north
of the Huaihe River, from the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan
ttSBSPO&gBzZSi
Liberated Area, from the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Liberated Area
 chapter FIVE VICTORY IN the DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
336 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
C turned to the United States. On January 29 the U.S govern-
CPC’s Liberated Areas, to push relations between the KMT and 1 nt announced the withdrawal of its representatives front the
the CPC to the final breaking point.”18 The letter contained a Executive Headquarters for Military Mediation On February2
stern warning:
the KMT authorities forced the CPC representatives to the Exe

“We have received special orders which state that if the gov¬ hnve Headquarters for Military Mediation, including Ye Jian-
ernment does not immediately cease its military operations CXrto return to Yan’an. Next they ordered the CPC represent-
against Zhangjiakou and the surrounding areas, the CPC will I fves stationed in Nanjing, Shanghai and Chongqing mdudmg
have no alternative but to view such actions as the government’s Dong Biwu, Wu Yuzhang and their colleagues, to leave those
public declaration of complete failure of the negotiations and its cities bv March 5. New China Daily, published in Chong¬
final rejection of a political solution. Full responsibility for all the oing wls orderfd to shut down. At this point, the KMT blocked
grave consequences arising therefrom will, of course, be borne by all possible avenues to peace and broke off all relations wi c
the government.” On October 11 the KMT army, without heeding
the repeated CPC warnings, launched an assault on Zhangjiakou CPh,' March 1947 the KMT troops began to suffer repeated
and occupied it. The KMT authorities let this victory cloud their setbacks in their full-scale offensive and had to shift the focus
judgment and immediately abrogated the Political Consultative their attacks to key sectors in the Liberated Areas. In the Shanxi-
Conference agreement on the National Assembly. That agree¬ Hebei-Shandong-Henan and Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei aret*andrn
ment provided that the National Assembly should be convened northeast China, they were forced to go on lhe defensive T
not by the one-party government of the KMT but by a reorgan¬ KMT concentrated its main strength on wiping out the peop e s
ized coalition government of all parties. Yet on the very after¬ armed forces in the Northern Shaanxi and Shandong Liberated
noon of the capture of Zhangjiakou, the KMT formally an¬ Areas before turning to others. The people’s armed forces contin¬
nounced that it was going to convene the Assembly. In this way,
ued to follow their strategy of active defence^
even more people came to see that it was the KMT that rejected In Shandong Province in late February, the East China Held
peace and democracy, while the CPC, left with no other choice, Army under tghe command of Chen Yi and Su Yu, aunched a
had been forced into a war of self-defence. Thus, the sympathy surprise attack in the Laiwu area. It wiped out over 56,000 men
of the people was with the Communist Party. of the KMT’s 2nd Pacification Zone, who had been advancing
The KMT asked all organizations that had attended the Polit¬ south under deputy commander Li Xianzhou. This dealt a crush¬
ical Consultative Conference to hand in lists of the representa¬
ing blow to the enemy troops, and made it possiblei^h iVearly
tives they would send to the National Assembly. The CPC flatly East China Field Army to focus on fighting in the South. In ear y
refused to do so, and the Democratic League did likewise. The March the commander-in-chief of the KMT grounc1 forcesGu
KMT-dominated National Assembly opened in Nanjing in mid- Zhutong, ordered 60 brigades, approximately 450,000 men, to
November 1946 (apart from the KMT members, it was attended advance8 steadily in close formation, ‘inching a new a^ ck^on
only by a few politicians from the Youth Party and the Demo¬ the Shandong front. Acting on orders ol the CPC Central
cratic Socialist Party). It adopted the so-called Constitution of the rary Commission, the East China Field Army lured the enemy m
Republic of China, designed to support the dictatorial regime of deep carefully biding its time and keeping its mam contingen
Chiang Kai-shek. On November 19 Zhou Enlai concluded his in reserve Then in mid-May it finally seized the initiative and
attempts to negotiate peace, which had lasted more than twelve nut out of action 32,000 of the KMT’s American-equipped crack
months, and returned to Yan’an. In January 1947 General Mar¬ troops, ihe Reorganized 74th Division, at the battle of Mengliang
shall issued a statement of his intention to leave China and then
 338 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPr ^PTER FIVE victory in the democratic revolution 339

gu. This smashed the KMT’s attack on key sectors in the Shan¬ headquarters staff of the Reorganized 36th Division H^dquar-
dong Liberated Area. h ‘ and its two brigades under Hu Zongnan. By August the KMT
Jn northern Shaanxi, the KMT launched a sudden assault on «ault on key sectors of northern Shaanxi had been smashed.
Yan’an, seat of the CPC Central Committee and General Head¬ During the period from March to June 1947, while in the
quarters of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Two hundred nrocess of defending themselves against KM 1 attacks on key
and fifty thousand troops, under the command of Hu Zongnan sectors PLA units began a partial counterattack in the Northeast,
and others, engaged the 20,000 CPC troops. Although outnum¬ Rehe eastern Hebei, northern Henan and southern Shanxi. Al¬
bered ten to one, for six days of round-the-clock combat the though 95 cities in the Liberated Areas remained under enemy
Communist troops held back the KMT forces south of Yan’an occupation, the people’s armed forces managed to recapture or
covering the withdrawal of the CPC central officials and other liberate 153 cities and to annihilate over 400,000 enemy troops.
residents. On March 19 they abandoned Yan’an, beginning a Within the one year period from July 1946 through June 1947,
period of bitter fighting in northern Shaanxi. The KMT generals the People’s armed forces wiped out 97 and a half regular bri¬
were overjoyed at the capture of Yan’an, but they soon realized gades, or 780,000 men, as well as 340,000 puppet troops, peace
that their happiness was premature. preservation corps and others — altogether, 1.12 million of tie
After withdrawing from Yan’an, the CPC Central Committee enemy. At the same time, its own ranks swelled to 1.9 million
decided to send to north China a working committee consisting men. In view of these circumstances, the people’s armed forces
o( several of its members, including Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De from were able to complete the phase ot strategic defence as they
the Secretariat, to carry out certain tasks on its behalf. The entered the second year of the War ot Liberation.
majority of the Secretariat, including Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai
and Ren Bishi, remained in northern Shaanxi. From there they
led the simple but efficient organs of the Central Committee and IV. THE OPENING OF THE SECOND FRONT
the PLA General Headquarters, directing military operations on
all fronts nationwide. Ye Jianying and Yang Shangkun took At this time the Kuomintang ruling clique was growing in¬
charge ot the Central Committee’s Rear Area Commission and creasingly corrupt, increasingly divorced trom the people, io
moved to northwestern Shanxi to manage the work in the rear. carry on the civil war, it relied heavily on the U.S. imperialists
Taking advantage of the favourable conditions in northern and sold out the rights and interests of the nation. U.S. soldiers
Shaanxi, including a good mass base, mountainous terrain and stationed in China behaved like a domineering army of occupa¬
plenty of room for manoeuvre, the PLA’s Northwest Field Army tion. The KMT bureaucrat-capitalists waxed fat on the wealth
Group, later called the Northwest Field Army, used the tactic they stole from the people. A great many industrial and commer¬
that Mao Zedong described as “wearing the enemy down to cial enterprises of the national bourgeoisie shut down, the ru¬
complete exhaustion and then wiping him out.”19 Acting accord¬ ral economy stagnated and prices skyrocketed. The areas under
ing to this principle, the Northwest Field Army, led by Peng KMT control sank into economic crisis. Huge numbers of people
Dehuai, dealt the attacking enemy forces heavy blows. Within 45 struggled on the brink of starvation. People of all political per¬
days after abandoning Yan’an, the army won three battles fought suasions (including the middle-of-the-roaders) gradually came to
at Qinghuabian, Yangmahe and Panlongzhen, wiping out more realize that in this war the central issue was not which party, me
than 20,000 enemy troops. They then turned to fight in north¬ KMT or the CPC, would win, but whether China would finally
western Shaanxi and at Shajiadian completely wiped out the become independent, unified, free and prosperous, as generations
 340 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE FIVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

of Chinese had longed for it to be. uert their fill of imperialist oppression. TT . .
While the army and people of the Liberated Areas were achiev¬ SinThese events showed many Chinese that while the United
ing great victories in their war of self-defence, the people of the Thef ? been an ally during World War II, its postwar policy
KMT areas launched a momentous patriotic and democratic S?l62orting Chiang and opposing the Communist Party was a
movement. With the students in the van, this movement against ot supp . • sufferings When American soldiers gang
the reactionary KMT government gradually crystallized into a n,aJdaChLcse univershy swdent in the Dongdan Playing Field
second front in the people’s War of Liberation. S Beiping on December 24, 1946, the incident triggered a mass

The Movement to Protest U.S. Atrocities December 30 more than five thousand students from
. University Qinghua University and other universities
This movement stemmed from the U.S. policy of supporting mlle^es in Bering held a demonstration to protest the crimes
Chiang in the civil war and opposing the Communist Party. In
exchange for U.S. aid, the KMT authorities signed the Sino-U.S.
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, one of a num¬
ber of agreements and treaties, both open and secret, which thce ^3tut0nPt
surrendered the nation’s sovereignty under humiliating condi¬
tions. Taking advantage of special trading privileges, Ameri¬ — S;«pience .of
can manufacturers flooded China’s markets with their prod¬ this Ancient city under KMT rule but also caused a nattonwrde
ucts, quickly gaining a monopoly. For example, 80 percent of the suree of anti-American sentiment. . __
goods on the shelves of the department stores in Shanghai were On December 31 the CPC Central Co^mi^^SSa^sautgTng
made in the United States. U.S. investment accounted for 80 live to its underground organizations in the KMT arf^’ “®lng
percent of the total foreign capital in China. These percentages them to mobilize the masses in big ciues in response to the sWdent
were the result not of normal international investment and fair movement in Be,ping. It asked the orgamzamns brnkUhe
economic exchange but of the unequal treaties signed by the broadest base of support” for this movement, take brave action
KMT government at the expense of national sovereignty. These and “lead the movement forward so as to isolate the U K and
circumstances were a mortal blow to the already precarious
Chinese national bourgeoisie. Areas controlled by the KMT after Chime” Evtr^rTtteZT;
the War of Resistance Against Japan had essentially become
American colonies.
With the connivance of the KMT government, U.S. military
personnel in China had been made subject to U.S. rather than “m°onestrikeeSAsmany alloOdJOO participated nationwide.
Chinese law, and the soldiers stationed in China ran rampant. Many professors, scholars and well-known cultural figures in
According to incomplete statistics, between August 1945 and Beiping Shanghai and other cities denounced the outrages perpe
November 1946, they committed at least 3,800 violent acts in the trated by U S soldiers as an insult to the Chinese people, esc
five cities of Shanghai, Nanjing, Beiping, Tianjin and Qingdao, ng he student movement as a struggle for mdividua and natiom
killing or wounding more than 3,300 Chinese. Such crimes could al dignity. The Shanghai chapter of the Democratic National
not but fire the indignation of the Chinese people, who had long Construction Association, the Shanghai Association of Industr
 *** A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC cHAPTER five victory in THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 343

aJists and Merchants for Progress and the Chongqing Chamber of This vicious inflation was actually a widespread form of plunder
Commerce, among others, issued statements in support of the of the masses.
students’ patriotic actions and demanded the withdrawal of U S Under these circumstances, national industry and commerce
troops.^ The student movement developed into a broad-based gradually went bankrupt and were on the verge of total collapse.
people’s movement, a united front against the U.S. and Chiane From October 1946 to February 1947, as many as 27,000 factories
Kai-shek. ' 6 and shops closed in 20 cities including Shanghai, Wuhan and
The anti-atrocity movement demonstrated that the Chinese Guangzhou. Total industrial output fell by more than 30 percent
nation would tolerate no humiliation. It helped the people under¬ of its prewar (1936) level. The number of unemployed increased
stand the underlying connections between American interference sharply. The vast majority of workers, city dwellers and even
in China’s affairs and Chiang Kai-shek’s autocratic regime and members of the middle and lower petty bourgeoisie were brought
policy of civil war. It also advanced the patriotic democratic to the brink of disaster. The rural economy also went into a sharp
movement. recession. In 1946 agricultural production sank 8 to 12 percent
In December 1946, to strengthen its leadership of the people’s below its 1936 level, and in 1947 it sank a further 33 to 40 percent.
movement in the KMT areas, the CPC Central Committee made Starving people became a common sight in many villages, and
Zhou EnJai director of its Urban Work Department. Under the bodies of the starved lined the roads. Government employees,
Party’s unified leadership, the movement made great advances. teachers and students were also in desperate straits. By July 1947
prices had soared to 60,000 times their prewar levels, and the cost
The Movement Against Hunger and Civil War of living had increased by a factor of 6,000 to 7,000. Those who
lived on fixed salaries or school subsidies could not afford ade¬
in the KMT areas China’s bureaucrat capital, combined with quate food and struggled on the edge of starvation.
U.S. monopoly capital, controlled the economic lifeline of the On February 28, 1947, the CPC Central Committee issued a
nation. In 1947 it made up two-thirds of China’s total investment directive on work in the KMT areas. On the foundation of the
m industry and 80 percent of its fixed assets in industry and struggle for survival, the Central Committee said, the Party
transportation. The bureaucrat-capitalists took advantage of all should try to build a broad front against the betrayal of the
sorts of political privileges to bleed the labouring people white nation, civil war, dictatorial rule and the terror practised by
and mercilessly annex capital of the national bourgeoisie, thus secret agents. Thus, it gave the right orientation to the people’s
creating a severe recession in the national economy.
movement.
As the civil war continued, the KMT government’s military In May the patriotic students initiated a movement on an even
expenses soared to 80 percent of its total expenditures. To make larger scale than the one launched the previous December against
up for the huge deficit this caused, the government printed U.S. soldiers’ atrocities. This time the targets were hunger and
money at an appalling rate. At the end of the War of Resistance civil war. On the 15th in Nanjing, the capital of the KMT
Against Japan, the annual rate of currency issue was 1.5 trillion government, students from Central University and other schools
yuan. By the end of 1947, it had reached 40 trillion. Drastic marched to the KMT Executive Yuan and Ministry of Education
inflation drove consumer prices skyward. An Associated Press to present petitions. On the 18th students from Beijing University
report from Shanghai on July 24, 1947, depicted this fact vividly: and Qinghua University took to the streets and called on the
“In 1940> 100 yuan bought a pig; in 1943, a chicken; in 1945, a people to oppose hunger and civil war. The KMT government
fish; in 1946, an egg; and in 1947, one-third of a box of matches.” issued an order forbidding groups of more than ten to gather to
 FIVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION M5
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHApTER . . A
344
tr uniarv 78 1947 the people in Taiwan rose in armea
lodge petitions and banning all protest marches and all strikes, °"Fe“t £ despotic ruTe of the Kuomimang. People of
including strikes by students. Chiang Kai-shek issued a warning, ^^nationality and of the native Gaoshan nationality fought
stating that “drastic action” would be taken against the students. thC u ", shoulder paralyzing the reactionary government m
But they did not give in. Sh™t of the province. The KMT sent a large detachment of troops
On May 20 in Nanjing more than 5,000 students broke through the mainland, who landed at the port city of Jilong. In the
a blockade of military police and marched through the streets Woody suppression of this rebellion more than 30,000 people were
carrying a banner that read “Demonstration of Students from
sixteen Universities and Colleges in Nanjing, Shanghai, Su¬ kl During 1947 about 3.2 million workers went on strike in more
zhou and Hangzhou Against the Crisis in Education.” As they twenty cities in the KMT areas. In September Shanghai
marched, they shouted the slogans “Oppose hunger!” and “Oppose workers went on strike to protest the authorities use of force to
civil war!” On the same day, in Beiping, more .than 7,000 students take over three democratic trade umons. The workers fought th
took to the streets carrying a banner that read, “Demonstration roons and police who had been sent to suppress them.
of Students from Beiping and North China Against Hunger and In the rural areas, the peasants rebelled against press-ganging
Civil War.” Patriotic students in Tianjin, Shanghai, Hangzhou, an ,he requTsition of grain and taxes. By January 1947 rebellions
Chongqing, Fuzhou, Guilin, Jinan, Changsha, Kunming and had occurred in more than 300 counties. Between May and June
other cities joined the struggle with strikes and marches. Many 1947, the grain riots had spread to more than 40 cities, including
professors and secondary school teachers sympathized with their Naniins Shanghai, Beiping, Wuxi and Wuhu.
movement. The Shanghai Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, There were new developments in the revolutionary movemen
its Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Bureau and underground Party organi¬ in minoriTy-nationality areas as well. In April 1946 the people o
zations in Nanjing, Beiping and other cities organized and led Inner Mongolia held a conference to unify the movement
these struggles, which became known as the May 20th Movement. autonomy in the region and decided on a policyt ofF stirugglei for
The May 20th Movement served to unmask and isolate the equality, autonomy and national liberation. In Apri1947 they
KMT reactionaries politically. Not long before this, in April convened the Conference of Peoples Representatives of Inn
1947, the KMT government had already used the ruse of govern¬ Mongolia, at which a provisional people’s political council wa
ment reorganization to draw members of the Democratic Socialist elected. The council in turn elected the Inner Mongolia Autono¬
Party and the Youth Party into its cabinet, calling itself a “liberal, mous Government with Ulanhu, a Mongol and member of the
multiparty” government. The KMT-controlled People’s Political ?_nLt Party, as chairman. On May 1 the Inner Mongoh
Council was scheduled to open on May 20 in Nanjing. The Autonomous Region was formally founded. The revolutmnary
students’ large protest march on that day was therefore a major movement in northern Xinjiang, whic egan 1 • tu:s
political blow to the KMT government. The KMT authorities in in Hi, Tacheng and Altay, also continued to expand during thi
Nanjing sent troops and policemen to suppress the students, and
more than 150 students were wounded or arrested. But the 56 A^Mao Zedong pointed out in a commentary written for the
repressive action of the reactionary government failed to achieve Xinhua News Agency on May 30, 1947’*e^e had turn
its intended result; it only served to spread throughout the against the Chiang Kai-shek government. On both the military
country the student movement against hunger and civil war. and political fronts,” he wrote, “it has met defeats, is now be¬
In the KMT areas, other aspects of the people’s movement also gged by the forces it has declared to be its enemies and can find
intensified rapidly.
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
riTin. five victory in the democratic revolution
346 CHAPTtK

no way of escape.” “The march of events in China,” he added, “is Advancing Towards the Central Plains
faster than people expected.... The Chinese people should quickly A, this time the KMT forces still enjoyed superiority in
prepare all the necessary conditions for the establishment of a mhers and, in particular, in equipment. The PLA still faced a
peaceful, democratic and independent new China.”20 a Tficult situation. Nevertheless, the CPC Central Committee
d fhe an unexpected policy decision: it would immediately shift
m a country-wide offensive, without waiting for the enemyis
V. THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY strategic offensive to be completely defeated and for ““PLA
SHIFTS TO THE STRATEGIC Ifn numerical superiority. It formulated the basic task for the
fecond year of the War of Liberation in these terms:
OFFENSIVE “To launch a countrywide counter-offensive, that is, to use our
main forces to fight our way to exterior lines, carry the war into
By the end of the first year of fighting, the situation in the civil re Kuomintang areas, wipe out large numbers of the enemy
war had changed dramatically. By July 1947 the Kuomintang’s on the exterior lines and completely wreck the Kuommtangs
total military strength had already fallen from 4.3 million men to counter-revolutionary strategy, which is, on the contrary, to c
3.73 million, its regular troops having dropped from two million So carry the war into the Liberated Areas, further damage
and drain our manpower and material resources and make it
to 1.5 million. Because its battle lines were overextended and most
of its troops were needed for garrison duty, the number of men imnossible for us to hold out very long.
available for combat was greatly reduced. As a result of succes¬ The CPC Central Committee chose the Dabie Mountains of the
sive defeats, it had lost large numbers of men, and morale Central Plains as the main target of their assault, because this
continued to sink: the mood among the officers and men was region, bordering on three provinces (Hubei, Henan andl Antal
defeatist and war-weary. Moreover, the people in the KMT areas was strategically located between Nanjing, the KMT capital an
rose up in struggle, making the KMT army’s rear insecure. In the important city of Wuhan on the middle reaches oi the
contrast, the People’s Liberation Army had grown from 1.27 Yan^e River. Relying on the Yellow River as a naturabamer
million men to 1.95 million, with the number of regular troops the KMT had concentrated its troops on the eastern flank in
approaching one million. Furthermore, having captured a large Shandong province and the western flank in northern Shaanxi,
quantity of materiel from the enemy, they were now better deploying only a small number ot troops to defend the central
equipped. Because the PLA did not need to divide its troops to region. Furthermore, the Dabie Mountains had beeni an. ol
defend supply lines or cities, the number of men available for revolutionary base area, and mass support was .'da“vnd^“°^
combat duty had also increased greatly. Lastly, as most of the which would make it easy for the Peop es Liberation Army to
Liberated Areas were undergoing agrarian reform, the peasant gam a firm foothold there. Once the PLA took the Dabie Moun
masses had greater enthusiasm for revolution and production, tains, it would constitute a threat to Nanjing to the east, Wuha
to the west and the Yangtze River to the south. It would therefore
and the PLA’s rear area was therefore secure.
be in a position to force Chiang Kai-shek to recall the troops he
On July 4, 1947, in an attempt to get out of his predicament,
Chiang Kai-shek issued the “General Mobilization Bill.” This was had sent to attack Shandong and northern Shaanxi so they could
intend with the PLA for control of this strategic region. Al¬
a desperate attempt to extend the war to the Liberated Areas, so
as to wear them down and make it difficult for the PLA to sustain though it would be most difficult for the PLA to captureAhe
region, success would immediately brmg about a dramatic change
the war.
348 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC 349
chapter five victory in the democratic revolution

in the course of the war, carrying the fighting away from the ■ o led 120 000 troops in a surprise manoeuvre, crossing the
Liberated Areas into the KMT areas. The CPC Central Commit¬ P^ural barrier of the Yellow River and thus raising the curtain
tee further decided that in advancing towards the Dabie Moun¬ n lhe pLA’s strategic offensive. In 28 days of continuous fight-
tains, the PLA should refrain from consolidating each city it •' jn southwestern Shandong, the PLA troops annihilated 56,000
captured, as it had done during the Northern Expedition in 1926 nf the enemy, opening a route to the south. Then they began their
and 1927. Instead, it should advance by leaps, penetrating swiftly heroic 500-kilometre march south, fighting all the way against
and deeply into enemy territory and abandoning any attempt to hundreds of thousands of KMT troops who intercepted and
build solid rear areas. It should first occupy vast rural territory, nursued them. They crossed 15 kilometres of marshes inundated
then build up revolutionary base areas and finally take the cities. by the Yellow River, waded the Shahe River and fought their way
To carry out this strategic plan, the CPC Central Committee across the Ruhe and Huaihe rivers. In late August, after more
coordinated the movements of three armies and deployed troops than twenty days of exhausting marches and heavy combat, they
to tie down the enemy on the flanks. That is, the main force of
reached the Dabie Mountains.
the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army, led by Liu Bo- The advance of Liu and Deng’s army forced the KMT to move
cheng and Deng Xiaoping, was to launch an assault along the its main forces back as reinforcements, quickly increasing the
central route, heading directly for the Dabie Mountains. The troops surrounding the Dabie Mountains to more than 30 bn
main force of the East China Field Army, led by Chen Yi and Su gades, totalling 200,000 men. Liu and Deng’s men were worn out
Yu, was to take the eastern route, pushing into the area between from continuous marching and fighting. Also, they had never
Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan and Anhui. Part of the Shanxi-Hebei- fought in the south before. After arriving in a new area, they
Shandong-Henan Field Army, led by Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi, needed time to establish political power and to mobilize the
was to take the western route, advancing into western Henan. The masses, and they were short of food, clothing and ammunition.
three armies were to annihilate the enemy forces through coordi¬ In view of these circumstances, Liu and Deng deployed one part
nated mobile operations. For the containing action on the flanks, of their forces in the northern foothills of the mountains and
the Northwest Field Army was to attack Yulin to draw the enemy moved the remainder to western Anhui and eastern Hubei. With
troops that were attacking northern Shaanxi up north, and the firm support from the masses, the troops fought tenaciously,
Shandong Army of the East China Field Army was to start an repulsing repeated attacks by the KMT troops on key sectors. By
offensive in eastern Shandong, driving the enemy troops toward November they had annihilated over 30,000 enemy troops and set
the sea. up democratic governments in 33 counties. These were the preli¬
The 500-kilometre drive on the Dabie Mountains was a unique minary successes in the Dabie Mountains.
attack. Mao Zedong predicted the serious difficulties involved in In late August, while Liu and Deng’s troops were on their 500-
this strategy. He pointed out that in fighting towards the exterior kilometre trek to the Dabie Mountains, a detachment of 80,000
lines, there were three possible outcomes. Having paid the price men from the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army, led by
to conquer a given territory, the PLA might 1) be unable to hold Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi, crossed the Yellow River into western
its ground and be forced back; 2) be unable to completely hold Henan. By late November they had wiped out 50,000 enemy
its ground and be forced to engage in guerrilla warfare on the troops and established democratic governments in 39 counties,
periphery; or 3) hold its ground. He urged the commanders to fulfilling their strategic mission in the Henan-Shaanxi border
prepare for the worst and strive for the best. area. In September the East China Field Army, led by Chen Yi
On the night of June 30, 1947, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiao- and Su Yu, crossed the Longhai Railway and marched south into
 351
HAPTER f,ve victory in thh DEMOCRAT1C revolution
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
350 „ for imperialist rule in China, now over a hundred years old
the Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu plains to fight on exterior lines. By late This is a momentous event ... and, having occurred, tt will

November they too had carried out their strategic mission. certainly culminate in victory throughout the country.
At this point, the three armies had fought their way to the
exterior lines. They had advanced together in a triangle formation Reform of the Land System
sweeping through the vast area bounded by the Yellow River to
the north, the Yangtze to the south, the Hanshui River to the west As the PLA went over to the strategic offensive, the new
and the sea to the east. Supporting each other like the three legs situation demanded an intensive land reform movement through¬
of an ancient bronze vessel, the three armies pressed forward and out the Liberated Areas. Such a movement was necessary to
approached the KMT’s line of defence along the Yangtze, posing arouse the peasants’ enthusiasm for revolution and production
a direct threat to Nanjing and Wuhan. This action pushed the and to win their support, which was vital to successful operation.
battlefront south from the Yellow River to the north bank of the in the War of Liberation.
Yangtze, transforming the Central Plains once an important In 1946 the CPC Central Committee issued the May 4th
rear area from which the KMT troops had launched attacks on Directive ,” which marked the CPC’s change from a policy of
the Liberated Areas — into a base from which the PL A troops reducing rent and interest to a policy of confiscating the land of
would advance to nationwide victory. Not long after, a spokes¬ the landlords and distributing it among the peasants. During the
man for the General Headquarters of the PLA said that as the period from May 1946 to June 1947, the land question was
three armies moved south they had “manipulated and drawn essentially resolved in two-thirds of the Liberated Areas A total
towards themselves some 90 out of the 160-odd brigades which of 600,000 peasants had enlisted in the PLA and ano er
Chiang Kai-shek had on the southern front, forced his armies into million were doing support work at the front lines. Ho'*'ever>
a passive position, played a decisive strategic role and won the reform had not yet reached one-third of the Liberated Areas, and
acclaim of the people all over the country.”22 in some places it had not been carried out thoroughly. Fr°m July
Other PLA units were still fighting on the interior lines. These to September 1947, to facilitate further advances m land reform
included the Northwest Field Army led by Peng Dehuai, the the Working Committee of the CPC Central Committee held the
Shandong Army of the East China Field Army led by Tan National Land Conference under the chairmanship of Liu Shaoqi
Zhenlin and Xu Shiyou, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Field Army at Xibaipo Village in Pingshan County Hebei Province^ On
led by Nie Rongzhen and the Taiyue Army of the Shanxi-Hebei- October 10 the Outline Land Law of China formulated by the
Shandong-Henan Field Army led by Xu Xiangqian. They inten¬ conference was approved and promulgated by the Central Com
sified their military operations and gradually went over to a mittcc
counteroffensive. During the summer of 1947, the Northeast The Outline Land Law of China presented a thoroughly revo¬
Democratic United Army launched a strategic counteroffensive, lutionary programme. First, it stipulated, “The land system of
completely changing the military situation in northeast China. feudal and semi-feudal exploitation is to be abolished and the
Conducting offensive operations on every front, the PLA had, system of land to the tillers put into effect. This was a pubhc
in fact, switched to a strategic offensive nationwide. This was an demonstration of the Party’s commitment to overthrowing the
event of historic significance. Mao Zedong said at the time: feudal system of land ownership.
“This is a turning point in history. It is the turning point from Second, the Law stipulated, “All the land of the landlords and
growth to extinction for Chiang Kai-shek’s twenty-year counter¬ the public land in the villages is to be taken over by the local
revolutionary rule. It is the turning point from growth to extinc-
 ter FIVE victory in the democratic revolution
352 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

peasant associations and, together with all other land there, is to

be equally distributed among the entire rural population, regard¬
less of sex or age.” The method to be used was to take from those SuTTh. p»». -T;
who had a surplus of land and give to those who had a shortage
poor P“sany^fthae° land and punish those who were local
and to take from those who had better land and give to those who
was soon berng carried out enthus.astt-
had worse. In general, these provisions served to meet the need
of the peasants — especially the poor peasants and farm labourers
— for land. They also helped avoid the mistake made in the past
of allotting no land to landlords and only poor land to rich
peasants. However, equal redistribution of all land tended to
encroach upon the interests of the middle peasants. This method were encroached upon, or . , odiers were barred from
was therefore changed when land reform was conducted in the sified as rich peasants
newly-liberated areas and in all other parts of the country. participating in decision ma ^ deviation also harmed
Third, the Law stipulated that peasants’ congresses and their tax was imposed on^ them. exaim3le the industrial and
elected committees were to be the lawful bodies responsible for national industry and comme landlords were confiscated, and
carrying out the land reform. It also provided for the establish¬ commercial enterprises run y distinction was
ment of people’s courts to ensure implementation of the policies the taxes levied on enterprises ^^^^between big,
and decrees relating to land reform and to maintain revolutionary made between the landl^rd b t en dcspotic and non-despotic
public order. Thus, while the peasants were mobilized to over¬ middle and small landlords, 01 ^- in the
throw the landlords and acquire land themselves, the government landlords. All these people were denounced ^ ^ ^
promulgated laws and decrees to support them in their struggle, same way. Some landlor s , nhces they were beaten
guaranteeing the complete success of the movement. left with no means sle ^PCCemral Committee found out about
As the War of Liberation progressed, under the guidance of STsteps situation and
the Outline Land Law hundreds of millions of peasants op¬
pressed under the feudal system participated in a great demo¬ gradually put the reform uc on vast area represented
cratic revolution. However, while the National Land Confer¬ The land reform conducted across history. It uproot-
ence made an enormous contribution, it overestimated the a social transformation unpara e China, liberated the
deficiencies in the land reform in the Liberated Areas and ed the feudal system from the ^rtd to cruel oppression and
overstated the problems within the Party. It did not adopt peasants who had so long <-en su them their own masters.
specific policies to prevent the reform from encroaching upon
the interests of the middle peasants and to protect national not only ^s^le
industry and commerce, and it stressed only the need to guard
against Right tendencies, without mentioning the danger of * - — ***“
“Left” tendencies. This was one of the reasons why during the
Parly- , 1Q4o feudal relations of production had
land reform and the related Party consolidation, serious “Left”
errors were made in many areas.
After the National Land Conference, leading Party and gov- ated Areas. Once the masses of the peasants nau
354 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC ^PTER F1VE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

political and economic shackles, their political consciousness and if defence still did everything in its power to salvage peace
organizational level reached unprecedented heights. In response Chiang Kai-shek, for his part, ceaselessly expanded the war, at
to the Party’s call, “Join the army to protect your land!” able- fhe same time convening the bogus National Assembly that
bodied peasants swarmed into the people’s armed forces. Peasants Wonted a so-called Constitution and forcing the CPC represent
everywhere sent grain, bedding and clothes to the front. More¬ Lves to leave the KMT areas, thus closing the door to peace
over, they organized themselves into transport teams, stretcher negotiations. In July 1947 the KMT government issued an Order
teams, railway and road sabotage teams and other military sup¬ for General Mobilization to Suppress the Insurrection of the
port units. Many established or strengthened people’s militia Communist Bandits.” This order indicated in legal form its final
units, which cooperated with the PL A in the defence of the and complete break with the Chinese people. By issuing it, Chiang
Liberated Areas. The people’s armed forces thus found an inex¬ Kai-shek lifted a rock only to drop it on his own feeti He left t
haustible source of manpower and material assistance, enough to Chinese people with only one alternative: to unite and overthrow
win the War of Liberation. It was precisely as Mao Zedong had him In the second half of 1947, the military situation changed
said: “The whole Party must understand that thoroughgoing greatly to his disadvantage. As Zhou Enlai explained: We have
reform of the land system is a basic task of the Chinese revolution shown the people with facts that we are strong enough to over¬
in its present stage. If we can solve the land problem universally throw him, and the people don’t want him anyway. Even e
and completely, we shall have obtained the most fundamental in the upper social strata (except for a few reactionary cliques)
condition for the defeat of all our enemies.”24 and the middle class are getting tired of the loadandwantto
overthrow him. Thus, it is opportune to raise the slogan. Over
throw Chiang Kai-shek!’”26
VI. THE PARTY’S PROGRAMME TO
Formulating a Programme of Action for the New Period
OVERTHROW CHIANG KAI-SHEK
AND LIBERATE ALL CHINA In December 1947 the CPC Central Committee held a
meeting at Yangjiagou, Mizhi County, northern Shaanxi, to
After the War of Liberation entered the stage of strategic draw up a specific plan for overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek and
offensive, the General Headquarters of the Chinese People’s liberating all China. At this meeting Mao Zedong presented a
Liberation Army issued a manifesto containing the resounding report outlining a political, military and economic programme
slogan, “Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and liberate all China!”
The pace of historical progress sometimes exceeds human folHeh began by declaring, “The Chinese people’s revolutionary
expectations. As Zhou Enlai put it in the autumn of 1947, “For war has now reached a turning point.”27 This was a victory bought
a time after the Japanese surrender, the Party hoped to establish at enormous cost, a victory won after iongyears of struggleby
a new China through peaceful means, though without any relax¬ the Chinese people under the leadership of the Communist Party
ation of armed self-defence.”25 However, Chiang Kai-shek tried
every means possible to frustrate the efforts for peace of the ““'reiterated the main points of the PLAN Manifesto of
Communist Party and the Chinese people and imposed on the October 1947, which listed eight basic policies of the army, lhe
people the unprecedented calamity of nationwide civil war. After
the outbreak of that war, the Party, while responding with armed ^“Unite workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and business-
 pjvE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
CHAPTLK r,v
356 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPc
Accordingly, in his report Mao set forth the CPC’s plans in this
men, all oppressed classes, all people’s organizations, democratic
parties, minority nationalities, overseas Chinese and other pa¬ ^Confiscate the land of the feudal class and turn it over to the
triots; form a national united front; overthrow the dictatorial ™-asants. Confiscate monopoly capital, headed by Chiang Kai
Chiang Kai-shek government; and establish a democratic coali¬ diek T v Soong, H.H. Kung and Chen Lifu, and turn it over to
tion government.”28 This, he said, was the fundamental political he new-democratic state. Protect the industry and commerce of
programme of the CPC. Practice had demonstrated that without 1 national bourgeoisie. These are the three major economic
the broadest possible united front, consisting of the overwhelming oolicies of the new-democratic revolution. The principles
majority of the population, it would be impossible to bring the SL1iding the new-democratic national economy,” he added, must
Chinese revolution to victory. And without firm leadership by the closely conform to the general objective of developing produc¬

Party, it would be impossible for any revolutionary united front tion promoting economic prosperity, giving consideration to both
to consolidate and expand. nubiic and private interests and benefiting both labour and capi¬
From the military point of view, Mao analysed the methods tal. Any principle, policy or measure that deviates from this
that the PLA had been using and that would enable it to carry general objective is wrong.”31 , „ . ,
the War of Liberation to a victorious conclusion. He highlighted Mao emphasized that to ensure achievement of the Party s
ten principles of operation, all of which centred around the basic political, military and economic objectives, the Party must firs
principle of concentrating a superior force in every engagement consolidate its ranks by solving the problem of ‘ impurities in the
so as to destroy the enemy forces one by one. He emphasized the class composition and style of work of its local organizations,
need for the PLA to suit its methods of operation to the new especially those at the primary level in the countryside. Only
situation, now that it had shifted to the strategic offensive. For when these “impurities” were removed, he said, could the Party
example, one of the principles was: “Strive to wipe out the enemy and the broadest masses of working people all march in the same
through mobile warfare. At the same time, pay attention to the direction and could the Party lead the masses forward.
tactics of positional attack and capture enemy fortified points and Mao concluded his report with these forceful words: Ihe
cities.” Another, designed to leave the enemy no time to breathe, dawn is ahead, we must exert ourselves.
was: “Give full play to our style of fighting — courage in battle, A decision adopted at the CPC Central Committees meeting
no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting.”29 in December 1947 stated that Mao Zedong’s report was a pro¬
The army, Mao said, should replenish its strength with all the grammatic document in the political, military and economic
arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy, making fields for the entire period of the overthrow of the reactionaiy
the front its main source of manpower and materiel. (This was Chiang Kai-shek ruling clique and of the founding of a new-
particularly important for main forces fighting far from their democratic China.”33
bases or without a rear area to fall back on.) Military leaders in
world history have seldom made such an open statement of their Formulating New Policies and Tactics for the New Situation
strategy and tactics while fighting was still going on. But Mao
pointed out that because the PLA’s strategy and tactics were During the period following its December meeting, the CPC
based on a people’s war, no army opposed to the people could Central Committee concentrated on developing concrete policies
either adopt them or counter them. and tactics appropriate to the new situation. There were three
With nationwide victory in sight, the CPC also felt it necessary reasons for this. First, as the PLA progressed triumphantly, new
to proclaim a basic economic programme for the new China.
 359
chapter five victory in the democratic revolution
358 A CONCISK HISTORY OF THE CPC

areas were liberated, including many cities, and these presented ‘0 - *£• S withreganL to any outlie SS
the Party with unfamiliar circumstances and tasks of which it had
fees^ on'the war, Party consolidation, land reform indusUy
no experience. Second, the Party and army consisted mainly of
peasants and petty bourgeois. Some of them were inclined to
approach urban work from the perspective of small producers or and
iaier inner Party encu and, t3CtiCSt
comrades at all levels must
to apply their methods of rural work empirically to the urban
■=»“ “
work. Without guidance from the Party, such tendencies could
become destructive. Third, historical experience had shown that
in periods when the Party had broken with the KMT, “Left”
deviations were likely to occur, and that when successes were land reform, Mao Zedong drafted “^^fproblems of
scored in revolution, some people were prone to become arrogant
and imprudent, which likewise led to “Left” deviations.
According to Mao Zedong, in spite of the fact that the line,
basic principles and policies of the GPC Central Committee were
correct, in practical application “Left” deviations had occurred
kSsksSSS
“to a greater or lesser extent in all the Liberated Areas and in
some cases had developed into serious adventurist tendencies.”34 framework of the PrlfC P id^le and smalllandlords, as well as
In rural work, such deviations consisted in encroaching on the
interests of the middle peasants, neglecting the tactical impor¬
tance of narrowing the scope of attack in land reform in the new were not. ^"uninate ^en ral Committee also reissued two
Liberated Areas (that is, neglecting to neutralize the rich peasants
and small landlords) and lacking the patience to work step by
Agrarian RevolutionaryWar (1927 37). emit Qn Some
step. In urban work, “Left” deviations manifested themselves in
encroachment on the interests of the industry and commerce of jSraS! for Land " These provided guidelines
the national bourgeoisie, one-sided stress in the labour movement
for local organizations in dealing with such Problems.
on the immediate interests of the workers to the neglect of
production and construction in the cities, and destruction of
production facilities there. As for relations between the Party and
the masses, “Left” deviation was seen in the sweeping slogan, “Do
everything as the masses want it done,” which rejected the Party’s
leadership role and encouraged the tendency to let the Party “tail was very much in the sp analysed the causes of the
after” the people. been made during Und ^
In view of these problems, Mao Zedong strictly admonished
forward principles and methods to conec classes should be
the Party:
“All comrades in the Party should understand that the enemy ated the criteria according to ^^t^rtanS of rmly uniting
is now completely isolated. But his isolation is not tantamount to j J need to
our victory. If we make mistakes in policy, we shall still be unable
 361
360 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPc VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
ChaPTEK FIVE

adopt a policy to protect intellectuals and to win over as many of otiefv the needs of the peasants but also to reduce the
them as possible so they might serve a people’s republic. He also '"mberof persons subjected to political attack, rapidly stabiliz-
stressed the need to avoid adopting any adventurist policies n miblic order and stimulating production.
towards industry and commerce. He declared that the CPC was ingw h he successive liberation of a series of large and medium-
strongly against indiscriminate beating and killing and the tortur¬ • ^cities the CPC was confronted with many new problems.
ing of criminals. The CPC Central Committee distributed copies
of this speech to Party organizations at all levels and published it
in the Party’s newspapers. It proved very helpful in putting the
land reform and other mass movements back on the right track.
With Mao Zedong’s approval, the “Report on Some of the Prob¬
lems in Land Reform” by the secretary of the Northwest Bureau,
Xi Zhongxun, and the “Report on Problems in Work in the New a th.t its nolicv had been construction, not destruction. No
Areas” by the secretary of the Central Plains Bureau, Deng
Xiaoping, were also distributed to Party organizations every¬
ZS22B3SSL
entering
.now- „ «*■•»«
their style of
where. Thanks to the Party membership’s hard work, by the
extravagant y_ y A1) individuals and organizations,
spring of 1948 the “Left” mistakes in land reform had for the
most part been rectified, and the land reform movement had other tharfthe^governrnent authorities (including the public se
returned to its proper course. ^hy bureau)8 had been prohibited from making arrests or
Because the peasants in most villages in the new Liberated
confiscating property. recaptured from the
Areas were not yet organized and public order was still unstable,
the conditions there were not yet ripe for reform of the land
system. Accordingly, the CPC Central Committee decided that in
those villages the methods developed during the War of Resist¬
ance Against Japan could be used. This meant that in the begin¬
Sisli'HSSH
“fevery of the organs of Kuo
ning the policy would be to reduce rent and interest, to readjust
the distribution of seed and grain and to institute a rational mintang rule', arrest only the chief reactionaries and do not
distribution of the grain-tax burden. This would provide the invoive too mny personSf defining bureaucrat-
peasants with material benefits and shift a larger percentage of
the tax burden to the landlords and rich peasants. Only when the

™ " «»-» »»7bI

necessary conditions were present for enforcing the Land Law
would land reform be introduced. The reform would be conduct¬
ed in two stages. During the first stage, efforts would be made to
bring the rich peasants to a neutral stand and struggle would be
directed exclusively against the landlords. During the second
... d„ »
stage, land would be equally distributed, including the surplus ^t'o^'ntnnftra^do'noUighUy^advance slogans of
land previously rented out by the rich peasants. These methods
were applied in the new Liberation Areas, where they served not ra^1nnftteCTCrc"Co0mmiUee°approved and issued “The
 363
CJ^PTFJ* FIVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
362 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

, noiicies for all fields of work, Mao Zedong repeatedly urged

Northeast Bureau’s Directive on Protecting Newly Recaptured
fhe entire Party membership to acquire a solid understanding of
Cities,” which emphasized that when dealing with urban matters
£* Party’s general line. In April 1948, speaking at a conference
it was necessary to abandon practices- suited to guerrilla warfare
Of cadres, he summed up that line as follows: “The revolution
or to villages. Instead, newly recaptured cities should be governed
against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism waged
in the short term by a system of military control. In December
bv the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the
the Central Committee approved and distributed Chen Yun’s
nroletariat - this is China’s new-democratic revolution, and this
report on the takeover of Shenyang in Liaoning Province. The
experience in Shenyang helped solve the two most difficult prob¬
fs the general line and general policy of the Communist Party of
China at the present stage of history.” “If we actually forget the
lems: how to ensure complete control over a city and how to
Party’s general line and general policy,” he warned “then we shall
quickly restore public order. Chen Yun enumerated the specific
he blind half-baked, muddle-headed revolutionaries, and when
methods to be used as follows:
we carry out a specific line for work and a specific policy, we shall
“a) different aspects of the work should be assigned to different
lose our bearings and vacillate now to the left and now to the
divisions;
b) in each enterprise or government department the military right, and the work will suffer.”40 . ...
He also insisted that the Party must determine its tactics
control commission should start from the top;
according to the circumstances. In applying the policies adopted
c) the original staff of each unit should be left unchanged; and
by the Central Committee, the Party organizations must make
d) the commission should take over all units before placing
concrete plans, taking into account different local conditions and
each under the administration of the appropriate division.”38
avoiding over-simplification.
These methods, Chen Yun said, had been used successfully in
Mao emphasized the need to translate the Party s policies into
Shenyang and had served to ensure a quick takeover, so as to
the people’s actions. He pointed out that exponents of the slogan
allow no lime for sabotage and to avoid confusion and social
“Do everything as the masses want it done were absolutely
unrest. At the same time, he considered it imperative to solve the
mistaken: they were denying the leadership role Jarty,f
key political and economic problems in order to set people’s
encouraging cadres to “tail after” the masses. The Party he
minds at rest — restoring electricity, stabilizing currency and
said “must lead the masses to carry out all their correct ideas in
prices, disarming enemy police, using the media to publicize
the light of the circumstances and educate them to correct any
government policies and calm the public, issuing wages, and so
on. He added, “To ensure success in taking over a city, it is most wrong ideas they may entertain. . •
To ensure thorough implementation of the Partys policies it
important that the troops be well disciplined.”39
was essential to uphold the Party’s centralized, unified leadership
It was necessary to enforce social reform measures systemati¬
and to increase Party members’ sense of organization and disci¬
cally, only when conditions were ripe. Because the Party adopted
pline The problem was particularly important at this point,
a series of correct policies, public order in the newly-liberated
because the revolution had already made tremendous progress.
cities was stabilized quickly, production resumed and increased
Many of the Liberated Areas had been linked together and many
and the Party established good relations wiih the city dwellers of
cities had been or were about to be liberated The War of
various social strata. These newly-liberated cities contributed
Liberation had become much more of a regular war. These
greatly to the war effort and to the economic prosperity of the
changes required that the Party move quickly to do away with
Liberated Areas.
the indiscipline, anarchy, localism, and practice ol operating
To ensure rigorous application of the Party’s line, principles
 cHAFrER FIVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
364 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC.
f Snecial Criminal Courts" and “Martial Law.” The areas under
independently that had grown up during the long years of guer¬ S-MT control were devastated by White terror.
rilla warfare when the various army units had been separated R To give its dictatorial rule an air of democracy, from March to
from each other by the enemy. The Central Committee required vri 1948 the KMT held in Nanjing a Constitutional Congress
that all local Party organizations strictly enforce its policies and ^ wh ch Chiang Kai-shek was “elected” President. Because of
that they establish a regular system of asking the Central Com¬ factional conflicts within the KMT administration, and because
mittee for instructions and submitting reports to it at stated [he United States government was considering findinganother
intervals. At the same time, they were to strengthen inncr-Party leader of the KMT to replace Chiang, the leader of the Guangxi
democracy and the Party committee system. faction, Li Zongren, was “elected” vice-president. At the same
Having come to an historic turning point, the Communist time the KMT authorities were deploying their remaining regu
Party, as the political party of the proletariat, had to anticipate lar army forces and local troops to reinforce the South and
and study new situations and problems as they arose, and formu¬ outlying regions in preparation for a last-ditch struggle agams
late appropriate and effective measures to deal with them. The
the revolutionary people. f
CPC instituted practical policies and worked hard to help all its In 1948 the economy of the KMT areas was on the brin
members understand their importance and maintain a high de¬ collapse Prices rose sharply. In June of that year, the price oi rice
gree of unity based on a correct line. Thus, work in all fields was in Shanghai reached eight million yuan per hectolitre, eight times
conducted in an orderly manner. All this provided the most the January level. In August the KMT government issued a
important preconditions for nationwide victory in the revolu¬ document entitled “Emergency Measures; for Handling
tion.
nancial and Economic Situation” and in October another called
“Supplementary Measures for Improving Economic Control. It
also issued “gold yuan” notes to replace the original currency .The
VII. CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION exchange rate was three million yuan for one gold yuan notec
OF THE PEOPLE S DEMOCRATIC However, the new currency also depreciated quickly, and prices
soared Thus, all the KMT government s efforts to alleviate he
UNITED FRONT economic crisis were in vain. They served only to worsen the
situation for both urban and rural working people and brought
As the People’s Liberation Army went over to the strategic- national industry and commerce to the verge of fasten
offensive, the KMT authorities, in an effort to maintain their As the KMT regime crumbled, the Peoples Liberation Army
tottering rule, stepped up their oppression and exploitation of the advanced triumphantly. Under the influence and leadership of
people and their suppression of the patriotic democratic forces. the Communist Party of China, the peoples movements xn the
After issuing the “Order for General Mobilization to Suppress
KMT areas began to gain momentum.
the Insurrection of the Communist Bandits” in July 1947, the The student masses increasingly pinned their hopes on vie y
KMT government drafted all eligible men and requisitioned all in the War of Liberation. Accordingly, they dropped the slogan
available material resources to continue the civil war. It arbitrar¬ “Oppose civil war!” and instead called on people to Oppose
ily arrested, imprisoned and executed workers, students and other persecution!” In October 1947 the chairman of the Zhejiang
patriotic democrats and promulgated a series of reactionary laws University Autonomous Student Association, Yu Zisan was ar¬
and decrees, including “Methods for Dealing with the Commu¬ rested and tortured to death in jail. When they learned of this
nists in Rear Areas,” “Regulations Governing the Establishment
366 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC. ^ VICTORY „ ™ DEMOCRATIC ~ *7

atrocity, more than 100,000 students demonstrated in twelve The Demoaatk ^ague. the CPC Central Committee sai^
cities, including Hangzhou, Nanjing, Shanghai and Beiping. They
waged a struggle against persecution, illegal arrests, secret police alS° “fdMy ” The democratic parties and
times of difficulty. Jn lhe struggie against the KMTs
and the killing of young people. In early 1948, when the KMT
crats played an ac civil war. They cooperated with
authorities had students at Tongji University massacred, students dictatorial rule “d its pol Y jn the course of struggle.
in Shanghai, Beiping and other cities intensified their protests. In
April students in north China protested against the KMT author¬ ThhisCwas the major characteristic of all the democratic parties at
ities’ suppression of the North China Students’ Association with
the slogan “Oppose persecution, protect the Students’ Associa¬ "kMT authorities not only bitterly hated the CPC but were
tion!” Moreover, they joined the teachers and other school staff also hostile towards all consistently
in Beiping and Tianjin in demanding better material benefits. though the Democratic ec ^. ms t0 achieve democracy and
The teachers, workers, researchers and doctors all held strikes. advocated the use of dem( . authorities contin¬
The movement grew and became known as the “April storm.” ual means to achieve of
During May and June, a nationwide student-led movement ually used violence to perse h ■ inenl democrat, Du
against U.S. support for the Japanese militarists swelled to in¬ Li Gongpu and Wen Yiduo ano t members of local
clude people from all sectors of society. The reactionary KMT Bincheng, was assassinated in XiamQr kidnapped.
rulers were thus completely isolated. branches of the Democratic eag or raided In May 1947
All the democratic parlies and the majority of democrats Several of its newspapers were demolish c ■ CPC’s
without party affiliation became daily more inclined to support “MT published a document purpo.rung t
the people’s revolution. As successes were scored in the War of Programme for the
Liberation, the KMT authorities stepped up persecution of the
prepared by the KMT, d h pederation of Corn-
patriotic democratic forces, and as the CPC’s propaganda struck Association for Promoting 6mo , progressive
deep roots among the people, some democrats and hitherto un¬ rades of the Throe Peoples Principles and other ^
committed persons began to turn away from the once widespread organizations as “receiving; orders [™m thcCPCa^ ^
search for a “third road.”42
be the willing tools ot ih rvmneratic League an illegal
Although the Youth Party and the Democratic Socialist Party, KMT authorities declaredthe ^mentary pub-
once participants in the Democratic League, had gone over to the organization and banned all ^ November 6, 1947, pro-
KMT, the Democratic League and other democratic parties and lished by the Xinhua > unarmed organization. Its
most of the independent democrats stood with the CPC. They tested: “The Democratic League _is an 00^^ ^ Thdr Qnly
refused to participate in the “National Assembly” or the KMT members have no guns, ^ J3 . , tj.ev were long ago
government and opposed the bogus constitution. On June 28, weapons are speech and ^i ' l Chiang could
1946, the eve of the full-scale civil war launched by the KMT,
the CPC Central Committee stated in a circular on the cur¬
rent situation: “On the question of negotiations, the Democrat¬
ic League advocated that the CPC take a strong position and
oppose any concession. If the KMT wants war, they think the
CPC should fight back. They believed that war was inevitable.” ss sass sr s=,Se.....
 pjvE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

368 A CONCISE HISTORY OF TIIF. CPC

was forced to announce the dissolution of the party: “Let it be

known that from this day onward, the members of this organiza¬
tion will cease all political activities, all members of this head¬
in the KM , rhine^e Kuomintang. On January 1, 1948,
quarters will resign from their posts and this headquarters is ocratic Factions of the Chinese g f th Kuomintang.
hereby dissolved as of today.” they founded the RevoiuUonary Comnuttee^a^ ^ u Jishen as
The CPC made every possible effort to unite with the demo¬
cratic parties and individuals. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and other with Soong A^he^amgres^the^announced, “Our immediate
chairman. At the cong Qverthrow the traitorous, dictatorial re-
CPC leaders and the Party organizations maintained close contact
revolutionary wsk is t realize independence, democracy
with the leaders of the democratic parties, encouraging and
gune Of Chh*"? sh h Revolutionary Committee of the
supporting them in their struggle against the dictatorship of the
and peace in China. . lf tQ cooperation with the
KMT. This also helped strengthen the left-wing factions in those
Kuomintang tirm y c , . basic principles of the
parties.
Communist Party and revolution progressed and as
In January 1948 Shen Junru and other leaders of the Demo¬
cratic League convened the 3rd Plenary Session of its 1st Central new-democracy PI0g“tee le raedlhrough practical struggle,
Committee, at which they declared they would not accept the ifea^ne to^ublicly^c^iowledge the^eadersh^p of the Communist
dissolution of the League and would restore the headquarters.
The participants in this session clearly stated that the League "“other democratic parties.
would “absolutely not adopt a neutral stand in matters of right al Construction A^aUon Cht Dfimocratic Par-
and wrong.” They also pointed out that the argument for an
independent “middle road” was untenable under the prevailing °e"u San Society6 China Zhi Gong Dang and the Taiwan
circumstances in China. The League, then, had no alternative but Demrcradc^dfSovernment League, all expressed thetr commit-
to take the people’s democratic, revolutionary stand and join in
the struggle to overthrow the KMT ruling clique, eradicate the meo Anrflnri"eacVrCentTal Committee issued a May
feudal system of land ownership, drive the U.S. imperialists out
Day^logan that called for thew“”Je“x“® df aVTeactSnaiies
of China and achieve a people’s democracy. The participants in
consultative conference w ic ^ coalition government.
the session affirmed that the Communist Party of China was
“worthy of every patriot’s admiration” and that from then on the
League would cooperate with it. This session marked the Demo¬
cratic League’s conversion to the standpoint of new-democratic
revolution. As the leader of the League, Shi Liang, said many the Liberated Areas to and
years later, “This political change will go down in the history of
the Democratic League. From this point on, the Democratic IhetuXg^fa new ChLa under the people's democratic
League took the right path of total cooperation with the Commu¬
nist Party of China and, practically speaking, accepted the CPC’s
leadership.”43
At about this time, the democratic factions in the KMT began
to form a revolutionary alliance. On November 12, 1947, in Hong
..pub,.... *
 370
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC cHAptf.r five victory in the DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 371

a country suffering under imperialist oppression.”44 With the number of them were deployed for garrison duties, only 1.74
exception of a few exponents of bourgeois democracy who had million were available for use at the front lines. Moreover, morale
turned reactionary, the great majority of them had gradually was low and the troops lacked combat effectiveness. Even though
discarded it and now believed that the Communist Party’s polit¬ the KMT reactionaries still controlled three quarters of the
ical position on building socialism through the establishment of territory and two-thirds of the population, they were faced with
a people’s republic was correct. It was this belief that provided a hostile people and were extremely isolated. Under these circum¬
the foundation for the Communist-led system of multiparty coop¬ stances, they were forced to abandon their strategy of “total
eration and political consultation. defence” and adopt one of “defence of key sectors.” Their five
strategic armies (under Hu Zongnan, Bai Chongxi, Liu Zhi, Fu
Zuoyi and Wei Lihuang) had been cut off from each other by the
VIII. THE GREAT DECISIVE BATTLES PLA and had been operating separately in northwest China, the
Central Plains, east China, north China and northeast China,
In the autumn of 1948 the War of Liberation entered the without adequate coordination. As a result, the only thing they
decisive phase for nationwide victory of the people’s forces. could do was to guard strategic areas and communication lines,
A t I his time, the People’s Liberation Army had expanded to a leaving only a small number of troops available tor strategic
total of 2.8 million men, of which 1.49 million were in the field manoeuvring. They had already lost the advantage of a contin¬
armies, as compared to 1.27 million at the beginning of the war. uous battlefront. The KMT regime was on the verge of collapse.
It was also much better equipped, great quantities of new equip^ All these circumstances showed that the moment for decisive
ment having been captured from the enemy — one could say that battles between the PLA and the KMT troops was at hand. But
the United States was supplying the PLA through the KMT the total military strength of the KMT still exceeded that of the
troops. The PLA had now established powerful artillery and PLA. The Communist Party was therefore faced with two major
engineering corps, which made it possible for it to attack strongly strategic questions. First, did it dare launch decisive battles,
fortified positions and thus to gain experience in positional war¬ fighting on an unprecedentedly large scale? Second, did it dare
fare. Moreover, the ideological education movement carried out attempt to capture the enemy’s key cities and to annihilate his
in the army by the methods of “pouring out grievances” and the strongest corps? At the time, the KMT authorities were in the
three check-ups” had greatly enhanced the political conscious¬ process of making a major strategic change in troop deployment.
ness of the troops and their combat effectiveness.45 The Liberated In August 1948 they convened a “military self-criticism meeting”
^ccSAAAd gradually been linked t0 form a continuous area of in Nanjing, during which they decided: 1) to concentrate their
2,355,000 square kilometres, or 24.5 percent of the total territory forces in the area between the Yellow River and the Yangtze, 2)
of the country. Their population was now 168 million, or 35.3 to strengthen the defence of Liaodong and Rehe in northeast
percent of the total. Land reform had been completed in most of China in order to stabilize north China and to defend their
the Liberated Areas, and the enthusiasm of the peasant mass¬ positions south of the Yellow River, and 3) to do all they could
es for revolution and production had reached unprecedented to defend the Central Shaanxi Plain and Hanzhong in northwest
heights. The rear areas of the PLA were therefore increasingly China in order to protect their line of defence in southwest China.
secure. If the PLA allowed time for the KMT to conduct this strategic
In contrast, the KMT troops had decreased from 4.3 million concentration of forces, it would find it very hard to carry on
men at the start of the war to 3.65 million. Because a significant military operations later. The CPC Central Committee, headed
 372 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC 373
CHAPTER five victory in the democratic revolution

by Mao Zedong, analysed the military situation and decided to KMT’s 2nd Pacification Zone, Wang Yaowu, was captured. This
seize the opportunity for decisive battles. It organized three was the beginning of a series of victories in which the PLA
consecutive major campaigns — the Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign, liberated the enemy’s heavily fortified cities, and it was therefore
the Huai-Hai campaign and the Beiping-Tianjin campaign. These .he beginning of the total collapse of Chiang Kai-shek s defence
campaigns were correlated with each other, so that they proceed¬ svstem which was dependent upon them. The liberation of Jinan
ed from one victory to another. linked up the North China and East China Liberated Areas and
The overall strategy called for annihilation of the enemy by greatly improved conditions for support of the front lines. It also
groups. The Central Committee chose the correct target for the freed the East China Liberation Army to move south and join the
first strike and began the decisive phase of the war in northeast Central Plains Liberation Army in its large-scale campaign to
China. This would prevent the KMT from carrying out its annihilate the enemy south of the Longhai Railway. For these
strategic plan of concentrating its forces. At the same time, some reasons, the victory at Jinan was of great consequence.
of the PLA troops in northeast China could move to fight south
of the Great Wall. Moreover, the CPC could take advantage of
The Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign
the industry there to support the war effort nationwide. At this
time the military situation in northeast China was most favour¬ On September 12 the Northeast Liberation Army concentrated
able to the PLA, which was quite sure of victory. Although there its main forde of 700,000 men and launched the momentous
were still 550,000 KMT troops in the region, they had been cut Liaoxi [Western Liaoning Province]-Shenyang campaign.
off trom each other in three areas — Changchun, Shenyang and On the basis of strategic considerations, the CPC Central
Jinzhou. The PLA, for its part, had 700,000 regular troops Committee believed that it would be wise to hem in Chiang
stationed in northeast China, which, together with 300,000 local Kai-shek’s troops in northeast China and annihilate them one by
troops, totalled one million men, far outnumbering the enemy. one. Chiang did not know what to do with his 550,000 troops
The Liberated Areas covered 97 percent of the region’s total land stranded north of the Great Wall. If these troops, led by Wei
area and contained 86 percent of its population. Of the 2,100 Lihuang, were to retreat south of the Great Wall, the KM 1 would
kilometres of railways, 2,000 km. were in the people’s hands. be able to retain them as a relatively complete unit of strategic-
After land reform and the elimination of bandits, the PLA’s rear importance. Moreover, they could then be combined with Fu
areas were secure. Such favourable conditions were absent in Zuoyi’s army in north China, to cause trouble for the PLA later
other sectors. The Central Committee accordingly decided to on. Mao Zedong pointed out the need to consider the possibility
begin the final push in northeast China, so as to be certain of of such a retreat and to wipe out all the enemy troops while they
victory in the first campaign. were still in northeast China. To do this, the Northeast Field
The opening shot in this series of decisive battles was fired on Army had first to gain control over the Beiping-Liaomng Railway
September 16, 1948, in Shandong, in the battle of Jinan, which and then to capture Jinzhou, in Liaoning Province, sealing off the
ended on September 24. The East China Field Army had massed exit from the Northeast. But the commander of the Northeast
a powerful force to attack this strategically important city. After Field Army, Lin Biao, put undue emphasis on the difficulties
eight days and nights of fierce fighting, 20,000 men from the involved in moving south for the operation and advocated attack¬
KMT’s reorganized 96th Corps, under the command of Wu ing the city of Changchun, in Jilin, instead. After a period o
Huawen, revolted and crossed over to the people’s side. A further hesitation and repeated criticism by the Central Committee, Lin
110,000 enemy troops were wiped out, and the commander of the Biao resolved to move his troops south.
 chapter five victory in the democratic revolution 375
374 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

On September 12 the Northeast Field Army under the com¬ The Huai-Hai Campaign
mand of Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan began the attack on Immediately following the conclusion of the Liaoxi-Shenyang
Jinzhou. To reinforce the city’s defence, Chiang Kai-shek hurried¬ campaign, 600,000 men from the East China Field Army, the
ly summoned a portion of his troops from north China and Central Plains Field Army and regional armed forces from east
Shandong and organized them into an army to move east. In the China, the Central Plains and north China, launched the Huai-
meantime, he organized the main body of his troops at Shenyang Hai [Huaihe-Haizhou] campaign. Unprecedented in scope, this
into an army to move west. The first of these two armies was campaign was centred at Xuzhou in Jiangsu and extended east as
blocked by the PLA in the Tashan-Hongluoxian sector, and the far as Haizhou, west as far as Shangqiu, north to Lincheng (now
second was intercepted northeast of Heishan and Dahushan. On Xuccheng) and south to the Huaihe River.
October 14 the Northeast Field Army launched its final assault In November 1948 the KMT convened a military conference
on Jinzhou. In 31 hours of intense fighting, it succeeded in at Xuzhou, where it decided to transfer the armies under Liu Zhi
annihilating nearly 90,000 enemy troops and capturing Fan Han- and Du Yuming to Xuzhou, with orders to fight if they could. If
jie, deputy commander-in-chief of the KMT’s Northeast “Bandit they could not, then they were to retreat south across the Huaihe
Suppression” Flcadquarters. River to defend the Yangtze. This showed that the KMT General
The liberation of Jinzhou impelled part of the KMT troops Headquarters was still wavering between defence and withdrawal.
defending Changchun to revolt and the remainder to surrender. At the time, there were 800,000 KMT troops deployed around the
Seeing that the retreat route out of northeast China was now cut intersection of the Tianjin-Pukou and Longhai railways at
off, Chiang Kai-shek gave Liao Yaoxiang, who was in command Xuzhou. .
of the army moving west, strict orders to recapture Jinzhou. The Early in September, Su Yu, deputy commander of the Last
Northeast Field Army immediately encircled Liao’s army - China Field Army, had suggested organizing the Huai-Hai cam¬
which consisted of crack troops of the New First Corps and the paign. He recommended that the main forces ot the East China
New Sixth Corps — from the north and south. After stiff fighting Field Army leave southwest Shandong for northern Jiangsu, with
lasting two days and one night, it completely wiped out the the aim of wiping out the right flank of the KMT army stationed
100,000 troops of that army and captured Liao Yaoxiang. The at Xuzhou. The Military Commission of the CPC Central Com¬
Northeast Field Army followed up this victory and on November mittee had agreed. In November the Military Commission decid¬
2 took Shenyang and Yingkou. Thus, the whole of northeast ed to expand the scope of the Huai-Hai campaign, with the overall
China was liberated. plan of separating Xuzhou and Bengbu and wiping out Liu Zhi’s
During the 52 days of the Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign, 472,000 main forces. In a telegram sent to Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng
enemy troops were wiped out. From this time onward, the PLA Xiaoping and others on November 16, the Military Commission
was numerically superior to the KMT, a change that marked pointed out that victory in this campaign would not only secure
another turning point in the Chinese revolution. The liberation the situation north of the Yangtze but also lay the foundation lor
of northeast China not only turned the one-million-strong North¬ the resolution of the situation nationwide. On that day the CPC
east Field Army into a powerful strategic reserve but also pro¬ Central Committee decided to organize a General Front Commit¬
vided favourable conditions for the subsequent liberation of tee consisting of Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, Su Yu
and Tan Zhenlin, with Deng Xiaoping as secretary. The commit¬
Beiping, Tianjin and the rest of north China. Moreover, it pro¬
tee was to assume unified leadership ol the East China Field
vided the PLA with a secure strategic rear area where there was
a certain amount of industry. Army and the Central Plains Field Army.
 377
CHAPTER five victory in the democratic revolution
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
376
rtic of surrounding the enemy while allowing him one channel
Throughout the Huai-Hai campaign, the KMT’s troop strength f escape which was designed as a trap. On November 25 the
in this sector exceeded the PLA’s. Its equipment was also far PL^trooPs encircled Huang Wei’s army south of the Kua.he
superior. Under these circumstances, the PLA s tactic was to pjver at Shuangduiji. The enemy)reinforcements were either
repeatedly divide the enemy’s troops, massing a superior force to wioed out or intercepted. From December 6 to 15, the PLA
annihilate his forces one by one. The campaign was divided into inducted a general offensive and destroyed the enemy s enure
three phases. force in the area. During this period, the KMT armies under Qiu
The first phase lasted from November 6 to 22, 1948. During rinpnuan Li Mi and Sun Yuanliang, all commanded by Du
this period, the KMT army under Huang Baitao was stationed Yuming^deputy commander-in-chief of the KMT’s “Bandit Sup-
along the Longhai Railway between Lianyungang in the east and nression” Headquarters at Xuzhou, withdrew from the city. They
Xuzhou in the west. As Mao Zedong stated in a telegram ad¬ were besieged by the main forces of the East^ China Field Army
dressed to the forces which were to take part, in this first stage of near Chenguanzhuang, and Sun Yuanliang’s entire army was
the campaign, the central task was to concentrate forces to wipe
out that army. The PLA decided to use more than half of its total anmhihitedd ^ of the campaign lasted from December 15,
effectives to cut off and attack the enemy troops that were coming 1948 to January 10, 1949. The chief objective now was to wipe
to reinforce Huang’s army; this would prevent the two units from out Du Yuming’s forces. However, in order to coordmate tto
joining forces and ensure that Huang’s troops did not escape. On action with the Beiping-Tianjm campaign, in the beginning of this
November 6 the battle began. Huang’s army tried to escape to the phase the PLA troops on the front line of the Huai-Hai campaign
west. At Jiawang and Taierzhuang, the 23,000 men led by He were ordered to stop their attack on Du’s army for two weeks to
Jifeng and Zhang Kexia, who were deputy commanders ol the give Fu Zuoyi’s army on the north China front a false sense of
KMT’s Third Pacification Zone and underground members of security. In the meantime, the PLA concentrated on a pohucal
the CPC, suddenly revolted. The main forces of the East China offensive, urging Du and others to surrender with their troops.
Field Army immediately crossed the area those troops had been On January 6, 1949, after the PLA had succeeded in dividing and
defending and quickly cut off Huang Baitao’s line of retreat as surrounding Fu Zuoyi’s army, it launched a general attack on the
he approached Xuzhou. The enemy reinforcements from all troops under Du Yuming, who refused to surrender. After four
directions were checked. Huang’s army had no choice but to turn days and nights of intense fighting, the armies led by Li Mi and
back to Nianzhuang. Thus forced into a pocket no more than 10 Qiu Qingquan were completely annihilated. The units wiped out
kilometres in length and breadth, Huang’s entire unit was wiped included the 5th Corps, one of the KMT’s crack umts_ Du
out on November 22. _ _ . Yuming was captured. This marked the successful end of the
The second phase of the campaign lasted from November 15
Huai-Hai campaign. . . ., ^r».rHr
to December 15. The main objective now was to annihilate Huang The campaign had lasted 66 days. During this time the K
Wei’s army, which had been dispatched as reinforcements and had lost 555,000 men, and its crack troo^ along the southern
was to march alone all the way from southern Henan to the front had been destroyed. The area north of the middle and lower
Huai-Hai area. The 120,000 men of Huang’s army were Chiang reaches of the Yangtze had been liberated and linked up with h
Kai-shek’s own personal troops, and their combat effectiveness North China Liberated Area. The PLA had pressed south to the
was relatively strong. The 18th Corps of Huang’s army was part north bank of the Yangtze. Thus, the KMT capital of Nanjing
of the KMT’s crack force. The main forces of the Central Plams layex posed directly in front of the PLA forces. The reactionary
Field Army and part of the East China Field Army adopted the
378
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter five victory in the democratic revolution

Kuomintang regime was disintegrating. vv»lieved that the key to success was to postpone the enemy s
decision to flee south or west and hold him in north China so the

The Beiping-Tianjin Campaign PI A could wipe him out there. , ,

Acting in accordance with the Central Committee s plan, the
With the successful conclusion of the Liaoxi-Shenyang cam¬ main forces of the Northeast Field Army ended their period of
paign, and with victory on the horizon in the Huai-Hai campaign, rest and consolidation early, not long after the conclusion ol the
one million men from the Northeast Field Army and the Second I iaoxi-Shenyang campaign. Starting on November 23, they took
and Third Armies of the North China Military Command joined a short cut and covertly moved south of the Great Wall. There
forces to launch the Beiping-Tianjin campaign. they joined forces with the Second and Third Armies ol the
At the time, the KMT’s north China forces, not counting the North China Military Command. Applying the principle of en¬
50,000 of Fu Zuoyi’s men stationed at Guisui and Datong, num¬ circling the enemy troops without attacking them or separating
bered more than 500,000. These men were stationed in a narrow the enemy troops without encircling them, with lightning speed
stretch of land extending 500 kilometres east from Shanhaiguan the combined forces made a strategic encirclement and cut
along the Beiping-Liaoning Railway and west to Zhangjiakou the links between the enemy forces in Beiping, Tianjin and
along the Beiping-Suiyuan Railway, with Tanggu as their opening Zhangjiakou, but did not make a tactical encirclement. This

to the sea. Of these troops, 17 divisions were commanded by Fu action cut off their escape routes to the south and west and at the
Zuoyi, and 25 were directly under Chiang Kai-shek. Earlier, same time drew the KMT’s 92nd, 94th and 105th corps, originally
Chiang had told Fu to withdraw his troops southward to reinforce stationed at Tianjin and Tanggu, to the area around Beiping.
the defence line along the Yangtze. Fu was deeply suspicious of After that, the PLA started a general assault by taking enemy
Chiang’s discrimination against those who were not his own men positions on both wings and then capturing the ones in the
and had not wanted to withdraw. At this time, his troops were middle. In late December, the PLA troops conquered Xinbao an
already shaken by the PLA’s victories in northeast China. How¬ and Zhangjiakou on the west wing. At Xinbao’an they annihilat¬
ever, he calculated that the Northeast Field Army would need ed 16,000 men from the 35th Corps, the main force directly under
three to six months of rest to recuperate from the Liaoxi- Fu Zuoyi’s command. At Zhangjiakou they destroyed the head¬
Shenyang campaign and would not be ready to fight south of the quarters of the enemy’s 11th Army and the 105th Corps, wiping
Great Wall until the following spring. For this reason, he decided out more than 54,000 men. On January 10, 1949, the CPC Central
Committee decided to form a General Front Committee for the
to defend Beiping and Tianjin, control an escape route by sea,
Beiping-Tianjin campaign under Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan and
seek to expand his forces and wait to see what would happen.
Nie Rongzhen. On January 14, when the enemy defending Tian¬
Accordingly, he began to withdraw forces from other areas under
jin on the east wing refused to surrender, the PLA used a
his control, including Chengde, Baoding, Shanhaiguan and Qin-
huangdao, and prepared to flee south by sea or west toward powerful force to launch a general offensive against the city.
After 29 hours of intense fighting, the solidly fortified and
Suiyuan if necessary. If Fu Zuoyi withdrew, the PLA could seize
heavily defended city fell. The 130,000 enemy troops had all been
Beiping and Tianjin without fighting. But then Fu’s troops would
wiped out, and Chen Changjie, commander of the KMT’s Tianjin
help reinforce the KMT units along the Yangtze River defence
garrison, had been captured. After Tianjin was liberated, the
line or, in any event, make it possible for the KMT to maintain
enemy troops defending Tanggu took to their boats and fled
greater military strength. That would be disadvantageous to the
PLA in later battles. Therefore, the CPC Central Committee south.
380 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPc cHAptf.r five victory in the democratic revolution 381

In order to avoid destroying the world-famous ancient capital of the Liberated Areas showed incomparable enthusiasm and
of Beiping, the PLA first surrounded the city and then dispatched ceaselessly provided enormous amounts of human and material
representatives to meet with Fu Zuoyi. Thanks to the PLA’s great support for the front. The underground CPC organizations and
strength and the speed with which it had carried out its deploy¬ revolutionary people in the KMT areas also contributed to the
ment, and thanks also to the CPC’s patient persuasion and to the PLA’s victory in the campaigns. At the time, although the PLA’s
urging of people from all social strata, in the end Fu Zuoyi was equipment had improved, transport conditions remained ex¬
obliged to give in. Acting in accordance with the will of the tremely poor. To ensure the needs of the vast army at the front,
people, he ordered the troops under his command to leave the city people helped transport supplies on their shoulders or in push¬
to await reorganization. On January 31, 1949, Fu’s army complet¬ carts. According to statistics, no less than 5.43 million labourers
ed its move, and the PLA entered the city. The peaceful liberation were mobilized to support the Huai-Hai campaign, and they
of Beiping was proclaimed. carried 7,300 tons of ammunition and 480,000 tons of grain and
The Beiping-Tianjin campaign had lasted for 64 days. More other goods. Chen Yi once gratefully remarked that victory in the
than 520,000 KMT troops had been put out of action or reorgan¬ Huai-Hai campaign had been brought in pushcarts by the people.
ized as part of the PLA, and most of north China had been This mass participation was powerful proof of the enthusiastic
liberated. A few enemy troops were allowed to remain in Suiyuan. popular support enjoyed by the Communist Party in the War of
In September 1949 these troops, led by Dong Qiwu, indicated Liberation.
their willingness to revolt and accept incorporation into the PLA. The victory in the three campaigns was also a victory for Mao
Thus, three patterns were set for disposing of the KMT troops Zedong Thought. The CPC Central Committee and its Military
— the Tianjin pattern (fighting them), the Beiping pattern (reor¬ Commission, headed by Mao Zedong, with their great revolution¬
ganizing them into PLA units), and the Suiyuan pattern (keeping ary prowess and superior military command skills, seized the
them intact for a time, winning them over or neutralizing them right moment for decisive strategic action and selected the proper
politically, and reorganizing them at a later date). course. They mapped out different concepts of operation in the
In terms of their scope and achievements, the three great light of the different situations in northeast, east and north
campaigns of Liaoxi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Beiping-Tianjin China. All of these factors contributed to victory in these great
were unprecedented in Chinese military history and unusual even campaigns.
in world military history. Over the course of four months and
nineteen days, from September 12, 1948, to January 31, 1949,
these campaigns led to the annihilation of more than 1.54 million IX. CARRYING THE REVOLUTION
KMT troops. Essentially, they caused the collapse of the military
strength that had propped up the reactionary KMT regime and
THROUGH TO THE END
thus provided a firm foundation for nationwide victory of the
Chinese revolution. By the end of the three campaigns, the KMT government’s
The success of the three campaigns was a great victory in the military strength north of the Yangtze River had crumbled. It
people’s war. During the course of the campaigns, the comman¬ was even having trouble organizing its defence south of the river.
ders and fighters of the People’s Liberation Army displayed a On November 9, 1948, Chiang Kai-shek sent a letter to President
high degree of revolutionary commitment and initiative, fighting Truman asking him to quickly provide more military support and
heroically and resourcefully against the KMT troops. The people even to send U.S. military advisors to help conduct the war. The
 TFK FIVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
CHAPTER Eiv*
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
382 Unless these conditions were fulfilled, he said, he would
United States government, however, sensed Chiang’s imminent 3rnlht to the finish” with the Communist Party. Clearly, these
doom and did not wish to accede to his request. On January 8, * f're conditions not for peace but for the continuation of war. At
1949, Chiang’s government sent messages to the governments of t ti^ there were also some bourgeois Right-wingers who
the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union asking •hdsted\hat the Communist Party immediately put a stop to the
them to “mediate” in the Chinese civil war. All tour governments War of Liberation, accept Chiang’s “conditions for peace and
tactfully cited their own particular considerations and declined. c fmm eliminating its enemies completely.
At this point, Mao Zedong summed up the situation as follows: rC Should the Chinese people carry the revolution through to t e
“The U.S. government has changed its policy of simply backing . or should they abandon it halfway, allowing the reactionary
the Kuomintang’s counter-revolutionary war to a policy ot em¬ forces the breathing-time to stage a comeback? At this historic

bracing two forms of struggle: moment with victory already in sight, this question took on vital
“1. Organizing the remnants of the Kuomintang’s armed forces importance' In the last hundred years, had not the people had
and the so-called local forces to continue to resist the People’s enough bitter experience to know the answer- Q . M
Liberation Army south of the Yangtze River and in the remote With these thoughts in mind, on Decembei 30, ’
border provinces, and 7„Hnn(1 iccned through the Xinhua News Agency a New Years
“2 Organizing an opposition faction within the revolutionary messageTha t tva^a great call to carry the revolution through to
camp to strive with might and main to halt the revolution where
it is or, if it must advance, to moderate it and prevent it from ^“We1 must use the revolutionary method to wipe out all the
encroaching too far on the interests of the imperialists and their forces of reaction resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely,
running dogs.”46 we must unswervingly persist in overthrowing
Li Zongren, leader of the Guangxi faction, was prepared to dalism and bureaucrat-capitalism; and we must overthrow the
take a chance. He stood ready to replace Chiang Kai-shek, and in reactionary rule of the Kuomintang on a country-wide scale and
order to gain time to implement his scheme of instituting two set up a republic that is a people’s democratic dictatorship under
governments divided by the Yangtze River, he was willing to the leadership of the proletariat and with the worker-peasant
negotiate with the Communist Party. With this in the back¬ alliance as temain body.”47 This, he went on to say, would then
ground, on December 24, 1948, Bai Chongxi, another leader ot make it possible for China to develop into a socialist society. But
the Guangxi faction, sent a telegram to Chiang urging him to hold if the revolution were abandoned halfway, it would mean giving
peace talks. In response to Bai’s hint — or perhaps under his the^reactionaries a chance to heal their wounds, so that one day
influence — the KMT’s Hubei Provincial Political Council and they might stage a comeback and again plunge the whole country
the governors of Henan and Hunan provinces recommended into darknessgWhat was required of all those who wished to
resumption of peace talks. In that interest, they also demanded participate in the revolutionary cause, he said, was unanimity
Chiang’s resignation. and cooperation, not the setting up of any ‘opposition faction or
As a result of these internal and external pressures, Chiang
Kai-shek was forced to issue a statement on New Years Day, theOPnTnuary ^7, in his capacity as chairman
1949 suing for peace. However, in his statement, he demanded, of the CPC Central Committee, issued a statement indicating the
among other things, the preservation of the KMT-manufactured
Constitution, (which had never been approved by the people), ot a™, h,
his so-called legally constituted authority and of his reactionary
384 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC cHA1>TER FIVE victory in the democratic revolution

and abundant reason to wipe out completely the remnant armed tr.at to Taiwan. Li Zongren’s government also intended to
forces of the reactionary Kuomintang government in not too long the territory south of the Yangtze. It was obvious that the
a period and has full confidence that it can do so, nevertheless, KMT’s acceptance of the CPC’s eight terms was only a smoke-
in order to hasten the end of the war, bring about genuine peace
and alleviate the people’s sufferings, the Communist Party of SCrFrom March 5 to 13, 1949, the 7th Central Committee of the
China is willing to hold peace negotiations with the reactionary rommunist Party of China held its 2nd Plenary Session at
Nanjing Kuomintang government or with any local governments Xibaipo Village in Pingshan County, Hebei Province. In his
or military groups of the Kuomintang....”48 These negotiations So the session, Mao Zedong set forth policies to promote
would be held, he said, on the basis of eight terms, including that the speedy achievement of the country-wide victory of the revo
war criminals were to be punished, that the bogus constitution lutioTand to organize this victory. He proposed that afterwards
and the bogus “constituted authority” were to be abolished and the Party should shift the focus of its work from the rural areas
that all reactionary troops were to be reorganized on democratic o the cities and defined the basic political, economic and foreign
principles. nolicies the Party should adopt. He also set the general tasks and
Mao’s statement was warmly received by the democratic par¬ main course for transforming China from an agricultural country
ties, democrats without party affiliation and other people from into an industrial one and from a new-democratic society into
all social strata. On January 22, 55 individuals, including Li socialist one. He appraised the new situation in the class struggle
Jishen, Shen Junru, Guo Moruo and Tan Pingshan, who had just both at home and abroad and gave timely warning that the
arrived in a Liberated Area, issued a joint statement expressing “sugar-coated bullets” of the bourgeoisie would become the main
their firm support of Mao’s statement and their readiness to help danger to the proletariat. He stated the Party s policy with regard
advance the cause of revolution and build a new China under the to negotiations: “Our policy is not to refuse negotiations. but to
leadership of the Communist Party of China. demand that the other side accept the eight terms in their entirety
On January 21 Chiang Kai-shek announced that he would and to allow no bargaining.- He added that if negotiations on
resign from the position of President and that Vice President Li an overall basis succeeded, that would have great advantages. If
Zongren would serve as Acting President. The next day, Li they failed, then separate negotiations on a local basis would be
Zongren expressed his willingness to accept the Communist Par¬ held after the PLA had made further advances.
ty’s eight terms as the foundation on which to begin peace talks. To bring the war to an early conclusion and realize genuine
After Chiang Kai-shek resigned, he returned to his hometown peace on April I a CPC delegation headed by Zhou Enlai entered
of Xikou in Fenghua County, Zhejiang Province. However, he into negotiations in Beiping with the KMT^government
continued to run the government from behind the scenes. He atives headed by Zhang Zhizhong. On April 15, after the two
decided that the peace talks should be limited to dividing the sides had had repeated exchanges of views and consultations t
country at the Yangtze River. In other words, he insisted that CPC representatives presented a final amended version of he
“the integrity of certain provinces south of the Yangtze should be Agreement on Internal Peace, demanding a response fromi the
KMT government by April 20. The KMT government represent¬
ensured.”49 At the same time, Chiang ordered his followers to
prepare for war by strengthening the armed forces. His plan was atives agreed unanimously to accept this agreement and sent

to reorganize and train two million troops south of the Yangtze Huang Shaohong back to Nanjmg with tlic doeument. It P
pened that at this moment the KMT Central Executive Commit¬
over a period of three to six months in order to stage a comeback.
At the same time, he began to make arrangements for his final tee was holding a session of its Standing Committee and a
 386
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE C.Pc CHAPTER five victory in the democratic revolution 387

Political Conference in Guangzhou. The Central Executive Com¬ navigate the Yangtze. The Conservative Party leader Winston
mittee issued a statement rejecting the agreement and instructed
Churchill even proposed that aircraft carriers be dispatched to
Li Zongren and He Yingqin to act accordingly. On April 20 Li
Chinese waters to provide “effective power of retaliation.” The
and He sent a telegram to the KMT government representatives General Headquarters of the PLA immediately issued a state¬
in Beiping telling them not to sign the Agreement on Interna] ment declaring, “The Chinese people will defend their territory
Peace. The failure of the negotiations was announced. Neverthe¬ and sovereignty and absolutely will not permit encroachment
less, at the request of the Communist Party, the KMT govern¬ by foreign governments.” This statement demonstrated that
ment representatives remained in Beiping, and most of them later China was not afraid of threats and would resolutely oppose
participated in the preparations for the People’s Political Consul¬ any imperialist aggression. It made the Chinese people, long
tative Conference of new China.
bullied and oppressed by the imperialists, proud and elated.
Because the KMT government refused to sign the Agreement This event showed that the time when foreign invaders, relying
on Internal Peace, on April 21 Chairman Mao Zedong and on their military might, could commit atrocities on China’s
Commander-in-Chief Zhu De issued an order to the army for sovereign soil was gone forever.
a countrywide advance. The Second and Third Field Armies When the PLA troops broke through the KMT defence lines
(lormerly the Central Plains Field Army and the East China along the Yangtze, the government in Nanjing fled to Guang¬
Field Army), which had been placed under the command of zhou. On April 23 the PLA captured Nanjing, the KMT capital,
Deng Xiaoping, secretary of the General Front Committee, announcing the downfall of the reactionary regime that had
started to cross the Yangtze River from north to south. In this lasted for 22 years. The PLA troops then continued their victo¬
operation they had the support of troops from the Central rious advance to the provinces in south-central, northwest and
Plains Military Command and of the people along the north southwest China. By either military or peaceful means, most of
bank as well as the cooperation of the guerrilla forces south the remaining enemy forces were put out of action. The vast
ot the river. The battle line stretched for more than 500 territory of the country was liberated and Chiang Kai-shek’s
kilometres, from Hukou in Jiangxi Province in the west to Kuomintang clique was driven from the mainland.
Jiangyin in Jiangsu in the east. One million troops divided into

?ueV^1UmnS f0Ught their way across the Yangtze on boats,

ihe KM 1 defence line along the river, which had been pains¬ X. THE GREAT VICTORY OF THE CHINESE
takingly built up over a period of three and a half months
collapsed instantly. DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
On April 20 and 21, while the PLA was crossing the
Now that the reactionary Kuomintang regime had been over¬
Yangtze, four British warships, including the Amethyst, intrud¬
thrown, conditions were ripe for the founding of the People’s
ed into the Yangtze, an inland waterway of China, and pro¬
Republic of China. In June 1949 in Beiping, the Preparatory
ceeded to areas defended by the PLA, trying to prevent the
Meeting for the New Political Consultative Conference was con¬
crossing. The British and Chinese exchanged fire. The British
vened, and a standing committee headed by Mao Zedong was
killed or wounded 252 PLA men. The Amethyst was disabled
established. This committee was in charge of drafting the Com¬
by the PLA and forced to anchor on the river near Zhenjiang.
mon Programme and working out a government structure. This
The other three ships escaped. After this, the British govern¬
was the beginning of the comprehensive preparatory work to
ment declared that British warships had the legal right to
build a new regime in China.
 389
CHAPTEK FIVE VICTORY in THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
388 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
have now stood up.... We have closed our ranks and defeated both
As early as March 1949, in a report to the 2nd Plenary Session domestic and foreign oppressors through the Peoples War of
of the 7th Central Committee of the CPC, Mao Zedong put Liberation and the great people’s revolution, and now we are
forward a plan for the basic line of China’s development: China proclaiming the founding of the People’s Republic of China
should be transformed from a new-democratic, agricultural coun¬ From now on our nation will belong to the community of the
try into a socialist, industrial one. On June 30 of the same year, oeace-loving and freedom-loving nations of the world and work
in an important article entitled “On the People’s Democratic courageously and industriously to foster its own civilization and
Dictatorship,” he restated this idea. Historical experience, he well-being and at the same time to promote world peace and
wrote, showed that the plan to build a bourgeois republic in China freedom. Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and
could come to nothing. The only solution was to found a people’s humiliation. We have stood up.”53 . ^
republic, transform China from an agricultural country into an The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference was an
industrial one and realize the transition from new-democracy organ of the people’s democratic united front, based on the
through socialism to communism. “To sum up our experience,” alliance of workers and peasants and led by the Communist
he concluded, “and concentrate it into one point, it is: the people’s Party. It consisted of representatives of the CPC, the democratic
democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the working class parties, public figures without party affiliation, various people s
(through the Communist Party) and based upon the alliance of organizations, the People’s Liberation Army, all the localities and
workers and peasants.”51 Mao emphasized that the people’s dicta¬ nationalities and Chinese living overseas. The conference adopted
torship must be under the leadership of the working class, because its “Organic Law” and elected the 1st National Committee of the
“it is only the working class that is most far-sighted, most selfless Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (Mao Zedong
and most thoroughly revolutionary.”52 The dictatorship was to be was elected its chairman on October 9). Until the National
based on the alliance of the working class, the peasantry and the People’s Congress was convened after a general election, the
urban petty bourgeoisie, and mainly on the alliance of workers plenary session of the CPPCC was to act in that capacity. ^
and peasants, because those two classes were the main force in The conference also approved a “Common Programme. The
overthrowing imperialism and feudalism and in making the tran¬ Programme made the following stipulations regarding the state
sition from new-democracy to socialism. It was necessary to unite system and the form of government.
with the national bourgeoisie, Mao said, so as to resist the “The People’s Republic of China is a new-democratic or a
oppression of imperialism and develop China’s economy, but the people’s democratic state. It carries out the people’s democratic
national bourgeoisie could not be the leader of the revolution or dictatorship led by the working class, based on the alliance ol
have the chief role in state power. This article, together with workers and peasants, and uniting all democratic classes and all
Mao’s report to the Central Committee, laid the political basis for nationalities in China.” “The people’s congresses and the people s
a common programme to be adopted by the New Political Con¬ governments at all levels are the organs for the exercise of state
sultative Conference. power by the people.” “The organs of state power at all levels shall
On September 21, 1949, the New Political Consultative Con¬
practise democratic centralism.” ,
ference — renamed the Chinese People’s Political Consultative The basic principle for economic construction, the document
Conference — was solemnly inaugurated in Beiping. In his open¬ stated, was “to develop production and bring about a prosperous
ing address Mao Zedong proudly proclaimed the founding of the economy through the policies of taking into account both public
People’s Republic of China: and private interests, of benefiting both labour and capital, ol
“,..[T]he Chinese people, comprising one quarter of humanity,
 ^^r FIVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 391
390 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
_ . i___ -m First Plenary Session of the Chinese
mutual aid between the city and countryside, and circulation of 0l| ^Political Consultative Conference came to a successful
goods between China and other countries.” The document noted Peoplle * fhe evening a ceremony was held in Tian'anmen Square
that the state would coordinate and regulate the state-owned Cl:v the foundation stone for the Monument to the Peop£s
economy, individual economy, private capitalist economy, etc.
Heroes. ^The epitaph on the Monument, composed by Mao Ze
“In this way,” it continued, “all components of the social economy
can, under the leadership of the state-owned economy, carry out ^“Eternal gloryato*the heroes of the people who laid down their
division and coordination of labour and play their respective
parts in promoting the development of the social economy as a
whole.” With regard to the policy towards nationalities, the
who laydown their lives in the people, war and the
Common Programme stated:
“All nationalities within the boundaries of the People’s Republic
of China are equal. They shall establish unity and mutual aid C^of^
many struggles against domesttc ^foragn enerme^ ^ ^
among themselves, and shall oppose imperialism and their own
public enemies, so that the People’s Republic of China will become
people^’ lhdusPwhUeCcelehrating their victories, the Communist
a big fraternal and cooperative family composed of all its national¬
Crti of CWna and the people of the whole country commemo¬
ities.” “Regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where nation¬
rated with reverence the revolutionary martyrs who had heroical
al minorities are concentrated.” As for foreign policy, the document
"n their lives to the long-term struggle for nattonal inde¬
declared that it was to be based on the principle of “lasting interna¬
tional peace, and friendly cooperation between the peoples of all pendence and the peopleps b]ic of china marked the
countries, and opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and
war.” This Common Programme became the great charter for the
Chinese people, and served for a time as a provisional constitution. ,h. Chines, ib— »■«»»'"J ",Mon f„„
The conference also adopted the Organic Law of the Central in a new era in Chinese nisxory, a

People’s Government. It unanimously elected Mao Zedong chair¬

neHowTad!he Chinesfpeople’s revolution come about, and how
man of the Central People’s Government and elected Zhu De, Liu
Shaoqi, Soong Ching Ling, Li Jishen, Zhang Lan and Gao Gang ‘nin^aid^-A revolution cannot be ‘made' ... revolutions
vice-chairmen. Fifty-six other persons, including Chen Yi, were
elected members. (Afterwards, the Central People’s Government
Council appointed Zhou Enlai Premier of the Government Ad¬
ministration Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs.)
The conference approved Beiping as the capital of the People’s
Republic of China and changed the city’s name back to Beijing.
It also adopted the Western calendar as the chronological system,
the “March of the Volunteers” composed by Nie Er as the new
national anthem and a national flag with five stars on a field of
red, symbolizing the great unity of the people of the whole
country under the leadership of the Communist Party.
392 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC ^TER FIVE VICTORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

and bureaucrat-comprador bourgeoisie, placed itself in opposition

to the Chinese people. When the War of Resistance Against Japan
came to an end, the Chiang Kai-shek clique ignored the fervent
aspirations of the Chinese people to build an independent, dem¬
ocratic, strong and prosperous new China. Instead, it pursued a 1,6 -?hese th ee plans were put to the test of practice time and
policy of autocracy and civil war, bringing the entire people to Asa result the first was abandoned by the Chinese people
the brink of starvation and death. As a result, the people had to
rise to save themselves. Thus it was profound social problems that
touched off the revolution, and a solid mass basis provided the
condition for its expansion.
The Chinese people had always been heroic in their resistance
to aggression and oppression. However, during the period of
nearly eighty years from the Opium War in 1840 to the May 4th
Movement in 1919, they had failed in all their struggles because
*r.~vv »' «■’
and to advance from new-democracy to socialism. That was an
they lacked the leadership of an advanced revolutionary party. It

sissass
was the Communist Party that clarified for the people the aim of W T°hTreasoCn the Communist Party was able to lead the revolu-
their revolution. And it was the Communist Party that, over a
long course of struggle, found the way for them to bring that
revolution to victory. It was the Party that cemented the Chinese
people —who had always been considered “a plate of loose sand”
— into an unconquerable force with one heart and one mind. It
was under the leadership of the Party that the Chinese people,

Hism
through twenty-eight years of arduous and courageous struggle,
won their historic victory at last. Thus, from the revolutionary
practice of modern times, the people have drawn a scientific
conclusion: without the Communist Party there would have been
no New China. This is the great truth confirmed by their own
experience.
The leadership position of the Communist Party was not the
m thfmlsses’“^inte“gMarxism-Leninism with the real-
result of some individual’s desire or will. For a long time, the to the masses-. * h le series of lines, principles
Chinese people were presented with a choice of three plans for
building the country, three visions of its future. The first, repre¬
sented by the Northern warlords and later by the Kuomintang
ruling clique, was that China should be under the dictatorship of
the landlord-comprador class and retain its semi-colonial and
semi-feudal status. The second, advocated by some middle-of-the-
roaders, was that China should be a bourgeois republic and
 chapter five victory in the democratic revolution
394 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
. , n thousand li (five thousand kilometres].”5" Having won
correct theoretical principles guiding the Chinese revolution and ° rtory in the new-democratic revolution, the Communist Party
a summation of the Party’s experience gained in practice. It is the Tf China integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism
crystallization of the collective wisdom of the Communist Party. ith the concrete practice in the country, would continue leading
The formation and development of Mao Zedong Thought meant The peop“ ^ the long and difficult struggle to build the new
that Marxism had already taken deep root in China. Once this
Sinicized Marxist ideology was accepted by the Chinese people, China.
it became a great material force in the revolutionary transforma¬
tion of Chinese society. Seeing this point, even Dean Acheson, the
NOTES
U.S. Secretary of State, who adamantly opposed Communism,
had to admit at the end of 1949: “We must face the fact that there , Cheng Siyuan, Reminiscences of Political Events, Chin. ed„ Guangxi People’s
is no Chinese basis of resistance to Communism.”56 He said this
States MS Umted Stales Governn.cn,
even though he would not resign himself to defeat and was still
under the illusion that someday democratic individualists would
prevail again and establish a capitalist system in China.
‘SfSfffiS’Alffk Victory in die War of Resistance
Following the principle of combining Marxism-Leninism with
the Chinese reality, the CPC accumulated valuable experience Against Japan,” Ibid., p. 13.

while leading the new-democratic revolution. As Mao Zedong

summed it up:
“A well-disciplined Party armed with the theory of Marxism- 7I,nedAFens!S”4a"f4retherKM?governmcnl and the Soviet government
Leninism, using the method of self-criticism and linked with the signed ,hi“ treaty. along
masses of the people; an army under the leadership of such a
Party; a united front of all revolutionary classes and all revolu¬
tionary groups under the leadership of such a Party — these are E3S5 StctTa lnced that tt
Central Government of China hat B. the Nationi ^ fjghting ^ ceased jn
&&
the three main weapons with which we have defeated the ene¬
my.... Relying on them, we have won basic victory.”57 Si^a^eSteNahoial Government of the Republic of China will assume
The victory of the Chinese people’s revolution eloquently full governing authority over them. _ Circular 0f the Central
proved that Marxism-Leninism can guide not only the liberation
struggles of people in capitalist countries but also those of people
in colonial and semi-colonial countries.
In 1949, in an article commemorating the 28th anniversary of
sfSssr,
the founding of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong said:
“Twenty-eight years of our Party is a long period, in which we U Dean^Aches^mA/v^yenr^^n1 the State Department, W.W. Norton & Co., New

have accomplished only one thing — we have won basic victory

in the revolutionary war. This calls for celebration, because it is
the people’s victory, because it is a victory in a country as large
as China. But we still have much work to do; to use the analogy
of a journey, our past work is only the first step in a long march
 397
chapter FIVE victory in the democratic revolution
396 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

14. After Japan’s surrender, in view of the peasants’ eager demand for land, the
CPC Central Committee decided to change the land policy for the period of the
War of Resistance. That is, instead of merely reducing rents and interest, it would
confiscate the land of the landlords and distribute it among the peasants. The
“May 4th Directive” marked this change.
SSSSSSSSSS'sa-aas
15. “Some Points in Appraisal of the Present International Situation,” Selected
Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed„ Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1975, Vol. IV.
p. 87.
16. Ibid., p. 100. 4478 the Present Situat.on by Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central
17. Ibid., p. 89.
18. Zhangjiakou is a city of strategic importance in Hebei Province, and a hub of
Data"
communications between Hebei and Inner Mongolia. ing House, Betjmg, 1985 Vol ll,p. - Seventh Central Committee of
19. “The Concept of Operations for the Northwest War Theatre,” Selected Works
of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1975, Vol. IV, p. 134. «<*■ --
20. “The Chiang Kai-shek Government Is Besieged by the Whole People,” Select¬
ed Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1975, Vol. £*£ liTpeo^sTr^fflS^ op.'cit., p. 422.
IV, pp. 135, 138.
21. “Strategy for the Second Year of the War of Liberation,” op. cit., pp. 141-142. ». “The ChSte Have S,^ UPr^W W^fMao Ze„o„g, Eng.
22. “On the Great Victory in the Northwest and on the New Type of Ideological
Education Movement in the Liberation Army,” op. cit., pp. 213-214. ?4VF"7c" inThe^l^'onheleeo^ Internationa,” CoUecei Works. Eng
23. “The Present Situation and our Tasks,” op. cit., p. 157. ed!, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964 Vol. 32 d Works of
24. Ibid., p. 165. . 55. in “Some ^-tions ^ceming ^ext^his expression as follows:
25. “Launch a Massive Nationwide Counter-Offensive to Overthrow Chiang
Mao Zedong. Vol..Ill, P- 1 )> correci leadership is necessarily from
Kai-shek,” Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, In all the practical work of our Party, a ^ ^ of thfi masses (scaUered
Beijing, 1981, Vol. I, p. 304. the masses, to the masses. Thi_ . thcm (through study turn them into
26. Ibid., p. 308. and unsystematic ideas) and conce t masses and propagate and
27. “The Present Situation and Our Tasks,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. concentrated and systematic ®°th“ 1their own, hold fast to them
ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1975, Vol. IV, p. 157. explain these ideas until the masses en^brace them as mm o. ^ in such
28. Ibid., p. 169. and translate them into action, .. . lhe masses and once again go to
29. Ibid., p. 161. action. Then carted Ihrough. And so on,
30. Ibid., p. 167.
31. Ibid., p. 169.
32. Ibid., p. 173.
33. Ibid., p. 158 (note).
34. “A Circular on the Situation,” op. cit., p. 219.
™'■ vr s“- G°™nment
35. “On the Policy Concerning Industry and Commerce,” op. cit., p. 204.
36. “A Circular on the Situation,” op. cit., p. 220. Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1975, o . , P-
37. “Telegram to the Headquarters of the Luoyang Front After the Recapture of
58. Ibid.
the City,” op. cit., pp. 247-248.
38. “Experience Gained in Taking Over Shenyang,” Selected Works of Chen Yun
(1926-49), Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1988, p. 260.
39. Ibid., p. 265. n
40. “Speech at a Conference of Cadres in the Shanxi-Suiyuan Liberated Area,
Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. ed.. Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1975,
Vol. IV, p. 238.
41. Ibid., p. 232.
42. I.e., a regime that was neither the KMT dictatorship of big landlords and big
bourgeoisie nor the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the CPC.
43. Shi Liang, “Speech at the 40th Anniversary of the Founding of the Democratic
League,” December 15, 1981, China's Democratic Parties, Chin, ed., Chinese
 CHA,™ SIX F— OF PKC ANP TRANSITION TO SOCAUSM »

j freouent civil wars and loreign

as a time of ^aos caused by ^ chinese le
aggression and the breakup new society.
stood up and China long antic-
An independent, united and " d born. Inspired by this
CHAPTER SIX ipated by the popu ace was *^ J exhlbited
great victory, Chinese at party of China and

THE FOUNDING OF PEOPLE’S revolutionary fervour. T disDlayed wholehearted service

PLA officers i"hardP work and plain living and
REPUBLIC OF CHINA to the people, and the spirit areas. people were

AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM strict discipline in their wo b innings all around them,
struck by the freshness a"derne^~opie rejoiced over
Workers, peasants and "he lh exu,tauon, numerous young
their emancipation, rmea revolutionary
I. THE EARLY PERIOD OF NEW CHINA AND students and other intellectual ^ ^“^todying abroad
THE PARTY’S TASKS work. Youthful overseas middle-of-the-
relurned to China in lag broken away from the reaction-
The victory of the Chinese people’s revolution and the found¬ roaders, including those forces y initiative.
ing of the People’s Republic of China opened a new chapter in ary enemy, moved e‘°e‘\Xhange old ideas in order to
Chinese history. The Communist Party of China, which organ¬ Many desired to study an . ces Party forces and the
ized and led the revolution to victory, assumed nationwide state adapt to the chaaBed “ liberated areas and in the original
power, shouldering the heavy task of leading the people of all revolutionary forces from he more effective core
ethnic groups in the construction of a new life. A fresh chapter
was opened in the Party’s history. ”*

On October 1, 1949, 300,000 citizens of the capital assembled emerged over the vast ^p^Tj’^ople’s revolution was not
in Tiananmen Square to hold a grand founding ceremony. The great victory of tteQ«*P«P ^ ^ ^ of world
Amidst their cheers, Chairman Mao Zedong, on the Tiananmen only historically unprecedented *f ^ Qctobcr Socialist

Rostrum, solemnly proclaimed: “The Central People’s Govern¬ significance, ranking after tlh fascism. A great
ment of the People’s Republic of China is founded today.” He Revolution and the W°rld ,d>s population broke through
pressed a knob and hoisted the first bright red five-star flag. nation with onrfou J ° * greatly^hanged global political
His action was followed by a military review, in which the Eastern imperialist fro , g V democracy and
Commander-in-Chief Zhu De reviewed the land, naval and air patterns; expanded lor“s ed nations and peoples
forces of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Enthusiastic socialism, and inspired the jhus^he victory was welcomed
celebrations were held in various major liberated cities across in their struggles for liberation. Thus the
the country.
“rES 5 £ s^ one ^r Ma«ism-
The founding of the People’s Republic of China marked the
end of a century in which colonialists and imperialists collab¬ concrete practice of the Chinese
orated with feudal rulers to enslave the Chinese people as well

398
 ^PTER SB FOUND,NG OF PRC AND TRANS,T,ON TO SOOAL.SM 40,
400 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
•„ in Europe and Asia. India. Burma, Sweden and Svritzer-
revolution, making it the victory of Mao Zedong Thought. f \ negotiated to sever diplomatic relations with the KMT
It raised the prestige of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong government and establish diplomatic ties with NewChimr Al-
Thought among the Chinese populace and it was accepted as the
guiding ideology for various undertakings of the People’s Repub¬
lic, while its influence spread worldwide. ad P ntinns with the KMT government and restoring the legal

Tests Facing the Newly-Born Republic

The great revolutionary triumph of the Chinese people repre¬

sented the main prevailing stream of the time. In the initial
period after the founding of New China, the Chinese Communist
Party and the Chinese people were confronted by many difficul¬
ties and numerous severe tests.
In military terms, despite a basic victory, the People’s Libera¬
tion War was yet to be fully concluded. The one million KMT
economic 'assistance to Ch,na. The United States which atW
troops in southwest and south China and on coastal islands still
ed to dominate the globe, after its ^^"/““Xed to re
put up desperate struggles. In the new liberated areas, the rem¬ in opposition to communism pcdjcy^failed^ It
nant forces left behind by the fleeing KMT struck by disorder
were in collusion with local despotic forces. They waged local
Xfd to recognlze^New ChL and tried * *£?»£*
bandit guerrilla warfare against the people’s political power,
placing their hopes on imperialist intervention in China’s civil S=o^S^=r^s legal seat in
war and on the outbreak of a third world war in a vain attempt
to stage a comeback.
In economic terms. New China had carry-overs from the
shambles of the old society characterized by decreased produc¬
tion, impeded communications, hard lives for the people and a
high rate of unemployment. The long-term, indiscriminate issu¬
ing of paper money by the KMT government, in particular, *?
chaHenges^This^cmailwi ^the^eed^to^culuvate^new^
resulted in cemented skyrocketing prices, rampant speculation
and a chaotic market. The Chinese Communist Party and the Preferred to whether the Party,under completely new historical
people’s government faced a new, severe test, in regard to their condhions as it moved into urban areas, held state power and
abilities to check runaway inflation and price rises, stabilize the
economic situation, and restore production to provide a firm
economic and political foothold, that was more difficult than
launching offensives to suppress bandits.
In international terms, as soon as it was founded New China £=NS£ SSS.S
was recognized by the Soviet Union and various people’s democ-
 SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 40}
402 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
the Local Government of Tibet. In October, thePLAmovedmto
the 7th Party Central committee as well as the deep concern
has^to be stationed there and Tibet was peacefully llbfra‘^ . “
shown by many friends of the Party.
me newly-liberated areas, the PLA launched large-scale bandit-
In brief. New China had been founded, but many still questioned
mppression operations. With the support of the broad ™ass*‘
whether the new people’s regime could keep a firm foothold and the
the people, by June 1950, nearly one million armed KMT bandits
Chinese Communist Party could be a successful administrator. This
had been wiped out, leading to initial social stability.
had to be answered by practice. International friends and foes also
In conjunction with the victorious advance of lbe PLA.
looked on attentively and waited for an answer.
tary control committees were first set up in the newly-liberated
In the face of the complex situation and various difficulties in
areas to suppress counter-revolutionary disruptive actl',lt“s>
the early period after the inception of New China, the Central
mafntata social order, take over all public institutions of the
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party kept a clear head,
KMT and organize the restoration of production. When cond
fully confident of meeting the challenge. In line with various
lions permitted, conferences of people’s representatives from all
basic principles formulated at the 2nd Plenary Session of the 7th
circles^were convened. These gradually exercised the functions
Party Central Committee, the Party methodically adopted a series
and powers of the people’s congress, discussed and determined
of measures and waged effective struggles to consolidate the new
local government administrative policies and major matters need¬
People’s Republic.
ing development or reform, and elected local people’s govern¬
Rear combat to eliminate remnant KMT troops went on
ments The system of people’s representative conferences became
smoothly. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army, following a
Tn appropriate form for the transition from a military control
unified Central Military Commission, continued to advance
svstem toPa formally elected people’s congress. Echelons of polit¬
through south and southwest China. Seeing the collapse of enemy
ical power from the central to local levels of the People s Republic
forces was a foregone conclusion, our army adopted outflanking
of Xa were set up on a completely -w basis after the borough
and encircling tactics and, like a thunderbolt, heroically pursued
smashing of the reactionary ruling machine °f cadres
and attacked the stragglers, winning successive victories in the
ernment functionaries were mostly cadres of the PLA, cadres
Hengyang-Baoqing Battle and the Guangxi Battle that eliminated
from old liberated areas and intellectuals whohadnewly pin^i
the Bai Chongxi group, and the Guiyang Battle and the Chongq¬
the revolution. The top level consisted mainly of
ing and Chengdu Battle that wiped out the Hu Zongnan and Song
Party members and included considerable numbers of patnouc
Xilian groups. After drawing a lesson from reverses in its attacks
democrats from various fields. This was astatepowerotfe
on Jinmen Island, the PLA successfully crossed the sea to liberate
united front with multi-party cooperation led by the Chinese
Hainan Island in April 1950. Against the backdrop of sweeping
communist Party. It was a government under the people s demo-
military victories on the Chinese mainland, the PLA peacefully
liberated vast areas in Yunnan, Sichuan and Sikang, one after cratic dictatorship, one unprecedented in Chi“eSfe h‘St“y " J ,
truly and effectively exercised power nationwide from the centra
another. By June 1950, after eight months of fighting, the PLA
wiped out a total of 1.3 million regular KMT troops, making a down to the grassroots level. . . f
Confiscation of bureaucratic capital was an important task for
total of 8.07 million KMT casualties in the entire Liberation War.
the military control committee in newly-liberated cities. On con
Thus was completed the task of liberating all Chinese territory
liberation of overall experience gained in taking over administra
with the exception of Tibet, Taiwan and a few islands. In May
tion of cities during the Liberation War in northeast and north
1951, the Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of
China the Party decided to adopt different methods in handling
Tibet was reached between the Central People’s Government and
404 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC . PTER SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 405

bureaucrat-capital enterprises from those used to deal with the „ transnort services. Most parts of the country had no basic
KMT organs of power. It would not smash these bodies, but tal Tlar tax s^tem. The income of the people’s government fell
instead first adhere to their original organizational institutions w of expenditure, so it could only rely on the issuance of large
and production systems, “maintaining original posts, salaries, and Sm™ms ofcurrency to make up financial deficits. Under such
systems.” The military control committee took them over intact, ^instances lopsided-developed speculative capital persisted in
exercised supervision over production and then gradually con¬ Cir tine trouble in newly-liberated cities and prices continued to
ducted democratic reform and production reform. This made it TvS ln o derto check the market disorder worsened by the
possible to rapidly enact takeover tasks and prevent chaos, basi¬ manipulation of speculative capital, the Party and government
cally avoiding the phenomenon of stoppage of production and mlving on the forces of the state-owned economy and the support
damage to equipment. By early 1950, a total of 2,800 bureaucrat- of peasants in old liberated areas, adopted effective
capital industrial and mining enterprises and over 2,400 financial measures and necessary administrative means. They successively
enterprises had been taken over. They formed the main sector of organized two large-scale campaigns agamst speculation. The first
the state-owned economy in the early period after the founding was the ’ ilver dollar battle.” Military administrative depart¬
of the People’s Republic. ments and the people’s government in various large cities to
The people’s government abrogated the economic prerogatives counter the rampant silver dollar speculation of the tune issued
gained by imperialists in China through taking advantage of exnhcit orders strictly forbidding the free circulation of gold bars
unequal treaties, and recovered control over China’s customs sUver doUars and foreign currencies on the market They couM
offices where imperialists had long been entrenched, exercising only be sold to the People’s Bank and it was stipulated that th
control over foreign trade and foreign currency. They safeguard¬ Renminbi (people’s currency) was the sole legal currency. Th
ed the state’s independence, sovereignty and economic interests. speculators,‘however, turned a deaf ear to the govern"
and continued to disrupt financial markets. In Shanghai, th
country’s largest industrial and commercial metropohs some
Price Stabilization and Financial-Economic Integration
peop/even hectored that the PLA could ^
Confronted by an extremely difficult financial and economic
situation, the Party carefully led a major struggle to stabilize
prices and unify finances and the economy. ly sealed the securities building, the headquarters of financial
Financial and economic problems of the time were due to speculation, and arrested more than 200
several causes. One was the on-going military conflict, which brought to justice, dealing a heavy blow to illegal activities
entailed massive supporting expenditure. Another was the gov¬ designed to disrupt finances. Speculators changed °ver to hoard
ernment’s shouldering of responsibility, for the sake of social • fnoderuns cotton yarn, cotton cloth and coal, jacked up
stability, for all the millions of military and government employ¬ pricesan? disrupted ^market. KMT special agents clamoured
ees and teachers left behind by the old government, so long as fhLt controls on rice, cotton and coal alone were enough to kill
they did not oppose the new order. These steps were necessary, Shanghai Then the “war of rice and cotton” was waged. Chen
but the resultant numbers of national personnel divorced from
production whom the government provided for or paid salaries to
exceeded 9 million. This constituted a very heavy burden. Large
amounts of funds were also needed to restore production and
 407
hapTER SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM
406 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
vnenditure; unified allocation of national materials so the bulk
determines feelings of mental well-being of citizens.” Large-scale
6f dispersed important varieties would be gathered by the state
allocation, transportation and concentration of grain, cotton yarn
which would make rational use of them and regulate supply and
and cloth, and coal were organized nationwide by the people’s
demand; and unified management of national money. The cash
government. On November 25 when prices were soaring the most
nf all military and government institutions and publicly-owned
rapidly, various major cities across the country took united action
enterprises, except for shortly-needed funds, should be deposited
in line with the unified arrangements of the central government
in state banks and allocated under a unified plan. This resolu-
to sell large quantities of goods without restriction. This resulted
,ion was immediately carried out conscientiously throughout^
in the rapid fall of prices. Simultaneously, they tightened the
country The government also adopted such measures as reduc¬
money supply, with the result that speculators went bankrupt, one
tions in staff, takeovers of stock, strengthening of taxation, issu¬
after another, since their funds could no longer turn over. The
ing of government bonds and curtailment of expenditure. All
heavy blow administered at capital speculation represented the
these measures yielded remarkable results. After March, finan¬
first round of victory won in the struggle between restriction and
cial revenue and expenditure approached equilibrium inflation
counter-restriction on the bourgeoisie. This won extensive support
was halted and prices assumed daily stability. The following
from the masses, including capitalists who were willing to engage
figures convincingly show this situation. While Shanghai s whole¬
in normal and legal business. Subsequently, a representative of
sale price index was 100 in the first month after the city s
the national bourgeoisie in Shanghai acknowledged that the silver
liberation (June 1949), the figure jumped to 2,097.9 m February
dollar unrest in June was suppressed by the Chinese Communist
1950. a more than 20-fold rise. Following attacks on speculation
Party with political force, and this time the price was stabilized
and monetarv-economic integration, with the nation’s wholesale
with economic clout alone, giving Shanghai industrial and com¬
price index standing at 100 in March 1950, the figure was 85.4 in
mercial circles a lesson. After this, the socialist state-owned
December 1950, 92.4 in December 1951, and 92 6 in December
economy gained the first initiative to stabilize the market.
1952, demonstrating maintenance of stability and a slight tail.
To further fundamentally stabilize prices, it was necessary to
The work of stabilizing prices and unifying finances and the
ensure a balance between state financial revenue and expenditure
economy was a victory of great importance on the monetary and
and between market material supply and demand. To achieve
economic front after the founding of New China. A subsequen
this, it was essential to move from methods of decentralized
end was put to the inflation and price rises which had brought
management adopted in various liberated areas to cope with
enemy-imposed isolation and encirclement. The new situation untold suffering to the people for the twelve years flowing the
War of Resistance Against Japan during the period ol KM 1 rule
after the founding of New China led to the introduction of
A stop was also made to the decades of unbalanced financial
integrated management and unified leadership over the nation’s
income and expenditure of old China, creating favourable condi¬
financial and economic work. In March 1950, the Party Central
tions for winning a secure livelihood for the people, while restor
Committee issued a circular on the basis of the Decision on
ing and developing industrial and agricultural production, lhis
Unifying the State’s Financial and Economic Work promulgated
wonderful achievement won the admiration and praise ol those
by the Government Administration Council, calling on Party
people at home and abroad who doubted whether the Communist
committees at all levels to use every means to guarantee full
implementation of this resolution. Its main contents entailed: Party could make the economy a success. It proved that the
Chinese Communist Party was not only invincible militarily and
unification of national monetary income so the main part would
be held by the central government and used in principal state strong politically but had economic clout.
 CHAFTER SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 409
408 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
umber of unemployed workers, craftsmen and intellectuals mo¬
The 3rd Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee wn tar ily increased. The burden on the peasants was very heavy,
The 3rd Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the auite a few of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie were
Chinese Communist Party held in Beijing in June 1950 analysed “ tenterhooks. Dtsrnptive activit.es and the brilhant triumph in
the international and domestic situation. It summed up the work me attack on speculative capital caused some comrades in the
since the 2nd Plenary Session of the 7th Party Central Committee Party to mistake the main targets of the struggle as the bourgeois^
over the year around the time of the founding of New China. Mao fe In light of this situation, the session criticized the idea, holding
Zedong gave a written report at the session entitled “Fight for a that it was possible to eliminate capitalism and practise socialism
Fundamental Turn for the Better in the Nation’s Financial and ahead of tune, pointing out that it was an erroneous concept
Economic Situation.” In it the Central Committee outlined the inappropriate for national conditions. The national bourgeoisie
would be eliminated in the future, but they should now be rallied
central task for the whole Party and people nationwide. The
session pointed out that the group of victories won on China’s with us to jointly develop the national economy and not
economic front indicated the beginnings of an improvement in Tshed away Our policy towards the national bourgeoisie re-
the financial and economic situation but there was still no fun¬ mained one'of unity and struggle, with the emphasis on unity,
damental turn for the better. A fundamental upturn needed and one of controlling funds and not ot squeezing out an
about three years and the creation of three conditions. These were
the accomplishment of agrarian reform, a reasonable readjust¬ “8p£‘y Session of the 7th Party Central Committee
ment of industry and commerce, and a massive reduction in wal one of the most important meetings of the Party Central
funds needed by state organizations. Committee in the early period after the founding ol New China.
Mao Zedong delivered a speech entitled, “Don’t Hit Out in All The resolution of the session laid down an explicit tactical ^hne
Directions.” It pointed out: “To accomplish agrarian reform, we and programme of action for the Party’s work during the three
must combat the remnant forces of imperialism, feudalism and years of economic rehabilitation.
the KMT reactionaries; the enemies confronting us are as numer¬
ous as they are powerful. We must properly handle the relations
between classes, political parties and national races at home so as II THE WAR TO RESIST U.S. AGGRESSION
to isolate and attack current main foes. We should not hit out in
* and AID KOREA, REFORM OF LAND
all directions. Making too many enemies will create unfavourable
nationwide tension. We must create concessions and easing in one SYSTEM AND OTHER DEMOCRATIC
aspect, so workers, peasants and small craftspeople support us and REFORMS
the overwhelming majority of the bourgeoisie and intellectuals do
not oppose us.” The cable regarding taxation and unemployment After the 3rd Plenary Session of the 7th Party Central Com¬
which Mao Zedong sent to the secretary of the Shanghai Party
mittee, just as the Chinese people were fighting tor; a
committee before the session mentioned such tactics. “We are now improvement in the financial and economic situation, New China
in an intense period of change, whose successful progress we
was again faced with the threat of external aggression.
should ensure with no unnecessary or minimal destruction. A On June 25, 1950, civil war broke out in Korea. The split o
firm grip on this can help reduce resistance and gain initiative.”1 North and South Korea was the result of the separate acceptance
At that time, due to historical reasons and social and economic by the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union of
reorganization resulting from the victory of the revolution, the
 BR gx FOUNDING OF FRC and transition to SOCIALISM 411
410 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

the surrender of Japanese troops at the 38th parallel of north

sadOT n incident* thc Korea.n
latitude which marked the dividing line of Korea after World KOrmust teStopped immediately. If the U.S. forces attempt to
War II. On the third day after the outbreak of Korea’s civil war,
U.S. imperialism announced arms assistance to South Korea,
interfering in the country’s internal affairs. At the same time, it aX”unmdde"ted the determination and strength
ordered its Seventh Naval Fleet to move into the Taiwan Straits 1 rittn^e neoole who had stood up, believing that it was
“to prevent any attack on Taiwan,” brazenly interfering in Chi¬ °f 1 \ible that China would dispatch troops to take part in the
na’s own affairs and setting foot in China’s territory of Taiwan. imP so ttre wafno cause to worry, and that they were sure to
Subsequently, the UN Security Council, manipulated by the
United Slates, adopted a resolution, dressing up the aggressor
troops of the United States and the other countries it patched
together against Korea as UN forces, appointing General McAr¬
thur, commander-in-chief of U.S. forces in the Far East, as the
commander-in-chief of UN forces, further expanding the war
against Korea. The Chinese Government voiced strong protest Conflict between the armed forces of the Chinese people and U.S.
against the United States for its crimes of aggression against
imperialists eventually became inevitable.
Korea and Chinese territory. On June 28, Mao Zedong delivered
a speech, pointing out, “The affairs of various countries around
Beating Back U.S. Aggressor Troops
the world should be governed by their own citizens. Asia’s at lairs
should be handled by Asians and not be run by the United States. Would New China, founded for only a year, dare to meet the
The U.S. aggression against Asia can only arouse the extensive United States, the most powerful imperialist country
and resolute resistance of the Asian people.” On July 13, the henH-nn? This was no small matter in light of the situation
Central Military Commission promptly made the “Decision on lino in China it that time. Economic rehabilitation had just
Defence of the Northeast Frontier,” and the Northeast Frontier
Force was organized. On September 15, U.S. troops landed in
Inchon, cutting off the retreat of the south advancing forces
ES&ssRfcgSSS
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The aggressors people’s political power had not been completely consolidated.
pressed up to the mouth of the country and there was the ThtT weapons1 andPequipment of the
possibility that the war flames would spread to China’s northeast were still quite backward, and navy and air forces were sti
border. On September 30, Zhou Enlai, premier of the Govern¬ the initial stages. If China dispatched troops tobecomemvolved
ment Administration Council and foreign minister, gave a stern
in the conflict, could they win, would theyJgl t
warning: “The Chinese people ardently love peace, but in the themselves and court disaster to their own door, thus making it
defence of peace, they have not been and will never be, afraid ot impossible for the country to carry out economic constructio^
fighting against wars of aggression. The Chinese people will never In the face of such an emergency situation, the Political Bureau
tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they allow the imperialists to If the Central Committee of the Chinese C°mmu^t Party
commit wanton aggression against their own neighbours and turn under the guidance of Mao Zedong, met several times in the first
a blind eyes to it.” On October 3, Zhou asked the Indian ambas-
 EK SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 413
412 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

On the basis of these assessments, the conference made the

half of October 1950. They made an all-round assessment of the
determined strategic decision to resist U.S. aggression and aid
internal and external situation, clearly took a sobre note of the
immediate difficulties and made a penetrating analysis of the K rea protect Chinese homes and the motherland.
K on October 8, Mao Zedong, chairman of the Chinese Peoplc
necessity and possibility of dispatching combat troops. Troops
d evolutionary Military Commission, issued an order that the
had to be dispatched because if U.S. invading troops were allowed
Northeast Frontier Forces be formed into the Chinese People s
to occupy the whole of Korea and their powerful forces pressed
Volunteers (CPV) and Peng Dehuai be appointed their comman
up to the banks of the Yalu River, it would be difficult for
der and political commissar. They were to await orders to set out
China to engage in peaceful construction, while international
to Korea and participate in operations. The Soviet Union ongi
and domestic reactionaries would be bound to swell with arro¬
naily agreed to dispatch its air force in support but ^s offer was
gance. The consequences would be extremely unfavourable to
rescinded at the last moment. On the evening of October 19, 1950,
China and to various countries in the East. The War to Resist
wSlo ak force cover, the CPV vehemently and spirited*
U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea meant protecting homes and the
native land. The Joint Declaration of the Various Democratic Tressed the Yalu River. The arrogant U.S. imperialists simply did
not expect China would dispatch its troops to enter the w“. On
Parties of China which was published later succinctly stated,
“The life and death of Korea and the safety and danger of China October 25 the CPV rapidly encountered the enemy which then
Straight in. Taking advantage of the foes’ weaknesses o
are closely related. If the lips disappear, the teeth will be cold; if
misjudgment and rash advances by divided forces, the Chinese
the door is broken, the hall will be dangerous. The Chinese
troops seized their opportunity while moving forward and made
people’s support of the Korean people’s war of resistance against
U.S. aggression was not only their moral responsibility, but also a surprise attack on the enemy. They won the very first battle,
closely linked to the vital interests of the entire Chinese people. and drove the enemy from the banks of the Yalu River to areas
It was determined by the necessity of self-defence.” Possibilities south of the Qingchon River. , .
of winning lay in the fact that a war waged against aggression was U S aggressor troops, wrapped in fond delusions, continued t
a just one and a just cause enjoys abundant support. Morale was advance towards the north on a larger scale, launching a general
high and China had abundant reserves of troops. Our army, attack named “Christmas Day decisive conclusion campaign.
which had always been able to defeat well-equipped enemies with The CPV and Korean People’s Army adopted the tactic of luring
inferior weapons, possessed rich combat experience, flexible strat¬ the enemy in deep, under extremely trying conditions when
egies and tactics and a valiant, militant spirit unafraid of sacrifice enemy planes conducted wanton and indiscriminate^cold
and hardships. The battlefield was near northeast China, facili¬ The Chinese army had insufficient supplies in the bitterly cold
tating logistics support. On the other hand, although the U.S. weather but fought valiantly, surrounded, wiped out and inflicted
troops had advanced weapons, their forces were dispersed, their heavy casualties on large numbers of enemy troops. Subsequent
supply line long, and their fighting will weak. China strove for victories in further battles forced the enemy troops to change
the possible defeat of the aggressors within the territory of Korea from a general offensive to a general retreat, moving back to
while simultaneously remaining prepared for potential U.S. air south of the 38th parallel line, thus reversing the war situation.
force bombardment of some Chinese cities and industrial bases, This was followed by three successive major campaigns with hot
and naval attacks on Chinese coastal areas. Even in this eventu¬ advances and retreats, and offences and defences. By June 10
ality, if these cities and areas were war-torn, it would at most 1951, our army had won all five battles, wiped out a total of
mean delaying victory in the Liberation War for several years. 230 000 enemy troops and stabilized the battleiront near the 38th
 CHArrER SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 415
414 A CONCISE HISTORY OF TIIE CPC
once had fears and delusions about imperialism were
parallel line. I profound lesson and woke up. The whole world looked
Under such circumstances, beginning in July 1951, both sides Tchina with new eyes, and China’s international prestige was
held truce negotiations. However, the U.S. imperialists did not s oktened to an unprecedented level. Since then, imperialists
willingly give up their aggressive ambitions, attempting to use anve dare no° rash attempts to invade New China. A relatively
military pressure, such as air strikes and coastal otfensives, to stable peaceful environment was won for China’s economic con-
force the Korean-Chinese side to submit in talks. The United
States mobilized one-third of all its army, one-fifth of its air force struction and sociaUe Volunteers who entered Korea to fight
and nearly half of its navy and threw them into the Korean naJ^he enthusiastic support of the Chinese people at home as
battlefields, making them the main force in the war of aggression their ^.weZl backing Domestically, the Party led the large-
against Korea. Truce negotiations, which were intermingled with
scale movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea
the fighting, were carried out intermittently, dragging on for two vied nationwide to join the CPV and to donate money for buying
years. In the whole process, the CPV and the Korean People’s aircraft and guns. They worked hard on all fronts to promote
Army, made use of the terrain to dig tunnels, adopted the
production and practise strict economy, ZesZn and
operational tactic of combining positional defence and counterat¬ their actual deeds. The movement to resist U.S. aggression ana
tack during movement, wiped out much ot the enemy s effective aid Korea inculcated in the people the spirit oi a high degree ot
strength through several minor victories. They further eliminated patriotism and internationalism and greatly inspired the people s
720,000 enemy troops in two years. China’s domestic army units,
revolutionary enthusiasm and labour fervour, becoming a tre¬
as the reserve forces of the CPV, took turns to go to fight in mendous motivating force in restoring and developing the nation
Korea, the CPV air force supported by the Soviet Union also
al economy and promoting various social reforms.
began'fighting, and logistics transport guarantees were streng¬
Beginning in September 1954, group after group of the CPV
thened. Thus, the United States was compelled to sign the truce
returned home from Korea, even though at that time• ^eUnittd
agreement on July 27, 1953. Mark W. Clark, then commander-in-
States was still unwilling to reach agreement with the Korean
chief of the UN Forces, later wrote dejectedly about the moment
Chinese side on solving the Korean question peacefully or with
in his reminiscence, “I have earned an unenviable reputation. 1
drawal of all foreign armed forces from both North and South
am the first commander in U.S. history who signed a truce
Korea In October 1958 the CPVs were totally recalled home,
agreement in an unwon war.”3 demmistrating^he sincerity of the Chinese people -th. to
The U.S. aggressors employed every kind of modern weapon
the peaceful solution of the Korean issue and China s stand ol
except the atom bombs. The war, however, ended eventually with
having no intention to station troops in a foreign country.
triumph for the Chinese and Korean armed forces and people.
The victory exploded the myth about the invincibility of U.S.
imperialism. Just as Peng Dehuai stated in the Work Report on
Abolishing the Feudal Land System
the CPV War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the While engaging in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and^id
victory eloquently proved “the time has gone forever when West¬ Korea the Party, following the plan adopted at the 3rd Plenary
ern aggressors could occupy a country as long as they mounted sZoVof the 7th Party Centra. Committee ^ the ^
several big guns on the coast of the East as they did for several between the winter of 1950 and the spring of 1953 to accomplish
centuries.” The national self-confidence and pride of the Chinese land reform in the countryside of the newly-liberated areas. Their
people was greatly strengthened as a result of the victory. Some
 six FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 417
416 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

.. , hand With regard to landlords, the scope for confiscating

population accounted for over half the country’s total.
3 nnerty was limited and for small plot leasers, standards were to
As soon as the new areas were liberated, a campaign was
launched to clean up banditry, combat despots and reduce rent
pr0pe L for the amount of land to be preserved. Implementation
1 these^policies was aimed at better protecting middle peasants,
and return deposits. Meanwhile, grass-roots political power and
of h f ,P°' tn , hf. colitting up of the landlord class and reducing
militia organizations were established in rural areas. A number C— movement. It would contribute
of peasant activists were trained, in preparation for the launching
KXuzing the national bourgeoisie, and, in the last analysis,
of agrarian reform. In June 1950, the Central People’s Govern¬
facilitating the restoration and development of production.
ment Council adopted and promulgated the Law of the People’s
Whh regard to working methods, it was stressed that agrarian
Republic of China on Agrarian Reform formulated under the
reform1 should be carried^, in a guided, planned and orderly
guidance of Liu Shaoqi and submitted to the government after it
„v Since agrarian reform formed an acute class struggle,
was discussed at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 7th Party Central
entailed implementation of the Party’s mass line, and fiance °n
Committee. The law summed up the experiences and lessons the
Party gained in leading past agrarian reform, and set down new poor peasants, farm labourers, uniting of middlefth“
mobilization of the broad masses of peasants, so that
policies in keeping with the new situation prevailing after the
Struggle to defeat the landlord class they could taisetheirlevel
founding of New China. It became the basic legal basis for
guiding the agrarian reform. consciousness and organization. Thus they wBte*1
The agrarian reform movement was conducted when nation¬ confident of their own strength and mas“r^/^s“wi4”'land
p-.rtv oDDOsed the peaceful agrarian reform of bestowing
wide victory had been won in the people’s revolutionary war and
unified people’s political power had been established. The most
important question confronting the Party was no longer how to
seize victory in the revolutionary war but rather how to rehabil¬
itate and develop the national economy. Every item of the Party’s
work was to be centred around and serve this central task, which
was also the basic aim of the agrarian reform. The first general
principle of the Law of Agrarian Reform affirmed, “Abolition of
the land ownership of the feudal exploitative landlord class and
introduction of peasant land ownership so as to liberate rural
productive forces, develop agricultural production and pave the
way for New China’s industrialization.” In accord with the need
and potential of the new situation, China changed the past policy
=====
iSm m——d after the founding
of collecting surplus land and property from rich peasants to that
of New China was the largest in Chinese history, anclakei the best
of preserving the rich peasant economy; that is, a rich peasant’s
organized and most smooth compared to earlier ones. This
land tilled by himself or by a hired hand and his other property
should be protected, and a small amount of land leased by a rich
peasant was generally preserved and kept intact. Levies were to
be placed on large areas of land leased by a semi-landlord, rich
peasant that exceeded the amount of land tilled by himself or by
 420 CHAPTER SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 421
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

was basically accomplished throughout the region. As a result, the The movement was targeted mainly at bandits (chieftains,
last remnant feudal system on this territory of the People’s hardened bandits), special agents, despots, heads of reactionary
Republic of China was eventually eliminated. secret societies and core members of reactionary parties and
iP.sues. A mass line was adopted for the movement. Under the
Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries leadership of the Party committee, the whole Party and masses
were mobilized, public security and judicial organs were com¬
The suppression of counter-revolutionaries was one of the bined with the broad masses of the people, various democratic
three great movements (the other two being War to Resist U.S parties and democrats were drawn into participation, and the
Aggression and Aid Korea, and agrarian reform) carried out in masses consciously rose to denounce and expose counter¬
the early period after the founding of New China. revolutionaries. In February 1951, the Central People’s Govern¬
A large number of counter-revolutionaries were left behind in ment promulgated the Regulations of the People’s Republic of
the mainland when the defeated Kuomintang reactionaries fled China on Punishment of Counter-Revolutionaries, providing le¬
to Taiwan. Unreconciled to their routing, they continued to carry gal weapons for the struggle to suppress counter-revolutionaries
out disruptive activities and make trouble. After the Korean War and a standard for measuring penalties. After a nationwide
broke out, they believed that a third world war would soon occur upsurge in the movement to suppress counter-revolutionaries had
and that the time had come for Chiang Kai-shek, swollen with taken shape, in May 1951, the Central Committee of the Chinese
counter-revolutionary arrogance, to launch a counterattack. Communist Party made a timely decision to immediately imple¬
They destroyed factories and railways, burnt warehouses and ment a prudent drawing back policy and concentrated its efforts
citizen residences, looted grain and property, spread rumours and on handling long-standing cases. In the handling of cases, the
organized riots, raided and besieged grass-roots people’s govern¬ Party stressed the need to conduct investigations and studies, to
ments, and slaughtered revolutionary cadres and activists among lay the emphasis on the weight of evidence and to not easily trust
the masses. In 1950, in the vast new liberated areas, nearly 40,000 confessions, oppose taking hasty actions and extorting admissions
cadres and masses, including more than 7,000 in Guangxi, were through compulsion and providing them with credence. Attack
murdered by counter-revolutionaries. To cope with this situation, should be directed mainly at those counter-revolutionaries guilty
on October 10, 1950, the Central Committee of the Communist of heinous crimes and bitterly hated by the people. A lenient
Party of China issued the Instruction on Suppression of Counter- policy should be adopted towards those who commit light crimes
Revolutionary Activities, calling on Party committees at all levels and were willing to repent. The nationwide movement to suppress
to firmly correct the deviation of excessive leniency towards counter-revolutionaries was basically concluded in October 1951.
counter-revolutionaries at certain times and in some places and With its accomplishment, the counter-revolutionary remnant
comprehensively implement the policy of combining suppression forces left behind in the mainland by Kuomintang reactionaries
with leniency. The chief criminals shall be punished without fail had been basically wiped out. The bane of wild outlawry, includ¬
those who are accomplices under duress shall go unpunished and ing bandits in west Hunan and Guangxi whom previous dynasties
those who perform deeds of merit shall be rewarded.” Chief of old China had been unable to eliminate, as well as black social
counter-revolutionaries who are guilty of heinous crimes and who forces in many cities, were by and large eliminated. This brought
are steeped in evil and refuse to repent shall be firmly sup¬ unprecedented stability to China’s social order and effectively
pressed. Beginning in December, a large-scale movement to sup¬ supported and co-ordinated agrarian reform and the struggle to
press counter-revolutionaries was launched nationwide. resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea.
 SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 423
422 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
pnual rights for men and women and protection of the
Other Democratic Reforms
n0gamy’,e interests of women and children shall be instituted,
legitimate in ‘ n ^ familiai structure that had
The Party also led the people in conducting multi-faceted
democratic reforms in co-ordination with agrarian reform and ThlS T H thousand years as well as a deepening of the
for several

suppression of counter-revolutionaries. ^rSTfdarstruggTe of the Chinese people. The Party and govern-
struggle o
antl-feudal ideological and organizational
First, democratic reforms were gradually unfolded in state-run
industrial, mining and communications and transport enterprises. ^extensive pTbUc.ty on and implementation of the Mar¬
In November 1951, the CPC Central Committee issued the In¬ riage Law, effectively promoting the emancipation of Chinese
structions on Cleaning Up Counter-Revolutionaries in Factories,
Mines and Communications Enterprises and Carrying Out Dem¬ “'struggle to ban prostitution, patronage of whores, trading
ocratic Reform in Them. During the democratic reform, workers
were boldly mobilized and relied upon in a guided way to
expose and denounce feudal gangmaster and various other sys¬
tems which opposed the workers, systems extant in old enterprises
November 21, 1949 g a decisjon to seal off
and not reformed in time after take-over. The Party wiped out
the counter-revolutionaries and remnant feudal forces concealed
in enterprises, promoted a number of workers and staff prestigi¬
ous among the masses to leading posts in administration, produc¬
tion and management. It established factory management com¬
mittees and worker representative conferences, drew workers into
participation in factory management and realized democracy in
enterprise management, so that workers would truly become
sfaiiilsh
masters of enterprises. At the same time, the movement led to
self-education among the worker masses to eliminate estrange¬
ment resulting from feudal trade association and regional con¬
cepts and to strengthen unity among workers and between work¬
ers and managerial and technical personnel. This gave further
expression to the new socialist relationship of production based
measures.^he ugly scanfof the old

ansiilsi
on the taking over of ownership of enterprises and placing it
under the people’s state. This was an indispensable step taken to
transform bureaucrat-capitalist firms into socialist businesses.
On May 1, 1950, the Central People’s Government promulgat¬
ed the Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China, the first
law of New China. The Marriage Law stipulated, “The feudal
marriage system characterized by arrangement, compulsory mar¬
riage, superior male and inferior female and neglect of children’s
interests shall be abolished and the new democratic marriage
system characterized by free marriage of male and female, mo-
424 ^pter Six founding OF PRC and transition to SOCIALISM 425
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPc

tarily renounce their habits. After two to three years of efforts fore us ”4 On the eve of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 7th Party
these social maladies which lingered despite repeated prohibitions Committee, the Party Central Committee telegraphed
and were considered incurable in Western society, were almost various localities, demanding that “the principal responsible com-

totally banned under the leadership of the Communist Party and of Party bureaus of the Central Committee personally
the people’s government. This could only surprise the world and ^1,e fmaanaal, banking and economic tasks and that centra
earn applause. Party bureau conferences regularly discuss fiscal work They

The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea was the must not slacken their effort in the slightest, thinking this is the
continuation of the Chinese people’s democratic revolution Ssk only for financial business organizations. This holds true,also
against imperialism, while the agrarian reform and various other for the Party committees of big cities, provinces and autonomous

democratic reforms marked the accomplishment of the Chinese Ions under the Party bureaus. The Political Bureau of the
people’s democratic revolution against feudalism. The mighty Party Central Committee discusses financial and economic wor
torrent of revolution cleaned up the filth and mire left over from at afmos" every conference.- Moving from all-out leadership

the old society. China’s social outlook and social mores experi¬ over the revolutionary war to all-out leadership over peaceful
enced great changes. This victory further consolidated political construction marked a profound change in the Party history
power under the people’s democratic dictatorship and provided Old China’s economy was extremely backward. The eight y
necessary social and political conditions for the work of restoring Jananese imperialist war of aggression against China and the
and developing the economy. three-year conflict launched by Kuomintang reactionaries against
he people caused serious damage to the country. In companion
with earlier record levels, in 1949 total industrial output had
III. FIGHT FOR THE RESTORATION OF halved in worth. The output value of heavy rnd,ustry. d™PPe^
70 percent and light industry by 30 percent. That year, stee
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
output was only 158,000 tons, a fall of 80 percent; “al output
32.43 million tons, a drop of 48 percent; gram production 113T8
The 3rd Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the
million tons, down about 25 percent, and cotton yield 444 000
Chinese Communist Party proposed to the entire Party and
tons a dip of about 48 percent. Modern industry came to 17
nation the general slogan and task “Fight for a fundamental turn
percent of total industrial and agricultural output value in 1949.
for the better in the nation’s financial and economic situation,”
According to statistics from the UN Asia-Pacific Society Com-
since armed conflict had been basically concluded. Only Tibet
mittee in 1949 China’s per-capita income was U.S.S27 ess han
and Taiwan remained to be liberated. The focus of the Party’s
work had begun to shift from military to the economic sphere two-thirds the average U.S.$44 of Asia as a
with its entry to major cities. As early as the 2nd Plenary Session half the U.S.$57 of India. This made concentrated efforts to
of the 7th Party Central Committee held on the eve of the restore the national economy a pressing task.
founding of New China, Mao Zedong pointed out, “From the The outbreak of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid
very first day we take over a city, we should direct our attention Korea adversely affected the shift of the focus to e—
to restoring and developing production there.” All other work construction Much manpower and material resources were ne
would “revolve around and serve the central task.” In the early ed to support the war and national defence. However, since the
stage after the founding of New China, he solemnly declared, conflict* remained confined to the Korean battlefield, the Party
“Economic construction on a national scale has been placed Central Committee decided to “engage in combat, stabilization
 SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 427
426 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

c m liberate the forces of production. It was implement-

and construction simultaneously.” Stabilization meant stabilizing reform was k seasons of winter and spring in order not
prices. This task was accomplished under arduous conditions ed mainly a ararian reform did not change the individual
while the war was still going on. A two-fold economic construc¬ to hold up wort Ag : economy Freedom from the feudal
tion policy focussed on key projects and planned postponements.
Another adverse effect of the Korean War on economic work "TareatWtested the enthusiasm of individual peasants for
was the U.S. government’s brazen declaration of dominion over l faskThirty deemed it necessary to gradually develop
China’s public and private property in the United States, its Sthour aid alng ££%
prohibition of entry to China by all U.S. goods and ships and its
°f VntUfuTplaPyrtoC^asant fervour for individual economic sec¬
manipulation of the Paris Planning Committee to impose com¬
plete international blockades and embargoes on New China. In s' The state put in great efforts to promote the restoration and
foreign trade, China decided, “proceeding from an overall point
of view, to put the Soviet Union in the first place, and at the same
time prepare to do business with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Ger¬
many, Britain, Japan and the United States.”6 The blockades and
embargoes of the imperialists obstructed China’s access to the
outside world. The Chinese government was compelled to adopt
appropriate measures to control all property of U.S. authorities
and enterprises in China and freeze U.S. public and private totalled 20 million nationwide They
savings deposits in the country. Subsequently, the Chinese gov¬ billion cubic metres of earth works, equivalent to 23 Suez Cana
ernment dealt with American public and private businesses in
China through requisition, administration, purchases and tighten¬
ing of control. It took over various cultural, educational and
relief organizations receiving U.S. subsidies. The economic and
KSSssSSSSS;
were all begun and stepped up at that time_ railway
cultural undertakings of other nations in China were dealt with The restoration of communications link., P . ? .
case to case on its own merits by the government in accordance
with the principle of reasonableness, advantage and restraint in
the light of the different conditions in the nations and trades
concerned. The difficulties caused by the blockades and embar¬
goes did not frighten the Chinese people. On the contrary, in¬
spired with the spirit of self-reliance, they redoubled efforts to
fight for restoration and development of the economy. railway rights became the fuse of the \9U Kcvoim ^
less throughout the entire period during the KM 1 rul ,
Restoration of Agriculture, Transport, Industry and Commerce
t£tS3S£S3£XSSKSJi jg
“The recovery of agriculture will serve as the foundation for
the recovery of all other branches, since if no food is available,
™e Chengdu and Chongqing stations to warmly hail the achieve-
everything else is out of the question.”7 The aim of agrarian
 SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 429
428 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

ment. Many could not help becoming teary-eyed. Arduous con¬ „n as nercent of the nation’s total retail sales. The
mcrce made UP p)ayed a relatively crucial role in
struction was also started of the Xikang-Tibet and Qinghai-Tibet private c p pf industria] products to meet the needs of
highways, leading to Lhasa, on the “Roof of the World.”
In the restoration and construction of industry, the Party laid inCr^)nuface helping commodity circulation to promote urban-
emphasis on two points. The first placed wholehearted reliance in
the working class and the second did so in the state-run economy.
Workers who had been emancipated and become masters of the
aa-MsssttW
state and enterprises exhibited greatly heightened labour enthu¬
siasm. Numerous model workers emerged and an extensive la¬ Inri exerted positive influence on other capitalists. However, the
bour emulation drive was launched. Key project construction, an aie ranitalist economy also possessed negative aspects. In
apart from first restoring and revamping existing businesses in orfer to develop production and promote economic Pr“P"^’
northeast China and other places, led to the building of a group the people’s government had to support the positive aspect of t
private capitalist economy benefiting the national economy and
of major enterprises, such as the Fuxin Haizhou open-cast coal
the neonle’s livelihood while restricting its adverse role. In I
mines, the seamless steel tube factory and heavy rolling mill of
the Anshan Iron and Steel Co., the Shanxi Heavy Machinery ? loaq the neonle’s government attacked speculative cap)-
Plant, cotton mills in Wuhan, Zhengzhou, Xi’an and Xinjiang, tTand won tLhe Ground of victory in the struggle between
and the Harbin Flax Mill. The rails for the Chengdu-Chongqing restriction and opposition to restriction. When Pr‘c“ ^“
Railway and all steel and iron sluice gates used in the project to stable in early 1950, due to the disappearance of false purchasing
harness the Huaihe River were made in China. power resisting from inflation and other —Cc
Restoration and development of trade were important links in such as sluggish sales of commodities, closed factories, detune.
promoting material exchange between urban and rural areas and shops and increased unemployment. In ^
restoration of the entire national economy. The Party held that bles the government adopted measures such as expansion ot sta
state-run and cooperative commerce should be gradually devel¬ orders with private factories for processing of materials and
oped and expanded to become the main distribution channel. purchasing oflarge quantities of farm and sideline products to
After several years of efforts, by the end of 1952, an integrated
state-run commercial system encompassing various departments
at all levels had taken basic shape throughout the country.
State-run commerce increased its share in the nation’s total retail
sales Irom 14.9 percent in 1950 to 34.4 percent. Cooperative
commerce was an important adjunct for state-run stores to link
up with the masses, and particularly the peasants. In 1952, its only helped private industry and commerce to tide over diff.cu
annual retail sales constituted 19.6 percent of the nation’s total ties but enabled them to achieve mighty progress. In 1951, the
retail sales worth. number of the nation’s private industrial enterprisesi ■»»!>««> to
A question of vital importance in the restoration and develop¬ those in 1950 had increased by 11 percent, the tota
ment of the national economy was how to treat private industry production by 39 percent, the number
and commerce. In 1950, private industry accounted for 51 per¬ firms by 11 9 percent and total retail sales by 36.6 percent, in
cent of total national industrial output value and private com- yea™ profits earned by the national bourgeoisie surpassed those
 six FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 431
430 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPc
1HA munist Party, degenerated into arch criminals of corrup-
in any of the 22 years under the Kuomintang rule.
C°m Although they had given some meritorious service dur-
ti0n,ht democratic revolution, the Party never tolerated their
Movement Against “Three Evils” and Struggle Against jng the democra^ ^ fey the court and execut-

“Five Evils” CHmThe essence of the slruggle against “three evils” that lasted
more than half a year was maintenance of the integrity
The Party and government protected the legal management
and appropriate development of private industry and commerce
in accordance with the Common Programme. However, lawless
elements among the capitalists, not satisfied with ordinary profits
SnSSES
gained by normal methods, tried hard to grab high spoils by
illegal means such as bribing state functionaries. The serious
acceleration of this situation forced the decision of the Party
Central Committee to launch a movement against the “three
i == -
evils” of mainly corruption, plus waste and bureaucracy, among
personnel of Party and state organizations. It also led to a
campaign against the “five evils” of capitalist bribery of govern¬
ment workers, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on
it
government contracts, and stealing of economic information for healthy social contort Cen(ral Committee issued an
private industrial and commercial firms.
Cases of cadre corruption were discovered and dealt with
sporadically after the founding of New China. Serious corrup¬
tion and waste by some cadres exposed in the report submitted
by the Northeast Bureau to the Party Central Committee in
November 1951 aroused the great attention of the Party Cen¬
tral Committee. The committee immediately made the Decision
on Streamlining Administration, Increasing Production and
Practising Economy, in Opposition to Corruption, Waste and 7h“d"
Bureaucracy. This struggle was necessary in order to carry
through the policy adopted at the 2nd Plenary Session of the
7th Party Central Committee of guarding against corruption whole nation After the movement reached an upsurge, the Party
7sued aTimeiy^instruction, saying that the various big cities must
within the entire Party. A vigorous and steady major attack
was launched through a mass movement in order to create “nay attention to maintaining the normal progress o
active public opinion and exhibit mass power. Major represent¬ life ”8 “Production, transportation, finance and tra e co
ative cases were grasped and tackled in the struggle to arouse
the vigilance of the whole Party and the attention of the whole
society. Liu Qingshan, former secretary, and Zhang Zishan,
then secretary, of the Tianjin Prefectural Committee of the
 SK FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM «»
432 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
t over 1949. with an average annual increase rate of 34.8
taxes and return of illegal gains. The Party Central Committee
peTen Total agricultural output worth rose by 53.5 percent over
pointed out: Concluding the struggle in this way “enables us to
So with an average annual increase rate of 15.3 percent. The
gain complete political and economic initiative and bring about
9t>ut of major industrial and agricultural products surpassed
rapid economic restoration and development, so capitalists may
°a Pneak level gained before the founding of New China. Along
again move closer to us and rekindle their management enthu¬
'"utfthe restoration and development of production, a balance
siasm and workers not face unemployment.”10 To handle negating
was achieved between state financial revenue and expenditure^
positive aspects of the bourgeoisie, which emerged within the
The economic structure improved. Culture, education and public
Party during the upsurge of the movement, the Party Central
Lnith services developed appropriately. The incomes of employ
Committee stressed: “The political and economic position appli¬ ^ and peasanrs mcreascd and their living standards improved
cable to the national bourgeoisie on the basis of the Common
M/hat In 1952 the total number of the nation s set employee
Programme remains unchanged.”11 The nationwide movement
radtcrea d o ib mmlon from the 1949 figure of 8 million,
against the five evils concluded after half a year. It attacked the
white their average wages had risen by 70 percent. A labour
five serious evil malpractices of capitalists. Widespread education
insurance system was instituted among enterprises and a free
on legal management was conducted among industrialists and
medical service among government employees and teacher. A
businessmen, promoting the establishment of worker supervision
survey indicated that in 1936, the year which saw the highest
in private enterprises and the introduction of democratic reform.
ore-liberation living standards for employees, average annual
This enabled the Party to gain another round of victory in the
speldlng per family member was 140 yuan (calculated on the
struggle between restriction and opposition to restriction. After
basis of 1957 prices). The figure reached 189.5 yuan in 1952 p
the movement ended, the Party and government, in the light of
35 percent. The 1952 income of peasants generally increased by
the newly emerged strained relations between the public and
over 30 percent compared to that in 1949.
private sectors and between labour and capital and a depressed
Simultaneous with economic restoration, profound^change^oc-
market, took further measures to readjust relations on a new
curred in the national economic structure. The state, private
basis. It worked to expand the placing of state orders with private
capitalist, individual, state-capital and co-operat.ve econom.es al
enterprises for the processing of materials, purchases and monop¬
developed. With state support and the superiority of the socialist
oly sales, to guarantee reasonable profits to ensure the relative
economy the state-run economy developed even faster. In 1949
development of capitalist industry and commerce. In 1952, total
the share’ of socialist industry in total national industrial worth
output value of capitalist industry increased 54 percent compared
(excluding handicrafts) was 34.7 percent. The figure rose to 5
to that of 1949.
percent in 1952. Furthermore, industry share (including han i
crafts) in the nation’s total industrial and agricultural output
Achievements in the Three Years of Economic Restoration value rose from 30 percent in 1949 to 41.5 percent. Modern
industry went up from 17 percent to 26.6 percent. The proportion
After three years of efforts, the national economy met with
of heavy industry in the total industrial output value clunbe
comprehensive restoration and initial development. In 1952, total
from 26.4 percent in 1949 to 35.5 percent in 1952. This progress
industrial and agricultural output value reached 81 billion yuan,
indicated that the restoration of China’s economy not only mclud-
up by 77.5 percent over 1949, and by 20 percent over the record
S quantitative development, but also change in nature and
1936 level. The average annual increase rate in the three years
was 21.1 percent; total industrial output worth increased by 145.1 improvement in quality.
 434
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CpC cflApTER SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 435

IV. THE PARTY PROPOSES THE GENERAL tween the working class and state-run economy on the one hand
nd the bourgeoisie on the other had undergone several rounds
LINE FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
aJith no conclusion. Instead there had been vacillations that had
creat impact on state economic life. The aggravation of these
Near the end of 1952, our country’s development faced a new
Contradictions resulting from rapid growth of industrialization
situation and many new problems. To lead the people in their
compelled the Party to consider measures to step up and expand
continued advance, the Party needed to put forward fresh tasks
and goals. ^ mutual-aid and cooperative movement in the rural areas and
control capital in the cities. This inevitably made it essential to
The struggle to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea had long
been stable and an agreement on major issues had been reached place the task of socialist transformation of the national economy
uring peace talks. This war New China was compelled to wage on the agenda. It was against this background that the Party
was expected to end before long. The main task left over from the Central Committee, after nearly one year of deliberation, drew
democratic revolution, that of large-scale agrarian reform, had up and put forward the Party’s general line for the transitional
basically been accomplished nationwide. The work of restoring period: For a considerably long period of time, there would be
the national economy, though adversely affected by war and gradual realization of state socialist industrialization, plus state
accompanied by intense social reform, proceeded quite smoothly socialist transformation of agriculture, the handicraft and capi¬
due to the hard work of the people nationwide. Originally resto¬ talist industries and commerce. The clear general line proposed
ration of the national economy was planned to take three to five the great task of building socialism to the people of the whole
years but the anticipated goal had been surpassed in three years. country. This was a major strategic step taken by the Party at a
All this showed that China had acquired the conditions for crucial historical moment.
carrying out planned economic construction. The Party made a Realizing socialism in China was the struggle objective laid
timely decision to begin the First Five-Year Plan for national down by the Chinese Communist Party at the time of its found¬
economic development in 1953. The main part of the plan en¬ ing. Contemporary Chinese history has proved that all efforts
tailed national industrialization, of course. This was the goal the aimed at realizing capitalism in China, whether by relormist
Chinese people had cherished over the past 100 years, and the key method or by revolutionary method, had ended in failure. This
to changing China s backward state and achieving strength and gave rise to the historical necessity of seeking a new objective oi
prosperity. The Chinese people were finally able to take big struggle. The objective set by the Chinese Communist Party
strides forward on the road to industrialization. to realize socialism precisely embodied this historical necessi¬
At the same time, new dilemmas which appeared and accumu¬ ty. However, China was originally an economically very back¬
lated in society required the Party to work out explicit guidelines ward semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. This basic national
and systematic policies for their gradual solution. In the rural condition determined the need to take two steps to bring about
areas after the agrarian reform, the main problem was that the socialism in China and the need to change over to socialist
scattered and backward individual economy of the peasants could revolution after passing through the new democratic revolution.
hardly meet the growing needs of the cities and industry for grain This was the road that Chinese revolution must follow in its
and agricultural raw materials. The initial appearance of polari¬ history of development. It was the reason why for a considerably
zation between the rich and the poor compelled the Communists long time, the Party had invariably taken new democracy as its
to consider the question of how the private economy should primary programme and used it to determine the nature of the
develop. In the cities, restriction and anti-restriction struggles revolution it led and the nature of the republic founded through
 436 SJX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 437
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTtK _

this revolution. With regard to the issue of when the revolution . fr.sh experience and the attainment of new understanding o
should change over to the socialist stage, the Party merely noted ° tens nken for socialist transformation had brought about
that this was the inexorable trend for which certain conditions thrt rchlnge m the original tentative idea. The Party Central
were essential. It had not made concrete judgments and could not rnmmhtee deemed it opportune and necessary to formulate the
do so on the time and conditions for the changeover. This needed n tv’s aeneral line for the transitional period. This clearly set the
to be decided in the light of the concrete conditions in the process tables for the whole Party and the whole people to graduailly_pass
of the development of the revolution. over to socialism, tasks which were estimated to be fulfilled in
The 2nd Plenary Session of the 7th Party Central Committee fifteen years or longer. „
held on the eve of the victory of the democratic revolution laid Why and how had this change taken place.
down various basic policies for the republic soon to come into First because China already had a relatively strong and rapid¬
being. It also set the basic orientation for changing China from ly developing socialist state-run economy. This formed a good
an agricultural into an industrial state and for progress from the beginning and an important force to rely on for the social^
transformation of the entire national economy. Confiscation o
new democratic society to the future socialist society. However,
at the time of the founding of New China, the country’s socialist bureaucrat-capital and turning it into state P~P«rty
future was not written into the Common Programme formulated nalty one of the three major economic programmes for the new
by the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, which democratic revolution. However, as a result of confiscation of
acted as a provisional constitution. Liu Shaoqi gave an explana¬ bureaucrat-capital, 80 percent of the fixed assets of ^
”a!
tion about this on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party: “This pre-liberation industrial and mining enterprises and communica
is because adopting quite serious socialist steps in China is a tions and transportation became state assets ** „tradon
matter for the distant future.” He pointed out at the same time: banks came basically under state management The
There is no doubt that in the future China will advance to of such a huge economic force in the hands of the state gave
socialism and then communism.” During the session, some non- confiscation a socialist revolutionary nature Later summing up
Party people asked Mao Zedong how long it would be before this stage Mao Zedong said: The statement that the democratic
China would advance into socialism. Mao Zedong replied it revolution and the socialist revolution can be accomphshed at one
would probably take twenty to thirty years. On several Party stroke “confused the two revolutionary stages, making it er
occasions, including a conference of the Political Bureau in roneous- but is alright to voice when it comes to the opposition
September 1948, the 2nd Plenary Session of the 7th Party Central erfbtireaucrat-capita 1.”'2 New China’s socialist state-run economy
Committee and at a number of inner-Party cadre meetings in the should not be put on a par with the official economies during
first few years after the founding of New China, Mao Zedong, Kuomintang rule and even earlier periods in Chinese history. It
Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai all said it would take at least a decade represented and guaranteed the interests of the pcopk: and society
or at most fifteen to twenty years for China to practise socialism. and was thus well received and trusted by the people^ It became
Then they had a rough idea that, after a considerable length of the main force for supporting state finances and ^rhzing rile
time when industry had developed and the state-run economy had economic situation and the main body of the existing bas^
been expanded, it would be possible to adopt “serious socialist industry0 The main tasks for the First Five-Year Plan were to be
steps” to realize nationalization of capitalist industry and com¬ undertaken by it. The realization of Chinas industrialization
merce and the collectivization of individual agriculture. By 1952, could only rely on developing the socialist state-run economy, and
after three years of practice and developments, the accumulation not on the capitalist private economy. Chinas national capitalist
 ter SIX FOUNDING of PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 439
438 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

economic strength was weak and it consisted mainly of commerce ,rtr the gradual transition to socialism.
Second, because we had accumulated much experience in the
and financial capital, with little industrial capital. National in¬
..e Cind restriction of private industry and commerce, this actual-
dustrial capital was invested mainly in light and textile industries
lv became the initial step towards the socialist transformation of
and little in heavy industry. Private factories generally were small
.L capitalist economy. Protecting national industry and com¬
in scale (69.7 percent had less than 10 workers), their technology
merce was another one of the three major economic programmes
was backward (workshop handicraft industry accounted for 79.1
tor the new democratic revolution. Protection included positive
percent). China’s national bourgeoisie was unable to lead China’s
aspects advantageous to the national economy and people s live¬
democratic revolution to victory, still less was it able to undertake
lihood and restrictions on negative aspects acting against these.
the heavy task of realizing industrialization in China. While most
Because China’s economy was backward, the use of the positive
state-run industries were comparatively advanced in technology,
role of private industry and commerce was of crucial signil icancc.
their labour productivity was relatively high, and workers had a
However, contradictions existed between the capitalist economy
strong sense of being masters of state-run enterprises. Their
on the one hand and the interests of the people and society, state
livelihood was secure and they enjoyed various kinds of power
management and the socialist economy on the other hand. There
and welfare. Their labour enthusiasm was high. In short, the
were some contradictions between the workers and the capitalists
socialist state-run economy at that time clearly demonstrated its
within the private economy. Readjusting and solving these m
superiority over other economic sectors and was a new thriving
accordance with the needs of economic development and with the
and prospering force. By 1952, the proportion of state-run indus¬
greatest interests of the vast majority of the people would inevita¬
trial output in total modern industry had increased to 56 percent
bly entail the struggle between restrictions on capitalism and
and the business volume of state-run wholesale commerce made
resistance to these constraints by capitalists. The 2nd Plenary
up 60 percent of the nation’s total. Socialism had become a
Session of the 7th Party Central Committee pointed out, “‘Restric¬
relatively strong factor in China’s social and economic life. In
tion versus opposition to restriction will be the mam form of class
addition, the highly integrated financial and economic work
struggle in the new democratic state.” Under national economic
supported by the state economy and state administrative force
restoration, during the struggle waged against illegal and negative
was naturally guided step by step onto the path of the planned
capitalist resistance to state restrictions, in the process of ration¬
economy. The subsequent development of the planned economic
ally readjusting industry and commerce, the state created a scries
system built on this highly centralized and unified basis showed
of forms from low- to high-level state capitalism. They entailed
that it had defects in certain aspects which needed to be readjust¬
mainly rational distribution of raw materials and markets, and
ed and reformed to suit the changed situation. But this choice
sustained support of the positive role of private industry and
made by the Party and government under the severe circum¬
commerce while ensuring growth of the state-run economy. These
stances prevailing at that time was the only correct one when
included the placing of state orders with private enterprises for
there was a shortage of and pressing demand for materials.
processing of materials, private company sales ot goods tor the
Moreover, a certain degree of unity and planning was always
state on a commission basis, state monopoly of the purchase and
necessary for the stability and development of the national econ¬
marketing of products of private enterprises, and stale-private
omy. When the First Five-Year Plan began, the demand for the
operation. These measures were adopted mainly to help private
development of the state-run economy and the expansion of the
industry and commerce to overcome production dilliculties. At
planned economy became a basic factor by which the Party
that time, it was difficult for many private enterprises to survive
deemed it necessary and possible to put forward the general line
 CHAPTER SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 441
440 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

and develop without the support of the state, so the capitalists needs of industrial development and avoid polarization between
welcomed these state measures. The results that ensued showed the affluent and badly-off. In the light of current experience and
that the series of state capitalist configurations not only aimed to understanding, the Party believed that only by organized mutual
draw on and restrict capitalist industry and commerce, they also aid and cooperation, was it possible to develop output and achieve
inevitably deepened the links between the capitalist and socialist common prosperity. During the period of national economic
state-run economy, causing different degrees of changes in their restoration, simple cooperative mutual-aid teams were universal¬
relations of production. This, thereby, to varied extents, started ly set up, while primary cooperatives characterized by pooling of
initial socialist transformation of them, even though the Party did land began to develop. There were also typical trials by advanced
not fully realize this at the very beginning. From its summation cooperatives (collective farms) characterized by collective owner¬
of experience, the Party affirmed that the continued expansion ship of the basic means of production. After summing up these
and improvement of various forms of state capitalism provided practical experiences, the Party confirmed that these mutual aid
the concrete way to the gradual socialist transformation of capi and cooperative forms not only were effective means for helping
talist industry and commerce. It changed former concepts which poor peasants overcome their difficulties and increase produc¬
regarded future declaration of nationalization and elimination of tion, but also appropriate methods for preventing the spontaneous
the private capitalist system at one stroke as the only measure for tendency towards capitalism in the countryside and guiding agri¬
socialist transformation. This was another basic aspect of the culture towards a socialist orientation. The Party also established
Party’s view.that it was timely to put forward the general line for a new concept: China’s industrialization and agricultural me¬
gradual transition to socialism. chanization would be a very drawn-out process, so agricultural
Third, because the Parly had accumulated much experience cooperatives could not sit back wailing for industrialization and
after the accomplishment of the agrarian reform in launching mechanization. Generally, small-scale agricultural mutual aid
agricultural mutual aid and cooperation in rural areas. This and cooperative organizations which lacked large machinery
became the initial step towards the socialist transformation of could augment production by relying mainly on unified manage¬
individual agriculture. Confiscation of feudal land and placing it ment and cooperation. They reassembled handicraft workshops
under peasant ownership was one of the three major economic which initially also lacked major equipment but could still raise
programmes for the new democratic revolution. After the peas¬ production by relying mainly on cooperation. Many people were
ants were given distributed land, the question was, how could convinced by this viewpoint. This was the third basic factor by
individual scattered and weak agriculture meet the rapidly grow¬ which the Party deemed it possible to put forward the general line
ing needs of industrialization for food and raw material crops? for the gradual transition to socialism.
How could polarization between rich and poor be avoided? At These three points indicated that since the new democratic
that time, each individual peasant household held only an aver¬ future was bound to develop towards socialism, the new demo¬
age of some ten mu (15 mu—1 hectare) of farmland, each poor cratic economy already contained socialist factors of decisive
peasant household or hired hands had an average of less than half significance that were continually expanding their force and
a draught animal and half a plough. There were also shortages of scope. Thus, the new democratic construction stage also meant
funds. Even maintenance of production was not easy, to say the transitional period from new democracy to socialism. In a
nothing of expansion on any scale, improvement of conditions summing-up speech made in September 1953 at an enlarged
and diversified economic development. On the foundation of such meeting of the Standing Committee of the National Committee
an individual agricultural economy, it w'as impossible to suit the of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Zhou
442 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 443

Enlai said, “To pul it in a nutshell, the transitional period means the Chinese Communist Party, made a detailed exposition of the
the new democratic construction period, the period of gradual rrmtent of the general line. While examining and revising this
transition to socialism, as well as a period of gradual increase in nutline Mao Zedong wrote this succinct summary: From the
the share of the socialist economic sector in the national econo¬ founding of the People’s Republic of China to the basic accom-
my.” nlishment of socialist transformation is a transitional period
Fourth, judging from the then international environment, the = general line and general tasks during this transitional
imperialists carried out military aggression and posed a threat to neriod are, within a considerably long period of time, to gradually
China. They imposed a strict economic blockade on the nation. realize the state’s socialist industrialization and gradua ly realize
While the capitalist countries themselves were in the doldrums, the stale’s socialist transformation of agriculture, handicraft in¬
socialist countries were vigorously developing, demonstrating dustry and capitalist industry and commerce. This general line,
their superiority over capitalism. During economic rehabilitation like a beacon light, illuminates various fields of our work. If we
and construction in the First Five-Year Plan, only the Soviet depart from it, we will commit Right or Left deviations errors
Union aided China. Although the Parly proceeded from China’s Mao gave the following explanations as to why the lounding oi
specific conditions while formulating concrete economic policies the People’s Republic of China should be taken as the beginning
and methods of work, the Soviet Union’s expertise in socialist uf the transition period from new democracy to socialism: we
construction and its economic system still formed a role as a say things that mark change in the nature of revolution, and mark
model for China. It also constituted a factor that prompted the the basic conclusion of the stage of new democratic revolution
Party to deem it necessary to begin the gradual transition to and the beuinning of socialist revolution, are the change m
socialism. political power, the extinction of the counter-revolutionary re¬
In September 1952, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the gime of the Kuomintang and the founding of the People s Repub
Central Committee, Mao Zedong said, “We will basically accom¬ lie of China. We do not mean that we can set about carrying out
plish socialism in ten to fifteen years, not begin the transition to the great task of socialist transformation in all national fields
socialism after a decade.” This marked the beginning of prepara¬ immediately after the founding of the People’s Republic. Now
tions to promote the general line for the transitional period. we still need to solve contradictions between feudalism and
Thereafter, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai also expounded in detail democracy; i.e., between the landlords and peasants in the vast
the guiding thought and rough ideas about “beginning from now rural areas. Over time, the principal contradictions in the rural
the gradual transition to socialism.” The conference of the Polit¬ areas will be between feudalism and democracy, not between
ical Bureau of the Central Committee, held in June 1953, formal¬ capitalism and socialism. Therefore, two to three years are needed
ly discussed the matter, forming a fairly comprehensive exposi¬ to carry out agrarian reform in rural areas. By then, we will, on
tion. The slogans issued on September 24, 1953 to celebrate the the one hand, carry out democratic agrarian reform in the rural
fourth anniversary of the founding of New China announced this areas- on the other hand, in the city, we will immediately start to
general line to the whole Party and the people throughout the take over bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises and turn them into
country. In December, the “Outline for Study and Publicity on socialist enterprises, set up socialist state banks and simultaneous¬
the Party’s General Line for the Transitional Period—Fight to ly set about to establish socialist state commerce and cooperative
Build China Into a Great Socialist State by Mobilizing All commerce nationwide. Over the past few years we have begun
Forces,” which was drafted by the Propaganda Department of the implementing measures for stale capitalism in private capitalist
Central Committee and transmitted by the Central Committee of enterprises. All these facts demonstrated the complicated situa-
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
six FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 445
444

line which became the new programme for uniting

tion prevailing in the first few years of China’s transitional
and mobilizing the entire population in the effort to build a great
period.” In February 1954, the 4th Plenary Session of the 7th
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party formally socialist new China.
approved this general line confirmed by the Political Bureau of
the Party Central Committee. v PLANNED ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION
The Party’s general line for the transitional period was one
characterized by “one industrialization and three transforma¬ I ' AND the start of socialist
tions,” and “one main body and two wings.” “One industrializa¬ INDUSTRIALIZATION
tion” implied the gradual realization of state socialist industrial¬
ization; this is the main body. “The three transformations” meant
On January 1 1953, in an editorial of Renmin Ribao (People s
the gradual realization of socialist transformation of agriculture,
Daily) the Party and government announced: China has begun
handicraft and capitalist industry and commerce. These were the implement the First Five-Year Plan for national construction.
“two wings.” “Industrialization” and the “three transformations” At the 4th Session of the 1st National Committee of theChmese
related to, promoted and contained each other, demonstrating the People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Zhou tmai
organic unity between the development of productive forces and minted out "The vear of 1953 is the starting year for the First
the reform of the relations of production. This was a general line Five-Year Plan.... Mobilizing the working class and the people_of
wherein socialist construction and socialist transformation were the whole country in the concentrated effort to overcome'Jiff
conducted simultaneously. “Industrialization ” and “transforma¬ culties and work lo fulfil and overfulfil the annual 1953 construe
tion” both required a very long period of time for their realiza¬ don plan is the overriding task facing us that will run through
tion, step by step. This stipulation was based on the consideration the whole year.” The following year, at the 1st Session of the Is
that China’s original production forces were at a very low devel¬ National People’s Congress, he further noted since imple¬
opmental level, and the reform of hundreds of millions of indivi¬ mentation had begun of the First Five- ear > f
dual peasants and handicraftsmen required arduous and meticu¬ construction work has held the primary position in the life ot the
lous work. This task could be realized only through long-term whole country.” The whole Party and entire populace turned
efforts, estimated at the time to take three five-year plan periods, their attention to the task of socialist industrialization joyous y
or fifteen years, plus three years of restoration, a total of eighteen greeting and plunging into the upsurge of large-scale and planned
years. This was a comparatively careful estimate. Compared with economic construction for New China.
the original plan whereby China would first spend fifteen or
twenty years on new democratic construction and then carry out The First Five-Year Plan
and accomplish socialist transformation in one step, there was
change in concrete steps and methods, but the estimated time The drafting work of the First Five-Year PlanM(1953-57) was
conducted under the guidance of Zhou Enlai and Chen, Ynn. The
needed was roughly the same.
After the general line for the transitional period was put work started in 1951. In December 1952, the Party Uentrai
Committee issued the Instruction on the Drafting of the 195
forward, extensive and intensive publicity and educational work
was conducted among the whole Party and people throughout the Plan and the Outline of the Long-Term Programme In Apr
1953 the Parly Central Committee approved the broadcasting ot
country. Unity of understanding was quickly achieved within the
highlights of 1953 national economic plan. The general line
Party and support was received from the populace nationwide for
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER six FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 447
446

put forward during this period by the Party Central Committee Npr-ause China’s industrial foundation, particularly for heavy
for the transitional period was clearly defined: The gradual b nnstrv was very weak. In order to acquire a material base
realization of state socialist industrialization forms the main body f reezing industrialization by relying on the nation’s own
of the general line. According to the spirit of the related instruc¬ f ,1, pverv nossible means had to be tried to achieve major
tions of the Party Central Committee, we, on the one hand, Xtld development of heavy industry. When China started
initially drafted and began to implement the First Five-Year the First Five-Year Plan, although industry had been restored
Plan; on the other hand, we continued to constantly discuss and Ld had surpassed record levels, planned industrialization took
revise the proposals. The work lasted four years and the text of off at a very low point. In 1952, the share of modern industry in
the plan was changed five times, being basically finalized in tie total output worth of China’s agriculture and industry was a
September 1954. Following its consideration and approval by the mere 26 6 percent, and that of heavy industry m total “dustnal
National Representative Conference of the Party in March 1955, output value was only 35.5 percent. In the Soviet Union these
the plan was formally discussed and adopted at the 2nd Session figures had reached 45.2 percent and 39.5 percent, respectively,
of the 1st National People’s Congress held in July that same year. in8 1928 before that nation started its First Five-Year Plan.
The NPC was unanimous in agreeing that the plan drawn up 1952 the per-capita output of many major mdustnal products of
under the auspices of the Central Committee ot the Chinese Chma notPonly lagged far behind
Communist Party “is a programme of decisive significance wher¬ countries but was also lower than India s 1950 level. For exam
eby the people of the entire country arc working for the fulfil¬ pie the per-capita steel output of China was 2.37 °t
ment of general tasks for the transitional period. It is a plan for India and the United States, the respective figureswere:4 kg; and
peaceful economic and cultural construction.’ 538 3 kg. In terms of power output, China had 2.76 kwh, India
The guiding principle and basic tasks for the First Five-Year 10 9 kwh and the United States, 2,949 kwh. A paragraph written
Plan entailed: Concentrating major efforts on developing heavy by Mao Zedong to describe this situadon had a Prf°un^PreS£
industry and establishing an initial foundation for state indus¬ sion on the people: “What can we make at present? We can make
trialization and modernization ol national delcnce; appropriately tables and chairs, tea bowls and teapots, grow tod grair. and
developing communications and transportation services, light grind it into flour, we can also make paper bu we cannot
industry, agriculture and commerce; suitably training construc¬ manufacture even a motor vehicle, an aircraft, a ank 01 ^
tion personnel; systematically promoting cooperatives for agricul¬ tractor”'5 The Chinese people, of course, were eager to quickly
ture and handicrafts; continuing to carry out transformation of change this situation. Light industry had some foundation, then
capitalist industry and commerce; ensuring steady growth of the limited by market and raw material supplies The 'ltdizauon rate
share of socialist sectors in the national economy, and simul¬ for equipment was very low and the potential for increased
taneously correctly giving play to the role of individual agricul¬ production very great. It was thought that to mereasenjgnflilm*
ture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce; and production, main reliance could only be placed °n the work
ensuring a gradual rise in the level of the people’s material and enthusiasm of the peasants and their investment of funds. Such
cultural life on the basis of developing production. being the case, during the First Five-Year Plan, there was the
(1) The Party determined at that time to take industrialization objective possibility for the state to concentrate its mam effort on
as the main task of overall economic construction and concentrat¬ developing heavy industry. The prevailing tense international
ed major efforts on developing heavy industry. This was partly situation and imperialists’ threat of armed aggression compeUed
due to the influence of Soviet construction expertise and also greater thought being given to the construction of heavy industry
 448
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 449

essential for the modernization of national defence. construction must be based on actual conditions with accurate
The plan stipulated that during the five years, on the one hand estimates of potential increase in subjective strength. Serious
China would build a number of new industrial departments on a shortages in funds, machinery, equipment and technical person¬
grand scale and with advanced technology, while on the other nel were an important factor restricting economic construction.
hand, the nation should use modern, advanced technology to The blockade and discrimination imposed on us by the United
expand and transform existing industrial departments. The na¬ States and other developed capitalist countries in the fields of
tion should make rational use of and rebuild existing industrial economic, technological and scientific exchange were also major
foundations in northeast China, Shanghai and other coastal cities, restrictive factors. Action had to be based on capability and
and also begin to erect new hinterland industrial bases to greatly reality. On the question concerning speed of development, a lack
increase China’s industrial production capacity and initially rec¬ of experience and constant hopes to quickly change China’s poor
tify the irrational distribution of industries which were nearly all and backward state, meant that consideration was usually first
concentrated in the coastal areas and northeast China. The plan given to needs and less attention paid to objective limitations and
stipulated that during the five years the total value of state actual potential. For example, when the plan was first drafted, it
investment in economic and cultural construction would hit 76.64 proposed that industrial production should increase at an average
billion yuan. This equalled over 700 million taels (1 tael= 1.1023 annual rate of over 20 percent and agricultural production at 7
ounces) of gold, an unprecedented amount in Chinese history. Of percent. This plan was drawn up roughly in reference to the
the capital construction investment, 58.2 percent was for indus¬ 1950-1952 growth rate. But that was a high speed of recovery
try, of which 88.8 percent was for heavy industry. which was unrealistic to want to maintain for planned economic
Giving priority to the promotion of heavy industry did not construction after restoration. At that time, expectations for
mean it would be developed in isolation. There had to be overall increased industrial production were placed mainly on putting
consideration and comprehensive arrangements to achieve a total newly built projects into operation. There was overanticipation ot
balance among the various closely-interlinked national economic the speed with which new factories would start up production. In
departments. The First Five-Year Plan stipulated that while particular, extravagant hopes were entertained tor rapid increase
giving priority to the growth of heavy industry, the nation should in agricultural production, and the disadvantageous factors that
appropriately develop agriculture, light industry, transportation, restricted such increase were underestimated. After careful inves¬
post and telecommunications, and commerce as well as cultural tigations and repeated calculations and in view of natural disas¬
and educational undertakings. Out of total capital construction ters causing the failure to fulfil the planned main annual targets
investment, 7.6 percent was for agriculture, forestry and water for agricultural production in 1953 and 1954, it was finally
conservancy departments, 19.2 percent for transportation, post decided that industrial production should increase at an average
and telecommunications departments, 3 percent for banking and annual rate of 14.7 percent. Of this, 70 percent should come from
trade departments, and 7.2 percent for cultural and educational tapping the potential of existing enterprises, while agricultural
departments. Great attention was also paid to market stability, production should increase at an average annual rate of 4.3
and emphasis was laid on the four major balances of finance, percent. Such a growth rate was relatively high compared with
credit, foreign exchange and materials so the national economy equivalent rates for many countries. It was, however, in keeping
could develop proportionally and in a planned and co-ordinated with China’s reality and so could be fulfilled.
way.
(3) In economic construction, the Party adhered to the policy
(2) The Party emphasized that the scale and speed of economic of relying mainly on China’s own efforts while seeking assistance
 CHAPTER SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 451
450 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

to bring about a better life for the populace. However, in the

from abroad. The drafting and implementation of the First Five-
midst of them there also exist contradictions between immediate
Year Plan received great help from the Soviet government. Ne¬
^nd long-term interests, and between local and overall interests.
gotiation between China and the Soviet Union determined that
Mishandling of these would either hinder the development of
the Soviet Union helped China build 156 projects. These consti¬
Jltional construction or affect improvement of the people s live
tuted the core of industrial construction during the First Five-
lihood In order to accumulate construction tunds, the people of
Year Plan (part of which needed to be carried over to the Second
he whole country had to work hard, practise economy, be indus¬
Five-Year Plan). For the building of these projects, the Soviet
trious and thrifty and subordinate personal interests to the fun
side not only provided loans, but gave concrete guidance and help
damental, long-term interests of national construction. Necessary
in prospecting for natural resources, the selection of factory sites,
limitations had to be put to the range of improvement ot imme¬
technical design, the supply of machinery and equipment, and aid
diate living standards. In the process of continuous expansion,
in construction and installation, personnel training and placing
there should also be appropriate improvements in living stand¬
factories into trial run and operation. During the First Five-Year
ards through developing production and raising iabom produc¬
Plan period, the Soviet Union dispatched 3,000 technical experts
tivity. There should be no undue rise in accumulation at the
to China, while China sent more than 7,000 students and 5,000
expense of consumption, which would dampen the people s enthu-
trainees to the Soviet Union. This was a glorious page in the
siasm for building socialism. At .he beginning ofthe. Fim Five-
history of friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples.
Year Plan, the construction scale was very big, but the share o
However, the Party still insisted on and emphasized the need to
accumulation in the entire national income went up only slightly
rely mainly on the nation’s efforts and disapproved of dependence
in 1953 compared with 1952, an appropriate scale for the time.
on Soviet aid. During the First Five-Year Plan period, foreign
The above-mentioned guidelines were based on reality m
loans accounted for only 2.7 percent of the state’s total financial
China and embodied the consistent ideological tenet of integrat¬
revenue. China began in 1955 to repay these loans annually with
ing the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism with the con¬
favourable balance of trade with the Soviet Union. In projects
crete practice of national construction.
designed and equipped with Soviet help, 20 to 30 percent of the
volume of design work and 30 to 50 percent of machinery and
equipment came from China itself. There was no dependence on Upsurge in Industrial Construction
foreign aid for whatever the nation could supply. In 1956, the
Inspired by the initial implementation of the First Five-Year
Party Central Committee further clearly put forward the princi¬
Plan and in the process of publicizing and studying the Party s
ple of establishing an independent, comprehensive industrial sys¬
general line for the transitional period, a lively atmosphere quick
tem. These policies and measures were of far-reaching signifi¬
fy prevailed throughout the nation’s rural and urban areas for
cance in enabling China to adhere to its independent stand in the
participation and support for state industrial construction.
subsequent radical change in international relations.
The working class took the lead. Workers were the “ding class
(4) The Party called for correct handling of the relations
of the state, as well as the main force on. the industrial front T hey
between accumulation and consumption in planned economic
were known by people of alt social strata as •’elder brothers.” They
construction and an appropriate combination of production
not only strove to raise their own ideological consciousness but
growth with improved living standard. The two were fundamen¬
tried hard to lift their educational levels and levels of scientific
tally identical, since the basic aim of socialist construction is to
and technical knowledge. In 1953, the All-China Federation of
gradually meet people’s growing material and cultural needs and
 CHAPTER SIX FOUNDING OF Pile AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 453
452 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THF. CPc
nrc In just a few years, the number quickly increased to
Trade Unions, in accordance with the spirit of the Party Central fns of thousands of prospectors through the transfer of profes-
Committee’s instruction on increasing production and practis¬ ionals front other fields, assignment of college graduates special
ing strict economy, issued an Emergency Circular on Further led in geology and who had been transferred from other dtset-
Launching the Labour Emulation Drive for Increasing Produc¬ nltne to study geology, as well as adoption of large-scale training.
tion and Practising Economy to Ensure an All-Round Fulfilment P Peasants also showed great concern for industrial construction,
of State Production Plans. In April 1954, Wang Chonglun of thinking that once developed it might provide chemical fertiliz¬
Anshan Iron and Steel Company and six other national industrial ers mechanization for farming, electric lighting in homes and
model workers presented a proposal to the All-China Federation telephones They supported industrial construction by striving to
of Trade Unions for launching a technical innovation movement increase production and actively paying agricultural tax and
which took off from the vigorous labour emulation drive going selling grain and cotton to the state. The existence of a disparity
on among the working class. between the prices of industrial and agricultural products became
The Party Central Committee called upon Party committees at an TZrtant channel for the peasants to contribute energy to
all levels to follow the pattern of selecting large numbers of cadres state and industrial construction. In the initial development
for the army during the war years. It was to be most determined industrial construction, particularly in mining areas, large nurn
to pick outstanding cadres from various fields and assign them to bers of young peasants were accepted into the fast expanding
work on the industrial front and train them to become key
leading members for industrial construction. At that time, as "dn^sC'pouring in from the industrial construction
many as 10,000 cadres were assembled at one time nationwide. front. On December 26, 1953, the three major projects the
The Party called on experienced and new cadres to assiduously heavv rolling mill, the seamless steel tube factory, and the No.
study industrial construction. At the National Representative ircni-smelting “urnaee-of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company
Conference of the Party held in 1955, Mao Zedong stressed: “We held the inauguration ceremony. They formed the fust batch o
have entered a new historical period in which we should diligent¬ important projects in China's heavy industrial construction to be
ly study socialist industrialization, socialist transformation, mod¬ completed and go into production. They greatly
ern national defence and begin to study atomic energy. To keep northeast iron and steel base with Anshan Iron and Steel Compa
track of this new situation, we should immerse ourselves in these ny in the centre. This was a victory of important significance for
fields and become experts. These are our tasks.” the take-off of New China’s socialist industrialization. All t
Engineering and technical personnel and scientific workers workers of the company wrote to Chairman Mao Zedong report¬
were to give full play to their abilities in industrialization. Large ing on this good news, and Mao Zedong sent a congratulatory
numbers of graduates from institutions of higher learning and telegram in reply. Soviet experts contributed much to the recon
various professional and technical schools accepted state assign¬ struction of the Anshan Company. The Soviet government sent a
ments. Braving all hardships, they joyously hurried to the indus¬ delegation to attend the celebration meeting. The construction of
trial construction front in various parts of the country. University the Baotou Iron and Steel Company in north China and the
students of the science and engineering disciplines urgently need¬ Wuhan Iron and Steel Company in central-south China also
ed in construction were even graduated and assigned jobs one formally started, making a good beginning for the
year ahead of schedule in 1952 and 1953. The vanguards of of large iron and steel bases in the hinterland. By 1956 building
construction, the geological prospecting teams, were an example had been completed and production begun at the Changchun
of how this worked. In old China, there were a mere 200-odd
 q^PTER six FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 455
454 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

Automobile Manufacturing Factory, China’s first plant produc¬ ..mailed suiting and boosting economic construction. These meant
ing heavy-duty trucks. China’s first jet plane had been successful¬ preparation for and implementation of the First Five-Year Plam
ly manufactured by China’s first aircraft manufactory. The P ffter the founding of New China, the Party proposed tha

Shenyang No. 1 Machine Tool Plant, China’s first factory manu¬ “reform of the old school education and of the old cultural
facturing machine tools, and the Beijing Electronic Tube Factory, institutions in our society should be conducted carefully s ep by
step, and all patriotic ^intellectuals should be won over to the
which engaged in mass production of electronic tubes, all went
into operation in 1956. The Wuhan Yangtze River Bridge span¬
^IiTaddition'to state leadership over schools, abolition of the
ning north and south was completed in 1957, making it possible
oBginal reactionary political education, and the estabhshmen
for railways to run the entire length of the country. The comple¬
and strengthening of revolutionary political education, reformt of
tion and opening to traffic of the Qinghai-Tibet, Xikang-Tibet
educational work included two main aspects. One was to solve the
and Xinjiang-Tibet highways linked Tibet with the hinterland.
problem of opening the door of education to the broad masses of
There were countless small and large projects, with one major
workers and peasants. Thus, the Party called for great efforts to
project started or completed each day, on average.
launch an anti-illiteracy campaign, develop primary and midd
In short, although New China’s industrialization took off with
schools and expand the enrolment of chddren of workers^
a weak foundation, faced multi-sided restrictive factors and ar¬
peasants. It set up worker and peasant accelerated middle schools
duous tasks, many favourable conditions existed. The most cru¬
men worker and peasant cadre remedial classes and classes for
cial had been the enthusiastic support of the people throughout
the country for the task put forward by the Party for socialist furthering their technical know-how, creating special a™nue!_‘°
industrialization, the main body of the general line and general raise the educational levels of worker and peasant cadres. The
other aspect was the development and reform of higher education.
tasks for the transitional period. As the entire Party and people
In 1952 readjustments of colleges and departments were conduct¬
of the whole country arduously struggled with one heart and one
ed on a national scale. The policy was directed mainly a training
mind, China’s industrialization programme made steady progress.
industrial personnel and teachers, developing special colleges and
training schools, consolidating and strengthening umversiUes
and forming a system encompassing engineering colleges with
VI. CULTURAL AND POLITICAL comprehensive faculties. Colleges and universities substantially
CONSTRUCTION AND DIPLOMATIC WORK "sed their enrolments as a result. All these measures were
aimed at meeting the urgent needs of planned economic construe
The upsurge of economic construction was followed by a high tion and construction personnel for industrialization.
tide of cultural construction. Construction in other fields also For scientific work, the Chinese Academy of Sciences was set
developed appropriately. up shortly after the founding of New China. In the spring o
1954, in transmitting the report submitted by tHe-leading Pa y
group of the Chinese Academy ol Sciences, the Party Centra
Cultural and Ideological Construction
Committee issued this instruction: “As the stales planned
Cultural construction required first fitting and promoting po¬ nomie construction has begun, we must make great eThir s to
litical change. This meant a change from old China to New China develop natural sciences, to bring about constant development ol
and the transition from new democracy to socialism. Second, it production technology and help with all-round understanding
 45,0 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THH cp<.; cHAlymi Six FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 457

and more effective use of natural resources. China’s scientific a egression and aid Korea, the agrarian reform and suppression of
foundation has been weak. Since bringing up scientific research¬ hunter-revolutionaries. They were to gain education through
ers and the accumulation of scientific research experience require nractice. The activities marking the 30th anniversary oi the
a considerably long period of time, we must work hard and founding of the Communist Party of China and the first publica¬
inspire ourselves to catch up, otherwise our backward science will tion of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong in 1951 gave an
hold up the development of our national construction.”15 The impetus to an upsurge in the study of the history and theory of
written instruction also systematically expounded the Party’s the Communist Parly of China. In response to the Party’s call,
policy of uniting with scientists, the principle of energetically twelve famous professors of Beijing University, in September
training new scientific forces and that of establishing the national 1951 initiated a political study movement among professors ot
scientific research work system with the Chinese Academy of the university. This was followed by a study movement centred
Sciences at the centre and including institutions of higher learn¬ on ideological remoulding, launched among teachers of institu¬
ing and scientific research sections of production departments. In tions of higher learning, first in Beijing and Tianjin. Entrusted
art and literature work, the Party continued to advocate literature by the Party Central Committee, Zhou Enlai gave a report on the
and art that served workers, peasants and soldiers and the people “Question Concerning the Remoulding of Intellectuals” to teach¬
in general. It also set forth the principle of “letting a hundred ers of institutions of higher learning in the two cities. In the light
flowers bloom, weeding through the old to bring forth the new.” of his personal experience in the revolution and in ideological
In medical and health work, the Party put forward the three remoulding, Zhou expounded mainly the necessity and aim of
major principles ol ‘ gearing work to the needs of the workers, reforming the thinking of intellectuals. He emphasized the need
peasants and soldiers,” “putting prevention first” and “combining to draw a distinction between ourselves and the enemy and
Chinese and Western medicines.” Guided by these policies and repudiate the ideas of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-
principles, remarkable achievements were gained in the reform capitalism. He encouraged all nationalist-minded and patriotic
and development of science, culture and public health services. intellectuals to stand closer to the people and strive to further
Intellectuals’ ideological remoulding was “an important condi¬ take the stand of the proletariat. Teachers participating in the
tion for the completion of democratic reforms in all fields and study sessions felt greatly enlightened and inspired. Through
the gradual industrialization of our country.”16 In the initial hearing reports and studying documents, they reviewed their
period after the founding of New China, the greater section of thinking and conducted criticism and self-criticism. The Party
intellectuals exhibited soaring patriotic fervour, most of the ac¬ summed up this study experience and disseminated it among
complished refused to flee with the Kuomintang and instead teachers of the nation’s universities, colleges and secondary tech¬
remained in the mainland to greet liberation. The return home of nical schools, gradually spreading it to intellectuals in various
large numbers of famous intelligentsia, including Li Siguang and circles, forming an ideological remoulding movement among
Lao She, to participate in national construction was clear proof intellectuals nationwide. The movement came to a basic conclu¬
of this. Intellectuals were enthusiastic about study and desired to sion in the autumn of 1952. A total of 91 percent of the teaching
understand the new society, the Chinese Communist Party and staff of higher education, 80 percent of university students and
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. The Party exten¬ 75 percent of middle school teachers participated in these activi¬
sively organized study for them of basic Marxism and the Party’s ties. Their results on the whole were positive. Nevertheless, the
principles and policies. It also arranged for them to take part in study movement had some shortcomings, mainly in making dis¬
or visit mass movements, including the struggle to resist U.S. tinctions between right and wrong on the grounds of ideological
 SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 459
458 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE Q>c

Marxism was a method for intellectuals to educate and remould

criticism. For example, in learning from the Soviet Union, some
units demanded that certain biological theories of the Soviet themselves. The two criticisms played a very good role in studyin8
Ind publicizing historical and dialectical materialism and so had
Union be recognized as “proletarian,” and others of Western
scientists be criticized as “bourgeois.” These matters were handled
their positive aspect. However, the ideological and academic ques¬
very crudely, with some units adopting mass struggle means and tions they posed were complicated, belonging to the intellectual
some people were offended. In the process of the movement, the world Use of the criticism movement to solve them was anover-
Party took opportune measures to correct the shortcomings, and simplification and one-sided, which made debate in academic fields
issued a circular to various work units calling their attention to difficult. The two criticisms turned academic and cultural ques
prevention of such shortcomings. Most intellectuals felt that they tions into political struggles which they tended to intensify, so they
had gained something. Through study they had overcome old also had their negative aspect. In 1955, another movement was
ideas and accepted new ones, had established the viewpoint launched to criticize H u Feng’s literary and art theory . H u Feng was
of serving the people, knowing their way ahead and gaining a progressive literary and art critic who had long participated in the
strength. Left-wing literature and art movement. Different opinions and
In 1951, criticism of the film The Life of Wu Xun was criticisms in progressive literary and artistic circles had circu a cd
launched in newspapers and magazines. Wu Xun, eulogized by about his theories. A severe criticism was directed against h
the new movie, became famous for developing school education 300 000-word letter containing his ideas on the question of litera¬
during the late Qing Dynasty by begging, and was praised as a ture and art presented by Hu Feng to the Party Central Committee.
“perpetually strange beggar” by imperial rulers. Discussion and Very soon the criticism was transformed into exposure and suppre
criticism of this film not only raised the question of how should sion of the “Hu Feng counter-revolutionary clique. Thus an ldeo
a historical figure like Wu Xun be evaluated, but extended to the logical debate in the literary and art field was turned into a political
question of how to look upon contemporary Chinese history and struggle; H u Feng and a group of literary and art workers associated
the road of Chinese revolution. The criticism became part of the with him, including both Party members and non-Party progres¬
movement of intellectual ideological remoulding. In 1954, start¬ sive writers, were groundlessly labelled as a ‘‘counter-revolutionary
ing from giving his support to critical articles by two youths on clique,” the target of the struggle. It had made no distinction be¬
research on A Dream of Red Mansions, Mao Zedong launched and tween friends and enemies and confused the two different types of
contradictions-contradictions between the enemy and ourselves
led an extensive attack on the bourgeois idealism of the Hu Shi
school. Hu Shi was the most influential representative of the and contradictions among the people, creating a major case ot
bourgeoisie in ideological and cultural fields after the May 4th injustice in ideological and cultural fields after the founding of New
Movement. The issues raised not only concerned how to appraise
and study A Dream of Red Mansions, a famous classic Chinese ^In^March 1955, the Party Central Committee released the
novel. They also concerned the liquidation and criticism of the Instruction on Publicizing Materialism and Criticizing Bourgeois
most influential bourgeois academic school after the May 4th Idealism. It emphasized that in order to realize China s socialist
Movement in the fields of philosophy, literature, history, sociol¬ construction and transformation, the fundamental task of the
ogy, politics and ideology. In these two attacks launched by the Party in ideological work was to publicize matenatem and oppose
Party, the questions raised were important and the work carried idealism, so that cadres and the masses would be liberated from
out was essential. Launching criticism and discussions in combi¬ the influence of bourgeois ideology and raise their socialist con
nation with practical examples for study and application of sciousness. Fulfilment of this task required long-term efforts.
 CHAPTER six FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 46!
460 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

With regard to the correct unfolding of academic criticism placed high on the Party’s agenda.
P m January 1953, in compliance with the proposal oi the
and discussion, the instruction stipulated a series of principles.
fentral Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Centra
Among them were “reasoned and realistic academic criticism and
People’s Government Council adopted a resolution on convening
discussion.” “Criticism and discussion should lake research work
local people’s congresses elected at various levels, and, on this
as the basis. Simplistic and rough altitudes should be opposed.
basis holding the National People’s Congress. After more than a
Academic controversy should be solved through free discussion,
year's intense work, the 1st Sesston of the 1st NPC was held tn
with imposition of administrative orders opposed. Those criti¬
cized should be allowed to make counter-criticism, with the latter Reiiing in September 1954. , r. .
The primary task of the session was to formulate the first
not suppressed. The few people holding different opinions should
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, which is the
be allowed to reserve them, the principle that the minority should
state’s basic law, Mao Zedong delivered an ebuhient opening
be subordinated to the majority not to apply in this regard.”
speech entitled “Strive to Build a Great Socialist Country. L1"
During criticism, “We should adhere to the Party’s united front
Shaoqi made the Report on the Draft Constitution of the People s
policy and the policy of uniting and remoulding intellec¬
Republic of China on behalf of the Constitution Drafting Com¬
tuals.... We should draw distinction between political counter¬
mittee, The session adopted the Constitution of the Peoples
revolutionaries and those who err in academic ideas.” In dealing
Republic of China, an encapsulation of the historical experience
with the latter, “we should ensure they can continue to carry out
gained in the Chinese people’s heroic struggle for the founding of
research useful to society, enjoy respect and give play to their
New China over a century and more, as well as a summary of
special skills that benefit society and that they can pass on their
new historical experience gained since the estabhshment oi the
skills to youth. At the same time, we should encourage them to
People’s Republic of China. The session affirmed the road trav¬
take an active part in academic criticism and discussion and
ersed by the Chinese Communist Parly in leading the Chinese
remould themselves.” These stipulations were devised on the basis
people in the new democratic revolution and established in legal
of summing up experience and lessons while studying a situation
form the Party’s general line for the transitional Penod as
and problems before carrying out academic criticism and discus¬
general tasks for the entire Chinese people. The Constitut on
sions. They were aimed at correcting and preventing the appear¬
clearly stipulated: “The People’s Republic of China is a peop e s
ance of deviations in academic criticism and discussions so these
democratic state led by the working class and based on he
would develop along the correct path. They laid the initial
alliance of workers and peasants.... All power in the Peoples
groundwork for the presentation for the Party’s subsequent policy
Republic of China belongs to the people The organs through
of “letting a hundred schools of thought contend.” However, with
which the people exercise power are the National People Con
the launching of the movement to expose and struggle against the
gress and the local people’s congresses.... The National People s
“Hu Feng counter-revolutionary clique,” implementation of these
Congress, the local people’s congresses and other organs of s ate
stipulations was seriously obstructed and neglected.
practise democratic centralism.” Thus the basic political system
of our state was established. The Constitution explicitly stated,
The Formulation of the First Constitution of the PRC “The People’s Republic of China, by relying on the organs of state
and social forces, and by means of socialist industrialization and
Along with the beginning of large-scale national economic
transformation, ensures the gradual abolition of systems of ex¬
construction, the strengthening of various forms of political con¬
ploitation and the building of a socialist society. This set the
struction and further stimulation of public enthusiasm were
 pTER SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 463
462 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE cpc
a , i events and important arrangement of personnel, and to
orientation and way for the nation’s transition to socialism. The tiona, - the development of the cause ot socialism. The
Constitution also prescribed the fundamental rights and duties of ■i0int n elected Mao Zedong as honorary chairman, Zhou E at
citizens. In short, it embodied two cardinal principles of people’s session elected tviao ^ * Ling and ]4 others as vice-

democracy and socialism, recorded the victories of the protracted « Ch^ The contfhued existence of the People's Political Con-
struggle of the Chinese people and pointed out the correct road chairmen-T conformed with the stipulation of the Con-
for their continued struggle. that The people's democratic united front will continue
In line with the Constitution, the session voted for state lead¬ S v its part ” and embodied the system of mult,-party co¬
ers. Mao Zedong was elected chairman of the People’s Republic operation and political consultation under the leadership of the
of China; Zhu De, vice-chairman; Liu Shaoqi, chairman of the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, while
Soong Ching Ling and 12 others became vice-chairmen. Zhou
Enlai was decided on as premier after being nominated by Mao
Zedong. Following this, the National People’s Congress has been
the highest organ of state power of the People’s Republic of China Taws relating upstate organs were reformulated at the 1st Session
and the State Council, originating from the National People’s nf the 1st NPC These included the Organic Laws of the NPC
Congress and being the highest administrative organ of the state,
^Council, People’s
that is, the Central People’s Government.
In accordance with the principles prescribed by the Constitu¬ governing Criminal^-

tion, multi-faceted construction was carried out in the political

field, w'ith the main ones as follows:
(I) The People’s Political Consultative Conference continued
to exert its role.
With the convening of the National People’s Congress, the
CPPCC no longer had to act on its behalf. In December 1954 the
CPPCC held the 1st Session of the 2nd National Committee,
£
irnmBs—
guaranteeing sTg—nt
which discussed and adopted the statutes of the CPPCC. It clearly
pointed out that a People’s Political Consultative Conference was
still necessary as a people’s democratic united front organization
to unite various ethnic groups of the country, democratic classes,
democratic parties, people’s organizations, overseas Chinese and ££•*£, totalled over 35 or about ^rcen, of
other patriotic democratic personages. Its tasks were, under the the nation’s total WulattonTh^y ^ ^ During ,he long
leadership of the Communist Party of China, to continue to
consolidate and develop the people’s democratic united front, and area, “Veng p h Yarious ethnic groups had gradual-
through the unity of various democratic parties and people’s
organizations to more extensively unite the entire populace and
report the masses’ opinions and suggestions to relevant state
organs, to conduct consultations on major domestic and interna-
— a. «*»“
 LrrEK SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 465
464 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE Q>c
, -nlia Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Uygur Autono-
dominated. People of various ethnic groups in China had com¬ ^ Region, 27 autonomous prefectures and 43 autonomous
monly suffered from imperialist aggression. Around the time of "nunties Bv 1958, the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and
the founding of New China, imperialist powers still carried out N^naxia Hui Autonomous Region had been established. The
Cn
various scheming activities among some minority nationalities S? Autonomous Region, for which the Preparatory Committee
instigating so-called “national independence” in a vain attempt to
cet un in 1956, was formally established in 1165.
split China up. Proceeding from this reality and in accord with (IV) Revolutionization, Regularization and Modernization of
its consistent stand of ethnic equality and unity, the Party decid¬
ed that regional national autonomy would form the basic policy '^The Constitution stipulated: “The armed forces of the People's
for solving China’s nationality question. In other words, regional Republic of China belong lo the people. Their tasks arel° defend
national autonomy was introduced in regions where minority I |L achievements of the people’s revolution and national co
nationalities lived in compact communities, within the unified struction and defend the state’s sovereignty, territorial integrity
big family of the motherland. Under the unified leadership of the
and security” If countries openly hostile to the PRC engage 1
Central People’s Government, national autonomous regions and arms expansion and war preparations and pose a threat to China s
autonomous organizations at different levels were established in security, the nation cannot go without powerful, modern iiationa
accordance with the sizes of population and regions inhabited by
defence forces. Therefore China had to build up land, air
ethnic groups. This policy made it possible to ensure the unifica¬ naval forces strong enough to defend China’s territorial inlegn y
tion of the motherland and the unity of all nationalities in order and defend air and sea territory against ‘^on. During the
to jointly resist imperialist aggression plus develop economic and
period of peaceful construction, China s powerful P^A^tchhad
cultural construction. It also ensured the equal status of all Crtempered m the People's War of Liberation and the War to
nationalities and satisfied the desire of minority peoples to be¬
Resist U S Aggression and Aid Korea, gained new achievements
come masters of their own affairs. This was an important creation
hi its advance along the road to revolutionization, standardiza
made by the Party in solving China’s national problem in the
tion and modernization.
light of Chinese history and reality and by applying Marxist-
Leninist theory to national problems. This Party proposition had
Party Building
been accepted by the Common Programme in the early period
after the founding of New China. In accordance with the princi¬ Strengthening the building of the Party and Party unity was
pled stipulations of the Common Programme on national policy, the basic condition for fulfilling the tasks of industrializationi and
and after summing up the experience gained since the establish¬ [ socialist transformation set down in the Party’s general line tor
ment of the inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the first nation¬
al autonomous government at the provincial level founded in * Ate “ n^of New China, the Party paid great alien-
May 1947, the Central People’s Government, in August 1952, tion to the construction of Party organization when it was n
promulgated the Outline for the Implementation of Regional Dower In 1950, as some within the Party had become afroga“
National Autonomy in the People’s Republic of China. The and conceited having been heralded as heroes and given the st\
Constitution stipulated further measures on regional national of bureaucracy and commandism under the nationw.de victory

autonomy and the political, economic and cultural construction for the revolution, the Party Central Committee issued a senes ol
for various minority nationalities in addition to the Common instructions concerning building up of the Party. A campaign was
Programme. By September 1956, China had set up the Inner
 468 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPc CHAPTER SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 469

iat of the Party Central Committee held separate forums on the Irussion. A strongly united Party, a Party taking united action
question of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi, continuing to expose and dnd working hard for the correct goal it had set formed the most
verify the facts about their scheming. At the same time it awaited "nortant guarantee for the smooth progress of various work m
their awakening, education was being conducted. Gao Gang, the early period after the founding of New China.
however, rejected Party education, and finally alienated himself
trom the Party and the people by his shameful suicide. In March Diplomatic Work
1955, a resolution on expelling Gao Gang and Rao Shushi from
the Party and removing them from all their posts was adopted at Tn order to create favourable international conditions for
the National Party Representative Conference. In order to streng¬ planned economic construction, the Party called for various
then supervision over Party members, particularly high-ranking activities and struggles in the diplomatic Held....
Party cadres, the National Party Representative Conference de¬ The end of the Korean War saw some easing of tension in
cided to set up central and local supervisory committees at Asia The United States, however, not only did not wish to
various levels, and elected the central supervisory committee with withdraw its troops from Korea for the peaceful solution ot
Dong Biwu as its secretary. the Korean question, but kept its fleet in the laiwan Straits
The anti-Gao Gang and anti-Rao Shushi struggle was carried intervening in China’s internal affairs. Moreover, it attempted
out under the principle of “learning from past mistakes to avoid to proceed from Indochina to pose a military threat against
future ones and curing sickness to save the patient,” with the China and maintain the tense international situation. This ran
emphasis on drawing on ideological and political lessons, thereby counter to the wishes of most countries and people around the
educating the whole Party, and in particular high-ranking Party world, particularly those in Asia and Africa so was unpopular
cadres. This was a comparatively successful and healthy inner- The Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, which had the grea
Party struggle carried out after the Chinese Communist Part> support of China, waged resolute struggle against the French
wielded power over the whole country. colonial aggressor troops and won decisive victory in 1954. In
Generally speaking, in the years after the founding of New April 1954, prompted by the Soviet Union, a conference on
China, the mental outlook of all Party members was relatively the Korean question and the Indochina issue was held m
good. They maintained the styles of hard work and close ties with Geneva, attended by foreign ministers ot China, the Soviet
the masses which were developed during the revolutionary war Union, the United States, Britain, France and related countries.
years. The Party paid close attention to educating Party members This important conference was one which the People s Republic
and the struggle to expel degenerates from Party ranks. The Party- of China attended for the first time in the status and capacity
Central Committee continued to keep up, under the condition of as one of the five major powers to discuss international issues.
wielding political power over the whole country, the strong unity During the conference, the Chinese delegation led by Zhou
formed during the Yanan rectification campaign and following Enlai was active diplomatically. Due to U.S. obstruction, the
the Seventh Party Congress. Careerists Gao Gang and Rao Shushi conference failed to reach an agreement on the political solu¬
were expelled from the Party and few in leading Party levels were tion of the Korean issue, but reached one on restoration of
implicated. As a result, Party unity, far from being harmed, was peace in Indochina. France withdrew its troops from the three
strengthened. Differences in policies and work at the Party lead¬ countries of Indochina, recognized their national rights, thus
ership could be ironed out and co-ordination of opinions and putting an end to the colonial war France had waged for many
unity of understanding achieved through normal inner-Party years in this region.
470 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER six FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 471

In order to develop relations with newly emerging independent

situation in the Taiwan area. The declaration led to the ambaf f
countries, especially neighbouring nations, in December 1953, the dorial talks between China and the United States, which began in
Chinese government in discussions with India on relations of the
two countries in the Tibet region, first proposed the Five Princi¬ AUfhese1fruitful diplomatic activities promoted relaxation of the
ples of Peaceful Coexistence. These included mutual respect for tense international situation and expansion of China’s ties with
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non¬ the world. They demonstrated China’s important role in interna¬
interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual tional affairs and created the favourable external environment
benefit, and peaceful coexistence. They won favour with the for China’s peaceful construction.
Indian side. In June 1954, Zhou Enlai visited India and Burma
on invitation. He issued joint statements, respectively, with the
Prime Ministers of the two countries. There was unanimous VII. SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF
agreement that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
should be the basis guiding relations and they were proposed as
AGRICULTURE, HANDICRAFT AND
the norm for handling international relations, a move with exten¬ CAPITALIST INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE
sive and far-reaching significance.
With national liberation movements surging in Asia and Afri¬ Along with the implementation of the First Five-Year Plan
ca, in April 1955, heads of government from 29 Asian and and start of socialist industrialization, and publicity about the
African countries with similar historical backgrounds held a general line for the transitional period, the systematic socialist
conference in Bandung, Indonesia, to discuss questions of com¬ transformation of agriculture, handicraft and capitalist industry
mon concern, including the defence of peace, struggle tor na¬ and commerce also took off.
tional independence and national economic development. The
Chinese delegation headed by Zhou Enlai attended the confer¬ Steady Progress of Agricultural Cooperative Movement
ence. In the face of imperialist sabotage of the conference plus
In 1953, the Party adopted, in succession, two resolutions on
complex differences among the participating countries, Zhou
the agricultural cooperative movement. The first was the Resolu¬
Enlai unequivocally put forward the policy of “seeking common
tion of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
ground while reserving differences.” He called upon various
on Mutual-Aid and Cooperation in Agricultural Production
nations to put aside differences while strengthening unity and
published in the spring of 1953. The second was the Resolution
cooperation in the struggle against colonialism for the common
of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on
interest and thus brought the conference to a successful conclu¬
Developing Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives, published at
sion. The conference adopted a final communique, putting for¬
the end of 1953. The mutual-aid and cooperative movement in
ward ten principles for promoting world peace and cooperation.
China’s rural areas made steady progress under the guidance oi
These' actually embodied and extended the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence. During the conference, the Chinese delega¬ these two resolutions. .. . .. Do
The first resolution originated as a draft within the y
tion established contacts with participating countries. It also
in December 1951. It was brought up against a backdrop ot
declared that the Chinese people did not want to go to war with
different views on the nature and future of the labour mutual-
the United States and that China was willing to discuss with the aid organizations which had undergone great development »
United States matters concerning the relaxation of the tense old liberated areas of the countryside. Individual peasants ww
 cHApTBR SIX FOUNDING OF PRC. AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 473
472 A CONCISE HISTORY OF TIIF. CPC
for a long period of time, so its popularity with peasants was
to “get organized” before they could eliminate poverty and unavoidable. The Party understood the traits of the peasants as
attain prosperity. The long-term goal of such organization was orivate property owners and stated that their fervour for the
collectivization and socialization. The Party consistently advo¬ individual sector of the economy must not be neglected and
cated these, with no opinion to the contrary. Differences lay rudely dampened. It adhered to the policy of firmly uniting with
in what steps should be taken. In old liberated rural areas, middle income peasants and permitting development of rich
along with restoration and growth of the economy, there was peasants. The Party had invariably maintained it necessary to
laxity in private-based mutual-aid organizations and spon¬ encourage organization and develop peasant enthusiasm for
taneous development towards rich peasants. Faced by this mutual-aid labour in order to overcome difficulties that lay in
situation, some comrades proposed guiding these mutual-aid decentralized management, help poverty-stricken peasants in¬
organizations to a more advanced level. They were then mainly crease production and embark on the road to ample food and
perennial mutual-aid teams with a small number of coopera¬ clothing; and, to enable the country to get more food and raw-
tives pooling land. Measures which would raise public accumu¬ materials, it is necessary to encourage the peasants to “get organ¬
lation of mutual-aid teams and expand the percentage of ized,” to develop the peasants’ enthusiasm for labour mutual aid.
cooperatives’ distribution according to work should be adopted This mutual-aid labour was based on the individual sector ol the
to gradually overcome self initiative by peasants, slowly shak¬ economy (peasant private property). Its future development en¬
ing, weakening and even negating the private foundation of tailed agricultural collectivization and socialist transformation.
mutual-aid team organization. Some comrades opposed these The draft demanded that labour mutual-aid teams be developed
views, thinking the main issue in consolidation of mutual-aid in a guided way and on a large scale across the country, and that
teams was to substantiate their production contents, and not in areas where the masses had rich experience in mutual aid and
shake their private foundation. This latter task and collectivi¬ where the leadership backbone force was strong, agricultural
zation of agriculture were future tasks, requiring great devel¬ producers’ cooperatives formed by pooling ot land as shares
opment of state industry and massive use of agricultural ma¬ should be selectively developed. In addition, the draft also stated
chinery. Differences of opinions also found expression among that in places with the full agreement of the peasants and the
leaders of the central authorities. The Secretariat of the Central availability of machinery, it was all right to trial-establish a few
Committee carried out conscientious discussion of differences, socialist collective farms. The resolution draft analysed the two
took the opinions of various parties into consideration and tendencies towards the question of agricultural mutual aid and
reached a common understanding. On this basis, the CPC cooperation. One was a negative attitude which failed to see this
Central Committee held the first conference on agricultural was the way by which the Party guided the peasants to advance
mutual-aid and cooperation in September 1951. The above- gradually from the individual peasant economy to a large-scale
mentioned resolution draft resulted. collective mechanized economy, denying that various existing
The guiding thought which served as the basic starting point agricultural producers’ cooperatives were a form of transition to
of the draft was that of paying attention to the two types of socialist agriculture. The second was the impetuous attitude,
initiatives. The production enthusiasm of the Chinese peasants adopted by those who ignored essential conditions, such as volun¬
roused on the basis of agrarian reform was expressed in two areas. tary participation by peasant and economic preparation. Such
One was enthusiasm for the individual economy and the other people prematurely and unduly tried to rescind or restrict the
was enthusiasm for labour mutual-aid. Under Chinese economic private property of peasants who joined cooperatives, thinking
conditions, a substantial individual peasant economy would exist
474 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 475

that socialism could be fully accomplished in the countryside in ttThe r0ad to the gradual realization of the socialist transforma-
one go. The Party criticized these two extreme tendencies and ™ of agriculture as pointed out by the Party leads from tem-
demanded that agricultural mutual aid and cooperation be car¬ * arv mutual-aid teams of simple and common labour to peren-
ried out as a major matter in accordance with the necessity and mutual-aid teams with a small amount of public property
possibility of production development. It was to be on the guiding aiined through division of work on the basis ol common labour,
principle of vigorous development and steady progress and the ft then moves on to agricultural producers’ cooperatives with
tenet of voluntary participation and mutual benefit, adopting the nnoled land as shares, unified management and some public
method of demonstrations of models and gradual popularization. nrooerty, and then to advanced agricultural producers coopera¬
After more than a year of trials, the Party believed that practice tives (ie collective farms) under collective public ownership,
proved the correctness of the guiding principle set by the resolu¬ which is socialism in its full sense. This road of development from
tion draft, which was made public as a formal resolution in the socialist embryo to greater socialist factors to full-blown socialist
spring of 1953. When it was published, the term “mechanization cooperatives, is a path charted by our Party for the gradual

conditions” required for the trial operation of socialist collective realization of the socialist transformation of agriculture. I he
farms was changed into “suitable economic conditions.” This resolution served to turn more attention to the establishment ot
showed that the Party’s view on the use of machinery as a primary agricultural producers’ cooperatives, confirming that
prerequisite for operation of advanced cooperatives had changed these had demonstrated their superiority during their trial oper¬
somewhat. ation and in the process of their early development. This proved
In 1953, after the Party’s general line for the transitional they were suitable forms for guiding the peasants to effect tran¬
period was published, the Resolution of the CPC Central Com¬ sition to advanced cooperatives that were socialist m a fully real
mittee on Developing Agricultural Producers’ Cooperatives was sense. They thus increasingly became an important link in the
adopted and published in December alongside the CPC Central Party’s lead to the further advance of the mutual aid and coop¬
Committee’s major decision on the implementation of state mo¬ erative movement. . . .
nopoly on the purchase and marketing of grain during the emer¬ Under the guidance of the two resolutions, the agricultural
gence of a tense situation in the food market. The resolution cooperative movement had made great progress and was basically
sound during this period. Some spontaneous deviations appeared
stressed that serious contradictions had been exposed with in¬
creasing clarity between the individual agricultural economy and momentarily in 1953 but were quickly corrected. The Party
the growing needs for socialist industrialization. In order to Central Committee set up a rural work department with Deng
Zihui as its head, which followed the development ol and gave
further raise agricultural productive forces and gradually over¬
come the disparity between agriculture and industrial develop¬ concrete guidance to the movement. While actively promoting
mutual aid and cooperation, the Party particularly stressed that
ment, the most fundamental task of the Party in its rural work
agricultural production was the overriding work in rural areas,
was to use the easily comprehensible principles and methods
while other kinds of work were conducted around and served
acceptable to peasants to educate and urge them to become
organized and slowly carry out the socialist transformation of agricultural production. The fundamental criterion for judging
agriculture. The resolution placed the hope for increased agricul¬ whether or not mutual aid and cooperation was successful was

tural production and common prosperity on the cooperative increase in production. According to statistics releasedl at the end
of 1954 the number of mutual-aid teams had increased from over
movement. After summing up China’s experience gained in mu¬
tual aid and cooperative movement, the resolution pointed out: 4 million at the end of 1951 to nearly 10 million, that of primary
476 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC „BR SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOC.AL.SM 477
chapter
cooperatives from over 300 in 1951 to over 14,000 in 1953 and Planned Purchases and Supply of Grain
then 100,000 in the autumn of 1954, to 480,000 at the end of 1954.
t rvtober 1953, the Central Committee made a decision on
Peasant households participating in mutual-aid teams and coop¬
Planned purchase and supply of grain (state monopoly on the
eratives jumped from 21 million in late 1951 to 70 million at the
frehase and marketing of grain). Its implementation gave a
end of 1954. Their percentage of the nation’s total farm house¬
u c to both agricultural mutual-aid and cooperation, and boost-
holds increased from 19.2 percent to 60.3 percent. Many statisti¬
T he ost acism and transformation of private grain traders,
cal materials available at that time showed that over 80 per¬
cent of cooperatives increased production and income. General¬
ly speaking, mutual-aid teams did better than individual farming,
$ferrSK££s-=:s
and cooperatives excelled mutual-aid teams. That was why the
mutual-aid and cooperative movement was welcomed by the
broad masses of the poor peasants who were eager to join them.
In many villages in the old liberated areas, 60-70 percent and
even 80 percent of peasant households joined cooperatives in erain The small peasant economy had only nmiteu
what had become a mass movement.
In the spring of 1955, the number of primary cooperatives had
grown to 670,000 nationwide. The CPC Central Committee decid¬
ed to consolidate the agricultural producers’ cooperatives. This
was because, during the process of major development of cooper¬ .n. r.i" —ifp-;;: «
atives, rough work was unavoidable in new cooperatives. In were rnmoant giving rise to the gram problem. In the first year
addition, in 1954 the state purchased 3.5 billion kg of grain above of the start of’large-scale planned economic “nstruc“°nJ 3 ““
quota, causing complaints from peasants. Phenomena that de¬ situation emerged in the purchase and SUPP ^ ofhf31"
served serious attention, such as abnormal slaughter of pigs and the sales volume of grain needed to be supplied by the state snot
up by 1 l ucent over the previous year. It was apparently ha d
cattle, and neglect of collection of manure and preparations for
ploughing and sowing, had appeared in some places. The princi¬ to fulfil the state’s grain purchase planHthat,yefbe^o appea
of stock in some areas. Grain market disorders tegan to appear
ples for consolidation were: In view ot conditions in difiereni
in small cities, towns and disaster-stricken areastHwen m Bejrng
areas, either temporarily cease development, go all out to consol¬
and Tianiin there were worries about flour supplies. On ueptem
idate or appropriately reduce numbers and scale or continue
bef 4 some traders in Beijing bought all the grain available on
promotion in the course of consolidation. This was known as
the marke'within two hours. People worried that the evil wind
“cessation, contraction and development." After initial consolida¬
of price hikes several times a day would blow again. Confronting
tion on this basis, the number of the nation’s cooperatives had these* severe^ circumstances, the Party needed to prudently eval¬
been cut by 20,000, and initially consolidated at 650,000. limely
uate the situation and properly handle the relations 1^ Estate
steps were taken to readjust the cooperative movement, thus state and peasants (gram-surplus households), betwem.the state
maintaining the pattern of steady advance, characterized by and commodity grain consumers (workers, city dwtlUers and
development, consolidation, renewed development and renewed erain-short households in the rural areas), between the state an
consolidation. in traders and between the central and local govern-
 CHA1TER SK FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 479

478 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THF. CPC CH i needs for grain. At that time, this was the correct, inevitable
tr‘®L Later, in order to alleviate the tension caused by excessive
ments. Of these relations, the first two were difficult to tackle,
cl*° nnrehases in 1954, the Party reduced amounts of grain
with the first in particular the most challenging. Chen Yun, then
^chased and adopted the fixed quota system for production
in charge of financial and economic work at the central level,
Purc, 1 murketine This dispelled certain complaints ot the
said, “I am now carrying a load of explosives, with black dyna¬ S K or »« monopoly
mite in the front end and yellow in the rear. If we fail to obtain
grain, the entire market will fluctuate; if we adopt the method of
•'SST^r.Iho'sntom of state monopoly on purchase and
compulsory grain purchase by the state, the peasants will prob¬
markedng of grain required evaluation of the surplus gram of
ably oppose us. We choose between the two, but both pose
dangers. The present problem is how to ensure obtaining grain. If
our methods prove impracticable and fall through, I can say with
certainty, the grain market is sure to become chaotic. This is no
joke.”17
toid ” The fundamental solution to the grajn^ortage waS w
After carefully considering and weighing the eight possible
increase grain production, but the potential for doing so by
measures, the central authorities decided the only basic alterna¬
relying on the small peasant economy was very ‘ow- L^g^sca
tive was to implement compulsory purchases in rural areas,
institute a ration system in cities and exercise strict control over mechanization of agriculture was the distanl* the
development At this time, reliance had to bt placed on t
private businesses. This was a long-term plan of major impor¬
cooperative movement with this as the bas^ for coiiducting
tance. As long as there was no marked increase in agricultural
appropriate technical transformation. All these factors urged the
production, this was the road to be invariably followed. On the
Party to call for energetic development ot agricultural producers
evening of National Day, the Party Central Committee agreed to
cooperatives. Mutuaf aid and cooperation as well as compu^ory
this important decision at the conference room behind the Tian¬
grain purchase were the two strategic measures for the remould
anmen rostrum. Since implementation of the state monopoly on
ing of peasants; they related to and promoted each other.
the purchase and marketing of grain affected the lives of almost
In instituting the system of state monopoly over grain purchase
the entire urban and rural population, after the resolution was
anSSi. was necessary to decree that no Pnvate trader
taken, the Party Central Committee called on all Party members
were allowed to engage in free dealing in grain. The> could
and cadres at various levels to go down to grassroots units and
serve asgrain sales agents for the state. Private factories ooud
adopt this work as an extremely urgent economic and political
only nrocess products entrusted by state grain departments. 1 h y
task. The Party believed it could win the support of the peasants
col not autonomously buy raw materials or sell their f.mshed
for this policy and this was borne out by facts. It would do so by
products This was the meaning behind transformation o priv<
relying on close ties established between the Party and the peas¬
fn" and commerce for the enure gi*in trade^ mptoenU-
ants since the agrarian reform, strengthening general ideological
tion of state monopoly on gram purchase and marketing was
work and education on the general line through outlining the
followed by state monopoly purchase of oil-bearing crops and
future of socialism, and by giving full consideration to the
stale monopoly sales of edible oil. In 1954, purchase of cotton was
rational interests of peasants in planned grain purchases. Imple¬
monopolized by the state and cotton cloth was bought and sold
mentation of the state monopoly on the purchase and marketing
exclusively by the state. These all constituted important steps
of grain initially eased the strain on the supply of grain, main¬
tained the stability of market prices and moderately met indus-
480 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC cHAPTER six FOUNDING OK PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 481

taken to promote the socialist transformation of private industry

and commerce. eleThentCPC Central Committee attached great importance to
findings report. In June, the Party Central Committee
Steady Advance of Socialist Transformation of Private ' ve held enlarged meetings of the Political Bureau to discuss
Industry and Commerce Tand set down the policy for transforming capitalist industry
Ihrough state capitalism. Later, it decided no. to adopt the
In the course of presentation and formation of the general line, niirp ostracization of private commerce but enforce
Li Weihan, head of the United Front Work Department of the stale'capitalist policy instead. Thus, the Party’s policy towards
CPC Central Committee, led an investigative group to Wuhan, ^anitiilist industry and commerce was summed up as utiUza
Nanjing and Shanghai in the spring of 1953 to survey and sum SSS and transformation.” The process of using and
up the Party’s experience in implementation of the policy to use restricting capitalism would also transform it. The change
and restrict capitalist industry and commerce. Thereafter, the feferred to here did not mean final transformation through
department submitted a findings report on Questions Concerning abolishing capitaUst private ownership of the means of produ
Public-Private Relations in Capitalist Industry. lion and turning such bodies thus run into socialist enterp^
After three years of rehabilitation of the national economy, the It meant the gradual turning of capitalist companies into state
private capitalist economy had undergone profound reorganiza¬ capitalist enterprises under the condition o &
tion and transformation. Most private enterprises had established limited and incomplete private ownership, in the process o
contact and cooperation with the socialist economy through var¬ implementing due consideration to pubUe and P^me mteres^
ious forms and had, to different degrees, changed from the and benefiting both labour and capital. The Party estimateu
relationship of production characteristic of capitalist enterprises. that it would take three to five more years to basically complete
They were no longer purely private capitalist in nature, but the task of guiding private industry and commerce onto th
instead, state capitalist enterprises under the management of the Mth of state capitalism. The final transformation would need
people’s government, having links with the socialist economy and a time span of three five-year plans. In September, while
accepting worker supervision. The development of private indus¬ talking with some representatives of democratic parties an
try from a primary state capitalist form to an advanced state industrial and commercial circles, Mao Zedong said, More
capitalist form (the former entailed state purchase and marketing than three years of experience have shown it already certai
monopoly of private firm products and placing of state orders
with private enterprises while the latter involved joint state-
private operation) was, in fact, a gradual transformation .of
arsris ss
production relations and gradual advance to socialism. Therefore,
in his report to the Party Central Committee, Li Weihan pointed
to
accomplishing the task of socialist transition.
5:5
, ^
out: State capitalism “is the main form of using and restricting Adoption of the policy of using, restricting and transtormmg
capitalist industry, the main form for us to gradually bring capitalist industry and commerce and the introduction of th
capitalist industry onto the path of state planning and the main
form for transformation of capitalist industry and its gradual
transition to socialism.” It was also a principal link in united front
work with the bourgeoisie and in the “transformation of capitalist
 ER SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 483
482 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

nA expansion and readjusted enterprises. As a result production

capitalist forms based mainly on placement of state orders with
if joS venture enterprises developed rapidly, w.th increased
private enterprises. In January 1954, the State Finance and
rnfits Take per-capita labour productivity, for example. Stand-
Economic Commission put forward the Opinion on Systematical¬
ly Transforming Capitalist Enterprises Employing Ten Workers C at ioo in 1950, it increased to 314 in 1955 in joint publ.c-
or More Basically Into Joint Public-Private Enterprises. In 1954, nrivate industry, a three-fold increase, while it was 158 in private
China began to switch to priority development of state capitalism, industry in the same period, an increase of over 50 Percent. The
the advanced form of public-private operation. Placing state superiority of joint public-private operation was marked. The
orders with private enterprises mainly referred to state-capitalist dividend distributed to private shareholders in joint public-
cooperation outside enterprises. Public-private operation entailed nrivate factories mostly far exceeded the profits gained during the
cooperation between the socialist sector and the capitalist sector Sriod of private operation. These circumstances prompted more
inside enterprises. The public side had considerable equity rights, capitalists to demand joint public-private operation, thus creating
conducting public and private joint management of businesses a favourable situation for the socialist transformation of industry
with the public representative in the leading position. In these two
forms of state capitalism, profits were distributed according to “jo^t" public-private operation generally began with large
state income tax, enterprise public accumulation funds, work¬ enterprises. However, not many existed m the natioris capdahst
ers’ welfare funds, and capitalist dividends which accounted for industry The majority of firms were scattered and backward
roughly 25 percent. Most enterprise profits went to the state and "and medium businesses. After fairly large enterprises

workers, basically serving the national economy and the people’s introduced joint operation, the more than 120,000 medium and
smalf'bodies, which made up half the total output vatae of
livelihood. This produced varying degrees of socialism in these
enterprises. private industry, faced a difficult production position ■due to

At that time, most private enterprises were using obsolete having simple and crude machinery, complete *ork Pr°“
dures and disruption of former economic >nks. Jims“
equipment and were backward in operation. The labour produc¬
demanded joint public-private operation. In order to guarantee
tivity of the textile industry, one of the comparatively high
kev Droiects it was impossible for the state to disperse funds
development level industries for private enterprise, comprised
and assign cadres for such large numbers of ^b cnterprises^
three quarters of the state-run textile industry, and the gap was
expanding. For this reason, plus restrictions on raw materials and Under such circumstances, in December 195
Committee put forward the policy of overall planning and
the market, many private enterprises found it difficult to operate.
consideration for the interests of all concerned, making arrange
They requested the state to supply support and practice of public-
ments through relevant departments and conductmg trans or
private operation.
mation along the lines of different trades. In varioustrades*
In 1954 and 1955, great progress was achieved in the work of
big entities nurtured the small and advanced the backward.
expanding joint public-private operation. The number of joint
Small and medium enterprises were first reorganizedand iam^
public-private enterprises increased from 1,036 in 1953 to 1,746
aamated Then joint public-private operation was introduced,
in 1954, and the figure rose to 3,193 in 1955. Their output value
individual joint operation was combined .i > -organiza-
accounted for 49.6 percent of the nation’s total output for private
tion and transformation to meet the needs o trades. Ini 1955
industry (including joint ventures). After the introduction of
joint public-private operation was fully introduced in trades
joint venture enterprises, labour enthusiasm was very high since
the state sent cadres to strengthen leadership, invested in building Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin.
 ^PTEK SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 485

484 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC f npno 7il-mi and the Rural Work Department of

Acceleration and Hasty Conclusion of Socialist

Transformation
Stf Srr ^ a'conference 2*^ 9U
In the summer of 1955, a heated debate took place within the TmumcLl and autonomous regional Party committees. At
Party concerning the speed of agricultural cooperation. Prior to Z mectmg Mao Zedong delivered a report titled “On the
the discussion, the socialist transformation of agriculture, handi¬
craft industry and private industry and commerce, on the whole, fh°:Cn oTnrath“oryn ^S'^ing & J £
was proceeding steadily in a planned and systematic way. After
the debate, due to sharp criticism of Right opportunism, likened
to women with bound feet, the pace of the agricultural coopera¬
tive movement was drastically accelerated. So was the speed of
socialist transformation in other fields. nf the links between China’s agricultural cooperation and me-
In the spring of 1955, the Rural Work Department of the chamzaton, and between social reform and technical renova¬
Central Committee proposed a plan which required that by the tion also contained profound views. However, the report wa.
spring of 1956, the number of agricultural cooperatives, which designed to severely criticize the Right deviatiomsm of Deng
stood at 650,000 after consolidation, should reach one million.
This plan was approved by the Conference of the Political
Bureau of the Central Committee. Before long, Mao Zedong
returned to Beijing from an investigation tour of the south. He
made new observations and judgments of the grain situation
and the development of agricultural cooperation. He proposed
revising the plan and quickening development, increasing the and
...»
countless tabSs”-all this amounted to an erroneous Righ¬

number of agricultural cooperatives from 650,000 to 1.3 mil¬ tist guiding policy. Mao even alleged they were proceeding
lion, doubling the figure. Deng Zihui did not agree with this “from the8 stand of the bourgeoisie, the rich peasants, or
alteration. He contended that the cooperative movement should well-to-do middle peasants with their spontaneous tendencies
keep pace with industrialization and growth should not be too towards capitalism.” Thus, he exaggerated a normal inner Par y
dismite over the speed of growth for cooperation, turning it
fast, and that the cadre leadership level and the level of the
masses’ political consciousness should be raised step by step. into a two-line difference and introducing abnormality to sound
There should be no demands for undue haste. He contended inner-Party democracy formed over many years
that the development from 100,000 agricultural cooperatives in Mao Zedong’s report was relayed straight to rura y
branches Party organizations in various places re-examined con
the autumn of 1954 to 650,000 in the spring of 1955 had
servatism” and opposed “Right deviation” and rearranged the
already been quite fast. Many problems existed and the task
of consolidation was very heavy. Main efforts should be devot¬ cooperative —SW £“om-
ed to consolidating existing cooperatives and laying the foun¬
mittee^held^hc enlarged 6th Plenary Session. In line with Mao
dation for their further development. Subsequent practice
Zedong’s report On the Cooperative Transformation of Agncu
showed that Deng Zihui’s opinion was correct and conformed
with the reality. Mao Zedong, however, asserted that the
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC COPTER Six FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 487

ture, the session adopted a resolution and determined Deng Zihui euiding the movement, while with regard to actual blind devel¬
and the Rural Work Department of the Central Committee had opment that appeared in total disregard of these principles and
committed “Right opportunism,” stressing that “only through plans, the leadership not only failed to correct this, but instead
criticism of this can fundamental change be brought about in gleefully praised it. As a result, the tidal wave that speeded up
rural work.” In December, the book Socialist Upsurge in China’s the mass cooperative movement, like a seismic wave, engulted the
Countryside, compiled under Mao Zedong’s guidance, was pub¬ whole of China’s countryside. Cooperatives were suddenly accom¬
lished. He wrote the prefaces and 104 notes for the book, includ¬ plished in the space of only a few months. By the end ol 1956,
ing the summary ot concrete experience in successful running of peasant households joining the cooperatives accounted for 96.3
cooperatives. They contained many correct opinions on work in percent of the nation’s total peasant families. Of these, 87.8
rural economic, technical, cultural, educational, women’s and percent joined advanced cooperatives in only seven years, 11
youth spheres, saying, “political work is the life-blood of all years ahead of schedule.
-economic work ... to foster the socialist spirit which postulates the Pushed by the rapid development of the agricultural coopera¬
principle of integrating collective interest with individual interest tive movement, a surging tide of joint public-private operation
as the criterion for judging all words and deeds ... diligence and of capitalist industrial and commercial enterprises also rose
thrift ought to be the principle for all our economic enterprises,” throughout the country. The greatly accelerated plan drawn up
and other important expositions ol universal guiding significance. by the Party Central Committee in November 1955 still called for
However, the prefaces and some notes not only sharply criticized finishing joint public-private operation of all trade, group by
Right opportunism in the cooperative movement, but also posited group and stage by stage, in two years. However, private indus¬
that the Right conservative ideas were conducting mischief in trialists and merchants in various places, including some enter¬
many other fields of work, thus further expanding the scope of prise workers and staff members, sounded the gong and beat the
“anti-Right conservatism.” drum everyday, asking for approval for joint public-private oper¬
Under such a political atmosphere, a tidal wave of fury was ation. The government had to adopt the method of one-time
formed in the agricultural cooperative movement. Although Mao approval, all-round joint operation. This entailed first giving
Zedong, in his On the Cooperative Transformation of Agriculture, recognition to joint public-private operation, then carrying out
focused criticism on Right conservatism, he thought that the the appraisal of stocks and assets of enterprises, production ar¬
problem was not one of rash advance by that time. However, he rangements, enterprise reorganization and personnel readjust¬
insisted that socialist transformation of agriculture be accom¬ ment. On January 10, 1956, Beijing was the first to declare it had
plished in 18 years, that he would adopt the method of gradual completely realized joint public-private operation for every trade.
advance from low to high and that he would control numbers of By the end of January, over fifty large and medium-sized cities
cooperatives according to actual situations. He put forward his across the country, where capitalist industrial and commercial
estimate: By the spring ol 1958, half of peasant households would enterprises were relatively concentrated, declared one after an¬
have joined the primary cooperatives; semi-socialist transforma¬ other that they had accomplished joint public-private operation
tion would have been basically accomplished in 1960; then semi¬ in all trades. By the end of the year, 99 percent of the nation’s
socialist peasant households should gradually be developed into private industrial households and 82.2 percent of private commer¬
complete socialist ones by stages and by groups. However, due to cial households had been drawn onto the path of public-private
the political pressure formed by the severe criticism of Right joint ventures or cooperatives.
opportunism, his estimate no longer formed the principle for After the general line was put forward, the former policy oi
488 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPc
-j^TER SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 489

active leadership and steady advance was also adopted for hand¬ nitalists were no longer in charge of their formerly owned and
icraft cooperation. Organization proceeded from handicraft pro¬
managed private enterprises, but were employed as staff numbers
duction cooperative groups, handicraft supply and marketing mf en*erpriscs, with duties commensurate with their abilities.
cooperatives to handicraft production cooperatives. The steps
Thev continued to receive a fixed interest which now, however
started with supply and sales, advancing from small to big and las no longer related to the profits of the enterprises formerly
from low to high, gradually introducing socialist transformation
owned by them. They drew interest according to the checked and
and production change. The rapid development of agricultural
approved assets represented by their privately owned shares (n
cooperatives also affected the speed of handicraft cooperatives. A
wat estimated at that time that the assets owned by the nation s
demand was raised at the end of 1955 that handicraft cooperation i- K totalled 2 42 billion yuan) and to a fixed interest rate
should be basically achieved in two years. As a result of the move
ZAnnual^Tnmrest rate of 5 percent, which was slightly higher
from the past method for transformation through stages, groups
than the bank interest rate at that time). A term ot seven years
and areas for various sectors of the trades to overall cooperation
was set for receiving the fixed interest and later extended to ten
in the entire handicraft trade, by the end of 1956, over 91.7
vears Taking into account the tremendous development ot
percent of handicraft workers had joined cooperatives.
former state-owned economy, the publicly owned socialist econo-
The progress of socialist transformation between the latter half
my ScS ownership by the whole people and the collecttve
of 1955 and 1956 obviously went too fast, forming a deviation
ownership of the labouring masses, thus occupied a dominant
from real work. From the viewpoint of orientation and line,
nosition in China’s national economy. . ,
however, the socialist transformation of private agriculture,
This situation was reflected in the composition of the nauonal
handicraft and capitalist industry and commerce, ultimately con¬
income. The proportion of the national income from theaUte
formed to objective needs. Accomplishment of the transforma¬
tion was a matter of historic significance. owned sector rose from 19.1 percent in 195V°2 , e ^rcent to
1956' from the cooperative economy, it rose from 1.5 percent t
53 4 percent; from the economy under joint state-private owner¬
ship The proportion increased from 0.7 percent to 7.3 percent
VIII. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOCIALIST meanwhile in the individual economy, it dropped from 71.8
SYSTEM IN CHINA AND COMPLETION OF percent to 7 1 percent and in the capitalist sector, from 6.9
™t to nearly zero. Thus the first three economic sectors
THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN
accounted for 92.9 percent. As regards total industrial output

In 1956, socialist transformation of private ownership of the value, socialist industry rose from 56 Per“"VTrcent W ^
percent, and state capitalist industry from 26 9 ^ ^
means of production was carried out to a decisive victory in
percent while private capitalist industry dropped from 17.1 per
China. Private ownership representing individual ownership by
cent to nearly zero. Of the total retail sales of commodities,
the peasants, handicraftsmen and other labouring people was
state-owned commerce together with supply a“d "tarketing co_
basically converted into public ownership characterized by collec¬
operative commerce, rose from 42.6 percent to 68.3 percent, state
tive ownership by the labouring people, while capitalist private
capitalist commerce and cooperative commerce organized by
ownership by the capitalists was basically converted into state
former small private merchants increased from 0.2 percent to V'5
ownership or public ownership by the whole people. After the
nercenr while privately owned commerce dropped from 57.2
introduction of joint state-private ownership in all trades, the
percent’to 4.2 percent. Thus, by 1956, a socialist economic system
490 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER Six FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 491

had already been established in China. ne must recognize in regard to the completion ol such a pro¬
Economy is the basis of a social system. The leadership of the found revolutionary change as that of eliminating private owner¬
Chinese Communist Party, the state machine of the people’s ship in China—a large country with a population ol hundicds of
democratic dictatorship and the guiding position of Marxism in millions: first, steady growth of the national economy was al
the ideological field, were powerful socialist factors existing in the along basically guaranteed; second, it was carried out, by and
superstructure which guaranteed China’s transition to a socialist large with the widespread support of the masses ot people. This
society. Now, with the establishment of the socialist economic was extremely difficult to attain, yet it was, in fact, accomplished.
foundation, the Party, the people’s democratic dictatorship and Drastic change in the relations of production often results in
Marxist ideology have taken up the task of consolidating and damage to the productive forces for a time. In general, this did
developing the socialist economic foundation. not occur during socialist transformation in China, although lack
of enthusiasm for production on the part of some people did arise
as a temporary problem. On the contrary, the transformation
Great Victory of the Socialist Reform and the Problems
guaranteed and promoted development of the productive forces.
Remaining
Take grain output for example. It grew annually during the
The tasks set by the Party’s general line during the transitional process of the founding of cooperatives. Farmland irrigation
period in terms of the socialist reform of agriculture, handicraft projects and the technical transformation of agriculture also
industry and capitalist industry and commerce were in the main developed correspondingly. Production and economic returns ol
completed by 1956. In this sense, the transitional period came to former private enterprises increased considerably during the
an end and the transition to socialism was realized. According to course of socialist transformation. Naturally, agricultural trans¬
our present analysis, this -situation indicated that China had formation could have aroused strong objections, rocking as it did
begun to enter the primary stage of socialism. Of course, the the peasants’ profound conception of land and draught animals
building of socialism will undergo a prolonged historical process as being privately owned, as well as contravening their tradition¬
and requires that the Party and people make tremendous efforts. al autonomous methods of management based on each family or
During the period, they may even face unexpected hardships and household as an independent unit. But the Party presented t e
setbacks. Nevertheless, the Chinese Communist Party did indeed peasants with facts, showing how cooperatives would benefit the
lead the Chinese people to enter the socialist society. Whatever poor and lower-middle peasants who, making up the majority of
happens, this was a great victory and a significant milestone in the rural population, were facing difficulties in production, and
the history of the country and the Party after the founding of the assuring them that cooperatives, at least, would not damage their
People’s Republic of China. interests. Therefore, the peasants supported cooperatives or went
Proceeding with socialist transformation at an accelerated pace along with the main trend. At first, when the Party s policy °
led to impetuosity and carelessness in the latter stages. Profound mutual benefit and participation on a voluntary basis failed to be
lessons should be drawn with regard to the leadership of the strictly implemented, relatively better-off peasants did suffer
Party. The chief problem was that the Party became conceited in some losses. The Party, however, paid attention to correcting
face of such a tremendous victory. It was no longer as cautious these deviations and showed them how the development of coop¬
as before, or as careful in listening to the voice of the masses. It erative production would also benefit them. Realizing it was the
also failed to pay as much respect to inner-Party democracy as it trend of the times, they either supported the campaign or went
had done in the past. However, there are two basic facts which along with the majority. The working class, of course, lul y
 CHAPTER SIX FOUNDING of PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 493
492 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
. nal economy grew steadily and the transformation was widely
economy g Jhis enabled thc object,ves of the
supported the all-round introduction of the joint state-private
ownership in private industrial and commercial businesses. Some SUP'ahst transformation to be achieved fairly smoothly. This fact
capitalists beat drums and gongs to celebrate the event in the indicates that! in general, the socialist transformation led by the
daytime but cried on each other’s shoulders at night. They found
the situation stressful, but had to accept it, however unwillingly. PaMyarToneeUenvisSaged that the socialist revolution might adopt
In dealing with national capitalists the Party did not adopt the a oolicy of peaceful redemption towards the capitalist class. After
methods of struggle used against landlords. Instead, fixed interest th!rOctober Revolution, Lenin drew an outline for this kind ot
payments to capitalists continued without interruption. They Leful buving-out policy and plan. Owing to various reasons.
were given jobs and the status of their representatives in state Lentn’s plany was notimplemented successfully. The Communist
organs remained unchanged. Hence, they also could accept the Party ofPChina entered into an alliance with the natl0“l capital
conversion and follow the general trend. ist class during the democratic revolution and continued to ma
Whenji capitalist, known as a “textile tycoon,” was asked why tain this alliance during the socialist transformation. This his
he accepted the socialist road, he said, “It’s true, I’m a capitalist, torical background, as well as practical necessity and a real
but first of all I am a Chinese.” He explained how, as a Chinese possibility, enabled the Communist Party to buy out the capitalist
national capitalist, he had all along dreamt of developing industry ciasS peacefully and effectively for the first time in thc history o
to bring salvation and prosperity to his country, but how in the socialism The Party led the masses of people to create a buymg-
old society, he had suffered continual oppression and extortion out method which ruled out payment of large sums ot state
from imperialists and bureaucrat-capitalists. In the early days of money in redemption in favour of allowing the capitalists to
national liberation, the government extricated his enterprise from ™ominue to receive part of the dividend from enterprises for a
its impasse by providing it with loans, entrusting it to process relatively long period of time. Moreover, a series ot forms ranging
products and purchasing its products, enabling it to increase its from primary to advanced state capitalism were created to steer
profit year by year. He went on to say, “Following implementa¬ capitalist industry and commerce towards a gradual transition to
tion of the First Five-Year Plan, many large factories were built socialism During the cooperative transformation of agriculture,
throughout the country. Various places went in for large-scale aserteof forms was also created for the socialist transport from
construction, and achievements were made faster than I had the primary stage to the advanced stage. Thanks to these creative
dreamt was possible. What an encouraging situation! Where methods China’s socialist transformation, while still taking t
would we be today if it wasn’t for the Communist Party and if Soviet Union as the model to follow in its objectives, nevertheless
we hadn’t taken the socialist road?” “To me, it [abolition of the acquired special characteristics of its own in the particular road
capitalist system] means losing what I personally gained from it chose to follow. Thus, use of this new experience and thinki g
exploitation. Compared with the government’s total investment served to enrich and develop Marxist theory on scientific social-
during the First Five-Year Plan period, it was just too trivial.
What we have gained is a powerful and prosperous socialist iSmimpe,uosity and carelessness in the late stageofthesooalist
country in which everybody lives a comfortable life.... Materially, transformation gave rise to many problems. The Party had
in fact, I didn’t lose anything. I live quite well.”19 These words make careful investigations and studies to bring about systemati
vividly reflect the basis and results of the Party’s policy of uniting readjustments and to gradually resolve problems in keepnng wi
with and remoulding national capitalists. In the course of this the need to develop the productive forces, and concern for the
very complicated, difficult and profound social reform, the na-
494 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
cHapTEr SIX FOUNDING OF PRC AND TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM 495
country’s social life, as well as the will of the masses of people.
« were mostly fulfilled ahead of schedule. The following year,
There were several important questions which needed to be
answered. One, socialist public ownership already occupied a r7WwaCs one of the years which witnessed the most successful
dominant economic position, but was it necessary to make it the 195 ’ of the country’s economic construction. By the end ot
set for the First Ftve-Year Plan had been
only economic sector, or should the individual economy and
private economy which benefitted the national economy and
"3KXStUntnent, investment in capUa,
enhanced the people’s livelihood be maintained to a limited
extent? Two, with the complete transformation of capitalism and instruction of the economy and in culture, education and p
individual economy and the extension of a highly centralized health totalled 49.3 billion yuan, overfulfilling the original pJan
planned economic system to cover the whole sphere of economic . 15 3 nercent With the addition of the funds raised by enter

life, should the role of market regulation continue to be devel¬ Jisls and vadous localities, the country's actual investment m
oped, and if so, how? Three, how should the state-owned economy capital construction totalled 58.8 billion yuan. Th» were 921
give play to the initiative and enthusiasm of the central authori¬ industrial and mining projects under construction over and above
ties, the local governments at various levels and the enterprises? Ihe set mvestment limit. Of these, 428 had been put tnto oration
And should the proprietary rights and the managing power over
the collective economy be divided into different administrative an<T “added X JSM? 49.2^ yuan, a^ut 1.9

the original value of fixed assets owned by the country m

layers and give play to its initiative according to the different
layers and different conditions? Other questions: As to public
ownership, was the larger the scope the better? As to manage¬ 19 In 1957 the nation’s total industrial output value hit 78.39
ment, was the more concentrated the better? Most of these bilL yuan, overfulfilling the ^ <^^3
problems surfaced in different degrees during the course of
transformation. However, they became submerged in the upsurge
of the transformation before there was time to discuss them
thoroughly and deal with them carefully. These questions and
other problems brought on by impetuosity and carelessness in the
later stages of the socialist transformation could have been grad¬
ually resolved in practice by relying on the accumulation of tion of the output value of heavy industry to the nations gross
experience, if serious investigation and readjustment had been industrial output value rose from 35.5 percent
made in a calm manner of seeking truth from facts. The objective nercent somewhat of an improvement over old China s heavy
situation called for the Party to conduct readjustment and reform industry which had been extremely backward. As tor the outpu
in this regard. SS^portant industrial products, steel outputreached 5 35
• xqc-j lin ?QA nercent over that of 1952 and 5.8
times the°highest steel output before the founding of the People s
Achievements of the First Five-Year Plan
Cublk he output of coal hit 130 million tons, 96 percen
In 1956, when the socialist transformation of agriculture, n wThan that of 1952 and 2.1 times that of the top output
handicraft industry and capitalist industry and commerce was in before the founding of the People's Republic; and the output of
the main completed, the main targets set for the First Five-Year electric power amounted to 19.34 billion kwh, an increase of 166
percent wer 1952 and 3.2 times that of the highest output before
 CHA1.TER sk founding of PRC and transition to SOCIALISM 497

496 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC t While the income from state-owned enterprises and msti-
the founding of New China. A large number of basic industries perCel1 had increased to 46.5 percent, of which the income Irom
tutions had mcreaseu iu , q i nercent The people s
which were non-existent in old China were established one by one.
Since more than half of the investment for capital construction
was pooled in the hinterland, a large number of industrial and
mining enterprises mushroomed in these areas, initially improv¬
ing the allocation of industries which had been irrationally con¬
centrated in coastal areas in old China. The achievements at¬ to 205 yuan, a rise of 38.5 percent, wum,
tained in industrial production during the First Five-Year Plan
CreThe^acrhiCTements^nThina^cconomic construction during the
period greatly outstripped what old China had accomplished in The acnieven. foundation for the
100 years. The growth rate also ranked among the advanced in
rates of performance by other countries when their industries
first began to take off.
In 1957, the country’s total agricultural output value reached
60.4 billion yuan (according to 1952 prices as constant), fulfilling
101 percent of the original plan and showing an increase of 25
percent over 1952 and an average annual growth of 4.5 percent.
Grain output hit 195.05 million tons, up 19 percent over 1952 and
showing an average annual growth of 3.7 percent; and the output
of cotton reached 1.64 million tons, up 26 percent over 1952 and
gssifssf#;
registering an average annual growth of 4.7 percent. The growth
rate of agriculture was not lower than the world’s average level.
However, compared with the speedy growth of the country’s
industry during the same period, relatively speaking, it lagged
behind. The growth of grain and cotton production did not reach
|§§§S§§§^£Si
the level which people had optimistically expected. Tension re¬
mained uneased and pressure to increase agricultural production
remained high.
During the five years, the nation’s prices basically remained
stable. Except for the year 1956 which witnessed deficit, the state theoretical understanding and practical action.
--—-
treasury registered a balance in revenue and expenditure, with
even a slight surplus. The structure of the state revenue changed NOTES
considerably. In 1950, it had mainly relied on income from taxes
on industry, commerce and agriculture, which accounted for 75 1 Telegraph sent to Chen Yi on April 16, 1950.
percent. Income from state-owned enterprises and institutions
3 MaTw.'^Danube River » rt. Yalu River, the Harrap Co. of
had made up only 13.4 percent, of which the income from
industry accounted for 6.8 percent. By 1957 the proportion of
5&S •* w“rks °fMa° Zedong’Chin-ed- Pcople’s Publish'
various tax incomes to the nation’s revenue had dropped to 49.9
 498 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

ing House, 1986, Vol. II, p. 692.

5. Mao Zedong’s May 20, 1950 telegraph to Rao Shushi on financial and economic
work.
6. Mao Zedong’s December 22, 1949 telegraph to the Party Central Committee on
preparations for a trade treaty with the Soviet Union.
7. “The Present Financial and Economic Situation and Relations Between Differ¬
ent Aspects of the Economy of New China,” Selected Works of Zhou Enlai Eng
CHAPTER SEVEN
ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1989, Vol. II, p. 15.
8. fhe Party Central Committee’s instruction issued on February 15, 1952 on the
treatment ot capitalists who abided or semi-abided bv law or seriously violated it
SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION
during struggle against the five evils.
9. Mao Zedong’s written comment on the Central-South Bureau’s new plan of
ADVANCES TORTUOUSLY
offensive against “tiger” transmitted on February 17, 1952.
10. The Central Committee’s instruction issued on May 9, 1952 on verdicts and
THROUGH EXPLORATION
return of illegally commandeered property.
11. Bo Yibo’s report on the movement against corruption, waste and bureaucracy
21C19521 °rgani2ations’transmitled b>' the Party Central Committee on January
I. THE 8TH NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS
12. Mao Zedong: Talks given w'hile reading the Soviet Textbook on Political
Economy between the end of 1959 and the spring of 1960. AND CHINA’S PROBING OF ITS OWN ROAD
13. Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Zedong, Chin. cd„ People’s
Publishing House, 1986, Vol. II, p. 712.
FOR SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION
14. "Fight for a Fundamental Turn for the Better in the Nation’s Financial and
Economic Situation,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Eng. cd., Foreign I an- The year 1956 went down in the Party’s history as having
guages Press, Beijing, 1977, Vol. V, p. 30.
15. Written instructions given by the CPC Central Committee on March 8, 1954 completed in the main the socialist transformation of private
on the report of the leading Party group of the Chinese Academy of Sciences ownership of the means of production and begun the exploration
16. Mao Zedong: Opening Address at the 3rd Session of the 1st National of China’s own road for socialist construction. hrand-
Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Renmin
Ribao (People s Daily), October 24, 1951. After the founding of the socialist system m China, a brand
1984C/<?C^07 W°rks °fChen Yun (1949-56), Chin, ed., People’s Publishing House, new task confronted the Party. How should the country s socialist
economy, politics and culture be built up and developed? Inspired
18 Selected Works of Li Weihan, Chin, ed., People’s Publishing House, 1987,
p. 266 with enthusiasm, the whole Party tried eagerly to dedicate itself
19. Xinhua News Bulletin, January 21, 1956.
l° However! theVarty lacked adequate theoretical and ideological
preparation for how to build socialism m China. During the
prolonged democratic revolution, the Party underwent strenuous
and tortuous struggles. By its 7th Congress, it had summed up
historical experiences and acquired a fairly comprehensive und
standing of the revolution in terms of theory, line, and variou!
principles and policies, as well as estimations and counter
measures related to different kinds of possible favourab e or
unfavourable circumstances. A fairly solid common understan
ing had been achieved among the high-ranking Party leaders.
Hence the Party had been relatively fully prepared as to how it

499
 500 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC 501
chapter seven socialist construction
could achieve the nationwide victory of the democratic revolution
,h-n socialist transformation was gaining momentum, the
and then begin the building of New China, and had led this Iy: partv particularly the high-ranking Party leaders, really
historical process systematically. But building socialism in China whole Pa h P deal Qf theif attention on social reform.
is far more difficult and complicated than carrying out the
Afte^sS transformation was basically completed, the focus
democratic revolution country-wide. China’s revolutionary road
should not be patterned on that of other countries, nor should its
path of construction copy that of other countries. In the early
days of socialist construction, the Party called on the nation to
“learn from the Soviet Union.” This practice was historically
necessary and led to some positive results. However, the experi¬
ences of the Soviet Union were not all successful, nor were all its
‘be conducted in the light of China's *»Wy *****
successful experiences applicable to China’s conditions. After all,
situation and needs of the development of Chinas productive
learning from the Soviet Union could not replace seeking one’s
own road. As for how China should strike out on its own road of
f°The international situation underwent a change marked by
socialist construction, it was impossible for the Party to make full
theoretical preparation in advance. Only in accordance with the
principle of combining the basic tenets of Marxism with China’s
real situation could it sum up its own experiences, draw on the
experiences of other countries and conduct practical explorations.
In exploring China’s own road for socialist construction, would it
sSsfcss £
ThHauIed widespread shock within the Soviet Union and all
over the world. The imperialists seized this opportunity to s r
be possible to experience fewer big setbacks than was the case in worldwide upsurge of anti-communism and anti-socialism, crea
searching for China’s revolutionary road? The Party hoped so. Sees of ideological confusion among the masses o
Later, history proved that we failed to avoid big detours owing to
the fact that we underestimated the difficult and complicated ‘Top, and brfngmg Lt pity 0^”!
nature of building socialism in China. At any rate, this was a “ht^mpte repudiation of the history of the struggle
problem which could only be solved through the practice of
for socialism carried out by the Soviet Fatly a”d J^°Ple
exploration. In this respect, a good beginning had already been the leadership of Stalin. The Party s principled stand was ex
made. nressed in two articles published in the name of the editorial
1 he 8th National Party Congress was convened in September department of Remnin Ribao (People's Daily) on the basis of
1956 following tremendous changes in the domestic and interna¬ dtsPcu" m enlarged meetings of the Pohtmal Buremr o
tional situation. At home, the situation was marked by the basic the Party Central Committee. One, entitled On the Hlstorlc
completion of socialist transformation and by China’s entering Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, appeared
into a new historical period of all-round socialist construction. Experience o. i Qn ^ Hjstorical Experience of the
Shifting the focus of the whole Party’s work to economic con¬
struction began at the end of the revolutionary war. At that time,
however, the heavy tasks of democratic reform and socialist
transformation needed to be fulfilled simultaneously. Particular-
 chapter seven socialist construction
502 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
in the beginning, Zhou Enlai agreed with the strategy for
doing away with blind faith in Stalin and Soviet experiences, Jedmg up development. Facing the ever-rising targets which
emancipating the mind shackled by dogmatism, and striving to “SUIed strain on finance and material supply, howler he
seek a road for revolution and construction suited to each coun¬ Sglu.A nut earlv on at a State Council meeting in February
try’s own conditions. ?956 “At present there are symptoms of impetuosity. We should
The 8th Party Congress highlighted the initial results gained raard against it. Socialist enthusiasm should not be dampened,
by the Communist Party of China in exploring China’s own road but we should not carelessly make suggestions which are without
for socialist construction. Publication of “On the Ten Major good grounds, or beyond the limits of possibility, nor should we
Relationships” in April 1956 marked the beginning of this explo¬ accelerate the speed arbitrarily. Otherwise, it will be very danger
ration and paved the way for the convening of the 8th Party ous We should on no account raise the slogan, ‘Realize mdustri
Congress. ■7ation at an early date.’ If we think over it soberly, we hall
recognize that we really cannot do it.” When drawing up plans,
“On the Ten Major Relationships” and a Series of whether a 12-year plan or a long-term plan, all departments
New Policies should bear actual conditions in mind.”' In accordance with this
thulking, the meeting of the Party Central Committee Presided
In early 1956, the Party Central Committee made known to the over by Liu Shaoqi in May set the policy of fighting against both
Chinese people the draft of the National Programme for Agricul¬ conservatism and rash advance. The 3rd Session of the 1st Na¬
tural Development (1956-67) and the policy of building socialism tional People’s Congress held in June accepted and adoptedl this
with greater, faster, better and more economical results, based on policy, which was put forward in the report by Li Xiannia _
the ideas of Mao Zedong and leaders of some localities. The LatcJ’in April 1957, Mao Zedong said, “In my mind, I began
programme and policy, put forward under the situation in which somewhat to crave greatness and success. I only began to change
the socialist transformation of agriculture was being speeded up, n Mmch and April last year. I had talks with comrades from
reflected the Party’s intention of shifting its attention to agricul¬ more than 30 departments and later talked about the ten major
ture and the construction of the national economy as a whole, and relationships at the Supreme State Coherence.
the desire of the Party and the people to quicken the development The Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee called
of the productive forces on the basis of the new socialist relations conferences with comrades from 34 econonuc departments to
of production. Particularly, after the armistice of the Indo-China make reports and discuss problems, preparation for theriSth Parly
war was realized at the Geneva Conference, the international Congress On the basis of these discussions, Mao Zedong dratted
situation became more relaxed. The Party predicted that there fhe report which was entitled “On the Ten Major Re atmnshi^
might be a period of peace internationally, and planned to seize It was discussed at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau
the opportunity to speed up the country’s economic construction. in April. After it was approved by the Political Buream the report
However, in the surge of opposition to “Right deviationist conser¬ was delivered at the Supreme State Conference on May 2. The
vatism,” the Party failed to fully understand and respect the law report set one basic policy; this was to mobilize all positive factors
governing economic construction and set excessively high and at home and abroad to serve socialism. It dealt wlth te"
enormous demands on speed and scale for the development of (ten major relationships) which were put forward, on the one
agricultural production and construction in other fields, thus hand, through summing up China’s own experiences and
leading to impetuosity and rash advance. The Party took note of the problems in China's construction and development, and on
this problem and began to correct it.
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter seven socialist construction
504

the other, by drawing lessons from Soviet experience. Mao Ze¬ economic construction were advanced . Relationships”

dong stressed that with regard to Marxist-Leninist theories, ?enfthTmlat”p between tie Han nationality and mi-
“What we must study is all that is universally true and we must deal Vkl nationalities,
• iitip<; the
make sure that this study is linked with Chinese reality. It would nority the relationship
relations p between the
andParty and
COUnter-
lead to a mess if every single sentence, even of Marx’s, were
1,011 Union and £ latnsh^between China and other coun-
followed.”3 Foreign experience should neither be rejected out of Ss“tions concerning mobilizing all positive factors in pol¬
hand nor copied indiscriminately. “Particularly worthy of atten¬
tion is the fact that in the Soviet Union certain defects and errors itical life and ideological anc' c^tl!”^‘fhe Ten Major Relation-
that occurred in the course of their building of socialism have
lately come to light. Do you want to follow the detours they have
made?”4 This confirmed the basic thinking that in building social¬
ism China should take its own road in the light of its own
tific'and “l wo* also^clared this principle
conditions. title anu cuuui _ reference In his report entitled Let a
“On the Ten Major Relationships” chiefly discusses economic
issues, stressing the need to mobilize all positive factors in all
aspects of economic work. The first three questions focus on the
S-tS iTK‘J52 SSSS
relationship between heavy industry on the one hand and light
industry and agriculture on the other, the relationship between
industry in the coastal regions and industry in the interior, and 5X5 S» » P.B» Ccur.l Committee. P»,
the relationship between economic construction and construction
for national defence. The report confirmed that we had not
committed major mistakes while handling these relationships in
the past, and stressed that we should make appropriate readjust¬
ment according to the situation and our experiences and devote
greater efforts to developing agriculture and light industry, make
use of and develop industry in the coastal regions, and cut the
proportions of military and administrative expenditures as much ment functionaries serving socialism and P 1 ralion
as possible so as to spend more on economic construction. In the class "5 Socialist construction must rely upon cl°sl-coup
between manual workers and mental workers and upon a fra,er
long run, this would help the development of heavy industry and
industry in the interior and strengthen national defence. This, in
fact, involved the question of blazing a Chinese road of indus¬
trialization which was different from that of the Soviet Union.
The fourth and fifth questions, discussing the relationship be¬
tween the state, the units of production and the producers, and
the relationship between the central authorities and local govern¬
ksssses- ,-ifwrrr.' as
ments, began to touch on the question of economic structural
reform. Thus a number of new policies for China’s socialist
 506
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC ^pter seven socialist construction 507

leaps and bounds, and the human world is on the eve of a new the people’s democratic dictatorship, we should continue to exer¬
scientific, technological and industrial revolution. We must rouse cise dictatorship and at the same time to broaden democracy K
ourselves to catch up and “attain the heights of modern science With regard to the handling of inner Party contradictions, “On
Mao Zedong’s speech at the meeting stressed the necessity of the Ten Major Relationships” reiterates the policy started in
currymg out a technological and cultural revolution to innovate Yanan of “learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and
the backward technology and fight against ignorance. He called curing the sickness to save the patient” and opposes ruthless
on the whole Party to study science and unite with non-Party struggle and merciless blows.” Thus, a number ol new policies on
intellectuals to work hard in order to quickly catch up with China’s socialist political construction were initially advanced.
advanced world technological levels. After the conference, the ~ In June that year, the Party proposed to strive for peaceful
State Council established the Scientific Planning Commission means to liberate Taiwan in order to realize the complete reuni¬
wh,ch, organized and led by Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Li Fuchun and fication of the motherland. It declared that “all patriots belong to
Nie Rongzhen, was composed of several hundred renowned scien¬ one family” and “whether one embraces patriotism earlier or later
tists. In a few months, the commission formulated the Outline of brooks no distinctions.” It also suggested the Chinese Communist
the Long-Range Plan for the Development of Science and Tech¬ Party and the Kuomintang, in the interest ot the nation and the
nology (1956-67) and adopted a series of emergency measures to motherland, join hands for a third round of cooperation.
put the plan into practice. Thus, several new policies for China’s All this vividly shows how the Party sought in every way to find
socialist cultural construction were initially put forward a road for building socialism suited to China’s own conditions.
While discussing the Party and non-Party relationship, “On the Later, when recalling the history of this period, Mao Zedong said
Ten Major Relationships” advances the policy of “long-term repeatedly: Economic construction in past years was learned main¬
coexistence and mutual supervision” between the Communist ly from foreign experience. The discussion of the ten major rela¬
Party and all democratic parties. This clearly declared that under tionships in April 1956 signified that we had now begun to put
the new historical conditions after entering socialism, China forward our own line for construction with a content all our own.
would not practise the one-party system like that in the Soviet
Union and confirmed that the united front under the leadership The 8th National Congress of the Communist Party of China
ot the Chinese Communist Party and multi-party cooperation
would continue to exist and give play to their roles. Regarding The 8th National Congress of the Communist Party of China
the question of how to deal with counter-revolutionaries, the was held on September 15-27, 1956 in Beijing, lhis was the
report, on the premise of confirming the necessity of the former Party’s first national congress after taking over power country¬
movements to ^suppress and eliminate counter-revolutionaries, wide, one which manifests the solidarity of the Party and its
estimated that “counter-revolutionaries still exist, although their thriving cause. It was attended by 1,026 delegates representing
number has greatly diminished”; put forward the principle that the nation’s 10.73 million Party members. More than 50 foreign
there should be fewer arrests and executions in the suppression of Communist Party and Workers’ Party delegations, representa¬
counter-revolutionaries in society at large, and that the policy tives of all the democratic parties in China, and democratic
started m Yanan of “killing none and arresting few” should be personages without party affiliation attended the congress on
adhered to in clearing out counter-revolutionaries in Party and invitation. Mao Zedong made the opening speech. Liu Shaoqi,
government organs. In his speech at the Shanghai municipal on behalf of the Party Central Committee, gave a political
Party congress held in July, Zhou Enlai stressed, “With regard to report. Zhou Enlai reported on suggestions concerning the
 509
chapter seven socialist construction
508 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
wished in China. The main task of the Party and the people
Second Five-Year Plan for Development of the National Econ¬ ef‘?he whole country at present is to concentrate forces to solve
omy. Deng Xiaoping presented a report on the revision of the contradiction a'nd quickly turn China from a backward
Party Constitution. Zhu De, Chen Yun, Dong Biwu and more
than 100 other delegates addressed the congress or delivered
written speeches.
The basic task of this congress was to sum up the experiences /he socialist system in China. The formulation on the essence
since the 7th National Party Congress, and unite the whole Party the principal contradiction in China, however, was not e
and all the forces that could be united, both at home and abroad,
to struggle for the building of a great socialist China.
The congress correctly analysed the domestic situation and the
changes in the major contradictions at home and put forward the
Party’s fundamental tasks for the future. The political report
made by Liu Shaoqi not only systematically expounded the series
of principles and policies highlighted in “On the Ten Major
Relationships,” but also advanced and resolved a series of strate¬
gic questions. The decision adopted by the congress concerning
the political report clearly pointed out: Our Party has led the
people to achieve the overall and decisive victory in the socialist
transformation of agriculture, handicraft industry, and capitalist
industry and commerce. “This indicates that the contradictions
between the proletariat and the capitalist class in our country
have in the main been resolved, that the several thousand years’ strength on developing the productive forces. History has pro
history of the class exploitation system has basically ended, and
that the social system of socialism has been basically established th^he ^ngres^ adhered°to The principle for economic construe-
in our country.” The Chinese people must also liberate Taiwan
and fight for the thorough completion of the socialist transforma¬
tion, the final abolition of the exploiting system and the continual
elimination of counter-revolutionary remnant forces. “However,
the main contradiction in our country has become that between
the people’s demand for the establishment of an advanced indus¬
trial country and China’s actual situation as a backward agricul¬ ona ba”ch is both positive and reliable, so as to ensure a
tural country, between the people’s demand for the rapid devel¬ fairly balanced growth of the national economy^ The congress
opment of economy and culture and the situation in which the resolution also pointed out: If we underestimate the possibiihtyof
current economy and culture cannot satisfy the people’s demand. relying on favourable conditions to develop our c0™^y S pt^
The essence of this contradiction is the contradiction between the tive forces fairly quickly we will °eCt°ve of
advanced socialist system and the backward social productive vatism- and if we set an excessively high speed irrespective oi
forces in the situation where the socialist system has already been
 510
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 511

various kinds of objective limitations, we will commit the mistake

be based on.
of adventurism. The Party must pay attention at all times to
Deng Xiaoping’s report on revision of the Party Constitution
preventing and correcting these two erroneous tendencies. The
put forward the main policy on strengthening Party building now
congress also put forward the strategic plan of building a basically
that the Party has come to power in China. It pointed out the need
complete industrial system in China within a period of three
to place importance on inner-Party ideological education, en¬
five-year plans or an ever longer period of time. The congress
hance the whole Party’s ideological level of Marxism-Leninism,
adopted Suggestions on the Second Five-Year Plan for the Devel¬
adhere to the Party’s sole purpose of serving the people whole¬
opment of the National Economy (1958-62) providing that by
heartedly, carry forward the Party’s fine traditions of seeking
1962, the nation’s gross industrial and agricultural output value
truth from facts and adhering to the mass line, develop inner-
should increase over that in 1957 by around 75 percent, of which
Party democracy, strengthen the Party’s democratic centralism,
the total industrial output value should rise around 100 percent
and tighten up supervision over Party organizations and Party
and the total agricultural output value around 35 percent. The
members. He pointed out that since the personality cult was a
nation’s steel output should reach 10.5 million to 12 million tons,
long-standing social phenomenon, it would inevitably have some
grain output around 250 billion kg, and the national income
reflections in our Party’s life and social life. The Party’s task, he
should increase around 50 percent.
said, was to resolutely oppose, as a principle of the Party’s central
In his speech, Chen Yun pointed out: Our socialist economic
authorities, the practice of elevating individuals spectacularly
situation will be like this: In industrial and commercial manage¬
and of sounding panegyrics over an individual’s virtues and
ment, state and collective management should be the main form,
achievements, and to adhere unswervingly to the system of com¬
supplemented by a certain amount of individual management!
bining collective leadership with individual responsibility, in
With regard to planning, planned production should be the main
order to carry out the Party’s democratic principle and mass line
form of industrial and agricultural production supplemented by
in all spheres.
free production within the scope allowed by the state plan in the
After much deliberation and consultation, the congress elected
light of changes in the market. In the unified socialist market, the
the 97-member 8th Party Central Committee on the basis of
state-controlled market is the main form, supplemented by the
giving full play to democracy. The 1st Session of the 8th Party
free market led by the state within a definite sphere.10 The
Central Committee elected 17 Political Bureau members and six
congress attached importance to this opinion and adopted it in the
alternate members to the Political Bureau. It elected Mao Zedong
resolution. It was an important attempt to breach the socialist
chairman of the Party Central Committee, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou
pattern of the past, both theoretically and practically, and to
Enlai, Zhu De and Chen Yun vice-chairmen of the Party Central
explore a path for economic structural reform.
Committee, and Deng Xiaoping general secretary of the Party
With regard to the work of the state, the congress proposed
Central Committee, and these six people formed the Standing
continuing to strengthen the people’s democratic dictatorship,
Committee of the Political Bureau. The Standing Committee of
further expand the country’s democratic life, and carry out
the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee included
the struggle against bureaucratism; strengthen the unity of all
four secretaries elected at the 7th National Party Congress and
Chinese nationalities; continue to consolidate the people’s demo¬
two new, younger members. The 8th National Party Congress
cratic united front, and gradually to enact complete sets of laws
inherited the leading body of the Party Central Committee elect¬
and establish a complete legal system to ensure that there are laws
ed at the 7th National Party Congress and added some new
which the activities of the Party and government can and must
members, making preparations for the future replacement of the
 chapter seven socialist construction 513
512 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

old with the new. At the preparatory meeting to discuss the list WhThe Party’sliM swat thf 1st Session of the 8th National Party
of candidates for members of the Party Central Committee, Mao Congress was correct, and the many new principles and concep¬
Zedong noted that the make-up of the list reflected the historical tions put forward at the congress were full of creative spirit Of
development of the Party and, as the focus of the Party’s work
course, many of these new concepts and principles could not be
had been shifted to construction and the economy, in the future, firmly'established or acquire common understanding as the time
the Party Central Committee should have many engineers, scien¬
for working them out in practice was very short, so that they were
tists and mature cadres from among the workers, although there
unlikely to become very mature either theoretically or ideologi¬
were none at present. This set a new standard for the future
cally. Many ideas (including those put forward soon after the s
construction of the collective leadership of the Party central
Session of the 8th National Party Congress) suffered setbacks
authorities.
before they had been put into practice or fully applied. There
The Constitution adopted at the 8th National Parly Congress
were numerous unexpected, complicated tests ahead. Neverthe¬
added the article: “The Party Central Committee holds that when
less when all is said and done, this congress did achieve initial
necessary, an honorary chairman can be elected in the Party
results in exploring China’s own road for socialist construction,
Central Committee.” This was because Mao Zedong himself
and history has proved these results to be of important, far-
mentioned to the Party Central CommiLtee that he was preparing
reaching significance for the development of the Party s cause.
that at an appropriate time, he would no longer hold the post of
Party chairman. He also proposed that he would not hold the post
Further Exploration After the 8th National Party Congress
of state chairman at the next term of office, and suggested
revision of the country’s Constitution by entering the provision After the 8th National Party Congress, efforts to further
that the chairman and vice-chairmen of the state could hold their explore China’s own road of socialist construction were devoted
posts consecutively only for two terms. He believed that by giving to the following two questions: One was how to formulate he
up the position at the first front he could concentrate his energy construction plan for 1957 and readjust some aspects of the
on studying certain problems, and that he could still, in the economic relations in accordance with the principles set at the 8t
capacity of a member of the Party’s Political Bureau, make the National Party Congress; and the other was how to make prepa¬
major-topic report at appropriate meetings after he gave up the rations for the rectification of working style throughout the Party
posts of chairman of the state and chairman of the Party. This and correctly handle the various kinds of contradictions among
suggestion can be considered as a deliberation of abolishing the the people which were becoming increasingly obvious.
existing life-long tenure of the posts of leaders and the prepara¬ In early 1956, although the trend of rash advance in economic
tion for the important reform of the Party and state system of construction was basically reined in, it was not completely curbed
leadership. and rash advance persisted in some areas. The final .accounting
The new Party Constitution stipulated that the National Party of revenue and expenditure at the years end found it to be the
Congress should institute a permanent system with a term of five first deficit year since 1953. As the problem of oyeranxiety to
years, and a national conference should be held every year. This achieve quick results had not been resolved ideologically, the
conference was thus made the 1st Session of the 8th National targets collected from various departments and localities tor the
Party Congress. As a matter of fact, however, no other sessions formulation of the 1957 plan still greatly exceeded the limits
were held during the term of the 8th Party Central Committee deemed possible for enabling the national economy to grow
except for the 2nd Session of the 8th National Party Congress
514 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC ^PTER seven socialist construction 515

steadily through an overall-all balance. Major controversy arose Initial progress and explorations of new ideas were also made
over questions relating to the assessment of the economic work of ■ the readjustment of the economic relations according to the
1956 and the formulation of the economic plan for 1957. Mao 1 nnciple of “three main bodies and three supplements” set by the
Zedong stressed that the incorrect part in the 1956 financial s h National Party Congress. Soon after the basic completion of
expenditure and investment in capital construction was not worth thc socialist transformation of capitalist industry and c0™™rce
“a finger,” and proposed that the budget targets should be set Li the handicraft industry, the Party repeatedly stressed that
higher, Zhou Enlai and many others, however, suggested that it individual handicraft works, small shops, small stalls and
would be better to slow down the growth, make it more reliable, neddling which were closely related to peoples lives should
and cut down the budget targets for 1957. Throughout the discus¬ ^main under private operation for a long time, and stated that
sions, Chen Yun kept emphasizing that the scale of construction drawbacks in the state monopoly for purchase and marketing
should not exceed national strength and that a balance between should be overcome, market management relaxed, a certain de
material supply, finance and credit should be maintained in erce of free purchase and free marketing should be introduced to
drawing up a plan. In a large country like ours, he said, economic enterprises and a portion of farm produce should be permitted
stability is of primary importance. While discussing the 1957 plan rn "e free market after the tasks for~^dand
and budget at the 2nd Plenary Session of the 8th Party Central contracted purchase by the state were full died. After the bth
Committee held on November 10, 1956, Zhou Enlai had proposed National Party Congress, the free market prospered conspicuous
that the principle of “ensuring key projects and adequately scal¬ lv and the number of individual industrial and commercial
ing down” should be adopted in 1957. Everybody attending the operations markedly increased. Take Shanghai for exampk, there
meeting agreed with this principle. At a meeting during the were 1,661 individual handicraft households mi September and
session on November 15, Mao Zedong said: There are both the number rose to 2,8S5 in October, then jumped further toA,236
progress and retrogression, but mainly progress; we should cher¬ by the end of 1956. To counter opinions which held that the
ish the enthusiasm of our cadres and people and should not pour growth of individual businesses went against the orientation of
cold water on them. Actually, Mao Zedong had a different cooperatives, Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) published an edito
opinion from that of the session concerning the opposition to rash ial which pointed out that the development of individual house
advance. However, he did not make any criticism. Instead, in holds engaged in the handicraft industry had, on the one hand,
keeping with the opinion of the majority, he agreed to carry out met the people’s needs for increasing commodity supplies on the
this principle in 1957. market and, on the other, expanded employment opportumties m
All this indicates that the leading body of the Party Central the cities Thus, it was beneficial, and not harmful, to the state.
Committee at that time had kept a sober mind and worked in a Following the increase of such individual households larger
style of seeking truth from facts and giving play to democratic self-managed handicraft households aud handicraft wor^h°Ps;
discussion. The plan for 1957 thus formulated ensured the year’s which became known as “underground factories aPI»^ed, and
economic work to be the most effective since the founding of New so did “underground shops.” What the attitude should be towards
China. But later Mao Zedong said that he had made a compro¬ happenings like this following the socialist transformation a-
mise at the 2nd Plenary Session of the 8th Party Central Com¬ roused the interest of former industrialists and businessmen and
mittee. This became one of the origins of the criticism Mao the whole of society. ' . . .
Zedong brought up at the Nanning Meeting held in January 1958 In December 1956, Mao Zedong gave many talks and held
in regard to the opposition to rash advance. discussions on this question with responsible members oi the
 CHAPTER seven socialist construction
516 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
A HHm.ah these considerations and suggestions were
All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce and the Depart¬
ment of the United Front of the Party Central Committee. He
expressed this opinion: Underground factories develop because
society needs them. They should come above ground and be
legalized. The number of such factories may increase as long as
there are markets and raw materials. It should be permissible to
open small “husband-and-wife” shops, hire labourers, and open
up large privately run factories. It will also become an outlet for
fixed interest paid to former capitalist industrialists and business¬
men if individuals are allowed to invest and open up factories. ats —a
Investment made by overseas Chinese will not be confiscated in
a hundred years. We may practise capitalism after capitalism is
eliminated. He called this “the new economic policy.”12 These
opinions of Mao Zedong were agreed to by other comrades of the
Party Central Committee. Soon afterwards, at a meeting of the
NPC Standing Committee, Liu Shaoqi said: Our country is more
than 90 percent socialist, so, in my opinion, there is no harm in
siggsiis
a capitalist development of several percent. On the one hand, this
bit of capitalism may serve as a supplement to the socialist
economy and, on the other, it can serve as a comparison with the
socialist economy in certain respects.13 Zhou Enlai also said at a
State Council meeting: In socialist construction, a bit of private creased. In September 15, . agricultural production
enterprise with flexible operation is good and makes things more
lively.14 These new ideas for enlivening the economy represented
a new development of the policies of keeping the state and
collective operation as the main body and allowing for a certain
amount of individual operation as a supplement set by the 8th was proposed. In general, a 88 a producti0n team (now
National Party Congress. A further consideration related to this
was that capitalist private operation within definite limits under
state leadership could also be made supplementary to the main
body of the socialist economy. In his talks with personages of
industrial and commercial circles, Mao Zedong was also in favour
of extricating from the ranks of “capitalists” the large number of
small proprietors and self-employed people engaged in industrial
and commercial businesses who entered joint state-private enter¬
farm output quotas to each groupior ou
s ss
^ each p]0t of
prises together with capitalists, of no longer paying them a fixed &*££% contract the odd JObs in
interest (the amount was minimal), and of allowing them to join
 518 519
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC cHAKTER SEVEN socialist construction

the fields to households. The major work should be done collec¬ *,ork ahead of us. At the 2nd Plenary Session of the 8th Party
tively and the minor, piecemeal work, by households or indivi¬ Central Committee held in November 1956, what happened in
duals, thus replacing such labour-wasting practice as that of Poland and Hungary15 was duly heeded as an admonition. Thus,
having “all coop members work together like a swarm of bees,” while giving consideration to both national construction and the
and so on. These instructions were formulated under the direction neople’s livelihood, the session stressed, it was necessary to guard

of Deng Zihui. They were creative ventures oriented towards the Lainst and prevent cadres taking on privileges and divorcing
production responsibility system. themselves from the people. A decision was taken to carry out a
The 3rd Plenary Session of the 8th Party Central Committee rectification campaign throughout the Party ranks in the nex
held in autumn 1957 adopted the drafts of three stipulations year towards which discussions and preparations were to be
drawn up under the leadership of Chen Yun for improving the instituted right away.
management systems of industry, commerce and finance. The
stipulations were meant to appropriately transfer management The Rectification Campaign Focusing on the Correct Handling
power downwards to localities and enterprises as called for at the of Contradictions Among the People
8th National Party Congress.
In essence, the readjustment of economic plans and economic This rectification campaign centred on how to correctly handle
relations were designed to solve contradictions among the people. contradictions among the people. Since contradictions between
Systematically posing the question of how to correctly handle ourselves and the enemy were basically resolved (but not complete¬
contradictions among the people and making it the main theme ly however) in the country, endlessly emerging contradictions
of the campaign to rectify the Party’s style of work as well as of among the people became increasingly conspicuous and prominent.
the state’s political life was on the agenda only after Mao Zedong These contradictions were reflected in a concentrated way as con¬
had issued an important speech on this question at the Supreme tradictions between the masses of the people and their leaders; i.c.,
State Conference in February 1957. the people’s government and the ruling Communist Party. To re¬
solve these contradictions, from the angle of ideological cduc^Jh
it was necessary on the one hand to educate the Communist Par y
II. THE RECTIFICATION CAMPAIGN AND members who held leading posts, government personnel, and stair
members of economic and cultural organizations to listen seriously
THE ANTI-RIGHTIST STRUGGLE
to the criticisms of the masses and strive, in their style ot work to
overcome subjectivism, factionalism and bureaucratism which di¬
Actually, rectification of the Party’s style of work was also vorce them from reality and the masses; on the other hand efforts
proposed at the 8th National Party Congress. In connection with should be made to enhance the consciousness of the masses through
the Yanan rectification movement, Mao Zedong pointed out in education and encourage them to foster a socialist spirit based on
his opening speech to the 8th National Party Congress: At pres¬ the principle of combining collective with individual interests. The
ent, subjectivism, bureaucratism and factionalism still exist in the first aspect should be given priority; therefore, the Party rectifica¬
thinking and working style of many of our comrades; they are tion campaign should stress this aspect in seeking to resolve con¬
harmful to inner-Party unity and unity between the Party and the tradictions between the masses and the leaders, and study the new
people; we must strive to overcome these serious defects, for only problem of how to correctly handle contradictions among the peo¬
in this way can we successfully accomplish the great construction ple under the new situation in which the main task of revolution has
 521
520 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC q^pter seven socialist construction

rfant soeech entitled “On the Correct Handling of Contra-

shifted to construction.
prions Among the People ” He pointed out: Contradictions exist
In the autumn and winter of 1956, instability arose. Interna¬
ntersaUy and socialist society is also full of contradictions. It
tionally, the events in Poland and Hungary were bound to exert
nrecisely these contradictions that propel socialist society to
an influence on China. Domestically, the rapid progress of social
onstan ly advance. In socialist society the basic contradicnons
transformation and the profound changes, plus the rash advance
S, 'hose between the relations of production and the produc¬
in economic construction which could not be totally overcome,
tive forces and between the superstructure and the economic base^
resulted in some strain in the nation’s economic and political life.
However they are fundamentally different in character and have
In the second half of 1956, shortages of grain, meat and everyday
necessities occurred in many cities. Many difficulties were en¬
countered by a small number of students in continuing their
education, by workers in finding employment, and by demobi¬
lized soldiers in getting proper arrangements for placement. A
few people created disturbances. According to incomplete statis¬
tics, during the six months between September 1956 and March
former should be resolved through methods of coercion an
1957, more than 10,000 workers staged a number of strikes and
dictatorship while the latter can only be resolved through demo
strikes, while more than 10,000 students became involved in
strikes and drawing up petitions. In many places in the rural
areas, after the summer harvest, peasants agitated to withdraw
from the coops and complained about shortages of food grain.
Most sensitive of all to changes in the political climate were the
intellectuals, who became increasingly uninhibited in their think¬
ing after the policy was put forward of “Jetting a hundred flowers
bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend.” They criti¬
cized dogmatism and aired differing views on questions related
to culture, education, science and other fields. Some people also
openly criticized shortcomings and mistakes in the work of the
Party and the government as well as problems in the working
how to correctly handle contradictions among the people m
style of some cadres. Their comments, some of which were
erroneous, included many sharp criticisms. In face of these newly
emerging contradictions, many Party members and cadres, lack¬
ing ideological preparation, found themselves in a passive posi¬
tion, or, still judging new things by old standards, they regarded
all the disturbances and sharp criticisms by the masses as reflec¬ by small numbers of people, and the
tions of the class struggle and attempted to suppress them in a schools of thought con-
rude, simplistic manner.
tend” and “long-term coexistence and mutual supervis »
In February 1957, at an enlarged Supreme State conference
The quest n of practising economy and China’s path to industrial-
attended by more than 1,800 people, Mao Zedong delivered an
522 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter seven socialist construction

\nervision over the proceedings. Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi

ization. Mao Zedong said, “Today, matters stand as follows. The
pni south on separate routes. Along the way they made reports,
large-scale, turbulent class struggles of the masses characteristic
*kiL Party cadres to fully understand the profound transmon
of times of revolution have in the main come to an end, but class
Lm revolution to construction, and to fully understand and
struggle is by no means entirely over. While welcoming the new
Idoot the Party’s policy of correctly handling contradiction
system, the masses are not yet quite accustomed to it. Govern¬
among the people. In this way, “literature and art science and
ment personnel are not sufficiently experienced and have to
technology will prosper, the Party can always maintain its vital
undertake further study and investigation of specific policies.” He
ity, the people’s cause will flourish, and China will become a
held that it was imperative for us at this juncture to raise the
question of distinguishing contradictions among the people from nowerful yet lovable country.”16
P°Qn Aoril 27 the Party Central Committee formally issued its
those between ourselves and the enemy, as well as the question of
Direction the Rectification Campaign which pointed out.
the correct handling of contradictions among the people, in order
Since the Party has now attained the status of the party in powt
to unite the people of all nationalities in our country to develop
throughout the nation and received the support of the broad
our economy and culture, consolidate our new system and build
masses of people, many comrades are likely to adopt the simple
up our new state.
method of sending down administrative orders to deal with
Mao Zedong’s speech at the Party’s National Conference on
problems Some elements, lacking a firm stand, are prone to
Propaganda Work held in March 1957 by the Propaganda Depart¬
become tainted with remnants of the old society working style to
ment of the Party Central Committee and attended by more than
tike on certain ideas of special privilege, and to even treat the
800 Party and non-Party ideological workers further expounded the
masses with methods of retaliation. Therefore, it is necessary to
Party’s evaluation of intellectuals (the overwhelming majority sup¬
carry out an overall, profound rectification campargn throughout
port the socialist system; a small number do not quite welcome the
the Party against bureaucratism, factionalism and subjecMKm.
socialist system but are still patriotic; the number of intellectuals
This rectification campaign should be a serious ideological edu¬
who are hostile to our state is very small). He affirmed as necessary
cational movement to be carried out in a gentle, mdd y’ f
the reform of intellectuals and their integration with the masses of
well as a movement for making appropriate criticism and self
workers and peasants. “Let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred
criticism. The methods to be adopted should include heart to
schools of thought contend,” he declared, was a basic as well as a
heart talks between individuals, small discussion meetings or
long-term policy. In leading our country, the “open wide” policy
group ‘meetings; in general, large-scale criticism meetings or
should be followed, and to “open wide” means to give people a
public accusation meetings are not recommended. h . T
chance to express their opinions, so that they dare to speak, dare to
Situation in the Summer of 1957,” Mao Zedong sard. Th P V»
criticize and dare to debate.
aim in carrying out the rectification campaign is to create a
These two speeches, passed on to the broad masses of cadres
nohtical shuation in which we have both centralism and democ-
and intellectuals to discuss, aroused enthusiastic repercussions. In and freedom, both unity of will and personal
the course of passing on and discussing these two speeches,
contradictions among the people in various areas were also ex¬
63 The advance^f the theory and policies on the correct handling
posed and examined. As for the Communist Party, its rectifica¬
of contradictions among the people, and also the proposal tor the
tion campaign had already begun. The Party Central Committee
rectification campaign, together with the politica
circulated a number of inner-Party directives and the Parly
designed to create, continued and developed the line ot the
newspaper publicly issued a series of editorials to strengthen
 525
524 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPc CHAPTER SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

«/ that they have been accurately exposed. The criticisms made

National Party Congress; they represented new achievements in
exploring China’s own road for building socialism, with equally HvThe majority of nonparty personages are, fundamentally speak-
far-reaching importance and significance to the Party’s cause. yo sincere and correct, no matter how sharp they are. The e
“Ifticisms account for well over 90 percent and are extremely
Rectification Shifts to Anti-Rightist Struggle

After publication of the rectification instructions, the Party

and government organizations at all levels, Party organizations of
institutions of higher learning, scientific research institutes and
cultural and art units each held discussion meetings and group
meetings in various forms, listened to the opinions of the masses
both inside and outside the Party and welcomed the “free airing
of views” (a simplified phrase which developed in the course of Xrs and have be^ domineering. Although this was by no
discussing and implementing the policy of letting a hundred means true of all Party members, this situation was extreme y
flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend). common. This wrong orientation must be
From May 8 to June 3, on 13 occasions, the United Front nnd what is more, the sooner the better. These inner rany
Department of the CPC Central Committee held the forums instructions showed that the Party sincerely hoped, through its
attended by responsible members of the democratic parties and rectification to handle contradictions among the people correc -
nonparty democratic personages. From May 16 to June 8, on 25 v inelud'ng those between the masses of the people and leading
occasions, the United Front Department of the CPC Central members and also hoped to overcome the unhealthy tendency in
Committee and the No. 8 Office of the State Council held forums Tc Party and to strengthen unity between the Party and the
attended by personages from industrial and commercial circles.
Large numbers of cadres and ordinary people both inside and Pe<Hnwever a complicated situation arose in the course of the
outside the Party enthusiastically responded to the Party’s call rectification A few bourgeois Rightists, taking advantage o re

and put forward many criticisms and suggestions in regard to the “free airing of views” and “great democracy," launched unbridled
work of the Party and government as well as the working style attacks against the Party and the newborn socialist system. The
and ideology of Party and government cadres. The Party sincere¬ leading posUion of the Communist Party in the political life of
ly welcomed the well-meant criticisms and suggestions from all the state was attacked as "overall, country wide domination by the
the personages in general outside the Party and from Party Partv” They brazenly demanded that the Communist Party
members. In May, the Party Central Committee issued inner- withdraw from government offices and schools and that gover
Party instructions on several occasions pointing out that “in the ment representatives withdraw from the jomt state-private enter-
Xs They “iso demanded to “take turns at being ‘he banker
past two months, open discussions of contradictions among the
people have been conducted at various meetings participated by and vainly5^attempted to take over leadership from the Par y.
Ttfey tried their best to gloss over the achievements made: in
non-party personages and reported in newspapers and magazines,
thus, with exceptional speed, all kinds of contradictions have been socialist transformation and constructor.and
exposed. It seems that in the past we did not fully comprehend the superiority of the socialist system ^bey regarded the ys
the situation of these contradictions in detail. It is a good thing
 chapter seven socialist construction
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
r>ntral Committee issued inner-Party instructions for
bureaucratism, sectarianism and subjectivism. This situation a-
8’ 1 nizinu forces to beat back the attack of the Rightists. On the
roused the vigilance of the Party. That only a few people among
0161, davRenmin Ribao (People’s Daily) published an editorial
the intellectuals harboured hostility towards socialism had al¬
Spiled “Why This’" A turbulent anti-Rightist mass movement
ready been soberly appraised and pointed out by the Party on
6 eid nadonwide The practices of speaking out freely, airing
several occasions. But, their current furious attack had not been
SP WS fully holding great debates and writing big-character post
foreseen. On May 16, the Party Central Committee issued rele¬
TwerfaL" Se in the struggle against the Rightists. The
vant inner-Party instructions. While stressing that over 90 percent
of the criticisms of our Party made by non-Party personages were
sincere and correct, the Party Central Committee also pointed out
that recently, out in society there were a few people with anti-
Party leanings who were eager to have a trial of strength. They
had made some provocative remarks and tried to deflect the
Party’s direction (correctly handling contradictions among the
people and consolidating the people’s democratic dictatorship in
the interests ot socialist construction) to an erroneous orientation.
The Party Central Committee decided that their incorrect and
injurious remarks could be issued and published in the newspa¬
pers without interference, and for the time being no rebuttal
would be made so that their true reactionary features would be
stage of studying documents, criticism and ^tros^cnans y
exposed. That is to say, the Party changed its stance of opposing 6 irH Plenarv Session of the 8th 1 artv uciuk
free airing ol views” to one of favouring “free airing of views”
so as to take over the weapon from the Rightists. On May 19,
big-character posters appeared in some colleges and universi¬
ties in Beijing. The Central Committee held the view that big-
RlThf rS""on and anti-Rightist movement ended in the
character posters which could temper the masses while exposing
problems and Rightists, had more advantages than disadvantages. summer of 1958.
Thus institutions of higher learning and units of the Party and
government saw a rapid upsurge in speaking out freely, airing
Consequences and Influence of Expanding the Anti-Rightist
views fully, holding great debates and writing big-character post¬ Struggle
ers. This brought on an artificially aggravated, nationwide polit¬
After the socialist transformation of private-ownership of the
ical tension and instability.
“Things Are Beginning to Change,” an article written by Mao
Zedong in mid-May, marked the change in the guiding ideology
of the Party Central Committee. The theme of the on-going
rasr-sti*-
movement switched from the correct handling of contradictions
among the people to a struggle against the enemy, and from
inner-Party consolidation to beating back the Rightists. On June
 528 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter seven socialist construction 529

socialist road. If we had given up the struggle and had not clearly verged on the line of demarcation between the enemy and our¬
beaten back the attack of a few Rightists in the spheres where selves politically. Only a few days later, the Party Central Com¬
problems had arisen, it would have led to ideological and political mittee concluded that the contradiction between the bourgeois
confusion. Experience gained by the Party in this respect is Rightists and the people was contradiction between the enemy
precious and is of far-reaching significance. However, the Right¬ and ourselves. This led to a drastic expansion of the struggle
ists made up a very small number. At that time, the Party made against the Rightists both in regard to the numbers involved and
an overly grave estimate of the class struggle and the Rightist the nature of the contradiction. The methods adopted ot speaking
attack and failed to adopt a prudent view towards the ferocity of out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates and writing
the developing struggle. This resulted in a serious expansion of big-character posters during the movement were also important
the struggle against Rightists. Originally, the article “Things Are factors in seriously magnifying the struggle against the Rightists.
Beginning to Change” encompassed the following considerations: Among those who were designated as “Rightists’ only a very
criticize the Rightists; with some exceptions no names need to be small number opposed the Party and socialism. Many persons
mentioned, and room for manoeuvre should be left to facilitate simply made criticisms and suggestions about the Party’s work
compromise under appropriate conditions. The Party Central and its cadres. Their criticisms were either correct or lopsided,
Committee issued instructions on June 29, 1957 to the effect that but were not in opposition to the Party or socialism. However,
the number of Rightists who should be criticized by name in many leading cadres regarded themselves as infallible, could not
different fields should be 400 in Beijing and 4,000 nationwide. listen to unpleasant criticisms and tended to interpret these
Already this did not, in the main, criticize the political and criticisms as being anti-Party and anti-socialism. Some people put
ideological trend as such, but placed more emphasis on specific forward questions and ideas about the reality and theory ot
mention of names, the number of which, nevertheless, was still socialism. Even if their remarks deviate from the proper direc¬
quite limited. After only ten days, the number of people who were tion, their errors should have been resolved through discussions
to be criticized by name in accordance with the Party Central and education, and should not have come under attack as oppos¬
Committee instructions was doubled. In August, as instructed, ing socialism. Many faithful comrades, many friends who had a
the movement was to be further spread to prefectures and coun¬ long history of cooperation with the Party, many talented intel¬
ties, urban districts and large factories and mines (later to the lectuals and many young people who, politically, were lull of zeal
teaching staff of primary and middle schools), and, as proposed, but lacked maturity, were mistakenly designated as “Rightists.”
Rightists were to be “dug out” from in deep. According to Because of this they felt grieved and wronged for a long time and
statistics of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 8th Party Central could not play their due role in socialist construction. It was a
Committee held in September, over 60,000 people were designat¬ great loss not only to them personally, but also a loss to the cause
ed as Rightists; by the time the movement was over, the figure of the whole Party and state. Magnifying the struggle against the
had jumped to 550,000. With regard to the determination of the Rightists was a blow to the enthusiasm of many intellectuals and
nature of the Rightists, the suggestions of the United Front their faith in the Party to definite degree. This was also a loss to
Department of the Party Central Committee approved by the the Party and state.
Party Central Committee on July 11 still said that “among the When rectification of improper working styles started, the
people there is the division into left, middle and right.” At the Party Central Committee reiterated that we should not handle
same time, it pointed out that there were indeed some ultra- contradictions among the people with methods used in struggling
Rightists among the Rightists and some of the ultra-Rightists against the enemy. However, the situation was complicated, a
530 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

handful of Rightists had launched attacks; leading members of oeriod that is, before the completion of the socialist construction
fhe struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and
the Party at all levels tended to rely on the political experience
between the socialist road and the capitalist road to all along
they had accumulated and the habits that had become strength¬
been the main internal contradiction in China The second
ened during fierce class struggles over a long period of time; they
Eon announced that there were “two exploiting classes and two
again struck out on the familiar route of directing a mass move¬
abouring classes" in China. Rightists, the overthrown comprador
ment of struggle against enemies and interpreted a host of con¬
and landlord classes and other reactionaries made up what was
tradictions among the people which had newly emerged during
called one of the exploiting classes. “The national bourgeoisie,
the period of historical transformations as contradictions between
the enemy and ourselves. This is a big lesson in the Party history which is now gradually accepting the socialist transf°rmi,t'“”’
and its intellectuals” were called the other exploiting class. Work
since the founding of New China, showing how hard it is to deal
ers and farmers were the two labouring classes. In this way,
with an unfamiliar, complicated political situation and to bring
intellectuals were, for practical purposes, classified within the
about historical changes in political life.
Drastic enlargement of the struggle against the Rightists had scope of the second exploiting class. National Partv
The judgement of the 1st Session of the 8th National 1 arty
an extremely untoward effect on high policy: the assessment
Congress on the change of the main contradictions (i.e., he
which had been made at the 1st Session of the 8th National Party
principal contradiction within the country was no longer th
Congress on the principal contradiction in Chinese society was
contradiction between the proletariat and the bourge01"ie’b"
changed at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 8th Party Central
between the need of the people for rapid economic andl culdural
Committee. Mao Zedong pointed out in his speech in the early
development and the present state of the economy and cuUure
days of the plenary session that the main contradiction in Chinese
that fell short of their need) in Chinese society was, fundamen
society was still the contradiction between the proletariat and the
tally speaking, correct. The session did not negate the existence
bourgeoisie, the contradiction between the socialist road and the
of the class struggle and, what is more, it clearly pointed out
capitalist road. Many comrades expressed doubts concerning this
“After the completion of the socialist transformation, struggle
view at the plenary session panel discussions. They held that the
between socialism and capitalism in regard to stand, vtewpom
answer to the question reached at the 8th National Party Con¬
and method will continue for a fairly long period of time. 1 he
gress was still correct; that this conclusion should not be changed
fact that Rightists launched attacks in 1957 proved that the
because of the anti-Rightist struggle; and that the temporarily
struggle in the ideological field over which who would win out
exacerbated class struggle should not be regarded as the long¬
capitalism or socialism, had not naturally come to an end along
term, main contradiction. Some other comrades were of the view
with the completion of the transformation of private ownership
that although class struggle in the economic sphere had been
of the means of production. However, how to handle the stru8g'®
basically allayed, class struggle in the political and ideological
was a complicated matter. The Party lacked experiences in this
spheres would persist for a long time and was still the main
respect The practice of drastically magnifying the struggle
contradiction in society. In his speech at the later period of the
against the Rightists, once it found expression m theory unsettled
plenary session, Mao Zedong disagreed with the former views.
and revised the scientific judgement made at the 8th Na*
In accordance with Mao Zedong’s opinions, the 2nd Session of
Partv Congress concerning the main contradiction in Chinese
the 8th National Party Congress further affirmed, “The experi¬
Tocilty The revised judgement became the theoretica basis on
ence of the rectification movement and the struggle against
which the Party was to commit, again and again, mistakes, not
Rightists once again demonstrates that in the entire transition
 S33
^TEB SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION
532 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
,1 Tn his sDeech at the meeting he not only changed the
only of class-struggle magnification, but even those of a purely
eXrieement of the 8th National Party Congress on the mam
fictitious nature.
1 nntradiction in the Chinese society, but also changed the policy
Exploring the way to build socialism in China involves a very
of struggle against conservative ideas, on the one hapd’ and ™
difficult process, and must advance through complicated trials.
advance on the other, in economic construction, as had been
At that time, in the main, two major problems confronted China:
confirmed at the 1st Session of the 8th National Party g
one was the class struggle under socialist condition, and the other,
He criticized the 1956 opposition to premature advance as sweep-
the scale and speed of socialist construction. Throughout the long
f„g as^e the slogan of achieving greater, faster better and more
period of about 20 years (1957-76), our Party, in dealing with
economic results, as well as the Forty-Article Outline for Ag^
these two problems, repeatedly made serious mistakes which were
cultural Development; with the emergence of the Rightist cievia
mutually exacerbating and which steered the explorations astray
ion th “dPed the Rightist attackers with matter to gossip
along a course fraught with ups and downs.
about. The session adopted and published the revised draft of he
outline and decided that with the discussion of the outline as the
^emral task, a big debate over the rural produc«^»udta
III. EMERGENCE OF THE “GREAT LEAP conducted in the rural areas so as to promote the rapid develop
FORWARD” AND PEOPLE’S COMMUNES ment of agriculture. On November 13, thc People s Da ly pub-
lished an editorial to this end. The editorial pointed out, Some
The proposal to launch a “great leap forward” signalled the people have suffered from the disease of Right-deviatiomst con¬
Party’s intention to strive for the opening up of a new prospect servatism trailed at a snail’s pace and failed to understand that
in its exploration of the path for China’s socialist construction. after the formation of agricultural cooperatives we have the
History has proved that this effort failed. But the proposal in 1958 conditions and the need for a big leap forward on the productio
for a “great leap forward” was made against the background of front. This heralded the “great leap forward. Tonfer-
contemporaneous historical developments. Mao Zedong led the Chinese delegation to attend the Confer
First of all, there was the influence of the anti-Rightist strug¬ ence of Communist and Workers’ Parties held in November 1957
gle. The Party held that the victory of the struggle had greatly in Moscow, and the Chinese Communist Party enjoyed grea
fired the enthusiasm of the people for socialist construction. nrestige in the international Communist movement. The first
During the rectification, a new atmosphere of rapid production man-made earth satellite launched into space by *e Soviet U,
growth emerged in some factories and rural areas. Many people inspired socialists throughout the world. The Soviet Umon pu
were of the view that it was entirely possible that construction forward the suggestion that it would catch up with or surpass
could be conducted at a faster speed nationwide than envisaged
United States in fifteen years. Mao Zedong Propos^d at *
in the First Five-Year Plan. Mao Zedong believed all the more meeting that China should catch up with or surpass Britain *
that the 1956 opposition to premature advance was wrong. At the fifteen years in steel output. At the 8th National Congress onhe
3rd Plenary Session of the 8th Party Central Committee held in Chinese Trade Unions held in December, on behalf ot the Centra
late September and early October of 1957, apart from discussing Committee Liu Shaoqi extended his congratulations and open y
rectification and the struggle against the Rightists, the topic of "ced^call tothe people of thecountrythatChmashou.d
rural work also came under discussion. On listening to some
catch up with or surpass Britain in the output of iron and steel
leaders of local governments proposing to achieve greater, faster,
and other important industrial products in fifteen years. In winter
better and more economic results, Mao Zedong became very
 chapter seven socialist construction 535
534 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
as well as with the slogan of “carrying on a bitter struggle in three
that year, the Party committees of various provinces, municipal¬
years” to basically transform backward conditions, and departing
ities and autonomous regions held representative conferences at
as it did from the track of seeking truth from facts to direct
which they used the style of “speaking out freely, airing views
a steady advance. At the Chengdu conference, Mao Zedong
fully, holding great debates and writing big-character posters” to
stressed that it was necessary to do away with blind laith and to
criticize Right-deviationist conservatism; at the same time, they
emancipate the mind. He also stressed combining study with
mobilized and organized farmers to work day and night to set off
independent creation and criticized the dogmatism characterizing
a winter high tide of agricultural production centred on building
the past eight years’ economic work (mainly heavy industry and
water conservancy projects, raising pigs so as to provide more
the work of planning) and held that this was owing to the pressure
manure, and improving the soil. This raised the curtain on the
of foreign experience, the inability to think independently and the
great leap forward.
failing to take warnings from the dogmatism ot Wang Ming. The
Nanning and Chengdu conferences, inasmuch as they represented
The 2nd Session of the 8th National Party Congress a new starting point in exploring China’s own road lor building
socialism, had a positive aspect, lhal enabled the Central Com
In January and March 1958, Mao Zedong held work confer¬
mittee and the whole Party to open up a new train of thought;
ences in Nanning and Chengdu attended by some of the leading
strive to carry forward the good traditions ol maintaining inde¬
members from the central and local governments. With regard to
pendence and keeping the initiative in one’s own hands and the
estimating the economic work in 1956 and the debate over for¬
mass line- traditions which had been formed in the long revolu¬
mulating the 1957 economic plan, Mao Zedong more sternly
tionary struggles of the Chinese people; enhance vigour and
repudiated the struggle against premature advance; he criticized
develop China’s socialist construction with better methods and at
Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun, saying that the struggle against
a quicker pace. However, practice proved later that the confer¬
premature advance, or “rash” advance as it was called, discour¬
ences exerted a negative etlect on the work of the Cential Com¬
aged the 600 million people and committed a mistake of political
mittee and the whole Party. The leaders of the Central Committee
orientation. At the Nanning conference, Mao Zedong put for¬
who had opposed rashness or advocated opposition to rashness in
ward the idea of “uninterrupted revolution” and held that in 1956
a fundamental victory of socialist revolution was won in the 1956 (they represented the majority of the Party Central Com¬
ownership of the means of production, and in 1957 a fundamental mittee, and what is more, their stand was affirmed at the 1st
victory of socialist revolution was won in the rectification move¬ Session of the 8th Party Congress and at the 2nd Plenary Session
ment and the struggle against Rightists on the political and of the 8th Party Central Committee) were inappropriately criti¬

ideological front. Now a technical revolution should be conducted cized at the two conferences; this made way for the following two
to shift the focus of the Party’s work to technical revolution. influences:
It is true, the transfer of the focus of the Party’s work can be First, the new explorations actually negated the valuable, suc¬
considered a continuation of the correct strategic idea of shifting cessful experience accumulated by the Party and the people from
revolution to construction repeatedly stressed before and after the the time of the economic recovery to the First Five-Year Plan
1st Session of the 8th National Party Congress. However, this period and summed up by the 8th National Party Congress. The
particular kind of transfer could not but depart from the correct new explorations should have been conducted on the basis of
orientation, integrated as it was with criticism of the struggle these experiences. Totally ignoring them made it very hard to
against rash advance and the launching of the great leap forward avoid action based on conjecture and rashness divorced from
 537
536 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter seven socialist construction

reality. launched in the second half of 1956 had led to “saddle-shaped"

Second, the new exploration actually negated the experience economic development; that is, a high ude in 1956'a .lo™ “<^
and wisdom of the collective leading body of the Party Central (actually it is not a low tide) in 1957 and a bigger high tide in
Committee and destroyed the principle of collective leadership 1958 Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun and other leading members who
and democratic centralism of the Party. Thus, furthering the were responsible for the struggle against premature advance made
tendency to make individual arbitrary decisions and easing the self-criticisms at the session. Many people who were realistic and
development of the personality cult was hardly avoidable. took a sceptical, wait-and-see attitude were also criticized as
In May 1958, the 2nd Session of the 8th Party Congress was “bvstanders,” “people who are biding their time to take revenge
held in Beijing. On behalf of the Central Committee, Liu Shaoqi at the session; it was said that they did not hold the red bannei
made a political report. In accordance with the suggestion of Mao but a “white banner.” All the localities and departments were
Zedong, the session adopted the general line of “going all out, called upon to “pull up the white banners and plant red banners.
aiming high and achieving greater, faster, better and more econ¬ The pressure of these criticisms greatly encouraged the proneness
omical results in building socialism.” The explanation of the to boasting and exaggeration and further promoted the Left-
general line in the political report was that the main task of the deviationist overanxiety for quick results. Compared with he
Parly is to conduct socialist construction and implement technical targets suggested at the 1st Session of the 8th Party-C ongress, the
and cultural revolution (here, the implementation of the cultural targets for the Second Five-Year Plan adopted at the _nd Session
revolution was to develop culture, education and public health of the 8th Party Congress were doubled generally throughout the
that serve economic construction). The political report also put industrial field, and targets for agriculture were raised by 25-50
forward the policy of walking on two legs (referring to a series of percent. The steel output figure was increased from 12 mi ion
policies for balancing the relations between industry and agricul¬ tons to 30 million tons and grain from 250 billion kg to 350 billion
ture, industries run by the central government and those run by kg. In this way, the Second Five-Year Plan cast aside the pro¬
local authorities, large enterprises and small and medium-sized posals” adopted at the 1st Session of the 8th Party Congress and
enterprises). swerved down the road of the great leap lorward.
The explanation was correct. The advancement of the general After the session, the 5th Plenary Session of the 8th Central
line reflected the wishes of the broad masses of people who Committee was held. Lin Biao was elected vice-chairman of the
urgently wanted China’s backward economy and culture to be Central Committee and member of the Standing Committee ol
changed as quickly as possible. However, it ignored the objective the Political Bureau, and three other members were elected to
law of economic development, negated the comprehensive bal¬ enlarge the Political Bureau.
ance of the plan for the development of the national economy and After the 2nd Session of the 8th Party Congress, the movement
exaggerated the role of the subjective will and conscious efforts. of the great leap forward spread to all parts of the country. In t c
Moreover, in propaganda, the fundamental spirit of the general main, it was marked by a single-minded drive to attain a high
line was one-sidedly stressed as “Developing our socialist produc¬ speed in industrial and agricultural production and construction,
tive forces at the highest speed,” “Speed is the soul of the general and by the constant raising and revising of the planned targets by
line” and “Faster is the central link in achieving greater, faster, wide margins. The slogan “taking grain as the key link lor
better and more economical results.” Consequently, blind pursuit agriculture called for reaching the grain output targets stipulated
of faster economic results became an overriding concern. The in the 12-year programme for agricultural development within a
session held arbitrarily that the opposition to rash advance reduced period of only five years, three years, or even one to two
 539
538 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter seven socialist construction

years. The call to “take steel as the key link” pressed for a reduced „„ the contrary, officially expressed support. Grossly overestimat¬
ed vields falsely reflected enormous increases in agricultural
period of only seven years, five years, or even three years, in
which to fulfil in advance the steel output target of catching up nroduction. Leading members of the related departments of the
with or surpassing Britain within fifteen years, as originally central government and many localities were jubilant at the great
ton forward and had not the slightest doubt regarding the
stipulated.
High targets brought about high estimates of yet unharvested misrepresentations indicating unusually large margins of:increase
yields. During the 1958 summer harvest period, a wave of sending in production. The meeting went so far asP™8,1? v„ ,
expected 1958 grain output as reaching 300-350 billion kg (1
in false reports of high yields and launching high-yield “satellites”
S in 1957) and 400-500 billion kg in 1959. The meeting
swept various parts of the country. The news media played it up
with approval as denoting “how bold the people are determines made a formal decision that in 1958 steel output was to be double
how great the output of the land is,” and openly criticized the that of the previous year, reaching 10.7 million tons, and in -
“theory of limitations to grain output” increase and the way of It was to reach 27-30 million tons. The planned targets for the
proceeding on the basis of objective, practical conditions as the Second Five-Year Plan adopted at the meeting were in general
theory that “conditions determine all.” double those adopted at the 2nd Session of the 8th Party Congress
The high targets and proneness to boasting and exaggeration in only three months earlier. The Resolution on Setting Up People s
production promoted eagerness for the transition to a so-called Communes in the Rural Areas adopted at the meeting was
higher form in the sphere of relations of production, and fostered regarded as the “basic policy that should be followed for guiding
the subjective view that the larger the scale of agricultural coop¬ farmers to accelerate socialist construction, finish building social¬
eratives and the higher the degree of public ownership, the ism earlier and gradually make the transition to communisnn
greater the possibility to expand production. In April, the Central The meeting stipulated that the people’s communes should imple¬
Committee issued suggestions on properly merging small agricul¬ ment the principle of merging government administration with
tural cooperatives into large communes; thus large communes commune management and should include workers, farmers,
with one or several thousand households each were established on merchants, students and soldiers; stressed that peoples com¬
trial in various localities. Between July and August, Red Flag and munes should adopt the system of collective ownership at present
People's Daily publicly propagated Mao Zedong’s concept that and should not be in a hurry to change over to the system of
workers, farmers, merchants, students and soldiers would make ownership by the whole people. Nevertheless, the transition to
up each large commune to form the basic units of Chinese society. ownership bv the whole people could be realized at the earliest in
Henan, Shandong and other places immediately responded to the three or four years, or later on in five or slx
call and the establishment of rural people’s communes began. somewhat longer period. The resolution also stated, The real.za
lion of communism in China is no longer something in the distant
future.” The meeting rapidly pushed the great leap forward and
Output of Iron and Steel Doubled by the Year and Upsurge of
the movement to form people’s communes to a high tide. Lett
the People’s Communes
deviations errors, mainly characterized by excessively high tar¬
In August 1958, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central gets, messing things up by issuing wrong orders proneness to
boasting and exaggeration and the “tendency to effect the transi¬
Committee held an enlarged meeting in Beidaihe. The meeting
tion to communism prematurely" spread unchecked, causing
not only made no effort to correct the boasting, exaggeration and
confusion that was already seriously harming everyday life, but great harm.
 chapter seven socialist construction
540 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

After the Beidaihe meeting, people in the rural areas through-

After the meeting, in order to fulfil the current steel produc¬
the country rushed headlong into mass action and organized
tion task which, with the additions made and the sum doubled
that year, had reached 10.7 million tons (only 4 million tons were ^ople’s communes in a big way. Without any experimentation
took just one month or so to basically accomplish this. By the
produced in the first eight months of the year), a nationwide mass
end of the year, 740,000 agricultural cooperatives had merged
movement for making steel was started. With the first secretaries
into 26 000 people’s communes and over 99 percent of the farm
of the Party committees at all levels taking charge, people in the
tens of millions (about 90 million) were mobilized to go to the ers' households were now in communes. As to their characteris¬
mountains, cut trees, excavate coal and find minerals for iron¬ tics the people’s communes were “large in size and collective in
smelting. Some one million small locally devised smelting fur¬ nature”; for all practical purposes, this meant equaUtariamsm
and indiscriminate transfer of resources. Large meant that a
naces and coking furnaces were put together for making steel by
former cooperative with 100-200 households was merged with
indigenous methods. All modern large- and medium-sized iron
others into a people’s commune of 4,500-5,000 or
and steel enterprises also broke through various rules and regula¬
10 000-20,000 households. There was, generally speaking, one
tions, went in for the mass movement in a big way and threw the
commune in a township. “Collective” meant that after the_ merg¬
normal production procedures into disorder. At the same time,
ing of several dozen or even 100 cooperatives differing in eco¬
with iron and steel as the centre, the “entire nation” also went in
nomic conditions, some poorer, some better-oif, all their proper¬
for other undertakings such as power, transport, water conservan¬
cy projects and cultural and educational activities. This was ties were handed over to the people’s commune. Property ot
relatively greater amount would not be returned and that ot less
called “Taking steel as the key link, an all-round leap forward,”
amount would not be made up. An account was made of all he
and “One takes the lead and all go full steam ahead.” Scientific
property and it was distributed in a unified way within the
research, writing articles and poems, or drawing pictures, these
also needed to have a leap forward and to launch “satellites.” This commune. Partial implementation of the supply system (mclud
ing the establishment of public canteens in a big way and ood
widespread blind activity on a mass scale which completely went
provided free of charge, which were called communist factors)
against objective economic laws not only brought about an enor¬
led to serious equalitarianism between the former cooperatives
mous waste of human and material resources, but also led to
serious imbalance between the various branches of the national (they were called production brigades or teams after merging)
and between commune members. At the same time, commune
economy. By the end of 1958, China had produced 11.08 million
members’ plots of land for their private use, domestic animals,
tons of steel, but only 8 million tons were up to standard. Total
fruit trees and so on, also came under commune ownership In
industrial output value of the year was 54.8 percent higher than
the course of establishing various enterprises in a big way the
the previous year, while total agricultural output value, verified
local governments and communes often allocated and used land,
later, registered only a rise of 2.4 percent over the year before
materials and members of the labour force belonging to the
because several dozen million members of rural labour forces
production teams without compensation and even took over hous
were used elsewhere. Investment in capital construction rose by
es and furniture of commune members. All this was nothing u
87.7 percent as against that of the previous year. The total
expropriation of the farmers, who, very upset and discontented
number of workers and staff members throughout the country
slaughtered pigs and sheep, and cut down trees; this
rose by more than 66 percent, burdening the state financial
enormous damage to the productive forces and had a disastrous
department beyond its means. Market supplies were tight and
difficulties arose in production and the daily lives of the people. impact on agricultural production.
 543
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC ^pTFR SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION
542

In the people’s communes, the organization was strictly mili¬

tary. Activities were carried out as if in combat action and
-
ema?hJn rcertainly could mobilize and rely on ihe masses of
everyday life was led in a collective manner. Labour power was Inle for economic construction and could achieve the high
organized into squads, platoons, companies and battalions like a
thC n we desired and which the world had never seen, it was not
military establishment. The method of warfare by large contin¬ Sp^edlh, wish or sentiments of an individual; in a certain sense,
gents was adopted for industry and agriculture. Continuous oper¬
ations went on day and night. It was also stressed that communes
should strive for all-round self-sufficiency in production and
efforts were made to expand the distribution of commodities in
tlK Cv indeed existed Within the limits permitted by the
Ss
the commune. The former small peddlars and vendors, open economy indeed exisicu correctly led and organ-
markets and even household sideline occupations were banned as objective conditions, so long as * conformed t0
“capitalist tails.” Many cadres were of the opinion that the less
commodity exchange there was, the nearer communism would be.
For instance, Xushui County in Hebei Province and Fanxian
County in Shandong Province planned the “transition to commu¬
nism” after two or three years’ experiment. To this end, they
proposed “eight guarantees” and “ten guarantees” and announced
that the people’s communes would sustain all the expenses for
food, clothing, shelter, travel, childbirth, old age, sickness, death,
and weddings. These situations show how deeply the people’s
PHiSi
Sfiifgil
communes at the initial stage were imbued with pronounced
characteristics of equalitarianism and military communism.
The “great leap forward” and the movement to form people’s
communes constituted one instance of a serious mistake made by
the Party in the course of exploring China’s own road for building
socialism. The mistake had its source. “China’s economic back¬
wardness and poor material foundation have up to now landed us
in a passive state. We are fettered spiritually and we have not
emancipated ourselves in this respect” (Sixty Articles for Work
Method ‘draft’). The above remarks made by Mao Zedong in
launching the great leap forward spoke out the common feeling
of the entire Party. To exert the maximum efforts to construct the
country quickly so as to gain more initiative was the common
tion and had failed to make an e»™^t analysi^and study^.^
demand of the entire Party and nation. All the people were
willing to believe that, confronting the Chinese people who had experience accumulated during e mobilizing and
speedily achieved a series of great victories, there was nothing
they could not accomplish. Because we had established an excel-
 545
CHAPTER seven socialist construction
544 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
,th. cuseestion to oppose impatient, rash advance. At the
war and political struggles. When they switched to leading eco¬ ffla AMao "zedong"could still afford the ideas of respect (or
nomic construction, it was very easy for them to believe that if tU” ’ omise) However, after the struggle against Rightists, Mao
they adopted the methods of the mass movement, as in the -r " that developments entirely proved the error of
revolutionary war and political struggles, economic construction
could be conducted in a quicker and better way. During the
revolutionary war period, life in the revolutionary ranks, border¬
ing on military communism, not only left happy memories for
many comrades, but also influenced their concept of the future
ideal society. Because of the anti-Rightist deviation, the three
transformations of socialism were greatly accelerated and rapidly
ss irisrzs srx->r
determination. Impelled by hotheads eager for quick results, the
completed. Many comrades saw only its victories, but failed to
“great leap forward” could hardly have been avoided.
see the many rough and tumble problems that were left and that
would require a long time to adjust and solve. As a result, it
strengthened their self-confidence in relying on the anti-Rightist IV. INITIAL EFFORTS TO CORRECT
deviation and going all out to step up construction and accelerate
progress. Many comrades did not completely fail to see numerous “LEFr” MISTAKES
mix-ups and divergencies arising in the mass movement. Howev¬
er, they often regarded them as minor aspects in the development
of the situation for which, unavoidably, the price had to be paid
j&sr&szx —as
wstMm
as progress went on. They held that what was most important was
the enthusiasm of the masses of the people. They were worried
that correcting deviation would undermine this enthusiasm. But
what they did not understand was that only if the masses were
correctly led to achieve practical results in construction, could

IMlssiSss
their enthusiasm be really maintained; and that practices which
ran counter to objective economic laws and natural laws as well
as exaggerated and false reports of “leap forward results” which
damaged production, would truly undermine the enthusiasm of
the masses. In short, faced with a series of victories, many Cadres, He S the lead in pointing out and seeking to correct the
including many leading cadres in the Party, gradually dispensed “Left” mistakes he had already discovered, reahzmg that o,nly
with modesty and prudence and gave way to their gradually
expanding arrogance and self-satisfaction. They did not have
sufficient appreciation of the arduousness of building socialism
rTnr^tr" VtS
development. The Central Or—. "
in a large country with a backward economy and culture, and did
not have a sufficient understanding of the necessity to master Meeting hddin July 1959, led the whole Party in initial efforts
economic laws and scientific knowledge. In 1956, proceeding
to accomplish this aim.
from reality, many comrades such as Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun
 547
546 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter seven socialist construction

Rectification of the People’s Communes Utopian idea that cannot materialize. The relations of production
^ust suit the nature of the forces of production. Transition from
The First Zhengzhou Meeting was a work conference attended Baalist collective ownership to socialist ownership by the whole
by some, not all, of the central and local leaders. Mao Zedong Louie or from socialism to communism, must be based on a
proposed to hold the meeting, for he had found that in the St level of development of the forces of product.on Since
movement to form people’s communes many people had become we are enthusiastic about communism, we must iirst of all be
caught up in a “rash advance” and entertained all sorts of Tager to develop the forces of production and do our utmost to
confused ideas. There was a tendency to immediately proclaim realize industrialization. No groundless announcemennthould be
ownership by the whole people, abolish commerce and eliminate made that the rural people’s communes are about to carry out
commodity production. He felt that it was necessary to talk with the system of ownership by the whole people at once, much less
these comrades to bring them round, to let them calm down and ‘lhat we a” about to ’’enter communism at once.” Tins would only
read some works on Marxist theory “in the light of China’s distort and vulgarize the lofty ideal of communism and encour
socialist economic revolution and economic construction ... so age the tendency of petty-bourgeois egalitarianism, while faibrjg
that they could clarify their ideas.”17 An enlarged meeting of the to promote the development of socialist construction in any
Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee was also held in
Wuchang during November and December 1958. The two meet¬ ""The resolution countered the erroneous tendency to try to do
ings made preparations for the coming 6th Plenary Session of the away with commodity production and commodity exchange too
8th Central Committee held in Wuchang. Following many discus¬
eli-ly It pointed out: In the future, for a requrstte period of time
sions, the 6th Plenary Session adopted the “Resolution on Some
it will be essential to promote an extensive development of
Problems Concerning the People’s Communes” which accords the
commodity production in the people’s communes as well as of
rise of the people’s communes a high evaluation. At the same
commodity exchange between the state and the communes and
time, it elaborates several major policy issues and theories, in an
among communes. This kind of commodity production and ex
attempt to clarify the confusion which had already appeared in
ideology and work. cZgeTT be conducted in a planned way on the basts of
The resolution stands out against the erroneous tendency of socialist public ownership; therefore, it is not capitalist. To con
over-zealousness to make the transition to ownership by the whole linue to develop commodity production and to practise dlstrl^
people and to communism. It points out: It is necessary to ion according to work are two major issues of principle for
distinguish clearly between collective ownership and ownership promoting the socialtst economy. This must be the common
by the whole people, and in particular, between socialism and understanding of all members throughout the Party. ...
communism. The people’s commune is an economic organization U The resoluhon sttpulates: The means of hvelihood (mcludmg
which is at present basically still under collective ownership. The housing) and the savings deposits owned by commune members
turning of the agricultural cooperative into the people’s commune themselves are still to be owned by them after organization of the
does not mean changing from collective ownership to ownership neoole’s communes, and will always belong to them.
by the whole people, and in no way does it mean passing over ^The 6th Plenary Session also adopted “Resolutions On the
from socialism to communism. To deny prematurely the general 1959 National Economic Plan.” As the mistakes ot
principle of “to each according to his work” and to attempt to ambitious output quotas had as yet failed to be corrected, the
replace it with the principle of “to each according to his needs”; meeting formally announced 2-fold and over 2-fold °xhe
that is to say, to enter communism under unripe conditions, is a 1957 as the 1958 quotas for grain, cotton, steel and coal.
 548 549
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter seven socialist construction

quota for grain reached 375 billion kg and for steel, 11 million ownership by production team was canceled as soon as com¬
tons. Thus, although “reducing the pressure” was emphasized, the munes were established and complete ownership by communes
1959 quota for grain output was raised to 525 billion kg and other was instituted. The “egalitarianism and indiscriminate re<Julslt‘™
quotas were also kept high in the 1959 plan set at the Beidaihe of manpower, funds and materials as well as money collecting
Meeting. On the other hand, capital construction investment was threw the peasants into a panic. There lies the basic reason
reduced from the original 50 billion yuan to 36 billion yuan and the present tension in our relationships with the peasants. He
the quota for steel output from 27-30 million tons down to 18-20 stressed that the tendency of egalitarianism denied rational dif
million tons. For 1959, the plan stipulated an even “greater leap ferences in income among production teams and among Individ
forward” than that of 1958. After the resolution was adopted, ual members of the commune; that is to say, it denied the socialist
Chen Yun suggested that it was not necessary to announce the principle of distribution according to work, and of more pa^
various quotas set for 1959 in a communique, but his view was more work. The tendency of over-centralization denied the own
not put forward formally. ership by production teams, denied the proper rights pertaining
After the 6th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee, to production teams, and arbitrarily transferred the Proxiesi of
the work to rectify people’s communes was conducted nationwide. production teams to communes. The two tendencies embody the
The tendency to rush the transition to ownership by the whole mistaken idea of denying the law of value and the law of ex
people and to communism prematurely was stopped. However, change at equal values. Exchange at equal values during the
the egalitarianism and over-centralization within the communes period of socialism is an economic law which cannot be ne8ated_
still prevailed. Moreover, due to the obligation to fulfill the high violate it is to take over the fruits of other people s work free
purchase quota resulting from the high estimated output, and the of charge We did not adopt the method of expropriation of the
launching of inappropriate struggle against selfish departmental¬ national bourgeoisie without compensation; how can we appro
ism on the part of the production team and against the practice priate products of the peasants’ work without compensation.
of hiding the exact production figures, tension in Party and During the meeting, Mao further pointed out in a comment that
government relationships with the peasants was not really alle¬ to do to was “Left” adventurism. He also mentioned within a
viated. Mao Zedong learned of this situation during an inspection smaller circle that main efforts within the Party should be against
tour and deemed it necessary to further straighten out the prob¬ “Left” ideas and practice.
lem of “the communist wind,” which was to begin with the To straighten out the above two tendencies, Mao proposed 14
problem of ownership at the different levels within the commune. phrases to serve as principles to rectify and build the pet*le
Therefore, an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the communes. These are: “Unified leadership based on the produc
CPC Central Committee (also known as the Second Zhengzhou tion team; level-to-level management and relegating power to the
Meeting) was convened in Zhengzhou in February and March lower levels; three-level accounting, with each responsible for
1959. profits and losses; plan of distribution decided by the commune
At the meeting, Mao Zedong made an important speech which proper accumulation and rational transfer ; materials and labour
pointed out: The main problem in the people’s commune move¬ ?o be exchanged at equal value; distribution according to work
ment was that we have gone a little too far in our efforts to and admitting differences.” w .
improve the relations of production; that is, the system of own¬ After warm discussion, the Second Zhengzhou Meeting, on
ership in the commune. We did not understand that ownership agreeing with Mao Zedong’s suggestions and principles,worked
by the commune must also undergo a process of development. out “Regulations on the Management System of People s Com
550 chapter seven socialist construction 551
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

muncs (draft).” The “Eighteen Questions Concerning the People’s repeatedly stressed, “In short, we must act according to the
Communes” were also laid down in March and April at the masses’ suggestions. No matter what methods they are, they will
Shanghai Meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central do if they meet the demand of the masses. Otherwise, the method
Committee. The two documents stipulated: The production team won’t work in the long run.” “We must show concern for the
(about the size of the former advanced agricultural producers’ interests of the masses every day and every hour without fail and
cooperative; it was called production team in some areas, produc¬ must always see that our policy and measures suit the present
tion brigade in others) is the basic accounting unit of the people’s level of consciousness of the masses and the urgent current
commune. Ownership by the production team, at present, is the demands of the people. They won’t work and are bound to fail if
basic form of ownership in the commune. The second document these two factors are missing.”18
further stipulated that the production teams (called production
brigades in some areas, generally they were equivalent to the Quotas for the “Great Leap Forward” and Production
elementary agricultural producers’ cooperatives) under the pro¬ Arrangements Readjusted
duction brigade as a contracted unit, should own part of the
means of production and exercise limited powers of management; At the 7th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee
all old accounts arising from the organization of the people’s convened in Shanghai in April 1959, the draft regulating the
communes should be settled and compensations paid, either the people’s communes was reaffirmed and the draft national eco¬
requisition of manpower, funds and material by counties or nomic plan for 1959 was discussed. The convening of the 2nd
communes from production teams or that done by production National People’s Congress was suggested by some central com¬
teams onto commune members. The latter provision went against mittee members as an opportunity to openly revise certain high
the related regulation provided by the second Zhengzhou Meet¬ quotas set in the past. But they failed to elicit the support of the
ing. Mao Zedong stressed: Only by settling accounts is it possible majority of central committee members. Except for investment in
to put into effect the law of value that exists objectively. This law capital construction, which was reduced from 36 billion yuan to
of value is like a great school, and only by making use of it can 26-28 billion yuan, the high quotas set in the 1959 nationa
our cadres in their tens of millions and our people in their economic plan adopted at the session remained unchanged. Steel
hundreds of millions acquire some knowledge as to how to build was still 18 million tons, 16.5 million tons of which were said in
up our socialism and communism. Otherwise, nothing can be inner Party circles to be good steel. In 1958, good steel accounted
accomplished. for 8 million tons of the 11 million tons of steel produced.
After the Second Zhengzhou Meeting, the Central Committee The 1st Session of the 2nd National People’s Congress was
urged provinces and counties to hold multi-level meetings of convened in Beijing from April 18 to 25. At the session, the 1959
cadres. The five-level cadre meetings at county level included national economic plan set at the 7th Plenary Session of the 8th
cadres from production brigades and production teams, as well as Central Committee was approved and these high quotas were
some commune members, so as to make the principles and poli¬ announced. . , .
cies of the central authorities known to cadres and masses at the At the session, in accordance with the suggestion made by the
grassroots levels. Ihese meetings aimed to fully unveil contra¬ CPC Central Committee, Liu Shaoqi was elected chairman ot the
dictions and seek unity of thinking and actions. Mao Zedong People’s Republic of China, Soong Ching Ling and Dong Biwu
wrote letters several times to cadres at various levels on holding vice-chairmen, and Zhu De chairman of the Standing Committee
these meetings and discussed issues and methods with them. He of the National People’s Congress. It was decided that Zhou Enlai
 553
chapter seven socialist construction
552 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
apparent. First of all, the situation in agriculture was very unfa¬
should continue to serve as premier of the State Council of the
vourable. The area sown to summer crops of that year was 20
People’s Republic of China. Meanwhile, the 1st Session of the 3rd
oercent less than that of the previous year. (This was because the
National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consulta¬
1958 grain output was over-estimated and therelore the slogan
tive Conference (CPPCC) was held in Beijing. Mao Zedong was
“strive for a high yield on a smaller area and bring in a big crop
elected honorary chairman and Zhou Enlai chairman of the
was raised.) The output of summer grain and oil-bearing crops
National Committee. In 1956, 1957, early 1958 and at the end of
dropped by a large margin. Vegetables, meat and other foodstuffs
1958 Mao Zedong requested within and outside the Party that h’e
were in even shorter supply. There were also many problems m
should not serve as chairman of the People’s Republic of China,
industry, while the quotas for iron and steel failed to be fulfilled.
for he wished to withdraw from this leading post to the “second
According to the plan, 6 million tons of steel would have been
line.” However, because of the new situation after the great leap
produced in the first four months of 1959, but actually the output
forward, he stressed at the 7th Plenary Session that power should
was only 3.36 million tons. The problem could not be solved
be concentrated in the Standing Committee of the CPC Political
through the “iron and steel campaign.” The principle of taking
Bureau and Secretariat of the Central Committee under his
steel as the key link worked to the disadvantage of other indus¬
supreme command. Therefore, in fact, he still remained at the
trial sectors, particularly of light industry, which caused the
front line.
production of people’s daily necessities to drop drastically, lhe
After the 7th Plenary Session, Mao Zedong became aware of
amount of commodities in storage shrank, and supply shortages
problems among cadres who dared not reflect the real situation
to levels above them and dared not express differing opinions appeared everywhere. .
In this situation, Chen Yun pointed out that it was nccessai>
from them. At the 7th Plenary Session, he urged people to learn
to economize in the use of grain and to control the volume to be
from Hai Rui, a Ming Dynasty official who was honest, upright,
sold; the raising of pigs, chickens, ducks and fish should be
outspoken and bold enough to state his views in criticism of the
conducted by the state, the collectives and by individuals; raw
Emperor Jiajing. At the end of April, he wrote a letter for
and semifinished materials should be specially allocated for the
inner-Party circulation to cadres at all levels from the provincial
production of daily necessities; the number of surplus workers
to the production team, on speaking the truth. He said, “When
who were over-enrolled the year before should be cut down to
fixing output quotas, say the amount you can fulfil, and say the
reduce the pressure on consumer goods. Following this, he was
exact amount you have harvested. No lies should be told falsify¬
entrusted by Mao Zedong and the Secretariat of the Centra
ing the ceal situation.” “Honest people who dare to speak the
Committee to work out a quota for steel production. After careful
truth, in the last analysis, benefit the people and do not harm
investigation and study, Chen Yun in mid-May suggested to the
themselves. Those who are fond of telling lies bring harm to both
Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee that steel outpu
the people and themselves.” “We must admit,” he added, “a great
for 1959 should be cut back to 13 million tons. He also pointed
number of lies were told owing to pressure from above. Subordi¬
out in a letter to Mao Zedong, “I don’t think that it would be
nates are placed in a difficult position if the superior is boastful,
discouraging to fix the production figure a little lower (it is a
puts pressure on them and promises rewards. Therefore, en¬
reliable figure actually). Just as Comrade Liu Shaoqi stated at the
thusiasm should be there to work with, and definitely no
Political Bureau of the Central Committee, it would be disap¬
falsehood.”19
pointing if the quota was too high to fulfil.”20
Entering the second quarter of 1959, serious consequences
The Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong attached great
resulting from imbalance in the national economy became more
 555
554 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter seven socialist construction

importance to Chen Yun’s views. During May and June, the period, were of great and far-reaching significance. However, as
Central Committee issued a series of urgent instructions: to Mao Zedong at that time lacked a clear understanding of the
reduce the steel output from 18 million tons (16.5 million tons) seriousness of the mistakes, he still completely confirmed the
to 13 million tons; to restore private plots of land in the rural general line, the great leap forward and the people’s communes.
areas and allow commune members to raise livestock and encour¬ Therefore efforts to rectify “Left” mistakes were conducted with¬
age them to make full use of scattered pieces of land on which to in the framework of the “Left” guiding ideology expressed m the
grow crops without being required to hand in any part of it as great leap forward of 1958 and the people’s communes, though
public grain to the state, and to plant trees by houses and the general understanding of the mistakes gradually deepened.
roadsides which would be owned by themselves. The Central Moreover, with the idea regarding class struggle as the main
Committee also clearly pointed out that for over a long period of contradiction in society, some people held that anyone who
time it would be necessary to allow small private ownership of doubted or denied the great leap forward and the people’s com¬
this kind to exist along with large collective ownership. To permit munes was “taking a wait-and-see attitude,” or “biding their time
such small private ownership actually is to protect the fruits of to take revenge” or was an out-and-out hostile element. Since the
labour gained by commune members after their collective labour Central Committee’s measures to correct the “Left” were not at
hours, and cannot be considered “developing capitalism.” all adequately implemented, the “Left” mistakes failed to be
The Central Committee held a meeting at Lushan in early July. corrected completely and the situation did not take a 1 undamen-
With the meeting all prepared for and about to begin, Mao tal turn for the better. In the later period of the Lushan Meeting,
Zedong, in talking with some leading cadres, clearly affirmed that particularly, when a major reversal occurred, the situation took
Chen Yun’s view on “placing market in good order before capital a turn for the worse.
construction” was correct, and that good arrangement for people’s
clothing, food, housing, daily necessities and transport were mat¬
ters of vital bearing on stability among 650 million people. He V. ERRORS IN “ANTI-RIGHT
also proposed to arrange the national economic plan in the order DEVIATIONIST” STRUGGLE AND
of agriculture, light industry and heavy industry instead of heavy
CONTINUATION OF THE “GREAT LEAP
industry, light industry and agriculture, as had been arranged in
the past. This meant stressing agriculture as the basis of the FORWARD”
national economy. It is necessary, first of all, to do a better job
in agriculture. He also pointed out that overall balance was a An enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau ol the CPC
fundamental problem in economic work. One of the major lessons Central Committee was convened in Lushan from July 2 to
in the great leap forward was the failure to achieve an overall August 1, 1959. At the beginning of the meeting, Mao Zedong
balance. put forward 18 questions mainly concerning the current situation,
After nine months of efforts following the First Zhengzhou future tasks and some concrete policies. He considered that the
Meeting, the “communist wind,” boasting and exaggeration, high general situation could be described as: the achievements are
quotas and issuing orders blindly, were brought under initial great, the problems are many and the future is bright. He pro¬
control. The situation began to take a turn for the better. Some posed that all of the members, under the prerequisite of fully
correct theoretical viewpoints and thinkings based on which the affirming achievements, should conscientiously sum up experi¬
policies were formulated, which were put forward during that ences and lessons, further unify thinking and mobilize the whole
556 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter seven socialist construction 557

Party to fulfil the 1959 task of the great leap forward. The seek truth from facts.” Secondly, there is “petty bourgeois
meeting was divided into six large groups for talks and discus¬ fanaticism,” and “uppermost in our minds the thought of
sions. During the discussion, all the participants supported, in entering communism in one stride.” He also mentioned that
principle, the general line, the great leap forward and the people’s correcting “Left” tendencies was more difficult than eliminating
communes. However, many participants, from varying angles, Right conservative ideas. So arduous efforts were needed to
stressed the seriousness of the problems which had arisen after thoroughly correct “Left” thinking. Peng’s letter reflected ob¬
the great leap forward. They felt that the correction of “Left” jective reality and the demands of the masses. The basic content
mistakes, though achievements had been made in the previous is correct. For a member of the Political Bureau to air his own
stage, was not thorough enough, and they proposed that it should views in a letter to the chairman of the Party also conformed
be deepened. Some of them felt genuinely sorry about the mis¬ to the Party’s organizational principle.
takes they had committed in their work, and made earnest self- On July 16, according to Mao Zedong’s instruction, Peng
criticisms; while many others, not willing to spell out the setbacks Dehuai’s letter was printed and issued to all the participants. Mao
and errors in their work, were even less willing to listen to Zedong also proposed among several standing committee mem¬
criticism from others. They even believed that the correction of bers of the Political Bureau to “comment on the nature of the
“Left” mistakes had gone too far which had made the cadres and letter.” During the small group discussions, some people noted
masses feel disappointed, and appeared as a Right deviation. that the letter had exaggerated mistakes, underestimated achieve¬
ments, and carried a note of complaint and discouragement. They
A Letter of Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong went so far as to consider the letter actually denied the achieve¬
ments of the great leap forward and the people’s communes, and
Peng Dehuai, member of the Political Bureau and National that it was directed against Mao Zedong.
Defence Minister, felt anxious about the fact that the meeting Also there were other people who expressed basic agreement
had not completely solved the problem and had failed to with the contents of the letter, thought that it was good to air
achieve unity of ideas. Therefore, on July 14, he sent a letter one’s views, but disagreed with some statements in the letter (such
to Mao Zedong, expressing his sincere views and hoping to get as that concerning petty-bourgeois fanaticism).
Mao Zedong’s support and understanding, so that the meeting Zhang Wentian, vice minister of the Ministry of Foreign
could correctly sum up experiences and lessons. After affirming Affairs, Huang Kecheng, general chief of staff of the People s
the 1958 achievements in his letter, he laid emphasis on some Liberation Army, Zhou Xiaozhou, secretary of CPC Hunan
serious problems in work following the great leap forward of Provincial Committee, spoke at the group meeting, and clearly
1958, and analysed the underlying reasons for them. He noted, expressed their support for the basic views in Peng’s letter. Zhang
“The outstanding contradiction facing us in construction is the Wentian also made a systematic theoretical analysis of the serious
tension in all fields caused by disproportions.” Judging from problems which emerged after the great leap forward, and he
its character, the contradiction “assumes a political nature.” stressed the necessity to study the reasons for the errors and
Objectively the reason why we made mistakes is because we shortcomings from the angle of ideological views, methods and
lack experience in construction, while subjectively there existed style of work. He also mentioned that victory was apt to give
many problems in the way of thinking and style of work. First people a “swell head,” make them conceited and unable to accept
of all, there is the tendency towards boasting, exaggeration and different opinions. So, it was very important to develop a demo¬
one-sided thinking, and the mistake of “failure to adequately cratic style in the Party. Leaders should create a kind of environ-
 559
cHAPTER seven socialist construction
558 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
■ , Hai Rui ” with evil intentions, and had formed a so-called
ment for encouraging subordinates to dare to put forward their
“miUtary club” with Httang Kecheng, Zhang Wentian and Zhou
suggestions. “We shouldn’t fear that no one will eulogize our
Y^aozhou At that time, people inside and outside the Party and
virtues and achievements,” he stressed. “What we fear is that
home and abroad were talking about the “great leap forward
nobody dares to make suggestions to us.”
* a the neonle’s communes. Worries about the present situation
Peng Dehuai’s letter and Zhang Wentian’s speech aroused Mao
S criticism 01 shortcomings and mistakes in the leaders' work
Zedong’s strong dissatisfaction. Mao held that after the Zheng¬
from many cadres and masses of people (including staff member
zhou Meeting, the Central Committee had been leading the whole
of0governmen! institutions. Party school students, PLA comma -
Party to correct “Left” mistakes, while Peng and Zhang had not
Hers and soldiers and personages outside the Party, as/well as
been involved in it. Mao Zedong considered the orientation of the
some representative figures who had been labeled as Right is s)
great leap forward and the people’s communes to be correct. So
were ah reported to the Central Committee through various
from beginning to end, he had not given up certain illusory aims
channels. Among the criticisms made there were some which
in regard to the great leap forward and the people’s communes.
denied the “great leap forward” and the people’s communes. Mao
He believed that in 1958, the achievements predominated, while
Zedong tookSthese opinions and criticisms as attacks on the Part.v
shortcomings and mistakes only belonged to problems in work; "them with the disputes between leaders at the central
that is to say, counted for only one finger out of ten. Moreover,
level at the Lushan Meeting. He also linked criticism a
he considered that the problem of the “communist wind” of the
troversies on ^h c home front with the imperialists’ attack on
people’s communes had, in general, already been resolved by the
China and Khrushchov’s criticism of China. Therefore he co
Shanghai meeting, at which the decisions on 18 questions con¬
eluded, “The Party is under attack by inner and outer forces and
cerning the people’s communes were made. He believed that when
Right deviation has become the main danger at present Acting
the steel quota was reduced to 13 million tons in May 1959, “It
on such an erroneous judgement he determined to launch a
completely reflected possibility based on objective reality.”21 The
Lushan Meeting only needed to reach a common understanding
counterattack. On July 23, Mao Zedong convened a meeting f
which he made a speech saying, “Now there are some people
on this basis. Then the situation would take a turn for the better
inside and outside the Party- Rightists outside the Party and a
through a decision to readjust the quotas, which all would follow
group of people inside the Party— who talk as if we had no saving
in their work. But Peng Dehuai and others asked to further
Laces AUhe same time they fling themselves onto the boundary
deepen correction of the “Left” errors, demanding that the roots
of the Rightists ’’ He refuted point by point the opmions raised
of the “Left” errors be cleared away from the guiding ideology.
by Peng gehutand others, considering that they could not adopt
Therefore, Mao believed that Peng Dehuai and others had not
a correct attitude towards the revolutionary mass movement and
followed him to correct shortcomings and mistakes in work, but
that they were repeating the mistakes made during the opposi “>n
had actually expressed doubts and opposition to the “great leap
to rash advance. He also criticized them for bourgeois vacillati
forward” and the people’s communes, and had drawn up the letter
under the pressure of imperialism. On July 26, in a letter writte
as a challenge to himself and the leadership of the Central
bv someone in charge of Party work in reflecting opinions to the
Committee. Therefore it was an expression of Right deviation.
Central Committee, which criticized the “Left” adventurist mis-
Because of dissatisfaction with Peng and Zhang which had accu¬ fakes made m the previous year (1958), Mao Zedong wrote some
mulated in the past, Mao Zedong felt even greater distrust and remarks pointing oul that new circumstances bad appeared mside
aversion towards them after reading Peng’s letter and the written
the Party; that was, Right deviations feelings, Right deviation
record of Zhang’s speech. Peng Dehuai, he believed, was a “Right-
 500 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter seven socialist construction

ideology and Right deviationist activities were increasing their communes and the mass movement for economic construction,
power of a furious attack. The “Left” was sure to appear while and the slogan “politics in command” reflecting the leadership of
fighting against the Right, the Right was sure to appear while the Party over socialist construction. These were “mistakes of a
fighting against the “Left.” “This is natural. Now it is time to Right opportunist line which, in nature, opposed the Party, the
fight against the Right,” he noted. people and socialism.” It was decided to remove them from the
Owing to lack of understanding of the “Left” errors in the posts of Ministry of National Defence, the Foreign Ministry and
guiding ideology for the 1958 economic work, the fact that Mao the secretarial post of a Party provincial committee. At the same
Zedong had long enjoyed high prestige in the whole Party and the time, they were allowed to keep their original posts in the Central
personality cult inside the Party was growing, as well as that a Committee and the Political Bureau, with careful watch over
lew people added fuel to the flames, the atmosphere at the their behaviour. The resolution formally affirmed that the “Right
Lushan Meeting suddenly became tense after Mao’s speech. The opportunism had become the main danger in the Party at the
subject of the meeting was changed from correcting the “Left” to present” and “safeguarding the general line and fighting back the
opposing the Right in a struggle directly targeted on Peng, Huang, attack of the Right opportunists has become the present major
Zhang and Zhou, which formed a situation tilted to one side. On combat task of our Party.” .
Mao’s suggestion, the 8th Plenary Session of the 8Hi Central Out of consideration for maintaining Party unity and the
Committee was convened from August 2 to 16. Criticism was reputation of Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee,
leveled at Peng, Huang, Zhang and Zhou at big and small Peng Dehuai and others admitted and examined their “mistakes.
meetings. Moreover, the tone of the criticism grew sharper and Mao Zedong welcomed their doing so.
sharper. Connecting Peng and Zhang’s history, these criticisms
“settled old and new accounts together.” Lin Biao, calling Peng Serious Results of the Struggle Against Right Deviation
Dehuai a “hypocrite,” “schemer” and “careerist,” set the shrillest
tone of all in the criticism. A batch of political labels were pasted After Mao Zedong’s speech of July 23, Liu Shaoqi once
on Peng including “bourgeois democrat,” “fellow traveller in the proposed transmitting an anti-Right deviationist resolution to
democratic revolution, opponent in the socialist revolution,” and only the provincial level, and bringing out another resolution
“opportunist who has sneaked into the Party.” Peng Dehuai was on continuing to correct “Left” errors, to be issued to grassroots
groundlessly accused of “maintaining illicit relations with foreign units below county level. However, it was not possible to air
countries,” and of organizing a “military club” to “split the Party” this idea in the Party Central Committee under the prevailing
and to force Chairman Mao to step down.” Finally, the session circumstances. The anti-Right-deviationist resolution was grad¬
adopted a “Resolution on the Errors of the Anti-Party Clique ually made known Party-wide and a large-scale anti-Right-
Headed by Peng Dehuai” and the document “Safeguard the deviationist struggle was unfolded throughout the country. A
Party’s General Line and Oppose Right Opportunism.” The reso¬ large number of cadres and Party members were wrongly
lution affirmed that the anti-Party clique organized by Peng, criticized and many people, labelled “Right opportunists, were
Huang, Zhang and Zhou, in essence, denied the victory of the dealt organizational punishments which should not have been
general line and achievements of the “great leap forward”; that administered. In November, the Central Committee stipulated
they opposed high-speed development of the national economy, that the anti-Right-deviationist struggle should be carried out
opposed the movement for high yields on the agricultural front,’ only among Party cadres; therefore it did not affect members
the mass iron and steel movement, the movement of the people’s of democratic parties or intellectuals outside the Party. In rural
 563
562 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

areas, large numbers of peasant Party members and ordinary been singled out for correction, to develop once more. Problems
people outside the Party were criticized, but were not labelled. which had come to be recognized not long before, now did not
According to statistics on the re-examination and rehabilitation seem like problems at all. For instance, one of the main lessons
of cases in 1962, more than 3 million cadres and Party of the great leap forward was the failure to maintain compre¬
members were made the focus of major criticism and catego¬ hensive balance and proportion in the national economy. How¬
rized as Right opportunists. ever during the anti-Right deviation, this correct thinking was
Politically, the “anti-Right-deviationist” struggle had serious criticized as a “fallacy,” and it was stubbornly maintained that
consequences. Mao Zedong concluded, “The struggle which arose “the major proportions in China’s national economy are bal¬
at Lushan was a class struggle, a continuation of the life-and- anced and normal.” Disregarding the tense situation m econom¬
death struggle between the two antagonistic classes, the proletari¬ ic and political life, some insisted that the political and
at and the bourgeoisie, occurring in the course of the past ten economic situation in the country is excellent.” Some correct
years’ socialist revolution.”22 This conclusion regarded and dealt measures taken to reduce overly high quotas in the first half
with the normal inner-Party discussion of different opinions on of 1959 were subjected to censure as “shaped like a smal
principles and policies as a life-and-death struggle between the saddle” under the “influence of the trouble stirred up by Right
two antagonistic classes. This, both in theory and practice, served opportunists.” The system of contracting work and output
to further escalate the mistake of expanding the class struggle in quotas to households, which appeared in the process of recti
the wake of the anti-Rightisl movement, and to extend it to the fying the people’s communes, was regarded as taking the
inner-Party ranks and top leading levels of the Party. That is to “capitalist road” and suppressed. The main slogan then was.
say, in this connection, the struggle caused serious damage to Fight against the Right deviation, and go all out to set otf a
democratic life in the Party from the CPC Political Bureau and new upsurge of the great leap forward. The Lushan Meeting
the Central Committee right down to the basic units. Large reduced the steel output target for 1959 to 12 million tons. As
numbers of comrades who, in seeking truth from facts, dared to a political task, by means of indiscriminate use of equipment
reflect the real situation and put forward criticisms and sugges¬ and resources, 13.87 million tons of steel was produced by the
tions to the Party, were attacked. This only encouraged the end of the year. In 1960, the Party Central Committee demand¬
unhealthy tendencies of by-passing principles, fearing to speak ed achieving an even better great leap forward than the pre¬
the truth, acting worldly-wise and playing safe to keep out of vious year. The target for the output ot steel was set excessive y
trouble, to the extent of actually creating opportunities for high at 18.4 million tons, which in spite of everything was duly
hangers-on to flatter, toady, and seize every chance to gain fulfilled Plans were aired for the transition of ownership in
advantages through trickery. The harmful trends of the person¬ the people’s communes from ownership basically by the Pro¬
ality cult and arbitrary decision-making by one person spread duction team to that by the commune within the next three
widely throughout the Party. All these factors made it difficult five or eight years. In order to create conditions for the
for the Party to prevent, oppose or correct in time the greater transition, various methods were adopted to set up commune
mistakes which arose later. based economic projects “in a big way” by indiscnmina c
Economically the “anti-Right-deviationist” struggle curbed requisition of manpower and resources from production teams.
the positive progress of correcting the “Left.” This caused many The community canteens of the rural areas, their appearance
of the mistakes, which had arisen during the movements of the seen as a big event facilitating the “transition from socialism
great leap forward and the people’s communes and which had to communism,” were to be set up nationwide, without cxcep-
 565
chapter seven socialist construction
564 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
,959 while the output of agricultural and sideline production
tion. People’s communes were also organized in many small Li sharply. Grain output in 1959 was only 170 billion kg, 30
and medium-sized cities. In short, “Left” errors, primarily ,lion kg less than the 1958 real output of 200 billion kg. But
represented by overly-high production quotas, exaggeration and ", to. toe *e grain output was estimated at 270 billion kg
the “communist wind,” as well as by issuing blind orders, again supposedly Representing an increase of 8 percent as compared
spread rampant, persisting for a more prolonged period and
resulting in even greater harm.
Jh the 1958 output of 250 billion kg set at the Lushan
Meeting “after verification” (in fact, there was still some
The great leap forward with steel as its key link continuously
exaggeration). Due to overestimation of the output, gram p
aggravated the serious imbalance in the national economy. First
chases from peasants that year increased by 8.65 billion kg over
of all, the movement led to disproportion between accumulation
the previous year, reaching 67.4 billion kg and exceeding
and consumption. In the three years from 1958 to 1960, the rate
one-third of the real output. In 1960, gram output dropped
of accumulation reached 33.9 percent, 43.9 percent and 39.6
further to 143.5 billion kg, a figure 26.5 billion kg less than
percent, respectively, greatly exceeding the 24.2 percent average
the 1959 output and down to the 1951 level. The output o
rate during the First Five-Year Plan period, which was already
cotton also kept falling and reached the 1951 level while the
relatively high. It is true, this laid a foundation for the construc¬
tion of a large number of factories and mines. Nevertheless, output of oil-bearing crops declined to the level J?1 p .
reliable production capacity could only take shape through read¬ Production of light industry also went down steeply. The Party
justment. Secondly, the movement brought about an imbalance *°d the people were confronted with the most serious> —
between industry and agriculture, with heavy industry undergo¬ difficulties since the founding of New China. The I960 average
ing over-expanded development. From 1957 to 1960, heavy indus¬ erain consumption of urban and rural people was down by 19
try increased 3.3-fold, while agricultural production declined by fement “Compared with that of 1957. Of thts, per-capi
22.8 percent. The third setback was the imbalance between var¬ consumption in the rural areas fell by 23.7 percent. Per-capita
ious branches of industry itself. Iron and steel production asked consumption of vegetable oil was down by 23 percent, of meat,
for such large amounts of energy, raw and semifinished materials by 70 percent. Malnutrition leading to edema was conunoo in
and transport as to interfere with the normal production of other many amas, and in not a few provinces the^numbertf deaths
branches. Because of large-scale capital construction and the great among the rural population mcreased. As the birth rate tell y
increase in the number of employees and the scale of investments, a wide margin ove“ large areas, the mortality rate increased
financial revenues and expenditures became imbalanced, while conspicuously. According to official statistics the conn y
social purchasing power far out-stripped the supply of commodi¬ total population in 1960 dropped by 10 million over the
ties. The result was huge financial deficits and market short¬ previous year. For example, in Xinyang Prefecture of Henan
ages. Province the 1960 death rate in nine counties exceeded
Worst of all, agricultural production was drastically under¬ per thousand, representing a number several times that of
mined. Owing mainly to the renewed development of “Left” mrmal year This was a sad outcome, contrary to the original
errors during the great leap forward and the people’s communes tope of enabling people to live a better life sooner and earlier
movement, especially the overly-high estimates of output and That was the most disastrous result and most serious lesson of
of state purchases, the peasants’ enthusiasm was seriously un¬ the* faded “great leap forward” and people’s commune move-
dermined. In addition, vast areas of China’s farmland were hit
by natural calamities for several years running, beginning from ments.
 chapter seven socialist construction
566 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
worked out under the guidance of Zhou Enlai. The core of the
VI. FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS WHILE Ser was to call on the whole Party to make the utmost efforts
READJUSTING POLICIES AND n correct the “communist wind” as the Central Committee and
Chairman Mao had instructed agam and again since the winter
OVERCOMING DIFFICULTIES
nf 1958 Since then, it was felt, some localities, communes and
nroduction brigades basically had not committed the error again,
Severe difficulties and setbacks gradually awakened the whole hut most of the localities and communes had failed to rectify the
Party and the Central Committee. They were determined to take mistakes thoroughly. The wind blew again after last winter. Some
up conscientious investigations and study, correct mistakes and other localities, communes and production brigades made no
readjust policies. In November 1960, the CPC Central Committee correction at all, and the wind blew continuously, to the serious
issued an “Urgent Directive Letter on Current Policies for Rural detriment of the agricultural forces of production. The Urgent
People’s Communes.” The 9th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Directive Letter stipulated the Twelve-Article Policy which main¬
Committee of the CPC held in January 1961 formally adopted ly reiterated: “The three-level system of ownership with the
the principle of “readjustment, consolidation, filling out and production team as the basic accounting unit is the fundamental
raising standards” for implementation in the national economy. system of the people’s communes m the present stage. (Mat
The two events marked a turning point in the Party’s guiding Zedong added that “beginning from 1961, it would remain un
principles in this historical period. The movement of the “great changed for at least seven years,’ which was stipulated in lig
leap forward” and the transition to ownership by the communes various experimental places and plans for the transition of own¬
were halted. The whole Party shared comforts and hardships with ership by the communes.) The error of egalitarianism and indis
the masses of people and united to wage an unremitting struggle criminate requisition of manpower and resources should be thor
to overcome difficulties. At the same time, during the readjust¬ oughly rectified, and property unlawfully taken must be leturned
ment of policies and overcoming of difficulties, the Party Central in full, dr compensation paid for it. Basic ownership by the
Committee continued the efforts made between the Zhengzhou production team must be strengthened and ownership of minor
Meeting and the earlier period of the Lushan Meeting, as well as means of production by the production team should be carried
efforts made before and after the 1st Session of the 8th National out. Commune members should be allowed to cultivate a sn <
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Thus new experience private plot of land and engage in household sidelines on a small
was accumulated for further exploration of China’s own road to scale. The principle of distribution according to work should be
socialism. persisted in. (Mao Zedong added, “This will
for at least twenty years”) Rural trade fairs sho^ld^reSrlti0nr^’
Investigation and Readjustment of Rural Policies and so on. At that time, the letter also stressed: We cannot
commit mistakes of principle” so long as we persist in the three-
From October 1960, the Party Central Committee began to level system of ownership, uphold a partial supply system and
rectify the style of work and consolidate the communes, so as to
persist in running the rural community canteens well.
eliminate the five winds: namely the “communist wind,” the wind After the Urgent Directive Letter was issued, the entire Par y
of exaggeration, of enforcing arbitrary orders, of blind guidance was mobilized. Leaders and cadres at all levels were organized to
in production and the wind of cadres acceding to privileges. But go deep into the villages to publicize and explain the letter to
this task was first proposed in a formal, systematic way only after
grassroots cadres, and then join together with them in working
the issuance of the Urgent Directive Letter, which had been
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC 569
568 chapter seven socialist construction

hard to correct mistakes, implement policies and to turn the Following this, the CPC Central Committee issued a “Letter to
situation around in the rural areas. The Central Committee also the Central Bureaus and Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous
went on to approve and transmit reports on implementation of Regional Party Committees on Making Assiduous Investigation.
the Directive by various localities, so as to supervise and expedite AUhe same time, it reprinted and distributed “On Investigation
the work. In a document drafted for the Central Committee, Mao Work ” a piece written by Mao Zedong m the spring ot 9a0
Zedong wrote, “Comrade Mao Zedong ... as he himself has said, which had been lost for many years but discovered not long
is willing to share a common fate with those comrades who wish before (the title, as revised, was Oppose Book Worship when
to correct their mistakes. He said he himself had made mistakes published later on). The Central Committee required the leading
and must correct them.”23 He mentioned as one of his mistakes members above the county level to study these documents in
that he had written in the Beidaihe resolution that at the eai liest, depth in the light of actual conditions. The letter pointed out. I he
in three to four years, or at the latest, five to six years, collective mistakes and shortcomings in our work during the jast several
ownership could be transformed into ownership by the whole years occurred because many leaders slackened the work of
people. (He also explained in “The Summing-up of the Past Ten investigation and study which had been so successful during t e
Years” that he had agreed to the excessive steel quotas at the War of Resistance Against Japan and the War ot Liberationl -or
meetings held in Beidaihe, Wuchang and Shanghai, and that he a time, some judgements and decisions were made on the basis ot
had committed mistakes the same as other people involved at the lopsided and unrealistic materials. This is a major lesson. The
time.) Mao Zedong made a self-criticism in the Party and hoped Party leaders at all levels must under no circumstances neglect or
to arouse the awareness of the cadres that “now is the time to forget this costly lesson. The letter stated: Investigation and study
make up our minds to correct our mistakes.”24 deep down at the grassroots levels make up the primary task of
The 9th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the leadership work. “In everything, proceed from actual conditions
CPC was convened in Beijing in January 1961. Mao Zedong no investigation, no right to speak. This must be made the first
delivered many speeches at the plenary session itself as well as at and foremost principle in the thought and action of all cadres of
the CPC Central Committee’s preparatory work conference, call¬ the Party.” While conducting investigation, We must not be
ing on all Party members to resume the work style of seeking afraid of listening to opinions that are different from ours but
truth from facts and of conducting investigations and study. He contain substance, still less of seeing judgements and decisions
said, “Our Party is by tradition one of seeking truth from facts. negated through the test of practice.” This actually pointed out
In recent years, we conducted fewer investigations, and did not to the leading members of the Party that the problem was one ot
know the real situation, probably because we acted like high rectification of the ideological line. It stressed taking practice as
officials. 1 myself am just a high official and now seldom make the standard for testing truth instead of previously-made judge
the kind of investigations I had formerly carried out in Jiangxi ments and decisions, and thus paved the way for using the test of
Province.” He asked comrades to persist in the work style of practice to correct past decisions and mistakes. Investigation
investigations and study and to proceed in all cases from actual study and seeking truth from facts as an ideological line was
conditions. Mao also noted that socialist construction should not restored to a definite degree; this was an ideological prerequisite
be carried out in haste, but would probably take half a century. for the definite degree of important change which was made m
It must go slowly for a few years, and targets should not be so
the actual work of this period. . , ,
high, to avoid disasters brought on by seeking an undeserved Following the session, Mao Zedong directly organized
reputation. guided three groups to make separate investigations in the coun-
 CHARTER SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
570
ers’ cooperative in 1956). In the seventh year we ought to wake
tryside of Zhejiang, Hunan and Guangdong provinces. Also Liu ”25 This indicated that the work to rectify the policies of the
Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and Deng Xiaoping each went down neopie’s communes was a continuation not only of the efforts
to grassroots units in Hunan, Hebei and Sichuan provinces, and
made following the Zhengzhou Meeting, but dated back to the
in Beijing. The secretaries of Party committees of all provinces, formation of the advanced agricultural producers cooperative
municipalities and autonomous regions did the same. In the
and the efforts to readjust the relations within the agricultural
process of investigations, Mao Zedong discovered that the Urgent
cooperatives before and after the 1st Session of the 8th National
Directive Letter had failed to completely solve two major impor¬
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. The final revised
tant problems—egalitarianism among production teams within a
Sixty Articles for Agriculture stipulated: I he three-level system
production brigade and egalitarianism among commune membeis
of ownership in the rural people’s communes with the production
within a production team. In order to systematically solve various
team as the basic accounting unit is a fundamental system which
problems in the rural people’s communes including the above-
will remain unchanged for a long period, at least for thirty years.
mentioned two, in March in Guangzhou Mao Zedong presided
Although some fundamental problems existing in the peoples
over and drafted Regulations on the Work of Rural People’s
communes were not completely solved, the article played an
Communes (for short, the Sixty Articles for Agriculture). Major
important role in mobilizing the enthusiasm of the masses and in
amendments were made in the text ot the regulations several
restoring and developing agricultural production, since it solved
times after repeated discussions and on-the-spot experiments by
a number of urgent problems which had stirred up the biggest
large numbers of cadres and peasants. In the revised draft issued
complaints of the masses. The article also played a positive role
in June, the provisions in the original draft concerning communi¬
in curtailing any further blasts of the “communist wind” for quite
ty canteens and the partial supply system, which were universally
opposed by peasants, were deleted. Yet the Urgent Directive a long time to come.
With the initial correction of the ideological line and gradual
Letter and the draft of the Sixty Articles for Agriculture still
readjustment of the rural policies, the work to re-examine cadres
stated the two provisions as requirements which had to be carried
and Party members who were criticized in the past was put on
out. Abolishing or suggesting the abolition of community can¬ the agenda. The CPC Central Committee’s instruction on discus¬
teens were once condemned as big “Right opportunist” crimes. In
sion and trial implementation of the revised draft of the Sixty
September, based on opinions from several provinces, Mao Ze¬
Articles for Agriculture worked out in June 1961 clearly stipu¬
dong proposed placing the basic accounting unit of the people’s
lated that decisions in the cases of those who had been correctly
commune lower down to the level of the production team, which
criticized in previous years would not be changed; and the
was equivalent to the former elementary agricultural producers’
verdicts on those who had been wrongly criticized would be
cooperative. (The original production team, which was equivalent
corrected, their reputations rehabilitated and their posts restored.
to the former advanced agricultural producers’ cooperative, was
If only part of a problem had been wrongly criticized and dealt
later called a production brigade.) In his letter to the Central
with, the conclusion on this part of the problem would be correct¬
Committee, Mao Zedong said that under the original system, the
ed. An apology should be made to the masses (including well-to-
right of production was at the production team level while the
do middle peasants) who had been criticized. If punishment had
right of distribution was at the production brigade level. This
been incorrectly meted out, it must be corrected. Actually re¬
serious contradiction still fettered the masses’ enthusiasm for
examination work was for the purpose of eliminating the negative
production. “On this issue, we spent six years muddling along in
influence of the “anti-Right-deviationist” struggle, and readjust-
the past (from the founding of the advanced agricultural produc-
 CHAPTER SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 575
572 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
agricultural situation was made quite clear, the crux of problems
ing political relations within the Party, and also between the in industry was also fully revealed. So it was impossible to keep
Party and the masses who had been wrongly criticized. on with the 1961 plan proposed at the 9th Plenary Session of the
During the discussions and trial implementation of the Sixty 8th Central Committee of the CPC.
Articles for Agriculture, the Party Central Committee also issued In September 1961, the CPC Central Committee convened a
and called for trial implementation of the Thirty-five Articles on work conference in Lushan. After discussion, it adopted a “Direc¬
Handicraft Industry and the Forty Articles on Commerce which tive on the Question of Industry at Present.” It pointed out that
had been worked out in the same spirit. we had already lost more than twelve months. We can no longer
hesitate. We must make a prompt decision to resolutely cut back
Readjustment of Industry where cutting back is indicated, and reduce the production quotas
of industry and capital construction to a reliable level which may
The eight-character principle of “readjustment, consolidation, allow for unforeseen circumstances. It also pointed out that in the
filling out and raising standards” was suggested by Zhou Enlai next three years, implementation of the eight-character principle
and Li Fuchun in August 1960 when they presided over study of must focus on readjustment. If we do not make up our minds to
the controlled targets for the 1961 national economic plan. The make necessary cutbacks, but still persist in those unrealistic
principle was formally approved by the 9th Plenary Session of the quotas, our industry and even our entire national economy can
8th Central Committee of CPC in January 1961. There was no fall into a passive position, or into an even more difficult situa¬
great progress in the readjustment of industry at first, for they tion. Following the conference, with the approval of the Central
originally planned to keep the 1960 targets for the output of iron Committee, the State Planning Commission made a bigger adjust¬
and steel and other heavy industrial products. On this basis, the ment to the 1961 plan adopted by the 9th Plenary Session of the
1961 planned targets were neither raised nor reduced. Therefore, 8th Central Committee. The investment in capital construction
the 1961 planned figure adopted by the 9th Plenary Session of the was reduced from 16.7 billion yuan to 8.7 billion yuan; the quota
8th Central Committee was 19 million tons for steel, a little for steel was put down from 19 million tons to 8.5 million tons,
higher than the 1960 figure; grain was 205 billion kg, a rise of and the quota for grain down from 205 billion kg to 135 billion
10.8 percent over the output of 185 billion kg estimated at that kg. After implementation, the results at the end of that year
time for 1960. Owing to overestimation of the actual agricultural showed that those quotas were generally met. Grain reached 147.5
output and too high expectation for possible increase of output, billion kg, a slight rise over 1960.
the decision to lower the industrial target was difficult to be Another aspect in industrial readjustment was to rectify enter¬
made. The results of a half-year’s implementation indicated that prise order. The “great leap forward” gave rise to many problems
the output of steel and many other industrial products had in the enterprises. There was confusion in management work. The
dropped by a large margin. Urged by Zhou Enlai, the economic responsibility system and the system of business accounting be¬
and planning departments did their best to clarify the figures for came lax. Equipment was damaged, product quality lowered and
the actual grain output of the previous several years. Grain for labour productivity declined. Egalitarianism dominated wages
1958 was not 250 billion kg “checked” at the Lushan Meeting, but and bonuses. Deng Xiaoping stressed many times that industrial
200 billion kg; in 1959 it was 170 billion kg instead of the 255 enterprises must be rectified. Under his auspices, Li Fuchun and
billion kg reported; in 1960, it was 143.5 billion kg instead of the Bo Yibo were responsible for sending eleven working groups to a
estimated 185 billion kg. The summer harvest in 1961 was down large number of factories and mines to make investigations. On
by 8 billion kg as compared with the previous year. As the
574 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
chapter seven socialist construction
this basis, the “Regulations on the Work of State Industrial
Enterprises (draft)” (also known as the Seventy Articles Concern¬ for Science). Nie Rongzhen also wrote a special report to the
ing Industrial Enterprises) was worked out. Adopted at the Lu- central authorities, asking for instructions on some major policies
shan work conference of the CPC Central Committee, it was touched on in the document. In July, the draft was approved by
distributed by the Central Committee in September for trial the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee after discus
implementation. In the draft, there were some guiding principles sion It was put into effect on a trial basis. Directed by Deng
for readjusting state industrial enterprises such as the “five fixed Xiaoping, the leading Party groups of the Central Propagand
quotas” (for product programme and production scale; the num¬ Department and the Ministry of Education sketched the Provi¬
ber of workers and administrative setups; the consumption of the sional Regulations on Work in the Institutions of.Higher Lean*
main raw and semi-finished materials and sources ol supply; ing Under the Ministry of Education (draft) (abbreviated to be
fixed assets and circulating funds; and for cooperative relations). Sixty Articles on College Education). After thorough discussion,
Enterprises also carried out “five guaranties’ to the state (product the Party Central Committee approved the dralt at the work
variety, quality and quantity; operation not to exceed gross conference held in Lushan. It went into effect on a trial basis in
payroll; fulfilment of cost plan; handing over profit to the state; September. (Fifty Articles for Middle Schools and Forty Articles
and utilization period of the main equipment). This served to for Primary Schools were drafted and discussed at the Lushan
stabilize the sequence of production of the state enterprises under meeting They were approved and promulgated by the centr
the then mandatory plan system. It also made a detailed stipula¬ authorities in^March 1963.) In August, urged by Zhou Enlai, he
tion providing for a system of overall responsibility by the factory leading Party groups of the Central Propaganda Department, the
director under the leadership of the Party committee, a system of Ministry of Culture and China Federatton of Literary and Ar
workers, representatives congresses, and for the operations and Circles followed up with Suggestions on CcIta“ P“bta at
duties to be carried out under an administrative system of man¬ Present Work in Literature and Literature andArt (draft)(a
agement over the whole factory’s united production headed by breviated to Ten Articles on the Arts and later to Eight Articles
the factory director. As the regulations were implemented, a on Literature and Art). It was approved by the central committee
series of necessary rules and regulations in state enterprises was and issued in April 1962.
rehabilitated or established, thus playing a positive role in the One special concern of these articles was to readjust the rela
implementation of the principle of readjustment, consolidation, tionship between intellectuals and the Communist Party. Since
filling out and raising standards. the “great leap forward” in 1958, excessive and erroneous criti¬
cism had been heaped on intellectuals to keep them from becom¬
ing “bourgeois academic authorities” (in other words profession
Scientific, Educational and Cultural Policies Readjusted
alfy proficient but not socialist-minded’) Party leaders in some
To co-ordinate with the economic readjustment, all cultural cultural institutions went so far as to take intellectuals as the
fields underwent amendment. Repeated studies were made and target of socialist revolution, believing that most intellectuals
opinions in science circles were widely polled. The leading Party were part of the bourgeois class. In December 1958, Mao Zedong
groups of the State Science and Technology Commission and the had written a comment on a report about this situation. Please
Chinese Academy of Sciences, led by Nie Rongzhen, put forth print this and pass it on to Party committees and branches of all
the Fourteen Suggestions on Current Work at Research Institutes institutions of higher learning, research institutes art and btterary
of Natural Sciences (draft) (abbreviated to be Fourteen Articles groups, mass media and publishing houses. Ask them to read mid
discuss it. It’s imperative to grasp the correct orientation and try
 577
chapter seven socialist construction

A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

576 ;ngs such as assigning too much manual labour in production and
too much social activities for people in scientific, educational and
to unite all professors, assistant professors, assistant lecturers and
cultural units, and also the proneness to boasting, exaggeration
research personnel who can be united with and who can serve the
and messing things up in these work units by giving impractica
proletarian educational, cultural and scientific causes.”2" But the
endeavour made in line with this spirit had been suspended by orders in professional work. The regulations clearly stipulated
that the key task for research institutions was to strive tor
the “anti-Right Deviationist” campaign. The drafting and prom¬
scientific achievements and cultivate talents to serve socialism
ulgation of the Eight Articles was, in fact, a continuation of the
Research work at institutes should remain stable. Five-sixths ol
earlier effort. The Central Committee, when ratifying the Four¬
the researchers’ time should be devoted to professional work.
teen Articles for Science, pointed out: In recent years, quite a
Schools should focus on teaching and students should concentrate
number of comrades have developed a lopsided view in regard to
on learning. The slogan that “art should serve politics should not
knowledge and intellectuals. There have also been more instances
be understood in a too narrow sense. Literature and art works
of intellectuals being treated rudely. This must receive serious
should not only inspire people’s revolutionary enthusiasm and
attention. The Central Committee demanded that all work insti¬
broaden their political horizon, but also offer aesthetic enjoyment
tutions and departments employing intellectuals clear up the
and healthy entertainment. Any piece of art that fulfills one of
criticisms made among them since the “anti-Rightist” campaign.
the above-mentioned criteria qualifies as serving the people an
While correct criticisms should be confirmed, wrong ones —
whether totally or partially — should be corrected after investi¬ socialism. . _ , ,
The promulgation and implementation of the regulations
gation and a distinction should be made between right and wrong.
igated the tense relationship between the Party and intellectuals.
Things should be explained to them by leading Party persons and
Normal work schedules resumed. All this played an important
those who were wronged must be rehabilitated in order to relieve
role in making China to gradually form, by summing up expen-
the strain on them, develop democracy and strengthen unity.
ence, a series of principles, policies and specific measures for
Another crucial problem dwelt on in the articles was that of
socialist science, education and culture. Though problems arising
implementing the policy called “let a hundred flowers blossom
from expansion of the “anti-Rightist” campaign in 1957 were not
and a hundred schools of thought contend” in the fields of science
totally resolved, the majority of intellectuals were relieved of
and art. This is closely related to adjustment of the relationship
worries and felt more at ease. The conditions for concentrating
between the Party and intellectuals. In view of the problems that
on professional work, by and large, were adequately established.
had cropped up in the natural sciences, social sciences, arts and
Some intellectuals said, “We would like to have the regula tons
literature, these articles spelled out in detail a whole set ol
inscribed on stone tablets.” This remark fully reflected heir
principles for implementing, in a specific way, the “double¬
support for the regulation, but also betrayed their fear that the
hundred” policy. One principle was that when a concept consid¬
ered to be wrong was to be criticized, political ideas should be policies would change. .
The readjustment work done for intellectuals should have led
differentiated from academic and artistic ones; a clear distinction
to a scientific reassessment of their class nature. But the regula¬
must be made between contradictions among the people and those
tions did not touch on this basic question. Though the Seventy
between the enemy and the people. While dealing with different
Articles on Industry did broach it by reiterating that in enterpris¬
views among the people on academic and artistic questions, the
es the technicians and staff are “part of the working class it
use of methods of political struggle would be impermissible, to
made no mention of intellectuals working in scientific, education-
say nothing of adopting methods used against the enemy.
Moreover, these articles were directed against chaotic happen-
 579
CHAPTER SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION
578 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

The 7,000-Person Conference

al and cultural institutions. The question was not solved thor¬
oughly until the work conference on science and technology and From January 11 to February 7, 1962, an Enlarged Work
the work conference on arts were held in Guangzhou in March Conference of the Central Committee was held in Beijing. It was
1962. In a speech, Zhou Enlai reinstated the Party’s assessment presided over by Mao Zedong and attended by top leaders and
made at the 1956 conference on the question of the class nature those from the Central Committee, the affiliated bureaus and
concerning intellectuals. According to this assessment, the over¬ departments of the CPC and Party committees of various prov¬
whelming majority of them belonged to the category of labouring inces, municipalities, prefectures and counties, as well ^ fr01?^
people and not to that of the bourgeois class. Chen Yi, in his major factories, mines and army units - altogether some 7 0)
speech, particularly emphasized that the test of time in the past persons It is usually called the “7,000-Person Conference. This
12 years, especially in China’s most difficult years, had proven unprecedentedly large conference was held when the domestic
that the majority of Chinese intellectuals were patriotic, and situation began to change after a years readjustment of th
believed in the Party, sharing weal and woe with the Party and economic difficulties resulting from the three-year great leap
the people. If the Party cannot test a person in eight, 10 or 12 forward ” The problems were still great; people in and outside th
years, it only shows that the Party is too devoid of insight, he said. Partv were very much confused. The purpose ot the conference
He announced the removal of all the stigma attached to intellec¬ was 'to sum up previous experience, torcachaconsensuson some
tuals as being “bourgeois” and insisted on placing them in the issues, to strengthen unity and to mobilize the Paity Tor further
category of the labouring people. Shortly after, Zhou Enlai, in his victory through implementation of the readjustment principles.
report on the work of the government at the 3rd Session of the At fhe initial stage of the conference, the participants discussed
2nd National People’s Congress, again announced this scientific the written draft report, delivered by Liu Shaoqi on behalf of the
judgment. The work report had been approved by the Party Partv. The draft was not yet formally approved by the Centra
Central Committee earlier. Political Bureau, and was directly handed to the conference lor
Zhou Enlai’s Report on the Question of Intellectuals made at discussion, so as to pool collective wisdom and bring out sugges¬
the Guangzhou conference in 1962, his Report on Intellectuals tions for amendment. After repeated discussions and modifrca-
delivered in 1956 and his report On the Transformation of tiom a formal document was born entitled Report on the En-
Intellectuals made in 1951 — convey a continuous inner consist¬ larged Work Conference of the Central Committee.
ency. They are historical documents representing the Party’s Deng Xiaoping, then the Party’s secretary general, was re¬
correct policies toward Chinese intellectuals following the found¬ sponsible for the preparation of the conference. The d^af}ing
the conference report was first supervised by Deng and then by
ing of New China in 1949.
But the Party Central Committee had not entirely eliminated Liu The report systematically summed up the experience an
lessons in economic construction since the great leap forward
“Leftist” ideological and political views. A small number of Party
After enumerating the achievements made in the years socialis
Central Committee members were in disagreement with or in
construction, the report went on to the major shortcomings a
outright opposition to Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi’s speeches at the
mistakes: (I) The indexes set in the production plan were too high
Guangzhou conference. When asked by Zhou Enlai to state his
and the battle line for capital construction was overex^™^-
position on the issue, Mao remained silent. This circumstance
These would cause severe imbalance between the various branch
foreshadowed the subsequent emergence of another major rever¬
es of the national economy. (II) In the peoples communes the
sal in the Party’s policy in regard to intellectuals, knowledge, demarcation between collective ownership and ownership b> the
culture and education.
 5SU A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
chapter seven socialist construction 581
whole people was once blurred. The eagerness to rush transition
from one to the other violated the distribution principle of “to to understand better, summarize experience again and draw con¬
each according to his work” and the principle of “exchange at clusions. As to our mistakes and achievements, we used to com-
equal values.” This stirred up the “communist wind” — haste to oare them to the relationship between one finger and nine fingers,
transfer to communism prematurely — and the practice of equal- hut now probably the same thing might not apply. In view ol the
itarianism. (Ill) The improper practice of setting up a large whole country, perhaps the relationship was that between three
number of integral industrial systems countrywide led to excess¬ fingers and seven fingers. In some regions, the mistakes added up
ive transfer of power to the lower levels and over¬ to more than three fingers - they could be as many as seven
decentralization. (IV) There was an over-estimation of the in¬ fingers. As to the causes for the economic dilficulties, natural
crease in agricultural production and overly urgent demands disasters were only one aspect, mistakes in our work were> l° 11
made in regard to the development of construction. This led to large extent, another aspect. In some places, ‘30 percent of e
overpopulation in cities, burdening them with supply shortages difficulties came from natural disasters, the other 70 percent were
and adding to difficulties of rural production. man-made.” These opinions moved a step further in the direction
The report analysed the reasons for the shortcomings and of facing reality and bravely acknowledging, in a down-to-earth
mistakes, holding that on the one hand we lacked experience in way, the mistakes made in the actual work and guiding thoug
construction; on the other hand, many Party leaders had not been since the “great leap forward.”
modest enough over the years, and had abandoned the Party Liu’s speech and reports were warmly applauded at the confer
tradition of seeking truth from facts and following the mass line. ence. Since the participants still had much they wished to say at
These weaknesses undermined the Party’s democratic centralism this meeting sponsored by the Central Committee, Mao Zedong
and deterred the timely recovery and correction of mistakes. suggested prolonging the conference. The delegates spent the
The report emphasized that the basic directions and main Spring Festival in Beijing. “During the day, they aired views; at
principles of socialism, the “great leap forward” and the people’s night, they watched operas, drama or films. With two meals ol
communes the “Three Red Banners” — were correct. The staple food and one of porridge, everyone was satisfied. At the
achievements over the years were great; the shortcomings and latter half of the conference, grassroots leaders ottered their
mistakes were secondary, the report said; the Central Committee, suggestions to the central authorities and to the Party committees
including the departments under it and those under the State of various provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions.
Council shouldered the major responsibility for the shortcomings Several main leaders of the central committee delivered speeches.
and mistakes. Besides, the provincial leading organs should bear Mao Zedong made a long speech on January 30, focusing on
secondary responsibility for them. democratic centralism. He underlined the importance of suffi¬
On January 27, Liu Shaoqi delivered a speech to explain the cient democracy both in and outside the Party so that the masses
written report. He offered some important insights on questions could speak their mind. If we have made mistakes, we should do
causing ideological confusion within the Party. He emphasized self-criticism and let others criticize, he said. Mao made a sel -
that the “Three Red Banners” (the general line for socialist criticism, saying, “I’m directly and indirectly responsible for all
construction, the great leap forward and the people’s communes) the mistakes made by the Central Committee because Im the
would not be abolished. Instead, consistent efforts would be made chairman.” “1 should be the first person to be held responsible
to keep them. At present, some issues may be unclear by now, he He also emphasized that the Party was still afflicted with a lot ot
said, but if we look back after five or ten years, we will be able blindness in carrying out socialist construction. “As far as we are
_j o^nrimv manv unrecognized realms oi
582 A CONCISE HISTORY OE THE CPC chapter seven socialist construction 583

necessity. From now on, we should put forth our utmost efforts Thought was always correct. The occurrence of mistakes and
to study it, do research and, through practice, deepen our under¬ difficulties in the recent years resulted from not actmg according
standing of it, so as to gain a clear grasp of its laws,” he said. Mao to Mao’s instructions, or from interference either by Leftist or
also pointed out that China has a large population; it has a weak Rightist ideas. Had we listened to Mao, we would certainly have
foundation to start with and its economy is backward. “1 think it had fewer difficulties by far and we would have encountered
fewer detours. Lin deviated from the principles of seeking truth
will take at least over a hundred years to develop its productive
from facts and of applying the test of practice. He appealed to the
forces and to catch up with and surpass the most advanced
capitalist countries,” he said. soirit of the personality cult in summing up the bitter lessons of
experience. This had a negative effect on correcting shortcomings
Both Deng Xiaoping, representing the Central Secretariat, and
and mistakes as well as on implementing inner-Party democracy.
Zhou Enlai, the State Council, in speeches delivered at the
conference, made self-criticisms. Deng focused on the restoration
of the Party’s fine traditions and Zhou talked about the major Further Readjustment and Exploration
ways to overcome the difficulties. Zhu De spoke at the panel
After the 7 000-Person Conference, readjustment in the coun¬
discussion of the Shandong delegates. Chen Yun spoke to the
try’s economy’ and political relationships underwent further de¬
Shaanxi representatives after the conference. Both Zhu De and
velopment. The household contract responsibility system in agri¬
Chen Yun focused on inner-Party democracy. Several provincial
delegates criticized the shortcomings and mistakes in the work cultural production was tried boldly on a large scale.
The 7 000-Person Conference assumed that the most djtticult
and work style of their local leaders.
Under the prevailing historical conditions, the conference did period for the economy had been tided over. After the meeting,
however, it was discovered that insufficient preparation for diffi¬
achieve important results. The truth-seeking attitude adopted
towards shortcomings and mistakes, the democratic atmosphere, culties still existed in terms of budgetary deficit and inflation In
and the spirit of self-criticism inspired the whole Party. In gener¬ February 1962, Liu Shaoqi held an enlarged meeting of the
al, the Party members felt relieved and relatively free from Political Bureau Standing Committee (Meeting in the West
worry. The conference played a positive role in mobilizing the Building at Zhongnanhai) and pointed out that the country was
Party to work closely together to overcome difficulties. Of course, undergoing an “usual period.” Unless resolute measures were
at the time, the term of “Three Red Banners,” a premise con¬ taken the national economy would further deteriorate. Chen Yun
firmed in principle, was not changed. As to the “anti-Right- offered a systematic review at the meeting. On February 26
deviationist” campaign, the conference only urged rehabilitation according lo Liu’s proposal, Chen Yun delivered a long speech at
of the lower-level Party members who had been wrongly criti¬ a meeting of the members of the Party groups of the ministries
cized. Nothing was done to rehabilitate Peng Dehuai though his under the State Council. It was entitled Present Financial Status
so-called mistake in writing the “Lushan letter” was no longer and Several Measures to Overcome Difficulties. Ipointed out
mentioned. He was said to be leading an “anti-Party group” and that in the pace of agricultural recovery, we should strive tor
had “international support.” All these accusations, of course, were speed but be prepared for slowness.” The scale for capital con
purely fictitious and completely groundless. Thus, it was impos¬ struction then was based on the erroneous assumption that grain
sible to thoroughly rectify the mistakes and clear up the guiding output would reach 350 billion kilogrammes and cotton output
thought in the “great leap forward” and “anti-Right-deviationist” 3 5 billion kilogrammes, in 1958. The decision was also affected
campaigns. Lin Biao, in his speech, said that Mao Zedong by the predicted steel output of about 50 million tons. It turned
 CHAPTER SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 585
584 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
from 39.6 per cent to 10.4 per cent. Construction projects were
out that the designed scale of capital construction was more than reduced by over two-thirds.
industry and agriculture could support. Chen Yun proposed Third, reducing industrial projects. Wherever necessary, facto¬
arranging a stage of recovery of about five years in the national ries or projects were to be shut down, closed temporarily, merged
economic programme starting from 1960. In the recovery stage, or transferred. After the readjustment, the number of industrial
the lirst thing to do was to increase agricultural production so as enterprises was reduced by 38 percent in 1962 as compared with
to meet the demand for iood and clothing. The indexes for capital that in 1959. The indexes for most heavy industries were also
construction and certain heavy industries should at first be reso¬ lowered. Compared with 1960, industrial output value plummet¬
lutely lowered, then later raised again. The urban population ed by 47 percent in 1962. Of this, the output value of heavy
should be reduced on a wide scale and measures taken to check industry was reduced by 57 percent. Steel target was cut Irom
inflation. Chen Yun’s speech was warmly applauded and fully 18.66 million tons to 6.67 million tons. Weak links like mine
supported by leaders of the various departments under the central excavation, oil and chemical industries and the production oi
authorities. It was approved by the Central Committee and be¬ supplies needed in agriculture were reinforced.
came the guiding document for economic work at the time. The Fourth, further support for agriculture by assigning more
Central Committee decided to restore the government’s Financial hands and materials. Leadership in the rural areas was also
and Economic Group, to be headed by Chen Yun. In May, the
strengthened.
standing committee of CPC’s Political Bureau held an enlarged These resolute measures, coupled with efforts from residents
meeting, at which the report on the 1962 readjustment plan, and leaders at all levels, proved very effective. By the end of 1962,
which had been drafted by the Financial and Economic Group, the national economy had started to revive. Agricultural produc¬
was discussed and adopted. The report signaled a determination tion was the first to pick up. That year, grain output hit 160
to readjust the national economy drastically. Its major provisions billion kilogrammes, 12.5 billion kilogrammes more than the year
included:
before. The total agricultural output value increased by 6.2
First, streamlining the number of employees and reducing the
percent over the previous year, thus ending three consecutive
urban population. In 1961, according to the deployment plan of
years of recession. Moreover, national finances showed a balance
the central government, the staff was reduced by more than 8
of revenue and expenditure in 1962, with a cash surplus ot 830
million and the urban population was cut down by 10 million. In
million yuan. This ended four continuous years of deficit. Market
1962, a reduction of 10 million more employees would be made
supply was better and trade prices dropped by approximately 35
and the urban population would be further reduced by 12 million.
percent as compared with 1961. Urbanites’ living standards start¬
Between the start of 1961 and June 1963, the staff of employees
ed to look up. Compared with the previous year, annual per-
was cut down by about 20 million and 26 million city residents
capita consumption of grain, pork and cloth increased by 5.5
were re-settled. Zhou Enlai exclaimed that deploying such a large
kilogrammes, 0.8 kilogrammes and 0.8 metres, respectively. Eco¬
number ol people was the same as moving a medium-sized
nomic difficulty, however, had just barely been tided over. Peo¬
country; it was quite unprecedented.
ple’s living standards and the production level of industry and
Second, cutting down the scale of capital construction and
agriculture remained low. The Party and its people had yet to
eliminating or slowing down the construction speed of a large
make more efforts in the readjustment and recovery of the
number of projects. Compared with the situation in 1960, the
national economy.
1962 investment in capital construction was reduced from 38.4
As to the readjustment of political relationships, Liu Shaoqi
billion yuan to 6.7 billion yuan. The accumulation rate dropped
586 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC 587
CHAPTER SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

held a top-level state conference after the 7,000-Person Confer¬ specific cases involving serious offenses, no case should be left
ence and the Meeting in the West Building at Zhongnanhai. ]t unsolved. It was in this way that the rehabilitation work opened
was followed by the 3rd Session of the 2nd National People’s up smoothly and comprehensively. By August 1962, more than
Congress and the 3rd Session of the 3rd National Committee of six million cadres, Party members and ordinary people country¬
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, both of wide had been cleared.
which had been postponed for a year. At the meetings, Liu The rehabilitation of “Rightists” started around October 1959
Shaoqi briefed the participants, both Party and non-Party, on the according to Mao Zedong’s suggestion. By 1962, the label of
7,000-Person Conference. He explained that the Party, particular¬ “Rightists” was removed from most of them. As for people who
ly the Central Committee, was responsible for the shortcomings were wronged, the removal of the label did not mean the thor¬
and mistakes which had occurred over the years in domestic ough solution of their problem. But removal of the label brought
work. On behalf of the State Council, Zhou Enlai made a sincere improvement, to some extent, in their political status, work and
self-criticism in regard to problems existing in governmental living conditions. In July 1962, The Party Central United f lont
work. Those from democratic parties who attended, as well as Office proposed that “‘Rightists’ and their families who request
democratic personages without party affiliation, were moved by re-assessment should be re-examined,” “those who were wrongly
the Communist Party’s open-heartedness and boldness in admit¬ labelled should be rehabilitated.” The Central Committee did not
ting and correcting errors in these fields. They expressed their consent to the proposal at the time.
determination “to cross the river in the same boat” with the Party, When the central government assigned the basic accounting
united in a common purpose and overcome all difficulties. unit to the production team, which corresponded roughly to the
After the meeting, the Central Committee held the National elementary cooperatives, the initiative of the farmers received
United Front Work Conference and the Nationality Work Con¬ quite a boost. At the same time, various forms of the household
ference in order to investigate and correct “Leftist” errors. The contract responsibility system emerged spontaneously in many
two meetings underlined the importance of correctly handling the places. Ever since the establishment of cooperatives, moves
relationship among different classes, nationalities and religions, for the “household responsibility” would spontaneously sur¬
as well as the work concerned with overseas Chinese, so as to face whenever the Party called for readjustment of the relations
strengthen the unity of the various social strata and different of production inside rural collective economic organization. 1 hey
nationalities. would be stopped again and again only to emerge whenever the
As to the rehabilitation of leaders and Party members who opportunity arose. This fact showed that household management
were wronged during the anti-Right Deviationist campaign, Party within the economic structure of the rural collective economy of
committees at all levels had started the work after the Central peasants in many ways suited the Chinese rural forces ol produc¬
Committee passed out instructions in June 1961. But progress in tion which consisted mainly of manual labour, and also answered
different regions was uneven. Some regions and work units failed to the needs of the vast majority of peasants. In 1961, provincial
to give the instructions adequate attention. Because of this, the leaders in Anhui proposed to support these moves under the
Secretariat of the Central Committee, led by Deng Xiaoping, premise that the principal means of production were still collec¬
drafted and issued the Circular on Speeding up Re-examination tively owned and the farmers should “unify” their management
of Party Members and Cadres in April 1962. Experience accumu¬ to the state production plan. They proposed to set the “production
lated in army work served as a basis for the suggestion that all quota on the field, responsibility on the individual.” By July
wronged cadres below county-level be rehabilitated. Except for 1962, more than 20 percent of the rural areas all over the country
588 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 589
had been carrying out many different forms of fixing farm output
Holes advocated by the Party for China’s dealing with interna¬
quotas for each household. They proved highly effective and were
tional matters. In early 1957, Mao Zedong made an analysis to
welcomed by the peasants and grassroots leaders. After extensive
the effect that on a world scale at the time, except tor the forces
investigation and research, Deng Zihui aired his support for the
0f socialism, there existed three kinds ol forces: the forces of U. .
measures adopted in Anhui. He said that to inspire the labourers’
imperialism persisting in policies of war and aggression; the
enthusiasm, there needed to be a strict responsibility system, that
forces of other developed capitalist countries; and the force of
a system of responsibility for the farm work in production would
countries having national independence, together with national
be hard to carry out unless it was related to output. Both Liu
liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America, n
Shaoqi and Chen Yun approved of the idea.
regard to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the Pat y
Deng Xiaoping, at a Secretariat meeting and a meeting with
stood for continuously strengthening unity and cooperation with
the Communist Youth League leaders in July 1962, gave briefings
them As for the oppressed nations’ liberation movements and
on the responsibility system emerging in the vast countryside.
countries fighting to gain national independence, the Party advo¬
According to him, “The best production relations should be those
cated giving them active support and developing extensive friend¬
that most easily and most quickly recover and develop agricul¬
ly relations with them. Regarding capitalist countries other than
tural production in the localities. What the masses like, we should
the United States, the Party held that they also belonged to an
adopt. If the form is illegal, we can legalize it.” He quoted the
intermediate zone between the socialist countries and the United
popular saying Liu Bocheng often used: “It does not matter if it
States. (Later, Mao Zedong called these particular countries the
is a yellow cat or a black cat, as long as it catches mice.”27 He
Second Intermediate Zone, and the countries in Asia Africa and
announced that his was a tentative opinion, which might not
Latin America the First Intermediate Zone.) Therefore, China
count. The Central Committee would look into the responsibility
should also win them over and develop friendly relations with
system at a meeting in August, he said.
them. As to the United States, the Party advocated determined
opposition to U.S. armed aggression and threats to China, on the
one hand, while still striving for peaceful co-existence with the
VII. MAINTAINING INDEPENDENCE United States and settling disputes between the two countries
AND SOVEREIGNTY, through peaceful consultation on the other.
From the end of the 50s to the mid-60s, the world situation was
COMBATING HEGEMONISM
turbulent. Between the four forces mentioned above as well as
within each of them, relations splintered and were formed anew.
In the ten years between the mid-50s and mid-60s, major
The international situation on China’s borders was growing
changes took place in the international situation and China’s
strained. China was facing open and potential threats ol aggres¬
foreign relations. In the early years of this period, due to cessation
sion war provocations and military pressure from many direc¬
of the Korean War and the war in Indo-China, the international
tions. In such a turbulent and intense situation, the heart ol the
atmosphere surrounding China tended to relax. The Party hoped
Party’s concerns in international relations was how China could
to further such a situation and grasp the opportunity to speed up preserve her independence and sovereignty and light against
development of the domestic economy. The resolution adopted by hegemonism which loomed on all sides, for the purpose of main¬
the 1st Plenary Session of the 8th National Congress of the taining her national dignity and interests, safeguardmg Chinas
Chinese Communist Party in 1956 defined the fundamental prin- socialist cause and defending world peace and the interests ot
 CHAPTER seven socialist construction

590 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC , ,1 sympathy and support in the struggle for independence.
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 the
national liberation and of the entire socialist cause. At that time,
two countries actively cooperated in international str"gg*“’
the Party made a grim appraisal of the danger of war; and
,»ther nutting forward the famous five principles of peaceful
preparing for the worst possibility, made ready to fight an early
co-existence. China sincerely hoped to maintain and develop her
war, a big war, and a war launched from several directions.
friendly relations with India. In 1959 when the armed rebellion
Preparation for war became the major factor affecting the Party’s
launched by Tibetan reactionary elements was quickly sup
political and economic strategies.
pressed, some Indian authorities either overtly or covertly adopt¬
ed a supportive attitude towards the few national splittists in
Relations Between China and the Countries in Asia, Tibet, thus casting a shadow over Sino-Indian relations The
Africa and Latin America boundary disputes between China and India grew more acrimo-

Relations between China and the countries of Asia, Africa and

m°ln the past, there were no formally delimited boundaries, only
Latin America vigorously surged forward in the years after the
a iraditional and customary line formed in accordance with
mid-50s. The Chinese warmly expressed their support for the
administrative jurisdiction by both sides. The bounds^advo¬
Egyptian people’s struggle to maintain their sovereignty over the
cated by the Indian government went far beyond 'hose actu
Suez Canal in the face of British and French intervention, the
ly within its jurisdiction. It put a vast expanse of Chinese
Algerian people’s struggle against French colonial rule to win
administered territory north of the traditional and customary line
national independence, the struggle of African people in the area
under Indian jurisdiction. China advocated an overall solution to
south of the Sahara against colonialism and racism, and the
the boundary discord through friendly consultation. Before de
Cuban people’s struggle against U.S. armed intervention. In the
limiting boundaries, both sides should maintain the status q .
ten years, a large number of Asian and African countries estab¬
But the Indian government refused to negotiate^ After Angus
lished diplomatic relations with China, as did Cuba, a country in
1959, Indian troops invaded Chinese territory many tunes This
Latin America. Besides, the people of China and Japan developed
led to armed conflicts over the boundary. On November 7 1959
friendly exchanges, albeit through non-governmental channels
the Chinese government suggested that the armed forces of ea
because there were no diplomatic relations between the two
country immediately withdraw 20 km from their actually con¬
countries at the time. In 1964, China established diplomatic
trolled positions. This was rejected by the Indian government On
relations with France. This was an important achievement in the
October 17, 1962, Indian troops launched large-scale attacks °n
expansion of its diplomatic activities in countries outside of Asia,
Chinese frontier troops. The Chinese frontier troops, forced o
Africa and Latin America.
fight back in self-defence, recovered the Chinese territories occu
Between January 1960 and March 1963, according to princi¬
pfed by Indian troops. To show the sincerity of the Chinese
ples of peaceful co-existence and good-neighbourly relations and
through consultation based on equality and in a spirit of mutual government for the peaceful settlementof rfL^fire bv
on November 21 the Chinese government declared a cease fire by
understanding and mutual accommodation, China signed agree¬
the Chinese frontier troops along the entire length of
ments or treaties with Burma, Nepal, Mongolia, Pakistan and
Indian boundary. Furthermore, from December 1, the Chinese
Afghanistan, properly settling boundary questions unsolved in
frontier troops unilaterally drew back 20 km from the November
the past.
7 1959 line of actual control by both sides. Subsequently, the
China and India are two big Asian countries with ancient
civilizations. Peoples of the two countries always expressed mu-
592 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC 593
chapter seven socialist construction
Chinese frontier troops repatriated all Indian prisoners of war
threats in the Taiwan area. China can in no way recognize the
and returned all captured weapons and military supplies to the
,talus quo of U.S. infringement upon Taiwan. The talks had to
Indian side. All these actions proved that China tried to limit and
he suspended at the end of 1957 when all reasonable suggestions
calm down the boundary conflicts, and place friendship between
made by the Chinese side were stubbornly rejected by the United
the two countries above everything else. However, following this,
States. In order to suppress Kuomintang troops’ harassment and
threats of reoccurring boundary provocations still existed for a
wrecking activities on frontline defense ol the mainland coast, the
long period.
People’s Liberation Army began bombarding Quemoy in August
1958. The United States hurriedly reinforced its troops m the
Sino-U.S. Relations Taiwan Strait and, furthermore, sent its fleet to escort the Kuom¬
intang fleet. This constituted an invasion of Chinese territorial
Throughout the ten years, the United States maintained an
seas. The Chinese government sent many serious warnings to the
attitude of open hostility towards China. The two most acute
U.S. government against this. At the same time, the Chinese
questions were: One, the presence of American armed troops in
government reiterated its wish to solve Sino-U.S. disputes through
Taiwan—a matter of intervention in China’s internal affairs; the
other, U.S .armed aggression in Viet Nam, which posed a threat peaceful negotiations. .
In September, Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks were resumed in
to China’s security. U.S. intrusions into China’s territorial air
Warsaw. The United Slates attempted to “give up Quemoy and
were frequent. With the Bandung Conference finished, the Sino- Matsu in exchange for China’s promise not to appeal to force over
U.S. ambassadorial talks were begun in Geneva in 1955 as a result Taiwan and Penghu. In fact, the United States was still trying to
of a statement made by Zhou Enlai. An agreement was reached create “two Chinas.” The Chinese government by no means
regarding the repatriation for ordinary people of both sides. agreed with the idea, nor were the Taiwan authorities satisfied
Consequently, a large group of Chinese students, whose return to
with it. In consideration of the common ground shared by the
China was being thwarted by the U.S. government, were able to Chinese people and the Kuomintang group which opposed the
go back home to serve the motherland and the people. On the
“two Chinas” advocated by the U.S., the Chinese government
question of eliminating the tense situation in the Taiwan area, the decided to leave Quemoy and Matsu in the hands of the Taiwan
United States asked China to commit itself not to liberate Taiwan
authorities for the time being. On October 6, Mao Zedong wrote
by force and to acknowledge the right of the United States to a “Message to Taiwan Compatriots,” which was published m the
conduct so-called “unilateral and collective self-defence” on the
name of Peng Dehuai, minister of national defence, declaring the
Chinese territory of Taiwan, in a ploy to substantiate “two Chi¬ temporary cessation of shelling Quemoy on the condition that
nas,” or “one China, one Taiwan.” China upheld her principled
there would be no further U.S. escort. On October 25, Another
stand: the Chinese government would like to negotiate with the Message to Taiwan Compatriots” was published, announcing that
Taiwan authorities, to liberate Taiwan together with Penghu, there would be no shelling of Quemoy’s airport and docks on even
Quemoy and Matsu by peaceful means to finally realize the dates, in order to let Quemoy and other islands bring in supplies,
reunification of the motherland. But this is an internal affair, in it was not certain whether or not there would be shelling on odd
which the United States has no right to interfere, and which can dates. But to avoid possible losses, boats, ships and airplanes ol
not become a topic for Sino-U.S. talks. The diplomatic negotia¬
the Taiwan side should not come over. At the same time, the
tions between China and the United States on mutual relinquish¬
message advised the Kuomintang authorities not to rely on others
ing resort to force must lead to the removal of U.S. military
too much, pointing out that “matters concerning Chinese can be
594 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter seven socialist construction 595

settled only by the Chinese people. Matters that are hard to solve antiaircraft artillery, engineering, railways, mine sweeping and
in a short time can be taken care of later through long-term loeistics- By the end of March 1968, Chinese relict troops in¬
consultations.” The stalemate between China and the United volved a total of 320,000 people. Together with soldiers and
States on the question of Taiwan lasted for many years. civilians of Viet Nam, Chinese reinforcements, with blood and
An armistice was realized on the Indo-China Peninsula after lives defended north Viet Nam’s territorial air and its transpor¬
the 1954 Geneva agreement was reached. With 17 degrees north tation lines. The toll of the Chinese troops reached more than
latitude as the boundary line, north Viet Nam was put under the 5,000, and the materials in aid of Viet Nam amounted to more
administration of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. After than U.S.S20 billion. With the support of China and other coun¬
the French troops withdrew from Indo-China in 1955, the United tries, the Vietnamese people waged arduous struggles, finally
States seized the opportunity to replace France, using military driving the U.S. aggressive troops into the hopeless predicament
assistance to cultivate pro-American forces, especially through of no victory in sight. In November 1968, the United States had
active support to the Ngo Dinh Diem ruling clique of south Viet no choice but to declare the cessation of bombing and gunfire in
Nam in its cruel persecution of the people who had fought in the north Viet Nam, and to prepare for negotiations to end the war.
former war of resistance against foreign aggression and other Their firm resistance to U.S. imperialist hegemon ism and
patriotic personages. At the end of 1960, the south Vietnamese aggression policies demonstrated a high degree of national dignity
people were forced to take up arms to resist the reactionary rule and a -pirit of national independence on the part of the Chinese
of the U.S.-Ngo clique. In 1961, the United States dispatched people led by the Chinese Communist Party.
“special troops” to south Viet Nam, and in the following year, Matching its threat of force, the United States also adopted a
founded the “U.S. Military-Aid Headquarters in Viet Nam,” thus “peaceful strategy to win victory” over socialist countries. In 1959,
intensifying suppression of the south Vietnamese people and Mao Zedong exhorted us to heighten our vigilance against U.S.
getting ready to raid north Viet Nam. In order to support the peaceful methods, namely, by means of infiltration and corrup¬
Vietnamese people’s resistance against U.S. aggression, China tion, inducing socialist countries to evolve peacefully into capital¬
gave the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam large quantities of ist countries. Later, Mao Zedong repeatedly raised the question m
free military assistance. In August 1964, the U.S. started bombing all earnestness, and linked it with the danger of revisionism arising
north Viet Nam. The Chinese Government published a state¬ within the socialist countries. Prevention ot peaceful evolution is
ment, saying that “U.S. aggression against the Democratic Repub¬ an important strategic ideology ot far-reaching significance. How
lic of Viet Nam means aggression against China. The Chinese to correctly and effectively prevent peaceful evolution is an ever-
people must on no account sit back and watch without going to present problem that needs to be settled properly and seriously in
the rescue.” In March 1965, U.S. marine corps landed at Da Nang exploring the road to build a socialist country.
in the northern part of south Viet Nam, ready at any time to
attack northward. U.S. planes frequently intruded into Chinese Sino-Soviet Relations
territorial air over Yunnan, Guangxi and Hainan Island. Under
the circumstances, the Party Central Committee called on the The Communist Party of China has always stood lor maintain¬
army and the people of the whole country to get ready to deal ing relations of friendship between the two Parties and the two
with the most serious situation possible. By request of the Dem¬ countries, unity of the international communist movement and
ocratic Republic of Viet Nam, China began sending relief troops unity among the various socialist countries. In 1957, Mao Zedong
to Viet Nam to operate in spheres such as ground-air missiles, led a delegation to take part in a meeting of Communist and
 chapter seven socialist construction
596 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
I,Vied a meeting of Parties of several countries in Bucharest,
Workers' Parties of various countries held in Moscow. By way of where he made unwarranted charges against the Chinese Commu-
conducting internal consultations, the Chinese Communist Party ■ . party The Chinese Communist Party refused to submit to
put forward different opinions on some questions of the 20th foreign pressure. In July, the Soviet government suddenly noti¬
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As a result fied China of its unilateral decision to immediately withdraw all
ot the eflorts of the two Parties in co-ordinating their stand and Soviet experts working m China and to terminate all agreements
making mutual concessions, the Moscow Declaration drafted by on economic and technological cooperation between the two
both sides was passed. Even so, later on contradictions between countries This breach of faith, which greatly impaired the rela
China and the Soviet Union nevertheless gradually sharpened. tions between the two Parties and the two countries, ^s co”inut-
The contradictions and clashes between China and the Soviet ted just when China was suffering serious economic difficulties.
Union fell into two categories: 1. Differences in the ideological In October 1960, Liu Shaoqi led a Chinese delegation to attend
field. The two Parties had sharply contrasting opinions on the a meeting of various Communist and Workers Parties in Mos
international situation, the international communist movement’s cow After heated debates and necessary concessions, the Mos¬
line and tactics, and each other’s international and domestic cow' Statement” was adopted. The Chinese Communist Party
policies. 2. On the other hand, the then leaders of the Communist hoped that the unity of the international communist movement
Party of the Soviet Union considered their party as a sort of could be maintained on the basis of this statement. However, as
patriarchal Party,” demanding that the Communist Pa ty of it hap^nS, controversies in the international communist move-
China should follow its baton, in an attempt to control China and menTecame more and more acute after the 22nd Congress of the
make China militarily and diplomatically submit to the strategic Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1961. Leaders of the
needs of “Soviet-U.S. cooperation for domination of the world.” Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Soviet oc^papers as
In 1958, the Soviet Union demanded the establishment of a well as leaders of Communist Parties of many other countries
jointly-controlled long-wave station on Chinese territory and a influenced by the Soviet Communist Party, published many
jointly-commanded fleet in China’s territorial waters. Mao Ze¬ resolutions, statements and articles, attacking ‘h^Am^e Com-
dong and other Chinese leaders promptly delivered a stern rebuff munist Party and Parties of other countries. From D=«
to a demand such as this which would impair Chinese sovereign¬ 196p to March 1963, the Chinese Communist Party published
ty. In the same year, Khrushchov was deeply worried that the seve'n articles answering and criticizing several Soviet-influenced
mainland’s shelling of Quemoy would hamper “Soviet-U.S. co¬ Parties that had denounced China.
operation.” So he demanded that China make a commitment not In July 1963, Deng Xiaoping led a Chinese delegation t0 atlcn
to resort to force on the question of Taiwan. Of course, China talks in Moscow between the Parties of the two countries. Aroun
could not agree. When the Sino-Indian boundary conflicts broke this period, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
out, the Soviet Union did not bother to look into the rights and Party published “A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the
wrongs of the case, but issued a statement partial to the Indian International Communist Movement At the same tunejt
side, thus exposing Sino-Soviet divergences to public view. Central Committee of the Soviet Union published an Open
In April 1960, on the occasion of marking the 90th anniversary Letter to the Party Organizations at All Levels and to All Par y
of Lenin’s birth, the Chinese Communist Party published Long Members. ’ The controversy between .he Chinese an^Sovie
Live Leninism! and two other articles, criticizing some views of parties was further opened up to public view. The talks were
the Soviet leaders without mentioning names. In June, during the without result. From September 1963 to July 1964, the Centra
3rd Congress of the Romanian Workers’ Party, Khrushchov
 598 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 599
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, under the name of
the Renmin Ribao editorial department and the Red Flag Maga¬ the last analysis, the answer is made through the practice of the
zine Editorial Department, published nine commentaries on the Party and the people concerned. It is not for others to write articles
open letter of the Soviet Central Committee. In these articles, affirming or contradicting them. Whether big, medium-sized, or
“Khrushchov revisionism” was openly criticized by name, and small, Parties should respect each other’s choices and experiences.
lessons drawn from world history concerning “peaceful evolu¬ We can’t criticize others for conducting experiments in line with
tion” and “capitalist restoration” in socialist countries were ex¬ their own conditions. Even if they are wrong, it is up to them to sum
pounded. This controversy, which was unprecedented in scale, led up their own experience and try a different path. They should treat
to the disintegration of the international communist movement us in the same way, allowing us to make mistakes. Even if we make
and Communist Parties of many countries. mistakes, it is up to us to correct them. We object to being ordered
In October 1964, the Central Committee of the Communist Party about and we, for our part, will never issue orders to others.
When Deng Xiaoping met with some visiting comrades of a
of the Soviet Union dismissed Khrushchov from his leading posi¬
tion, and appointed Brezhnev First Secretary of the CPSU. Out of foreign fraternal Party, he talked about the relations between the
a desire to improve relations between the two Parties, the Chinese Chinese Communist Party and other foreign Parties and the past
Communist Party sent a delegation headed by Zhou Enlai to the controversies. He said: Looking back, however, we can see that
Soviet Union to take part in activities celebrating the October we haven’t always acted correctly. We have previously expressed
Revolution. But the new leadership of the CPSU claimed that their some incorrect opinions concerning another Party. The visiting
policies on China did not have “even minor differences” from those foreign comrades also said that they hadn’t always acted correctly
ol Khrushchov. In March 1965, Brezhnev compelled the convoca¬ either. This was one aspect of the past controversies, that is, the
tion of a preparatory meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties ideological divergencies. The key to the problem lies in integrat¬
of various countries for the purpose of collectively denouncing the ing the universal principles of Marxism with the concrete prac¬
Communist Party of China. The Chinese Communist Party and six tices of revolution and construction of each country, using new
other fraternal Parties refused to attend. From then on, the Soviet thinking and new viewpoints to understand, inherit and advance
Union kept increasing its armed forces on the boundaries between Marxism-Leninism in the face of ever-changing world situation.
China and the Soviet Union, and stationed troops in the People’s As to the other aspect of the controversies, Deng Xiaoping said:
Republic of Mongolia. In March 1966, when the Soviet Communist “If a Party and the country which it leads pursue a foreign policy
Party convened the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the of interference in the internal affairs of other countries, or
Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist Party decided not to send its invasion or subversion of them, then any other Party is entitled
representatives to attend. Following this, relations between the two to make its stand known and express its criticism. We have always
Parties broke off. opposed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union acting like a
In reviewing the history of the controversies, it is just as Deng patriarchal Party and displaying great-power chauvinism. It pur¬
Xiaoping later said: When a Communist Party comments on the sues a hegemonist line and policy in foreign relations.”28
actions of a foreign fraternal Party, it may often judge them accord¬ In dealing with the international communist movement and
ing to some rigid formula or established pattern. Facts show that relations between socialist countries, the Chinese Communist
this approach gets one nowhere. The correctness or incorrectness of Party upheld the independence and sovereignty of various Parties
the domestic principles and line of a Party in a given country should and countries, and opposed hegemonism of any big Party or any
be judged by that Party itself and by the people of that country. In big country and their treating of other fraternal Parties or other
socialist countries unequally or ruling by force. With dauntless
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter seven socialist construction 601
600

spirit, the Chinese Communist Party withstood the pressure from question of fixing farm output quotas to the household. However,
that quarter. This demonstrated the genuine Marxism and true right at the start, Mao Zedong raised the problems of classes, the
principles of proletarian internationalism of the Chinese Commu¬ general situation, and contradictions for discussion. These topics
nist Party. The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people also became the major content of the 10th Plenary Session of the
are proud of this, and have won the respect of the Communists CPC 8th Central Committee held in Beijing in September. At
of various countries and the people of the world. both the Beidaihe Meeting and the 10th Plenary Session, Mao
Zedong made speeches in which he criticized Khrushchov’s ideas
in the Soviet Union and discussed the questions of classes and
VIII. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF “LEFT” class struggle in China. He regarded differences in understanding
within the Party as the reflection of class struggle, and opinions
DEVIATIONIST POLITICAL MISTAKES differing from his own, but which in fact, conformed fairly well
AND SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF with objective conditions, as indications of Right opportunism;
ECONOMIC READJUSTMENT that is, revisionism. All this he denounced as a “foul wind
blowing towards individual farming” and “reversal of previous
verdicts.” Now some people see the situation as entirely dark, he
During almost two years of readjustment before and after the
said. They are ideologically confused, have lost confidence, and
Enlarged Work Conference of the Parly Central Committee, which
was attended by 7,000 people, the domestic situation gradually took fail to see the brightness, therefore concluding that socialism is
a turn for the belter. However, the erroneous “Left” deviationist no good and that individual farming is the only choice. The
higher up the wind swept, the stronger it blew. Mao criticized
guiding thought on the issue of economic development, especially
in the issue of class struggle, had not been basically corrected. Deng Zihui and others who supported the policy of fixing farm
Actually, there still existed different views within the Party and output quotas to the household as representing the well-to-do
among the leaders of the Party on the situation and policies. In face middle peasants who wished to go in for private farming, and
of serious difficulties, these contradictions and divergencies re¬ even standing by the side of landlords, rich peasants and the
mained latent. After the situation took a favourable turn, the capitalist class in opposing socialism. The recent tendency to
deepening of domestic policy readjustment (following the West reverse previous verdicts was not correct, he added. The cases
Building Meeting and on to the proposal for assigning farm output arising in the campaign against Right deviation in 1959 could not
quotas to the household) and the further intensification of the be reversed in one gust of wind. At that time, Peng Dehuai had
Sino-Soviet polemics made inner-Party divergencies gradually sur¬ handed over a lengthy letter appealing to the Central Committee.
face again over appraisal of the situation and guidance of work. The Mao Zedong considered it an action to reverse previous verdicts,
Party met new twists and turns in its exploration of China’s own adding that Peng could not be rehabilitated. During the plenary
road for building socialism. session, Kang Sheng asserted that the novel Liu Zhidan was
written to “overturn Gao Gang’s case,” which received the sup¬
port of Mao Zedong. Xi Zhongxun and others who had stood by
The 10th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee
the work were called an “anti-Party group” out to redress Gao
In August 1962, the Central Committee held a meeting on Gang’s case. (Of course, criticism of the novel is permissible, but
work at Beidaihe. Originally, the topic had been discussion of the that kind of political analysis and repudiation was groundless.)
work in agriculture, commerce and other fields, including the The session thus decided to set up two commissions for making
 CHAPTER SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 603
602 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

separate inquiries into the cases of Peng Dehuai and Xi the reality of class struggle, handle it correctly, and acquire a
Zhongxun. After the session, Deng Zihui was dismissed from his sober understanding of the problem. At the same time, we must
position as minister of the central committee department of understand clearly that even though class struggle exists in cer¬
agricultural work. The reform to fix farm output quotas to the tain areas we should not widen and absolutize it. In 1957, as the
household on an experimental basis was thus once again cracked scope of the anti-Rightist struggle widened, it was asserted that
down on. With this, the work of rehabilitating “Right opportun¬ the struggle between the two classes and between the two roads
ists” came to an end. Those who preferred suggestions to re¬ would remain the principal contradiction throughout the entire
examine and rehabilitate “Rightists” who carried out the work on stage of transition prior to the completion of socialism (estimated
a trial basis were beat back amidst censures of their “extreme at that time to be more than ten years). This was certainly both
recklessness.” in practice and in theory, failure to keep a clear head. In 1959,
“The 10th Plenary Session of the CPC 8th Central Committee at the Lushan Meeting, struggle against the Right deviation was
pointed out that throughout the historical stage of proletarian also regarded as class struggle within the Party, and as a kind of
revolution and proletarian dictatorship and as well as the whole struggle which would continue for at least twenty years, even
historical stage of transition from capitalism to communism possible for half a century. At the 10th Plenary Session of the 8th
(which needs several decades, or even a much longer period), Central Committee, the criticism of Peng Dehuai, Xi Zhongxun
there exists class struggle between the proletariat and the bour¬ and Deng Zihui was regarded as a struggle of the proletariat
geoisie, and struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist against the bourgeoisie. A completely wrong judgement was
road.” This sentence in the communique was written by Mao passed on the nature of this matter. Then came a new assertion
Zedong himself. On the questions of the class struggle and the that the period of transition with class struggle as the principal
danger of restoration of capitalism, he said, from now on, we contradiction would continue right up until the higher stage of
must remind ourselves of this every year, every month and every communism is reached. The period would be longer than several
day so that “we can retain a relatively sober understanding of this decades, possibly one hundred years, or several hundred years.
problem and have a Marxist-Leninist line.” Thus this important, This conclusion was even more arbitrary and less clear-minded.
yet complicated problem concerning how to understand and deal Not long after, the assertion was defined as the Party’s “basic
with class struggle in socialist society was once again put before theory and basic practice” and during the “cultural revolution” it
the whole Party in a serious, yet very simplistic way. After basic came to be called “the Party’s basic line in the whole historical
completion of the socialist transformation of private ownership of stage of socialism.” Just as “Resolution on Certain Questions in
the means of production, besides the external enemy’s invasions the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s
and subversions, internally in socialist society, class struggle will Republic of China” pointed out, at the 10th Plenary Session of
continue within certain limits for a long time, and can even the 8th Central Committee, Mao Zedong “widened and absolu¬
become sharp under certain conditions. This is an important fact. tized the class struggle, which exists only within certain limits in
It was proved by the attack launched by an extremely small socialist society, and carried forward the viewpoint he had ad¬
number of Rightists in 1957. It was further proved by the emer¬ vanced after the anti-Rightist struggle in 1957 that the contrad¬
gence of speculation and profiteering, graft and theft, sabotage by iction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie remained the
hostile elements and the appearance of “restoration records” principal contradiction in our society.” This indicates that the
written by a small number of landlords during the period of viewpoint of the widening of the class struggle had become
economic recession and readjustment. It is quite necessary to face further systematized, and served as the theoretical preparation
 CHAPTER SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 605
604 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

for further escalation of the Party’s “Left” deviationist mistakes. notion that “once class struggle is grasped, all problems will be
When the 10th Plenary Session came to end, Liu Shaoqi ex¬ solved.” A decision was made to launch a socialist education
movement in rural areas to clear up accounts, warehouses, prop¬
pressed full support for Mao’s theoretical viewpoints and analysis
of the situation. At the same time, in view of the fact that the erty and work-points (known as the “four clean-ups”) and a
criticism of Peng Dehuai’s “Right opportunism” within the whole “five-anti” movement in cities against corruption and theft, spec¬
ulation and profiteering, extravagance and waste, decentralism,
Party after the Lushan Meeting in 1959 had hampered the work to
correct “Left” mistakes that would have continued in their actual and bureaucracy. In May, Mao Zedong himself in Hangzhou
work, Liu Shaoqi proposed that the situation concerning criticism directed and worked out The Draft Decision of the Central
of Peng, Xi and Deng at the 10th plenary session be passed on only Committee of the Communist Party of China on Certain Prob¬
to high-ranking Party cadres, not to cadres at the lower levels. The lems in Our Present Rural Work (known as the First Ten-Point
Central Committee adopted his proposal. Mao Zedong also said, do Decision). The decision’s estimate of the domestic political situa¬
not relax economic work on account of the stress on class struggle. tion was overly serious, considering that serious, sharp class
We should “give work the priority.” The plenary session discussed struggles had surfaced in current Chinese society. The “four
and passed several resolutions concerning consolidation of the col¬ clean-ups” and the “five-anti” movements are “revolutionary
lective economy to develop agricultural production and commer¬ socialist struggles to attack and smash the furious attack launched
cial work. The session also passed a revised draft of sixty articles on by capitalist forces.” The decision urged various localities to train
the people’s communes, and decided to continue implementation of cadres and make on-the-spot experiments in preparation for the
the eight-character principle for readjusting the national economy. widespread socialist education movement. In September, in the
After the 10th Plenary Session of the Party’s 8th Central Commit¬ light of some questions arising in the experiments, the Party
tee, a complicated situation arose in the Party’s and nation’s work. Central Committee formulated “The Draft Regulations on Some
On the one hand, politically, the “Left” mistake of widening class Specific Policies in the Socialist Education Movement in the
struggle grew steadily more serious. On the other hand, the task Rural Area” (known as the Second Ten-Point Decision). Based on
for economic readjustment and restoration basically continued as fully affirming the First Ten-Point Decision, the Second Ten-
scheduled, and was successfully fulfilled by 1965. The two factors Point Decision clearly defined the principle of “taking class
were mutually contradictory, but the contradiction was temporar¬ struggle as the key link.” This is a principle of “Left” deviation.
ily controlled within definite limits. However, the regulations also stipulated relatively correct specific
policies on uniting more than 95 percent of cadres and masses and
“Four Clean-Ups” and “Five-Anti” Movements, and Criticism relying on organizations and cadres at the grassroots level. From
the winter of 1963 to the spring of 1964, the “four clear-ups”
in Political and Ideological Spheres
movement was carried out in a large number of rural communes
After the 10th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee, and brigades throughout the country, and the “five-anti” move¬
the Party Central Committee decided to launch a widespread ment was in its trial stage in a small number of cities.
After the autumn of 1963, the polemics between the Chinese
socialist education movement and wage a large-scale class strug¬
and Soviet Parties grew fiercer by the day. Under the circum¬
gle in the cities and countryside.
stances, Mao Zedong held that revisionism had already appeared
At a meeting of the Party Central Committee held in February
within our Party. The correct proposition on rural work, which
1963, Mao Zedong introduced the experiences summed up by
Deng Zihui and others had advocated, was epitomized as san zi
Hunan and Hebei provinces and other places, and advanced the
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC 607
606 CHAPTER SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

yi bao (the extension of plots for private use, the extension of free In it the domestic situation was grossly exaggerated and even
markets, the increase of small enterprises with sole responsibility further out of keeping with the actual circumstances, and it was
for their own profits or losses, and the fixing of output quotas asserted that the enemy was trying to entice and corrupt the
based on the individual household) and was regarded as a “revi¬ cadres that “establishing a dual counter-revolutionary political
sionist domestic programme.” In the spring of 1962, Wang Jia- power” was the “principal form adopted by the enemy against us,
xiang, head of the International Liaison Department of the Cen¬ and that “the current movement is a large-scale mass movement
tral Committee, suggested to the central committee that to gain that is more extensive, more complicated and more deep-going
time for overcoming difficulties and speeding up construction, it than the land reform movement.” It was decided that “the whole
is necessary to strive for a relative relief of tension in foreign movement is to be led by work teams,” that is, organizations and
relations; in the struggle with the United States, the Soviet Union cadres at grassroots level were to be put aside. Liu Shaoqi also
and India, careful consideration should be given to tactics; in the urged sending large numbers of work teams to concentrate forces
field of foreign assistance, we should be realistic and act within for a battle of annihilation, and using the work methods of the
our capability. The general spirit of these suggestions was correct, land reform movement, such as visiting poor peasants, showing
and as to making suggestions to the central committee, this was concern for them and striking roots among the commune mem¬
in complete conformity with organizational principles. But these bers. The central committee continuously transmitted ^documents
suggestions were distortedly generalized as san he yi shao (liqui¬ which later were proved to be wrong, such as the “Report on
dation of the struggle against imperialism, the reactionaries and Taking Back Leadership of the Baiyin Nonferrous Metal Compa¬
modern revisionism, and reduction of assistance and support to ny ” submitted jointly by the Gansu Provincial Party Committee
the revolutionary struggle of other peoples) and regarded as a and the Party Leadership Group of the Ministry of Metallurgical
“revisionist international programme.” Many suggestions on a Industry, the “Report on the Struggle to Seize Back Power in the
united front made by Li Weihan, head of the United Front Xiaozhan Area,” submitted by the Tianjin Municipal Party Com¬
Department of the Central Committee were also criticized as mittee and a document on summarizing experience m the social¬
“capitulation to the bourgeoisie.” Both Wang and Li were severely ist education movement of the Taoyuan Production Bridge of
criticized as “revisionists in the Party” and dismissed from their Funing County in Hebei Province, all of which stressed the
positions. struggle to seize power. Because many local cadres had doubts
The “four clean-ups” and “five-anti” movements were looked and resentments, the central committee stressed that the major
upon as important strategic measures in fighting against revision¬ danger then was “Right deviation,” urging cadres at prefectura
ism, preventing revisionism and digging out the domestic roots of and county levels to criticize fear of “Left,” but not of Right
revisionism. In the movements, some units conducting on-the- ideas. Therefore, in the second half of 1964, “Left deviation
spot experiments came up with material describing examples of developed a step further.
the “class enemy usurping leadership” or cadres involved in From the latter part of 1964 to early 1965, the Central Com¬
“peaceful transition” (i.e. to capitalism). In May and June of mittee held its working conference. Mao Zedong presided over it
1964, Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi made a further estimate that and worked out “Some Current Questions Raised in the Socialist
leadership in roughly one-third of the grassroots units in the Education Movement in the Rural Areas (i.e., the 23-Point
country was not in our hands, but in the hands of the enemy and cument). The document, affirming that most of our cadres were
their allies. With this in mind, the central committee, under the good or fairly good, stipulated that we should free them as
direction of Liu Shaoqi, revised the Second Ten-Point Decision. quickly as possible from being examined and gradually realize the
 609
chapter seven socialist construction
608 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
and people’s communes in China’s countryside, and in about 3.9
“three-way combination” representing the masses, cadres and oercent of the nation’s total state-owned industrial enterprises and
work team. The work method we advocated was to take the mass communications departments. As for the rest, such as the finan¬
line, and not create an aura of mystery or adopt the “human sea” cial, trade, cultural and educational departments, the “four clean¬
tactics that smacked of the military. The results of the “four ups” movement had been conducted as on-the-spot experiments
clean-ups” movement were to be seen in doing the work of in only a few units. The socialist education movement in both the
construction well, and raising production should be one of the cities and rural areas, which had been carried out for three
criteria of how well the movement is being conducted. These years and more, played a positive role in correcting unaccept¬
regulations partially corrected the overly “Left” practices which able behavior among cadres such as grabbing more than their
influenced various localities while Liu Shaoqi was directing the share, issuing mandatory orders, bullying people and oppressing
“four clean-ups” work during the second half of 1964. However, the masses, as well as many shortcomings in management of the
the 23-Point Document unduly emphasized that the nature of the collective economy. It was also useful in cracking down on graft,
movement was to solve the contradiction between socialism and embezzlement, speculation and profiteering, and in checking
capitalism, pointing out that “this movement targets the Party unhealthy activities tending to foster feudal superstitions^ But
persons in power taking the capitalist road.” (Later, this became due to “taking class struggle as the key link,” many problems
the major slogan of the “cultural revolution.”) Some, such as the differing in nature were regarded as class struggle or as reflec¬
Party persons in power were out in the open, others were behind
tions of the class struggle within the Party. This led to confusing
the scenes; some of the people supporting the Party persons in the two different types of contradictions and caused many cadres
power were at the lower levels, others were in higher levels. There
and ordinary people to suffer under attacks which should not
were even some people working in provincial departments and the have been made against them. Some correct policies and measures
central organs who opposed socialism. Mao Zedong wrote instruc¬
for helping to enliven the rural economy, develop farm produc¬
tions in inner-Party documents, pointing out that the leaders tion and improve peasants’ living standards could not be carried
taking the capitalist road were “bad cadres of the bureaucrat- out well because more often than not they would be censured as
capitalist class.” They “have become or are becoming bourgeois a “capitalist tendency” or a “capitalist tail.” Nevertheless, this
elements who suck the blood of the workers.” “The bureaucrat movement was conducted only in some areas under unified
class on the one hand and the working class and the poor and leadership, in stages and in groups. Moreover, certain deviations
lower-middle peasants on the other are two bitterly antagonistic
arising in the movement were corrected, thus limiting and alle¬
classes.” The spearhead of the struggle was thus pointed at Party
viating to some extent the negative aspects of the movement By
leaders at various levels. This served to develop “Left” deviation-
and large, industrial and agricultural production had not been
ist error of broadening class struggle to a new stage, that is, a stage
adversely affected nationwide, and no widespread social chaos
of so-called “class struggle” created artificially, arbitrarily and
systematically.
eVeintthleideological sphere, the criticism and struggle were also
According to the provisions of the “23-Point Document,” the
aggravated. As early as in the autumn of 1962 Jiang Qmg
socialist education movement in both the cities and rural areas
censured a new kunqu opera Li Huimang as a ghost play a
should be called in short the “four clean-ups” movement (i.e.,
ghost appears on the stage as a character) incompatible with
four clean-ups in the political, economic, organizational and
socialism. In May 1963, Jiang Qing organized some people to
ideological fields). By the spring of 1966, the “four clean-ups”
write articles criticizing Li Huimang and former articles praising
movement had been conducted in about one-third of the counties
 611
610 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER seven socialist construction

and art were subjected to open political criticism. From the

the opera. This created a tense atmosphere in literary and art
summer of 1964 onward, this kind of criticism was expanded to
circles. In December 1963, Mao Zedong wrote these comments:
academic circles. A number of representative figures and theoret
“Problems abound in all forms of art such as the drama, ballads,
ical viewpoints in the spheres of philosophy, economics and
music, the fine arts, the dance, the cinema, poetry and literature,
history and all other academic spheres were vigorously criticized
and the people involved are numerous; in many departments very
in'research institutes, schools of higher learning, and publications
little has been achieved so far in socialist transformation.” “Isn’t
throughout the country. Among the criticized works, many were
it absurd that many Communists are enthusiastic about promot¬
excellent or rather good. Some had shortcomings, but were
ing feudal and capitalist art, but not socialist art?” He also said
groundlessly criticized as having anti-Party and anti-socialist
on many occasions that the Ministry of Culture was a “ministry
political problems. Among the theoretical viewpoints which were
of emperors, kings, generals and ministers,” a “ministry of scho¬
criticized, some were correct, while the others could be discussed.
lars and beauties,” and a “ministry of foreign dead people.” The
In either case, it was also groundless to criticize them as ant
Ministry of Culture and the literary and art circles immediately
Party and anti-socialist political problems. Among the represent
organized a rectification campaign to study these instructions.
ative figures criticized, most were important leading cad«S’ “
In June 1964, after reading the “Report on the Situation in the
complied writers and scholars who were Party members in
Rectification Campaign Carried Out in the China Federation of
cultural and academic spheres. After being criticized, many of
Literary and Art Circles and the Associations Under It (Draft),”
them were dismissed from their leading posts, or unable to
Mao Zedong wrote an instruction: “In the last fifteen years these
associations, most of their publications (it is said that a few are
“ng^e SSl of 1964, Mao Zedong held a forum
good), and by and large the people in them (that is, not every¬
Soon'later, on many occasions, he issued written directive^nd
body) have not carried out the policies of the Party. They have
made speeches, advancing many extreme proposals for reform
acted as high and mighty bureaucrats, have not gone to the
workers, peasants and soldiers and have not reflected the socialist
^ With°criticism intensified in the spheres of literature, art
revolution and socialist construction. In recent years, they have
science and education, the large majority m the whole continge
slid right down to the brink of revisionism. Unless they remold
involved were once again called “bourgeois intellectuals
themselves in real earnest, at some future date they are bound to
The erroneous and aggravated criticism carried out in the
become groups like the Hungarian Petofi Club.” At that time,
ideological sphere trampled on the policy of letting a hundred
in the sphere of literature and art, there really existed some
flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought^nteni Tins
unhealthy phenomena. It is necessary to point out the problems
brought about a tense atmosphere among the broad tanks of
in this field and solve them by the means of normal criticism,
intellectuals who were thrown into a state of extreme anxiety an
strengthening leadership and improving work. However, Mao
nervousness, [t impaired their enthusiasm and hindered the de¬
Zedong’s two written instructions did not objectively appraise the
velopment of cultural, scientific and educational undeitakmgs^
whole situation in literary and art circles. Hence this led to
At the lime when “Left” deviations criticisms were growing
launching mass movements and political struggles to settle prob¬
increasingly exacerbated, Deng Xiaoping made efforts trying to
lems in culture and art. In cultural departments, culture and art
control the'situation. In March 1965, the Secretariat erf: the CPC
units and in nationwide periodicals and newspapers, Li Huiniang,
Central Committee held a meeting on correcting toe Lett
Xie Yaohuan and other operas, Jiangnan in the North, Early
deviation which arose in the socialist education movement carried
Spring and other films, and many theoretical views on literature
 613
612 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

out in experimentation at Beijing University. In speaking of the nroblems had not been solved properly such as imbalance m the
current situation in ideological and cultural spheres, Deng Xiao¬ structure of industry, poor quality of products and low produc¬
ping said: Now people dare not write articles, and the theatres tive efficiency; many problems remained in enterprise manag
put on plays only about soldiers and fighting. As to the cinemas, ment as well. Therefore, the central committee stipulated that
this film can’t be shown, that film can’t be shown. What film can from 1963, three more years should be spent in continuo
you find that’s ever so perfect? Those “revolutionaries” want to implementation of the principle of “readjustment consolidation,
achieve fame by criticizing others and try to climb up by stepping filling out and raising standards” as a transitional stage between
on other people’s shoulders. He proposed that such practices the second and third Five-Year Plans. That is to say 1962 was
should be stopped at once. In September 1965, Peng Zhen in a the last year of the Second Five-Year Plan, and the .I^tathe
speech at a national meeting of directors of cultural departments Year Plan would be put off and would begin from 1966. In the
and bureaus under the Ministry of Culture, also attempted to ease three years of transitional stage, the readjustment would be
the tense atmosphere in literary, art and academic circles by conducted under conditions of the basic completion of he large-
leading the criticism into the orbit of argument and reasoning. scale reduction and retreat of the national economy. major
However, the developing situation could not be held up for long. tasks and targets were: Agricultural production should reach or
In November 1965, Yao Wenyuan’s article “Comment on the exceed the level of 1957; industrial production should be around
New Historical Opera ‘Hai Rui Dismissed From Office’” was 50 percent higher than the level of 1957; ^ajor
published. It stirred up an even more erroneous, violent tide of relations in the national economy would be basically balanced on
criticism, and which acted as a fuse touching off the “cultural the new base of 1962; the managerial and administrative work f
revolution.” various departments would be led onto a normal path of develop¬
ment' enterprise labour productivity and the economizing of raw
Three Years of Economic Readjustment from 1963 to 1965 Tnd processing materials and fuel should reach or -rpass former
top records. To realize the above-mentioned tasks and targets,
After the 10th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee was imperative to implement the general principle of developing
of the CPC, although “Left” deviationist mistakes had developed the national economy with agriculture as the base and industry
further, they had not yet come to dominate the situation country¬ as the leading factor. The economic plan should be drawn up
wide before the launching of “cultural revolution.” The major according to the order of first solving the problems of food
attention of the Party and the people throughout the country was clothing and daily necessities, then strengthening basic industry,
focused on readjustment of the national economy, while restoring while giving consideration to the development of national defence
and developing production. In the first half of 1963, the overall and breakthroughs in top-level science „ln.ri_
situation of the national economy took a favourable turn. With ln the three years of continuous readjustment, some experi
this, a mood of impatience began to gain ground, the feeling was menu were made on reform of the economic system Jwo reform
that the task for national economic readjustment had been ba¬ measures merit attention. One was the trial establishment of
sically completed, therefore we could now turn to speeding up industrial and transport trusts. Many enterprises that produced
national economic development. In September the same year, the and managed similar products were integrated into special cor¬
Party Central Committee made an objective analysis of the porations They were managed according to economic laws rather
current economic situation; the conclusion was that agricultural ton by administrative means. In March 1963, on the motion of
production had not yet been restored to the level of 1957; some Liu Shaoqi, China’s first trust—the China Tobacco and Cigar
 614
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter seven socialist construction 615

Company— was set up on a trial basis. Subsequently, a dozen or

problem of food and clothing, then they can fight a war. Other¬
so national, provincial and municipal trusts were founded, thus
wise, firearms would be useless. Secondly, be prepared against
accumulating experiences for future reforms. The other measure
natural disasters. Once a famine year comes, and localities have
was reform of the labour system. In 1957, Liu Shaoqi advocated
no stores of grain, cotton or edible oil, they have to rely on
the idea of employing fewer regular workers, but more temporary
assistance from other provinces for support. It’s not a permanent
workers who were both workers and peasants. In 1958, he further
solution. Once we have a war, we would have many more diffi¬
advocated two labour systems and two educational systems: one
culties. No matter which province is involved, local national
was a full-time working system and full-time schooling system-
disasters are unavoidable, to say nothing of several provinces
the other was a work-study, or farm-study labour system and
combined. Third, the slate should not accumulate too much. We
educational system. In 1964, Liu Shaoqi again made the above
should give consideration to sections of the population who
proposals, which were confirmed by the central committee. Since
still haven’t enough food and clothing; furthermore, we should
then, the labour system of employing both permanent workers
consider storing grain locally among the people in preparation,
and temporary workers was gradually introduced on a nationwide
for war and natural,disasters; and thirdly, consider accumulation
scale. I he work-study, or farm-study programme was carried out
in some experimental units. of funds by localities for use in expanded reproduction.” He also
said that we have had several years’ experience of draining the
After May 1964, as the United States and the Soviet Union
pond to get all the fish (referring to high purchase quotas), with
were intensifying their military threats against China, the prob¬
many localities unable to maintain simple reproduction in famine
lem ot war preparations in economic work became an important
years. We should take warning from this. Preparing against war
item on the Party’s agenda. Large-scale construction of the Third-
and natural disasters and doing everything for the people is at the
Line Region (strategic rear) in southwest China was laid out. To
same time the best method for serving the state according to the
help promote it, the central committee decided to carry out the
old saying that if the common people have ample food and
principle of “stopping” (all new projects), “reducing” (projects
clothing, how could the monarch be hard up?29
under construction), “moving” (some enterprises and institutions
After five years of readjustment between 1961 and 1965, the
to the Third-Line Region), “separating” (some enterprises and
relation between industry and agriculture, the relations within
institutions into two, with some of them moving to the Third-Line
industry and the relation between accumulation and expenditure
Region) and “helping” (enterprises in the Third-Line Region with
were brought into relative balance. Industry had increased its
technical force and equipment from enterprises of the same
ability to support agriculture. Enterprise managerial levels and
category in the First-Line and Second-Line regions). Actually,
economic results were somewhat improved. On this basis, indus¬
this was another large-scale readjustment of the national econ¬
omy. trial and agricultural production was revived and developed;
market supply was improved; revenue and expenditure were
To consider economic construction from the angle of war
balanced; prices nationwide were stable, and the market was
preparation involved not only the re-distribution of industry
brisk. At a time when the task of readjusting the national econo¬
Mao Zedong advanced the slogan: “Be prepared against war, be
my was in the main accomplished, the 1st Session of the 3rd
prepared against natural disasters, and do everything for the
National People’s Congress met during the end of 1964 and the
people ; this was especially aimed to develop agriculture and
beginning of 1965. At the session, Zhou Enlai announced that the
mobilize local enthusiasm for construction. He said: “First, be
national economy as a whole would soon enter a new stage of
prepared against war. The people and army must first solve the
development and that China would begin to carry out the ihird
 617
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER seven socialist construction
616

Taking 1962 as the base period (which marked the lowest point
Five-Year Plan beginning from 1966. The Chinese people should
in the readjustment process), in the three years from 1963 to
redouble their efforts to make China a socialist power with
1965 the average annual total output value of industry and
modern agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and
agriculture increased 15.7 percent; the average annual total out-
technology. This was the first time the Party had taken such a
nut value of agriculture rose 11 percent; and the average annual
solemn occasion to call on the people of the whole nation to
total output value of industry went up 17.9 percent. While m the
realize the task of the four modernizations. But owing to the
First Five-Year Plan period, the rates of growth in the three fields
outbreak of the “cultural revolution” this great task could not be
were, respectively, 10.9 percent, 4.5 percent and 18 percent.
implemented according to plan.
Considering that the base numbers in 1962 were very low, eco¬
nomic growth in the following three years of the readjustment
period was restorative in nature; therefore, it cannot be t ully
IX. TEN YEARS OF ACHIEVEMENTS AND
compared with that in the First Five-Year Plan.
TWO DEVELOPMENT TENDENCIES With 1957 as the base period, in the eight years between 1958 and
IN THE EXPLORATION 1965, investment in capital construction reached 93.8 billion yuan,
with which 531 large and medium-sized projects were completed.
Total industrial and agricultural output value increased by 59.9
The ten years from the 1st Session of the 8th Central Commit¬
percent. Of this, total agricultural output value rose by 9.9 percent,
tee of CPC to the eve of the “cultural revolution” (1956-66)
and total industrial output value by 98.1 percent. In major indus¬
witnessed a tortuous development in the Party’s exploration of
trial products, steel increased 2.3 fold, to 12.23 million tons; raw
how to build socialism in China.
coal 77 percent, to 232 million tons; electricity 3.5 fold, to 67.6
In the ten years of large-scale socialist construction, al¬
billion kwh; crude oil7.75 fold, to 11.31 million tons; and synthetic
though China suffered serious setbacks, it nevertheless won
ammonia 8.7 fold, to 1.484 million tons. In the major agricultural
great achievements as well. In one year and more following 1956,
products, the output of cotton reached 2.098 million tons, up 27 9
efforts were made to continue carrying out the original tasks set
percent; grain 194.55 billion kg, close to 195.05 billion kg in 1957
in the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), and to surpass them. It was
(original estimates of grain output stood at 185 billion kg, not
then followed by the Second Five-Year Plan period (1958-62).
including the output of soybean.); ups and downs in the year ol big
However, the five years were marked by three years of the
leap forward” lowered the average growth rate during the period
anomalous (i.e., casting aside scheduled tasks) “big leap forward”
from 1958 to 1965. However, due to the painstaking efforts made
and a serious economic recession brought on by it. To overcome
by the Chinese people nationwide, agricultural production was
the difficulties, the Party and the Chinese people waged an
restored at a fairly quick paced and even increased in some fields.
arduous struggle. In the latter two years of the Second Five-Year
Industrial production rose in every branch, and even showed a
Plan (1961-62), China went in for readjustment of the national
economy. Then followed three years (1963-65) of continuous considerable growth in some fields.
The “big leap forward” inflicted tremendous damage and waste
readjustment. This was regarded as a transitional stage between
on China’s industrial and agricultural production and construction.
the Second Five-Year Plan and the Third Five-Year Plan (begin¬
However, these years still saw development. There was the begin¬
ning from 1966). The readjustment, resulting in smooth economic
ning of an overall arrangement for industrial construction for the
development, required a total of five years. The achievements
most advanced branches of scientific research, and national de-
scored in various fields were notable.
 619
618 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter seven socialist construction

fence, construction of water conservancy works, mechanization of nf Daqing, and in 1960, the most difficult year, the Party Central
Committee decided to muster workers, cadres and technicians
agriculture, and for many other projects in modernization. Statis¬
from various fields to conduct oil prospecting and exploitation on
tics showed that from 1949, the year of the founding of New China,
the boundless grasslands. In only one year, they ascertained the
to 1964, over two-thirds of the total large and medium-sized projects
area of the oilfield and conducted experimental exploitation. In
in various departments of heavy industry were put into operation
in the three years of the “big leap forward.” The growth of steel¬ three years, they built up the largest oil-producing base in China,

making capability in the three years accounted for 36.2 percent of with an oil output covering two-thirds of the national total. They

the total increase in steel-making capability from 1949 to 1979; coal also made breakthroughs in the geological theory of oil reserves,

mining capability made up 29.6 percent and cotton spinning spin¬ oil exploitation and oil refining technology. Subsequently, Sheng-

dles amounted to 25.9 percent. After carrying out the principle li and Dagang oilfields were also opened up. By 1965 China was

of readjustment, consolidation, filling out and raising standards, self-sufficient in oil. The Chinese people proudly proclaimed:

newly-begun work projects, and capacity added to old, made steady Gone are the days when the Chinese people had to depend on
“foreign” oil. The petrochemical industry, closely related to the
gains.
In the development of industry, the nation’s total industrial oil industry, was also gradually built up.
fixed assets in 1966 were four times that of 1956. In the iron and In the ten years, a total length of 8,000 km of new railways

steel industry, besides further development of the Anshan iron were built. Of these, the Yingtan-Xiamen, Baotou-Lanzhou,
Lanzhou-Haiyan, Lanzhou-Urumqi, Chongqing-Guiyang, and
and steel base, the largest in China, two big iron and steel bases,
Wuhan and Baotou in the interland, as well as a number of large Guiyang-Liuzhou railways were completed and opened to trattic.
The Chengdu-Kunming, Guiyang-Kunming, Liuzhou-Guiyang
and medium-sized iron and steel plants in other parts ot China,
and Xiangfan-Chongqing railways were speeding up construction.
were also built in the ten years. In addition, the construction of
Apart from Tibet, various provinces and autonomous regions
a strategic rear iron and steel base in Panzhihua of Sichuan also
were linked by local railways. For the first time, Fujian and
started in this period. In the machine-building industry, China
Oinghai provinces, as well as Ningxia and Xinjiang autonomous
was able to manufacture equipment for metallurgical, mining,
regions, saw railways running through their land. 1 he proposal
power and petrochemical industries, as well as to set up factories
and plan for building the Third-Line Region gave an important
in the fields of aircraft making, automobile manufacturing and
mechanical engineering. China was also able to design and man¬ impetus to railway construction.
ufacture some kinds of large modern equipment. In 1964, China In the ten years, scientific and technical achievements were

could independently supply over 90 percent of its major machines outstanding. Many specific requirements in the Twelve-Year

and equipment. Industry in support of agriculture had developed Long-Range National Plan for Development of Science and Tech¬

considerably. In the ten years, tractors and chemical fertilizers nology worked out in 1956 were fulfilled. In 1963, China went

used in the countryside increased by seven fold, and the supply ahead in advance to work out another ten-year national plan tor

of electricity for the rural areas went up by 71 fold. There was the development of science and technology (1963-7,.). Mao Ze¬

an improvement in the regional distribution in the composition dong gave instructions in regard to drawing up the new plan: The

of industrial departments. battle for science and technology must definitely be I ought and

The most outstanding was the development of the petroleum moreover, must be fought well. Without science and technology,

industry which was vital to China’s national economy at that the productive forces can not be increased.
time. In 1959, industrial oil currents were discovered in the area The achievements made in the fields of science and technology
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC 621
620 CHAPTER SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

for national defense were particularly striking. The work in these particularly worth notice was that these economic and cultura
fields, presided over by Nie Rongzhen, started in 1958. In 1961, achievements were attained under conditions in which China was
the Central Committee made an important decision to speed up suffering serious economic difficulties at home and facing wai
the development of scientific research and industry for national threats and tremendous pressure from abroad (capitalist coun¬
defense, with the research and production of atom bombs and tries had been enforcing a blockade and embargo on China for a
guided missiles as the central tasks. In November 1962, the long time and the Soviet Union had torn up contracts and
Central Committee established a fifteen-member special commis¬ withdrawn its assistance). During the period, China also paid oil
sion headed by Zhou Enlai, including Nie Rongzhen and Luo all its debts to the Soviet Union (mainly debts incurred lor
Ruiqing, to be in charge of the research and production involved. munitions during the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid
Mao Zedong instructed: “Make major efforts for coordination to Korea). Upholding the policies of maintaining independence and
do the work well.”31 Zhou Enlai devoted a great deal of energy to self-reliance, the Chinese people and the Chinese Communists
this task. After strenuous efforts made by the broad masses of braved the foreign pressure and overcame the difficulties. Jhe
scientists, technicians, commanders and fighters of the People’s heroic spirit of the Chinese people should go down unrivaled m
Liberation Army, as well as by workers, staff members and cadres history It is in this period that shining examples emerged, such
of concerned departments, China successfully exploded its first as that of Jiao Yulu, Lankao County Party Secretary of Henan
atom bomb on October 16, 1964. This was a concentrated expres¬ Province, who displayed the spirit of serving the people whole¬
sion of the new level in science and technology reached by China heartedly and giving his all till his heart stopped beating; Wang
at that time. This brilliant achievement attained through the Jinxi, a Communist oil worker at the Daqing Oilfield, who came
policy of self-reliance effectively broke the nuclear monopoly and to be known was as “Iron Man” for his hard work and spirit ot
defused the nuclear blackmail of the superpowers and raised fearing no difficulties; the Communist commune members of
China’s international status. The Chinese government stated: Dazhai Production Brigade of Xiyang County, Shanxi Province,
China has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and who together with the local people, demonstrated the spirit of
thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China is forced to persisting in self-reliance in their arduous efforts to prevail over
conduct nuclear tests and develop nuclear weapons for defense natural disaster and to conduct construction and production in
and for protection of the Chinese people from nuclear threat. The farming; Lei Feng, a Party member and PLA soldier, who dis¬
Chinese government hereby solemnly declares that China will played a selfless Communist spirit. The Party called on all cadres,
never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use Party members and broad masses of people to learn from them.
nuclear weapons. This became a tremendous spiritual force for building socialism^
In the field of basic sciences, in 1965 China first produced Just as the “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History ot
synthetic crystalline bovine insulin, taking the leading position in Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China
the world. pointed out in expounding the achievements made in the ten
In the ten years, educational undertakings forged rapidly years- “The material and technical basis for modernizing our
ahead. From 1957 to 1966, graduates from institutions of higher country was largely established during that period. It was also
education totalled 1.4 million and graduates of technical secon¬ largely in the same period that the core personnel for our work
dary schools numbered 2.11 million, or respectively, 4.9 times and in the economic, cultural and other spheres were trained and that
2.4 times that of the period from 1950 to 1956. After readjust¬ they gained their experience. This was the principal aspect ot the
ment, educational quality was improved greatly.
Party’s work in that period.”
 623
CHAPTER SEVEN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION
622 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
class struggle which does exist in certain spheres or by virtually
In ten years of exploration, there were two trends of develop¬
fabricating class struggle, is wrong and harmful. Equally detn
ment in the Party’s guiding ideology. One trend was correct or
mental is overestimating the practical possibility of peacefu
relatively correct. That is to say, the Party had developed some
“ olution in a particular setting, as well as opposing many correct
correct or relatively correct theoretical viewpoints, principles and
ideas and policies by dubbing them revisionist. At the same time
policies, and accumulated some correct or relatively correct prac¬
we must see that in the ten years of exploration, the correct trend
tical experiences in its exploration of a road of its own for
and the erroneous trend did not each separately go their own way
building socialism. This correct trend was in force mainly during
but were often interspersed and intertwined. They co-existed not
the period of exploration lasting over a year before and after the
only in the process of the whole Party’s exploration, but also in
1st Session of the 8th Party Central Committee held in 1956, the
the developmental process of the individual’s cognition. Some¬
eight- or nine-month exploration before the 1959 Lushan Meet¬
ing, and the five-year exploration for readjustment after the
times this trend got the upper hand in the wh°l® Part^’““et,meS
that trend, or different trends co-existed in different spheres.
winter of 1960.
Ten years’ development and accumulation of “Left deviation-
The other trend was erroneous. That is to say, the Party had
ist errors eventually prevailed for a time over the correct trend
formed some erroneous theoretical viewpoints, policies, ideas and
of development to bring on the launching of the ^cultural revo
practical experiences in the exploration of its own road for
lution.” Of course, the mistakes made before the cultural revo¬
building socialism. In thinking back on the Party’s history, Deng
lution” cannot be equated with those of the cultural revolution,
Xiaoping said on many occasions, “From 1957 on, China was
whether in scope, gravity, or in nature. In 19 7, when speakmg
plagued by ‘Left’ ideas, which gradually became dominant.”32 He
about why it was necessary to launch the cultural revolution,
was referring mainly to the “big leap forward,” which had led to
Mao Zedong stressed that it was because all the past struggles
overanxiety for quick economic results and the “Left” deviation-
launched in the rural areas, factories and literary and art circles,
ist mistakes from the broadening of the anti-Rightist struggle, to
as well as the socialist education movement, “could not solve the
the “anti-Right deviation” fight at the Lushan Meeting, and to
problem.” This clearly indicates that the errors which occurred in
the magnifying of the class struggle after the 10th Plenary Session
the struggles before the “cultural revolution” and the errors of the
of the 8th Party Central Committee. Just what is correct needs to
“cultural revolution” itself were different in nature. One cannot
be analysed; so does what is incorrect. Errors are often caused by
fail to see the difference between them, just as one cannot fail to
going beyond the limits of truth. As to the speed of socialist
see their inner links. The former was the precursor of and
economic construction, we should strive for a possible, effective,
preparation for the latter. , ,
sustained, stable and balanced high speed. This is necessary and
In the ten years, correct and relatively correct trends of devel¬
correct. If we go beyond limits and subjectively seek rash ad¬
opment also spread. However, because the correct trend itself was
vance, we will go astray and do great damage to economic
not yet mature or thoroughgoing enough, it was powerless in the
construction. On the question of class struggle under socialist
end to prevent the erroneous trend from developing further, so
conditions, it is necessary and correct to attach importance to the
that later, on the contrary, it was overwhelmed for a period ol
existence of class struggle in certain spheres and to maintain
time by the development of erroneous trend. But m the long run,
vigilance against the danger of peaceful evolution and revision¬
the correct trend could not be completely abandoned and de¬
ism. It would be extremely erroneous if we failed to see the class
stroyed. A considerable part of the correct trend (for example, the
struggle and its dangers.
Sixty Articles for Agriculture) still played a positive role among
To exceed the limits of truth by broadening and absolutizing
 624 625
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter seven socialist construction

the broad sections of cadres and masses during the “cultural about mistakes, we should not speak only of Comrade Mao
revolution.” This is one of the reasons why, when the guiding 7edong, for many other leading comrades in the Central Com
ideology of the “cultural revolution” was fundamentally wrong, mittee made mistakes, too. Comrade Mao got carried away when
the broad masses of cadres and people still during the period we launched the ‘great leap forward,’ but didn’t the rest of us go
scored definite achievements in their actual work. More impor¬ along with him? Neither Comrade Liu Shaoqi nor Comrade Zhou
tant is the fact that these correct things which had accumulated Enlai nor I for that matter objected to it, and Comrade Chen Y un
served as preparation for the subsequent process of correcting the didn’t say anything either. We must be fair in regard to these
mistakes and the erroneous guiding ideology of the “cultural questions and not give the impression that only one individual
revolution.” Of course, while pointing out this kind of historical made mistakes while everybody else was correct, because this
sequence, it is necessary also to sec that after things which were doesn’t tally with the facts. When the Central Committee makes
in disorder had been set to rights and the policies of reform and a mistake, it is the collective rather than a particular individual
opening were in effect, the Party’s guiding ideology advanced to that should bear the responsibility.”33
a completely new historical eight on the basis of the thorough In short, in the ten years of construction, whether achieve¬
correction of the error of the “cultural revolution.” This new ments or failures, were results occurring in the process ot Paity s
advance, as compared with the correct trend which had grown in exploration of a road of its own for building socialism. So long as
the ten years before the “cultural revolution,” is much broader they are correctly summed up, all experiences, whether positive
and much more profound. It embraces many new creations and or negative, are the Party’s precious treasures.
new development which never existed before. The two advances
cannot be put on a par.
The successes and correct things which accumulated during the NOTES
ten years of construction and exploration were achieved by the
Party and the Chinese people through collective struggle. Among 1. “Economic Work Should Be Conducted m a Practical Way ” Selected Works of
the leaders of the Party Central Committee, Mao Zedong un¬ 7hou Enlai Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1989 , Vol. 11, P-1 ■
doubtedly played the most important role. Liu Shaoqi, Zhou
Enlai, Zhu De, Chen Y un and Deng Xiaoping all played impor¬
tant roles. Many correct ideas and decisive policies were advanced
by Mao Zedong and won the support of the Party Central cd.. Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1989, Vol. II, P-
Committee’s collective leadership. With the support of Mao Ze¬
6. Ibid., pp- 167-168.
dong, other leaders’ correct suggestions could also be passed and 8 "Contoueto Exercise Dictatorship and at the Same Time to Broaden Democ¬
carried out in practice. Undoubtedly, Mao Zedong should bear
racy” Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Eng. ed„ Foreign Languages Press, Betjtng,

major responsibility for the mistakes made in the ten years. It is ^Resolution onto Political Repot, Made a, to CPC 8th National Congress,
not only because he was chairman of the Central Committee at
msltrlfworttfChen Yun (1956-85), Chin, ed., People's Publishing House,
that time, but also because he advanced and supported some
major erroneous ideas and decisive policies. Sometimes, these n^'How’ to Treat Individual Handicraft Households,” People's Daily, December
even resulted from his personal arbitrariness which impaired the 2LD56. ^ . _ 1Q,,
Party s democratic centralism and suppressed relatively more
correct ideas. But just as Deng Xiaoping said: “When we talk
\i Standing Committee meeting on December
29, 1956.
 626 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

14. Speech by Zhou Enlai at a State Council meeting on April 6, 1957.

15. In June 1956, strikes, demonstrations and riots occurred in Poznan, Poland
In October and November the same year, strikes, demonstrations and riots took
place in Budapest, Hungary.
16. From an outline for a speech written by Mao Zedong in March 1957.
17. Mao Zedong: “Suggestions on Reading Some Books,” November 9, 1958
18. “Inner-Party Newsletter,” March 15 and 17, 1959. CHAPTER EIGHT
19. Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Zedong, Chin, ed.. People’s
Publishing House, 1986, Vol. II, p. 812.
20. Selected Works of Chen Yun (1956-85), Chin, ed., People’s Publishing House
THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION”:
1986, p. 130.
21. “The Summing-Up of the Past Ten Years,” June 18, 1960. TEN YEARS OF NATIONWIDE
22. “The Origin of Machineguns and Mortars and Others,” August 16 1959
23. Instruction transmitted by the Party Central Committee on November 28 CHAOS
1960 regarding the fourth report of the Gansu provincial Party committee on
implementation of the Central Committee’s Urgent Directive Letter.
24. Instruction transmitted by the Parly Central Committee on November 15,
1960 regarding the report ot the Hubei provincial Party committee. I. THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION”
25. A letter or Mao Zedong on September 29, 1961. to the Standing Committee
members of the CPC Political Bureau and related comrades. INITIATED
26. An instruction to Lu Dingyi, head of the Central Propaganda Department, on
December 22, 1958.
27. “Restore Agricultural Production,” Selected Works of Deng Xiao¬ Bv 1966 China had successfully readjusted the national econ¬
ping (1938-65), Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1992, p. 293 omy had overcome serious economic difficulties, and had begun
28. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-82), Chin, ed., People’s Publish¬
ing House, 1983, pp. 278-279. Important Speeches by Comrade Deng Xiaoping implementing its Third Five-Year Plan for the development of
(February-July 1987), Chin, ed., Party Literature Publishing House under the the national economy. Just at such a time, the cultural revo u
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 1987, p. 31.
tion” look place. It was called “cultural revolution at the time
29. Mao Zedong’s letter to Liu Shaoqi on March 12, 1966. ’
30. Mao Zedong’s talk with Nie Rongzhen and others in December 1963, quoted but it was not a revolution at all. Actually, it was an internal
in Jiang Zemin’s speech at the 4tli National Conference of the Chinese Association disorder which damaged the development of China’s socialism.
ol Sciences.
This so-called “great revolution” was initiated and led by Mao
31. Mao Zedong: Introduction on a letter (dated November 13, 1962) of sugges¬
tion from Luo Ruiqing to Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee on the Zedong to prevent the restoration of capitalism, maintain the
establishment of a 15-membcr special commission. Party’s purity and search for China’s own socialist road. However,
32. Deng Xiaoping: Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, (revised and he did not recognize as incorrect the broadening ol class struggle
enlarged edition), Chin, ed., People’s Publishing House, 1987, p. 102.
33. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-82), Chin, ed.. People’s Publishing during the socialist stage, and he misjudged the political situation
House, 1983, p. 260. of the Party and state. These mistaken ideas had developed to a
very serious extent. He confused right and wrong in regard to a
series of important theoretical issues and policies. I his led to
blurring the distinction between ourselves and the enemy, to the
conclusion that revisionism had in fact appeared in the Party
central authorities, and that the Party and the state were facing
the danger of a capitalist restoration. He held that the four
clcan-ups” movement in the rural areas and the “five-anti move¬
ment in the cities launched in the past several years, as well as

627
 629
628 CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION'
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee. They organ

criticism in the idelogical field, had proved ineffective in solving
Yao Wenyuan, a member of the writing group under the Shang¬
these problems. Only through the form of a “cultural revolution”
hai Municipal Parly Committee to write an article criticizing the
— mobilizing the broad masses from bottom to top in an open,
olay Hai Rui Dismissed from Office. The whole writing process
all-round way — could the dark side in the Party and the state
was conducted in a highly abnormal, secretive atmosphere. In the
be thoroughly exposed and the power usurped by so-called “per¬
article Wu Han, a famous historian and a vice-mayor of Beijing
sons taking the capitalist road” be taken back. This “great revo¬
at the time, was criticized by name. In 1960, Wu Han had written
lution” was entitled “cultural” because it had been started with
an opera Hai Rui Dismissed From Office after Mao Zedong had
“criticism” in the cultural field. Mao added that the “great
advocated the mentality of Hai Rui, a figure in Ming Dynasty
cultural revolution” was in essence a “political revolution.” Be¬
(1368-1644) history. Yao groundlessly insinuated that returning
cause he had misjudged the situation and wrongly applied his
farmland” and “redeeming unjust cases” as mentioned m Hai Km
theories, policies and methods, things went contrary to his wishes,
and moreover created opportunities for conspiratorial activities
Dismissed From Office alluded to the “tendency to go it alone in
agriculture” and the “pressure to reverse correct verdicts that
by Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and others who evinced out-and-out
had been criticized back in 1962. On the strength of this imputa¬
support for Mao’s proposals but, in reality, entertained wild
tion lie launched a fierce political attack on the opera, calling it
ambitions of their own. These careerists used what power they
a reflection of the bourgeoisie’s struggle against the dictatorship
held in the Party Central Committee to flaunt the reddest banner
of the proletariat. In fact, the article touched upon a large
of “revolution,” fan up a fanatic personality cult with Mao
number of important political differences existing “Jim th
Zedong as the idol, and swung the “Left” deviation as far as it
leading stratum of the Party Central Committee since 1961, with
could go. They instigated and connived with a batch of opportun¬
its range of attack not limited to Wu Han alone. For more than
ists, adventurers and degenerates, stirred up the masses to “made
ten days following publication of the article, no newspaper in
revolution by way of kicking out Party committees.” This
Beijing, including the People’s Daily reprinted it. As to an article
raised a relentless, anarchical tide of “down-with-everything”
published in Shanghai, newspapers elsewhere in China have al
and brought on nationwide chaos, with untold damage to the
ways had the right to decide whether or not to reprint it. Howev¬
work of the Party and the state and to normal and social order in
er, this instance deepened Mao’s suspicions as well as his dissatis¬
general. The most serious setbacks and losses were inflicted on the
faction with some major leaders in the Beijing Municipal Party
socialist cause in China since the founding of the People’s Repub¬
Committee and the Party Central Committee. He felt convinced
lic.
that Peng Zhen, first secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party
Committee and mayor of Beijing, was Wu Hans backer behind-
Fuse of the “Cultural Revolution” the-scenes and that Beijing was an independent kingdom, im¬
penetrable and watertight.” Later, when Beijing newspapers
On November 10, 1965, the Wenhui Bao in Shanghai carried
reprinted the article, they treated it as a toptc for academic
Yao Wenyuan’s article “Comment on the New Historical Opera
discussion. Meanwhile, in a talk with a small number of officials
Hai Rui Dismissed from Office” This served as the fuse which
Mao said: “The crucial point (of Hai Rui Dismissed From Office)
touched off the “cultural revolution.”
is ‘dismissed from office’; the Emperor Jiajing dismissed Hai Rui
In February 1965, Jiang Qing who held no post in the Party
from office, and in 1959 we dismissed Peng Dehuai, and Peng
except that of Mao Zedong’s secretary, had gone to Shanghai to
Deliuai is ‘Hai Rui.’” These words of Maos added political
meet Zhang Chunqiao, who was then secretary of the Secretariat
 630 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION” 631

stringency to the criticism of Hai Rui Dismissed From Office. By revised the summary three times, and suggested it be reported, in
early 1966, the criticism had developed into a movement. Ideo¬
the name of the Military Commission, to the Party Central
logical and cultural criticism spread widely throughout the circles Committee for approval. On April 10, it was transmitted to all
of historical studies, literature, art, and philosophy. What position levels of the Party. The grave political censure in the summary
and attitude one adopted towards Hai Rui Dismissed From Office was directed not only against leaders of the literary and art
(and later towards any propaganda or comments on Hai Rui as circles, but also against some leaders in the central authorities.
well) seemed to have become the only criterion for judging The drawing up of the summary also marked the beginning of
whether he or she was against the Party and socialism or not. collusion between Lin Biao and Jiang Qing, each using the other
On February 3, 1966, Peng Zhen, head of the Cultural Revo¬
for personal ends.
lution Group established in 1964, held a group meeting at which At the end of March, Mao Zedong had talks with Kang Sheng,
an “Outline Report on Current Academic Discussion” (later Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao, one after another; he severely
known as “The February Outline”) was worked out. In the denounced the “February Outline” as wrong, as blurring class
Outline they tried to set appropriate restraints on the ultra-left lines and as mixing right with wrong; he called the Propaganda
tendency which had already arisen in the academic discussion Department of the Central Committee the Palace of Hell, where
regarding its nature, principles and objectives, and to keep the it was necessary to overthrow the king and set the little devils
movement under the leadership of the Party and within the limits free, adding that the Central Committee Propaganda Depart¬
of an academic discussion. They did not agree to turn it into a ment and the Beijing Municipal Party Committee were shielding
movement of serious political criticism. The Outline was passed scoundrels, suppressing the Left and disallowing revolution; if
by the Standing Committee members of the Political Bureau of they continued to shield undesirable persons, the Central Com¬
the Party Central Committee then in Beijing, reported to Mao mittee Propaganda Department, the Beijing Municipal Party
Zedong in Wuhan, and then on February 12 transmitted to the Committee and the Cultural Revolution Group should be dis¬
whole Party. According to the spirit of the Outline, the Propagan¬ solved. He also said, I have always proposed that if the central
da Department of the CPC Central Committee did not agree to organs did harmful things, I would call on local organizations to
publish the so-called “crucial-point” article by Guan Feng and Qi rebel and launch an offensive against them. After Mao finished
Benyu in criticism of Hai Rui Dismissed From Office. speaking, the Secretariat of the Central Committee suspended
When Jiang Qing saw that the criticism of Hai Rui Dismissed Peng Zhen from work in April.
From Office was meeting with resistance, she secured the support Around the same time that Hai Rui Dismissed From Office
of Lin Biao, vice-chairman of the Military Commission of the was being criticized, a political frame-up was perpetrated in the
CPC Central Committee and minister of National Defense, and army at the instigation of Lin Biao against Luo Ruiqing, member
from February 2 to 20 in Shanghai held a forum on work in of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, vice-premier of the
literature and art in the armed forces. In its summary, the forum State Council and general chief-of-staff of the People’s Liberation
wrote off the tremendous achievements of the revolutionary Army. Believing the false accusations lodged by Lin Biao and Ye
literature and art since the founding of New China under the Qun, Mao in November 1965 suggested, “We should be on guard
leadership of the Party, slandering the literary and art circles as against those who have no faith in giving prominence to politics
having been “under the dictatorship of a sinister anti-Party and but feign agreeement with it while spreading eclecticism (that is,
anti-socialist line.” It declared, “We must resolutely carry on a opportunism).” Mao’s remarks showed that he did not trust Luo
great socialist revolution on the cultural front.” Mao Zedong Ruiqing. Because of this, Luo was wrongly criticized, and isolated

II
 CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION’ 633
632 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
the Outline and censured it, stating that it covered up the political
to undergo investigation on fabricated charges of “usurping mil¬
nature of the academic criticism, and that it was a revisionist
itary power and opposing the Party.” At this time, Yang Shang-
program to prepare public opinion for the restoration ot the
kun, alternate member of the Secretariat and director ol the
bourgeoisie. Therefore, the “May 16 Circular” called upon the
General Office of the Central Committee, was transferred on the
whole Party to “hold high the great banner of the proletarian
basis of fabricated charges. Lu Dingyi, member of the Secretariat
cultural revolution, thoroughly expose the reactionary bourgeois
of the Central Committee, vice-premier of the State Council and
stand of those so-called ‘academic authorities’ who oppose the
minister of the Propaganda Department of the Central Commit¬
Party and socialism, thoroughly criticize and repudiate the reac¬
tee, was also calumniated and forced to stop work.
tionary bourgeois ideas in the sphere of academic work, educa¬
These serious political incidents arising in succession and
tion, journalism, literature, art and publishing, and seize leader¬
implicating high-ranking leaders of the state and Party, added
ship in these cultural spheres. To achieve this, the Circular
to the strident political criticism echoing through the press,
pointed out, it was necessary at the same time to criticize and
shook the people with rousing forces both in and outside the
repudiate those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have
Party, and created a hectic atmosphere of ubiquitous, omnipre¬
sneaked into the Party, the government, the army and all spheres
sent, “class struggle.” This gave people an overwhelming, false
of culture, and to clear them out or transfer some of them to other
impression that revisionism had really appeared in the Central
positions. Above all, we must not entrust these people with the
Committee. work of leading the cultural revolution.” In light of the assess¬
ment that representatives of the bourgeoisie had sneaked into the
Two Meetings of the CPC Central Committee Mark Party, the government and the army, the circular warned of the
All-Round “Launching of the ‘Cultural Revolution”’ danger of a bourgeois restoration, pointing out that “those repre¬
sentatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the
An enlarged meeting of the CPC Central Committee’s Political
government, the army and all spheres of culture are a bunch of
Bureau held in May 1966 and the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th
counter-revolutionary revisionists. Once conditions are ripe, they
Central Committee in August marked the all-round launching of
will seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the prole¬
the “cultural revolution.” On the 16th of May, the meeting
tariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Some of them we
adopted the “Circular of the Central Committee of the Chinese
have already seen through, others we have not. Some are still
Communist Party” (the “May 16 Circular,” for short), and the
trusted by us and are being trained as our successors, persons like
session of August passed the “Decisions of the Central Committee
Khrushchov, for example, who are still nestling beside us. Party
of the Chinese Communist Party on the Great Proletarian Cul¬
committees at all levels must pay full attention to this matter.”
tural Revolution” (for short, the “Sixteen-Article Decision,” a
The circular was a concentrated reflection of Mao Zedong’s
document having sixteen articles). The two documents and the
serious miscalculation of the political situation in the Party and
reshuffling of leading organs of the Central Committee put the
state at that time. The incisive remarks quoted above were all
“Left” deviationist principles of the “cultural revolution” in a
added by Mao himself. He considered that the struggle in the
dominant position in the Central Committee. country between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie had reached
The “May 16 Circular” began with criticism of the “February
a very serious pitch. Under the fierce attacks of the bourgeoisie,
Outline,” then put forward the problem of representatives of the
quite a large majority of units in the cities and countryside were
bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the
not in the hands of Marxists, or of the masses. More serious was
army and all spheres of culture. The Circular grossly distorted
 635
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION"
634
weight than ten thousand ordinary sentences.” “Whoever is
the fact that revisionists had appeared in the leadership of the
against Chairman Mao will be punished by the entire Party and
Party. As he saw it, a bunch of veteran cadres, who had been able
condemned by the whole nation.” In an abnormally tense atmos-
to cooperate with him in the stage of the democratic revolution,
nhere the “May 16 Circular” was passed without proper discus¬
did not agree when, in the socialist stage, it became necessary to
sion and in compliance with Mao’s suggestion, the meeting
combat the bourgeois class and carry out collectivization in the
decided to suspend Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing and Lu Dingyi from
countryside. They had already become the persons in authority
their posts as members of the Secretariat of the Central Commit¬
within the Party taking the capitalist road. These persons already
tee and Yang Shangkun from his post of alternate secretary of
constituted a bourgeois headquarters inside the Central Commit¬
the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The meeting also
tee, and they had a revisionist political and organizational line.
removed Peng Zhen from his posts as first secretary of the Beijing
They had agents in various provinces, municipalities, autono¬
Municipal Party Committee and mayor of Beijing, and Lu Dingyi
mous regions and departments of the Central Committee and the
from his post as head of the Propaganda Department of the
central government. He felt that they were obstructing the imple¬
Central Committee. Furthermore, the meeting decided to cancel
mentation of a series of ideas and methods he had advocated for
the Cultural Revolution Group headed by Peng Zhen, and found¬
the construction of socialism and that there was no way to carry
ed the Central Cultural Revolution Group directly under the
them out. Therefore, Mao harbored increasing dissatisfaction and
Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. The Central Cultur¬
distrust towards Liu Shaoqi and other leaders of the central
al Revolution Group was set up with Chen Boda as head, Kang
authorities. When Mao linked these firm convictions about the
Sheng as adviser, and Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao deputy
situation with the lessons he drew from the occurrence of Khrush¬
heads. Its members included Wang Li, Guan Feng, Qi Benyu an
chov revisionism within the Soviet Party, he was filled with
Yao Wenyuan. (Some of its other appointed members were before
anxiety about the future of the Party and the country. In a talk
long persecuted and expelled.) Actually the group, operating as a
with Ho Chi Minh soon after the “May 16 Circular” was passed,
special setup, was not subject to any restraint whatever by he
he said: “We are all over seventy years old. We are bound to be
Political Bureau and became the de facto headquarters of the
invited by Marx some day. Who on earth will be our successors?
“cultural revolution.”
Bernstein, or Kautsky or Khrushchov? Nobody knows. Prepare
Before the meeting came to a close, Jiang Qing and Kang
at once while there’s still time.” That was Mao’s reason for
Sheng had already spread these decisions to the general public.
mentioning in the “May 16 Circular” that there were “persons
Fierce attacks were launched against the Beijing Municipal Party
like Khrushchov” within the Party.
Committee in the newspapers. A work team headed by Chen Boda
In May, at an enlarged meeting of the CPC Central Commit¬
went to the office of the People’s Daily to seize power. On June
tee’s Political Bureau, Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi and
1, the People’s Daily published an editorial entitled “Sweep Away
Yang Shangkun were wrongly criticized for their “anti-Party
All Monsters and Demons,” calling on the masses to make cul¬
clique.” At the meeting, Lin Biao listed instances of coup d’etats
tural revolution.” Next day, the newspaper published a big-
in ancient and modern times, in China and elsewhere. While
character poster written by Nie Yuanzi and a few others o
attacking Peng, Luo, Lu and Yang, Lin spilt preposterous lies that
Beijing University, which slanderously attacked the Party Com¬
there were people within the Party Central Committee who
mittees of Beijing University and of Beijing Municipality. The
wanted to stage a coup d’etat. At the same time, he did his utmost
poster, supported by Mao, was also broadcast nationwide. The
to create a personality cult, proclaiming that “Everything Chair¬
newspaper also carried a congratulatory commentary. Students ot
man Mao says is the truth. A single sentence of his carries more
636 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTKR EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION’ 637

universities and middle schools in many cities were the first to tion of the proletariat. They have called black white and stood
rise in response to its call. They started with the struggle against the facts on their heads, encircled and attacked the revolutionar¬
so-called “sinister gangs” making their presidents and teachers the ies, suppressed opinions differing from their own, and imposed a
targets, wreaking havoc in the schools. Many school Party com¬ white terror, and they have done all this with great smugness.
mittees were helpless in the face of it, their work brought to a They inflated the arrogance of the bourgeoisie and clamped down
standstill. In early June, the CPC Political Bureau’s Standing the morale of the proletariat. This is utterly vicious!” In light of
Committee, then presided over by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiao¬ the disputes on the question of socialist construction within the
ping, decided to send work teams to universities and middle leadership in the Party, the big-character poster pointed out:
schools in Beijing to lead the “cultural revolution,” and also drew “Associating this with the erroneous tendencies of the Right
up the “Eight-Point Directive” which was designed to put the deviation in 1962 and the apparently ‘Left’ but actually Right
movement under the Party’s leadership and restore order. Then deviation in 1964, shouldn’t this awaken people and make them
in many universities and schools strife arose between two or more ponder?” In his big character poster, he mentioned there was a
student factions, and incidents occurred of some students oppos¬ bourgeois headquarters in the Central Committee. Obviously, he
ing the work teams. Jiang Qing, Chen Boda and Kang Sheng first was accusing Liu Shaoqi and other leaders who presided over the
fomented discord among students, then unilaterally reported to routine work of the Central Committee, although he did not
Mao. Mao scathingly censured the work teams, saying that they mention their names. From criticism of Hai Rui Dismissed From
“have done a disservice and obstructed the movement.” Liu His Office to the “May 16 Circular,” and to the big character
Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping bore the responsibility and examined poster of Mao’s, the spearhead of struggle kept escalating. Now,
their mistakes. In compliance with Mao’s suggestion, the Central finally, the meeting clearly pointed out the principal target of
Committee ordered the withdrawal of all work teams on July 28. attack in the “great cultural revolution.”
Mao considered that the just rising “cultural revolution,” In light of Mao’s suggestion, the 11th Plenary Session of the
which had just risen after the enlarged meeting of the CPC 8th Central Committee adopted the “Decisions of the Central
Political Bureau in May, had been suppressed. In order to clear Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Great Prole¬
away the “obstruction,” it was necessary to mount another all¬ tarian Cultural Revolution” (the “Sixteen-Article Decision,” for
round launching of the revolution. On August 1, Mao himself short). The decision stipulated that “our objective is to struggle
presided over the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Party Central against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the
Committee. At the enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bour¬
of the Political Bureau on August 4, Mao Zedong again scathing¬ geois academic ‘authorities’ and the ideology of the bourgeoisie
ly censured the dispatch of work teams as “an act of suppression and all other exploiting classes, reform education, literature and
to the students’ movement” and “a mistake in matters of political art and all superstructures unsuitable to socialist economic basis,
line.” And he added, “There are ‘monsters and demons’ among in order to consolidate and develop the socialist system. The
people present here.” At the session on the 7th, Mao made public main target of the present movement is those within the Party
his big-character poster “Bombard the Headquarters,” asserting who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road.” The
that “in the last 50 days or so, some leading comrades from the decision stressed that young people’s main revolutionary orienta¬
central down to the local levels ... have adopted the reactionary tion has been correct from the beginning; let the masses educate
stand of the bourgeoisie, enforced a bourgeois dictatorship and themselves and liberate themselves in the movement; they should
struck down the surging movement of the great cultural revolu¬ put daring above everything else and not fear creating disturb-
 639
CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION'
638 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
This meeting, just as the enlarged meeting of the Political
ances; they cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so Bureau in May, was held in a very tense political atmosphere.
temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. They Many of the participants were utterly astonished at such a sudden
should make the fullest use of big-character posters and great ^r.d important change of personnel in the central leadership; their
debates to argue matters out. The “Sixteen-Article Decision,” like minds were filled with all sorts of perplexities and suspicions. The
the “May 16 Circular,” failed to set clear criterions for distin¬ of the “Sixteen-Article Decision” at the Pfary session
guishing between persons taking the capitalist road, Leftists, marked the fulfillment of the legal procedure within the Par y
Rightists and middle elements, or to provide specific regulations
for the launching of the “cultural revolution.
concerning how to realize the Party’s leadership. Although the
“Sixteen-Article Decision” also proposed that we should distin¬
Nationwide Chaos
guish the two different types of social contradictions, it actually
fostered a blind, spontaneous mass movement which largely con¬ On the same day the Uth Plenary Session of the 8th> Party
fused friends with enemies. As a result, those correct regulations Central Committee was convened, Mao Zedong wrote to R
were never followed later on in the movement. Guards ofZ middle school attached to Qinghua University
In compliance with Mao’s suggestion, the plenary session reor¬ expressing his warm support for their rebellious spirit The ^
ganized the leading body of the CPC Central Committee. It Guard movement soon spread throughout the
elected eleven instead of seven as members of the Standing August 18 to November 26, Mao Zedong received over 11 million
Committee of the Political Bureau. The additional members were college and middle school teachers, students and Red Guards
Tao Zhu, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng and Li Fuchun. Tao Zhu, Shi occasions in Beijing. The CPC Central Commit ee and the
former first secretary of the Bureau of Central South China, was State Council jointly issued a circular on inviting students or
transferred to the post of standing secretary of the Secretariat of representatives of students of colleges and middle schools, repre¬
the Central Committee and head of the CPC Propaganda Depart¬ sentatives of revolutionary students of middle schools, and repre¬
ment, according to the decision of the enlarged meeting of the sentatives of teachers and other staff members of various,parts°{
Political Bureau held in May. But he was soon removed after he country to Beijing, free of charge, to look around and see the
being elected a member of the Standing Committee of the Politi¬ “great cultural revolution.” This brought the spreading exchanges
cal Bureau. (He was later persecuted to death.) Not long after, Li of experience between these groups to a nationwide high tide.
Fuchun was also removed from his position. Liu Shaoqi was This was a grave step which led to social chaos throughout the
demoted from the second to the eighth place on the name list of country. The Central Cultural Revolution Group launched a
Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Although no vice- so-called defense of Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong Thought In
chairman of the Central Committee was elected, Lin Biao was feverish response, Red Guards of various parts of the country
named vice-chairman of the Central Committee soon after the charged into the’premises of cultural and educational circles,
session. Former vice-chairmen Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De Pany and government organs, as well as social "feting
and Chen Yun were no longer mentioned. During the session and widespread damage on whatever they ■deemed to be feudal
in the days following the session, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and bourgeois and revisionist.” Many people in cultural units; and
other central leading comrades were criticized one after another. educational institutions. Party organs and government offices
The two meetings made it possible for the erroneous “Left” were criticized and denounced as members of sinister gangs
leadership by Mao Zedong himself to replace the collective lead¬ “representatives of the bourgeoisie,” “reactionary academic au
ership by the Party Central Committee.
 641
640 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTF.R EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION’

thorities” and “counter-revolutionary revisionists.” They were mittee distributed an emergency directive issued by the Military
subjected to criticism, humiliation, beating and persecution, and Commission of the CPC Central Committee. It rescinded the
their homes were searched. Many patriotic, democratic person¬ decision that the cultural revolution in military academies an
ages who had cooperated with the Communist Party over a long schools should be led by the Party committees. After that, To
period, former industrialists and businessmen and returned over¬ ClTout Party committees in making revolution” became a popu¬
seas Chinese were also assaulted and persecuted. This kind of lar slogan which opened wider the floodgates of anarchisnr
behavior which cut deep rifts in the social order and trampled Instigated by the Central Cultural Revolution Group, rebels
democracy and legality underfoot evoked universal resentment urned their attacks on Party and government leading organiza¬
among the masses. The Red Guard organizations, which contend¬ tions at various levels. As a result, many Party and government
ed head-on because of differing views or interests, kept disinte¬ cadres from central to local levels were struggled against and
grating and reorganizing. Under this or that signboard, they criticized leaving the work of Party and government bodies in a
waged fierce factional struggles. Some persons among them came state of paralysis or semi-paralysis. All Party activities at the
to realize that any behavior opposing and assaulting Party and grassroots levels as well as the regular activities of Party members
government organs was wrong, and they determined to resolutely
oppose any such destructive behavior. Party and government Ca?n November 1966, a national meeting of industrial and trans¬
leading cadres at various levels filled with skepticism towards the port enterprises was held. In their speeches, the participants
movement, were thrown into a state of extreme anxiety over the suggested that the “cultural revolution” in industrial and tram
situation. The “May 16 Circular” said that the overwhelming port enterprises be led by the Party committees and that the
majority of Party committees “have a very poor understanding of relation between revolution and production be handled correctly.
the movement and their leadership is far from conscientious and They were against stopping production to make revolution, which
effective.” This created a problem which obstructed the move¬ in essence negated the “Left” draft regulations put forward by
ment. In a continued effort to overcome this so-called “obstruc¬ the Central Cultural Revolution Group. However these «.rrect
tion,” the Central Committee held a work conference in Beijing suggestions at the meeting were scathingly censured by L Biao
in October 1966. The meeting focused on criticism of Liu Shaoqi and Jiang Qing. Upon their intervention, two documents were
and Deng Xiaoping, accusing them of pursuing “an erroneous issued Tn the name of the Central Committee concerning the
line of repressing the masses and attacking active revolutionar¬ “cultural revolution” in industrial and transport enterprises and
ies,” which was a “reactionary bourgeois line” opposing the mass¬ in rural areas (the “ten-point regulations on tndustry and^he
es’ self-liberation. In his speech at the meeting, Chen Boda lauded “ten-point directive on agriculture,” for short). The two docu
the Red Guards’ acts of sabotage to the skies, but accused people menbTwere intended to push the cultural revolution beyond the
who harbored reservations and vigilance as fearing the masses origtaThmits, which confined it to cultural units, educational
and revolution, or even as repressing the masses and opposing the circles Party organs and government bodies, into industrial en
revolution. After the meeting, a storm of criticizing the “reaction¬ terprises and the rural areas. This was another grave step.toward
ary bourgeois line” was whipped up nationwide. Afterwards, any nationwide upheaval. The countryside was not affected by the
behavior beyond normal or legal limits suffered no restraint; but cultural revolution for very long, since the
any intervention in such impermissible behavior had slapped on thev could not “stop production to make revolution. Neverthe
it the label of “reactionary bourgeois line.” Society was thus less many rural cadres, activists of the Party and model workers
caught in continuous chaos. In early October, the Central Com- were struggled against and criticized. More destructive was th
 V

642
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION” 643

large numbers of industrial enterprises became involved in the considered it absolute, to the point of confusing friends with
cultural revolution. As a result, backbone members of the leading enemies. He still held to the concept of attaining great order
core of these enterprises were criticized, and a large number of under heaven through great disorder, even in a situation where
workers left their posts in production, and the enterprises were power was still in the hands of the people. The series of “Left”
thrown into confusion. deviationist fantasies which Mao developed were completely
From beginning of the movement, Mao Zedong took an affir¬ wrong, and were not only opposed to Marxism, but also to the
mative attitude towards the serious confusion in society. In his real situation in China. Mao stressed that there were revisionists
July 8 letter to Jiang Qing, Mao held the opinion that great within the Party and in the Party leadership; his assessment was
disorder under heaven could bring in great order across the land. also not true. The implications of what he referred to as revision¬
In his view, this demonstrated that the masses were fully mobil¬ ism were very vague. Consequently, many things that were not
ized; it threw the enemy into disorder, and tempered the masses. revisionist, and many that were actually principles of Marxism
In a very perilous position, Zhou Enlai did his best to get the and socialism, were criticized as revisionist. For example, the
agreement of Mao Zedong to protect a group of veteran cadres, so-called “dark wind,” “rush towards private farming” and “pres¬
outstanding personages of democratic parties, experts and scholars! sure to reverse verdicts,” which Mao had repeatedly criticized as
He tried his utmost to lead Party and government departments revisionist since 1962, were nothing but the reasonable and cor¬
which were still functioning to keep social production going and the rect suggestions put forward by some officials and people inside
1 unctions of state power in operation. However, now that the great and outside the Party for redressing mistakes made in the move¬
disorder under heaven had already begun to take on startling di¬ ments of the Big Leap Forward and the People Communes as well
mensions, it inevitably burst out of control and could only get as the anti-Rightist deviation at the Lushan Meeting in 1959.
worse. Fraught with enormous destructive force, it advanced fierce¬ Now, as clearly seen, the proposals and support for many kinds
ly along its vicious course, wreaking catastrophe difficult for people of farm production responsibility systems, such as the “fixing of
to have imagined in the early stages of the “cultural revolution ” farm output quotas for each household,” by Liu Shaoqi, Deng
The “cultural revolution” initiated by Mao Zedong had under¬ Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Deng Zihui and others heralded the rural
gone deliberation and preparation for a period of time. Later, he reforms made since 1978. However, these proposals were called a
regarded it as one of the two great things he had done in his life revisionist programme by Mao Zedong.
(the other was the revolution led by him to establish the new For a long time, Mao Zedong was loyal to Marxism and the
China). This shows clearly how important the “cultural revolu¬ people’s interest, continuously observed and thought deeply about
tion” was in his eyes. As a leader of the proletarian party in problems in the real life of the newly rising socialist society and
power, Mao Zedong showed great concern for consolidation of strived to perfect the ideal of socialism. His basic train of thought
the Party and people’s power which had been established with about socialism was consistent with the basic principles of Marx¬
such great difficulty, maintained strict vigilance against the dan¬ ist scientific socialism. Mao’s unique concept of socialism in¬
ger ol capitalist restoration, and tried hard to find out a way to cludes both some valuable foresights and some unrealistic ideas.
solve this problem. This was priceless and far-sighted. And his Several days before the “May 16 Circular” was adopted, after
unremitting efforts to eliminate corruption in the Party and reading a report submitted by the General Logistics Department
government bodies, as well as to prevent cadres becoming di¬ of the PLA on developing agricultural production and side-
vorced from the people, also won the support of the Party and the occupations in the armed forces, Mao wrote a letter of approval
masses. But he magnified the class struggle in socialist society and (which came to be known as the “May 7 Directive”) to Lin Biao
 645
CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION’
644 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
culties arising in socialist construction, people were susceptible to
in which he described the ideal society he had been looking mechanically copying former practices and experience. As a
forward to. In his letter, he said that all trades and professions in
result they saw problems which were not related to class struggle
the country should be made a social organization in which people
as class struggle, took the class struggle which existedl to’ a limited
engage in industrial and agricultural productions, study cultural
degree under the new conditions as occupying a dominant posi
knowledge and military affairs. They also should criticize the
tion and continued to adopt methods of mass struggle on a large
bourgeoisie. The organization would be run as one in which social
scale as a solution. It was easy to resume the practices which
division of labour and commodity production should be gradual¬
resembled their life experience under military communism and
ly limited, and so should the principle of distribution according
had proved so effective in the revolutionary ranks in past periods
to work and the principle of material interest. The social organi¬
of war and to take them as a sort of basis to plan an ideal society.
zation also should be economically self-sufficient or semi-self¬ Although the founders of Marxism expounded and proved the
sufficient. (Mao considered that ignoring these limitations would historical trend that capitalist society would inevitably be trans¬
give rise to capitalism.) Mao’s concept was then highly valued by formed into socialist society, they could only proceed from the
the People’s Daily as the guideline for establishing “great schools status quo of the relatively developed capitalist society to draw a
of communism” throughout the country. As a matter of fact, this general inference about a future socialist society which they had
was a further development of his 1958 concept of the people’s not experienced. Using only one or two particular theses ot theirs
communes. But his concept of socialism characterized by equali- and then misunderstanding them certainly can never solve con¬
tarianism with Utopian coloration got us absolutely nowhere. crete problems in China and makes it very easy to fantasize
Therefore, the concept could not but be resisted in various socialism. For a long time, Mao’s senes of Left deviafionist
degrees by many comrades within the Party. Some leading com¬ theoretical viewpoints on class struggle in the socialist period and
rades in the Central Committee, who did not agree with Mao’s his concepts of socialism which were tinted with Utopianism had
erroneous suggestions, but put forward some correct proposals, been regarded as an important development of Marxist theory
were accused of fostering revisionism or taking the capitalist and spread far and wide; thus people thrown into a situation of
road. He considered that serious resistance from the leadership of broadened class struggle were confused and misled. Upholding
the Central Committee was blocking his efforts to seek a just, the erroneous deviation was even regarded as defending the
perfect socialism. In conclusion, he saw them as an independent sacred cause of Marxism. Those who took a skeptical attitude
kingdom or a bourgeois headquarters within the Party. Such an towards the erroneous deviation still found it hard to oppose it
assessment was obviously groundless and completely wrong.
with perfect assurance. .
There are reasons rooted in social history which led to the In the 60s, our Party was compelled to conduct intense polem¬
formation of Mao Zedong’s erroneous viewpoints, determined the ics with the Soviet Party on the line and principles ot the
inability within the Party to resist them and enabled many people international communist movement. This mfernational back¬
to accept them. As the Party rapidly entered the new historical ground also exerted a great influence on domestic polmcallife;
stage of socialism, it did not make ample ideological preparation Normal debates arising among comrades m the Party holdi g
or proper scientific investigation of how to carry out the all-round different opinions were often looked upon as serious struggles
construction of socialism in a country with a poor economic and between Marxism and revisionism. As a result, inner Party rela¬
cultural background. In the past periods of revolutionary wars, tions became more strained with each passing day. Maos great
the Party had accumulated a great deal of experience in class merits in the Chinese revolutionary cause and the cause ot
struggle. In observing and dealing with new problems and diffi¬
646 647
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC, CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION”

socialism made him an indisputable political leader and ideolog¬ ordinary circumstances, their erroneous words and acts were,
ical authority. For this reason, though broad masses of Party after all, somewhat restrained by Party organization and discip¬
members and cadres, including many high-ranking officials, had line and, therefore, their true colors could not be sufficiently
growing reservations about many abnormal phenomena in the exposed. Once they had the extremely abnormal opportunity like
“cultural revolution,” they still found it hard to resist the series the “cultural revolution,” their wild political ambitions and con¬
of “Left” deviationist viewpoints advanced by Mao and to hold spiratorial methods for usurping Party and state power could be
back the outbreak and development of the “cultural revolution.” carried to extremes. Due to various historical reasons, after the
In leading the unfamiliar cause of socialist construction, our founding of New China, the process of democratization of the
Party specially needed prudence. However, some leading cadres Party and State political life had not been able to develop smooth¬
had gradually become arrogant in midst of a series of successes. ly. And there were many defects in the system of Party and state
At that time, Mao Zedong’s prestige was at its peak among the leadership and the organizational system. These defects in our
Chinese people. He also gradually became conceited, divorced systems made it possible for Mao Zedong, the people s respected
from the masses and isolated from the reality. His subjectivism leader, to make mistakes unchecked, for careerists like Lin Biao
and arbitrary style became more serious as times went on. The and Jiang Qing to run amok for a time, and for the disaster-
cult of Mao Zedong was so widespread that it had gradual¬ ridden “cultural revolution” to take place and develop without
ly became a craze by the time the “cultural revolution” was any restriction.
launched. Just as Deng Xiaoping said: “After criticism of the
opposition to rash advance in 1958 and the campaign against
‘Right deviation’ in 1959, democratic life in the Party and state II. “OVERTHROW EVERYTHING” BRINGS
gradually ceased to function normally. There was a steady growth
ON ALL-ROUND CIVIL STRIFE
of such patriarchal ways as only one person having the say, one
person making important decisions, practising the cult of person¬
ality and one individual placing himself above the organization.
“All-Round Seizure of Power” Evokes Escalation of
Lin Biao propagated the ‘peak theory,’ saying that Chairman
Nationwide Turbulence
Mao’s words were supreme instructions. This theory was wides¬ In January 1967, a violent storm of rebels seizing the power of
pread throughout the Party, army and country.”1 Consequently, leadership at various levels of Party and government organiza¬
this led to the sabotage of the collective leadership principle and tions first started in Shanghai, then spread throughout the coun¬
democratic centralism in Party and state political life. In this try. The “cultural revolution” had entered a new stage of so-called
aspect, Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng and other careerists “all-round seizure of power.” This stage brought about more
played the most abominable role. Among them, some had been serious social turbulence and greater disasters than the previous
Party members for many years, had done useful work for the
stage.
Party and assumed important Party and state important posi¬ In early January 1967, under the command of Zhang Chun-
tions, while some had only a few achievements during their qiao and Yao Wenyuan, rebel organizations in Shanghai headed
official careers and had formerly occupied low positions. But they by Wang Hongwen of the Shanghai No. 17 State-Owned Cotton
had one point in common; that is, they joined the Party with a Mill, seized leadership power from the Party and government of
strong blend of exploiting-class ideology and a thirst for personal the city. Mao Zedong vigorously supported the action of seizing
power and influence which developed as conditions changed. In power and saw it as an effective method to thoroughly reorganize
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC 649
648 CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION”

the leadership at various levels in implementation of the princi¬ rect handling of cadres and various rebel organizations, that
ples of the “cultural revolution.” On January 16, the Red Flag various rebel organizations should be rectified and the anarchist
published a commentary which transmitted Mao’s remarks, say¬ idea of “suspecting everyone and overthrowing everyone be
ing: “The seizure of power from a handful of Party persons in
authority taking the capitalist road was a revolution in which one °PIn order to stabilize the situation, the CPC Central Committee,
class overthrew another under the conditions of proletarian dic¬ the Military Commission of the Central Committee, the State
tatorship.” On January 22, the People’s Daily also published an Council and the Central Cultural Revolution Group published a
editorial calling on all the proletarian revolutionaries to “launch series of circulars and directives, urging teachers and students of
an all-round struggle of seizing power throughout the country colleges and middle schools to stop exchange of experiences with
and successfully fulfill the great historical mission entrusted by other localities and to resume school classes and carry on the
Chairman Mao.” Then rebels in Shanxi (January 14), Qingdao revolution; asking factories, mines, enterprises and rural produc¬
(January 22), Guizhou (January 25), Heilongjiang (January 31) tion teams to persist in making revolution in their spare time, that
and other provinces proclaimed the all-round seizure of power is to grasp revolution and promote production; demanding the
from provincial and municipal Party and government leading return to normal order of railways, ports, communications and
organs, and their seizure of power was approved by the Central transportation, and the protection of radio stations, banks, ware¬
Committee. In a short period, the storm of all-round seizure of houses, prisons and other units. Most important was Maos deci¬
power swept from departments under the Central Committee and sion to dispatch PLA troops to carry out the task of three
the State Council to local Party and government organs, as well supports and two militaries” (supporting industry, supporting
as to all walks of life. This gave rise to a sharp struggle between agriculture, supporting the broad masses of the Left, military
persons intent on taking over power and the masses inclined to control, political and military training).
support the existing Party and government leadership, and be¬ In appraisal of the situation, Mao considered that the all¬
tween one power-seizing faction and other ones. As a result, a round seizure of power” would signalize a positive outcome in
raging tide of anarchism stemming from all-round civil strife February, March or April 1967. But things were far from what
marked by stampedes of “down with everyone” forged ahead, got Mao imagined. Many requirements and regulations published in
out of hand, and threw China into unprecedented chaos. above-mentioned editorials and directives had produced very
Although Mao Zedong expressed his support for “great disor¬ little effect. The “great alliances” and “three-in-one combination
der under heaven,” nevertheless, in face of the daily worsening as the basic principles in the process of seizure of power had not
crisis, he could not but try to restrain it. At that time, newspapers been carried out; but, on the contrary, they became the focus o
and magazines published editorials and articles, one after anoth¬ further struggles. Two or more sharply contrasting large rebe
er, repeatedly transmitting Mao’s instructives on seizing power, organizations in various places had somewhat different political
mainly urging people to “realize great alliances of proletarian inclinations, but, in general, they all operated the mflu-
revolutionaries” and “set up a ‘three-in-onc combination” com¬ ence of “Left” deviationist principles and ultra- Lett trends oi
posed of “leaders of the rebel organizations, representatives of the thought. Some rebel organizations chose their own favorite lead¬
PLA troops stationed in the locality and revolutionary leading ing cadres as prospective members for the “three-in-one combina¬
cadres.” The temporary power organs established after seizure of tion ” and strived to realize a “great alliance” and the seizure o
power were called “revolutionary committees.” To form the “great power with their own faction as its nucleus. Alter being over¬
alliances” and “three-in-one combinations,” Mao urged the cor¬ thrown, many leading cadres were unwilling to, or could not.
 CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION 651
650 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

come out to join leading groups. Some were “combined” with this army?” Tan Zhenlin said: “You don’t want the leadership ot the
rebel organization, but soon overthrown by the other. Following Party, always letting the masses liberate themselves, educate
their own interests, each faction took only those directives of themselves and make revolution themselves. What’s this anyway.
Chairman Mao or those of the Central Committee which were It’s metaphysics.” He added, “Your purpose is to overthrow
favourable to itself and each thought what it did was right. On veteran cadres.” These criticisms spoken out with the force of
the fundamental issue of “power,” the contention among rebel justice represented the will of the Party and the people and
organizations was so acute that countless disputes and conflicts demonstrated the qualities of selflessness and uprightness of the
occurred which led to ruthless armed struggles. After getting proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation. On hearing
involved in supporting the “Left,” the PLA troops found it hard the report from the Central Cultural Revolution Group, Mao was
to avoid supporting this faction or that faction. As a result, this highly dissatisfied with these veteran cadres, because their argu¬
brought about many disputes and conflicts between rebel organ¬ ments and resistance were actually aimed at completely correct¬
izations and troops supporting the “Left.” Some rebel organiza¬ ing “Left” deviationist errors of the “cultural revolution,’ and
tions in various places assaulted military units, giving rise to also directed against the absurd practices of the “cultural revolu¬
bloody incidents. People showed universal discontent with the tion.” Mao severely criticized these veteran comrades. At a meet¬
chaos that had seriously endangered the security of the state, ing of the Political Bureau of the CPC, the Central Cultural
society and the troops. Revolution Group attacked them on charges of stirring up an
Confronted by such a situation, revolutionaries of the older “adverse current of bourgeois restoration.” Following this, the
generation came out boldly and rose up to resist the turbulence. functions of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee
At an enlarged meeting of the Military Commission of the CPC were basically taken over by the Central Cultural Revolution
Central Committee, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen Group. , . . .
and others demanded that the stability of the army must be The crux of these questions put forward by revolutionaries ot
maintained, and did not agree to the free airing of views as the older generation came down to whether Party leadership was
practiced in civilian life (in the forms of speaking out freely, necessary. This was the root cause of the chaotic situation fea¬
airing views fully, holding great debates and writing big-character tured by “overthrowing everyone” in the “cultural revolution.
posters). Over this problem, they had a sharp dispute with Jiang The “Left” deviationist theories and principles of the “cultural
Qing, Chen Boda and Kang Sheng. At two meetings, on February revolution,” under the signboard of criticizing revisionism and
11 and 16, with many members of the Political Bureau partici¬ capitalism, denied the Party’s basic policies and basic achieve¬
pating, Tan Zhenlin, Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Li Fuchun, Li Xian- ments made in the seventeen years since the founding of New
nian, Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen, leaders of the Political China, wrongly accused the majority of leading cadres who
Bureau or Military Commission, sharply criticized many of the upheld the Party’s correct line and policies from the Central
wrong actions taken by the Central Cultural Revolution Group . Committee down to the localities as capitalist roaders and at¬
and spoke out, justly denouncing Chen Boda, Kang Sheng and tempted to strike them down, and further to overthrow all the
Zhang Chunqiao. Ye Jianying said: “You have caused chaos in Party and state leading bodies. The “all-round seizure of power
the Party, government, factories and the countryside! As if that which confused right and wrong, the enemy and ourselves, was
is not enough for you, you still want to cause chaos in the army! absolutely wrong. How could it be said to correctly handle cadres
If you go on like that, what is it you’re trying to do?” “Can we and let “representatives of revolutionary cadres come out to
make revolution without the leadership of the Party, without the make revolution? Nominally, the “cultural revolution” relied
652 CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION' 653
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

directly on the masses, but, in reality, in the “cultural revolu¬ ous levels, as well as assaulting leading organs of the Party and
tion,” large numbers of leading Party and state cadres were state. In addition, factional struggles among rebel organizations
ferreted out and persecuted, the Party’s leading bodies and organ¬ escalated continuously. In April 1967, the People's Daily pub¬
izations at various levels lapsed into a state of paralysis or lished Qi Benyu’s article clearly criticizing Liu Shaoqi, though his
semi-paralysis, the broad masses of Party members and activists name was not mentioned. This touched off a high tide of so-called
were unable to play their roles, Party disciplines and state laws “great revolutionary criticism” consisting of a series of all-round
were discarded, and the state’s judicial and public security organs attacks on “China’s Khrushchov.” This kind of “great criticism”
were unable to perform their functions. These circumstances did everything possible to slander and frame Liu Shaoqi, by
provided just the right conditions for a handful of careerists, obscuring right and wrong, confusing friend with foe. This helped
adventurers, opportunists, degenerate elements and all sorts of spread and abet “Left” deviationist ideological trends and exerted
social dregs habituated to destructiveness to get together, grow a very bad influence. Mao Zedong considered that the “great
and run riot without restraint. This horde of anti-socialist forces criticism” would promote the great alliances, but things went
flaunting the most “revolutionary” banners provided the social contrary to his wishes. The great criticism promoted great chaos.
base on which careerists Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and their likes In many places for a long time, it was not possible to found
relied to create chaos. Out of their Irusl in the Party and Mao revolutionary committees. In May, armed clashes took place in
Zedong, in the early stage of the “cultural revolution,” many some places. From June to early August, instigated by the Central
people became involved in the movement, but they definitely did Cultural Revolution Group, tens of thousands of people were
not support cruel struggles and ruthless attacks of the ultra- mustered by around 1,000 rebel organizations of Beijing and
“Left.” Later, as their consciousness was raised through different other places to besiege Zhongnanhai (the gathering was dubbed
experiences they had, they kept leaving the rebel organizations. the “Frontline of Ferreting Out Liu Shaoqi”) and to assault the
Many of them in turn used different forms to resist and oppose highest organ of state power. On July 22, Jiang Qing provoked
the “cultural revolution.” They were therefore persecuted in violence by raising the slogan of “attack by reasoning, and defend
varying degrees, and some even lost their lives. In reality, the by force” among rebel organizations. In his August 7th speech,
“cultural revolution” divorced them both from the Party and the the minister of Public Security Xie Fuzhi, in league with the gang
masses. So how could there be realization of “great alliances” of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing, incited the smashing of judicial and
among the masses? Facts proved that it was hard to stabilize the public security organs. On the same day, Wang Li made speeches
turbulence through the self-contradictory way which one had to provoking the seizure of power from the Foreign Ministry lead¬
uphold the “cultural revolution” as a whole, but as to details, one ership. In the first half of August, large-scale armed conflicts
was also asked to correct some activities which went too far. flared up in Shanghai, Nanjing, Changzhou, Zhengzhou,
After resistance from revolutionaries of the older generation in Changchun, Shenyang, Chongqing, Changsha and other places.
February was suppressed, anarchism ran increasingly rampant. Many more public security, judicial and procuratorial organs
Jiang Qing and her group denounced the resistance as the “Feb¬ throughout the country were assaulted. In the name ol the
ruary adverse current,” and even spread news of it out into Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rebel organizations of the ministry
society by way of agitating the masses to launch a widespread recklessly issued directives to Chinese embassies abroad to rebel,
counter-attack against the “February adverse current sweeping and even set fire to the office of the British Charge d’Affaires in
down from above.” This started a new wave of ferreting out, Beijing. After Lin Biao advanced the slogan of “Down with the
attacking and persecuting Party and state leading cadres at vari¬ Palace of Hell in the General Political Department” in the second
654 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER eight THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION”

half of July, newspapers and other publications raised the slogan, regard to the overthrow of large numbers of cadres, Mao reiter¬
“Down with a handful of capitalist roaders in the army!” Thus, ated the necessity of “correct handling of cadres, and helping
many local rebel organizations started a wave of storming mili¬ more people through education and narrowing the target of
tary institutions. Conflicts between rebel organizations and troops attack ” We must “liberate a number of cadres,” he added, an
helping the Left increased. Illegal incidents such as ransacking “let cadres step forward.” In compliance with Mao s suggestion,
banks, warehouses, vehicles, vessels, files and confidential docu¬ the central authorities, provinces and municipalities ^
ments, and sabotaging railway traffic—were perpetrated one af¬ study courses in rotation, thus extricating a number of leading
ter the other in many localities. A large number of people were cadres from the ordeal of investigation. Newspapers, by n«ensi
wounded or killed in armed conflicts. In particular, the city of fving criticism of factionalism and anarchism, helped somewhat
Wuhan on July 20 witnessed crowds surrounding Wang Li, rep¬ o suppress Xa “Left” activities. In January 1968, Qi Benyu was
resentative of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and hem¬ also isolated for the convenience of investigation. Although these
ming him in, while a demonstration took place numbering measures'taken by Mao Zedong could not change the situation
hundreds of thousands of local armymen and people. (Mao basically, they did prevent in certam degrees the situation from
Zedong was in Wuhan just at that time.) These events reflected
the growing dissatisfaction of broad masses of people, army detln1the'1winter of 1967 and the spring of 1968, the chaotic
officers and PLA soldiers towards the “Left” deviationist errors situation in society changed for the better, comparatively speak-
ins As long as ultra-“Left” thought and ultra- Leftists were held
committed by the Central Cultural Revolution Group. The devel¬
oping tension created a situation almost beyond control. under a certain degree of restraint, there was growing suspicion
In face of the spreading disturbances, Mao Zedong was com¬ of1he “grem cultural revolution” and of the Central Cultura
pelled to adopt a series of urgent measures. At the end of August, Revolution Group among the masse. People ofmn ^pressed
he approved a report submitted by Zhou Enlai requesting that views against the “January seizure of power and Febr^
Wang Li and Guan Feng, both members of the Central Cultural adverse current” and complained of the injustice to a large
Revolution Group, be kept in isolation for investigation. The number of veteran cadres who had been overthrown In Shanghai
Central Committee kept issuing orders to maintain public order, and Beijing, there appeared big-character posters cnticiz^g ^
ensure the safety of state-owned materials and equipment, and Boda and Kang Sheng, and calling for the overthrow of Zha g
protect the life and property of the people. It also took measures Chunqiao and Xie Fuzhi. Ninety-one leading cadres of the Min
to protect foreign embassies and foreigners residing in China. istry of Foreign Affairs (most of whom were ambassadors in
Military control was also instituted over the most turbulent foreign countries, or occupied other important positions) put up
provinces, municipalities and Party and government de¬ ^character poster thoroughly criticizing the reactionary slo¬
partments. In October, the CPC Central Committee transmitted gan of “Down with Chen Yi” and demanding his t0 the
throughout the country a summary of the talks given by Mao ministry to preside over the work. These trends threw Lin Bia ,
Zedong during his inspection tours of north, south central and Jiang Qing and others into a panic. Following the last ten days
east China between July and September. In view of the endless March 1968, newspapers came out with one article afteran
conflicts among many rebel factions, Mao once again called for criticizing the “Right-deviatiomst trend to reverse verdicts^ Lin
the realization of “great revolutionary alliances,” and criticized Biao and8 Jiang Qing collaborated to frame up false charges
the Red Guards, saying, “Now is just the time they are apt to against Yang Chengwu (acting chief of the General Staff of t e
make mistakes,” so we must help them through education. In PLA, Standing Committee member of the Military Commissio
 657
CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION"
656 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
aa teams” to schools and some Party and government depart¬
and deputy secretary-general of the Military Commission), Yu
ments was called a revolutionary measure for realizing the aim
Lijin (political commissar of the PLA Air Force) and Fu Chongbi
that “the working class must exercise leadership m everything.
(commander of the Beijing Garrison). They were all removed
For two years, all universities and many middle schoo s through¬
from their positions in the army for “having made extremely
out the country still failed to respond to the repeated cal from
serious mistakes.” Meanwhile, Huang Yongsheng was appointed
the central authorities to resume classes while making revolution.
as chief of the General Staff of the PLA and head of the General
After entering schools, the workers’ and PLA propaganda teams
Office of the Military Commission. It was not long before the
set about the work of resuming classes.
functions of the Military Commission of the Central Committee
The struggle to seize power lasted twenty months and proceed
were actually being performed by its General Office. This gave
ed amidst wave after wave of grave social turbulence. All twenty-
Lin Biao and his gang more powerful control in the army. The
nine provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions through¬
raging tide of anarchism that had somewhat abated now be¬
out the country managed, in the end, to establish their revo u-
gan running high again as fanned up by opposing the “Right-
tionary committees. Though the “three-in-one combination was
deviationist trend to reverse verdicts.” Factional struggles among
comprised of “army representatives, revolutionary leading cadres
rebel organizations and bloody incidents caused by violence be¬
and leaders of the rebel organizations,” actually, in many places
came accelerated. This led to deterioration in public order again
and units, the army representatives were in ot the5 revo u-
in some localities. The incidents of violence increased again such
tionary committees. In the complicated situation, the PLA troops
as assaulting PLA units, looting state-owned property, damaging
did a lot of work in carrying out the task of “three supports and
public facilities, and inflicting casualties on PLA officers, soldiers
two militaries.” They played an active role in easing tension,
and ordinary people. Armed conflicts among rebel organizations
maintaining social order and reducing losses caused by turbu¬
in some universities and colleges escalated, causing casualties.
lence. But, influenced by the “Left” deviations general prmcip e
Once again, Mao Zedong had to take emergency measures to
control the situation. Apart from military control over some in effect at that time, they could not avoid mistakes which had
some negative consequences. Many of the PLA olficers taking up
serious chaotic provinces and municipalities, Mao also instructed
administrative duties in civil organs found they were not familiar
departments concerned to dispatch “Mao Zedong Thought propa¬
with the work. Among the small number of former leading cadres
ganda teams” (made up of workers, PLA officers and men) to
admitted into revolutionary committees, some were competen ,
schools to exercise leadership over them. In his talks with a few
but found it hard to play more than a limited role due to the
heads of rebel organizations, Mao criticized them for resorting to
prevailing conditions. Some bad cadres and bad leaders ot rebel
violence. He said: “Now, workers, peasants, soldiers and residents
organizations in revolutionary committees ganged up on each
are displeased with what you have done; so are the great majority
other, or worked in opposition. They continuously stirred up
of your students, as well as some who had supported your faction.
trouble in and outside revolutionary committees, becoming major
You are isolated from workers, peasants, troops, residents and the
factors of instability. Interrupted by frequent disputes and disor¬
vast majority of the students.” After two years of practice, Mao
ders, many revolutionary committees could not 1 unction normal¬
Zedong gradually realized that these Red Guards who had been
ly Revolutionary committees exercised a centralized leadership
praised as rebels at one time were not a reliable force for carrying
system incorporating the Party and government functions, or
out his ideas and proposals. Two years earlier, sending work
integrating government administration with economic manage
teams to schools had been completely discredited. However, this
time, sending “workers’ propaganda teams” and “PLA propagan- ment, therefore, they formed a highly concentrated locus oi
 659
658 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION'

power which had to carry out “Left” principles in every field of evolution ” in spite of the facts and asked the session to discuss
work. As a matter of fact, they represented a serious retrogression [he issue. Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and others took this as an oppoi-
in the state’s political system and administration. unity to launch attacks on Chen Yi, Ye Jianymg, L. Fuchun, U
Yiannian Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen, who had been
The 9th National Congress of the CPC involved in the “February adverse current” (Tan Zhenlin was
deprived of the right to attend the session), and to organize
After the setting up of the revolutionary committees in 29 criticism of Zhu De, Chen Yun and Deng Zihui as die-hard rig i
provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions across the
country, Mao Zedong decided to convene the 9th National Con¬ dCDue0toSthe extremely abnormal state of inner-Party life, and
gress of the Communist Party of China. To make preparations for without thorough investigation or serious discussion, the plenary
the congress, the enlarged 12th Plenary Session of the CPC 8th session wrongly approved the “report on the examinationl ol th
Central Committee was held in Beijing October 13-31, 1968. The crimes of Liu Shaoqi—renegade, hidden traitor and scab <
circumstances were extremely unusual. At that time, members made the erroneous decision “to expel Liu Shaoqi from the Party
and alternate members who had succumbed under the label of forever an?remove him from all the posts he has held in and
“renegade,” “enemy agent,” “having illicit relations with foreign outside the Party.” Chen Shaomin, who was present at the session,
countries,” or “anti-Party element,” had reached 52.7 percent of refused to agree to the decision in the face of great pressure.
the 8th Central Committee. They were deprived of the right to During his period of examination, Liu Shaoqi had been complete-
attend the session. Many of the members of the Central Commit¬ lv deprived of the right to defend himself. Liu suffered all kind
tee who were allowed to attend the plenary session had just been of torture and died of illness under the weight ofYalse^charget* in
liberated from the “cowshed” (referring to the place where people K a if eng of Henan Province on November 12, 1969. Later, alter
were isolated for further investigation during the “cultural revo¬ serious°re-examination, facts proved that the charges against Liu
lution”). Of the 97 full members, with 10 having died since the Shaoqi of “renegade,” “hidden traitor,” and “scab” were false and
11th Plenary Session, only 40 were qualified to attend the session. had been all put up by Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and company. It was
When it began, 10 alternate members were elected to fill the completely wrong for the session to reach such a political conclu¬
vacancies of full members in order to have a quorum. Among the sion^Pand mete out such an organizational punishment m Liu
alternate members, only 9 were qualified to attend the session, Shaoqi’s case. This is the most serious case of injustice in the
with 10 having been elected to full membership and 12 having p tv\ historv According to statistics drawn up by the Supreme
died since the 11th Plenary Session. On the other hand, members People’s'court before September 1980. more than 28 00 peo^e
of the Central Cultural Revolution Group and the General Office who were implicated in the case were penalized. As early as
of the Military Commission, principal leading members of the March 1967 Kang Sheng and Jiang Qing stirred up a sinister
provincial, municipal and autonomous region revolutionary com¬ campaign of “feneting out renegades." Rebel organizations
mittees and the major military commands, totalling 74, were throughout the country set up this or that kind of special case
invited to the session, accounting for over 55 percent of the total Soup They dished out materials on historical problems involving
participants. many cadres on whom the Party had already longbefore^
Mao Zedong presided over the session. In order to maintain correct conclusions. They even fabricated a large number of cases
that the fundamental direction of the “cultural revolution” was such as the so-called “61 -person case,” the “Xinjiang renegades
correct, in his speech, Mao persisted in praising the “cultural clique,” the “northeast renegade clique” and the “south China
 661
660 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION”

renegades clique.” Many faithful veteran Party members who had st e 0f socialism which were further developed in the cultural
fought heroically under enemy rule and many non-Party person- revolution.” It was also the general guiding ideology during t e
ages who had made special contributions to the Party were “cultural revolution,” and was indivisibly connected with the
labelled “renegades,” “special agents” and so on. Some of them practice of the “cultural revolution.” The report expounded t e
were even persecuted to death. Besides, many innocent cadres and formation and meaning of the theory, recalled the prepardhon
ordinary people, accused of being “counter-revolutionary ele- and execution of the “cultural revolution” under the guidance of
ments,” became involved in many wrong cases framed by Lin the theory, extravagantly lauded this “revolutionary theory” as a
Biao, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng and company. They were also “great contribution” and praised the “great achievements score
persecuted, and some died without being cleared of the unjust in the “cultural revolution.” However, the report did not expound
accusations. It is another bitter lesson to be learned in the Party’s on how the party was to lead and organize the socialist economic
history, following the magnified compaign of the 1930s to ferret construction and cultural advance. The ™
out undercover counter-revolutionaries in the early Soviet areas. I -■ p t Constitution which wrongly reversed the correct content oi
The 9th National Congress of the CPC was held in Beijing on the old Party Constitution adopted at the 8th National C^ngress
April 1, 1969. One thousand five hundred and twelve deputies } CPC The “theory of continued revolution under the
representing nearly 22 million Party members attended the con- dictatorship of the proletariat” was put down » the^ general
gress. At that time, various provincial, municipal and autono- programme, while development of the productive forces and
mous regional Party committees and primary Party organizations construction of socialist modernization were not mentioned at
at the basic level had not yet recovered or been re-established. Articles on the rights of Party members were deleted, and
The large majority of Party members had not yet resumed their furthermore, Lin Biao was put down in the general programm
organizational lile. In view of this situation, conditions lor con- «c0mrade Mao Zedong’s close comrade-in-arms and succes
vocation of the congress were not ripe. Deputies to the congress sor » j^js meaSure was in outright violation of the Party s organ-
could not be selected through voting, but were recommended izational principles of democratic centralization, and had never
through consultations by the Central Committee and the Party before occurred in the Party’s history.
core leading groups of revolutionary committees in various prov- In March 1969 before the convening of the 9th Congress
inces, municipalities and autonomous regions. This provided the incidents of armed conflict at the border area occurred as Soviet
chance for Lin Biao and Jiang Qing to arrange their company into iroons intruded into the area of Zhenbao Island in Heilongjiang
the ranks of the 9th Congress, making the congress far from pure Province on several occasions. Before the congress met, Mao
organizationally. ' Zedong discussed the question of preparedness against war at a
At the congress, Lin Biao, on behalf of the Party Central briefin° with members of the Central Cultural Revolution Crroup.
Committee, delivered the political report. The “theory of contin- Four years earlier, in 1965, in light of the international situation
ued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat” was the China faced, the Party Central Committee had made a grim
basic idea in the report, and was looked upon as the latest aonraisal of'the danger of war. This time, it exaggerated the
development of Mao Zedong Thought. The term “theory of possibility of war breaking out as even more imminent. The
continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat” report to the 9th Congress contained references to making ready
had specific implications determined by the particular historical lo ^ an eariy war? a big war and a nuclear war with the Soviet
background. It was the generalization and summation of Mao’s Union and the United States. Preparations against war not only
erroneous “Left” deviationist viewpoints on class struggle in the became an important topic for discussion at the congress, but also
662 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION’ 663

was a guiding principle for all work. Before long, a nationwide would show good results in one to two years, or two to three years.
campaign was begun to dig air-raid shelters, speed up construc¬ Even to a leader like Mao, it was still hard to have the situation
tion of the third line region and undertake other work in prepar¬ well in hand, and many of his predictions failed to materialize.
ation against war. The 9th Congress had been convened, but it had not initiated any
The congress elected 170 members and 109 alternate members trend towards bringing the “cultural revolution” to a victorious
to the Central Committee. Only 32 percent of the original mem¬ end as he had expected. On the contrary, because ideological and
bers or alternate members of the 8th Central Committee (not political “Left” deviationist errors escalated, while organizational
counting the deceased) were admitted into the 9th Central Com¬ life deteriorated and there were more undesirable persons in the
mittee. A large number of prestigious veteran cadres were exclud¬ Party, actually, a more profound crisis smoldered behind the
ed from the Central Committee. Quite a number of followers and scenes; sharper and more complicated struggles were brewing.
trusted supporters of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing became members
or alternate members of the Central Committee. At the 1st
Plenary Session of the 9th Central Committee of the CPC, Mao III. THE DOWNFALL OF THE LIN BIAO
Zedong was elected Chairman, and Lin Biao, the only vice-
CLIQUE AND FRUSTRATION
chairman of the Central Committee. The members of the Stand¬
ing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee IN CORRECTING “LEFT” ERRORS
were Mao Zedong, Lin Biao (the following were listed in the
order of the number of strokes of the surnames), Chen Boda, Implementing the “Left” Policy
Zhou Enlai, and Kang Sheng. Among the newly-elected members of Struggle-Criticism-Transformation
of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee, more
than 50 percent were the followers and trusted supporters of Lin After the 9th Party Congress, the movement of struggle-
Biao and Jiang Qing. Chen Yun, Li Fuchun, Chen Yi, Xu criticism-transformation was unfolded throughout the country
Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen were elected as members of the Central according to Mao Zedong’s plan. Mao said, “Struggle-criticism-
Committee, but excluded from the Political Bureau of the Party transformation in a factory, on the whole, goes through the
Central Committee. following stages: Establishing a three-in-one revolutionary com¬
As an outstanding feature, the 9th National Congress was mittee; carrying out mass criticism and repudiation; purifying
dominated from beginning to end by an atmosphere full of “Left” the class ranks, consolidating the Party organization, and simpli¬
deviationist thinking and fanatical worship of the personality cult fying the administrative structure; changing irrational rules and
of Mao Zedong. Mao’s brief opening address to the congress was regulations and sending office workers to the workshops.” Al¬
interrupted as many as several dozen times by strident slogans of though here only factories were mentioned, the same method was
“Long live ... long, long live...” The congress had legitimized the actually applied in all other fields. Mao personally participated
erroneous theory and practice of the “cultural revolution,” and in the experiment of struggle-criticism-transformation in six of
solidified the position of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing in the Party Beijing’s plants and two of its universities (namely, the Beijing
Central Committee. The ideological, political and organizational General Knitwear Mill, the Xinhua Printing House, the Beijing
guidelines of the 9th Congress were utterly wrong. The congress No.3 Chemical Plant, the Beijing Beijiao Timber Mill, the Beijing
failed to play any positive role at all in the Party’s history. “February 7” Locomotive and Rolling Stock Plant, Qinghua
On many occasions, Mao predicted that “cultural revolution” University and Beijing University), and demanded that other
 CHAPTER EIGHT THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION’ 665
664 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

places sum up their experiences and follow suit. Mao Zedong rampant factionalism which undermined and harmed the Party,
attempted to realize his ideal of “great order across the land” were basically impossible to overcome. The relations between
through struggle-criticism-transformation, which also by implica¬ Party members and between the Party and its members were
tion included his intention to end the “cultural revolution.” abnormal. But of course the re-establishment of Party organiza¬
However, the movement itself was an expression of the “Left” tions at all levels and the restoration of regular activities for most
policy. As a matter of fact, the struggle-criticism-transformation Party members helped in some degree to stabilize the situation
carried the “Left” errors of the “cultural revolution” to specific and promote industrial and agricultural production.
embodiment in all fields. As a result, social contradictions as well The so-called “educational reform” was carried out in this
as contradictions within the Party continued to intensify and period. With the launching of the “cultural revolution,” institu¬
there was little improvement in the social order or in stale affairs. tions of higher learning stopped enrollment and “suspended class¬
Party consolidation and Party building was an important task es to make revolution” for four years. According to Mao’s instruc¬
during this period. One of Mao’s instructions called the “fifty- tion that “students should be selected from among workers and
character guiding principle for Party-building,” read: “The Party peasants with practical experience, and they should return to
organization should be composed of the advanced elements of the production after a few years’ study,” in June 1970, the Party
proletariat; it should be a vigorous vanguard organization capa¬ Central Committee decided to resume enrollment experimentally
ble of leading the proletariat and the revolutionary masses in the in some colleges and universities and instructed that the past
fight against the class enemy.” Under socialist conditions, in nationwide entrance examinations and the method of enrolling
which the exploiting class had been eliminated as a class and class those with excellent marks be abolished in the institutions of
struggle only existed in a certain situation, the “fight against the higher education. Instead, students were to be enrolled “through
class enemy” was regarded as the sole purpose of Party building, recommendation by the masses, approval by their leaders and
with not a word on state construction of material and spiritual re-examination by the school authorities.” Students enrolled in
civilizations. The “class enemy” then mainly referred to the this way were called “worker, peasant and soldier students.” The
so-called “bourgeois headquarters” represented by Liu Shaoqi and period of schooling was shortened to two or three years. Later, the
its “agents” all over the country. Such a Party building principle students were assigned the task of “studying in the university,
was obviously wrong and harmful. In Party consolidation and administering it and transforming it with Mao Zedong Thought.”
Party building, the Party organizations were required, in accord¬ This so-called reform entailed harmful results: teachers were
ance with this principle, to carry out rectification and absorb new relegated to the status of having to be reformed, making it
difficult for them to fulfill their proper role; normal teacher-
Party members. That was called “getting rid of the stale and
taking in the fresh.” As a result, some qualified Party members student relationships and procedures were thrown into disorder;
couldn’t resume their regular membership activities in the Party, the educational level of many new students was quite low; pro¬
or were erroneously expelled from the Party, while among the fessional and cultural courses were drastically reduced, seriously
new Party members taken in, some were by no means quali¬ lowering the quality of education; the practice of entering uni¬
fied. Because of the incorrect guiding principle, many problems versity “through the back door” came into vogue. But most
emerged during that period of Party consolidation and Party teachers, under the extremely unfavorable conditions, remained
building. Outrageous ideas and behavior during the “cultural devoted to their work and many students did their best to achieve
revolution” involving the personality cult, the scramble for power good records. However, generally speaking, the prolonged “sus¬
and profit, sabotage of the Party’s organization and discipline and pension of classes and making revolution” and “educational re-
666 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION1 667

form” seriously weakened education and the growth of a whole long-term difficulties to the country’s modernization drive. To
generation of teenagers. In 1971, a National Educational Confer¬ settle them down, the government, the enterprises and other
ence was held in Beijing. The conference passed the summary, institutions spent at least 10 billion yuan. In addition, the move¬
finalized with modifications by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wen- ment aggravated the burdens of the teenagers’ families as well as
yuan, which made “two assessments,” namely, in the seventeen of the peasants in some areas. That constituted one of the main
years since the founding of the New China, “Chairman Mao’s factors in the social unrest at that time.
proletarian revolutionary line has not been implemented in the During this period, a large number of cadres and intellectuals
main, as a result of which the bourgeoisie has exercised dictator¬ from governmental organizations and institutions went down to
ship over the proletariat”; and the great majority of teachers “still the countryside to do manual labor in various “May 7” cadre
remain basically bourgeois in their world outlook.” At the time, schools. Although they were tempered by the labor and had a
Mao Zedong pointed out: Don’t go too far in assessing the better understanding of the countryside, they for a long time were
seventeen years, it is not the majority; instead, it is only a handful deprived of the opportunity to carry on their professional work
of people who have implemented an erroneous line under the and scientific and cultural research, causing heavy losses to
proletarian dictatorship; most intellectuals still support the so¬ China’s modernization construction. What is more ludicrous is
cialist system. Nevertheless, disregarding these opinions, Zhang that some workers in state-owned plants were also sent to the
Chunqiao and others pushed the “Left” tendency to the extreme. countryside “to learn from the poor and lower-middle peasants”
The completely wrong two assessments written into the confer¬ because of insufficient production tasks or factional strife, thus
ence summary acted as heavy spiritual shackles on the teachers artificially aggravating social contradictions. After the Lin Biao
and other intellectuals for a long period of time. incident, struggle-criticism-transformation was seldom men¬
Since colleges enrolled no students and factories recruited no tioned.
workers following the launching of the “cultural revolution,” the
commercial and service industries stagnated and middle school The Downfall of the Lin Biao Clique
graduates in cities could neither continue higher education nor be
assigned to jobs. In December 1968 Mao sent out the call: “It is Mao Zedong thought that the issue of Party building had been
highly necessary for young people with education to go to the initially resolved and he shifted the emphasis to government
countryside to be re-educated by the poor and lower-middle building. On March 8, 1970, Mao proposed to convene the 4th
peasants.” This brought about an upsurge of educated young National People’s Congress and revise the Constitution. Mean¬
people going to mountainous areas and the countryside. The while, he proposed to abolish the state chairmanship.
movement was advocated as highly significant for “combatting The Lin Biao clique visualized the coming 4th People’s Con¬
and preventing revisionism” and “reducing the differences be¬ gress as an opportunity to grab more power. This factional group
tween town and country, industry and agriculture, physical and was gradually formed on the basis of personal ambition during
mental labor.” In a few years, over 16 million educated youths the “cultural revolution.” Since Lin held the position of “deputy
went to the mountainous areas and the countryside. Although commander” during the early stage of the “cultural revolution,”
they tempered themselves and made contributions in developing the clique’s power rapidly swelled and reached its peak through
China’s backward rural and frontier areas, they lost the oppor¬ the 9th Party Congress and the 1st Plenary Session of the 9th
tunity to receive formal schooling when they were young. This Party Central Committee. By that time, Lin’s position as “succes¬
left a gap in the training of professional personnel, and brought sor” had been formally written into the Party Constitution and
 CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION- 669
668 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

the clique’s other principal members including Huang Yong- initiative to make a speech in which he persisted in his proposal
sheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng and Qiu Huizuo had all not to abolish the office of the state chairman. He directed the
entered the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. Through spearhead at the Jiang Qing clique by advocating the idea that
the special organization of the General Office of the Military “Mao Zedong is a genius.” Group meetings were held on the
Commission of the Central Committee, they were actually in afternoon of August 24 to discuss Lin’s speech. Previously, Chen
charge of the routine military work. Chen Boda, who became Boda had compiled some material entitled “Quotations trom
powerful through the “cultural revolution,” joined the Lin Biao Engels, Lenin and Mao Zedong on Genius.” At the meetings, the
clique at a time when his contradiction with Jiang Qing was members of the conspiratorial group made speeches explaining
sharpening. These people plotted to take advantage of the 4th the material—Chen Boda in the North China Group, Ye Qun m
National People’s Congress and the revision of the Constitution the Central China Group, Wu Faxian in the Southwest China
to raise Lin Biao to the state chairmanship. Although Mao Group, and Li Zuopeng in the Northwest China Group. In a
declared time and again that the office of chairman of the veiled attack on Zhang Chunqiao without naming him, they also
People’s Republic of China should be abolished and that he brought up two issues: namely, the need to resume the office of
himself would not take up the post, on April 11, 1970, Lin made state chairman, and the title of genius, in accordance with the
a counter proposal by suggesting that Mao be the chairman. The proposals in Lin’s speech. Their speeches, printed in Bulletin No.2
real intention, however, was revealed by Ye Qun privately in their of the North China Group that evening, aroused strong responses
group in July 1970 when she asked: “What about Lin Biao if the in all the other groups. Most of the participants were indignant
state chairmanship is abolished? Where will he be placed?” on hearing that some people “deny that Mao Zedong is a genius,
During the “cultural revolution,” the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing “depreciate Mao Zedong Thought” and “don’t agree that Mao
cliques colluded with each other on the one hand, while on the Zedong should be state chairman.” They demanded that people
other hand, fought without scruples against each other for more like that be “ferreted out,” bringing on a strained situation.
power. These careerists took every opportunity available to make At this point, Mao became aware of the factional activities
trouble and played vile tricks under the most high-sounding carried on by Lin Biao and his followers in scrambling for
pretexts. In examining the draft revised Constitution, contradic¬ personal power. On August 25, at an enlarged meeting of the
tions between the two cliques surfaced. At a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Com¬
Constitution working team on August 13, 1970, and at the Polit¬ mittee called by Mao Zedong, it was decided to stop discussing
ical Bureau meeting the following day, Wu Faxian insisted on Lin Biao’s speech, recall Bulletin No.2 of the North China Group
adding three qualifiers to the Constitution—“with genius, com¬ and instruct Chen Boda to make a self-criticism. On the 31st, Mao
prehensively and creatively”—in the sentence stating that Mao wrote “An Opinion of Mine” in which he severely criticized Chen
had developed Marxism. Kang Sheng and Zhang Chunqiao op¬ Boda’s “launching of a sudden attack, stirring up trouble and
posed the addition, bringing on a fierce debate. Superficially, that fearing only failure to bring on nationwide chaos, striking with
was only an argument over wording, but actually, it was seizing powerful bravado, as if to blast Lushan flat and stop the rotation
on an incidental difference of opinion to exaggerate matters, and of the earth.” Mao said that “on no account should the people get
symbolized the prelude of a bigger strife. mixed up with Chen Boda’s rumors and sophistry” or “be fooled
On August 23, 1970, the 2nd Plenary Session of the 9th Central by those who claim to know Marx but actually know nothing
Committee of the CPC was held in Lushan, presided over by Mao about Marx.” The plenary, on the proposal of Mao Zedong,
Zedong. Right at the beginning of the session, Lin Biao seized the exposed and criticized Chen. Wu Faxian and others were also
 671
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION’
670

d’etat, the code name of which was “combined fleet.” They set up
criticized. The plenary session resumed its pre-planned agenda on
secret strongpoints in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou and
September 6, passed in the main the revised draft Constitution
stored up firearms, ammunition, transceivers and taping devices,
and suggested that the Standing Committee of the National
and collected confidential documents of the Party and state.
People’s Congress hold its 4th National Congress at an appro¬
Meantime, they organized “fighting platoons” and “training un¬
priate time; approved the State Council’s report on the National
its” made up of meticulously culled members in Guangzhou and
Planning Conference and the National Economic Plan for 1970
and the report of the Military Commission of the Central Com¬ Shanghai to receive special training. In March 1971, the main
mittee on strengthening preparedness against war. During the figures of the “combined fleet” met in Shanghai and settled on
session, the Central Committee proposed that Chen Boda be the plan for an armed coup d’etat, the code name for the plan
investigated. After the session closed, the Central Committee being “Outline of ‘Project 571’” (in Chinese pronunciation, 571
issued a directive in November calling on senior cadres to study sounds similar to “armed rebellion”). The “outline” analyzed the
situation and stipulated the main points in the procedure, the
Marxist and Leninist works, saying that “only after reading some
basic works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin can the high- slogans and the tactics. In mid-August just when the “combined
ranking cadres distinguish genuine from sham Marxism.” Then fleet” actively prepared to trigger the crime, Mao went on an
the Central Committee held the North China Convention and for inspection tour of south China. In Wuhan, Changsha and Nan-
chang, Mao Zedong had conversations with Party, government
more than one month, exposed and criticized Chen Boda. In
addition, the Central Committee appointed new persons into the and army leaders of provinces and autonomous regions including
Hubei, Henan, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Jiangxi, Jiangsu
General Office of the Military Commission controlled by the Lin
Biao clique. In April 1971, the Central Committee convened a and Fujian. In the talks, he stressed the struggle at the 2nd
meeting to report on “criticism of Chen Boda and Party rectifi¬ Plenary Session of the 9th Party Congress and criticized by name
cation” at which Huang, Wu, Ye, Li and Qiu of the Lin Biao Lin Biao, Huang, Wu, Ye, Li and Qiu. He pointed out: “Someone
clique were instructed to make self-criticisms. On April 29, the is impatient to be chairman of the state and wants to split the
Central Committee issued a circular announcing a decision to Party and seize power.” “The recent Lushan meeting was another
expand the campaign of “criticism of Chen and Party rectifica¬ struggle between two headquarters.” He also said that “What has
tion” to grassroots units throughout the country. happened at Lushan is not over yet. The problem remains to be
Measures taken by the Party Central Committee and Mao solved” and Lin Biao “should, of course, be held responsible to
Zedong after the 2nd Plenary Session of the 9th Central Commit¬ some extent.” By sharply raising the problem of Lin Biao, Mao
tee weakened the power of the Lin Biao clique. The clique, made known that he did not trust Lin any longer. On the
thrown into confusion, fell into a passive position, and seeing that contrary, he thought Lin had become the head of another head¬
the situation was unfavorable, decided, in a reckless move, to quarters against him.
Lin Biao and Ye Qun, who were at Beidaihe then, learned ot
stage an armed coup d’etat.
Early in October 1969, the then Air Force Commander Wu Mao’s remarks from reports sent by their followers and were
thrown into a panic. On September 7, Lin Liguo ordered the
Faxian appointed Lin Liguo, the son of Lin Biao, as deputy
“combined fleet” to enter into “first-degree combat readiness.” On
director of the General Office and concurrently of the War
the 8th, Lin Biao issued his hand-written order for approving the
Department of the PLA Air Force Headquarters. In October
act and decided to assassinate Mao during his tour. Simultaneous¬
1970, Lin Liguo took advantage of his position and power to
ly, they made preparations to flee south to Guangzhou with their
secretly organize members to form the backbone for the coup
672 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION" 673

followers and to set up another Party center there. had lauded so vociferously; that he, named as the chairman s
On September 3, Mao arrived in Hangzhou from Nanchang. “successor,” in the Party Constitution, went on to commit treason
After he had been alerted to certain suspicious circumstances, he and flee the country; that six newly-promoted Political Bureau
returned to Beijing promptly on the 12th ahead of schedule, thus members altogether engaged in the counter-revolutionary activi¬
defeating the plot of the “combined fleet.” ties—all this, and more.
At 10:30 pm on the 12th, Zhou Enlai received a telephone The events roused people to serious thought: What result and
report from the Central Guards Bureau saying that Lin Liguo had prospect did the “cultural revolution” bring to the Party and
flown a Trident plane from Beijing to Shanhaiguan that evening. nation? Was the “cultural revolution” necessary and rational?
Zhou ordered an investigation into the sudden flight of the plane Why must great order across the land be reached through great
to Shanhaiguan and demanded that the plane immediately return disorder under heaven? Was it necessary to “continue revolution”
to Beijing. Seeing that their intrigue to flee south was exposed, under the proletarian dictatorship? Was it true that those over¬
Lin Biao, Ye Qun and Lin Liguo hurriedly got on board the plane thrown by the “cultural revolution” were people in authority
and fled the country in the small hours of the 13th. The plane taking the capitalist road? Was China really faced with the danger
crashed at Undur Khan, Mongolia, killing them all. The remain¬ of capitalist restoration then? In other words, could the cultural
ing principal figures of the “combined fleet” either commit¬ revolution” possibly advance the interests and hopes of any
ted suicide or were arrested. The plot to mount a counter¬ stratum of the Chinese people? What social support had the
revolutionary armed coup d’etat was thus scattered to the winds. “cultural revolution” relied on in the five years since it was
These were the events making up what is now known as the launched? What was the significance of all the losses and disasters
“September 13th Incident.” it brought on? What point was there in continuing it any longer.
The incident of the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary clique The “Incident of September 13” woke up many cadres and masses
intriguing to seize supreme power and plotting the armed coup to the fanatical personality cult and objectively declared the
d’etat was a disastrous effect of the “cultural revolution” due to bankruptcy of the “cultural revolution” both in theory and prac¬
overthrowing a series of basic Party principles. In the five years tice. Mao himself was also painfully disappointed by it.
following the “cultural revolution,” the Party’s leading role was
greatly weakened and the Party’s organizational disciplines were Readjustment of the National Economy Following Ups and
undermined. A large number of experienced veteran cadres who Downs in the Turmoil
stuck to revolution were overthrown or expelled. The Party
organizations at all levels were lax and the state’s democracy and During 1967-68, the national economy speedily deteriorated in
legality were trampled on. Factionalism and strife over power and the social turmoil following the “cultural revolution.” In the
profit burst into the open and became legitimized. The whole second half of 1966, the Red Guard movement and the travels
country was plunged into chaos. All these created conditions made by the so-called revolutionaries to other cities to agitate and
in which the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary clique could run to exchange experiences in making revolution across the country
amuck and dare to hatch a reckless plot. From this imbroglio, brought great losses to industry, communications and transporta¬
people saw clearly that Lin Biao, the very person who so enthu¬ tion Because the turmoil mainly took place in cultural and
siastically advocated the personality cult, went so far as to plot educational departments and Party and governmental institutions
the assassination of the chairman of the Party, the “great teacher, at that stage, the system of production, by and large, remained
great leader, great commander and great helmsman” whom he intact, which, together with the relatively sound foundation in the
 675
CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION’
674 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
in 1968 was 13.3 percent lower than that of 1966 The ftnancial
national economy as a result of the preceding five-year readjust¬
revenue greatly decreased, market supplies tightened and the
ment, all fields of production made comparatively satisfactory
people’s livelihood deteriorated. Residents received fewer ration
achievements in 1966. Industrial and agricultural output value
coupons for heating-coal and cotton cloth.
reached 253.4 billion yuan, an increase of 13.4 percent over 1965.
With the establishment of provincial, city- and county-level
The output of major industrial and agricultural products also
revolutionary committees, together with the convocation of the
increased by a great margin. The state’s financial revenue in¬
Party’s 9th Congress and restoration of Party organizations at all
creased by 18 percent over the previous year and there was a
levels, China’s domestic situation gradually stabilized and the
surplus of 1.72 billion yuan after revenue and expenditure were
national economy slowly recovered.
balanced. Many production and construction projects were com¬
In February 1969, the national planning conference was re
pleted or surpassed the state’s annual quotas. But soon by the end
sumed after two years of abeyance. The 1969 National Econ°™‘c
of 1966 the turmoil spread to industrial and communications
Planning Outline (draft) was discussed at the meeting and later
enterprises, wreaking disaster to economic construction. “Going
distributed to lower levels as a key document to
all out to seize power” threw the leadership, adjustment and
while being implemented. At the time, leaders like Zhou Enlai,
management systems in economic work into a state of semi- or
who was in charge of government work, grasped the opportunity
complete paralysis, throwing the national economy out of control.
to restore the work in the major industrial departments and other
The 1967 national economic plan was impossible to implement
comprehensive economic fields, thus strengthening the macro¬
and as a matter of fact, it was cast aside. It was not even possible
control over the national economy. Their efforts were instrume
to draw up a 1968 annual economic plan. These were the only two
tal in reviving the 1969 national economy to some degree^Indus-
years in which the annual planning failed to be implemented
tnal and agricultural output value for the year reached 261.3
since China first established the economic planning system. Many
billion yuan, an increase of 23.8 percent over the preceding year
effective rules and regulations in the enterprises, especially the
and the national income hit 161.7 billion yuan, an increase of 19.3
relatively complete policies formed in the previous five years of
percent However, the increase was obviously of a recuperative
readjustment, such as the seventy articles for industry, were
nature for most production indexes of major industria and
trampled on as “revisionist” rules to “interfere, block and sup¬
agricultural products were still below or equivalent to the levels
press.” Even the system of overall leadership by the factory
of 1966. Many difficulties and problems in economic work caused
director led by the Party committee, the distribution principle of
by the “Left” errors still remained as serious repercussions^
“to each according to his work” and profit targets were discarded
The national planning conference during February and March
as bourgeois trappings. Thus followed chaotic enterprise manage¬
1970 drew up the Outline for the 1970, and the Fourth Five-Year
ment, low product quality, high cost, lax labour discipline and
National Economic Plan (draft). Due to over-estimation of the
increased industrial accidents. With workers leaving their posts,
possible war danger caused by foreign aggression interna lonally
transportation obstructed, materials supply blocked, cooperation
and over-optimism in regard to the domestic economic situation,
discontinued and poor social security, many industrial, mining
emphasis was placed on “preparation against war as the guiding
and transport enterprises completely or partly suspended opera¬
principle, concentration on strengthening the strategic rear area,
tion. Production during the two years dropped drastically. In
establishing self-sufficient area of economic cooperationMmd
1967, industrial and agricultural output value fell by 9.6 percent
promoting a “new leap forward" in the economy. The Planning
compared with that of 1966, and in 1968, the figure dropped
outline drawn up according to this guideline repeated the prob
another 4.2 percent lower than that in 1967. The national income
 677
676 CHAPTER EIGHT TIIE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION’
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

construction only accelerated. By the end of 1971, a serious

lems of over-anxiety to get quick results and blind pursuit of high
nroblem of “three breakthroughs” emerged in Chinas national
indexes and high speed. Also problems arose because of a rapid
economy, namely, the number of workers and of lice stalf exceed¬
and blind transference of enterprise managing power to local
ed 50 million, the total payroll was over 30 billion yuan and the
authorities. In 1970, measures in economic construction were
volume of marketable grain sales topped 80 billion jin, all three
adopted to expedite the swift, extensive building of a strategic
figures much higher than the pre-planned mdexes. In 1972, the
rear area against war (mainly construction of the national defense
problem of the “three breakthroughs” continued to mount so as
industry). The local “five small” (small iron-and-steel, machin¬
to seriously affect the nation’s supplies of grain in storage which,
ery, chemical fertilizer, coalpits and small cement works) indus¬
in turn, led to a series of disastrous results such as severe
tries developed swiftly and the widespread transfer of enterprises
imbalance in the national economy, tight market supplies and
and institutions from the central departments to local authorities
deterioration of the people’s living standards.
triggered abrupt changes in the economic structural system. Con¬
During 1972-73, according to Zhou Enlai’s instruction, the State
sequently, the 1970 national economy underwent a relatively big
Council adopted all kinds of measures for readjusting the national
development. The actual levels of the year’s economic progress
economy. First of all, great efforts were made to solve the problem
basically fulfilled the major indexes of the Third Five-Year Plan.
of the “three breakthroughs,” by reducing the scale of capital con¬
The output of most industrial and agricultural products surpassed
struction, streamlining the payroll, strengthening the management
the 1966 indexes. But the blind and rash construction and struc¬
of labour wages and rectifying the work of grain marketing. Etlorts
tural changes inevitably gave rise to many serious problems. By
were also made to readjust the ratio between agriculture, light
the year’s end, economic development was beset by a series of
industry and heavy industry and accord agriculture the first place
contradictions. For instance, the production of grain and econom¬
in the national economy; readjust the relationships between the
ic crops fell short of the requirements of industrial development
national defense construction and economic construction and cut
and population increase; the raw materials industry could not
down national defense expenditure to a proper level; lower the
keep up with the development of the processing industry; the
excessively high economic indexes in the Fourth Five-Year Plan,
many, large scale capital construction projects made the rate
strengthen the centralized and unified leadership in economic work
of accumulation exceedingly high; product quality deteriorat¬
and stress unified planning and discipline.
ed, maintenance of equipment was neglected, accidents increased
Although the overall “Left” errors were not basically corrected
and so on. Economic construction in 1971, however, was carried
and lots of problems still remained in economic work, readjust¬
on without regard for all these contradictions and without hesi¬
ment for nearly two years alleviated to a large degree the disas¬
tation in pressing for the high indexes stipulated in the Fourth
trous effects of the rash advance in economic work, particularly
Five-Year Plan outline. loo much enterprise managing power
in the second half of 1973. The economic situation took an
being too quickly transferred to the local authorities greatly
obvious turn for the better and economic work, including foreign
weakened the central government’s macro-control. In order to
economic and technological exchanges, developed decisively. In
establish their own “small but complete” economic system, the
1973, China imported a number of technologically advanced
localities mounted their work on too large a scale, proposing to
single pieces of machinery as well as complete sets of equipment,
“double production.” Meanwhile, the proportion of investments
including thirteen complete sets of equipment for chemical ferti -
in rear area construction and military projects remained steadily
izer four sets for synthetic fiber manufacture and three sets for
high. Thus, in 1971, the scale of capital construction did not
the petrochemical industry. Major targets of the 1973’s national
diminish but further expanded and the rash drive for economic
 679
678 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION’

economic plan were fulfilled or surpassed. Industrial and agricul¬ and masses on other fronts, had always put the Party s, nations
tural output value hit 396.7 billion yuan, with an increase of 9.2 and people’s interests above everything. At their own positions,
percent over the previous year; the national income reached 231.8 they worked hard and surmounted untold difficulties to make
billion yuan, an increase of 8.3 percent, and the financial revenue, contributions to the socialist cause. Their contributions are an
80.97 billion yuan, an increase of 5.6 percent, while revenue and embodiment of the Chinese people’s great strength released under
expenditure were balanced. The year 1973 turned out to be the banners of patriotism and socialism.
economically the best in that period.
The achievements in construction by no means represented any Frustration in Efforts to Correct “Left” Mistakes
merits of the “cultural revolution” but rather the concerted,
successful efforts of cadres at all levels together with the broad After the Lin Biao incident, Mao Zedong, with the assistance
masses. This period of time also witnessed conspicuous achieve¬ of Zhou Enlai, adopted a series of measures to solve important
ments in some key engineering and scientific projects. In railway problems related to it. The CPC Central Committee dismissed
construction, the Chengdu-Kunming railway was completed in Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng and Qiu Huizuo tro
July 1970, the Zhuzhou-Guiyang railway in October 1972 and the their official positions to reconsider and make a clean breast oi
Xiangfan-Chongqing railway in October 1973. These railways, all they did. The Central Committee also decided to disband tbe
together with the previously built Baoji-Chengdu, Chongqing- General Office of the Military Commission and established the
Guiyang and Guiyang-Kunming railways, opened up southwest¬ Military Commission Work Council, with Ye Jianying in charge
ern China which had languished in prolonged seclusion from the of the daily affairs of the Military Commission. The Liri Biao
outside world because of underdeveloped transportation. These incident was reported to cadres and Party fromfentral
arterial railways were constructed under extremely arduous and to lower levels. Beginning from December 1971 the CPC Central
harsh conditions. Their completion was not only an outstanding Committee successively distributed three installments of materi¬
feat of pioneering in China’s railway history but also rare in the als concerning the struggle to put down the counter-revolutionary
world. In the realm of science and technology, April 1970 saw the coup d’etat of the Lin Biao clique. A rectification campaign to
successful launching of China’s first man-made earth satellite criticize Lin Biao was conducted nationwide to expose and con-
which signalled a historical breakthrough in China’s astronautics. demn the crimes of the Lin Biao clique and to ferret out people
The Daqing Oilfield, as a major pillar of China’s energy resources and clarify events related to its intrigues and activities. The
construction, was not immune to “Left” obstruction either. But results of all the measures were useful and considerable. Howev¬
the Daqing people staunchly withstood the disturbances and er although Mao learnt some lessons from the incident and
steered exploitation of the oilfield onto normal channels begin¬ readjusted policies to a certain degree, he failed to fully realize
ning from 1971. Crude oil production increased steadily and the encompassing mistake of the “cultural revo ution itself. He
rapidly over a long period. By 1975, annual output reached 46.259 let Jiang Qing and her followers continue to play an important
million tons, laying a foundation for the country to surpass 100 role in the political life of the Party and state. With the problem
million tons in crude oil output. In addition, China accumulated remaining basically unresolved, big relapses in the political situa-
rich technological and managerial experience in building extra tion were bound to appear later. .
large oilfields like Daqing. All these demonstrate that despite the Following the Lin Biao incident, Mao himself took care ol
long social turmoil, workers, engineers, technicians and cadres on implementation of the cadre policy. Zhou Enlai’s close co-
the industrial, scientific and technological fronts, like the cadres operation proved a good help. On November 14, 1971, when he
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC 681
680 CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION

met with the participants in the Chengdu Forum, Mao said, believed one-sidedly in Lin Biao’s words and made mistakes
indicating Ye Jianying, “Don’t call him an exponent of the These actions had a powerful political influence within and
‘February adverse current’ any longer. What was the nature of outside the Party. f ,, , •
the ‘current’? It was opposition to Lin Biao, Chen Boda, Wang Li, During this period, Zhou Enlai combined criticism of the L
Guan Feng and Qi Benyu.” Thus Mao reversed the verdict on the Biao counter-revolutionary clique’s crimes with criticism of t c
case of the “February adverse current.” On January 10, 1972, ultra-“Left” trend. The action was an extension of the correct
Mao attended the funeral ceremony for Chen Yi. Mao’s words proposals put forward in February 1967 by many leading com¬
and Zhou Enlai’s memorial speech delivered at the ceremony rades of the Central Committee who early on had called tor
confirming Chen Yi’s great, life-long contributions to the revolu¬ correcting the errors of the “cultural revolution.” Zhou raised the
tionary cause rehabilitated Chen. During April 1972, acting on issue of criticizing the ultra-“Left” tendency at some important
Zhou’s instruction, the People’s Daily carried an editorial which national conferences as well as on other occasions. He pointed out
pointed out that veteran cadres who had been tempered in long that the people would lack courage to implement the Party s
years of revolutionary struggles were precious assets of the Parly; correct line unless the ultra-“Left” tendency was completely
and that it was necessary to carry out correctly the Party’s cadre repudiated. As to the cadres’ misgivings regarding the production
policy, to criticize Lin Biao’s erroneous political and organiza¬ and professional work, he pointed out, “The movement and
tional line and to remove obstacles from both the “Left” and the vocational work should not be placed in opposition and politics
Right. To implement the policy, many veteran cadres or their in command” “should be expressed in one’s vocation.” He encour¬
relatives wrote to Mao and the Central Committee asking to have aged cadres at all levels to engage in production and professional
the facts set straight. Mao wrote instructions or comments on work with perfect assurance. In accordance with his suggestions,
some of the letters and Zhou repeatedly urged departments economic departments under the State Council worked out spe¬
concerned to speed up their investigations of special cases so that cific rules and measures to rectify the enterprises and strengthen
some former important officials could have their reputations economic management. With regard to work in the countryside,
restored and a large number of responsible Party, governmental the CPC Central Committee reaffirmed that rural work must be
and military cadres at all levels, who had gone down to the conducted according to the sixty articles on agriculture. Addition¬
countryside to labor or who had been directed to “stand aside,” ally the Central Committee issued instructions on distribution m
could return to leading positions. A number of specialists, scho¬ the commune, to solve problems such as failure to honor com¬
lars and professors also came back to their working posts. Al¬ mitments and equalitarianism in remuneration, which serious y
though their situation was still hard, most of them tried their best dampened the peasants’ enthusiasm for production. In regard to
to promote the difficult development of the socialist undertaking, culture and education, Professor Zhou Peiyuan of Beijing Uni¬
difficult as were the prevailing conditions. On March 10, 1973, versity, in line with Zhou Enlai’s opinions, proposed three points
the CPC Central Committee decided to reinstate Deng Xiaoping for strengthening teaching and research in basic theories. The
to enable him to participate in the regular activities of the Party article was carried in the Guangming Daily for propaganda. 1 he
and to work in his former position as vice-premier. In December People’s Daily also published experiences of Shacheng Middle
the same year, during a conversation with participants in a School in Huailai County, Hebei Province, in educational reform.
Military Commission conference, Mao suggested that He Long, It was proposed that middle school education should center
Luo Ruiqing, Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin and Fu Chongbi be around classroom teaching and book knowledge. This sort of
rehabilitated. Mao made a self-criticism, admitting that he had propaganda reportage reflected the earnest hopes of scientists,
 682 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION” 683

researchers, teachers and students. Mao; he made the erroneous decision that the Lin Biao clique was
However, the Jiang Qing clique which had established itself
ultra-Right beyond all doubt, and by no means ultra-“Left”;
through the “cultural revolution” and the ultra-“Left” trend were therefore it was permissible to criticize only the ultra-Right. This
certainly not about to leave the matter at that. They continued to cut short Zhou Enlai’s efforts to correct “Left” mistakes.
grasp at the supreme power, in the path of which the downfall of During August 24-28, 1973, the 10th National Congress of the
Lin Biao meant to them only one less obstacle. The efforts made CPC was held in Beijing. This was one year in advance of the
by cadres in all fields to fight off the effects of the ultra- Party Constitution stipulation that a congress be held every five
“Left” tendency, restore production and a proper routine of years. Presided over by Mao, it was attended by 1,249 deputies
work, achieved results. These were welcomed by the broad mass¬ representing 28 million Party members throughout the country.
es, but opposed by Jiang Qing and her followers. They denounced The 10th Party Congress continued the “Left” errors of the 9th
the articles carried in the Guangming Daily and the People’s Congress. It passed the political report and Party Constitution
Daily, repudiating the u!tra-“Left” trend, and directed the Peo¬ drafted by Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen,
ple's Daily office internally to carry out proceedings criticizing which did not correctly analyze the reason for the Lin Biao
the comeback of Right deviation among its staff members. Mean¬ incident, nor sum up necessary lessons. On the contrary, it af¬
time, they directed the Shanghai-based Werihui Bao to attack firmed that “both the political and organizational lines of the 9th
Zhou Peiyuan’s views emphasizing the basic theories of natural Congress were correct.” As formerly, the whole Party was called
sciences. In 1973, the State Planning Commission, according to upon “to persist in the continued revolution under the dictator¬
instructions given by Zhou Enlai, drafted “Regulations on Ad¬ ship of the proletariat” and the “proletarian cultural revolution.”
hering to Unified Planning and Improving Economic Manage¬ It maintained, as an “objective law,” that “great disorder across
ment” to be submitted for discussion at the National Planning the land leads to great order and it will be repeated every seven
Conference. Twenty-eight provinces, municipalities and autono¬ or eight years.” In addition, it was predicted that “the struggle
mous regions were all in favor of the document, while only between the two lines within the Party will exist for a long time
Shanghai under the control of Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wen- to come.” The criticism of Lin Biao’s “ultra-Right nature” was
yuan, opposed it. Zhang brazenly said, “I am strongly opposed to listed as a primary task. Guided by such a wrong “Left” policy,
pressure from the majority. It’s an honor to be isolated.” Conse¬ the “cultural revolution” was slated to go on and on with increas¬
quently, the 1972 and 1973 documents of the National Planning ingly disastrous results.
Conference were not officially distributed. The congress elected 195 members and 124 alternate members
Mao Zedong was not completely wakened by the Lin Biao to the Central Committee. Some veteran cadres including Deng
incident. He was still dreaming that the “cultural revolution” Xiaoping, Wang Jiaxiang, Ulanhu, Li Jingquan, Tan Zhenlin and
might have a certain satisfactory end close to the one he originally Liao Chengzhi, who had been persecuted during the “cultural
envisioned. When the leading cadres headed by Zhou Enlai came revolution” and excluded from the 9th Party Central Committee,
into sharp confrontation with the Jiang Qing clique on the issue were elected to the new Central Committee. Although more core
of criticizing the ultra-“Left” trend, Mao erroneously supported members of the Jiang Qing clique were balloted in, the re-entry
the stand of Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao. The “cultural of some revered veteran cadres displayed another significant
revolution” was an outcome of “Left” errors. Criticism of the trend.
ultra-“Left” trend, if it developed, would inevitably lead to repu¬ On August 31, 1973, the 1st Plenary Session of the 10th
diation of the “cultural revolution.” That was unbearable for Central Commmittee of the CPC elected the Party’s central
 685
CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION’
684 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
ialism, revisionism and reactionaries of various countries and the
organs. Mao Zedong was made chairman, and Zhou Enlai, liuuidaiion of people’s revolution). At their instigation, leading
Wang Hongwen, Kang Sheng, Ye Jianying and Li Desheng vice- officials in departments which handled foreign affairs became
chairmen, of the CPC Central Committee. Wang Hongwen made targets of attack. Work in these departments was sabotaged for a
his name as a rebel in Shanghai. Then merely because he was considerable period of time. Practically all the ambassadors were
relatively young and had been a soldier and factory cadre, he was recalled from abroad to take part in the “cultural revolution and
suddenly promoted to the high, position of vice-chairman. Kang many of them were persecuted. Under the influence of anarchism
Sheng, although a veteran Party member, had made many serious and ultra-leftist thinking, some people in these departments skir
mistakes, but because of his close link with Jiang Qing and her ed state policies and acted according to their own inclinations^
followers during the “cultural revolution,” he was also elevated Violations of discipline occurred from time to time In Publicity
to the high rank of vice-chairman. oriented to foreign audiences, no attention was paid to the pr
After the 10th National Party Congress, Jiang Qing, Zhang cinle of drawing a distinction between propaganda geared to the
Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen formed the “gang outside and that devoted to the home front. The propagation of
of four” in the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee. Mao Zedong Thought was made the main task in China sforeig
The force of the Jiang Qing clique was strengthened and they activities This led to the mistake ol assuming ourselves to be the
became more reckless in their ambitious attempts and activities
only revolutionary Party or country in the world and °f.trylng “
to usurp supreme Party and state power. However, through the impose our own ideology on others. Our mistaken dealings with
Lin Biao incident, many cadres and Party members had their fordgn countries also included adopting overly rude attitudes or
political consciousness and discernment raised. The issue of overreacting in disregard of the norms for international ex-
whether to affirm or negate the “cultural revolution” was becom¬
ing an increasingly intense struggle. ChTwas natural that all this should have aroused the suspicion
and uneasiness of the governments and officials of the countries
in which Chinese embassies had been established. China r
IV. CREATING A NEW SITUATION IN tions with the Western countries became very strained, particu
DIPLOMATIC WORK larly as a result of the serious incident that took place in August
1967, when some 10,000 people m Beijing encircled the British
Diplomatic Disputes Caused by “Left” Mistakes charge d’affaires’ office and set the office building on fire. Within
a year or more, among the over forty countries which had
In the early period of the “cultural revolution,” the work of the established full or partial diplomatic relations with China, close
Party on foreign affairs was seriously disrupted by “Left” way of to thirty had become drawn into disputes Some ofthese
thinking. Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng and their cohorts result of mishandling by China. This seriously impaired Chinas
created a great deal of trouble by meddling in departments which image in the world and made its diplomatic work increasingly
handled foreign affairs. They even went so far as to usurp the difficult. Premier Zhou Enlai and most cadres dealing with
power of the Central Committee in that sphere. They wilfully foreign affairs always opposed such ultra-"Left mistakes and
negated the major achievements of the previous seventeen years tried^their best to prevent them. Mao Zedong also criticized these
in this field by attacking the relevant Party line of that period. mistakes and asked for their correction. The deviations in han¬
They repudiated the conduct of foreign affairs as tantamount to dling foreign affairs were rectified and abnormalities eliminated
“three capitulations plus one liquidation” (capitulation to imper-
 687
686 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION1

soon after remedial measures were taken. Compared with other eliminate the after-effects of the Viet Nam war as soon as
fields, the damage done to the work in foreign affair was smaller, oossible, to stop the decline of its world position as a superpower,
and the time of the disruption shorter. On May First Internation¬ and to meet the challenge of the Soviet Union. The worsening o
al Labour Day in 1969, Mao Zedong met with some of the foreign Sino-Soviet relations made this idea feasible. From its own per¬
diplomatic envoys to China on the grandstand over the Tian¬ spective, China also wanted a rapprochement with the Um ed
anmen rostrum and had a friehdly talk with them. This was to pass States in order to deal with the direct, serious threat posed by the
on a message that China wanted to improve and develop its relations concentration of large numbers of Soviet troops along its northern
with other countries. Not long after that, China began sending out borders to achieve the great cause of national unification by
its diplomatic envoys, charged with adopting the initiative in mend¬ solving the Taiwan issue, and to restore and expand its relations
ing relations with their resident countries and repairing the dam¬ with other countries.
age, which had been done mainly because of ultra-“Left” actions on After Richard Nixon became president m January 1969, tne
the part of China. In this way, China’s foreign relations were again United States began to approach China through various channe
put back on the track of normal development. In July 1971, Dr. Henry Kissinger, special assistant to the
president in national security, made a secret trip to China, rhe
news, when published, shook the world. In February 1972, Pres
Relaxation of Sino-U.S. Relations and Establishment of
ident Nixon visited China, met with Chairman Mao Zedong and
Diplomatic Relations Between China and Japan
held talks with Premier Zhou Enlai. Through the talks the
Tremendous changes took place in the world situation in the Sino-U.S. Joint Communique was signed on February 28 in
1970s following the enormous development of events in the more Shanghai. This marked the beginning of the process of norma 1-
than twenty years since the end of World War II. Mao Zedong zation of relations between the two countries.
and Zhou Enlai, after making a careful examination of the new In the joint communique, both sides stated their own princi¬
world situation, made an important and timely policy decision pled positions and recognized the need to implement the Five
which showed their farsightedness, courage and resourcefulness. Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and oppose the threat of
This, coupled with the adoption of flexible measures, enabled hegemonism. On the Taiwan issue, which had impeded the lm
China’s foreign relations to take a turn for the better, resulting in provement of Sino-U.S. relations for a long time, the American
a new situation for Chinese diplomacy. The key link in the side expressed its recognition that all Chinese on both sides of the
favourable change was the amelioration of Sino-U.S. relations. Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan
For twenty years, ever since the founding of the People’s is part of China. Later, leaders of the two governments held talks
Republic of China, the United States had maintained a hostile on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two
attitude towards it. Under the impetus of a changed world, countries. The Chinese government stated that, in order to
leaders of both China and the United States saw the need as well achieve this objective, the U.S. government should sever its
as the possibility of holding talks to improve and normalize their “diplomatic relations” with Taiwan, withdraw all its armed forces
relations. From the point of view of the United States, the serious and military equipment from the island and abolish the Mutual
problem facing it was the antagonism between itself and the Defence Treaty” it had signed with Taiwan, and recognize th
Soviet Union. However, a few power centers had already arisen, Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legiti¬
with China as an important force among them. The United States mate government of China. In accepting China’s stated principles
found it necessary to improve its relations with China in order to with regard to the Taiwan issue, the United States constantly pu
 689
CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION"
688
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

the abnormal situation in Sino-Japanese relations. The Japanese

up obstacles to normalization by expressing certain reservations,
side, sharply aware of its responsibilities in causing tremendous
such as demanding a statement by China pledging peaceful so¬
losses to the Chinese people during the war, expressed the desire
lution of the Taiwan issue as a pre-condition for U.S. troop
to make a deep self-examination. The Japanese government rec¬
withdrawals and abolition of the said treaty. The Chinese govern¬
ognized the government of the People’s Republic of China as the
ment, for its part, clearly pointed out that the Taiwan question is
sole legitimate government of China, and Taiwan as an insepara¬
its own internal affair and how the question will be solved should
ble part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.
be decided by China alone. In December 1975, President Gerald
Consequently, Japan severed its “diplomatic relations with t
Ford visited China and held talks with Vice-premier Deng Xiao¬
Taiwan authorities. In early 1973, each country set up an embassy
ping. At that time, the attitude of the U.S. government indicated
in the other’s capital and the two countries exchanged ambassa¬
a retrogression from the previous commitments made by the
dors A series of agreements were signed regarding trade, avia¬
Nixon administration on the Taiwan question. Sino-U.S. normal¬
tion, ocean transport, fishery, science and culture resulting m the
ization was delayed owing to the fact that the American govern¬
rapid development of exchanges in all these spheres. The two
ment had not made up its mind to solve these problems. However,
countries commenced their talks on the signing of a treaty ot
a liaison office was established in each other’s capital in 1973, and
peace and friendship beginning 1975. The establishment of di¬
for several years exchanges in trade, science, culture and technol¬
plomatic relations between China and Japan put an end to their
ogy experienced substantial growth. The protracted hostility be¬
history of long-standing hostility and opened a new chapter in the
tween the two countries was ended and initial steps were taken
history of neighbourliness and friendship between the two na¬
towards normalization. This was without a doubt a major event
tions. This was of great significance for both countries as well as
in the history of Sino-U.S. relations. It also had a great impact on
the international situation. for world peace and development.
Those years were also a peak period in which many Western
Sino-U.S. detente made way for improvement in Sino-Japanese
European countries established diplomatic relations with China.
relations. The Japanese government had long toed the line of the
With the increase in their political and economic strength since
U.S. government by maintaining a hostile attitude towards China.
the end of the war, their drive to compete with the two superpow¬
I he fact that the United States had taken the lead in carrying out
ers became increasingly stronger. Their tendency toward mutua
diplomatic activities aimed at rapprochement with China pro¬
support and cooperation with China in defending world peace
duced profound repercussions in Japan both in the government
and the independence and prosperity of their countries was also
and the public at large. Public opinion strongly demanded di¬
growing. China had the same desire as these countries. Betore
plomatic relations with China as quickly as possible so as to attain
1969 of all the Western, Northern and Southern European coun¬
a favourable competitive position politically and economically
vis-a-vis other countries. With the help and support of many tries* only six had full diplomatic relations with China, while
Britain and Holland had such relations with China as were
political parties, social organzations and personages friendly to
compatible with maintaining a charge d’affaires’ office in respec¬
China, the Japanese Premier Tanaka Kakuei began his visit to
tive capitals. By the end of the 1970s, Chma had established
China on September 25, 1972. Chairman Mao Zedong met with
the Japanese premier and other guests. Premier Zhou Enlai held diplomatic relations with all the countries in these regions, with
the exception of Andorra and three other small nations. Relations
talks with him which resulted in the signing of a joint statement
were also normalized between China and the European Economic
on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two
Community. In the early 1970s, China successively normalized
countries on September 29. The statement declared the ending of
 691
690 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION'

diplomatic relations with Canada, Australia and New Zealand in intensifying a political campaign against China, the Soviet Union
North America and the southwest Pacific region, respectively. concentrated large numbers of troops along the Sino-Soviet bor¬
Since then, China has developed cooperative exchanges with these ders sent troops into the Mongolian People s Republic and pro
countries in the economic, scientific, technological and cultural voked armed conflicts on the borders. Under these circumstances,
fields. China was forced to strengthen war preparations while at the
same time seeking to improve the strained relations between the
The Restoration of China’s Rightful Seat in the UN two nations. In September 1969, when Premier Zhou Enlai met
with Soviet Prime Minister Kossigin in Beijing, an understanding
On October 25, 1971, the 26th General Assembly of the United was reached between the two sides that negotiations on the border
Nations passed a resolution on the restoration of the rightful seat question should be held under circumstances where no threat
of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations and the existed, and that in order to achieve this, an agreement should be
immediate expulsion of the representatives of the Kuomintang
signed first of all to maintain the status quo along the border
clique from all UN organizations. For a long time since its
avoid armed conflicts and disengage the armed forces of both
founding, the People’s Republic of China had been deprived of
sides in the disputed areas. The Soviet side initially opposed the
its rightful seat in the United Nations due to obstruction by the
discussion of signing such an agreement. Later when they could
United States. The Chinese government had waged a consistent
not icfuse to carry on discussions, they denied the existence of
struggle for its restoration. With China’s position steadily improv¬
disputed areas, a question which Kossigin had agreed to discuss.
ing in the world community, and the successive admission of
From the middle of the 1960s onwards, the Soviet Union, taking
newly-independent Asian and African countries into the United
advantage of the decline of the United States asasuperpower
Nations, the United States found it more and more difficult to go
intensified its expansion abroad in its rivalry with the United
on putting up obstacles. In the course of deliberation on China’s
States for world hegemony. The Chinese Communist Party and
seat at the 26th UN General Assembly, obstructions put up by
the Chinese government, while opposing the hegemomsm of the
the United States and some other countries, now in the form of
United States, waged a resolute struggle against the hegemomsm
a “two Chinas” scheme, were removed, and the problem finally
and big-nation chauvinism of the Soviet Union which were man¬
resolved, thanks to the joint efforts of many Asian, African and
ifested in the way they handled Sino-Soviet relations and other
other countries which upheld justice. This was a major victory on
China’s diplomatic front. From then on, as a permanent member international affairs.
of the Security Council of the United Nations, China has worked A deep-rooted friendship between the peoples of Chma and
unceasingly for the realization of the objectives of the United Viet Nam was forged through their long-term struggles against
Nations — the maintenance of world peace, the strengthening of imperialism and colonialism. After the founding of New Chma,
friendship and cooperation among nations, and the promotion of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Government,
the cause of human progress. despite their own difficulties and hardships at a time when
everything had to be started from scratch, gave full support to the
Sino-Soviet Negotiations and the Worsening of Vietnamese people’s resistance against French and American
Sino-Vietnamese Relations aggression and later to reconstruction of their country, rendering
them tremendous and selfless assistance both militarily and econ¬
The crucial issue between China and the Soviet Union in the omically. However, after the Vietnamese completed the liberation
1970s was the threat to China’s security posed by the latter. While of their whole territory in 1975, following the withdrawal of the
 692 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION”

American troops from south Viet Nam in 1973, the Vietnamese period, a large number of countries in Southeast Asia, South
authorities pursued a course of regional hegemonism in an at¬ Asia, Africa, South America, including the Caribbean region,
tempt to set up a “federation of Indo-China states.” It was natural Western Asia and Oceania, established diplomatic relations with
that China should adopt an attitude of opposition to this scheme. China. The friendship and cooperation between China and these
The Vietnamese authorities reacted by adopting an anti-China countries and their coordination in international affairs was
policy. In a flagrant manner, they provoked border disputes, strengthened all round. The overwhelming majority of the third-
invaded Chinese territory, and ruthlessly persecuted and expelled world countries, though they had gained national independence,
large numbers of Chinese residents from Viet Nam. Since 1975, were still faced with the serious task of fighting imperialism,
China had repeatedly proposed negotiations on the border ques¬ colonialism and hegemonism. Some faced the task of combating
tion, but Viet Nam used various pretexts to postpone the talks. racism in South Africa, and foreign expansionism of Israel. China
After the invasion of Kampuchea by Viet Nam, its leaders closely gave resolute support in various ways to these countries in theit
linked this action with their attack on China, claiming that China just struggle to defend their national independence and state
was their “most direct and dangerous enemy.” Proceeding from the sovereignty, oppose foreign aggression and interference, and
fact that China always treasured the traditional friendship between maintain peace in their respective regions as well as in the whole
the two peoples, the Chinese side gave them repeated warnings and world. China always worked earnestly in the common struggle to
remonstrations. But since the Vietnamese leaders thought they promote third-world unity, change the old international order
could count on the support of the Soviet Union, they went farther under which big nations bully small ones, rich countries exploit
and farther down the road in their opposition to China, resulting in poor ones, and to set up a new international order based on the
a serious deterioration of the Sino-Vietnamese relations. Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.
After the 1970s, China’s relations with several East European In the first half of the 1970s, while engaged in an appraisal of
countries, including Poland, Democratic Germany, Czechoslo¬ the international situation, Mao Zedong gradually formed a
vakia, Hungary and Bulgaria, improved in various degrees. Trade concept of the three worlds. He maintained that the two super¬
and exchanges in science and technology were restored. Since powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, belonged to the
both China and Rumania advocated the principle of independ¬ first world, and the other developed countries in the West, as well
ence in international affairs, they were able to support each other as the East European countries, belonged to the second world,
and cooperate closely in the international arena. China’s relations while the developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin Ameri¬
with Yugoslavia also improved outstandingly after 1970. ca which were great in number, belonged to the third world. In
making this distinction, he highlighted the contradiction between
Developing Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union and the United States, countries which were on
Third-World Countries a head-long course of hegemonism on the one hand, and the world
forces who opposed them on the other, and emphasized the
Building friendly and cooperative relations with the third- important role of the third-world countries in the fight against
world countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America was one of the world hegemony. The importance of uniting with the second-
notable achievements made by China during the 1970s. The world countries in this fight and exploiting the contradictions
number of third-world countries which had established normal between the two superpowers was also stressed, as was the fact
relations with China greatly increased, reaching another hightidc that China belonged to the third world and therefore it should
of diplomatic successes on a more extensive scale. During this unite with all possible forces in the world to form the broadest
694 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION’ 695

international united front in a common struggle to defeat aggres¬ Confucius and Confucianism and the promotion of the legalist
sion, control and oppression by the superpowers, and work for school of thought. In his talk with Wang Hongwen and Zhang
world peace. From a theoretical point of view, although some of Chunqiao in July 1973, he said that Lin Biao, like the Kuomin-
these analyses did not accord with reality, they certainly played tang, was a worshiper of Confucianism and an opponent of the
a positive role in providing guidelines for Chinese diplomacy in legalist school of thought. In January 1974, a selection of state¬
the fight against superpower hegemonism and the threat of war, ments by Lin Biao on the one hand, and Confucius and his
as well as in the work to build friendly and cooperative relation¬ disciples on the other, which was entitled “Lin Biao and the
ships with third-world and other types of countries, including the Doctrines of Confucius and Mencius,” was issued to all Party
work on Sino-U.S. normalization. To a certain extent, these organizations for the purpose of criticism. A nationwide cam¬
guidelines also paved the way for the implementation of China’s paign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucianism soon swept the
open policy in later years. country. Mao Zedong launched the campaign not only because he
wanted to bring out criticism of Lin Biao and his clique who were
promoting the ideological principles of Confucius and Mencius
V. THE DOWNFALL OF THE JIANG QING — criticism which was to be made by tracing the clique’s ideology
to its origin — but also because he wanted to uphold the “cultural
CLIQUE AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE
revolution” by propagating the idea that historically speaking, the
“CULTURAL REVOLUTION” exponents of the legalist school of thought were in favour of
reforms while the followers of Confucianism were always against
Although the 10th National Party Congress fully reaffirmed them.
the “cultural revolution,” the masses of cadres and people felt The Jiang Qing clique, in order to consolidate and expand the
growing weariness, doubts and grievances toward it. Zhou Enlai’s power they had gained during the “cultural revolution,” tried
efforts to rectify the “Left” mistakes, though thwarted halfway, their best to make use of the campaign. When they realized that
won general approval and support. Mao Zedong wanted to see the in July 1973, Mao Zedong had criticized the work of the Foreign
end of the abnormal situation that had existed for a long time, Ministry, which was under the leadership of Zhou Enlai, and the
and had already corrected some of the mistakes he had come to work of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of
recognize, in the hope that there would be stability and unity and the Chinese Communist Party, which was in the charge of Ye
China’s economy would recover and grow. On the other hand, he Jianying (in December), the situation seemed to offer opportun¬
was worried about a possible “restoration and retrogression,” and ities for them to spearhead the attack on Zhou Enlai and other
the negation of the “cultural revolution.” In fact, he was experi¬ revolutionary veterans in the course of the campaign. On two
encing a sharp mental conflict. occasions in January 1974, Jiang Qing made speeches at large
assemblies attended by army cadres in the Beijing area and by
Re-Emergence of the Turmoil and officials from central Party and government organizations, call¬
Struggle Around the 4th NPC ing on them to take an active part in the criticism of Lin Biao
and Confucianism. Assuming herself to be the leader of the
Around the time when the 10th National Party Congress was campaign, she attacked by name a number of cadres at the central
in session, on several occasions, Mao Zedong stated that the and local levels and cadres in the army, and thus put Zhou Enlai
criticism of Lin Biao should be linked up with the criticism of and Ye Jianying in a position facing all the blame. In another
 CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION" 697
<596 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

statistics gathered from January to May of 1974, the production

speech, she openly declared that there was a “very important
of coal dropped 6.2 percent as compared with the corresponding
Confucian” and called for the criticism of the “present-day Con-
period in the previous year, railway freight transport dropped 2.5
fucian.” Using her own name, she wrote letters to some army
percent, steel production, 9.4 percent, and chemical fertilizers, 3.7
units and government organizations and sent them relevant ma¬
percent. Financial revenues were 500 million yuan less, while ex¬
terials, instigating them to “ignite the fuse and fire the cannon”
penditures were 2,500 million yuan more than the previous year.
and to “seize power.” She also sent people to some army units,
Mao Zedong, while supporting the campaign to criticize Lin Biao
instructing them to “start a prairie fire.” A group of writers under
and Confucius, did not want to see the recurrence of a big social
her control published many critical essays attacking by innuendo
upheaval. To prevent a more turbulent situation, the Party Central
certain correct policies and measures of the pre-“cultural revolu¬
Committee, with the approval of Mao Zedong, issued a notice on
tion” period which had been abandoned for some time only to be
the 10th of April, instructing that no fighting squads or similar mass
resumed recently. The measures included the re-appointment of
organizations should be formed, and no effort should be made to
some revolutionary veterans to official posts in keeping with the
establish tics between the different trades and regions. In the notice
Party’s policy on cadres. All these innuendoes were made under
issued by the Party Central Committee which was entitled “Circu¬
the name of criticizing the Confucian doctrines of “restraining
lar on Grasping Revolution and Promoting Production,” fallacious
oneself in order to restore the old rituals,” and “restoring
slogans such as “Stop working for the erroneous line” were criti¬
the toppled state, re-establishing heirless family line and re¬
cized. The circular pointed out that the manipulators who were
appointing dismissed officials ” Jiang Qing and her followers
instigating strikes behind the scenes should be exposed and criti¬
resorted to distortions and provocations in opposing what they
cized.
called “attempts to turn the tide and make a comeback” while at
Mao Zedong, who had detected the ulterior motives of Jiang
the same time, they set up models for “going against the tide.” At
Qing and her ilk in making use of the campaign to further their
their instigation and direction, meetings were held in all possible
own interests, criticized them on many occasions. On July 17, at
places to denounce revolutionary veterans and to criticize person¬
a meeting of the Politburo, he warned her against “establishing
ages in cultural and educational circles. This again created a
two plants — an iron and steel works and a label making factory
highly strained political atmosphere. Factional strife recurred
— and sticking labels on people at her own will.” He openly
following the re-appearance of liaison offices, of visiting groups
declared before many people: “She doesn’t represent me; she only
from the localities to seek help from higher authorities, groups
represents herself.” Mao Zedong also criticized Jiang Qing, Zhang
sending up reports and of other factional cliques. Some people
Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen for their factional
raised slogans such as “Stop production under the erroneous line,”
activities and admonished them: “You should watch your step
aimed at provoking strikes and walkouts. Some of the leading
and avoid forming a small faction of four!” These criticisms made
cadres were again toppled or forced to leave their posts, while
them pull in their horns for some time.
others became involved in factional strife, helping one faction to
On October 11, 1974, the Party Central Committee issued a
push aside another faction. This, again, paralyzed the leadership
circular on the decision to convene the 4th National People’s
in many areas and departments. The campaign to criticize Lin
Congress within a short period. The circular passed on Mao
Biao and Confucius wrought new havoc on the initial political
Zedong’s comments: “It is already eight years since the beginning
stability and economic growth — both of which had been but
of the proletarian Cultural Revolution. At present, it would be
recently achieved through arduous efforts following the Lin Biao
good if stability prevails. The whole Party and the whole army
incident. Industry again took a downward turn. According to
 CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION’ 699
698 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

the PLA. Back in December 1973, at the suggestion of Mao

should unite.”
Disregarding Mao’s opinions, the “gang of four” intensified Zedong, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
their underhanded activities, as they saw in the forthcoming NPC decided that Deng should become a member of the Politburo and
new opportunities for them to seize more power. On October 4, take part in the work of leadership of the Central Committee
Mao Zedong proposed Deng Xiaoping for the post ol first vice- a decision to be confirmed by the 2nd Session of the 10th Central
premier of the State Council. Jiang Qing and her cohorts were Committee of the Party. It was also decided that Deng should
very dissatisfied with this. On many occasions at Politburo meet¬ become a member of the Military Commission and take pan in
ings, they created trouble and attacked Deng, who justly and the work of leadership of the commission. On January 5, 1975, at
forcibly refuted their attacks. the suggestion of Mao Zedong, the Party Central Committee
After plotting for a long time, the “gang of four” sent Wang issued a document appointing Deng Xiaoping as a vice-chairman
Hongwen to Changsha on October 18 to make a report to Mao of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee and
Zedong, which consisted of false accusations against Zhou Enlai concurrently the chief of the General Staff ol the PLA, and
and Deng Xiaoping. This was done behind the back of the majority Zhang Chunqiao as the director of the General Political Depart¬
of the Politburo members with a view to preventing Deng from ment of the PLA. At the 2nd Session of the 10th Party Central
becoming first vice-premier and “forming a cabinet” by the “gang Committee held in early January, the decision to make Deng
of four.” Mao Zedong warned Wang Hongwen on the spot, asking Xiaoping a member of the Politburo was alfirmed and he was
him to set a watch on Jiang Qing and not to gang up with her. Mao elected a vice-chairman of the Party Central Committee and a
then asked Wang to go back and see the premier and Ye Jianying member of its Standing Committee. The fact that Mao Zedong
for a talk, saying that if he had any comments to make, he should continued to criticize Jiang Qing and her ilk on many occasions,
make them in front of the people concerned. Mao dismissed Wang’s his re-assertion that Zhou Enlai was in charge of the day-to-day
way of accusing Zhou and Deng behind their backs as no good. On work of the Party Central Committee and of the government, and
October 20, Mao sent a message to Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen the fact that Deng Xiaoping was again entrusted with important
by word of mouth reaffirming that the premier was still the man to jobs — all these played an important role in thwarting the “gang
exercise over-all control, and that the preparatory work for the 4th of four” in their plot to form a cabinet of their own, and in
N PC and the appointment of senior officials at the congress should ensuring the smooth convocation ol the 4th NPC.
be handled by the premier and Wang Hongwen. Between the 13th and 17th of January 19/5, the 1st Session of
On December 23, 1974, Zhou Enlai, who was seriously ill, went the 4th NPC was held in Beijing. In his report on the work of the
with Wang Hongwen to Changsha to make a work report to Mao government, Zhou Enlai re-asserted the blueprints proposed by the
Zedong. In his talk, Mao again warned Wang against “forming a 3rd NPC in December 1964 concerning the two steps to be taken in
gang of four,” advising him to “refrain from forming any cliques, developing the Chinese economy — the first step was to use fifteen
since those who do are bound to trip and fall.” He also said: years to accomplish, before 1980, the building of an independent
“Jiang Qing has wild ambitions. Don’t you think so? I think she and relatively complete industrial system and national economic
has.” Mao asserted that Deng Xiaoping was strong politically and system, and the second step was to fully realize the modernization
ideologically and that he was a rare talent not easy to find. He of agriculture, industry, national defence, science and technology
proposed that Deng should hold three posts simultaneously — within this century so that China’s economy would be in the fore¬
first vice-premier, vice-chairman of the Military Commission of front of the world. The NPC re-elected Zhu De chairman of the
the Party Central Committee and the chief of the general staff of NPC Standing Committee, and elected Dong Biwu, Soong Ching
700 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION” 701

Ling and twenty others vice-chairmen of the NPC Standing Com¬ Party’s good style of work and wage a resolute struggle against
mittee. The congress decided that Zhou Enlai continue to be the factionalism. Those involved in factions had all sorts of wild
premier and Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Chunqiao, Li Xiannian, Hua ambitions, he said. They jostled for power and gain, resorted to
Guofeng and eight others to be the vice-premiers. The congress vicious plots and intrigues, stirred up trouble and strife. Deng
reaffirmed the objective of achieving the four modernizations (al¬ maintained that one must not budge an inch in the struggle
though the time set for their completion was too short to be realis¬ against factionalism. He called the attention of people to the
tic). The appointment of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping to the key implementation of the Party’s policies, including the policies
posts of the State Council was a great inspiration to the Chinese towards cadres of old, middle and young age, the policies towards
people and aroused new hopes in them. model workers, veteran workers and intellectuals — all this was
aimed at calling into play the initiative of people in all spheres.
He also set forth the important Marxist viewpoint that science
Work of Consolidation in 1975 and Reversals
and technology represented a force of production and stressed the
After the 1st Session of the 4th NPC, Zhou Enlai’s illness need to do a good job in these fields. These and other statements
became more serious. With the support of Mao Zedong, Deng made by him awakened a lot of people who had long been
Xiaoping took charge of the day-to-day work of the Party Central influenced by the trend of “Left” thinking and gave them great
Committee and of the State Council. By that time, work in every encouragement and inspiration. Under Deng’s leadership, and
field had suffered from interference and sabotage by the “gang with the full support and cooperation of Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian
of four” and was in a state of serious chaos. It was at this critical and many other veteran comrades who had resumed work in
juncture that Deng Xiaoping was entrusted with the important leadership posts, bold and resolute steps were taken to consolidate
job. Disregarding the fact he had just been rehabilitated and was the work in every field, with the result that notable achievements
beset with a great number of difficulties, he showed great revo¬ were soon registered.
lutionary courage, wisdom and leadership talent and soon suc¬ Because of factional contention and strife, rail transport under
ceeded in changing the situation. Basing himself on Mao Zedong’s the railway bureaus at Xuzhou, Nanjing, Nanchang and other
instructions on the need to maintain stability and unity and to places was obstructed for a long period, preventing smooth oper¬
boost the economy, he presided over various types of meetings ation of the four trunk lines of the Tianjin-Pukou, Beijing-
where he clearly and firmly put forward the guiding principle of Guangzhou, Lianyungang-Lanzhou and Hangzhou-Nanchang
consolidation in all spheres of work. He stressed that every sphere Railways and interfering with transportation over other trunk
of work in the country required consolidation, which was essen¬ lines. This posed a serious threat to industrial production and
tial for industry, agriculture, commerce, finance and trade, cul¬ normal city life and stood as the major obstacle to improvement
ture and education, science and technology, as well as for the of the situation countrywide. In late February, the Party Central
armed forces. He pointed out that the central issue was the Committee convened a meeting of Party secretaries in charge of
consolidation of the Party, with the consolidation of the leader¬ industry and made a decision on March 5 on the solution of
ship as the key to the solution of all other problems. Through the railway transportation and other problems. Work teams were sent
work of consolidation, it was essential to set up a leadership which out which cooperated with the local Party committees in starting
was powerful and bold. He emphasized the need to maintain the work of reorganization at railway bureaus with serious prob¬
stability and unity and develop the socialist economy; it was also lems. The work teams aroused the masses and mobilized them to
necessary to strengthen Party leadership, to give play to the criticize factionalism, removed a number of trouble-making fac-
 CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION" 703
702 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

on the work of consolidation in the armed forces, agriculture,

tionalist leaders, rehabilitated people who had been wronged,
science and technology, culture and education. Outstanding re¬
reshuffled the leadership in certain organizations, and re¬
instituted and improved relevant rules and regulations. These sults were achieved in every field.
Great progress was made in consolidating the army with regard
measures, which proved highly effective, won the support of the
to reshuffling the leadership of some major units and implemen¬
great majority of railway workers and staff members. By April,
tation of the Party’s policies on the question of cadres. Jhe
nineteen out of twenty railway bureaus had overfulfilled their
Science and Technology Commission for National Defence suc¬
transportation plans. The daily average loading of freight cars
ceeded in solving the knotty problem of factional strife between
amounted to more than 53,700, which was more than 10,000 over
two large groupings in the Seventh Machinery Ministry. In
the February figure of the same year. The numbers of freight cars
literature and art, the Party’s policy of “let a hundred flowers
loaded with coal daily reached 7,800. This was the first time in
bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend” was emphas¬
five years that the plan for coal transport by rail was completed.
ized, and the ban on the publication and performance ol a
The work of railway consolidation served as an example for all
number of good works was lifted. The literary field, which had
other industries, first of all, for the iron and steel industry. The total been lying fallow, with all the flowers withering, began to show
amount of iron and steel produced in the first four months of 1975
signs of life. ~ ,
fell short of the original planned target by 1.95 million tons. This Particularly noteworthy were two documents — one, drafted
was attributed primarily to the unsatisfactory performance of the by the State Planning Commission entitled “Certain Questions on
big iron and steel mills in Baotou, Wuhan, Anshan and Taiyuan. In
Speeding Up the Development of Industry” (abbreviated as the
May, the Party Central Committee held a forum on the iron and
“Twenty Articles for Industry”) and the other drafted by the
steel industry. After a month’s work of consolidation, the produc¬
Chinese Academy of Sciences entitled “A Report Outline on the
tion of iron and steel showed a clear upward turn. In June, the Work of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.” Both documents
average daily production of steel reached 72,400 tons, which ex¬ were important for their systematic rectification of “Left” mis¬
ceeded the planned daily average figure for the whole year and takes, and the restoration and formulation of correct policies in
helped to make up for the shortfall of the previous months. the fields of industry, science and technology. Not confined to the
After several months of consolidation, the economic situation work on consolidation, the two documents put forward many
showed steady improvement. According to a State Council report important, far-sighted ideas on the reform of industry, science
on industrial production for the first half of the year, “Industrial and technology. In fact, they paved the way for the reform in
production and communications have improved month by month these fields which took place in subsequent years.
since March.” In May and June, the production of crude oil and From the very beginning, the “gang of four” obstructed and
coal, electricity, chemical fertilizers, cement, diesel engines, paper resisted the all-round consolidation carried out under the leader¬
and paperboard, railway transportation — all these recorded their ship of Deng Xiaoping, seizing every opportunity to raise objec¬
highest monthly level in history. In 1975 the total production tions. On October 20, 1974, while discussing the theoretical ques¬
value of industrial and agricultural production was 11.9 percent tion of the dictatorship of the proletariat in meeting with Danish
higher than the corresponding period of the previous year. Indus¬ Prime Minister Paul Hartling, Mao Zedong said, “In a word,
trial production increased 15.1 percent; agricultural production
China is a socialist country. Before liberation she was much the
increased 4.6 percent. This shows that the work of consolidation
same as a capitalist country. Even now she practises an eight-
in this period was highly fruitful. grade wage system, distribution according to work and exchange
In the same period, vigorous measures were also taken to carry
704 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION” 705

through money, and in all this differs very little from the old at Beijing University, Mao Zedong gave his personal views on the
society. What is different is that the system of ownership has been classical Chinese novel Outlaws of the Marsh. The gang of four
changed.” On December 26, he also touched upon this question immediately seized on this subject to launch a country-wide
in his talk with Zhou Enlai and others in Changsha. He said, “Our publicity campaign in the press for so-called comments on Out¬
country at present practices a commodity system; the wage sys¬ laws of the Marsh. Jiang Qing brazenly fabricated the story that
tem is unequal, too, as in the eight-grade wage scale, and so forth. “the crucial thing in Outlaws of the Marsh was isolating Chao Gai
Under the dictatorship of the proletariat such things can only be and and turning him into a mere figurehead.” By innuendo she
restricted. Therefore, if people like Lin Biao come to power, it falsely accused Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping of havmg de¬
will be quite easy for them to rig up the capitalist system.” These prived Mao Zedong of his power. Learning this, Mao Zedong
statements made by Mao Zedong led people to think that distri¬ refuted Jiang Qing’s statements. This was another blow to the
bution according to labour and commodity exchange were of a arrogance and aggressiveness of the “gang of four.
capitalist nature or apt to turn capitalist. They were an extension The situation in 1975 took a noticeable turn for the better,
of his conceptions about socialism which were tinted with utopi¬ thanks to the common effort and struggle of many leading
anism. These erroneous statements were exaggerated and played comrades in the Politburo and the State Council represented by
up by the “gang of four” and were used as weapons in their Deng Xiaoping, a measure of restraint put on the gang of tour
opposition to the work of consolidation. by Mao Zedong, the popular desire for law and order and the
On February 9, 1975, the People’s Daily published an editorial enthusiasm of the broad masses of people as well as of the Party
entitled “Do a Good Job in Studying the Theory of Dictatorship of members and the cadres in their work and production. The
the Proletariat,” making public Mao Zedong’s statements on theo¬ various regional armed conflicts were brought to a halt, social
retical questions. A movement to study these statements soon swept order became stabilized in most areas, and the reviving economy
the country. At the direction of the “gang of four,” a large number swung rapidly upward. However, the work of consolidation car¬
of articles were published in the press in refutation of “empiricism,” ried out in each sphere inevitably went against many ot the
calling on people to “abolish bourgeois right” and instigating them “Leftist” policies and theories implemented during the cultural
to “attack the strongholds.” They slandered the various measures revolution,” and gradually constituted a systematic rectification
adopted in the work of consolidation as “empiricist,” which was a of these erroneous policies and theories. This represented a ten¬
direct attack on Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and other Party and dency towards a radical negation of the “cultural revolution
state leaders with rich experience. By “attacking the strongholds,” This situation aroused not only the frenzied opposition of the
they meant that the cadres, intellectuals and the rank and file of “gang of four,” but also the dissatisfaction of Mao Zedong
people who opposed the “Leftist” mistakes, were like the enemy in After Mao Zedong fell seriously ill in the winter of 1971, his
the strongholds in the period of the democratic revolution, and condition varied, sometimes taking a turn for the better, some¬
should be subjected to “over-all dictatorship.” times for the worse. Nevertheless, he continued to be responsible
Mao Zedong detected the ulterior motive behind the gang of for all major decisions of the Party and the state As the persons
four’s opposition to empiricism and criticized them for this. In who could approach him and enjoy his trust grew fewer and fewer
the light of Mao’s opinions, the Politburo held several meetings in number, his understanding of the real situation became poorer
to criticize the “gang of four.” But their wild ambitions proved to and poorer, and therefore his proposals and ideas on important
be irrepressible. They seized upon every chance to create trouble. matters of the Party and the state became more and1 more ab-
On August 14, 1975, in answer to a request from a woman teacher latter half nf 1975.
 707
CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION”
706 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

other things are secondary.” He also said, “What is the Cultural

to such a degree that he could hardly walk or speak. The little
Revolution? It is class struggle.” According to him, the reason why
contact he had with other members of the Politburo was main¬
some veteran revolutionaries were “dissatisfied with the cultural
tained through a liaison person. Under such circumstances, he
revolution” was that “their thinking still remained at the stage of
failed even more to have a complete picture of actual conditions.
the bourgeois democratic revolution.” He said, “You are making the
The distorted and provocative information provided him by the
socialist revolution, and yet don’t know where the bourgeois is. It is
“gang of four” played an extremely insidious role in eliciting
right in the Communist Party — those in power taking the capitalist
erroneous policy decisions from him.
road. The capitalist-roaders are still on the capitalist road.” Mao
In November 1975, Mao Zedong believed the false accusations
Zedong assessed the “cultural revolution” in general as “30 percent
of the “gang of four” against Deng Xiaoping, and his trust in the
versus 70 percent; i.e., 70 percent representing achievements, with
latter wavered. He decided to remove Deng from most of his
30 percent consisting of mistakes.” The mistakes were: 1. down with
posts. Not long after, Deng Xiaoping was accused of supporting
everything; 2. a full-scale civil war. To the great majority of cadres
Liu Bing, the deputy Party secretary of Qinghua University who
at lhat time, the arguments he put forward in these statements in
had written a letter of complaint against two confidants of the
favour of the “cultural revolution” were hardly convincing.
“gang of four.” Tiic pretext was that Liu’s letter had been handed
This campaign, which was very unpopular, upset the relatively
to Mao through Deng and that the letter was directing an attack
stable situation which had just emerged. Many correct policies and
on Mao. Thus a campaign to “criticize Deng and counter the
measures pul forward in the course of consolidation were negated,
Rightist wind to reverse verdicts” was launched.
leading officials who resolutely implemented these policies were
However, after ten years of turmoil, the masses of cadres and
persecuted, while factionalists and leaders of factions who had been
people now had an understanding which was quite different from
dismissed or removed from office now returned to their jobs. Fac¬
what they had entertained in the early period of the “cultural
tional strife again raged in certain regions, bringing on work stop¬
revolution.” The achievements of the consolidation work spon¬
pages and communication tie-ups. Chaos again reigned throughout
sored by Deng Xiaoping were universally acknowledged. The
the country. This situation aggravated the dislike which the masses
campaign to “criticize Deng and counter the Rightist wind to
of people had for the “cultural revolution” and helped them see the
reverse verdicts” went against reason as well as the will of the
real features of the “gang of four,” who had brought disasters upon
people, and was widely boycotted from the very beginning. From
the nation and people. Feelings of uncertainty, discontent and
the printed materials prepared for the criticism of Deng, people
indignation, which had accumulated in their minds over a long
in fact acquired a better understanding of him. They developed
period, grew very quickly and could easily explode like a huge keg
a greater trust in Deng as a person who persisted in the Party’s
of gunpowder with a fuse which could be lit at any time.
correct principles and policies.2 Obviously, this was far from what
the “gang of four” had anticipated.
In early February 1976, leaders of the Party Central Committee Victory in Smashing the Jiang Qing
convened several meetings, to which responsible comrades of the Counter-Revolutionary Clique
provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions and the area mili¬
tary commands were invited in groups. These meetings were held On January 8, 1976, Zhou Enlai, one of the main leaders of
to inform them of the statements made on many occasions by Mao the Party and the state, passed away. He was boundlessly loyal to
Zedong concerning the current campaign. In these statements, Mao the Party and people to the last breath of his life. Placed in a ver>
Zedong stressed repeatedly that “Class struggle is the key link, all difficult position during the “cultural revolution, he put the
 CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION” 709
708 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

was just magnificent! Popular indignation mounted, with the

overall interests of the nation above everything else, worked very
hard and tolerated all kinds of unjust criticism. He spent all his “gang of four” as the target of censure.
energies and wisdom in a tireless effort to carry on his normal On the evening of April 4, Hua Guofeng presided over a
meeting of the Politburo (Ye Jianying and Li Xianman being
work for the Party and state, to reduce to a minimum the losses
absent) to discuss the situation at Tiananmen Square. Hua Guo¬
caused by the turmoil, and to protect large numbers of cadres
feng had worked in Hunan province for many years both before
both inside and outside the Party. He waged a struggle against the
and after the outbreak of the “cultural revolution,” and was
“gang of four” in various ways. His death aroused boundless grief
transferred to work in the State Council in 1971. He was a
within the Party, army and among all nationalities of the country.
member of the 9th and 10th Central Committees of the CPC and
The tragic and moving scene of tens of thousands of people lining
a member of the Politburo of the 10th Central Committee. In
the street when the hearse carrying his body drove through
January 1975, he was appointed a vice-premier by the 4th Nation¬
Chang’an Avenue in Beijing, reflected the infinite sorrow of the
al People’s Congress. After the death of Zhou Enlai, during the
people in losing their leader at a time when the Party and the state
campaign to “criticize Deng and counter the rightist wind to
were in great jeopardy, and their sincere yearning for a way to
reverse verdicts,” he was appointed acting premier and was put
free the nation from its disastrous situation and open up the
in charge of everyday work of the Party’s Central Committee by
prospect for a bright future.
Mao Zedong in February. Under the manipulation of Jiang Qing
During the preparations for Zhou Enlai’s funeral, the “gang of
and her ilk, the Politburo meeting defined Tiananmen event as a
four” issued a series of prohibitions in an effort to obstruct and
counter-revolutionary incident, which had allegedly interfered
malign the mourning activities of the people which were being
with the orientation of the campaign. It was also decided at the
carried on an immense scale. This could not but arouse the
meeting that all the wreaths and slogans be removed from Tian¬
indignation of the great numbers of cadres and people involved.
anmen Square that very night. A report of the proceedings as well
Commencing in late March, people from all walks of life in
as the decisions of the meeting were written up by the liaison
Nanjing, Hangzhou, Zhengzhou, Xi’an, Taiyuan and other cities
person and handed by him to Mao Zedong, who gave his approval
broke down the restrictions put up by the “gang of four,” and held
after reading the report.
solemn commemorative activities to honour the late premier by In the early morning of April 5, on discovering that all the
making use of the old Chinese tradition of paying respects to one’s wreaths, poems and memorial couplets had been removed from
ancestors during the Qing Ming Festival on April 5. At the end the square, people became very angry and some of them came
of March, people in Beijing began to converge spontaneously at into serious conflict with the militiamen, police and soldiers who
Tiananmen Square to hold memorial activities in honour of Zhou were on the spot. At 9:30 that evening, 10,000 militiamen and
Enlai, and this continued for several days on end. Wreaths and police armed with wooden clubs were ordered to march into the
baskets of flowers were laid at the Monument of the People’s square to drive away, beat and arrest people in the square. On the
Heroes. People also put up handwritten memorials, recited poems night of April 7, it was broadcast nationwide over the radio that
of their own composition, and delivered speeches in honour of the at the suggestion of Mao Zedong, and with the approval of the
late premier and also in denunciation of the evil deeds of the Politburo, Hua Guofeng had been made first vice-chairman of
“gang of four.” On April 4, the commemorative activities in the Party’s Central Committee and premier of the State Council,
Beijing reached their climax. Some two million people, including and Deng Xiaoping had been removed from all posts both inside
many from other parts of the country, went to Tiananmen Square and outside the Party, while still retaining his Party member-
in disregard of repeatedly stated official restrictions. The scene
 711
710 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION'

ship. Wang Hongwen and company through this office and ask for
The Tiananmen Incident was a concentrated expression of the instructions. This move on the part of the “gang of four” was an
people’s protest movement against the “gang of four,” an event attempt to sever contacts between the Party Central Committee
which had developed under the influence of the correct leader¬ and the various localities and put the whole country under their
ship of the Party. The disastrous “cultural revolution,” which had direct control. Moreover, the “gang of four” ordered their faithful
lasted almost ten years, was increasingly detested by the masses followers in Shanghai to redouble their arms build-up of the
of cadres and people, who pinned their hopes on veteran revolu¬ militia which could be called into use as a strong backing in their
tionaries like Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping for the restoration eventual bid for power. They also falsified what they called the
of social order and of the correct policies of the Party. Yet it was last words of Mao Zedong which stated: “Act according to set
these veteran revolutionaries who were now receiving unjust principles.” They publicized this statement time and again in the
treatment. This poured oil on the flames of the people’s anger press, posing as the legitimate arbiters of the Party’s principles
against the “gang of four,” which finally burst out so vehemently and policies. An openly menacing press release of theirs stated
with the outbreak of the Tiananmen Incident. This movement of that “any revisionist ringleader who dares to temper with the
protest was also an expression of support for the correct leader¬ Chairman Mao’s set principles will come to no good end. This
ship of the Party represented by Deng Xiaoping. Clearly demon¬ insinuating remark was a slanderous attack on Hua Guofeng, Li
strating what the people supported as well as what they opposed, Xiannian and others then in charge of the work ol the Party
it helped to dig the grave of the Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary Central Committee. ■ „
clique. The blatant intrigues of the “gang of lour to seize the supreme
On July 6, 1976, Zhu De, another important leader of the Party power of the Party and state aroused the deep concern and
and the state, passed away, only to be followed by the death of anxiety of the veteran revolutionaries. Although most ol them
Mao Zedong, the principal leader of the Party and state, on were in a difficult position, they exchanged information through
September 9. The death of the three outstanding leaders within various channels and discussed ways to solve the problem. Under
less than a year immersed the whole Party, the whole army and attack by the “gang of four,” Hua Guofeng, who directed the
the people of all nationalities in great sorrow. This was because work of the Party Central Committee as its first vice-chairman,
millions upon millions of people had high respect and a deep was well aware of the need to eliminate this bane, which festered
sense of gratitude for the three leaders for the great achievements in the body of the Party and the state like an ulcer. He repeatedly
and magnificent contributions they had made in founding the studied the matter and discussed it with Ye Jianying and Li
Party, the army and the state, in leading the Chinese democratic Xiannian. With the approval of the majority of the Politburo
revolution and socialist construction, and in applying and devel¬ members, a decision was made to adopt resolute measures. Repre¬
oping Marxism under China’s own circumstances. senting the Politburo and fulfilling the will of the Party and the
After the death of Mao Zedong, the “gang of four” intensified people, Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying put Jiang Qing, Zhang
their activities to seize the supreme power of the Party and state. Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan and the faction s core
Wang Hongwen circumvented the official unit on 24-hour duty members in Beijing under investigation on the night of October
under the Party Central Committee’s General Office, and on 6. That same night, the Politburo held a meeting to discuss the
September 11 set up a separate office for similar functions in major issues to be dealt with by the Party and the state after
Zhongnanhai. He informed the Party committees of all provinces, heading off the conspiracy. The meeting passed a resolution
municipalities and autonomous regions that they should report to naming Hua Guofeng as chairman of the Party Central Commit-
712 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION" 713

tee and of its Military Commission; this was later confirmed by all nationalities. These setbacks, the most serious since the found-
the 3rd Plenary Session of the 10th Central Committee of the ing of the PRC, greatly weakened the Party organizations and
CPC held in July 1977. state power. Large numbers of cadres and ordinary citizens were
On hearing the news that Jiang Qing and others were being persecuted. Democracy and law were trampled upon and the
held under investigation, their faithful followers and the core whole country was gripped in a political and social crisjs. during
members of their faction desperately mobilized an armed rebel¬ the ten years, national income suffered a loss of about 500 billion
lion. This was a last-ditch struggle to save the Jiang Qing counter¬ yuan, and the living standard of the people declined. Science,
revolutionary clique from demise. The Party Central Committee, culture and education were seriously damaged, and the gap in
through effective measures to control the situation in Shanghai, science and technology between China and the advanced coun¬
thwarted the plot to launch an armed insurrection. The news of tries of the world widened. The cultural heritage left by history
the overthrow of the “gang of four” was published by the Party was destroyed on an enormous scale. The fine traditions of the
Central Committee on October 14. It was received with the Party and the excellent moral fibre of the people were seriously
greatest of joy and excitement. People could hardly wait to be the undermined. Metaphysics and idealism ruled the day. Anarchism
first to inform their friends and neighbours. and extreme individualism ran riot. The “cultural revolution
It was difficult to list all the crimes the “gang of four” had was not in any sense a revolution or a form of social progress. It
committed during the “cultural revolution.” Their downfall real¬ was a tumult of civil strife which had been launched under wrong
ized the common hopes of the Party and the people and crowned leadership and made use of by counter-revolutionary cliques, and
the combined, long-term struggle that had been waged against which brought serious internal disorder to the Party, the state and
them. Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian played an the people of all nationalities.
important role in smashing the “gang of four.” The Party and the During the “cultural revolution,” the Party and people never
people, after ten years of hardships and setbacks, at long last put ceased their struggle against “Left” mistakes and the two counter¬
an end to the disastrous “cultural revolution” by overthrowing revolutionary cliques, one headed by Lin Biao, the other by Jiang
two counter-revolutionary cliques, one headed by Lin Biao, the Qing. The struggle was extremely difficult and took a zigzag
other by Jiang Qing. These victories helped social order to return course The severe test of the “cultural revolution showed that
to normal, and put the work of the Party and the state back onto the Party’s 8th Central Committee, and the overwhelming major¬
the track of sound development. They also ushered in a new era ity of the members in the Politburo, the Standing Committee ol
of development in the history of the Party. This was a great the Politburo, and the Secretariat elected by the Central Commit¬
triumph of the Party and of the people; it was also a great tee stood on the correct side in the struggle. Many of them
triumph of Marxism and socialism. suffered severe attacks and persecution. Nevertheless, they took
The “cultural revolution” which lasted more than ten years, the interest of the whole nation into account, showed great
marked a period when “Left” mistakes dominated for the longest tolerance, and kept a close watch on the major acts and future
time in the history of the Party, and caused the greatest damage; prospects of the Party and state. They did everything within their
when all kinds of social contradictions were revealed in sharp power to render valuable service to the Party. Some, out ot a
focus and full range, and when extremely rich experiences and strong sense of justice, made outright criticisms of Left mis¬
lessons were accumulated and learned. takes Others persevered in cool-headed deliberations, took up
The protracted upheavals in the “cultural revolution” caused writing in all seriousness, and produced theoretical works or
great losses and reverses to the Party, state and Chinese people of memoirs of past events in order to sum up positive experiences in
 715
714 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION’

Party history. Still others drew up suggestions and proposals to exceptional feats of engineering, was completed, and these were
the Party concerning certain major issues in practical work, or opened to traffic along with the magnificent bridge spanning the
made known the Party’s fine traditions to the people they came Changjiang River at Nanjing. A number of large enterprises
in contact with. In fact, all these activities represented the various equipped with advanced technology went into production. Suc¬
forms of combatting or boycotting the “cultural revolution.” cess was scored in the crossbreeding of a new strain of rice and
Unfortunately, some of these comrades, such as Liu Shaoqi, Peng in its promotion. Outstanding achievements were also attained in
Dehuai, He Long and Zhang Wentian, who were members of the the fields of nuclear technology, artificial satellites, carrier rock¬
Politburo of the Sth Central Committee before the “cultural ets and other branches of high-tech research. Under the circum¬
revolution,” failed to survive its ordeals. These leaders of the stances of a nationwide turmoil, the PLA continued to pertorm
Party and state had made outstanding contributions to the peo¬ its duties in safeguarding the security of the country. A new
ple’s revolution and construction in China. Their boundless loy¬ situation was created in China’s diplomatic work. Quite under¬
alty and selfless spirit of dedication to the Party and the people standably, all these advances were by no means results ot the
will live forever in the minds of the people of various nationali¬ “cultural revolution.” Greater achievements would have been
ties. The overwhelming majority of the Party cadres, whether made if the “cultural revolution” had not taken place. During the
they had unjustifiably been toppled, or had been able to persist “cultural revolution,” the Party, the people’s government, the
in their work, or had resumed work earlier or later, were loyal to people’s army and the society as a whole did not change in nature.
the Party and people and had displayed a firm faith in socialism History again proved that the Chinese people are a great people,
and communism. Those intellectuals, model workers, patriotic and that the Communist Party of China and the socialist system
democrats, patriotic returned overseas Chinese, and cadres and have immense, powerful vitality. „
people of different social strata of the various nationalities who The “cultural revolution” was launched and led by Mao Ze¬
had been under attack or had suffered in other ways, never dong and, therefore, he was mainly responsible for this over-all
wavered in their love for their motherland or their support for “Left” mistake which lasted for so long. However, the mistake was
the Party. It was precisely because of the struggle and boycott made after all, by a great revolutionary of the proletariat in his
launched by the Party as a whole, along with the masses of pursuit of a pure, perfect socialist society and a new way to
workers, peasants, soldiers and commanders of the PLA, intellec¬ prevent capitalist restoration and build socialism. In actual tact,
tuals, young people and cadres at various levels, that the destruc¬ Mao Zedong was tied to an abstract conception which was di¬
tive role of the “cultural revolution” was held in abeyance to a vorced from reality. When he was making serious mistakes, he
certain degree. always thought that his theory and practice were Marxist, and
Despite all the tremendous losses during this difficult period, were necessary for the consolidation of the dictatorship of the
the Chinese economy continued to make some progress thanks to proletariat. This is where his tragedy lies. While insisting on
the joint efforts of the masses and the cadres. Grain production carrying out the “cultural revolution,” which was an overall
was steadily on the increase, reaching 286.3 billion kilogrammes mistake, he stopped and corrected a number of mistakes on
in 1976, an increase of 91.75 billion kilogrammes over the 1965 specific questions, such as giving protection to certain leading
figure. A number of major achievements were made in industry, Party officials and celebrities outside the Party, and helping to
communications, capital construction, science and technology. put a number of responsible comrades back to important posts.
The production of crude oil in 1976 was 6.7 times the 1965 figure. He had entrusted members of the Lin Biao clique with important
The construction of certain new railways, at times involving jobs. But it was also he who was leading the struggle to liquidate
716 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER EIGHT THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION” 717

liched article entitled “A Discussion on the General Guidelines for_ the Work in
this counter-revolutionary clique. He had once placed high trust * i, cnheres for the Whole Party and Country,” which was written by the Poll y
in Jiang Qing and other members of the counter-revolutionary Research1 2 Department of the Stite Council on the basis of the instructions given
clique. But he also made important criticisms and exposures of by Deng Xiaoping.
them and prevented them from attaining their ambition of usurp¬
ing supreme power. This was vital to the Party’s subsequent
struggle to smash the “gang of four.” Even in his late years, he
was on the alert in safeguarding the security of the country, and
stood up against the great pressure exerted on China by Soviet
big-power hegemonism. He implemented a correct foreign policy,
and gave resolute support to the peoples of various countries in
their just struggles. During the “cultural revolution” our Party
was not destroyed and was able to retain unity, the State Council
and the PLA were still able to perform duties which were re¬
quired of them, the foundations of socialism continued to exist,
socialist economic construction was still in progress, and our
country retained its unity and played an important role on the
international stage; all these facts were part and parcel of the
great role which Mao Zedong had played.
The “cultural revolution” was the consequence of going astray
in the effort to explore China’s own road in building socialism; it
was an incorrect practice carried out under the guidance of an
incorrect theory. It fully revealed, in very stark forms, the defects
of our Party and state, both in respect to their work and structure.
It also presented profound lessons to be learned so that a serious
mistake like another “cultural revolution” or any similar disas¬
trous upheavals would never be repeated. A scientific summing
up of the lessons of the “cultural revolution” will help us to find
the correct road to build socialism with Chinese characteristics
and march triumphantly along this road.

NOTES

1. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-82), Chin, ed., People’s Publishing

House, 1983, p.290.
2. The materials then printed for the criticism of Deng, labelled “The Three Big
Poisonous Weeds,” consisted of the Twenty Articles on Industry, A Report
Outline on the Work of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and another unpub-
 CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 719

Despite the downfall of the “gang of four,” the power in some

party and state organs remained in the hands of remnants of the
Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary faction. In certain localities,
they had struck deep roots and still had a definite influence, and

CHAPTER NINE in some places, turbulence had not ended. These were the most
pressing problems that had to be solved. On October 18, 1976, the

DAWN OF A NEW PROSPECT IN Party Central Committee issued a document entitled “Circular on
the Incident of the Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qmg
SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION and Yao Wenyuan Anti-Party Clique.” Commencing on Decem¬
ber 10, the Party Central Committee issued three documents
providing more evidence of their crimes. The documents exposed
I. TWO YEARS OF HESITANT PROGRESS and criticized the attempts of Jiang Qing and others to seize the
supreme power of the Party and state, and to frame Zhou Enlai
The liquidation of the Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary clique and other veteran revolutionaries, as well as the harm caused on
was greeted with joy and enthusiasm throughout the nation. all sides by their ultra-“Left” line. At the same time, a nationwide
People rejoiced to see the final collapse of the “gang of four” and screening was carried out to find out their entire factionalist
with it an end to the ten years’ turbulence of the “cultural organizational connections, and the events and persons involved
revolution.” The fact that the Communist Party of China was in their plot to usurp the supreme power of the Party and state^
able to excise the malignant tumour in its own body strengthened The leadership at various levels was gradually readjusted and
the people’s confidence in the Party. In Beijing and many other strengthened. Resolute measures were taken to expose the faction¬
cities, the masses of people celebrated by joining in huge parades alist leaders and core members and to put them under investiga¬
and rallies to express their heartfelt happiness, their support for tion The Party Central Committee sent work teams to the re¬
the Communist Party, and their demand for the restoration of maining few turbulent areas to stop the armed conflicts and
social order and a return to a normal, regular life. restore normal social order. By the first half of 1977, the armed
A great many serious political and social problems had accu¬ conflicts and turmoil caused by factional strife were basically
mulated during ten years of turbulence. The Party faced an stopped and a stable political situation gradually emerged. By
arduous task. Monumental, urgent work was required to restore 1978 the work of screening was basically completed in the grea
normal order in all Party organizations, revive the fine traditions majority of areas and work-units, and the counter-revolutionary
and working style of the Party, re-establish normal order in the political force which had brought great disasters to the people
political life of the nation, invigorate the organs of political power throughout the country for a decade was thus destroyed and the
at all levels to ensure their smooth operation, consolidate and power usurped by them retrieved.
develop the people’s democratic united front, and restore normal With the situation in the whole country returning to normal,
order in economic, cultural and educational undertakings which the 3rd Plenary Session of the 10th Party Central Committee was
had been disastrously undermined. Countless collapsed endeav¬ convened between July 16 and 21, 1977. The session decided to
ours cried out for resuscitation, numberless slackening enterprises expel Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qmg and Yao
awaited invigorating. In a word, reconstruction had to be under¬ Wenyuan from the Party once and for all and remove them Irom
taken in practically all fields. all posts both inside and outside the Party.

718
 720 CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 721
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

service of socialism were part of the working people. From then

To reverse the unjust verdicts made during the “cultural revo¬
on the leftist policy towards intellectuals which had been prac¬
lution” and rehabilitate the innocent victims was one of the most
pressing tasks at the time. But the work in this field made very tised for so many years was corrected and attention was again
paid to the importance of knowledge and intellectuals. This was
slow progress. At a Party Central Committee’s work meeting
a great inspiration to the intellectuals working m the fields ol
convened in March 1977, Chen Yun made a written proposal to
science, education, literature and art. The ban on a great number
restore the work of Deng Xiaoping, and to reverse the wrong
of good films and plays and other literary and art works, both
judgment concerning the Tiananmen Incident as well as other
Chinese and foreign, was lifted. Mass organizations such as the
major unjust verdicts. At the meeting, Wang Zhen also expressed
Chinese Federation of Literary and Art Circles and the Chinese
the same opinions. It was not until the 3rd Plenary Session of the
Writers’ Association resumed their activities. Creative work in
10th Central Committee that an official decision was made to
various spheres of literature and art began to be revitalized step
restore Deng Xiaoping to his previous posts as member of the
by step. From late 1977 to early 1978, the examination system in
Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, Standing Committee
schools that had been abandoned during the “cultural revolution
member of the Politburo, vice-chairman of the CPC Central
was restored, and new college students were once again enrolled
Committee and its Military Commission, vice-premier of the
State Council and chief of the General Staff of the PLA. At the through a nationwide unified examination.
In the economic field, chaotic conditions prevailed in pro¬
same time, work had started on sorting out and solving the
duction as after-effects of the “cultural revolution,” particularly
problems left over from the political movements preceding the
in manufacturing, mining, communications and transportation.
“cultural revolution.”
Harmful consequences were also reflected in obtructions in
In the fields of science, education and culture, a completely
commercial transactions, serious imbalances between the var¬
new situation emerged, thanks to the leading role of Deng Xiao¬
ious sectors of the national economy, and the lack of improve¬
ping. Setting things right in these fields was particularly signifi¬
ment over a long period in the people’s material well-being.
cant because it was just there that the “cultural revolution” had
Soon after the smashing of the “gang ol tour, the State
started. Science and education were put under Deng Xiaoping’s
Council adopted resolute measures to eliminate traffic jams
leadership after he had resumed work. In August 1977, at a
along the railway lines. Beginning in December 1976 and
forum on the work of science and education held by the Party
during the first half of 1977, the Party Central Committee and
Central Committee, he pointed out that the main aspects of the
the State Council held a series of meetings to discuss the urgent
work in the seventeen years since the founding of the PRC on the
need to put things in order in the enterprises, and to work out
educational and scientific fronts represented a red (correct) line,
various rules and regulations for restoring and developing
and that the overwhelming majority of Chinese intellectuals
production. After the work of consolidation, a number ol
served socialism willingly and voluntarily. By making this state¬
enterprises on the brink of collapse began to emerge from their
ment, he negated the claims made by Lin Biao and Jiang Qing
previous chaotic situation in production. National economy
that “a dictatorship of the black line” had existed in the field of
recovered rapidly and even made some progress in certain
literature, art and education. Deng Xiaoping called on people to
respects. In agriculture, a bumper harvest was reaped in 19/8,
respect mental labour and talents. In March 1978, at the National
with grain production exceeding 300 billion kilogrammes, the
Science Congress held in Beijing, Deng Xiaoping emphasized the
highest figure on record. The total value of industrial produc¬
Marxist viewpoint that science and technology were forces of
tion, which increased 14.3 percent in 1977 over the previous
production. He also pointed out that mental labourers in the
 722 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter nine a new prospect in socialist construction

year, again increased 13.5 percent in 1978. Financial revenues, tee of the NPC, re-appointed Hua Guofeng as premier ot the
which increased 12.6 percent in 1977 over the previous year, State Council, and appointed Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, Xu
registered an even higher increase of 28.2 percent in 1978. A Xiangqian and nine others as vice-premiers. ^ ,
financial balance was achieved both years, even with a little Simultaneously with the National Peoples Congress, the 1st
surplus. The living standards of the people were also on the Session of the 5th National Committee of the Chinese People s
rise. For the first time in many years, 60 percent of the workers Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) was also held. Deng
and other employees throughout the country received various Xiaoping was elected chairman of the National Committee. The
raises in pay in 1977. In 1978, the level of consumption among revival of the CPPCC, which had been completely inactive during
both the urban and rural residents rose 5.1 percent as compared the “cultural revolution,” was highly significant in enhancing
with the previous year. cooperation between the CPC and the democratic parties and
Between August 12 and 18, 1977, only four years after the strengthening the people’s democratic united front.
10th Party Congress, the 11th Party Congress was held. Its The 11th Party Congress and the 1st Session ot the 5th
convocation ahead of schedule was obviously necessary in order were unable to accomplish the task of formulating a correct hne
to decide on the major principles in the work of the Party and and policies for the new period following the c0"c u , the ime
to elect a new Central Committee. Some 1,510 deputies attend¬ “cultural revolution.” The reasons for this were that at the time
ed the congress, representing more than 35 million Party the Party Centra! Committee, in its basic flunkinghad^not yet
members. Hua Guofeng made the political report on behalf of been able to make a clean sweep of the Left mistakes not on y
the Parly Central Committee. Ye Jianying gave a report on of the “cultural revolution” but also of many years standing
revision of the Party Constitution. Deng Xiaoping delivered the within the Party, and that Hua Guofeng, then chairman of the
closing speech. The congress summed up the struggle against CPC continued to make “Left” mistakes on a series ot major
the Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary clique and announced the
conclusion of the “cultural revolution,” which had lasted ten ^ifwas indeed not easy lo eliminate within a short time the
years. It re-alfirmed the building of China into a powerful political and ideological confusion caused by the cultural revo¬
modernized country within the present century as the funda¬ lution" which had lasted ten years. The confusion was due partfy
mental task in the new period. The congress also revised the to the interference and sabotage by two counter-revolutionary
Party Constitution. The new Party Central Committee elected cliques one headed by Lin Biao, the other by Jiang Qing; it was
Hua Guofeng chairman of the CPC Central Committee, and also the result of some of the decisions and measures adopted by
elected Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian and Wang Mao Zedong under a “Left” guideline, and was connected with
Dongxing its vice-chairmen. the “Left” tendency that had existed within the Party for a long
In February and March 1978, the 1st Session of the 5th time Although Hua Guofeng had performed a meritorious role
National People’s Congress was held. As the previous National in the struggle to smash the Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary
People’s Congress was elected in early 1975 when the “gang of clique and had attempted lo put an end to the confusion caused
four” still posed a serious threat to the country, the election of a by the “cultural revolution,” he failed to have a fundamental
new National People’s Congress ahead of schedule was completely understanding of the problem of the “cultural revolution, par¬
necessary. At the session, Hua Guofeng made a report on the ticularly of the relationship between the “cultural revolution and
work of the government on behalf of the State Council. The Mao Zedong’s mistakes in his late years. Hua Guofeng also lacked
congress elected Ye Jianying chairman of the Standing Commit- “e insight and courage to solve the complicated problem of
 724 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 725

dealing with and eliminating thoroughly the mistakes of the PRC Constitution at the 1st Session of the 5th NPC restored
“cultural revolution,” and at the same time upholding the histor¬ many good points in the contents of the 1954 constitution. Nev¬
ical position of Mao Zedong and the role of Mao Zedong Thought ertheless, it failed to thoroughly correct the mistakes contained in
as the guiding ideology of our Party. He failed to realize that, the 1975 Constitution.
only by honestly pointing out Mao Zedong’s mistakes in his late In economic work, just as stated in previous passages, Chinese
years in launching and persisting in the “cultural revolution” and economy was freed from a state of paralysis or semi-paralysis
correcting them, would it be possible to carry on the fine tradi¬ within the two years following the collapse of the “gang of four.
tions of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese revolu¬ This was an achievement. But it was just at this time an over¬
tion with Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong Thought as their banner. anxious desire for achievements resulted in rash advance and a
He maintained that in order to uphold Mao Zedong’s heritage, it one-sided stress on speed. Starting from the winter of 1976, Hua
was impermissible to negate his important ideas and decisions in Guofeng and the departments concerned in the Party Central
the “cultural revolution.” Proceeding from this wrong position, Committee successively set unrealistically high targets in agricul¬
Hua Guofeng continued to persist in promoting the idea of tural mechanization, the production of grain, petroleum, coal,
“taking class struggle as the key link,” and “continuing the steel and chemicals, and raised lofty slogans which could never
revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat” even afier be realized. In a report written by the State Council in July 19/ /,
the liquidation of the “gang of four.” It was due to his obstruc¬ it was stated that “a situation is emerging which represents a new
tions that progress was slow and further advance was difficult leap forward in the national economy.” At the National People s
with regard to restoring the work of veteran cadres and reversing Congress held in February 1978, Hua Guofeng put forward a
unjust verdicts in history (including that of the 1976 Tiananmen programme of the State Council on the development of the
Incident). These ideas of Hua Guofeng’s found concentrated national economy during the ten years from 1976 to 1985, which
expression in two of his statements: “We should firmly uphold was based on a proposal made by the State Planning Commission
whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made; we should al¬ and other related departments. According to this programme, by
ways follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao issued.”1 In 1985 the production of steel should have reached 60 million tons
fact, this “two-whatevers” approach, which denied the necessity (the actual output turned out to be 31.78 million tons in 1978),
to do any analysis, far from upholding the historical position of that of petroleum should have reached 250 million tons (the
Mao Zedong and the authority of Mao Zedong Thought, could actual output was 104 million tons in 1978), and so forth. The
only serve to destroy them. Hua Guofeng regarded himself as the unrealistic nature of these targets can be illustrated by the exam¬
successor to Mao Zedong. While maintaining the old personality ple of petroleum. The target for petroleum production was set
cult, he cultivated and accepted a new personality cult of himself. without the necessary data obtained from geological surveys. As
The tact that the 11th National Party Congress and the 1st a matter of fact, petroleum production had not reached 14U
Session of the 5th NPC, instead of correcting the erroneous million tons by the end of the 1980s. The extraordinarily high
theories, policies and slogans of the “cultural revolution,” fully targets could not but require correspondingly high capital con¬
confirmed them, of course had something to do with the historical struction investment. According to the programme, capital con¬
limitations of the time, but it was mainly the result of the struction investment during the eight years between 1978 and
influence of Hua Guofeng’s mistakes. 1985 was equivalent to the total capital construction mvestment
The Party Constitution that had been revised by the 11th Party of the previous twenty-eight years. Although the programme had
Congress still contained “Left” mistakes. The work on revising the only been submitted to the National People’s Congress lor deli-
726 A CONCISE HISTORY OF TIIE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 727

beration and had not yet been made public, it already played a to asking a sick person to run swiftly after just beginning to
destructive role in practical work. In 1978, the accumulation fund recover from a prolonged serious illness. The results could only
increased 30.6 percent over the previous year, while the fund for run contrary to one’s wishes. This “rash advance” violated the law
consumption increased only 8.4 percent. The 36.5 percent in¬ of proportionate development of various sectors of the national
crease in the accumulation rate made 1978 the year with the economy by one-sidedly emphasizing the development of iron
highest increase rate in the twenty years since the “great leap and steel, petroleum, chemical and other heavy industries, and by
forward” in 1958. The 31 percent increase in capital construction seeking high speed, huge accumulation and heavy investment.
investment over the previous year also made 1978 the year with This could not improve, but could only aggravate the imbalances
the biggest capital construction investment and the highest in¬ between the different sectors of the national economy.
crease rate in investment in the twenty years since the “great leap Considering the situation as a whole, although the “cultural
forward.” revolution” had been brought to an end, and progress had been
In light of the scientific and technological progress in foreign made in various spheres of work in the two years since the
countries, Hua Guofeng put forward the watchwords “Don’t be counter-revolutionary clique headed by Jiang Qing was toppled,
complacent and conservative” and “Guard against parochial ar¬ the Party’s ideological guideline failed to undergo a fundamental
rogance” (which were actually the words of Mao Zedong). These change. This seriously obstructed the entire work of the Party and
were, of course, correct. However, proceeding from these watch¬ the state. The situation, which was marked by two years of
words, Hua Guofeng attempted to realize his plans for high-speed hesitant progress, was only ended by the 3rd Plenary Session of
development by relying on foreign loans and premature, excessive the 11th Central Committee held in December 1978.
import of foreign equipment and technology. The plans for high¬ The continuation of the “Left” ideological guideline in these
speed development in metallurgical and chemical industrial de¬ two years, for which Hua Guofeng was mainly responsible,
partments were based on large-scale imports, and the funds caused new ideological confusion among people both inside and
needed for such imports were to be raised by means of foreign outside the Party, and was also boycotted in various degrees by
loans. The domestic capacity of supplying the corresponding some Party members as well as ordinary people. On the one hand,
equipment and of digesting the imported technology was not there was a demand among people for making a distinction
taken into account, nor was China’s capacity for repaying its between what is right and what is wrong after a long period of
debts considered. That was why the plan was called a “rash turbulence and for eliminating “Left” mistakes, a demand which
advance planned on the basis of foreign resources.” Although the had not been met; on the other hand, there was a feeling of doubt
implementation of such plans had just started, and some of the and even of total distrust among some people towards Mao
planned projects were completed in later years and produced Zedong Thought, the leadership of the Party and socialism as a
some results, these plans were on the whole inadvisable. Despite result of the “cultural revolution,” which had tarnished the image
some differences in socio-economic conditions, the “rash ad¬ of the Party and socialism. It was obvious that it would be
vance” planned for this period bore some resemblance to the difficult to withstand arid overcome this erroneous tendency
“great leap forward” in the 1950s, with both originating from a without distinguishing between the rights and wrongs and elimi¬
“Left” ideological guideline which ignored objective conditions. nating the “Left” mistakes.
The recent “rash advance” was planned for a period when the Before he resumed work, Deng Xiaoping pointed out in his
economy badly needed recuperation after suffering from the letter of April 10, 1977, to the Party Central Committee that it
highly destructive 10-year-long turbulence. This was tantamount was essential to have a precise and full understanding of the
 CHAPTER nine a new prospect in SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 729
728 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

ments and the armed forces at the central level, and of most
system of Mao Zedong Thought, a viewpoint which was put
provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the
forward in contradistinction to the “two-whatevers” approach. In
administration of the central government, and the big military
May, he clearly stated that the “two-whatevers” approach was
area commands made open speeches or had articles published
erroneous. In his speech at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th
supporting or expressing agreement with the viewpoint contained
Central Committee, he warned against interpreting Mao Zedong
Thought by hanging on his individual phrases or sentences, and in this article.
Veteran revolutionaries including Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jian-
stressed the need to be good at studying and grasping the system
ying, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Hu Yaobang, Nie Rongzhcn, Xu
of Mao Zedong Thought and using it as a guide in our work in
Xiangqian and Luo Ruiqing supported the discussion. On differ¬
all fields. Only in this way, he added, can we avoid taking Mao
ent occasions, they emphasized the principle of seeking truth
Zedong Thought out of context or distorting it.
from facts, and stressed the need to restore the fine traditions of
The dissatisfaction and protest over the continued “Left” ideo¬
the Party, to follow the principle of acting in the light of China’s
logical guideline within the Party, from the top leadership to the
resources in economic construction and to resist and overcome
rank and file, found their concentrated expression in the big
debate on the criterion for judging truth which started in May the “Left” tendency that still existed.
On June 2, 1978, in his speech at a meeting on the political
1978. On May 11, the Guangming Daily published an article
under the by-line of Special Commentator which was entitled work in the PLA, Deng Xiaoping reiterated Mao Zedong’s view¬
“Practice Is the Sole Criterion for Judging Truth.” This article point of seeking truth from facts. He criticized certain comrades
reiterated the basic Marxist principle on the theory of cognition who “speak about Mao Zedong Thought every day, but forget,
that practice is the sole criterion for judging truth. It sharply abandon or even oppose the basic Marxist viewpoint and ap¬
pointed out that the mental shackles imposed on people by the proach of Comrade Mao Zedong on seeking truth from facts,
“gang of four” were far from being completely broken, that proceeding from practice and integrating theory with practice.”
people should dare to go and touch the “forbidden zone” set up He said that “proceeding from their point of view, it is enough to
by the “gang of four” and have the courage to thrash out what is copy, to pass on and to follow the original words of Marx, Lenin
right and what is wrong, that people should not apply set tormu- and Comrade Mao Zedong.” Deng further pointed out that any¬
las to limit, misuse or delete revolutionary practice which is one who opposed seeking truth from tacts could not claim to be
boundlessly rich and forging ahead with flying speed, and that following Marxism-Leninism or Mao Zedong Thought, but could
people should be brave enough to look into new problems posed only lead us to idealism and metaphysics and cause damage to
by most recent practice. This article attracted great public atten¬ our work and failure of the revolution. Basing himself on this
tion for its refutation of the erroneous “two-whatevers” approach belief, he maintained that “it is essential to make a clean sweep
from the viewpoint of basic theory, and gradually led to a of the poisonous influence of Lin Biao and the ‘gang of four,’ set
discussion. things right, shatter mental shackles and achieve the great eman¬
At this moment, Hua Guofeng instructed the propaganda cipation of our minds.”2
departments under the Party Central Committee to refrain from With the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and other veteran
making any comments and avoid getting involved. Wang Dong- revolutionaries, and with the support of the masses of people both
xing criticized this article on a number of occasions. But the inside and outside the Party, the Party was finally able, by the
discussion could no longer be cooled down by their will. Com¬ end of 1987, to start solving the problems which had not been
mencing in June, leaders of the Party and government depart¬ solved in the two years of hesitant progress.
 CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 731
730 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CFC

ideas that had been put forward in previous years adopted and
II. A GREAT TURNING POINT - THE 3RD developed on a new basis, thereby eliminating the “Lett ideolog¬
PLENARY SESSION OF THE 11TH ical guideline and all its manifestations as they had proved
CENTRAL COMMITTEE through practice extremely harmful to the cause of the Party and
of the people. These objectives, which the two years of meander¬
ing progress failed to achieve, were attained by the 3rd Plenary
The 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the
Session of the 11th Central Committee. This is why the 3rd
CPC held in December 1978 was an event of far-reaching signif¬
Plenary Session was recorded as a great turning point in Party
icance and marked a great turning point in the history oi the
Party since the founding of the People’s Republic ol China. history. . ,
At a Central Committee work meeting held betore the 3rd
The session put an end to the two years’ meandering in efforts
Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, Chen Yun and
to set things right following the downfall of the “gang of four.”
many other veteran revolutionaries raised some important issues
But as a great turning point, its significance went far beyond this.
that were of common concern to people both inside and outside
In the long years of revolution and construction, the Party
the Party. They maintained that the mistakes of the “cultural
Central Committee and Mao Zedong always upheld the Marxist
revolution” should be thoroughly corrected and unjust verdicts of
principle of seeking truth from facts, stressed the importance ot
the past years, such as in the case of Peng Dehuai, be rescinded.
proceeding from reality in all matters as well as of integrating
At the closing session of the Central Committee work meeting,
theory with practice, and after the socialist transformation was
Deng Xiaoping made an important speech entitled “Emancipate
completed, made great efforts towards the industrialization of
the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts, Unite as One and Adopt a
China which resulted in great achievements. But starting from the
Forward-Looking Approach.” This in fact provided the basic
“great leap forward” in 1958, a “Left” ideological guideline
guideline for the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Com¬
repeatedly emerged within the Party in the course of the its etlort
mittee, which was held between December 18 and 22 immediately
to break down fetishes and superstitions and explore China’s own
following the work meeting. According to Hua Guofeng’s original
road to socialism. This seriously impaired the Party’s correct
plan for the session, the main topic of discussion at the session
ideological guideline as well as its correct line of action, eventual¬
was to have been focused on economic questions. The speeches
ly leading to the 10-year-long turbulence of the “cultural revolu¬
and statements made by Deng Xiaoping and many other veteran
tion.” In the zigzag course of advance during the years from 1957
revolutionaries at the work meeting enlarged the sphere of discus¬
to 1966, the Party Central Committee and Party organizations at
sion and changed the session into an important meeting aimed at
various’levels, Mao Zedong and many other leaders of the Party
setting things right and creating a new situation in all aspects of
Central Committee, and leading officials at various levels as well
as ordinary Party members, put forward many good ideas, pro¬ work. .
In his speech, Deng Xiaoping emphatically pointed out that in
posals and schemes which accorded with China’s real conditions,
realizing the four modernizations, just as in making revolution in
and therefore were beneficial to the development of socialism.
the earlier years, the principle of seeking truth from facts must
Some of these produced initial results when implemented, while
be followed; this was the foundation of the proletarian world
others were put into practice only on a limited scale. But practi¬
outlook and of Marxist ideology. At present, he argued, the
cally all of them were engulfed and jettisoned in the turbulence
restoration of the tradition of seeking truth from facts required
of those ten years. After the “cultural revolution,” the fine
emancipation of the mind and overcoming the ossified thinking
traditions of the Party should have been restored, all the good
732 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 733

that existed in the Party for various reasons. He sharply pointed ued to confirm, ran counter to the cause of socialist construction
out that without emancipation of the mind, thinking was bound and modernization. Only on the basis of emancipating the mind and
to become ossified. The result would be “strange phenomena”: overcoming “Left” ossified thinking, could the great historic task
people would be wrapped up in the trammels of conventional of shifting the emphasis of the work of the entire Party to construc¬
ideas, bend in whatever direction the wind blew, and practise tion for modernization be accomplished.
book worship which was divorced from reality. He said that The communique of the plenary session pointed out: “The
“there would be no hope for China’s four modernizations if realization of the four modernizations requires an increase by a
ossified thinking was not done away with, or bold steps were not large margin in the forces of production; it also calls for changes
taken to emancipate the minds of cadres and of the people.”3 The in the relations of production and the superstructure, methods of
3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee expressed management, form of activity and ways of thinking which do not
agreement with the contents of Deng Xiaoping’s speech by stating accord with the development of the forces of production; there¬
in its communique: “The plenary session highly appraised the fore, it represents an extensive and deep-going revolution.” This
discussion on practice being the sole criterion for judging truth means that the relations of production and the superstructure,
and considered that it had a profound historical significance for methods of management, and forms of activity and ways of
the entire Party and people in promoting emancipation of the thinking are subject to change, but changes must meet the need
mind and in correcting the ideological guideline. No Party, state for development of the forces of production and be conducive to
or nation will be able to make progress, or grow in vitality, but their increase. This was a basic break with the harmful standpoint
will instead court its own destruction, if it proceeds from book of trying to change, according to one’s own will, the relations of
worship in everything and if its thinking is ossified.” By breaking production and the superstructure in disregard of the level of
the shackles of the “two-whatevers” approach in people’s minds, development of the forces of production—actually nothing but a
this statement laid the ideological foundation for overcoming the “Left” idea of making revolution for the sake of revolution.
“Leftist” ideological guideline that had prevailed for many years, In his speech, Deng Xiaoping said: “Democracy is an impor¬
restoring the Party’s fine traditions, and seeking China’s own road tant condition for the emancipation of the mind.” “In a fairly
to socialism along a correct direction. long period in the past, democratic centralism was not really
The plenary session earnestly discussed the question of shifting practised, centralism was talked about in isolation from democ¬
the emphasis of the Party’s work. It maintained that the nationwide racy, and there was too little democracy.... Without changing this
campaign to expose and criticize Lin Biao and the “gang of four” situation, how can you expect people to emancipate their minds
had achieved tremendous successes, and that the emphasis of the and activate their brains? How can the four modernizations be
Party’s work and the focus of attention of the entire people should realized?” Therefore, for the good of socialist construction and
be resolutely and opportunely shifted to socialist construction and modernization, it was necessary to strengthen democracy and
modernization. This was an extremely important decision. The practise democratic centralism in a correct way. While stressing
11th National Party Congress held in 1977 had played a positive democracy, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that there were still a
role in mobilizing the entire Party to build China into a powerful, small number of counter-revolutionaries in China and that we
socialist, modernized country. But the Party was then also faced should, of course, not lessen our vigilance against them. The
with the task of exposing and criticizing Lin Biao and the “gang of communique of the plenary session elaborated in detail on the
four.” Moreover, the erroneous theories, policies and slogans of the issues of democracy and dictatorship, democracy and centralism,
“cultural revolution,” which the 11th Party Congress had contin¬ and democracy and the legal system. The plenary session held
 CHAPTER nine a new prospect in socialist construction 735
734 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
economic problems, the plenary session expressed complete agree¬
that in view of the existence of an extremely small number of ment with Deng Xiaoping’s opinions. While confirming the P™-
counter-revolutionaries and other criminals, the dictatorship ol ciple of decentralizing power, it pointed out that bold steps should
the proletariat must definitely not be weakened. In dealing with be taken to streamline the economic administrative organs at
the class struggle in a socialist society, a strict distinction must be various levels, that people should resolutely act according to the
made between the two types of contradictions which are different laws governing economic affairs, that they should pay great
in nature and must be handled correctly. Only in this way can we attention to the role of the law of value, that earnest effort should
ensure stability and unity which are essential to socialist construc¬ be made to solve the problems in differentiating the tunctions
tion and modernization. In the ideological and political life between the Party, government organizations and enterprises,
witnin the ranks of the people, only democratic methods can be such as the problem of Party organizations superseding the power
adopted, whereas methods of repression and attack should not be of the government, the problem of government organizations
used. Socialist construction and modernization require central¬ superseding the power of the enterprises, and so on.
ized, unified leadership and the strict implementation of various The plenary session attached great importance to agriculture,
rules and regulations and labour discipline, but full democracy is the base of national economy. In order to call into play the
also needed for the correct implementation of centralism. In this socialist initiative of the millions upon millions of peasants, the
historical period, stress on democracy and a relationship of di¬ session worked out a series of policies and economic measures,
alectical unity between democracy and centralism is particular¬ including raising the prices for the planned purchase of grain by
ly needed. To guarantee people’s democracy, it is necessary to the state while lowering the prices for marketing industrial goods
strengthen the socialist legal system and institutionalize and
used in agriculture. The plenary session adopted the Decision on
legalize the democratic system so as to ensure the stability, Certain Questions in Speeding Up the Development of Agricul¬
continuity and maximum authority of this system as well as of ture (draft), and started eliminating the “Left” mistakes m agri¬
the laws. All this will help to create a situation where people can cultural work. It clearly stated the need “to strengthen labour
resort to law and must abide by the law, where law is strictly organizations and establish a strict production responsibility sys¬
implemented and violations of law are invariably dealt with,
tem ” The session also endorsed the system of contracting a job
where all the people are ensured of being equal before their own
with the production team as the basic accounting unit and ot
laws, and where no one is allowed any special privilege of being
linking remuneration with output.
above the law. In his speech, Deng Xiaoping put forward a major policy by
Apart from political democracy, Deng Xiaoping delivered a saving- “I am of the opinion that it should be allowed for some
special discourse on economic democracy. He said that in our
of the localities, enterprises, workers and peasants to have a
economic structure, power was too much centralized, and that
bigger income or larger revenues and a higher standard of living
bold measures should be taken, step by step, to decentralize the
as a result of their hard work and greater achievements. The tact
power so that the initiative of the four sides—the state, the that they enjoy a good life before others will definitely serve as a
locality, the enterprise and the labourer as an individual — could
nowerful example for their neighbours, enabling other localities,
be called into full play. What was most pressing at the time, he work-units and individuals to learn from them. In this way, the
added, was to give more power to the factories and mines as well whole national economy will continually be pushed forward in a
as the production teams in the rural areas; this would enable wave-like manner, with the result that the people of all national¬
every factory and production team to display, in one thousand
ities in the country will become well off fairly rapidly. Deng said
and one ways, a spirit of initiative and creativity. In discussing
736 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHARTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 737

this was “a policy which can influence and propel the whole violates the Party’s discipline should be subject to punishment,
national economy forward.”4 Subsequent events proved the great that Party organizations should be strict and fair in appraising
positive role of this policy, since it was in keeping with the merits and demerits and in meting out awards and punishments,
requirements of objective laws. and that they should promote healthy tendencies while combat¬
In a word, while persisting in socialism as the pre-condition, ting unhealthy ones. The decisions made in these respects were
the plenary session already took the first decisive step toward a highly significant in redressing the damage inflicted on Party-
much-needed reform in economic system and a corresponding organizations by the “cultural revolution” and the abnormalities
reform in political system. that still existed during the two years of meandering progress. In
In view of the actual situation in the economic sphere, the session order to uphold the Party’s rules and regulations, and cultivate a
called for an effort within a few years to gradually readjust the good style of work for the Party, the plenary session established
serious imbalances that existed in the economy, eliminate the con¬ through election the Central Commission for Discipline Inspec¬
fusion in production, construction, circulation and distribution, tion with Chen Yun as the first secretary.
and solve the problems in the lives of the people which had accu¬ The plenary session held a serious discussion on some major
mulated over the years. In opposition to the proposed “rash ad¬ political events that had taken place during the “cultural revolu¬
vance” based on foreign resources, the plenary session stressed the tion” and some other questions left over by history before the
need for an over-all balance and a step-by-step advance in capital “cultural revolution.” It decided to annul the erroneous docu¬
construction in the light of the country’s own resources. ments issued in 1976 concerning the campaign to “counter the
The session also put forward the principle of opening China to Rightist wind to reverse verdicts” and concerning disposition of
the outside world and the principle of attaching great importance the Tiananmen Incident. It examined and corrected the wrong
to science and education. In its communique, it was said, “On the judgments on Peng Dehuai, Tao Zhu, Bo Yibo, Yang Shangkun
basis of self-reliance, we should actively develop economic coop¬ and other comrades, and proposed that in solving problems left
eration characterized by equality and mutual benefit with other over by history, the principle of seeking truth Irom facts and
countries of the world, try our best to adopt the world’s advanced correcting whatever mistakes are found must be followed.
technology and equipment, and exert every effort to strengthen Some people were perplexed by the possibility that correcting
the work on science and education which are essential to the the “Left” mistakes of the “cultural revolution” and earlier peri¬
realization of the four modernizations. ods might lead to the negation of Mao Zedong and of Mao
In light of the experience and lessons in Party history, the Zedong Thought. The plenary session, while persisting in solving
plenary session decided to strengthen the system of democratic the problems left over by history according to the principle oi
centralism, to round out the Party’s rules and regulations and to seeking truth from facts, fully affirmed the great merits and
strictly implement discipline. It stressed the importance of collec¬ achievements of Mao Zedong in the light of historical reality. It
tive leadership in the Party Central Committee and the Party further pointed out that to require a revolutionary leader to be
committees at various levels; it required that the press and the free of shortcomings and mistakes was not Marxist, and did not
literary and art works of the whole country should sing more accord with the appraisal Mao Zedong made ol himself over the
praises of the masses of workers, peasants, soldiers, the Party and years. As to the overall work of summing up the “cultural
veteran revolutionaries, and give less publicity to individuals. revolution,” the session left it for later consideration at an appro¬
The plenary session laid it down that leading cadres at all levels priate date (it was taken up at the 6th Plenary Session of lltn
should be the first to observe Party discipline, that whoever Party Central Committee two and a half years later). The session
 CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION
738 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

social relations which had been seriously upset during the “cul¬
solemnly declared: “The lofty task facing the Party Central
tural revolution,” undertook the arduous task of construction and
Committee on the theoretical front is to give guidance and
reform, and succeeded in creating an excellent political and
education to the entire Party membership and the entire people
in recognizing the great merits and achievements of Comrade economic situation.

Mao Zedong from a historical and scientific perspective, to have

an overall and precise understanding of the scientific system of Correcting the Ideological Guideline
Mao Zedong Thought, and to integrate the universal theories of
Emphasis in the overall work was to be shifted to socialist
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought with the concrete
construction and modernization. A smooth transition required an
practice of socialist construction and modernization and develop
earnest effort by the Party to sort out the “Left mistaken ideas
them under new historical conditions.”
on the relationship between economic construction and^ class
The plenary session elected Chen Yun additional member of the
struggle After resolutely abandoning use of the slogan grasp
Central Committee Politburo and of the Standing Committee of the
class struggle as the key link,” the Party Central Committee made
Politburo, and vice-chairman of the Central Committee; Deng
a new correct exposition of the main contradiction m socialist
Yingchao, Hu Yaobang and Wang Zhen additional members of the
society. In March 1979, Deng Xiaoping pointed out: Our forces
Politburo; and Huang Kecheng, Song Renqiong, Hu Qiaomu, Xi
of production still remain at a very low level of development and
Zhongxun and Wang Renzhong additional members of the Central
lag far behind the needs of our people and our country. This is
Committee. Although Hua Guofeng remained as chairman of the
our main contradiction in the present period. To solve this main
Party Central Committee after the plenary session (Hu Yaobang
contradiction is our central task.” This does not mean, of course,
was soon appointed secretary-general in charge of the everyday
that there will be no class struggle m the future. He expl^fd’
work of the Central Committee), Deng Xiaoping had become the
“Class struggle in socialist society is an objective fact, which
leading core of the Party Central Committee in terms of the ideo¬
should neither be understated, nor overstated.” Understatement
logical guideline and practical work of the Party.
or overstatement will lead to serious mistakes. On the basis of
this understanding, the Party went a step ^
theory of “continuing the revolution under the dictatorship oft
III. SETTING THINGS RIGHT proletariat,” which served as the fundamental ideol^ical guide¬
AND STARTING CHINA’S REFORM line for the “cultural revolution. It was pointed out that thi
theory, according to the interpretation at the time, had been
AND OPENING TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD
aimed at “seizing power from capitalist-roaders, pushing the
Party committee aside to make “revolution” and “Down with
The guiding principles of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th
everything!” Practice proved this theory to be erroneous. From
Central Committee won the resolute support of the entire Party
then on, slogans with unclear implications such as these which
membership and the people of various nationalities throughout
might again become factors of instability, should therefore no
China. Having gained the initiative in setting things to rights after
the session, the Party in the period from 1979 to 1982, step by
l0Ihi the course of setting things to rights, the masses of cadres
step, solved many problems left over by history since the found¬
and people were freed from the mental shackles of the Personality
ing of the PRC and dealt with many new problems which had
cult and dogmatism that had prevailed for a period of time. Th
emerged in everyday life. It made readjustments in the various
 CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 741
740 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
nle’s democratic dictatorship, the leadership of the Communist
was much liveliness in the intellectual life of people both inside Party and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought are the
and outside the Party, stimulating them to work hard in studying fundmental pre-conditions for realization of the four moderniza¬
new situations and solving new problems. This represented the tions.” “Wavering in any of these four cardinal principles,
mainstream at the time. In the meantime, certain phenomena also added, “will endanger the cause of socialism as a whole, as ell
appeared which required attention and vigilance. On the one as the entire cause of construction and modernization While
hand, some comrades showed a lack of understanding of the criticizing the “Left” tendency of doubting the line of the 3rd
Party’s line and policies adopted since the 3rd Plenary Session, Plenary Session, Deng Xiaoping put the emphasis on sharpy
and even harboured a feeling of resentment towards them. This exposing the capitalist essence of the so-called social reform
indicated that they had not yet shaken off the yoke of “Left" advocated by certain people. He clearly pointed out that Ch
ideology. On the other hand, there was a handful of people who, should introduce the advanced technology and other useful things
taking advantage of the Party’s effort to set things to rights, of the capitalist countries selectively and in a planned way, bu
waved the banner of “social reform” and distorted the meaning would never emulate or bring in the capitalist system with all its
of the slogan of “emancipating the mind.” They used the tactic of ugliness and decadence. He also gave a scientific definition of the
“attacking a person for a single fault without considering his phrase "the emancipation of the mind,” stating that cmanupat
other aspects,” and of exaggerating the Party’s mistakes to the ing the mind means the application of the fundamental principles
utmost extent. In this way they tried to negate the leadership of of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought to the study of new
the Party and the road to socialism pointed out by the Party. situations and the solution of new problems” with the aim of
Some of them, by raising demagogic slogans such as “Oppose promoting the cause of socialism in China. We should never a low
hunger” and “Struggle for human rights,” instigated people to some people to use it to attack Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong
hold demonstrations, break into Party and government organiza¬ Thought, he warned. His speech demonstrates that from the very
tions by force, or even organize illegal organizations and publish beginning, the reform and open policy carried out by the Com-
clandestine journals, establish ties between the different localities munist Party of China had a clear socialist orientation.
of the country, and work in collaboration with the hostile political The Party Central Committee was of the opinion that m order to
forces in Taiwan and certain foreign countries. Inside the Com¬ completely overcome the “Left” and Right deviations and help the
munist Party, there was an extremely small number of people entire Party membership and the people of the whole country o
who wavered ideologically when the Party exposed and corrected identify themselves with the line of the 3rd Plenary Session, it was
its own mistakes. Instead of recognizing the danger of this trend necessary to have a correct understanding of the historical path the
of bourgeois liberalization, which manifested itself in opposing Party had travelled since the founding of the PRC and to sum up
the leadership of the Communist Party and the socialist system, in a scientific manner the historical experience gained by the Party
they supported it directly or indirectly to a certain extent. This during this period. This was because it was necessary not mily to
state of affairs, if allowed to go unchecked, was bound to disrupt bring order out of the chaos created by Lm Biao and1 the gang ol
the situation of stability and unity, leading to grave consequences. four ” but also to correct the mistakes made by Mao Zedong in his
In view of all this, Deng Xiaoping, as entrusted by the Party later years. Such correction was essential as it was indispensable to
Central Committee, issued a declaration at the Forum on the the complete shattering of the “Left” mental shackles and t e
Party’s Theoretical Work held in March 1979. Adopting a clear- further advance of the cause of the Party. But in order to do so, it
cut stand, he stated that the four cardinal principles of upholding was necessary to deal with the problem of how to appraise the cartel
the road of socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat or peo-
742 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 743

and thinking of Mao Zedong. However, the career and thinking of occurred in its analysis of situations and its understanding of the
Mao Zedong “are not the career and thinking of himself alone, they country’s conditions, with the result that the Party committed
are at the same time the career and thinking of his comrades-in- mistakes of enlarging the scope of class struggle and making
arms, the Party and the people; they are the crystallization of the impetuous and rash advances in economic construction, includmg
experience of the Chinese people in their revolutionary struggle in such serious mistakes as the “cultural revolution” which affected
more than half a century.”8 If the Party had not been able to handle all spheres of work and lasted for a long time. However, the
this problem properly, there would have been serious confusion achievements gained in the last thirty-two years are primary. It
within the Party and among the people, and the Party would have would be wrong to ignore or cover up the mistakes, or to ignore
lost its bearings. or negate the achievements and the successful experience behind
The 4lh Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee con¬ them.
vened in September 1979, discussed and endorsed Ye Jianying’s The resolution appraised the historical position of Mao Zedong
speech which was to be made at the rally in celebration of the 30th in a matter-of-fact way, and fully expounded the great significance
anniversary of the PRC. This speech gave an initial summing-up of of Mao Zedong Thought as the guiding thought for the Party. It
the history of the Party since the founding of the PRC. In November pointed out that Mao Zedong was a great Marxist, proletarian
of the same year, the Party Central Committee started work on revolutionary, strategist and theoretician. Considering his lilc as
drafting the Resolution on Certain Historical Questions of the a whole, his contributions towards the Chinese revolution far
Party Since the Founding of the PRC, with Deng Xiaoping in outweighed his mistakes. His contributions were primary while his
charge. He pointed out the general ideological guideline for the mistakes were secondary. Mao Zedong Thought is the application
resolution consists of three points: 1. Establish the historical posi¬ and development of Marxism-Leninism in China. It represents the
tion of Mao Zedong, persist in and develop Mao Zedong Thought. correct theoretical principles and the summing-up of experience
This is the most crucial point; 2. It is necessary to make an honest concerning the Chinese revolution and its correctness has been
analysis of the major events in the thirty years since the founding borne out by practice; it is the crystallization of the collective
of the PRC and see which are correct and which are wrong. This wisdom of the Communist Party of China. The resolution made a
should include a fair appraisal of the merits and demerits, rights scientific summary of Mao Zedong Thought in all its aspects as well
and wrongs of some leading comrades; 3. Make a basic summing-up as of the stand, viewpoint and method that run through all
of the past events.9 After the draft for discussion was completed, it its component parts. The resolution stressed that Mao Zedong
was submitted to 4,000 Party comrades for their deliberation and Thought is an invaluable intellectual treasure ol the Party which
then revised in the light of opinions from various quarters. In June shall serve as a guide for our action for a long time, that we must
1981, the 6th Plenary Session of the Party’s 11th Central Committee continue to uphold it and enrich and develop it with new principles
adopted the resolution. and conclusions that accord with reality.
As the resolution pointed out, the history of the Party since the This resolution made a scientific analysis and criticism of the
founding of the PRC, taken as a whole, was one in which the “Left” mistakes that had existed for many years and ot Mao Ze¬
Party led the people of various nationalities of the country in dong’s mistakes in his later years, while on the other hand, resolute¬
carrying out socialist revolution and socialist construction and ly upheld the Party’s fine traditions that had formed through long
gaining great achievements under the guidance of Marxism- struggles, as well as the scientific system of Mao Zedong Thought
Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. Owing to the Party leader¬ and the historical position of Mao Zedong. Thus it drew a clear
ship’s lack of experience, deviations of a subjectivist nature distinction between right and wrong, corrected the “Left” and Right
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONS 1RIJCT ION 745
744

erroneous points of view existing at the time, and achieved ideolog¬ ence in the Red Army, the Party and the Youth League and that
ical unity in the Party and among the people of the whole country. he had made outstanding achievements in the work of bringing
The resolution provided the fundamental guarantee for maintain¬ order out of chaos and reversing unjust verdicts after the “cultur¬
ing unity in the Party and among the entire people as well as for the al revolution,” he was elected chairman (general secretary) of the
smooth development of socialist construction. The fact that this Party Central Committee.
resolution could be drawn up not long after the ending of the
“cultural revolution,” providing correct conclusions on extremely Readjusting Social Relations
important and complicated historical questions, fully demonstrates
the foresight, the sagacity and the high level of political maturity One of the important measures for readjusting social relations
of the collective leadership of the Party Central Committee with was to reverse large numbers ol unjust verdicts made during the
Deng Xiaoping at the core. “cultural revolution” and handle step by step the many problems
The adoption of the resolution marked the victorious conclu¬ left over by history since the founding of the PRC.
sion of the Party’s task of correcting the ideological guideline. Although after the downfall of the “gang of four,” the work on
In the course of discussing the draft resolution, many comrades reversing unjust verdicts was partially carried out, progress was
criticized the mistakes made by Hua Guofeng in his work since quite slow. After 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Com¬
the smashing of the “gang of four,” and asked for a change in his mittee, Party, government and other organizations at the central
post. At the Politburo meeting held in November and December and local levels all quickened their pace in reversing unjust
1980, it was pointed out that Hua Guofeng had done some useful verdicts according to the principle of seeking truth from facts and
work in the previous four years, but his mistaken ideas on some correcting whatever mistakes were found. Cadres in these Party,
questions of principle had not fundamentally changed, and ob¬ government and army organizations who had been persecuted
viously he lacked the political and organizational ability required were rehabilitated, and democratic personages and intellectuals
as chairman of the Party Central Committee. At the suggestion who had been attacked, framed or persecuted in other ways had
of the Politburo, the 6th Plenary Session of the Party’s 11th their names cleared. In February 1980, the 5th Plenary Session
Central Committee held in June 1981, simultaneously with the of the 11th Central Committee decided to annul the various false
adoption of the resolution, decided to endorse Hua Guofeng’s charges against Liu Shaoqi and the wrong resolution concerning
request to resign from his posts as chairman of the Party Central him, and restored his reputation as one of the great Marxists,
Committee and of its Military Commission (prior to this, at the proletarian revolutionaries, and principal leaders of the Party and
suggestion of the CPC Central Committee, the 3rd Session of the state, thus reversing the biggest unjust verdict made since the
5th National People’s Congress held in August and September founding of the People’s Republic.
1980 had decided that he no longer hold the premiership of the The Party also re-examined some of the major cases which had
State Council, a post which was taken over by Zhao Ziyang). occurred in the periods before the “cultural revolution.” The work
The session elected Hu Yaobang chairman of the Party Central mainly consisted of reversing the wrong verdict made in 1955 on
Committee,10'Deng Xiaoping chairman of the Military Commis¬ the “Hu Feng counter-revolutionary clique,” correcting in April
sion of the Central Committee, and Hua Guofeng vice-chairman 1978 the wrong verdicts passed on those who had been unjustifiably
of the Central Committee. In view of the need for younger labelled as “Rightists” in 1957, and reversing the unjust verdicts
comrades to assume leadership in the Party Central Committee, passed on those who had been labelled as “Right opportunists” in
and of the fact that Hu Yaobang had many years’ work experi¬ the campaign to “combat Right opportunism” in 1959.
746 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 747

By the end of 1982, the extensive work on reversing unjust ing small traders, peddlers, small handicraftsmen and other la¬
verdicts had been basically completed, and unjust verdicts involv¬ bouring people from former industrialists and businessmen. By
ing more than three million cadres had been reversed. With a light 1981, out of the original 860,000 industrialists and businessmen,
heart, they went back to work or were appointed to new jobs. Tens some 700,000 had their class status re-defined as labourers. Not
of millions of people who were their family members, relatives or long after, it was clearly stated that former industrialists and
close colleagues and who had been treated unfairly because of such businessmen had become labourers in the socialist society and
relationships no longer suffered from discrimination. With their their class status changed to that of cadres or workers.
minds relieved, they plunged heart and soul into the cause of 4. An earnest effort was made to implement the Party’s policy
socialist construction and modernization. The names of the com¬ towards intellectuals and attention was paid to improving their
rades who had been persecuted to death also had their names working and living conditions. The state began to set up a system ol
cleared. In the course of carrying out this work, the Party’s fine academic degrees and restored the standards for evaluating aca¬
tradition of seeking truth from facts was restored and developed. demic and professional titles. Work was accelerated on the training
WThile calling the initiative of the cadres into play through and promotion of professionals and a number of unemployed scien¬
reversing unjust verdicts, the Party adopted measures to readjust tific and technical personnel were given appropriate jobs.
all types of social relations with the aim of mobilizing all possible 5. Support was given to the democratic parties to resume their
positive factors and trying all possible means to turn negative activities, develop their party organizations, and play an active
factors into positive ones: role in political life, economic construction and in the fields of
1. Beginning in January 1979, landlords and rich peasants were culture, education, science and technology. In August 1980, Deng
allowed to discard their class labels and were treated as rural Xiaoping pointed out: “We must further strengthen on a broad
commune members, while the class status of their children was scale the unity among all socialist labourers, patriots who support
uniformly defined as that of commune member. During the land socialism and patriots who uphold the unity ot our motherland.
reform, to classify the landlords and rich peasants as such was Our united front became further expanded and consolidated.
necessary; because the situation changed, it was also necessary to 6. In 1980 and 1981, the Secretariat of the Party Central
change their class status. Committee held several meetings to discuss questions concerning
2. Commencing in January 1979, the Party’s policies were Tibet, Yunnan, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia and to make an
implemented with regard to former Kuomintang personnel who earnest effort to implement the Party’s policies on minority
had taken part in a rebellion against the Kuomintang authorities nationalities. The central and local authorities took the tags off
or who had come over to our side. Soon after, release from comrades who had been labelled as “local nationalist elements.”
custody was granted to those still being held among the former 7. In March 1982, the Secretariat of the Party Central Com¬
Kuomintang officials and officers who had worked in the Kuo¬ mittee issued a document on religious questions during the period
mintang Party, government, army or secret service and who were of socialism which elaborated on the Party’s relevant basic view¬
of a rank no higher than a county magistrate or a regimental points and policies. Around this time, patriotic religious organi¬
commander. Besides, the Party’s policies were also implemented zations resumed their activities; monasteries, temples and shrines
towards Taiwan compatriots residing on the mainland and the were re-opened after being repaired or reconstructed and the
family members and relatives of people who had left the main¬ Party’s religious policies were implemented.
land for Taiwan. 8. The Party reaffirmed its policies towards overseas Chinese,
3. Beginning in November 1979, work started on differentiat¬ protecting and praising their enthusiasm in loving their country
 CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 749
748 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee held in February

and homeland, and encouraged them to make contributions in
1980 adopted “Guiding Principles for Inner-Party Political Lite.
support of national construction.
It laid down basic regulations on 12 questions related to persisting
The readjustments made in the Party’s policies and their
in the Party line, upholding collective leadership, and maintain¬
implementation, both of which are described above, were a cor¬
ing centralism and unity of the Party. At a forum convened in
rect handling of a series of contradictions among the people; they
November of the same year by the Central Commission tor
played an important role in effectively calling into play the
Disciplinary Inspection, Chen Yun sharply pointed out: The
initiative of people of various social strata, promoting social
style of a political party in power determines its very survival.
stability and unity, consolidating and expanding the patriotic
He called for a better understanding of the question by Party
united front, and propelling the cause of construction and mod¬
organizations at all levels and greater effort made by them in
ernization forward.
Party-building.
The Party Central Committee seriously summed up and
Strengthening Party-Building learned from the experiences and lessons in the political life of
the Party and the state and began to raise the question of rcfoim
During the ten years of turbulence, the Party’s fine traditions
of the leadership system of the Party and state. The enlarged
and good style of work were seriously damaged. Party discipline
meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee held in
slackened, ideas of individualism and anarchism were rampant,
August 1980 discussed and approved Deng Xiaoping’s important
and corrupt practices also spread among some cadres. A lot of
speech entitled “Reforming the Leadership System ot the Party
effective work had to be done in Party building so that the Party
and the State.” Deng Xiaoping pointed out: “It is true that our
could play its role even better as the core of leadership in socialist
various mistakes in the past had something to do with the think¬
construction and modernization.
ing and style of work of certain leaders, but more important were
in order to implement the decision of 3rd Plenary Session of
the problems of organizational set-up and work systems. He
11th Central Committee on perfecting Party rules and regula¬
maintained that the socialist system had great superiority, but
tions, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection held its
“many malpractices exist in the current specific institutions ot
first plenary session in January 1979. The session studied and
our Party and state which hinder or even seriously ^impede the
formulated practical measures to strengthen disciplinary educa¬
display of the superiority of the socialist system. The major
tion and the work on maintaining a good style of work, and
malpractices are bureaucracy, over-concentration of power, pa¬
started solving some outstanding problems in Party building.
triarchal behaviour, and leading cadres enjoying life-long tenure
Party commissions for disciplinary inspection at various levels
and privileges of all kinds.” The crucial problem was the over¬
seriously dealt with infractions of discipline by Party members.
concentration of power. Most of these malpractices were caused
In November 1979, the CPC Central Committee and the State
by an unscientific approach to the solution of certain problems
Council jointly issued a document entitled “Regulations Concern¬
due to lack of experience. But they were “more or less tainted
ing Living Conditions and Benefits for High-Ranking Cadre,”
with feudalism.” Therefore, while opposing the influence of bour¬
reaffirming some of the regulations laid down in the periods
geois ideology, there was the problem of eliminating the influence
before the “cultural revolution” which had proved effective. In
of feudal ideas. But we should oppose feudal ideas with socialist
issuing these regulations, the Party Central Committee and the
ideology, and should never allow opposition to socialism under
State Council stressed that the high-ranking cadres should take
the guise of opposing feudalism. The idea that one is entitled to
the lead in displaying the fine traditions of the Party. The 5th
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter nine a new prospect in socialist construction 751
750

propagating capitalist ideology in order to eliminate the remnant relatively long period of stability to the Sino-Vietnamese borders.
influence of feudalism is totally wrong.12 This speech provided With a consolidated defense as a pre-condition, the proportion ot
the basic guiding thought for reform of the system of leadership military expenditures in the national budget has been reduced
of the Party and the state. year by year since 1979 in order to divert more funds to construc¬
The Party took the first steps in the reform of the cadre system tion. (Military expenditures accounted for l7-5 Percenl °[ thc
in order to meet the need of modernization. The Party Central national budget in 1979, and only 8 percent m 1988 ) 19^’
Committee stressed that the selection and promotion of cadres, China decided to cut down the armed forces by a million, and
especially from among the middle-aged and young people, must be smoothly completed a reduction the scale of which has rarely
carried out according to principles of moral integrity and profes¬ been seen anywhere. The implementation of this major policy
sional expertise. Moral integrity is primarily represented by up¬ decision was highly significant for the maintenance of world
holding the road of socialism and the leadership of the Party as well peace, promoting China’s four modernizations and the building
as the revolutionization of the cadres as individuals. With this as of its modernized armed forces.
the prerequisite, the contingent of cadres should be made up of
younger, more educated and more professional persons. In Fe¬ Readjustment of National Economy and Rural Reform
bruary 1982, the Parly Central Committee adopted the “Decision
on Institututing the Retirement System for Veteran Cadres,” After the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee,
whereby the de facto life tenure of leading cadres was abolished. In the Party shifted the focus of its work to socialist modernization.
response to the call of the Central Committee, many veterans will¬ This brought an end to the economic stagnation and retrogres¬
ingly retired, left their posts or “withdrew to the second front,” as sion with a change for the better, but the serious imbalances
as the saying goes. A large number of middle-aged and young tested among the major relationships within the national economy per¬
cadres assumed leadership in succession. The step-by-step replace¬ sisted. Chen Yun and Li Xiannian wrote to the Central Commit¬
ment of the veterans by new cadres was a strategic move adopted tee proposing that “there should be a period of two or three years
by the Party to ensure the steady advance of the socialist cause and for readjusting the economy so that the various imbalances can
the continuity of the Party’s line and policies. be basically eliminated.”13 Only by solving this problem, Li Xian¬
Under the leadership of the Central Committee’s Military nian added, could better conditions be created for f uture growth
Commission headed by Deng Xiaoping, the quality of the Peo¬ of the national economy, and a good start be made for the work
ple’s Liberation Army has been raised both in its military and of the entire Party and the country as a whole after the shift of
political aspects; this has been achieved through an effort to make emphasis is completed.'* The Central Committee s Work Confer¬
it a modernized and standardized armed force. The Party as¬ ence convened in April 1979, formulated a principle for the
sumed absolute leadership over the army. The PLA has made allocation of three years to “readjust, restructure, consolidate and
tremendous achievements in cementing the relationship between improve” the national economy (the principle was called the
the armed force and the people, in defending China’s borders, eight-character policy for brevity). . f
protecting China’s security and participating in socialist con¬ Readjusting the national economy was in fact a process ot
struction. In February and March 1979, Chinese border troops exploring the way to socialist modernization suited to Chinese
launched a successful campaign of self-defense against the Viet¬ conditions; it was also a process of carrying out reform and
namese invaders. This dealt a blow at the arrogance of the Viet opening to the outside world.
Nam authorities and their regional hegemonism, and brought a Deng Xiaoping pointed out, “In carrying out construction,
 CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 753
752 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

as the proportion between accumulation and consumption, between

there is also the problem of acting according to Chinese condi¬
agriculture and industry, between light and heavy industry. An
tions and finding a Chinese way to modernization.” In moderniz¬
inappropriately high rate of accumulation had long existed along
ing China, he maintained, there are at least two major features
side an extremely backward agriculture and light industry; this
one must pay attention to. One is that China has a poor founda¬
situation underwent a fundamental change.
tion; the other is China has a large population and little arable
While making readjustments in the economy, the Party Cen¬
land.15 Chen Yun also noted that the major Chinese socio¬
tral Committee led the people in taking giant steps toward reform
economic hallmark lies in the fact that rural people account for
and opening to the outside world.
80 percent of the population, the population as a whole is very
Engels pointed out long ago that socialist society, like all
large, while the area of arable land is small. One must clearly
previous societies, is not an invariable entity; it is a society
realize that our four modernizations are to be carried out under
subject to continual development and reform. The basic system
these circumstances.16 In readjusting the economy, the Party
of socialism has struck roots on the land of China and has initially
resolutely corrected the mistakes made in economic work in the
manifested its superiority. However, there are still many short¬
previous years, eliminated the influence of the “Left” mistakes
comings and drawbacks in the economic, political and cultur¬
that had existed for a long time, and made an initial summing up
al structures as well as certain specific institutions. The socio-
of the experiences and lessons in economic construction since the
economic structure of the past, in which the state exercised
founding of the People’s Republic. It was pointed out that eco¬
overall control over everything, was necessary under the circum¬
nomic construction must proceed from the actual conditions in
stances at the time and proved effective at a certain historical
China; it must accord with economic laws and natural laws; it
stage. If continued today, it would put an unbearable burden on
must be carried out in the light of China’s own resources; it must
the state, hamper the growth of all vital forces in the society,
advance in an orderly way, undergo corroboration and strive for
bring about an ossified situation, and seriously hinder the further
practical results; the development of production must go hand in
development of the forces of production. Therefore, it is impera¬
hand with improvement of people’s livelihood; economic cooper¬
tive to reform those parts in the relations of production which do
ation and technological exchange with foreign countries must be
not accord with the forces of production, as well as those parts in
actively promoted on the basis of independence and self-reliance.
the superstructure which do not accord with the economic base.
The entire work of economic readjustment was carried out under
By so doing, the vitality of the socialist system can be maintained
the guidance of these principles.
and its superiority further called into play. When the work on
As the initial stage in implementing the eight-character policy
readjusting the economy started, Deng Xiaoping emphatically
centered around readjusting the economy, most of the Party leaders
pointed out: “In order to realize the four modernizations in an
at various levels, failing to fully comprehend the seriousness of the
effective way, we must make an earnest effort to solve the various
economic situation, were rather slow in addressing the problems. In
problems in the economic structure.”17 Of course, reform is a
1979 and 1980, the work on readjusting the economy proved inef¬
difficult and complicated undertaking. What is the correct way
fective since the total scale of capital construction had not been
reduced sufficiently. Commencing in 1981, under the leadership of to carry out reform and opening to the outside world? How can
economic growth be promoted through reform and opening while
the Central Committee, the entire Party membership carried out
at the same time consolidating and strengthening the ground
the policy in real earnest. This resulted in a rapid turn for the better
in the economic situation. A further gain was the gradual rational¬ already gained by socialism? This was a completely new task
facing the Party and the people. To accomplish it, there had to be
ization of the various relationships in the national economy, such
 755
chapter nine a new prospect in socialist constriction
754 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

a stage of exploration, a process of accumulating experiences on Acceleration of Agricultural Development,” which was passed as
the basis of practice. In the process, twists and turns, and even a draft resolution at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Party
mistakes, were well-nigh inevitable. Central Committee, was formally adopted by the 4th Plc"‘‘^’
Progress in economic structural reform achieved its first break¬ Session of the Central Committee in September 1979. The Deu
throughs in the rural areas. sion stressed that no instructions or comments made by govern¬
Following agricultural cooperation, the forces of production in ments at different levels, except “those stipulated by law, should
the countryside increased to a considerable extent on the basis of be imposed on the communes or production teams through ad¬
a collective economy. However, the people’s commune, where ministrative methods. They should be allowed under the guid¬
government administration and commune management were in¬ ance of an overall state plan, to act in the light oi their lo
tegrated, practised a management system which was highly cen¬ cal conditions, to follow their own schedules, exercise
tralized and a distribution system which leaned too much towards self-management, and to bring their initiative into phiy
egalitarianism. This kind of structure failed to arouse the enthu¬ These principles encouraged the peasants to create new exper
siasm of the peasants for production, and seriously offset the cnee through practice, and in this way threw the door wide open
tremendous agricultural input provided by the state. Consequent¬ for the structural reform in the rural areas.
ly, advance in rural production and improvement in the liveli¬ The greater enthusiasm and initiative shown by the peasants in
hood of the peasants were slow. In 1978, there were still more their work gradually led to breakthroughs in the original manage¬
than 100 million peasants who did not have adequate food or ment system of the people’s communes. Responsibility systems in
different forms quickly emerged m the rural areas. In the begin
clothing. To overcome the difficulties in agricultural production
and peasants’ livelihood, the Provincial Party Committees of ning, most of them were based on team management, linking the
Anhui and Sichuan Provinces relaxed their policies and followed total output with remuneration for all the team members. La er,
the principle of “rest and recuperation.” In these two provinces they developed into systems of management based on the individ¬
rural cadres at the grass roots and peasants started experimenting ual and then on the household, with the team leadership reaching
with a responsibility system in which the fixing of output quotas an agreement or signing a contract with each household on the
was based on the household or the team. farm output quota or tax-plus-sales quota to be fulfilled a
When the eight-character policy was first introduced, the Cen¬ leaving farm management, as well as any products over and above
tral Committee of the Party worked out twelve major measures the quota, entirely to the households.
in April 1979, the first of which was to “concentrate its major At that time, many cadres both inside and outside the Party
effort on increasing agricultural production and readjusting the were worried by these new forms of farm management, fearing
relationship between agriculture and industry.” Apart from rais¬ that they might result in a departure from soctahsm. The under¬
ing the price for planned state purchase of grain and lowering the standing of the Party Central Committee on this question also
cost price and market price of industrial products for agricultural underwent a course of development. In a Party document issued
use, which had already been called for by the 3rd Plenary Session in September 1979, it was noted that the responsibility system
of the 11th Party Central Committee, the proportion of state based on household management could be adopted by families
investment in agriculture was increased, while restrictions were engaged in certain kinds of sideline production where specie
put on the quota for planned state purchases of grain. All these circumstances required it or by families living in remote iso ated
measures greatly enhanced the enthusiasm of the peasants for mountainous regions where transportation was diffi.cult, but not
production. The “Decision on Certain Questions Concerning the under normal conditions in other areas. In May 1980, Deng
756 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

Xiaoping made a speech entitled “On the Question of Rural egalitarianism in distribution by doing away with the old practice
Policy,” noting that “after the relaxation of rural policy, good of “eating from the same big pot,” but also corrected the draw¬
results and rapid changes have occurred in some places which are backs of highly centralized management and a single-commodity
suitable for the household management system.” He pointed out production. The household responsibility system was established
that there was no reason to worry about whether this kind of on public ownership of the land; between the collective and the
system would affect the collective economy. So long as production household there existed a relationship bound by contract. 1 he
was developed in these areas, he added, so long as the social collective was responsible for the management and use ot big
division of labour and the commodity economy was promoted, pieces of farm equipment as well as water conservancy projects.
collectivization at a low level would move to one of a higher level, It had a public fund collected from the households and undertook
and collective economic units which were not consolidated would to look after the families of army men and martyrs, the five
become consolidated.18 In September 1980, the Parly Central guarantees family (the aged, the infirm, old widows and widowers
Committee issued a document entitled “On Certain Questions and orphans) and other families which were in difficulty; it was
Concerning the Further Strengthening and Improvement of the also responsible for making overall plans for capital construction
Responsibility Systems in Agricultural Production.” While stress¬ of farmland. Therefore, this type of family responsibility system
ing the need to make further improvements on the collective- was different from the small private economy that had existed
economy, the document pointed out: “The responsibility system before agricultural cooperation. It was not a negation of the
based on household management, which is practised under pro¬ superiority of the collective economy that had appeared since
duction team leadership, depends for its existence on the socialist agricultural cooperation. It integrated unification and division,
economy; it is not a departure from the socialist track and does exhibiting the superiority of the collective economy and at the
not represent any danger of capitalist restoration.” Later on, the same time bringing into play the positive factors of peasant
Party Central Committee further confirmed the household man¬ household management. This system was well received by peas¬
agement system as a form of responsibility system of the socialist ants everywhere. It enhanced their labour enthusiasm and pro¬
collective economy, a layer of management in the cooperative moted the growth of agricultural production. The rapidity with
economy. Encouraged and promoted by the Party Central Com¬ which it produced desired results was beyond expectation. In
mittee, the household management system had by early 1983 many places, the changes were noticeable within a single year.
spread nationwide to 93 percent of the production teams, most of Peasants’ income, increasing remarkably, sometimes doubled or
which carried out the tax-plus-sales quota system. even redoubled.
After the household responsibility system was introduced, the Some production teams, brigades or even people s communes
collectively-owned land was parcelled out to peasants for their use did not adopt the household responsibility system. Neither did
on a long-term basis. Agricultural production was carried out they preserve the original collective managerial system intact, but
virtually with the household as the basic unit for management, as made necessary changes or reforms, and in this way moved
well as accounting, each responsible for its own losses and gains. towards what Deng Xiaoping described as “collectivization at a
“After ensuring the needs of the state and the collective, the higher level.” Some communes and teams where collective econ¬
remaining farm produce belongs to the peasants themselves.” omy had been relatively steady in previous years failed to make
This responsibility system gave peasants the decision-making use of the superiority of the collective economy in the course ot
power with regard to production and distribution, and integrated promoting the responsibility system. This was a shortcoming.
responsibility, power and interests. Not only did it overcome the Nevertheless, they continued to make use ot many ol the success-
758 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 759

ful experiences of the collective economy and applied them to the public ownership occupying the dominant position, and in which
building of a new collective economy on the basis of the house¬ different forms of distribution were practiced, with the principle
hold responsibility system. of “to each according to his work” playing the major role. Com¬
Other shortcomings also showed up in the course of promoting merce, service trades and enterprises producting consumer goods
the rural responsibility system. For example, inadequate attention quickly flourished. This was conducive to readjusting the com¬
was paid to the protection of collective properties, including water position of industry. All these gave impetus to the subsequent
conservancy and other public facilities. The division of land for structural reform of the economy.
the use of peasants was too scattered, which made it difficult to In the same period, two major steps were taken in opening China
promote mechanization and irrigation. After discovering these to the outside world. One took place in July 1979 when the Party
problems, the Party Central Committee instructed the various Central Committee and the State Council, in view of the fact that
localities to adopt measures for their gradual solution. the two provinces of Guangdong and Fujian had the advantages of
The economic structural reforms in the cities were far more proximity to Hong Kong and Macao and of their role as the home¬
complicated than the rural reforms. Experiments in this field began land of numerous overseas Chinese, decided that the two provinces
after the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11 th Central Committee. These implement special policies and enjoy preferential treatment in for¬
included expanding the decision-making power on the part of the eign economic transactions. The other one was the establishment of
enterprises, putting some of the enterprises original ly administered Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou
by the central, provincial or autonomous regional authorities under of Guangdong Province and in Xiamen of Fujian Province. In these
the control of city governments, making enterprise independent of SEZs, foreign investment and the introduction of foreign advanced
the government, and experimenting with the comprehensive re¬ technology and management was encouraged through the adoption
form of urban economic structure in some cities. of various forms of cooperation, such as the processing and assem¬
In the late 1970s, more than 10 million educated youths who bling of imported materials or parts, compensation trade, joint
had gone to the countryside during the “cultural revolution” ventures, cooperative projects and enterprises based solely on for¬
began to come back to the cities in great numbers. Their urgent eign capital. In August 1980, the Standing Committee of the Na¬
demand for jobs aggravated the problem of insufficient employ¬ tional People’s Congress approved “Regulations Concerning the
ment already caused by the newly emerging labour force in the Economic Zones in Guangdong Province.” Construction of the
cities. It was impossible for the state to find jobs for them all. SEZs soon started one after another.
After the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Commit¬ The readjustments in the national economy as well as the intro¬
tee, the Party proposed solutions to this problem by enlivening duction of reform and opening China to the outside world began to
the whole economy and creating more opportunities, and by reap good results. The achievements had become evident by 1982
adopting, under unified planning and guidance of the state, a even though work on readjustment had not yet been completed.
multi-channel approach — introducing job opportunities to peo¬ Between 1978 and 1982, total industrial and agricultural output
ple through labour departments, getting people organized to value increased at an annual average rate of 7.3 percent. This
create new jobs, and asking people to look for jobs themselves. By rate of increase which represented a relatively rapid growth, was
October 1981, more than 20 million people had found jobs. In the achieved under circumstances in which the major relationships in
meantime, collective and joint enterprises mushroomed alongside the economy were becoming much more proportionate and better
private businesses. A situation began to emerge in which various coordinated. During the same period, people’s livelihood also im¬
forms of ownership and management existed side by side, with proved at an unprecedentedly fast rate. Take the year 1982, for
 CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 761
760 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
Xiaoping on building socialism with Chinese characteristics was
example. The average income of peasants reached 270 yuan, which
the ideological guideline of the 12th Party Congress; it is also the
was double the 1978 figure. Living expenses in urban families ideological guideline for the entire new historical period of re¬
averaged 500 yuan a year, an increase of 38.3 percent over 1978,
form, opening and modernization. It is under the guidance of this
taking into account the factor of inflation. Bank deposits reached idea that China’s reform, opening to the outside world and its
67.5 billion yuan, a 220 percent increase over the 1978 figure. It was
modernization effort have achieved great successes.
on this basis that the Party Central Committee started working out As proposed by the 12th National Party Congress, the general
a grand development strategy for China’s socialist modernization.
task of the Communist Party of China in the new historical
period was: To unite the people of all nationalities to work hard,
strive for regeneration through our own ellorts, and step by step
IV. THE 12TH NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS modernize our industry, agriculture, national defence, science
AND FULL-SCALE REFORM AND OPENING and technology to make China a culturally advanced and highly
democratic socialist country. The most important task, according
TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD to the congress, was to press forward with economic construction
in order to bring about an all-round new situation. In keeping
Formulating the Programme for with proposals made by Deng Xiaoping since 1979, the congress
Creating a New Situation in Socialist Modernization decided that the general objective of China’s economic construc¬
tion for the two decades between 1981 and the end of this century
On September 1,1982, the 12th National Party Congress opened was: while steadily working for more and better economic results,
in Beijing. Attending the Congress were 1,545 deputies and 145 to quadruple the gross annual value of industrial and agricultural
alternate deputies, representing more than 39 million Party mem¬ production — from 710 billion yuan in 1980 to 2,800 billion yuan
bers. Deng Xiaoping made the opening speech. On behalf of 11th or so by the year 2000, thus enabling the Chinese people to
Party Central Committee, Hu Yaobang delivered a report entitled become comparatively well-off. The change from the earlier
“Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernization.” objective of achieving modernization by the end of this century
Ye Jianying and Chen Yun made speeches on issues of cooperation to the stage where people would be comparatively well-off was a
between old cadres and younger ones who would eventually succeed decision made in accordance with China’s realities — her eco¬
them. Li Xiannian made the closing speech. nomic backwardness and extremely uneven development. In
In his opening speech, Deng Xiaoping emphasized the follow¬ terms of strategic thinking, this solved the problem of impetuosity
ing points: “In carrying out our modernization programme, we in seeking quick results, a mentality which had existed for a long
must proceed from the realities of China. Both in our revolution time. Impetuosity and rashness, which had led people to mistak¬
and construction, we should also learn from foreign countries and enly setting unattainably high objectives for the immediate fu¬
draw on their experience. But mechanical copying and applica¬ ture, was a major cause of the U-shaped up-and-down cycle in
tion of foreign experience and models will get us nowhere. We economic construction that had occurred repeatedly since the late
have had many lessons in this respect. To integrate the universal 1950s. In a spirit of seeking truth from facts, the congress pin¬
truth of Marxism with the concrete realities of China, blaze a pointed agriculture, energy, transportation, education, science
path of our own and build socialism with Chinese characteristics and technology as the key areas in economic development which
— this is the basic conclusion we have reached in summing up were of strategic importance. The congress mapped out a strategic
long, historical experience.”19 The idea put forward by Deng
762 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 763

plan consisting of two major steps: the first ten years would be tasks. It is imperative to closely link the building of socialist
mainly devoted to building a relatively solid base, accumulating democracy with that of the socialist legal system, so that socialist
strength, and creating favourable conditions; the next decade democracy is institutionalized and codified into laws. The fact
would usher in a new period of upsurge in China’s economy. The that these theories and tasks were put forward reflects the overall
key to bringing about an all-round upsurge in socio-economic requirements of socialist modernization. They have enriched the
development, the congress maintained, was to concentrate funds theories of scientific socialism and helped people to gain a more
on major economic development projects. In accordance with the comprehensive and deeper understanding of socialism.
principle “first, feed the people, and second, build the country,” The congress called for the building of the Party into a strong
the congress stressed the need to continue improving people’s leading core for the cause of socialist modernization; it also
livelihood. The leading position of the state economy was to be adopted a new Party Constitution. In the new Party Constitution,
upheld while developing diverse economic forms. Also stressed at the “Left” errors in the Constitution adopted in 1979 by the 11th
the congress were the leading role of planned economy and the Congress were discarded, while the merits of the Party constitu¬
supplementary role of market regulation, as well as the principle tions passed respectively by the 7th and 8th Congresses were
of persevering in self-reliance while expanding economic and carried forward. The General Programme section in the new
technological exchanges with foreign countries. All these were Constitution includes Marxist stipulations concerning the charac¬
problems in socio-economic development which demanded urgent ter and guiding ideology of the Party, the principal contradiction
solutions at the time. in our society at the present stage and the general task of the
A special feature of this congress was the proposition that Party, and the correct way to bring into play the Party’s leading
while setting objectives for economic construction, China must role in the life of the state. The ideological, political and organi¬
strive to attain a high level of socialist culture and ideology and zational requirements this Constitution sets for Party members
a high level of socialist democracy. The congress pointed out and cadres are stricter than those in all previous constitutions.
socialist culture and ideology constitutes an important character¬ According to the new Constitution, the Central Committee has
istic of the socialist system and a major aspect of its superiority. no chairman but only a general secretary. Advisory commissions
Generally speaking, socialist culture and ideology embodies two are to be established at the central and provincial levels as
aspects, the cultural and the ideological. The socialist character transitional organizations for the succession of younger cadres to
of our culture and ideology is determined by ideological educa¬ the old ones, so that many veteran comrades rich in political
tion, important aspects of which include revolutionary ideals, experience who have retired from their former posts may act as
morality and discipline. It is essential to propagate revolutionary consultants in the service of the Party’s cause. The congress
ideas and spirit so as to inspire the masses of people to take part stressed the need to improve the Party’s system of democratic
in socialist construction with great enthusiasm and enable more centralism and further normalize inner-Party life; to reform the
and more members of our society to become working people with leading bodies and the cadre system and ensure that the ranks of
lofty ideals, moral integrity, education and a sense of discipline. the cadres become more revolutionary, younger in average age,
This is a strategic principle in building socialism. The congress better educated and more professionally competent; to strengthen
pointed out that sustained socialist democracy provides the guar¬ the Party’s work among the workers, peasants and intellectuals,
antee and support for the building of a socialist material civiliza¬ and establish close ties between the Party and the masses. In view
tion and a socialist culture and ideology. To attain a high level of of the fact that impurities in ideology, style and organization still
socialist democracy is therefore one of our fundamental goals and existed within the Party, the congress pointed out with all serious-
764 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 765

ness that the style of a political party in power determines its very As the 1st Session of the 6th National People’s Congress held in
survival. As decided by the congress, an overall rectification of June 1983 pointed out, the main task for the next five years was to
the Party style and consolidation of Party organizations would mobilize people of all nationalities to strive for the comprehensive
begin from the latter half of 1983. overfulfilment of the Sixth Five-Year Plan, for the drawing up and
The congress elected a new Central Committee, Central Advi¬ implementation of the Seventh Five-Year Plan, and forging ahead
sory Commission, and Central Commission for Discipline Inspec¬ with all undertakings centred around economic construction. The
tion. At the 1st Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee National People’s Congress elected Li Xiannian president of the
that immediately followed the congress, Hu Yaobang was elected People’s Republic of China, Peng Zhen chairman of the Standing
general secretary, Hu Yaobang, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Committee of the National People’s congress, appointed Zhao Zi¬
Zhao Ziyang, Li Xiannian and Chen Yun were elected members
yang as premier of the State Council, and elected Deng Xiaoping
of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central
chairman of the State Central Military Commission.
Committee. At the 1st Plenary Meeting of the Central Advisory
Commission, Deng Xiaoping was elected chairman of the Com¬
All-Round Implementation of Reform and Opening to
mission. At the 1st Plenary Meeting of the Central Commission
for Discipline Inspection, Cheri Yun was elected first secretary of
the Outside World
the Commission. At that time new members were made part of Following the 12th National Party Congress, economic struc¬
the Party central leading collective, in addition to veteran revo¬ tural reform was rapidly carried out on a nationwide scale. Its
lutionaries. Beginning from September 1980, Deng Xiaoping, Li main features were: rural reform deepened on a solid basis; the
Xiannian and Chen Yun no longer held the posts of vice-premiers focus of national reform gradually shifted from the countryside
of the State Council. But together with Ye Jianying, they still to the cities; economic reform spread from a small number of
played an important role in leading the work of the Party and the cities selected for experiment to all urban areas; reform in other
state, with Deng Xiaoping at the the core of this generation of spheres also took giant steps forward.
collective leadership. Rural reform concentrated on the main task of stabilizing and
The 12th Party Congress was important in Party history inas¬ improving the household responsibility system which linked re¬
much as it had summed up the experience of setting things right, muneration with output. By 1987, the system was adopted by 180
mapped out a correct programme for creating an all-round new million peasant households, accounting for 98 percent of the
situation in socialist modernization, and worked out a new, national total. In early 1984, it was announced that the peasants’
improved Party Constitution. tenure of the land covered by this responsibility system would be
In November and December 1982, two months after the 12th extended to more than 15 years. For those long-term development
Party Congress, the 5th Session of the 5th National People’s projects, such as fruit orchards, forests, the utilization of barren
Congress was convened. Fresh revisions of the Constitution were hills and wasteland, the land tenure was even longer. The imple¬
made, with Peng Zhen presiding over the work. The new Consti¬ mentation of the household responsibility system engendered
tution adopted by the National People’s Congress not only thor¬ changes in the rural people’s communes. In October 1983, the
oughly corrected still remaining shortcomings of the 1978 Con¬ Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the
stitution, but also enriched its original contents and included new State Council jointly issued the “Circular on Separating the
stipulations suited to socialist modernization. This is the “Consti¬ Functions of Government from Commune Management and
tution of the People’s Republic of China” in operation at present. Establishing Township People’s Government.” Township or town
 CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 767
766 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CFC

government would be established as the basic organ of state Under the impact of reform and opening to the outside world,
power. At the same time, village committees would be universally collective and private enterprises and family businesses soon
multiplied. In 1987, there were 88.05 million people working in
set up as a mass organization for self-government. By the end of
township enterprises; their output value reached 476.4 billion
1984, the separation of government from the people’s commune
had basically been completed throughout the country and 91,000 yuan, or 50.4 percent of total output value in rural China. This
township and town governments had been set up alongside 926,- was the first time that the output value of township enterprises
000 village committees. By then, the system of rural people’s surpassed that of agricultural production, marking a historical
change in the Chinese rural economy. The rise of the township
communes had in fact ceased to exist.
enterprises not only helped to increase peasants’ incomes, pro¬
The universal implementation of the household responsibility
mote agricultural production and bring greater prosperity to the
system and the abolition of the people’s communes created fa¬
rural economy — while at the same time playing a tremendous
vourable conditions for the growth of rural commodity economy.
role in changing the peasants’ outlook — it also added more
The Party Central Committee grasped this good opportunity to
revenue and earned more foreign currency for the state, thus
speed up the process of turning the traditional rural economy into
making important contributions to China’s industrialization.
a commodity economy. In January 1985, the Party Central Com¬
With the development of township enterprises, a great number of
mittee and the State Council proclaimed the “Ten Policies on
Further Enlivening the Rural Economy.” The proclamation abol¬ small towns entered the scene. This new thing, which emerged in
the course of building socialism with Chinese characteristics,
ished the previous planned or compulsory purchases of agricul¬
occupies a place of strategic importance in China’s socio¬
tural and sideline products by the state, and introduced new ways
of planned state purchases of only a few important items of farm economic development.
The rural economic reform was not established at a single
products such as grain and cotton, which were to be done on the
basis of contracts signed between the state and the peasants. This stroke, nor was it brought about in a rush. It was done by
proceeding from realities, opportunely summing up the creations
reflected a new policy which showed respect for peasants’ power
of the masses of peasants, leading them along when conditions
of decision. Products other than those purchased by the state
were ripe, and promoting the trend in a proper way — the whole
according to contracts could be sold freely by the peasants, or sold
process represents a successful example of how the Party gives
to the state at negotiated price. Control on most other products
guidance to social reform. The deep-going social reform, which
was to be relaxed gradually so that they could be traded freely.
was carried out smoothly among several hundred million people
The state would no longer issue mandatory production plans to
in the Chinese countryside, has profoundly influenced the devel¬
the peasants. Agricultural tax, which had been paid in kind, was
opment not only of the rural economy, but of the entire Chinese
to be paid in cash. In this way, the planned purchase and
economy including the reform in other spheres.
marketing by the state, which had been practised for more than
The successful experience of rural reform and the new demands
thirty years, was basically changed. The rural economy was
put on the cities by rural development created favourable condi¬
channelled into the mainstream of planned commodity economy,
tions for the entire economic reform with emphasis on urban re¬
thus enabling the traditional way of farming to move towards a
form. The experiments and explorations with urban retorm carried
specialized, commodity-oriented and modernized agriculture.
out in a small number of cities since the 3rd Plenary Session of the
A big windfall from rural reform was the upsurge of township
11 th Central Committee also achieved remarkable results, accumu¬
enterprises. The implementation of the household responsibility
lated important experience and laid the foundation for further
system released a large amount of labour from the countryside.
768 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC chapter nine a new prospect in socialist construction 769

reform. Opening China to the outside world broadened people’s Under the guidance of the spirit ol the Decision, the entire
horizons, helped them see opportunities and challenges for China’s economic structural reform with emphasis on the cities unfolded
economic development in the new worldwide technological revolu¬ full-scale in 1985. By 1987, the year when the 13th National Party
tion, and made them understand more keenly the urgency of eco¬ Congress was convened, the reform had made noticeable progress.
nomic structural reform. The “Decision on Economic Structural The main achievements were:
Reform” adopted by the 3rd Plenary Session of the 12th Central First, diverse economic forms were further developed while
Committee in October 1984 summed up experience since the found¬ public ownership retained its dominant position in the economy
ing of the Republic, especially the experience of economic structur¬ and continued to grow. The original economic structure consist¬
al reform since the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Com¬ ing only of the single economic form of public ownership, which
mittee, put forward and elaborated more systematically a series of did not fully accord with the current level of productivity, had
important questions, both theoretical and practical, concerning this undergone a great change. The state-owned enterprises still held
issue. It is a programmatic document for carrying out overall eco¬ a predominant position. Of China’s total industrial output value,
nomic structural reform. their share decreased from 77.6 percent in 1978 before the reform
The important theoretical contribution made by the Decision to 59 7 percent in 1987, despite a considerable increase in their
was that it shattered the traditional concept of setting planned output value; in the same period, the share represented by the
economy against commodity economy, and confirmed that our collective economy increased from 22.4 percent to 34.6 percent,
socialist economy was a planned commodity economy based on the share of individual economy, private economy, joint ventures,
public ownership. This is the basic theory and practice of our cooperative ventures, foreign-capital owned enterprises and oth¬
structural economic reform. Taking this as the point of departure, er non-public businesses, all of which had been virtually non¬
the Decision goes on to give an exposition of the major problems existent in the past, now accounted for 5.6 percent. Of the total
to be solved in establishing a socialist economic structure full of value of retail sales of social commodities, the share of state-
vigour: enhancing the vitality of enterprise, which remains the owned commercial enterprises decreased from 54.6 to 38.7 per¬
key issue of economic structural reform; establishing a planning cent that of collective commercial enterprises decreased from
system which would enable the purposeful use of the law of value 43.3*percent to 35.7 percent; while that of the non-public sector
in the development of socialist commodity economy; setting up a of commerce increased from 2.1 to 25.6 percent. The number o
reasonable pricing system and paying full attention to the role of individuals engaged in their own industrial or commercial under-
economic leverage; separating enterprise from government; giv¬ takings increased from 150,000 to 5.69 million. The changes in
ing government organizations a proper role in economic manage¬ economic structure in terms of different forms of ownership played
ment; setting up various forms of the economic responsibility a positive role in developing economy, making life more convenient
system; strictly implementing the principle of “to each according for the people and offering them more job opportunities.
to his work” in matters of distribution; actively developing va¬ Second, in accordance with the principle ot separating enter¬
rious economic forms and expanding domestic and international prise from government and the proper separation of ownership
economic and technological exchanges. The Decision also stressed and management, the previous form of management m the state-
the importance of promoting a new generation of leaders, of owned enterprises, under which they obtained operating funds
training large numbers of cadres for the management of the from the state and turned over their gains to the state, changed,
socialist economy, and of strengthening Party leadership in order and their power of decision was enlarged. Compared with 1978,
to ensure the smooth progress of reform. the profits they retained for themselves increased from 3.7 per-
770 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 771

cent of the total amount of profits to more than 40 percent in cation were also placed on the agenda. In March 1985, the Party
1987 (or about 20 percent of the total after taxes and other Central Committee adopted the “Decision on Structural Reforms
expenses were deducted). This enhanced their capacity to reno¬ in Science and Technology.” The main contents of the Decision
vate and expand. By 1987, more than 80 percent of state-owned were: reforming the system of fund allocation; developing the
enterprises throughout China had been implementing some kind technology market; cultivating the capacity of scientific and
of management responsibility system on a contractual basis. technological institutions to develop themselves and enhancing
Within the enterprise, a system of reform was carried out in their vigor and initiative in serving economic construction;
which the main task was to implement the director’s (or mana¬ strengthening enterprises in their capacity to absorb and develop
ger’s) responsibility. new technology; promoting the cooperation and integration of
Third, the scope and form of macroscopic regulation and scientific, designing, and higher educational institutions with
control by the state was readjusted and improved by reforming enterprises; changing the situation where research institutions
the system of administration through planning. Compared with were somewhat isolated from enterprises, while departments and
the pre-reform period, in 1987 the number of items of industrial localities also worked in isolation from each other; encouraging
products under mandatory plans of the State Planning Commis¬ the reasonable flow of personnel. The main purpose of these
sion decreased from 120 to 60, with their proportion in the total measures was to turn technological achievements into commodi¬
industrial output value decreasing from 40 percent to 17 percent; ties and accelerate their transformation into forces of production,
the materials whose distribution was monopolized by the state so as to meet the developmental needs of a socialist commodity
decreased from 259 to 26 in number; the type of commodities economy. The subsequent reforms in science and technology were
controlled by state plans decreased from 188 to 23 in number; of developed in this direction.
the total amount of funds used for production and construction, In May of the same year, the Party Central Committee made
those from state revenues decreased from 76.6 percent to 31.2 the “Decision on Structural Reform in Education.” It included
percent, while those from banks increased from 23.4 percent to proposals that the management system be reformed, more power
68.8 percent. The role of economic leverage in macroscopic regu¬ of decision be given to the schools, the educational structure
lation and control had obviously strengthened. readjusted, the labour and personnel system modified correspond¬
Progress was also made in varying degrees in the reform of ingly, educational concepts, contents and methods which did not
financial, taxation, pricing and monetary systems, as well as accord with socialist modernization be changed. The objective of
commercial, labour and wage systems. these reforms was to enable various kinds and levels of education
Through these reforms, an unprecedented, flourishing situa¬ to take positive steps toward adapting to the diverse needs of
tion emerged in urban economic life. Meanwhile, certain confu¬ socio-economic development on their own initiative. Education
sion occurred as a result of inadequate measures in strengthening was invigorated through the implementation of the Decision.
and improving macroscopic control by the state in the course of After the 12th National Party Congress, simultaneously with
laying more stress on relaxing policies and invigorating enterpris¬ the steady advance of the rural and urban reforms, several major
es. Nevertheless, the changes as a whole were positive; they were steps were also taken in opening China to the outside world. In
changes towards a new system of planned commodity economy April 1983, by decision of the Party Central Committee and the
based on public ownership. State Council, certain policies practised in the SEZs were granted
With both rural and urban reforms spreading gradually over to Hainan Island, giving it enlarged powers of decision to expedite
the land, structural reforms in science and technology and edu¬ its development. In April 1988, Hainan Island was made a
 CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 773
772 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
Five-Year Plan (National Economic and Social Development
province and declared a Special Economic Zone. Earlier, in April
Plan for the 1981-1985 Period). Thanks to the realistic nature of
1984, fourteen port cities — Tianjin, Shanghai, Dalian, Qin-
the plan and the economic readjustments made in the previous
huangdao, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Ningpo,
years, the major proportional relationships in the economy be¬
Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang and Beihai — were
came more balanced. This created a favourable environment for
opened to the outside world. This was a major step in expanding
economic growth. The urban and rural reforms, in particular,
the open policy. In February 1985, the Changjiang Delta, Zhu-
called into play the initiative of all parties concerned, and became
jiang Delta and the Xiamen-Quanzhou-Zhangzhou Delta in
a great driving force for economic development. By the end of
southern Fujian were opened as coastal economic development
1985, the Sixth Five-Year Plan was overfulfilled in an all-round
areas. Thus, in implementing the open policy, a multi-level
way. The total industrial and agricultural output value increased
framework with several emphases and a combination of cities and
from 770.7 billion yuan in 1980 to 1,333.5 billion yuan in 1985.
areas was formed — which started with the Special Economic
Calculated in terms of the constant prices of 1980, the annual
Zones, and extended to the coastal open cities, the coastal eco¬
average increase was 11 percent. Gross national product increased
nomic development areas and finally to the interior, altogether
from 447 billion yuan to 856.8 billion yuan. Again, calculated
comprising two cities directly under the administration of the
according to the constant prices of 1980, the annual average
central authorities, 25 provincial cities and 67 counties, involving increase was 10 percent, surpassing the planned increase rate of
150 million people in the coastal regions of China now opened to 4-5 percent. Major industrial and agricultural products increased
the outside world. The introduction of foreign capital and ad¬
in quantity by a wide margin. Economic results and efficiency
vanced technology and equipment was speeded up, more Chinese
took an upward turn and state revenues, which had declined year
goods exported, and more foreign currency earned. By 1987,
by year during the later period of the Fifth Five-Year Plan, began
10,350 contracts were signed involving the use of foreign capital
to climb each year and helped achieve a basically balanced
up to an agreed total amount of 62,509 million U.S. dollars, of
budget. Capital construction and technological transformation
which direct investment by foreign capital reached 25,773 mil¬ made notable progress. Investment in capital construction during
lion. In the fourteen port cities, technical revamping projects
these five years was 46 percent over that of the Fifth Five-Year
numbered 5,000, with transactions valued at 3,450 million U.S.
Plan, while investment in technological transformation increased
dollars. This gave great impetus to the revamping of the current
77 percent. During the Sixth Five-Year Plan period, foreign
enterprises, the upgrading of products and the readjustment of
economic relations and trade and technological exchanges opened
product mix. New technologies were introduced and a number of
up new vistas. The total amount of imports and exports more than
new products developed, some of which helped to fill up certain
doubled the figures of the Fifth Five-Year Plan period, bringing
blanks in Chinese industries. about a notable change in China’s position in world trade. Science
and technology flourished side by side with education and cul¬
Fulfilment of the Sixth Five-Year Plan and ture. The income of urban and rural people rose remarkably, and
Adoption of the Seventh Five-Year Plan so did their level of consumption. The national consumption level
of residents, which averaged 227 yuan in 1980, rose to 406 yuan
After the 12th National Party Congress, economic develop¬ in 1985. Taking into account the factor of inflation, the annual
ment was relatively smooth for several years, especially for the average increase rate was 8.7 percent, which was much higher
first two years. Achievements in economic construction found than the average increase rate of 2.6 percent of the previous 28
expression mainly in the successful completion of the Sixth
774 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 775

years (1953-80). tional Economic and Social Development (draft).” The proposal
The fulfulment of the Sixth Five-Year Plan brought a happy put forward the basic guideline concerning economic work, the
solution to many perplexing problems of long duration. The steep major targets related to overall socio-economic development and
increase in grain and cotton production created conditions for its orientation, the strategic principles, major policies and meas¬
solving the problem of feeding and clothing the people. As a ures for its implementation, as well as the tentative ideas and
result of the relatively sufficient supplies of consumption goods, planned steps for carrying out economic structural reforms. The
many commodities, with the exception of grain and vegetable oil, State Council, in accordance with the Proposal put forward by
were sold without any restrictions, and many types of ration the Party Central Committee, made deeper researches into the
coupons formerly in use were abolished. Certain shortcomings proposed arrangements, tried to achieve an overall balance, and
and mistakes in economic development also occurred during this finally worked out “The Seventh Five-Year Plan for National
period. The arrangements set by the 12th Party Congress for the Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of
next ten years, which had been mainly aimed at laying a solid China.” In April 1986, the plan was approved for implementation
foundation, were not implenmented in earnest. In fact, Hu Yao- by the 4th Session of the 6th National People’s Congress.
bang did not agree with the principle of readjusting the economy,
nor with the principle that economic construction should proceed Party Consolidation and Building Socialist Culture
on a solid basis, that the various relationships in the economy and Ideology
should be properly readjusted, a solid foundation be laid for a
steady, measured advance. In his talks with leaders of various Overall work on Party rectification was begun following a
localities, he stressed high speed, high targets, fulfillment of plans decision made at the 2nd Plenary Session of the 12th Central
to redouble production figures ahead of schedule and competing Committee held in October 1983 and based on a decision of the
for top place. He put consumption before production and stressed 12th National Party Congress.
promoting production by stimulating consumption. The second The tasks of Party consolidation were: first, to unify thinking, to
half of 1984 saw overheating of the economy hand in hand with attain a high level of ideological and political unity throughout the
an excessive issue of paper currency and a distribution of national Party, correct all erroneous tendencies, either “Left” or Right,
income characterized by overspending. New elements of instabil¬ which violated the Four Cardinal Principles or deviated from the
ity emerged in economic life as a result of excessively high-speed line pursued by the Party since the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th
industrial growth, drastic increase of investment in fixed assets, Central Committee; second, to rectify the Party style, give full play
and excessive expansion of consumption funds, and sharp price to the revolutionary spirit of serving the people wholeheartedly,
hikes for some commodities. These created difficulties for eco¬ thwart any attempts to make use of one’s position and power to seek
nomic growth in the next few years. However, taking everything private gains, and combat bureaucracy which showed an irrespon¬
into account, the Chinese economy made rapid progress and sible attitude towards the Party and the people; third, to strengthen
attained notable successes during the years of the Sixth Five-Year discipline, uphold the organizational principle of democratic cen¬
Plan period. tralism, oppose patriarchism, factionalism, anarchism and liberal¬
Its smooth implementation enabled the Party Central Commit¬ ism, all of which were against organizational principles and disci¬
tee to begin drafting the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-90) early pline, and overcome the flabbiness and lack of unity within certain
in 1983. In September 1985, the National Party Conference Party organizations; fourth, to purify the Party ranks by acting
approved the “Proposal for the Seventh Five-Year Plan for Na¬ according to the Party Constitution, resolutely ferreting out those
776 777
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

elements who firmly oppose and endanger the Party and expelling tion, 145,456 were not allowed to register for the time being, 184,071
them from the Party. The crucial task was to clear out three kinds were accorded disciplinary measures of one kind or another — put
of people: rebels who climbed to relatively high positions by follow¬ on probation, removed from Party posts and suggested to be re¬
ing the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques, moved from other posts, served an inner-Party serious warning or
persons with serious factionalist ideas, and those who had engaged warning. However, Party consolidation was uneven in its develop¬
in reckless beating, smashing and looting. ment. Some Party and government organizations, including certain
Party consolidation was carried out under unusual cir¬ high- or middle-level leading organizations, failed to fully accom¬
cumstances. Impurities in ideology, style and organization as well plish the four tasks of Party consolidation, or worse, just went
as slack discipline left over by the “cultural revolution” still posed through the motions. .
serious problems within the Party, and the entire state and social The 12th National Party Congress gave a prominent place to
life, still in the midst of many profound changes, were stirred up as the building of a socialist society with an advance culture and
never before. For these reasons, the masses of people both inside and ideology. Generally speaking, the building of material civilization
outside the Party were bound to be deeply concerned about Party made it necessary to strengthen the building of socialist culture
consolidation, and to place high hopes on it, while at the same time and ideology. Specifically, the development of commodity econ¬
many unexpected problems were bound to crop up during the omy and the objective environment of reform and opening to the
process. All these made the task extremely arduous and complicat¬ outside world made it more imperative to strengthen the building
ed. However, Hu Yaobang, who was concurrently chairman of the of socialist culture and ideology. As a matter of tact, under the
Central Committee’s Directorate for the Work on Party Consolida¬ circumstances when the development of commodity economy and
tion, did not pay enough attention to the job. He willfully steered reform and opening to the outside world were so much stressed,
the task of “attaining ideological unity” to “rectifying professional there did exist a lack of attention to the building of socialist
guidelines,” and adopted a one-sided approach by advocating the culture and ideology. This facilitated the spread of the trend of
“promotion of economy through Party consolidation, and testing bourgeois liberalization. At a time when the Party exerted itself
the result of Party consolidation by the economy.” This made it all to correct “Left” mistakes, a Right erroneous tendency appeared
the more difficult to accomplish the task well. which went against the Four Cardinal Principles. At the 2nd
Party consolidation, carried out among Party members in groups Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee held in October
and at different times, extended over a period of three and a half 1983, Deng Xiaoping took a clear-cut stand, saying: On the
years and was basically brought to a conclusion in May 1987. On ideological front, spiritual contamination should not be allowed^
the whole, through Party consolidation, improvement was made The essence of spiritual contamination was to spread all sorts ot
with regard to ideology, style, organization and discipline of the corrupt and decadent ideas of the bourgeoisie and other exploit¬
entire Party. The situation took a favourable turn in the effort to ing classes, and disseminate feelings of distrust of socialism,
eliminate impurities in ideology, style and organization which had communism and the leadership of the Party. Spiritual contami¬
existed to a serious degree within the Party, and important experi¬ nation was extremely harmful; it could bring havoc to the coun¬
ence was gained in the correct handling of inner-Party contradic¬ try and people. He sharply exposed the confusion existing on the
tions. This helped to lay a solid foundation for strengthening and ideological front, pointing out that speaking about human values
promoting Party building in the new period. According to statistics, and humanitarianism in abstract terms, propagating democracy
through membership registration and other organizational proce¬ in an abstract sense and setting it against the leadership of t e
dures, 33,896 members were expelled, 90,069 were denied registra¬ Party contradicted the fundamentals of Marxism and might lead
 CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 779
778 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

young people astray. He pointed out that one must use Marxism which might determine the rise or fall, the success or failure of
to analyse, judge and criticize the modern bourgeois culture of the cause of socialism. The Decision further pointed out that the
the West, and should not hold it in esteem without discrimina¬ overall reform and opening to the outside world put new and
tion. “The use of Western decadent bourgeois culture to corrupt higher demands on the building of socialist culture and ideology.
young people should no longer be tolerated.”20 He said that it was Whether it could meet these demands, whether the decadent ideas
still necessary to continue the criticism and correction of “Left” of capitalism and feudalism could be effectively resisted, and
mistaken ideas in the ideological and theoretical fields. But it whether the various dangers of losing one’s bearings could be
should be clearly pointed out that the current problem on the averted — this was a great historic test. The Decision stressed that
ideological front calling for prior solution was the Right tendency bourgeois liberalization was a negation of the socialist system and
of flabbiness and laxity. The Party committees at all levels should advocation of the capitalist system, that it went diametrically
effectively strengthen their leadership over the ideological front. against the interests of the people and the historical trend and was
The struggle against spiritual contamination, or bourgeois liber¬ firmly opposed by the masses of people. Countering the erroneous
alization, which was to be unfolded in accordance with the spirit view expressed at the session that no mention should be made of
of the plenary session, fizzled out as a result of the passive “bourgeois liberalization,” Deng Xiaoping clearly pointed out.
Liberalization itself was bourgeois, and pushing liberalization
attitude on the part of the Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang.
would mean leading us onto the road of capitalism. “If this ideolog¬
The consequences were quite serious.
To strengthen the building of socialist culture and ideology, the ical trend were not resisted, once combined with the many dirty and
6th Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee held in evil things that would inevitably come in when China opened its
September 1986 made the “Resolution on the Guiding Principles doors, they would become a destructive force against our four
socialist modernizations, which was not to be ignored.” Therefore,
for the Building a Socialist Society with an Advanced Culture
he added, “We should talk about opposing bourgeois liberalization,
and Ideology.” The Decision elaborated on the strategic role of
not only this time, but keep on talking for ten or twenty years.”21 In
and the fundamental tasks in building socialist culture and ideol¬
March 1987, Deng Xiaoping said that not only should we talk about
ogy. It called for using the common ideal of building socialism
it for ten or twenty years, but “for fifty more years.”22
with Chinese characteristics to arouse and unite the people of all
The important ideas on strengthening the guiding role of
nationalities throughout the country in establishing and develop¬
Marxism in the building of socialist culture and ideology and
ing socialist morality, strengthening education in socialist democ¬
opposing bourgeois liberalization, which had been much stressed
racy, the legal system and discipline, spreading and raising the
by the Decision, were not immediately and vigorously put to
level of education, science and culture, while at the same time
upholding the guiding role of Marxism in the building of socialist practice, while no struggle was effectively waged against a real
erroneous Right tendency existing at that time. Towards the end
culture and ideology. The Decision called on Party organizations
of 1986, student unrest spread to quite a few cities. Deng Xiao¬
at all levels and the masses of Party members to take the lead in
ping made a speech entitled “Take a Clear-Cut Stand in Opposing
building socialist culture and ideology. The Decision pointed out
Bourgeois Liberalization.” This speech and his speech made at the
socialist culture and ideology with Marxism as the guide consti¬
6th Session of the 12th Central Committee on the same subject,
tuted an important characteristic of socialist society; it provided
which was conveyed to Party members and people throughout
spiritual and intellectual support for the development of material
China, gave them an ideological weapon for combatting bourgeois
civilization, while guaranteeing the correct orientation for its
liberalization. Following the “Circular on Party Members Strict
development, and therefore it was a matter of great importance
 CHAPTER NINE a NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 781
780 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

Session of the Standing Committee of the National People’s

Observation of the Party Constitution,” which was issued by the
Congress made the “Decision on Strengthening Education in the
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, a handful of Party
Legal System and Maintaining Stability and Unity” on January
members who openly advocated bourgeois liberalization were ex¬
22 1987. On January 28 of the same year, the Party Central
pelled from the Party. Thanks to timely and competent guidance,
Committee issued the “Circular on Questions of Combating Bour¬
student unrest soon subsided. The direct causes leading to student
geois Liberalization.” The Circular required Party organizations
unrest varied with different localities and different schools, includ¬
at various levels to acquire a full understanding of the importance
ing feelings of distrust towards Party leadership caused by the
and long-term nature of the struggle against bourgeois liberaliza¬
mistakes made by the central, local or school authorities in their
tion and to conduct education among Party members about the
work. But taking the problem as a whole, student unrest was the
need to firmly uphold the Four Cardinal Principles, and fully and
result of lack of a clear-cut, firm position towards bourgeois liber¬
correctly understand and implement the line, principle and poli¬
alization. Flabbiness and confusion prevailed on the ideological
cies formulated since the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central
front both at the central and local levels. In school forums as well
Committee. The Circular also contained a number of specific
as in many other places, there was failure to resist the assault of
policies on opposing bourgeois liberalization.
bourgeois liberalization, resulting in its rampancy. A handful of
Communist Party members played an extremely harmful role by
taking a lead in touting bourgeois liberalization. For all these, Party
General Secretary Hu Yaobang was largely responsible.
V. The 13TH NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS,
On January 16, 1987, the Political Bureau of the Central Com¬ BEGINNING OF ECONOMIC
mittee called an enlarged meeting, where Hu Yaobang made self- RECTIFICATION AND QUELLING OF
criticisms for violating the principle of collective leadership, and
for mistakes made on major political questions of principle in his
TURBULENCE IN 1989
capacity as the general secretary of the Party Central Committee,
and requested the Central Committee to allow him to resign his post The 13th National Party Congress systematically expounded
as Party general secretary. The meeting made serious criticisms of the theory of the primary stage of socialism and its basic Party
his mistakes in a comradely manner, and at the same time made a line. This theory and line were drawn up in reference to experi¬
realistic appraisal of his achievements. The meeting approved his ences in economic reform and opening up and in the construction
of socialist modernization following the 3rd Plenary Session of
request for resignation, but allowed him to retain his posts as
the 11th Central Committee, as well as in recognition of the
member of the Political Bureau and member of the Standing Com¬
national strength and the summarizing of practical experience.
mittee of the Political Bureau. In view of the fact that prior to 1980,
Zhao Ziyang had made achievements in his work at the provincial
level, and after becoming the premier in September 1980, had also The 13th National Party Congress and the Basic Party Line
made accomplishments in the field of economy, he was elected for the Primary Stage of Socialism
acting general secretary of the Party Central Committee. The De¬
The 13th National Party Congress was held from October 25
cisions at this enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau were con¬
to November 1, 1987, in Beijing. The 1,936 deputies represented
firmed by the 7th Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee
more than 46 million Party members. At the congress, Zhao
which was held in October of the same year.
Ziyang on behalf of the 12th Central Committee delivered a
In view of the lessons learned from the student unrest, the 6th
 CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION
782 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

report entitled “Advance Along the Road of Socialism With ical period of current Chinese society is the paramount issue in
building socialism with Chinese characteristics and constitutes
Chinese Characteristics.” The congress approved the report, re¬
vised some articles of the Party Constitution and elected a new the basic reference for stipulating and implementing correct lines
Party Central Committee, Central Advisory Commission and
congress also pointed out that this thesis implies first that
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.
The salient contribution made by the 13th Party Congress was China is already a socialist society and must persevere m and not
deviate from socialism, and second, that China s socialist socie y
its systematic exposition of the theory of the primary stage of
socialism and the basic Party line for this stage. is still in its primary stage; we must proceed from this reality and
h age cannot * shipped. Under the specific historic*1 con¬
Soon after the convention of the 3rd Plenary Session of the
ditions of contemporary China, failing to recognize that the
11th Central Committee, while summing up historical experi¬
Chinese people can take the socialist road without going through
ences, the Party Central Committee instituted a study of the
*he stage of fully developed capitalism is a mechanistic view on
ideological reasons for the mistakes made in the previous period
he question of revolutionary development. This is the cognitive
from the angle of recognizing Chinese socialist society as being in
root of Right deviationist mistakes. On the other hand, to believe
the developing stage. Earlier, in September 1979, in a speech
approved by the 4th Plenary Session of the 11 th Central Commit¬ that it is possible to skip the primary stage of socialism without
tee and delivered at a meeting to celebrate the 30th anniversary the massive development of the productive forcesms a _utop«n
of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Ye Jianying view on this question. This is the major cogmt.ve root of Left
pointed out that China is still a developing socialist country. Its
socialist system is still immature and imperfect, while the econo¬ “ Theecongress made a profound analysis of China’s present
my and culture are still under-developed. China’s socialist mod¬ society pointing out, on one hand, the socialist economic system
based on public ownership of the means of production, the
ernization must pass from a lower to a higher level and its
socialist system is still in its infancy. This initially revealed the socialist political system of the people’s democratic dictatorship
ideas on the primary stage of socialism. The “Resolution on and the guiding position of Marxism in the ideological field have
Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding already established. The system of exploitation and exploiting
of the People’s Republic of China,” adopted by the 6th Plenary classes have been eliminated, national economic strength has
Session of the 11th Central Committee in June 1981, clarified for increased tremendously and education tscience and culture have
nroeress. On the other hand, China has a targe
the first time that our socialist system is still in an early phase
and must undergo a long process of development before it can be population and poor foundation. Also, China ranks f“ behlnd
perfected. Later this thesis of socialism as being in its early phase other countries in per-capita gross national product.Jhe back
was reaffirmed in the report to the 12th Party Congress and in wardness of the forces of production determines that with regard
the “Resolution on the Guiding Principles for Building a Socialist To the relations of production, the degree of socialization of
Society with an Advanced Culture and Ideology,” adopted at the production required for the promotion of socialist Pu“'=
6th Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee. In light of shiD is still very low. The commodity economy and domestic
these probings, the 13th Party Congress summed up fresh experi¬ market are still underdeveloped while the socialist economic
ence in the reform and opening up and carried understanding of system is immature and imperfect. In superstructure a series of
the primary stage of socialism in China a big step forward. The economic and cultural conditions necessary for building a high
congress pointed out that the correct understanding of the histor- level socialist democracy and politics are also highly ma equa
 chapter nine a new prospect in socialist construction
784 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

The influence of decadent feudalist and capitalist ideas and the of the strategy of economic development stipulated by the 12th
forces of tradition engendered by small production is still wide¬ Party Congress based on the thesis of the primary stage of
spread and has time and again penetrated into the ranks of Party socialism. The three-step strategy was advanced by Deng Xiao¬
cadres and state administrators. All this shows that China has not ping in 1985 after serious consideration.
passed beyond the primary stage of socialism. The central task of the 13th Party Congress was to speed up
These scientific theses have offered a key to understanding and deepen the reform. The congress proposed that reform of the
both the successes and failures in socialist construction following economic system should focus on transformation of the operatmg
the nationwide liberation and have also provided a powerful mechanism of enterprises. The accompanying reform of the sys
theoretical weapon for the reform and opening up and for build¬ terns of planning, investment, materials and equipment supp y,
ing China into a socialist country with Chinese characteristics. finances'and foreign trade should advance in stages ,n order o
This is an important contribution made by the Chinese Commu¬ establish a general framework of a new planned commodity
nists to the theory of scientific socialism. economic system. So the congress called for enlivening the state-
The congress has systematically expounded the Party’s basic owned enterprises according to the principle of separating owner¬
line for building socialism with Chinese characteristics in the ship from management power, further promoting mter-enterprise
primary stage of socialism. The line is: leading and uniting with economic cooperation, boosting establishment of a socialist mar¬
the people of all nationalities, focusing on economic construction, ket system, perfecting a macro-economic regulation system based
persisting in the four cardinal principles, firmly push forward the on indirect control, continuously developing an economy with
reform and opening up, self-reliance, hard work and building our various systems of ownership with public ownership as its main
country into a prosperous, democratic, civilized modern socialist body and introducing a diversified system of payment based on
country. This basic line is summed up as “one central task and distribution according to work and a correct po®' *e
two basic points,” the central task being economic construction, experience of previous years, the congress analysed the arduous
while the two basic points refer to persisting in the four cardinal nature of the reform of the economic system and changed the
principles and the reform and opening up. This is a principle our basic objective for achieving a new economic systein in five years
Party has consistently maintained since the 3rd Plenary Session or longer which had been advanced by the Party Central Com
of the 11 th Central Committee. Practice proves that the imple¬ mittee in its Seventh Five-Year Plan. The congress pointed out,
mentation of this basic line is a fundamental guarantee of success “Assessment of the current situation indicates that it will take a
in work of all kinds. Departing from it would lead to committing longer time than expected for establishing the framework of a
mistakes of one kind or another. new system.”23 This demonstrates the spirit of seeking truth from
The Party congress stipulated a three-step strategy of economic
development. The first step is to double the 1980 GNP and ensure The 13th Party Congress pointed out that the implementation
that the people have enough food and clothing. The second step •md deepening of reform of the economic structure has raised an
is to quadruple the 1980 GNP by the end of this century and urgent demand for reform of the political system. The objective
guarantee a comparatively more comfortable life for the people. of reform of the political system for the near future is to establis
The last step is to increase the per-capita GNP to the level of the a leadership structure which can increase efficiency, invigorate
second rung developed countries by the mid-21st century. Then vitality and file enthusiasm on all sides. According to Deng
the people will be well-off and modernization will be basically Xiaoping’s speech entitled “Reform of the Party andi State Lead
realized. This strategy is a further enrichment and development ership System” delivered at an enlarged conference of the Polm
786 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 787

cal Bureau of the Party Central Committee held in August 1980, Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, his status and func-
the Party and the state have adopted a series of important tion as a policy-maker on important Party and national issues
measures in this field and made marked progress in separat¬ should not change. He was needed to control the helm in an
ing Party from government administration, decentralizing the exigency. This was needed for the Party’s cause. This proposal
decision-making power to lower-level units, strengthening estab-. was agreed to by all deputies to the session.
lishment of a legal system and eliminating the system of life-long The 1st Session of the 7th National People’s Congress held in
tenure of leaders. These reform measures were being implement¬ March and April 1988 elected Yang Shangkun president of the
ed all along, both before and after the 13th Party Congress. People’s Republic of China, and Wan Li chairman of the Stand¬
The congress also pointed out that in the process of combining ing Committee of the National People’s Congress; appointed Li
Marxism with Chinese practice in the last sixty years or more Peng premier of the State Council and elected Deng Xiaoping
there were two leaps of historical significance. The first leap was chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission.
in the new democratic revolutionary period. During this period,
the Chinese Communists summed up both successful and unsuc¬ Beginning of Economic Readjustment
cessful experiences, found a revolutionary road which was char¬
acteristically Chinese and led the revolution to success. The In the five years from the 12th to the 13th Party Congress,
second leap occurred after the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th China achieved great progress in economic reform and opening
Central Committee. During this period, the Chinese Communists, up But there were still a lot of problems and difficulties. Some
based on the positive and negative experiences summed up in the of them had accumulated over many years and could not be
thirty years and more following the founding of New China and solved in a short period of time, while some arose during the past
on the study of international experience and the world situation, few years in the process of advance. While implementing correct
found a road for building socialist China with Chinese character¬ strategies, principles and policies, the Party Central Committee
istics and entered a new stage of socialist construction. Advancing and the State Council made some mistakes in concrete guidance
along this road is the basic guarantee for leading our cause to on economic construction and reform and opening up. In regard
victory. to agriculture, the Party Central Committee and the State Coun¬
The 1st Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee held cil were once over-optimistic about the situation in the country
on November 2 elected Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Hu Qili side, slackened their guidance and decreased their assistance to
and Yao Yilin members of the Standing Committee of the Polit¬ agricultural production. This resulted in fluctuation and stagna¬
ical Bureau with Zhao Ziyang as the general secretary. At the tion in grain production for several consecutive years after a
session, Deng Xiaoping was appointed chairman of the Military bumper harvest in 1984. In industry they were ineffective in their
Commission of the CPC Central Committee, Zhao Ziyang its efforts to correct the indiscriminate expansion of the processing
first vice-chairman, and Yang Shangkun standing vice-chairman; industry. In the course of reforming the overcentralized and
Chen Yun was approved chairman and Bo Yibo and Song Rcn- over-tightly controlled economic system, they neglected necessary
qiong vice-chairmen of the CPC Central Advisory Commission; and suitable centralization. While emphasizing micro-economic
and Qiao Shi secretary of the CPC Central Commission for enlivening, they neglected overall balance and weakened macro
control. Lacking an overall, deep understanding of conditions m
Discipline Inspection. The Standing Committee of the Political
Bureau proposed to the session that although Deng Xiaoping had the country, they were anxious for quick results in both constru
retired from his positions on the Central Party Committee and tion and reform. Although the 13th Party Congress issued the call
788 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 789

once again to seek truth from facts in economic construction, in revenue to the total revenue dropped from 56.1 percent to 47 2
the actual work, the trend of seeking quick results failed to be percent. As a result the state’s macro-control capacity was weak¬
corrected. All these problems in economic construction are insep¬ ened. The fields of production, construction and circulation fields
arable from weaknesses in the Party’s leadership and ideological- saw a common phenomenon of high consumption, investment
political work. and expenditure but low efficiency, output and benefits. From
Overheating of the economy and other problems became ap¬ 1985 to 1988, inflation rose drastically. In 1988, the national
parent beginning in the second half of 1984. The Party Central retail price index rose by 18.5 percent after big consecutive
Committee and the State Council failed to adopt effective meas¬ increases in the previous years, scoring the biggest rise in many
ures in time to keep it within limits. At that time Zhao Ziyang, years. This seriously upset wide sections of the population.
who was then premier, advocated the so-called “soft landing.” The Accompanying this steep inflation, price reform was improper¬
result showed not even an inclination to “land.” On the contrary, ly introduced in the summer of 1988. In August, the Political
the overheating trend continued to develop. Although the dual Bureau of the Party Central Committee discussed and in princi¬
principle of tightening revenue and credit was adopted in 1987, ple passed the “Initial Plan for Price and Wage Reform.” Al¬
it was not put into effect resolutely enough. This caused more though the conference called for the adoption ol strong measures
problems to pile up, such as higher inflation, an imbalance for controlling inflation in a comprehensive way, it still empha¬
between social production and consumption, and an economy sized that now was the favourable opportunity for implementing
structurally irrational and in disorder. The main problem in price and wage reform. Reform of the price system was undoubt¬
development of the economy deeply penetrating all levels was edly necessary. But announcement of this big step, with inflation
that total social demand far exceeded total social supply. From climbing day by day, and without ample consideration ot how the
1984 to 1988, the national income increased by 70 percent (by 149 state and enterprises could bear it, how the people could endure
percent calculated at the then current prices), but the fixed it, in fact fired a burst of panic purchasing countrywide in the
capital investment rose by 214 percent and urban and rural second half of 1988. That same year in September, in this grim
residents’ currency income by 200 percent. Owing to ups and economic situation, the 3rd Plenary Session of the 13th Central
downs in grain production in a row of years and the over¬ Committee proposed to improve the economic environment, rec¬
expansion of the population (guidance over family planning work tify the economic order and deepen overall economic reform. The
had been relaxed for a period), the per-capita grain output session also decided to shift the focus of reform and construction
decreased while industrial production went up too quickly, result¬ in 1989 and 1990 to improvement of the economic environment
ing in a new imbalance between industrial and agricultural pro¬ and rectification of the economic order. The plenary session
duction. In the industrial field, basic industry and infrastructural pointed out that the main purpose of improving the economic
construction were not proportionally in balance with the process¬ environment was to decrease overall social demand, control infla¬
ing industry. Energy, communications and supply of raw materi¬ tion and rectify the economic order. That meant correcting disor¬
als lagged behind the over-expanded processing industry. Great ders of all kinds in economic life, particularly in the field of
quantities of industrial production capacity lay idle for long circulation. Resolute and effective measures were to be adopted
periods. The distribution power over funds, foreign exchange, in these two fields. Improvement of the economic environment
materials and equipment was over-decentralized. From 1984 to and rectification of the economic order were in keeping with the
1988, the proportion of the state revenue to the national income objective requirements of economic construction and reform of
decreased from 26.7 percent to 22 percent and that of the central the economic system.
 CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 791
790 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

attempt to change the system of the country. An upheaval was

Political Upheaval in 1989
taking shape.
The campaign to oppose bourgeois liberalization started in On April 15, 1989, Hu Yaobang died of heart failure. His death
early 1987 could not keep going because of Zhao Ziyang’s passive acted as a fuse to touch off the outbreak of turbulence. In some
attitude. In mid-May, Zhao arbitrary asserted that the conserva¬ institutions of higher learning in Beijing, a few anti-Party and
tive tendency to oppose reform and opening up was as dangerous anti-socialist conspirators had been scheming and manipulating
as the ideological tendency of bourgeois liberalization and both underground for a long time. In order to confuse people and
should be opposed equally. Since then the orientation of the poison their minds they spread rumours that Hu had died of
campaign was changed and the ideological tendency of bourgeois political persecution. The memorial activities quickly developed
liberalization ran rampant again. Zhao also seriously neglected into a political demonstration. For a while, rumours were spread
Party-building, the building of an advanced socialist culture and everywhere, while numerous big-character posters and slogans
ideology and political-ideological work. He suggested the “re¬ appeared attacking the chief Party and state leaders, the Party’s
form” of political-ideological work and denied some fine tradi¬ leadership and the socialist system. In just a few days, serious
tional and effective methods of Party political-ideological work¬ incidents occurred; crowds gathered outside the Xinhuamen Gate
ing methods. He failed to adopt effective measures to curb or of Zhongnanhai, the headquarters of the CPC Central Committee
solve the problem of the deteriorating Party style and social and the State Council; illegal occupation of Tiananmen Square
order, and severe decadence among some Party cadres and, in and massive street demonstrations took place. At the same time,
particular, among a very small number of leading cadres. For a such serious criminal activities as beating, smashing and looting
time, the Parly’s prestige among the people declined and its were perpetrated in Xi’an, Changsha, Chengdu and other cities.
fighting power dwindled. The price hikes and economic disorder During this period, the fabricators of the disturbances used the
brought widespread complaints from the people. The temporary student unrest to put forward a series of programmatic political
difficulties which arose during the economic rectification also demands. The two main ones were: first, they demanded reap¬
caused misunderstanding and worry on the part of the masses. praisal of Hu’s merits and shortcomings and cancellation of the
These factors were used by persons both in and outside the Party
Party Central Committee’s decision to dismiss him from his post
who were keen on bourgeois liberalization to attack the Party
in 1987; second, they demanded complete negation of the oppos¬
leadership. On the pretext of reforming the political system, they
ition to bourgeois liberalization, and called for rehabilitation of
published their political views and directly demanded cancella¬
those who were criticized and punished in the campaign to oppose
tion of the four cardinal principles, all-out Westernization and
bourgeois liberalization. Thus, these demands, made at the very
the introduction of a capitalist economic and political system. At
beginning of the turbulence, showed the diametrical opposition
this time antagonistic forces abroad were trying their best to
between bourgeois liberalization and the four cardinal principles.
promote a strategy of peaceful evolution and to exert influence
Confronted with this serious situation, Zhao Ziyang, then general
on China through various channels. Furthermore, the trend of
secretary of the Party Central Committee, like Hu Yaobang, did
thought in favour of “democratic socialism” was widespread and
not oppose or resist it. In fact, he supported the students and
activities of anti-socialist forces were rampant in some socialist
connived with their demonstrations.
countries of Eastern Europe. The pro-bourgeois-liberalization
On April 24, Li Peng presided over a conference attended by
forces in China were encouraged and began to hold political
the Standing Committee members of the Political Bureau of the
gatherings and write letters to the state leading organs in some
big cities, especially in Beijing, in late 1988 and early 1989, in an Party Central Committee (Zhao Ziyang had left for a visit to
792 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC 793
CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

Korea on the previous day) to study the situation. The Standing ing ideas from other Political Bureau members, he expressed
Committee believed that China was confronted with a planned, opinions differing from the stand and principles of the Cen¬
organized political upheaval which was against the Party and tral Committee when meeting with representatives from vari¬
socialism. The conference decided to establish a group under the ous countries and regions at the meeting of the Council of the
Party Central Committee to stop the disturbance. Also the Peo¬ Asian Development Bank on May 4. He said, “There will be no
ple’s Daily issued an editorial explaining the essence of the big turmoil in China,” ignoring the disturbances which had
struggle to the whole Party and the country. On April 25, Deng already surfaced. A host of facts had proved that the real aim of
Xiaoping in an important speech expressed his complete agree¬ the turmoil was to negate the Communist Party leadership and
ment with and support for the decision of the Standing Commit¬ the socialist system. Disregarding this, he still insisted, “They by
tee of the Political Bureau. He also offered a profound analysis no means oppose our fundamental system.” When facts proved a
of the essence of the unrest pointing out that the demonstrations handful of people were making use of the student unrest to
were not ordinary student strikes, but political upheavals reject¬ instigate a turmoil, he simply said that it was “unavoidable” that
ing the leading role of the Party and denying the socialist system. “some people would take advantage of this.” He totally negated
On April 26, People’s Daily published an editorial entitled “A the correct judgment of the Party Central Committee that a few
Clear Stand Against the Turbulence Is Essential.” The editorial people were creating turmoil and in so doing, brought out into
pointed out that a few people “flaunted the banner of democracy public the differences within the Party Central Committee. In¬
to undermine the democratic legal system, their purpose being to spired by his speech, the engineers of the disturbance hectically
spread disunity among the people, throw the country into confu¬ redoubled their activities, again stirring up trouble in a situation
sion and destroy the political situation of stability and unity. This which had already tended to subside. On May 6, Zhao Ziyang,
was a planned conspiracy, a situation of turmoil. Its essence was while meeting with comrades in charge of publicity and ideolog¬
basically to deny the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party ical work under the Central Committee, said, “Loosening up a bit
and the socialist system from the foundation. This was a serious and reporting on the demonstrations increases the degree of press
political struggle confronting the Party and people of all the openness a bit. There’s no great risk in this.” Soon the media
nationalities throughout the country.” The editorial made clear began supporting the student demonstrations and the turmoil,
the essence of the turbulence for the vast majority of the cadres, misleading public opinion. The scale of demonstrations in the
and many students began to realize the seriousness of the issue.
capital and other cities expanded and the number of participants
After May 4, about 80 percent of the students who had partici¬ increased. The instigators of the turbulence adopted a dual policy.
pated in the demonstrations went back to school and order was On the one hand they expressed their willingness to hold “dia¬
quickly restored throughout the country. logues” with the government leaders, and on the other, organized
At this point, Zhao Ziyang, who had only been back for a few a hunger strike. Commencing on May 13, they incited and forced
days from his visit abroad suddenly changed his original attitude some students to hold a hunger strike at Tiananmen Square, and
of support for Deng’s speech and said the People’s Daily editorial, used these students as “hostages” and “stakes” lor realizing their
based on the decision of the CPC Central Committee Political
political plot. The students’ hunger strike aroused the feelings of
Bureau and on Deng’s speech, had misjudged the nature of the
a section of the people who sympathized with the students from
student unrest. He demanded correction of this mistake. His
different angles, together with the misleading publicity; more and
wrong proposal was opposed and resisted by other members of the
more people came forward to express their support, from tens
Standing Committee of the Central Committee. Without solicit¬
of thousands to hundreds of thousands. The Sino-Soviet high-
794 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 795

ranking talks suffered serious interference and some state affairs according to schedule, the ringleaders of some illegal organiza¬
had to be suspended or cancelled. At the same time, demonstra¬ tions instigated people to set up roadblocks to halt military
tions in big cities and provincial capitals expanded quickly, and vehicles. They burnt some of the vehicles and killed PLA soldiers
some appeared in a number of small and medium-sized cities as and army officers. Moreover, they took advantage of the next day
well. The situation was unprecedented. being Sunday to incite more people to take to the streets. This was
In this dangerous turn of events, the Standing Committee of for the purpose of creating momentum for an insurrection to
the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held an overthrow the government and usurp state power. At this crucial
emergency meeting on the evening of May 16. The majority moment, the CPC Central Committee, the State Council and the
considered that in face of this situation, it was absolutely imper¬ CPC Central Military Commission were compelled to act reso¬
missible to retreat, but necessary to counterattack resolutely and lutely. They ordered the martial law troops stationed around the
gain control over the turmoil. Zhao Ziyang disagreed with the capital to move in by force on the night of June 3 to put down
majority and still insisted on retreating. The next day, attendance the counter-revolutionary rebellion. During their advance into
at the demonstrations and attacks on Deng Xiaoping increased on their positions, the troops met with fierce attacks from large gangs
an unprecedented scale. Also, slogans extolling Zhao were aired of marauders and had to adopt necessary armed action in self-
above Tiananmen Square and in the ranks of the demonstrators. defense. In the early morning of June 4, several thousand stu¬
To prevent worsening of the situation and in consideration of the dents withdrew peacefully from Tiananmen Square following
inadequate police force in Beijing to maintain normal production, patient persuasion by the army soldiers, and the square was
work, communication and social order, the Standing Committee cleared again. As the square returned to the hands of the people
of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee decided at and the martial law troops entered the areas under the martial
a meeting held on May 17 to implement martial law in some areas law, the counter-revolutionary rioting was quelled. The situation
in Beijing. On the evening of May 19, a conference attended by in Beijing was quickly brought under control; order was restored
leading members from the Party, the government and military in other big and medium-sized cities fairly soon.
institutions in Beijing was held. It called for emergency action The occurrence of this unrest and counter-revolutionary rebel¬
and decided to adopt resolute measures to stop the turmoil. Zhao lion had a profound social and historical background. As Deng
Ziyang opposed the CPC Central Committee’s decision and re¬ Xiaoping said, “This storm was bound to break out sooner or
fused to attend the conference, openly revealing his split with the later. As determined by the international and domestic climate,
Party. According to the State Council’s decision, starting at 10 it was bound to happen and was independent of man’s will.”24
a.m. on May 20, some areas in Beijing were put under the martial The international situation had a significant bearing on the
law. The engineers of the turbulence still occupied Tiananmen events. Since World War II, the capitalist world was restored
Square and tried to spread the disturbances and escalate the following the post-war crisis, and began to develop again. The new
disorders. Finally, the upheaval in Beijing developed into a science and technology in particular brought about a rapid devel¬
counter-revolutionary rebellion. opment in production and speeded up the transfer of new achieve¬
Throughout the progress of the student demonstrations and the ments to productivity. Some people were puzzled by this situation
hunger strike, the Party and government were patient and did and failed to see the uncompromising, sharp contradictions still
what they could. But as the Chinese saying goes, “The tree may existing in the capitalist system. At the same time, some socialist
prefer calm, but the wind will not subside.” On June 3, while the countries made serious decision-making mistakes which caused
martial law troops were heading for their positions in the capital numerous difficulties to economic construction and social pro-
 CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 797
796 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
VI. ADVANCE FURTHER IN ECONOMIC
gress. As a result the superiority of the socialist system could not
be brought into full play consistently from beginning to end, and
IMPROVEMENT AND RECTIFICATION AND
the image of socialist society among the people was undermined. DEEPENING THE REFORM
In this way, the idea that “socialism is not as good as capitalism”
began to spread unchecked. The political forces in some Western The 4th Plenary Session of the 13th Party Central Committee
countries advocated a strategy of peaceful evolution and strength¬ and Formation of the New Central Leadership
ened penetration of their ideological thought and politics into
socialist countries in a planned way and through various chan¬ After winning a decisive victory in quelling the counter¬
nels, and gave all-out support to all kinds of anti-Communist revolutionary rebellion in Beijing area, the Communist Party
Party and anti-socialist activities in an attempt to shake and seize held its 4th Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee in late
the precincts socialism was occupying. The serious effects of this June 1989, in Beijing. Before the session, the Political Bureau of
“big climate” on intellectuals, young students and some Party the CPC Central Committee held an enlarged meeting to make
members in socialist countries including China should not be necessary preparations.
underestimated in the least. The main task of the session was to discuss the serious
At home, the tendency of bourgeois liberalization appeared mistakes committed by Zhao Ziyang during the anti-Party,
after the overthrow of the “gang of four.” Some people blindly anti-socialism turbulence and to adopt disciplinary measures
worshipped the “democracy” and “freedom” of the Western cap¬ against him. The session examined and approved the Political
italist countries and negated socialism and the leadership of the Bureau’s “Report on Comrade Zhao Ziyang’s Mistakes in the
Communist Party. When this tendency emerged in early 1979, Anti-Party, Anti-Socialism Turmoil” delivered by Li Peng. It
Deng Xiaoping took a clear-cut stand in his speech “Uphold the held that at a juncture involving the destiny of the Party and
Four Cardinal Principles.” Later, he seriously proposed the task the whole country, Zhao Ziyang made the mistake of support¬
of opposing spiritual pollution and bourgeois liberalization. But ing the turmoil and splitting the Party. He bore unshirkable
the principle of opposing bourgeois liberalization was not con¬ responsibility for the formation and development of the rebel¬
scientiously implemented in the following years. After Zhao lion. The nature and consequences of his mistakes were very
Ziyang took over Hu Yaobang’s work in the Central Committee, serious. Although some of the things he had done were bene¬
the tendency of bourgeois liberalization was not checked. On the ficial to China’s reform, opening to the outside world and
contrary, it was allowed to expand steadily and run wild. A group economic development when he held leading posts in the Party
of diehards who persisted in their stand on bourgeois liberaliza¬ and the government, he departed from guidelines and erred in
tion and engaged in political conspiratorial activities became the practical work. Especially after coming to the leading position
main instigators and organizers of the turmoil and riots. Zhao in the Central Committee, he took a passive approach towards
Ziyang who connived at, encouraged and supported bourgeois upholding the four cardinal principles and opposition to bour¬
liberalization, became the representative within the Party of those geois liberalization, and neglected Party building, cultural and
who supported the turmoil. ethical development and ideological and political work, causing
The victory in quelling the turmoil and counter-revolutionary serious losses to the cause of the Party. In view of his mistakes,
rebellion has consolidated our socialist position and the 10-year the session decided to dismiss him from his posts of general
reform and opening up. It provides invaluable experiences and secretary of the Central Committee, member of the Standing
lessons for the Party and the people.
798 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 799

Committee of the Political Bureau, member of the Political

about calmly after the turmoil. They were also issues of close
Bureau, member of the CPC Central Committee and first
concern to the whole world. The 4th Plenary Session pointed
vice-chairman of the Military Commission of the CPC Central
out clearly that “the line, principles and policies adopted since
Committee. Later at the 8th Session of the Seventh NPC
the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee will
Standing Committee, he was dismissed from his post of vice-
continue to be resolutely implemented, and the basic line of
chairman of the Central Military Commission of the People’s
the ‘one central task and two basic points’ established at the
Republic of China.
13th Party Congress will also continue to be resolutely carried
The session made the necessary adjustments in the Party’s
out. The four cardinal principles, as the foundation of national
central leadership. Jiang Zemin was elected general secretary
construction, must be adhered to unswervingly and consistently,
of the Central Committee (Jiang held leading positions in
and the policy of reform and opening to the outside world, as
industrial departments for a long period, once served as mayor
the road to prosperity, must be implemented as usual in a
of Shanghai and secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party
steadfast manner. The country must not return to the old,
Committee); was elected member of the 12th and 13th CPC
closed-door path.”26 Practice proved that the line, principles and
Central Committees and member of the Political Bureau at the
policies laid down since the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th
1st Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee. Jiang
Central Committee were correct. But these principles and pol¬
Zemin, Song Ping and Li Ruihuan were elected members of
icies were not implemented consistently and were not used as
the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC
the basic concept to educate the people, the students, the cadres
Central Committee; the Standing Committee of the Political
and the Party members. Therefore the Party’s task was, on the
Bureau was made up of Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Yao
basis of conscientiously summing up experience, to “persevere
Yilin, Song Ping and Li Ruihuan; Li Ruihuan and Ding
in what is right, correct what is wrong, and do a bit more
Guangen were made members of the Secretariat of the Central
where we lag behind.”27 This was none other than the approach
Committee; Hu Qili and two others were removed from their
adopted by the new leading group of the Party Central Com¬
positions in the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the
mittee for dealing with this most fundamental problem.
Central Committee for supporting Zhao Ziyang’s wrong stand
In face of the grim reality in which some people, who persist
during the turmoil. in bourgeois liberalization, advocate “full Westernization or
Before the plenary session, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the
capitalism under the banner of “reform and opening up, and
political turmoil of the late spring and early summer “prompts us
by absorbing the lessons drawn from Zhao Ziyang’s mistakes
to calmly think about the past and consider the future” and that
of separating the reform and opening up from the Four Car¬
it also “will enable us to more speedily correct our mistakes and
dinal Principles and opposing the one against the other, Jiang
better develop our strong points.”25 In this spirit, the plenary
Zemin spoke at the plenary session. He stressed, “As proposed
session initially summed up lessons and clarified the Party’s
by Deng Xiaoping, the reform and opening up which we
principles and tasks for the present and the future.
resolutely carry out and implement is that carried out under
Should we continue to resolutely implement the Party’s line
the principles of persisting in the socialist road, the people’s
laid down at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11 th Party Central
democratic dictatorship, the leadership of the Communist Party
Committee? Should we still follow the basic line of “one central
and Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. In stark
task, two basic points” summed up at the 13th Party Congress?
contrast, the “reform and opening up” advocated by those who
These were problems our Party and the whole nation thought
stubbornly stick to bourgeois liberalization is one for realizing
 CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 801
800 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
provement and rectification and deepened the reform and open¬
Western capitalism, giving up the people’s democratic dictator¬ ing up. At the same time it strengthened ideological and political
ship, cancelling the leadership of the Communist Party and work and Party-building, overcoming the problem of stressing
abandoning Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. The material advance to the neglect of cultural and ideological pro¬
purpose of their reform and opening up is to bring about gress. As a result, the nationwide political situation was stabilized
capitalism. Of course, this is absolutely unacceptable to our rapidly, the economic situation improved and affairs in the
Party and the people.”28 Jiang’s speech provided a principled ideological field took a turn for the better.
distinction between socialist and capitalist “reform and opening On several occasions before and after the 4th Plenary Session
up.” His remarks were of special importance to overall under¬ of the 13th Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping said: Soon after
standing by the broad masses of the Party members and cadres the new leading group has established its prestige, he would
and to their conscious implementation of the line stipulated resolutely retire from his position on the Central Committee. He
since the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee hoped everyone would unite around Jiang Zemin. He explained
and to the healthy development of China’s construction and several times that it is extremely unhealthy and indeed very
reform and opening up, along the socialist orientation. dangerous to place the fate of a country on the prestige of one or
The 4th Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee also two persons. On the eve of the 5th Plenary Session of the 13th
made an earnest study of the current situation and called on the Central Committee held in November 1989, Deng Xiaoping,
whole Party to do the following four things well: the first was to considering that the new central leading group was effectively
resolutely stop the turmoil and quell the counter-revolutionary carrying on its work and had gradually gamed the trust of the
rebellion, strictly distinguish between the two different types of Party and the people, again handed to the Central Committee his
contradictions and further stabilize the situation of the whole resignation as chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission
country; the second was to persist in the policy of improving the undepressed his willingness to set an example in establishing a
economic environment and rectifying the economic order so as to retirement procedure to end the existing system of life-long
better implement the policies of reform and opening to the tenure in the leading posts of the Party and state. On November
outside world and develop the economy in a sustained, steady and 9 1989, based on his request, the 5th Plenary Session of the 13th
co-ordinated way; the third was to earnestly improve ideological Central Committee adopted the Decision Endorsing Comra e
and political work and make great efforts to carry out education Deng Xiaoping’s Resignation from the Chairmanship of the CPC
in patriotism, socialism, independence and self-reliance, plain Central Military Commission and appointed Jiang Zemin to the
living and hard work, and strictly oppose bourgeois liberaliza¬ post. The session paid great tribute to Deng’s revolutionary career
tion; the fourth was to greatly enhance the building of the Party, and outstanding service, stressing, “The series of viewpoints and
democracy and the legal system, resolutely penalize corruption, theories he has put forth under the principle of combining Marx¬
and accomplish a few items of popular concern so as to live up to ism and Leninism with China’s realities constitute an important
the people’s expectations of the Party. component of Mao Zedong Thought and an inheritance and
The successful convening of the plenary session symbolizes the development of Mao Zedong Thought under new historical con¬
Parly’s “decisive victory won in a life-and-death struggle”29 of the ditions, and are a priceless ideological treasure of the Chinese
Party and the country in stopping the turmoil and quelling the Communist Party and the Chinese people.” The session asked all
counter-revolutionary rebellion. After the plenary session, the Party members to “conscientiously study Comrade Deng Xiao¬
new central leading group has resolutely implemented the Parly’s ping’s works so that they will play an important guiding role in
basic line in an overall way. It strengthened the economic im¬
802 CHAFTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 803
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

the great process of our country’s socialist modernization in the tries by means of peaceful evolution. We also should not underes¬
years to come.”30 timate the damage to the Party-building caused by the unchecked
After the 4th and 5th Plenary Session, the second generation bourgeois liberalization and confusion Zhao Ziyang’s mistakes
of the central leading group with Deng as its nucleus smoothly brought to the Party and the harm done to the actual work.32 As
and gradually transferred its leadership to the third generation of “the problems mainly stemmed from the Party organization, the
the central leading group with Jiang Zemin as its nucleus as Party Central Committee asked “the Party committees at various
planned. (The first generation was established after the Zunyi levels to concentrate their efforts on doing a good job ot Party¬
Meeting with Mao Zedong as its nucleus.) This was of great building according to the requirements of the Party’s basic line,
significance for guaranteeing the stability and continuity of Party and determine to solve current urgent problems in the building
policies and the lasting security of the country. It also attested to of the Party.”33 Only then could the Party stand the tests of the
the high political maturity and organizational strength of the role of a ruling party, of the reform and opening up, development
Party. of commodity economy and opposition to peaceful evolution
under the new historical conditions.
Strengthen Party-Building and Improve Ideological In the autumn and winter of 1989 and in the next year, the
and Political Work Party organizations under the Party Central Committee under¬
took to deal with the impurity of some Party organizations. They
After the 4th Plenary Session, the Party Central Committee checked all the key persons who had participated in the turmoil
first of all concentrated on strengthening Party building. and rebellion and sorted out the major events involved. After the
The struggle to stop disturbances and to quell the counter¬ checkup was basically finished, the whole Party carried out
revolutionary rebellion proved that, in general, the Chinese Com¬ education among its members on the standards for qualified
munist Party was strong and the majority of Party organizations Communists. Based on the principle to be severe with Party
and members were good. No hostile forces could shake them. Also members, some departments proceeded with re-registration of
the turmoil exposed some serious problems in the Party. Some their Party members. The purpose was to solve problems within
Party members were involved in the riots to various degrees and the Party which were exposed in the turmoil and rebellion, as well
a few even became organizers and manipulators of the disturb¬ as the outstanding problems which existed in the daily life of the
ances and rebellion. Some Party organizations were weak and Party.
ineffective and gave up their leadership. A few even supported The work of checking and sorting out was combined with
the demonstrations. The serious corruption of some Party cadres, testing and judging cadres, mainly Party cadres at county level
especially a few leading members, became one of the main factors or above. The standards related to whether they held the same
causing such a large number of people to become involved in the viewpoint as the Party Central Committee in regard to both
unrest instigated by the conspirators. Therefore, Deng Xiaoping ideological recognition and actual behaviour in the curient polit
warned the new central leading group, “It is time to strengthen ical struggle; whether they upheld the four cardinal principles,
Party-building; otherwise it will be too late.”31 To help the whole persisted in the reform and opening up, opposed bourgeois liber¬
Party realize the significance and urgency of strengthening Party¬ alization; and whether they were honest and law-abiding in
building, Jiang Zemin stressed: While analysing the situation performing their official duties as well as brave in opposing
within the Party, we should not underestimate the impact on the corrupt tendencies. According to the resulting judgments, the
Party of foreign hostile forces’ attempt to change socialist coun¬ leading groups of some organizations and departments were read-
804 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 805

justed, with the aim of guaranteeing that the Party’s leadership Party and the government took up the following seven items,
at various levels remained in the hands of Marxists who upheld further checking up and reorganizing companies, resolutely
the four cardinal principles and the reform and opening up, and prohibiting the children of high-ranking cadres from engaging in
of building the leadership at various levels into a strong nucleus business, cancelling the “special supply” of a small number of
for implementing the Party’s line, principles and policies. Consid¬ foodstuff for high-ranking cadres, assigning cars strictly accord¬
ering that the future of socialism in China depended to a great ing to state regulations and forbidding the import of sedan cars
extent on the younger generation, the Party Central Committee and limousines, strict prohibition against holding dinner parties
called on the whole Party to do its best to train large numbers of or giving gifts at state expense, strict control over visits abroad by
successors to the socialist cause. Jiang Zemin also warned the leading cadres, investigation and severe punishment of corrup¬
whole Party that unless we went ahead to solve this problem, it tion, bribery, speculation and other criminal activities, particu¬
would be impossible for our Party to have strong reserve forces larly of big cases. People appreciated this work. The 6th Plenary
and to advance successfully. This was a problem of great strategic Session of the 13th Central Committee held m March 1)90
significance determining whether our socialist cause could long passed the “Decision on Strengthening Party’s Connection with
endure and keep developing.34 the Masses.” The session held that the line of trusting and relying
Party-building should be strengthened first of all in the Party’s on the masses and the principle of “from the masses, to the
ideological enhancement, especially in the field of theory. The masses” which was created and developed by the Party in its long
Party Central Committee proposed that to help Party and govern¬ struggles, was the basic working line of the Parly, one of its finest
ment leaders at county level and above to draw a clear distinction traditions and greatest political superiority. The session pointed
between right and wrong, and to maintain the correct orientation out that relations between the Party and the masses as well as
in a complicated situation, it was necessary to educate them between the cadres and the masses were good in general. But
in the basic theories of Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong bureaucracy, subjectivism, formalism and other negative and
Thought, and to make it a regular, systematic practice. In the corrupt tendencies, which seriously divorced the Party rom the
future all new leading members should be trained in Party masses have affected some Party organizations and cadres in the
schools. Other leading members should also, in turn, study for a preceding few years. In view of this, all Party members were
certain period of time in Party schools. At the same time the enjoined to maintain sharp vigilance and to struggle against these
Party Central Committee paid great attention to the summing up tendencies, and also strive hard to restore and carry forward the
and publicity of experiences in stepping up Party building at the fine traditions and working style of forging close links with the
grassroots units, particularly in stepping up the building of grass¬ masses. The session pointed out that work in the seven lields
roots Party organizations in rural areas, and commended those mentioned should be done well so as to strengthen the Party s tics
who had done excellent work in this field. with the people. After the session, the Standing Committee mem¬
One important aspect in strengthening Party-building was to bers of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee took
carry out the Party’s fine traditions, forge closer relations be¬ the lead in going deep into the grassroots units and among the
tween the Party and the masses, promote clean and honest gov¬ masses to do investigation and research. The Party and govern¬
ernment and to resolutely oppose corruption and degenerates. In ment departments at various levels stipulated relevant measures
July 1989, the Party Central Committee and the Stale Council and implemented them conscientiously. All these efforts promot¬
made the “Decision to Do Several Things of Concern to the ed Party-building. In November of the same year, the Party
Masses in the Near Future.” In keeping with this decision, the Central Committee approved the “Opinions on Improving the
 80(3 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHARTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 807

Party Style and Strengthening the Building of a Clean and Honest areas. The CPC Central Committee pointed out that persisting
Government” put forward by the Central Commission for Disci¬ in and perfecting the system of multi-party cooperation and
pline Inspection, and called on Party organizations at various political consultation under the leadership of the Chinese Com¬
levels to enforce Party discipline, seriously investigate all breach¬ munist Party was of important significance to the building of
es of discipline and handle them properly. The Party Central socialist, democratic politics in China.
Committee also made the suggestion to correct unhealthy tenden¬ While consolidating the Party building, ideological work
cies and disregard for the law and discipline on the part of those among the masses, especially ideological and political work
Party and government cadres who illegally build and equip among students, was also strengthened.
homes for themselves with public money according to standards After the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central
higher than those stipulated by the state. The Party Central Committee, the ideological and propaganda work made positive
Committee emphasized that improving Party style and building contributions to criticism of the “two whatevers,” and emanci¬
a clean and honest government must start with the leading pation of the mind as well as to exploration of the laws
organizations and cadres, and should be implemented resolutely governing socialist modernization and the reform and opening
and consistently. up. But afterwards, some erroneous tendencies, especially the
In December 1989, the Party Central Committee passed the decadent bourgeois ideas of Western countries, have been com¬
“Views on Upholding and Perfecting the Multi-Party Cooper¬ ing in a continuous stream and some quite serious problems
ation and Political Consultation System Under the Leadership have been exposed. Ideas such as preoccupation with money¬
of the Communist Party of China” emphasizing that the system making, scorning lofty ideals and worshipping, or having blind
was China’s basic political system. The opinions also reaffirmed faith in whatever is foreign, have spread, while vulgar, or even
that “long-term coexistence, mutual supervision, esteem for degenerate and decadent moods have developed. Unhealthy
each other, and sharing honour or disgrace jointly” are the practices which were eliminated in the early post-liberation
basic principles guiding cooperation between the Chinese Com¬ years have reappeared. While there are many tactors behind
munist Party and other democratic parties. The Party Central their reappearance, one important reason is the weakening of
Committee decided to strengthen cooperation and consultation ideological work. For a period of time, Zhao Ziyang opposed
of the Communist Party with various democratic parties, fur¬ those comrades who upheld the Four Cardinal Principles and
ther bring into full play the role of the democratic party resisted decadent ideas and bad practices. As a result, part of
members as well as of personages without party affiliation in the media and ideological and cultural front were no longer in
the people’s congresses; recommend democratic party members the hands of the Party and the people. Therefore the CPC
and non-party personages to take leading positions in govern¬ Central Committee emphasized that the related departments
ments at various levels and judicial organs; further bring into must adopt resolute measures to restore a wholesome situation.
play the role of the democratic parties at the people’s political In July 1989, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Circular
consultative conferences and support the self-construction of on Strengthening Propaganda and Ideological Work.” The whole
the democratic parties. Since restoration of their activities, the Party was alerted to clearly understand that China’s reform and
democratic parties have played an important role as partici¬ opening up and modernization construction were being carried
pants in the administration and discussion of state affairs, the out in a complicated international situation. Hostile forces in the
development of education, science and technology and the Western countries were carrying out political and ideological
application of knowledge in the construction of the border infiltration in various ways. They have tried their best to advo-
 NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 809
CHAPTER NINE A
808 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
decadent ideas and evil social tendencies.
cate sham “democracy,” “freedom” and “human rights,” and have The leading groups of some ideological departments were
instigated and supported bourgeois liberalization in China. We readjusted and consolidated; some newspapers and publications,
must adopt a clear stand and carry out sustained, resolute strug¬ social and scientific research institutes, and literary and art
gles against their attempts and activities to bring about “peaceful troupes, which had committed mistakes ot political orientation,
evolution.” The Party organizations at various levels should were rectified ideologically and organizationally in an earnest
attach great importance to this. They should strengthen their
leadership over propaganda and ideological work in order to WdOn the premise of adhering to Marxism, Leninism and Mao
check bourgeois liberalization and ensure that socialist ideas Zedong Thought, the principle of “letting a hundred flowers
dominate the field of ideology. blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend” was conscien¬
Great efforts over a period of time brought a change for the tiously implemented. Rectification was strengthened while litera¬
better. Stressing material progress to the neglect of cultural and ture and art was flourishing. All this resulted in the production
ideological progress was counteracted in the following fields: of a group of good works in the fields ot philosophy, social
Education in basic theory of Marxism, Leninism and Mao science, literature and art. .
Zedong Thought was emphasized again. From 1990 to the first In a word, a series of positive changes have taken place in tne
half of 1991, education in socialist ideas was carried out among fields of ideology and propaganda. .
the Party and government cadres and the broad masses. Educa¬ The improvement in Party building and ideological and polit¬
tion in modern and contemporary Chinese history and the present ical work played a positive role in China’s political and social
situation in China was regarded as important from many sides. A stability; it also provided important political and ideological
group of convincing theoretical articles on socialism and criticism conditions for the rectification and the improvement and deepen¬
of bourgeois liberalization were published. These measures fun¬ ing of reform in the field of economy.
damentally changed the situation in which works propagating
reactionary bourgeois and decadent ideas had spread unchecked
Economic Improvement and Rectification; Completion ot the
in ideological and cultural fields.
Seventh Five-Year Plan
Some effective ideological and educational systems and work¬
ing methods which had been followed for a long time in the The 3rd Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee,
past but which had been set aside for a time, were restored held in September 1988, decided to improve the economic envi¬
and improved. Education was strengthened in patriotism, col¬ ronment, rectify economic order, and deepen reforms. But, as it
lectivism, independence, self-reliance, hard work and respect was nearing the end of the year, little time was left to take
for law and discipline. Through a series of programmes such practical measures. Furthermore, the steps that had been adopted
as praising pace-setters and outstanding workers and learning proved to be ineffective in a short time. Overheating of the
from such heroic persons as Lei Feng, Jiao Yulu and Lai Ning, economy and inflation had not been eased in 1988. Rather, social
a more healthy socialist atmosphere was created. The Party’s
demand continued to swell that year.
fine traditions and working styles shone again in splendour. Compared with the previous year, in 1988 total investment in
The anti-pornography campaign (the nationwide effort to rec¬ fixed assets surged by 23.5 percent; the average per-capita income
tify and check on the markets selling books, magazines and of urban and rural residents for living expenses increased by 22.2
video-audio tapes, especially those emblazoning sex, violence, percent and 17.7 percent, respectively, far above the 11.1 percent
feudalism and superstition) checked the spread of bourgeois
 811
810 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

of growth rate of the national income. The gross industrial output lation area, raising economic efficiency by all means, deepening
value rose by 20.7 percent. The growth rate of the processing the reform and opening the door wider. As determined at the
industry went beyond what the energy and raw material industries meeting, the Party’s leadership in achieving these aims was to be
could cope with. Contradictions within the industrial structure had strengthened effectively. On the basis of summing up experience,
intensified, while tensions in transportation and communications the meeting proposed that economic construction must adhere to
deepened. In agriculture, the output of grain, cotton and edible oil a long-term policy of sustained, stable and concerted develop-
had shrunk to some extent due to frequent natural disasters and
policy mistakes. Under the pressure of excessive social demand, the Resolutions made at the meeting helped the entire Party to
issue of currency was increased by a big margin. This resulted in a unify its views on the economic situation. Thanks to the imple¬
massive financial deficit. The retail price index rose by 18.5 percent, mentation of the Party’s economic policies coupled with correc¬
a scale unmatched in many years. tion of Zhao Ziyang’s mistakes in economic guiding thought and
measures, China’s economy, though still in difficulty, was grad¬
The situation created difficulties for economic development in
1989. Moreover, the political turmoil in 1989 seriously interfered ually brought back onto the path of healthy development. By the
with the economic improvement and rectification and the deepen¬ latter half of 1989, the improvement and rectification policy had
ing of reform, to the further detriment of China’s economy. gained initial success, while greater achievements were scored in
Western capitalist powers imposed “econorhic sanctions” against
China on the excuse of the incident of the recapturing Tiananmen
1990: , „ J . ,-
—Inflation was brought under control. Reduction ol invest¬
ment in fixed assets and curb of rapidly increasing consumer fund
Square by the martial law enforcement troops in Beijing (a
had somewhat allayed the contradiction between rising total
justified deed that was grossly distorted by the Western media).
social demand and inadequate supply, which had been the
This further exacerbated China’s economic troubles. All these
factors demonstrate how great China’s economic difficulties were mainspring of the inflation spiral. Beginning in October 1989, the
in June 1989, when the 4th Plenary Session of the 13th CPC price-rise fell below 10 percent. Retail prices in 1990 were only
2.1 percent higher than the year before. As compared with the
Central Committee was convened.
period of panic buying in 1988, commodities now were plentiful
In this serious economic situation, the Party Central Commit¬
tee, while grappling to stabilize the political situation, resumed and prices were stable.
—Industrial restructuring started. Of investment in basic capi¬
improvement and rectification of the economy to bring about
tal construction, the proportion allocated for agriculture, energy
social and economic stability and development. In the early days
resources, transport and communications — the weak links in the
of November 1989, the 5th Plenary Session of the 13th CPC
national economy — was increased. Investment in productive
Central Committee made the decision to further carry out the
policy of economic improvement and rectification and deepen the enterprises rose, while the construction of such non-productive
reform. The meeting projected a period of three or more years projects as buildings, halls and hotels was curbed. With the
beginning in 1989, for reaching this goal. building of key state projects accelerated, a string of them were
To this end, the meeting stressed the reduction of total social established and put into production.
—Disorders in the field of circulation were rectified on a
demand and implementation of a policy for stringent control over
preliminary level. According to statistics, by the end of 1990,
finance and credit. It focused on strengthening basic fields of
more than 100,000 companies, 35.2 percent of the total number
production such as agriculture, adjusting the structure of indus¬
of firms of one kind or another, were disbanded or merged. Most
try, earnestly rectifying economic order, especially in the circu¬
812 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC 813
CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

of the companies operated by the Party and government institu¬ normal operation of 5 megawatt low-temperature nuclear heat-
tions were dismantled or detached from these institutions. Party supply test reactor; and the successful trial run of 10,000-ton
and government officials could no longer concurrently hold their combined trains on the Datong-Qinhuangdao Railway. Various
positions and accept jobs in these companies. The haphazard educational ventures continued to prosper. China had splendidly
proliferation of companies in the sphere of circulation was hosted the XI Asian Games, firing the national spirit and pro¬
hemmed in and market order was greatly improved. moting the nurture of socialist culture and ideology.
—The national economy grew at an appreciable rate. In 1989, To the surprise of many, China, beset by internal difficulties
the GNP increased by 3.9 percent and in the following year by 5 and external pressure, had curbed the rising inflation and turned
percent. Grain output witnessed bumper harvests in two straight the national economy onto a path ot healthy development in a
years, 1989 and 1990, up from the stagnation of the previous four short period. This demonstrated China’s huge economic potential
years. Following the sluggish market and slow growth in the latter and correct macro-economic policies. Economic stability was
half of 1989 and the first half of 1990 (unavoidable when fighting conducive to social stability on which economic stability itseli
inflation and cooling an overheating economy), industry gradually
was based. . . . , ,
resumed a normal growth rate in the latter half of 1990. In 1989 and Economic improvement and rectification were interlocked
1990, industrial production growth averaged 8.1 percent. with the deepening of reform. They required the support ot
—Foreign trade and economic and technical exchanges contin¬ structural reform, and at the same time created conditions tor the
ued to develop. Exports increased by 10.5 percent in 1989 and deepening of reform and its healthy development. While the locus
18.1 percent the following year. Exports of finished industrial was on improvement and rectification, economic restructuring
products, especially machinery and electrical equipment, in¬ continued to be carried out by centering on this focus and serving
creased significantly, while imports of high-grade consumer goods its aims. A rural socialized service system emerged. The enter¬
were cut down. The mix of import and export commodities was prise contract responsibility system was constantly perfected. The
improved. China continued to absorb foreign capital in proper establishment of enterprise groupings made headway. The system
amounts. The international tourist industry gradually returned to of foreign trade was revamped by establishing export-oriented
normal. Thanks to reduced imports and expanded exports, as well enterprises responsible for their own profits and losses. The
as to an increase in foreign exchange from sources other than pricing system was also revamped by focusing on the price-
trade, China reached a favorable international balance, overcom¬ adjustment of coal, grain, edible oil, labor service, and transport
ing several years of deficit. Cash balances increased substantially. fees. In all these reforms, the anticipated successes were achieved.
Opening up to neighboring countries advanced apace. The Shang¬ China’s multi-type economy with public ownership as the main
hai Pudong New Development Area was established. body continued to grow. The economic sphere of non-public
—Science, technology, education and various social undertak¬ ownership which was expanding in the national economy contri¬
ings continued to develop. New progress had been made in buted to economic growth during the period ol economic im¬
the spread and popularization of new technologies. Important provement and rectification.
achievements were scored in key scientific and technological The Seventh Five-Year Plan expedited by improvement, recti¬
projects. China’s science and technology reached the world’s fication and the deepening of reform was fulfilled by the end of
advanced level in many fields, as indicated by: the successful 1990. The majority of targets for national economic and social
launching of the Asia No.l communications satellite and the development were fulfilled or over-fulfilled. I he annual average
Long March No.2 cluster carrier rocket; the construction and growth rate of the GNP reached 7.8 percent, and the national
 CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIAL,ST CONSTRUCTION
814 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THF- CPC
“shopping-baskets” carry supplies of ever greater.™«ya*i
income, 7.5 percent, surpassing the requirements of the Seventh worth The historical achievements made by the Ormese l«ople
Five-Year Plan. The gross agricultural output value annually indicate that China’s socialist construction towards modernrza
increased by 4.7 percent, above the prescribed 4 percent. Overall tion has passed through an important stage.
growth took place in farming, forestry, animal husbandry, side¬
line production and fishery. The equipment was up-graded some¬ The 7th Plenary Session of the 13th CPC: Central Committee
what. The gross industrial output value grew by an average of and Beginning of Implementation of the Ten-Year
13.1 percent. This exceeded the planned 7.5 percent, gaining the Programme and the Eighth Five-Year Plan
third highest rate of speed next to that of the First Five-Year Plan
and the Sixth Five-Year Plan periods. Industrial production When the Seventh Five-Year: Plan had been fulfilled and
capacity expanded and the technical level was raised. Average implementation of the Eighth Five-Year Plan 0991 95) w^
annual output of major industrial products increased greatly in about to begin, the 7th Plenary Session of he IMiCPC^Centra
comparison with the previous five-year period. People’s living Committee met to examine and approve the Proposals 01 “e_
standards rose further. Real income for consumption in urban CPC Central Committee for the Drawing- P °
and rural areas increased by an average of 4.1 percent. Net Year Programme (1991-2000) and the Eighth Five-Year rU
income increase for farmers averaged 2.4 percent each year. In (1991-95) for National Economic and Social Developmen .
the last two years of improvement and rectification, the living The proposal was worked out after full deliberation and full
standards of the majority of urban and rural residents were preparation. Early in 1990, theStateCouncilset outto wnte
assured, and even raised somewhat. Ten-Year Programme and the Eighth Five-Year Plan.
Since reform and opening were introduced, China’s socialist The method of planning, which differed from past method ,
modernization drive had scored substantial achievements that was advantageous. Hrst, it integrated the Frve-Year Plan into the
attracted worldwide attention. China’s social and economic image Ten-Year Programme. This was because many issues in economic
underwent a profound change. Between 1978 and 1990, China’s Ind lodal development are continuous, therefore need a longer
GNP increased by 2.74 times (during 1980 and 1990, the average time for consideration. Some key construction projects scientrfm
annual growth rate was 9 percent, three times that of the world and technical topics for solving key problems, and the fostering
economy in the 1980s). Gross industrial output value rose by 3.89 of personnel cannot be completed within only one five-year plan
times; of this steel rose by 2.1 times, raw oil 32.7 percent and neriod A five-year plan based on the general tendencies and
electricity 2.4 times. The level of industrialization was raised to targets of the ten-year economic development is bound to be more
a new high. Gross agricultural output value increased by 2.03
times. Science, technology, culture and education further devel¬ effSecondalthefbasfc train of thought for drawing up the ten-year
oped. China’s defenses continued to be strengthened. China has nrneramme and five-year plan had been studied, domestic condi¬
basically settled the problem of feeding and clothing the people, tions and the international situation were ^sed whde the
and the living standards of the urban and rural people have direction and policies for construction and reform were consid
generally improved. In 1990, farmers’ bank deposits totalled ered in their broader aspects before specific formulations were
184.1 billion yuan. The whole outlook in the rural areas has
changed conspicuously. The per-capita income of residents in W°Thlrd°Uin writing the proposals, opinion were repeatedly-sob-
cities and towns increased by 68.1 percent as compared to 10 cited from provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities un
years earlier. Urban service facilities have expanded. The family
 816 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 817

direct central control, the departments under the CPC Central quantity of economic development, and laying more emphasis on
Committee, government organizations, major army units, peo¬ the improvement of the quality of economic growth and the
ple’s organizations, scholars and specialists, as well as leaders of quality of the national economy. 2. Underlining further economic
democratic parties. Thanks to the democratic' process and to structural reform and opening wider to the outside world and
following the mass line, the proposals had concentrated the wis¬ strengthening the cultivation of a socialist spiritual civilization,
dom from all sides rather successfully, thereby winning endorse¬ democracy and a legal system. These will provide guarantees for
ment and support. the fulfillment of the second step of the strategic objemive and
The “Proposals” stipulated that in the last ten years of this the sustained development of the economic system, politics, ideol
century China would realize the second step of the strategic oev and other aspects in the early 21th century.
objective and raise the quality of the national economy as a whole The 7th Plenary Session, on the basis of summing up historical
to a new level. This would be a more important stage in modern¬ and practical experience, set the fundamental guiding princip e^
ization construction. The basic requirements are: to increase the for the drawing-up and implementation of the Ten Year Pro¬
GNP at an average annual rate of about 6 percent in order to gramme and the Eighth Five-Year Plan. These were.
quadruple the 1980 GNP by the end of this century in terms of 8 —Firmly follow the road of building socialism with Chinese
constant price, by dint of greatly improving economic efficiency characteristics. The “Proposals” summed up the basic theory and
and optimizing the economic structure; to raise the people’s living oractice of building socialism with Chinese characteristics and
standards from just having enough to cat and wear to a state of advanced twelve principles. Some of these principles, which had
leading a fairly comfortable life; to expand educational undertak¬ been consistently adhered to by the Party in previous decades,
ings, promote scientific and technological progress, improve eco¬ now had new contents added under the new historical conditions,
nomic management, readjust the economic structure, and give others were a summation of new experience m modern zation
priority to key construction projects so as to lay the material and construction, reform and opening. In all, this was the crystalh
technological foundation for China’s sustained economic and t" the wisdom of the whole Party and the people of all
social development in the early 21st century; to initially establish nationalities- and it incorporated Deng Xiaoping s outstanding
an economic structure and operating mechanism, which suit the contribution’to the carrying on and development of Mao Zedong
development of a socialist-planned commodity economy based on Thought under new historical conditions. The twelve PnnclPf“
public ownership and which combine planning with market regu¬ signify that the Party’s understanding of building socialism wi
lation; and to raise socialist culture and ethics to a new level, and Chinese characteristics is deepening and that the Party is becom
further improve socialist democracy and the legal system. ins more mature. The fundamental guarantee tor the realization
These basic requirements of the second step of the strategic of objectives in the 1990s is to adhere to the path ot building
objective reflect the historical process of China’s national eco¬ socialism with Chinese characteristics. .«
nomic and social development and express the Chinese people’s --Firmly push forward reform and opening to the outsid
earnest wish and ambitions for re-energizing the nation to create world Reform in our country is a process by which the socialist
a strong and prosperous homeland. system improves itself and develops, and it aims at promoting th
The gist of the document includes: 1. Stressing economic growth of the productive forces and all-round social Pro^ss’ ^
construction as the center and regarding economic development giving full play to the superiority of the socialist system,
as the basis on which people’s living standards improve and social go on deepening the reform and open still wider to the outside
progress is made; setting a clear-cut demand on the speed and world on the basis of summing up the relevant experiences gained
818 CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

in the 1980s and in line with the objective requirements for tion in patriotism, collectivism and socialism, re-energizethe
developing the productive forces, so that they can become a national spirit, and improve the general mood of society. These
stronger impetus in pushing forward our economic and social will guarantee the healthy development of reform and opening
development. and economic construction. _r , •
—Firmly implement the principles of developing the national The plenary session pointed out that the last decade of th
economy in a sustained, stable and coordinated way. It is neces¬ century will be crucial in the process of China’s socialist modern¬
sary to strike a basic balance between aggregate social demand ization This is determined by the current domestic and interna-
and supply; conscientiously follow the principle of doing what is tional situation. We must consolidate and carry on the achieve-
within our capacity in arranging for economic construction ments made in the 1980s and greatly promote economic growth
and the people’s livelihood; guard against and surmount over¬ and social progress, to ensure that China enters the 21st century
eagerness for success. While potential of resources is brought to full of vitality. Party members as a whole and people ot al
a full play to promote economic growth, excessive allocation of nationalities must consolidate and develop the political siUiation
the national income should be avoided, to guard against rekin¬ of stability and solidarity, and concentrate on economic construc¬
dling inflation. tion, reform and opening. In this way, our great country will
—Firmly follow the principle of self-reliance, hard struggle emerge more dynamic and prosperous. , ft
and building up the country through thrift and diligence. China In accordance with the “Proposals” of the meeting, draft
is a big developing socialist country and must base economic outlines of the the Ten-Year Programme and Eighth Five-Year
construction on its own efforts. The use of foreign capital and Plan hammered oul by the State Council were
technology must go along with the efforts to develop China’s being approved by the 4th Plenary Session of he Standing
economy and enhance its capacity for self-reliance, so as to fulfill Committee of the NPC in March and April of 1991.
the strategic goal of social and economic development. The real¬ The successful completion of the Seventh Five-Year Plan, the
ization of China’s modernization requires the hard work of sev¬ formulation and execution of the Ten-Year Programme> and the
eral generations. For a long time to come, we must persist in the Eighth Five-Year Plan signify China's emergence from the drffi
principle of building the country through thrift and diligence, culties of 1989 and entrance onto a new stage of development in
practice economy in all fields of work, do everything with dili¬ China’s socialist modernization.
gence and thrift, and eliminate extravagance and waste that exist
to a serious extent in various fields.
—Firmly implement the principle of promoting both material VII. READJUSTMENT IN FOREIGN
civilization and socialist culture and ethics. The promotion of RELATIONS AND PROGRESS
socialist culture and ethics is one of the fundamental tasks in
building socialism with Chinese characteristics. In face of the
IN REUNIFICATION
complicated international situation and the arduous tasks of
reform and construction at home in the 1990s, it is all the more After the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee
necessary for us to promote socialist culture and ethics in real of the CPC in December 1978, the Party made necessary and
earnest. We should make sustained efforts to carry out the strug¬ important re-arrangements in foreign relations to adjust to the
gle against bourgeois liberalization; we should strengthen ideolog¬ changing international situation and the demands of domestic
ical and political work in real earnest, carry out in-depth educa- construction. In this work along these lines, the Party and state
 chapter nine a new prospect in SOCIALIST construction 821
820 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
other countries became involved in. Striving for peace requires
presented a new image. In this work, as in that of socialist optsUion o hegemonism and power politics. In his above-
construction at home, the chief architect was Deng Xiaoping. mentioned talks fn the early 1980s. Deng said that one of the
three major tasks facing us in the 1980s was “to op^se hegemon¬
Foreign Policy at the New Stage ism and maintain world peace in international affairs As tor
opposition to hegemonism. the Party tasten™*denMn ts
In his speech early in the 1980s entitled “The Present Situation international policy both in the new period and before. In March
and Tasks,” Deng stated, “It can be said that internationally the 1985 Deng pointed out, “In the days when Chairman Mao
eighties are an extremely turbulent period, full of crises, but we Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai were leading the country, China
believe that war can be put off and peace maintained for a longer was already opposed to superpower hegemony, regarding it as th
time if the struggle against hegemonism is carried on effectively. source of war” “It follows that opposing superpower hegemony
This is possible, and it is precisely what we are working for. Like means preserving world peace. Since the downfall of the gang of
the people of the rest of the world, we really need a peaceful four,’ we too have made it a state policy to oppose superpower
environment, and thus, for the interest of our own country the
heeemonv and uphold world peace. 3S ... f
goal of our foreign policy is a peaceful environment for achieving The Communist Party of China and the People s :Republic of
the four modernizations.”35 This put forward a new concept for China under the leadership of the CPC have adhered to th
the Party and state in setting general and specific policies in principle of independence and self-reliance, never giving in to any
international affairs. foreign pressures or obeying the baton of any foreign country.
Later in his talks with foreign guests and on other occasions, During the new stage, China’s policy of independence and seU-
Deng repeatedly explained that, following the 3rd Plenary Session reliancc is embodied in the policy of non-alignment " his talks
of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, there has been some with the head of a Latin American country m May 1984, Deng
change in China’s long-term viewpoint which had laid stress on said “China’s foreign policy is independent and truly no
the danger of war. Although the danger still remains, the forces aligned ChTna does not align itself with any country but invan-
checking the war are growing encouragingly. With the further ably pursues a policy of independence. It will not play the Unit
development of global peace-maintaining forces, a large-scale St^es card or fte ‘Soviet Union card.’ Nor will it allow others to
world war was not likely to break out for a relatively long period play the 'China card.’”3’ China’s independent foreign policy of
of time and there was hope of preserving world peace. In May peace and non-alignment conforms to the highest m‘e^es« the
1987, Deng said to guests from a West European country, “Con¬ Chinese people, and is conducive to world peace and stability. It
cerning the overall international situation, in my opinion, it “m£mm contribution to the preservation of world peace.
is possible to maintain peace for a rather long time. War is During the new stage, China will continue to uphold the five
avoidable.”36 This re-appraisal of the issue between war and peace principles of peaceful co-existence advanced by Chinese leaders
served as the starting point for the foreign policy of the Party and in the 1950s and to develop normal relations with other coun nes
state in the new stage. Practice in the past years has proved the in the world based on these principles. China pays special att
judgement is correct. tion to relations with the third world nations.
To say war is avoidable refers to a world war. Possibilities for In his talks in May 1984, Deng Xiaoping said, China 'T
a long-term peace require the concerted efforts of all peace-loving alwavs belong to the third world, and this position is the founda
forces. In fact, regional wars have been occurring every year, even to of our forcign policy. It means that China, being a poor
one such as the 1991 Gulf War which the United States and many
 822 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 823
country, belongs to the third world as a matter of course, that it
shares a common destiny with all third world countries and that Deng added.
At the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, the
it will remain one of them even when it becomes prosperous and
Party initiated the policy of opening up to the outside world.
powerful, because China will never seek hegemony or bully
Unless a big country like China mainly relies on its own efforts
others, but will always side with the third world.”40
in socialist construction, it will not work. But at the same time it
A major problem facing the third world countries is the
will not work unless China opens up.
development of their national economy. Deng summarized the
In his talks with Japanese guests in June 1984, Deng Xiaoping
current world problems as consisting of two: peace and develop¬
pointed out that the current world is an open one. He said, “After
ment. Development requires the establishment of equal and mu¬
the founding of the People’s Republic, we were blockaded, and so
tually beneficial economic relations among countries in a bid to
the country remained closed to some extent, which created diffi¬
help narrow the expanding economic gap between the developed
culties for us. Some ‘Left’ policies and the ‘cultural revolution’ in
countries and the developing countries, and to reverse the tenden¬
particular were disastrous for us. In short, the experience of the
cy toward widening imbalance and growing instability in the
past thirty years or more proves that a closed-door policy would
world economy.
hinder construction and inhibit development.” “As for our rela¬
Therefore, China should strive to maintain world peace, and at
tions with foreign countries, we shall pursue the policy of opening
the same time, improve North-South relations, strengthen South-
still wider to the outside world,”42 he added. Because China has
South ties, and jointly promote a common economic prosperity
adopted a long-term policy of opening, it must establish and
among all the countries in the world.
develop diplomatic, economic and cultural ties with all countries
At the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Commit¬
in the world based on the five principles ot peaceful co-existence.
tee, the focus of the whole Parly’s work was shifted to moderni¬
During the new period following the 3rd Plenary Session ot the
zation in socialist construction. The adjustment in foreign policy
11th Central Committee, the Party has carried on the policies
was in line with the shift in the focus of the Party’s work. China,
proved to be correct in practice in foreign relations, and at the
made up of a quarter of the world’s population, is economically
same time, it has made necessary adjustments and added some
backward and must stick to the socialist road in its drive towards
new factors to conform to the new international situation and to
modernization. Deviating from the socialist road would make it
meet the needs of socialist construction.
impossible for China to realize the four jnodernizations.
In its modernization drive, China needs a peaceful environ¬
ment. It is most advantageous for China’s construction if lasting Foreign Affairs Work of the Party and State
world peace can be achieved. In his above-mentioned talks with
China’s foreign policy in the new stage is embodied in the work
the head of a Latin American country, Deng stressed, “The aim
involving both state diplomatic affairs and other foreign matters,
of China’s foreign policy is world peace. Always bearing that aim
and in the Parly’s own foreign liaison work.
in mind, we are wholeheartedly devoting ourselves to the modern¬
Beginning in the early 1980s, the Communist Party of China
ization programme to develop our country and to build socialism
readjusted its relations with foreign parties. The 12th National
with Chinese characteristics.
Congress of the CPC held in 1982 made the decision to adhere to
“We are now devoting ourselves wholeheartedly to the modern¬
four principles in developing relations with foreign communist
ization of our country, and therefore we sincerely hope that no
parties: independence and self-reliance, full equality, mutual
war will break out and that we can gain a long-lasting peace,”41
respect, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.
 chapter NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 825
824 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

poses imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism, works to

In accordance with these principles, the Party has improved
strengthen unity with the people of other countries, supports the
and strengthened its friendly relations with some parties, resumed
oppressed nations and the developing countries in their just
once-broken ties with others and newly established links with still
struggle to win and preserve in national independence and devel¬
others. Early in 1977, the CPC resumed relations with the party
op their national economies, and strives to safeguard world peace
of Yugoslavia. In 1980, ties between the CPC and the communist
and promote the cause of human progress.” This formalized the
parties of Italy and Spain were restored. Then, the communist
parties of Greece, France and the Netherlands sent delegates to state’s foreign policy in legal terms.
visit China. In turn, the CPC dispatched delegates to attend these After years of negotiations during the 1970s, China and the
United States issued the “Joint Communique on the Establish¬
parties’ conventions. In May 1989, in the wake of normalized
state-to-state relations between China and the Soviet Union, the ment of Diplomatic Relations” on December 16, 1978. According
to its stipulation, China and the U.S. established diplomatic
relations between the two parties were also restored. Prior to this
development, the CPC had resumed its suspended relations with relations on January 1, 1979, realizing normal ties.
some East European communist parties. The Taiwan issue is an important one between China and the
In addition, the CPC established relations with socialist par¬ U.S. Through negotiations, the U.S. government finally recog¬
ties, social democratic parties and labor parties of many nations nized the Chinese government’s position that there is only one
such as Japan, France, Australia and New Zealand. Various links China, that Taiwan is part of China, and that the Government of
the People’s Republic of China is the only legitimate government
and contacts with the nationalist parties in third world countries
of China. The U.S. government also made the commitment that
were also established.
after establishing diplomatic relations with China, it would im¬
By the first half of 1991, the CPC had made contacts of one
mediately suspend its “diplomatic relations” with Taiwan, and
kind or another with more than 270 political parties in the world.
withdraw U.S. military forces and facilities from Taiwan and the
In the last two years, more than thirty foreign political parlies
Taiwan Straits. On this basis, China and the U.S. reached the
began to have contacts and exchanges with the CPC. The princi¬
ples governing relations with foreign communist parties, put agreement on the establishment ol diplomatic relations.
However, soon after, the United States suddenly passed the
forward by Deng Xiaoping and approved by the 12th National
Party Congress, are likewise applicable to relations with foreign “Taiwan Relations Act.” Actually, the law deliberately treated
Taiwan as a state and the Taiwan authorities as a government.
social parlies, social democratic parties, labor parties and nation¬
Many stipulations of the act violated the principles of the com¬
alist parties. Developing relations with different countries and
munique. The Chinese government solemnly warned Washington
parties of various kinds will not be influenced by fine distinc¬
that failure to abide by the agreement on the Taiwan issue and
tions, or outright disparity in ideology.
attempts to interfere in China’s internal affairs would only dam¬
The preface of China’s Constitution, passed by the National
age Sino-U.S. relations and result in no advantage at all to either
People’s Congress in December 1982, stipulates: “China consist¬
ently carries out an independent foreign policy and adheres to the side.
The establishment of Sino-U.S. diplomatic ties ushered in a
five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial
new period in the two countries’ relations and thus was welcomed
integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s
internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co¬ by all countries in the world. However, the U.S. had not complete¬
existence in developing diplomatic relations and economic and ly given up its intentions to meddle in China’s internal matters,
cultural exchanges with other countries. China consistently op¬ and this cast a shadow on Sino-U.S. ties.
 CHAPTER NINF. A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 82
826 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

except in the case of the German Democratic Republic, which

Since the establishment of Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations, the
later merged with the German Federal Republic (West Ger-
exchanges and cooperation between China and the U.S. and the
other Western countries have increased in the fields of economy, While China maintains and develops relations with the West,
culture, science and education, thanks to China’s adherence to some powerful political interests in the United States and the
reform and opening, and her independent foreign policy of peace West keep attempting to realize peaceful evolution in China; that
and self-reliance. is, to turn socialist China onto the path of capitalism through
After China and Japan established diplomatic relations in economic and cultural exchanges as well as other channels. The
1972, the two countries concluded the Sino-Japanese treaty on Communist Party, government, and people of China maintain
peace and friendship. During their exchange of visits in 1982 and
vigilance over this tendency.
1983, top leaders of the two nations put forward the four princi¬ At the turn of spring and summer of 1989, some Western
ples of “peace and friendship, equality and mutual benefit, mu¬
backstage provocateurs became deeply involved in China s polit¬
tual trust and long-term stability,” laying the foundation for
ical turmoil. Afterwards, certain Western nations imposed so-
long-term, friendly cooperation on an equal footing. While Sino-
called “sanctions” aimed at putting pressure on China, meddling
Japanese ties arc developing and expanding, the Chinese govern¬
in China’s internal affairs, and reversing China’s socialist direc¬
ment and the Chinese people, from their position of preserving
tion. Setbacks and complications arose in China’s relations with
peace in the Asia-Pacific region, are concerned about the attempt
the U.S. and other Western countries to different degrees. China s
of some Japanese to revive militarism.
foreign trade was damaged to some extent. The People’s Republic
In the late 1980s, China and the Soviet Union normalized
of China did not yield to the unreasonable “sanctions, just as in
relations after they had settled or partially settled some of the
the past it had never yielded to pressure from outside. To isolate
issues which had presented obstacles, conforming to the wish of
China and to impose “sanctions” were unfavorable not only to
the peoples of the two countries. In May 1989, Mikhail Gorbach¬
China, but to those who implemented them. Since the second halt
ev, general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, visited
of 1990, some Western countries have come to see the importance
China, making a breakthrough in normalization of relations
of restoring and maintaining normal relations with China and
between the two countries and the two Parlies that had been
have set about to improve them. Those Western political lorces
suspended for more than twenty years. The tours to the Soviet
that attempted to impose sanctions and put pressure on China to
Union of Chinese Premier Li Peng in 1990 and CPC Gener¬
give in failed. China stood the test, was tempered and came out
al Secretary Jiang Zemin in 1991 further enhanced the good-
even more resolute in continuing reform and opening along the
neighborly relations. The restoration of Sino-Soviet relations fun¬
socialist path. , .
damentally reversed the situation of confrontation which had
China has long maintained friendly relations with the coun¬
prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s, but did not revive the alliance
tries and the peoples of the third world. These relations were
which existed in the 1950s. These good-neighbourly relations are
strengthened after Western powers imposed “sanctions” against
based on the five principles of peaceful co-existence and arc of
China That is one of the reasons why some of them had to halt
worldwide importance. the “sanctions.” In the 1980s, China established diplomatic rela¬
The internal political situations in the East European countries
tions with more countries in Latin America, Africa, Western Asia
changed dramatically in 1989. In accordance with the existing
and the South Pacific. During 1990 and 1991, there were frequent
foreign policy and the five principles of peaceful co-existence,
exchanges of visits between Chinese leaders and leadeis of coun
China’s normal relations with these countries were maintained,
 CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 829
828 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC

addition to affairs involving world peace and each individual

tries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania. In 1990 alone, country’s own security problems, China also enthusiastically par¬
China established diplomatic relations with four countries -Na¬
ticipates in international economic, social and cultural coopera¬
mibia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and the Marshall Islands, and in
tion. In 1990, China played a special role in the efforts ol the
the case of Indonesia, restored diplomatic relations which had
United Nations to solve the Gulf crisis.
been suspended for nearly twenty-three years. In addition, China
In the 1980s, China settled the problems of the return ot Hong
normalized relations with Mongolia and Laos.
Kong and Macao. This was an important event in China’s history
Because of the anti-China policy of expelling ethnic Chinese
and a great victory for China’s foreign policy. On Deng Xiao¬
from Viet Nam carried out for many years by the Vietnamese
ping’s initiative, representatives of the Chinese government and
authorities, and following massive military aggression by Viet
the British government negotiated on the Hong Kong issue. On
Nam against Democratic Kampuchea, Sino-Vietnamese relations
December 19, 1984, following two years of talks, the heads ot the
sharply deteriorated. By 1990 and 1991, the Vietnamese Party
and the government expressed hopes to restore friendly and two governments formally signed a joint declaration on Hong
neighbourly relations with China, following which ties between Kong in Beijing. The document clearly stipulates that the Gov¬
the two countries improved. Thanks to the framework document ernment of the People’s Republic of China will resume sovereign¬
issued by the five UN Security Council permanent members and ty over Hong Kong as of July 1, 1997. The settlement of the Hong
supported by painstaking efforts of the ASEAN countries, and Kone issue set an example for the settlement ol the lutuie ot
thanks to China and Viet Nam’s shared hopes for an early Macao. Representatives of the Chinese government and the Por¬
settlement of the Kampuchean question, the emergence of a tuguese government held negotiations and on April 13, 1987, the
peaceful, independent and non-aligned Kampuchea, the long heads of the two governments signed a joint declaration in Beijing
cherished hopes of the Kampucheans, begins to look possible. on the Macao issue. It states that the Government of the People’s
In accordance with the principles that all countries, big or Republic of China will resume the sovereignty over Macao as ol
small, should be equal and should not interfere in each other’s December 20, 1999. Hong Kong and Macao have been part of
internal affairs, that all countries have an equal right to develop¬ China’s territory from the very beginning. However, the two
ment, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, China regions have long been occupied by Britain and Portugal tor
joined other developing countries in advancing a proposal for reasons buried in history. It is a historically-inherited problem
building a new international economic and political order. This which could not have been solved or even dreamt of being solved
aroused wide attention throughout the world and an especially by governments of the past. The idea ol “one country, two
warm response from the developing countries. systems” put forward by Deng Xiaoping provided favorable con¬
As a member of the United Nations and a permanent member ditions for an agreement over Hong Kong and Macao. When
of the UN Security Council, China has played a positive role in China and Britain reached basic consensus during the talks on the
this organization. China has been a strong advocate of the mainte¬ Hong Kong problem, Deng said to Sir Jeffrey Howe, British
nance of world peace, easing of international tension, disarma¬ foreign secretary at the time, “1 am confident that the ‘one
ment — in particular, the reduction of nuclear arms and other country, two systems’ concept will work. International reaction to
arms of the superpowers — opposition to all kinds of aggression such a solution will be favorable, and the solution will set an
and hegemon ism. China’s activities in the UN are characterized
example for other nations in settling disputes which history has
by firmly standing with broad third-world countries, in a cease¬
imposed upon them.”4'
less endeavor to implement the UN Charter and its principles. In
830 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 831

“One Country, Two Systems” Scheme and the Great Cause of tern is conducive to the sustained prosperity and stability of the
Reunification of Motherland two regions; and to maintain the prosperity and stability of the
two regions is not only conducive to the people in them but to
Restoration of China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao China as a whole. The main part of China is socialist. In a big
is a matter of diplomacy which requires negotiations with the socialist country, to allow a tiny region to practice capitalism will
British and Portuguese governments. However, after Hong Kong not hurt the overall course of socialism, but, will benefit it.
and Macao return to the motherland, what policy China follows The idea of “one country, two systems” was first presented as
in the two regions is China’s own internal affairs, in the Sino- a means of settling the Taiwan issue. The policy on Taiwan’s
British and Sino-Portugucsc joint declarations, the Government return to the motherland and the peaceful reunification (the
of the People’s Republic of China reaffirmed its basic future nine-point declarations), put forward on the eve of the 1981
policy towards Hong Kong and Macao. After China resumes National Day by Ye Jianying, then chairman of the Standing
sovereignty over the two regions, it will set them up as two special Committee of the National People’s Congress, actually proposed
administrative regions. The two regions will enjoy substantial “one country, two systems,” though the term was not used.
self-government, except in foreign affairs and national defense, How could the Taiwan problem be solved and cleavage between
which will be controlled by the central government. Their current the two sides of the Taiwan Straits be removed and reunification
social and economic systems as well as life styles will remain realized? Force should not be used unless Taiwan moves towards
unchanged. Further detailed explanation regarding this kind of “independence” or imperialists launch armed invasion of Taiwan.
basic policy was provided by the Chinese government and at¬ The problem should be settled in a peaceful way. How, then, can
tached to the joint communique as an appendix. It concretely the question be settled in a peaceful way? in his speech on
specifies that when the two special administrative regions are February 22, 1984, Deng Xiaoping pointed out, “The plan we
established, the socialist system and its policies will not be intro¬ have proposed for reunifying the mainland with Taiwan is fair
duced, and that Hong Kong and Macao’s existing capitalist sys¬ and reasonable. After reunification, Taiwan can go on practicing
tem and life styles will remain unchanged for fifty years. This is capitalism while the mainland practices socialism, all within the
the “one country, two systems” programme. The Basic Law of the same unified China. One China, two systems.”44
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Repub¬ A concrete programme has been formed gradually on the basis
lic of China, passed by the National People’s Congress in April of the only reasonable proposal leading to China’s reunification.
1990, spells out the programme in greater detail. It explains how An official of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the CPC Central
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region within socialist Committee said on June 7, 1991, ‘“One country, two systems’
China is to operate the capitalist system. The Basic Law of the means that two different political, economic and social systems
Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of will be practiced in one country. Neither Of the two parties seeks
China drawn up by the NPC drafting committee was also dis¬ the defeat of the other; instead, they respect each other and share
cussed and passed by the National People’s Congress. prosperity. In accordance with the policy, after the reunification,
Why will China implement a special policy in Hong Kong and China’s mainland will carry out the socialist system while Taiwan
Macao after regaining national sovereignty there? This was an will practice capitalism. The current political, economic and
important decision; its point of departure, the actual historical social systems as well as life styles will remain unchanged. Tai¬
situation. Hong Kong and Macao have long been carrying out the wan, as a special administrative region, will have a high degree
capitalist system. To maintain their original socio-economic sys- of autonomy with an independent judiciary; the final judgement
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 833
832

will not rest with Beijing. Also, Taiwan can keep its army. The question is solved through peaceful coexistence, the issue will be
fundamental interests of the Taiwan authorities, parties con¬ defused and these people will shed their illusions accordingly.
cerned and the Taiwan people will be guaranteed. This is not a This would be a very good thing lor the peace and stability of the
measure of expediency but a basic, long-term policy.” Pacific region and of the rest of the world. 46
The officia. formally proposed that “the CPC and the Kuo- The great unity of the motherland including Taiwan, Hong
mintang send representatives to establish contact in order to Kong and Macao is a trend certain to reach fulfillment. Hong
create conditior.; for negotiations towards the formal ending of Kong and Macao will return to the motherland in the 1990s and
hostilities between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits and gradual follow the plan of “one country, two systems.” Using the same
peaceful reunification. They can also, while adhering to the approach, all kinds of obstacles will be solved concerning the
principle of one China as a premise, discuss other problems that Taiwan problem, with the long-standing efforts by mamlanders,
the Taiwan authorities are concerned about. Representatives of Taiwanese and overseas compatriots, and with the increasing
other political parties and groups of the two sides can be invited exchanges and deepening of mutual understanding between the
to the negotiations.”45 people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits as well as with the
“One country, two systems” is a bold, highly creative policy. motherland becoming stronger and more prosperous.
Socialism, as China’s main form, has made great achievements in
the modernization drive and has unlimited vitality. The state does
not seek to obtain even one penny from Hong Kong and Macao NOTES
after reunification. (It is stipulated that the entire revenue of the
special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macao should 1. From a joint editorial dated February 7, 1977, by People’s Daily, Red Flag and
be used for local purposes, and not to be handed over to the T ihpration Army Daily. It was approved by Hua Guofeng.
2. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-82), Chin, ed., Peoples Publishing
central people’s government, and nor should it levy taxes on the
two regions. This principle is also applicable to Taiwan after TfeleMf’WorkTor^nfhaopi^ (1975-82), Chin, ed., People's Publishing
peaceful reunification.) The mainland is not fearful of capitalism
TZieaefworklof Deng Xiaoping (1975-82), Chin. ed.. People's Publishing
practiced in several other regions. It believes that reunification
will make China even more prosperous in its modernization drive. Tsd'ecT/’Workfof Deng Xiaoping (1975-82), Chin, ed., People’s Publishing
Although the Taiwan problem is an internal one, it is related
*°Srtec?efwo)kff Deng Xiaoping (1975-82), Chin, ed., People’s Publishing
to Sino-U.S. relations. A peaceful settlement of the Taiwan prob¬
lem will be favorable to the whole world. On October 31, 1984, f°SdMefwork\5lfnDeng9Xiaopmg (1975-82), Chin, ed.. People's Publishing
Deng Xiaoping said, “The question of Taiwan constitutes the House, 1983, p. 165.
main obstacle to better relations between China and the United Vsdecfed Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-82), Chin, ed., People’s Publishing
States, and it is even possible that this question could develop into
a crisis between the two nations. If the ‘one country, two systems’ IfTprior^tothis \he 5th Plenarv Session of the Party’s 11th Central Committee
held in February of 1980 decided to set up the Central Committee s Secretariat
approach is adopted, not only would China be reunified, but the and elected Hu Yaobang general secretary. Alter he became chairman of the 1 arty
interests of the United States would not be impaired. There are Central Committee, he was concurrently general secretary. After more than one
year, tile Constitution adopted by (he 12th National Party Congress St,pula ed
some influences in the United States today who, carrying on the that there should no longer be a chairman of the Party. The 5th Plenary Session
‘Dulles doctrine,’ regard Taiwan as a U.S. ‘aircraft carrier’ or as of the 1 llh Central Committee endorsed Wang Dongxing s request to resign
a territory within the US sphere of influence. Once the Taiwan his post of vice-chairman of the Party Central Committee and other jobs.
834 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CHAPTER NINE A NEW PROSPECT IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 835

11. Selected Works of Chen Yun (1956-85), Chin, ed., People’s Publishing House, ed., Party Literature Publishing House Under the CPC Central Committee, 1987,
1986, p. 245.
12. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-82), Chin, ed., People’s Publishing 37^Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-82), Chin, ed., People’s Publishing
House, 1983, pp. 293, 287 and 294.
13. Selected Works of Chen Yun (1961-85), Chin, ed., People’s Publishing House, 38°UDeng Xiaoping: Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (revised and
1986, p. 224. cniaraed ed.), People’s Publishing House, 1987, pp. 94-95.
14. Selected Works of Li Xiannian (1935-88), Chin, ed., p. 367. 39. Deng Xiaoping: Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (revised and
15. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-82), Chin, cd.. People’s Publishing enlarged ed.). People’s Publishing House, 1987, p. 44.
House, 1983, pp. 149-150.
16. Selected Works of Chen Yun (1956-85), Chin, ed., People’s Publishing House, 41. Dene Xiaoping: Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (revised and
1986, pp. 222, 226 and 227. enlarged cd.), People’s Publishing House, 1987, pp. 44-45.
17. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-82), Chin, ed., People’s Publishing
House, 1983, p. 147. 43. Deng Xiaoping: Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (revised and
18. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-82), Chin, ed., People’s Publishing enlarged cd.), People’s Publishing House, 1987, p. 58. . . . . . ,
House, 1983, p. 275. 44. Deng Xiaoping: Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (revised and
19. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-82), Chin, ed., People’s Publishing enlarged cd.), People’s Publishing House, 1987, p. 38
House, 1983, pp. 371-372. 45 Xinhua News Agency, June 7, 1991, People s Daily, June 8, 1)U.
20. Deng Xiaoping: Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (revised and 46. Dens Xiaoping: Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (revised and
enlarged cd.). People’s Publishing House, 1987, p. 32. enlarged cd.). People’s Publishing House, 1987, p. 85.
21. Deng Xiaoping: Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (revised and
enlarged ed.), People’s Publishing House, 1987, p. 143.
22. Important Speeches by Comrade Deng Xiaoping (February-July 1987), Chin,
ed., Parly Literature Publishing House under the CPC Central Committee, 1987,
p. 10.
23. Documents of the 13th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party,
Chin, ed., People’s Publishing House, 1987, p. 40.
24. Deng Xiaoping: “Speech at a Meeting with Commanders Above the Corps
Level of the Martial Law Enforcement Groups in Beijing,” June 9, 1989, pub¬
lished on June 28, 1989, by People's Daily.
25. Deng Xiaoping: “Speech at a Meeting with Commanders Above the Corps
Level of the Martial Law Enforcement Troops in Beijing,” June 9, 1989, published
on June 28, 1989, by People's Daily.
26. “Communique of the 4th Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee of
the Chinese Communist Parly” adopted on June 24, 1989.
27. Deng Xiaoping: “Speech at a Meeting with Commanders Above the Corps
Level of the Martial Law Enforcement Troops in Beijing,” June 9, 1989, published
on June 28, 1989, by People's Daily.
28. Jiang Zemin: “Speech at the 4th Plenary Session of the 13th Party Central
Committee” on June 24, 1989.
29. “Circular of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on
Strengthening Party-Building” on August 28, 1989.
30. People's Daily, November 10, 1989.
31. Main points of Deng Xiaoping’s talks given on June 16, 1989.
32. People's Daily, August 22, 1989.
33. “Circular of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on
Strengthening Party-Building” on August 28, 1989.
34. People’s Daily, October 29, 1989.
35. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-82), Chin, ed., People’s Publishing
House, 1983, p. 205.
36. Important Speeches by Comrade Deng Xiaoping, (February-July 1987), Chin.
 837
CONCLUSIONS

cation leveled against it by foreign aggressive forces. China has

built up a strong enough national defense to safeguard its securi¬
ty. New China stands erect in the East as an independent and
sovereign state, developing equal exchanges with the rest ot the
CONCLUSIONS world and actively participating in world affairs.
Second, unification. This represents a fundamental change in
the state of disintegration China fell into as a result of the
ADVANCE ALONG THE ROAD OF scramble for entry. The unity of the whole people and among all
SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE nationalities has been increasingly strengthened. This unity is
based on the people’s democracy, a situation which had never
CHARACTERISTICS emerged in China’s modern history or even in China’s entire past
history China will go on to bring about the unification ot Hong
Kong,’ Macao and Taiwan with the motherland according to the
After its founding in 1921, the Communist Party of China,
principle of “one country, two systems.”
continuing the efforts put forth by generations of its advanced
Third, democracy. The founding of New China put an end to
predecessors, resolutely took up the cause of the national-
the rule of the exploiting classes which had lasted for thousands
democratic revolution in order to change China’s fate as a semi-
of years, as well as to the rule of the reactionary classes supported
colonial and semi-feudal nation. The Party led the Chinese people
by imperialism. I t also ended infringement upon the most elcmen-
in a struggle lasting twenty-eight years to gain the great victory
tarv rights of the broad masses to existence. The people have
of the new-democratic revolution, and finally in 1949 found the
become masters of the country and society. Their right to 1 reedom
People’s Republic of China. China then entered upon a historical
is guaranteed; workers and peasants who had been oppressed at
period of establishing and developing socialism.
the lowest stratum of the old society have stood up. The Consti¬
The 42nd anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic
tution stipulates: The People’s Republic of China is a socialist
was celebrated three months after the 70th anniversary of the
state under the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the work¬
founding of the CPC. This meant that it had been forty-two years
ing class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. The
since China entered the socialist period, which is still continuing.
dictatorship is aimed at only a handful of enemies who try to
Before the victory of the new-democratic revolution, the Party
sabotage the basic state systems. The broad masses of workers,
Central Committee called on the whole party and people to
peasants, intellectuals and people of other classes and strata enjoy
struggle for the building of an independent, united, democratic,
prosperous and strong new China. Have all these goals been political, economic and cultural democratic rights. Through vari¬
ous channels and forms, they can participate in the management
attained?
First, independence. The People’s Republic of China was of state affairs, economic and cultural aflairs and other social
founded against the will of the imperialist countries which had affairs. . , .
oppressed, exploited and controlled China for a long time. Sub¬ Fourth, prosperity. Old China’s industry was extremely back¬
jected to foreign pressure of all kinds after its founding, the ward, its agricultural production could not satisfy the baicst
republic nevertheless succeeded in maintaining its independence, needs of the population and the country had almost totally lost
sovereignty, territorial integrity and national dignity. It the ability to defend itself. 'This impoverishment and weakness
triumphed over the isolation, blockade, interference and provo¬ have gone forever. New China has established an independent

836
838 839
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC conclusions

and complete industrial setup and national economic system Tortuous Course
which is initially thriving and prosperous. The output of major
Just as during the new-democratic revolution, the Party during
industrial and agricultural products has leaped to leading places
the 42-year socialist period struck a path which was neither
in the world. Without economic development, the state’s inde¬
pendence and unification could not have been guaranteed, nei¬ smooth nor straight.
After the founding of the People’s Republic, the Party spent
ther would the people’s democracy. At present, China is striving
seven years in basically finishing the task of the socialist revolu¬
to accomplish its construction of socialist modernization and
tion to realize the transition from new democracy to socialism.
there is still a long way to go before it attains the prosperity
That is an amazing achievement. To realize this transition, the
desired by the people. However, the 42-year struggle has laid a
Party, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, creatively solved
solid foundation for the country’s prosperity and an inspiring
many’ complicated problems. With the socialist system basically
perspective is within reach.
set up, the Party was confronted by a number of questions such
Independence, unification and prosperity are goals which
as how to continue to advance, how to undertake socialist con¬
several generations in modern Chinese history aspired to but
struction and how to improve and perfect the socialist system.
failed to reach. Now all these goals have been attained. They Generally speaking, there was no ready-made experience any¬
were possible only because of the victory of the new-democratic where in the world, and according to Marxist principles, no
revolution and after it, setting out on the socialist road. China’s country’s history can be a repetition ol another country s. Every
new-democratic revolution and socialist revolution and con¬ party and people must pursue a road of development that suits
struction are all led by the Communist Party. Without its the specific conditions of its own country. In particular, China
leadership, there would have been no victory of the new- was a big, backward agricultural country in the East, different
democratic revolution or of socialism, let alone of any of the from European countries. It had accumulated its own experiences
above-mentioned goals. during long-term revolutionary struggles and formed its own
Historically, practice has fulfilled the prediction of Mao traditions. Furthermore, the painful lessons from indiscriminate¬
Zedong. Early on in the late 1930s, he expounded the whole ly copying the Soviet experience prohibited China from copying
process of the Chinese revolution. He said the whole revolution that of other countries. In the early days of socialist construction,
led by the Communist Party of China includes two stages—the China learned from the Soviet Union in many aspects (not
democratic revolution and the socialist revolution. Because copying indiscriminately). But the Chinese communists headed
China’s bourgeois-democratic revolution could win victory only by Mao Zedong soon found out that the experience of the Soviet
under the leadership of the proletariat through the Communist Union was not completely successful and that China must take
Party, it is a new-democratic revolution. The first stage pre¬ warning from its unsuccessful aspects. China’s socialist road, like
pares conditions for the second and the two stages must the road of the democratic revolution, must be discovered by the
dovetail, allowing no bourgeois dictatorship between to inter¬ Chinese themselves.
vene. The victory of the new-democratic revolution inevitably The Party Central Committee with Mao Zedong at the core led
leads to socialism. the whole party and people to seek this road. They made tremen¬
The Communist Party of China is a great party capable of dous efforts, achieved magnificent results and accumulated wide
leading the whole course of the Chinese revolution, including the experience, both positive and negative. As practice has proved,
new-democratic revolution, the socialist revolution and socialist both in the democratic revolution and the socialist undertaking,
construction. the general principles of Marxism and Leninism must be com-
 841
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CONCLUSIONS
840
of the previous twenty-nine years.
bined with China’s concrete realities. To work out such a combi¬
Except for the beginning seven years which were relatively
nation, especially a good one, is particularly difficult, considering
smooth, it can be said that the road traveled by China during all
that socialism is a brand-new undertaking in the history of
the twenty-nine years was rough and bumpy. In its socialist
mankind and China is building its socialism on an extremely
undertaking, the Party made two big mistakes which brought it
backward foundation. There is the problem of correctly under¬
two big setbacks. One mistake, made between 1958 and I960 was
standing China’s concrete realities—that is, China’s national con¬
epitomized by the “great leap forward”; the other, between 1966
ditions—viewed from the angle of socialist construction and also
and 1976, was marked by the “cultural revolution.” These two
the problem of how to properly grasp the principles of Marxism
mistakes and setbacks were caused by serious deviations during
and Leninism concerning socialist society. the Party’s independent search for China’s own socialist road.
Not until the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central
How should these mistakes be viewed? It would be quite wrong
Committee held in 1978 could the Chinese Communist Party,
to say that the Party was devoid of any merit and to describe it
under the leadership of its Central Committee with Deng Xiao¬
as an utter failure just because it had made mistakes, since that
ping at the core, finally find a road for socialist construction with
is not in accordance with the facts. On the other hand, to
Chinese characteristics. This road is generalized as having “one
disregard these mistakes and refuse lo investigate them or to sum
central task and two basic points.” This is also a road adhering to
up experience and lessons from them, would also be wrong.
the principles of Marxism and Leninism on socialism and one
The two big mistakes and setbacks during the twenty-nine
proceeding from the reality in everything. years were manifestations of the “Left” guiding ideology. During
The 42-year history of the CPC after the founding ot New
that time, the Party launched several incorrect struggles against
China can be divided into two periods. The first period consists
the Right’deviation. This does not mean that Right errors should
of the twenty-nine years before the 3rd Plenary Session ot the
not be opposed and corrected. The Party had made the Right-
11th Party Central Committee and the second, of the following
deviationist errors during the period ot the new-democratic revo¬
thirteen years. . . lution and it assimilated experiences in correcting these errors
During the thirteen years, China made far greater achieve¬ Even after the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central
ments in all aspects of its socialist undertaking compared with the Committee, the Party corrected, in time, a number ol Right
preceding twenty-nine years. Although there were some small
tendencies which would have been otherwise very harmtul. The
setbacks during this period, the Party could always correct its
experience of many foreign parties also enabled us to see the
deviations in time, solve problems and gain new' experience. serious harm of the Right deviation. Historical experience warns
Practice has proved that the Party’s lines and policies since the
us that in the period of socialist construction, the Right tendency
3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee are correct.
may lead to the abandonment of socialism and the Party leader¬
History cannot be disjoined. The recent thirteen years can not
ship. Therefore, it is necessary to guard against and oppose Right
be separated from the preceding twenty-nine years. Without the tendency. “Left” tendency, under Chinese conditions, usually
achievements of the preceding twenty-nine years as the founda¬
reveals itself as impatience lo make headway, over-anxiety lor
tion, there could not have been the greater achievements of the quick results, and the blind pursuit of advanced production
next thirteen years, or the correct road after the 3rd Plenary relations together with speedy development of the forces of pro¬
Session of the 11th Central Committee. The lines and policies
duction regardless of objective conditions and laws. The other
following the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee manifestation of “Left” tendency consists of undue emphasis on
were made on the basis of both positive and negative experiences
 843
CONCLUSIONS
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
842
This is why we should pay attention to negative experiences as
class struggle, magnifying it without overall objective investiga¬ we5 as learn the positive ones as we study the Party’s history
tion and analysis of the actual social, economic and political We are fully confident in the future of Chma s socialist und
situation. As a matter of fact, “Left” tendency never leads to taking under the leadership of the Communist Party. This.is not
development and progress but only causes chaos and retrogres¬ nnlv because the Party has scored great achievements in this
sion. “Left” tendency can fabricate “class struggle” and wreak endeavor but also because the Party has made ser'ous 1“Thad
havoc within its own ranks. It cannot use proper methods to and through the lessons and experiences comprehends what
handle or solve class contradictions and class struggle which failed to understand in the past. Com-
really do exist within a definite sphere. Therefore, in socialist At the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Sf”
construction, “Left” tendency can similarly lead to the abandon¬ munist Party. General Secretary Jiang Zemin said These
ment of socialism and the Party’s leadership and thus must also nast'seventy ffears show that our Party, armed with Marxism-
be prevented and opposed. Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and endowed with revolu¬
There is no party which is immune to making mistakes. What tionary fireativity, has been able to maintain independence and
is important is whether it can learn lessons from them, and from tionary creau y the masses, struggled
those of others as well. Its own errors are usually better textbooks. made endless sacrifices for the fundamental in-
Big mistakes are, of course, very bad, but since they usually erest of the Chinese people. It has held fast to what is right and
reflect profound problems, they are especially worth earnest j j wh„t wrong And it was able to stand the trials of
study as textbooks. Error is often the precursor of what is correct, r^ess and setbaerhigh and low tides, favorable and unfavob
but this is not unconditional. The key point lies in knowing how able circumstances, proving that no enemy or adJers^
to sum up experience. ever crush or destroy it. Enduring countless ordeals, °ar Par y
The CPC is a great, glorious and correct party not because it has never gone into decline; tempered by innumerable hardships,
never makes mistakes but because it is good at summing up hw ill'become even stronger. Our Party has proved itself to be a
experiences and lessons, understanding objective laws better great, glorious and correct party!
through errors, and amending errors as well as making them the
precursors of correct action. Great Achievements in Forty-two Years
During the new-democratic revolution, the Party made two big
mistakes which accounted for the two big defeats in 1927 and Reviewing the past forty-two years, people keep saying that if
1934 The Party learned lessons from these two big mistakes and there had been no setbacks, we would have made ^ater “hieve
defeats so that it could take the correct road in the late 1930s and ments Although we may make this hypothesis, the development
win the great victory of the new-democratic revolution at the end Tnd progress of human society have never gone ahead in a
of the 1940s. straight fine. In the search of a new road for socialist constructi
The 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee on the basis of an extremely backward economy and culture left
became an epoch-making turning-point, because the Party Cen¬ by old China, mistakes in work and setbacksin d5vel°PI"“t
tral Committee with Deng Xiaoping at the core summed up, inevitable. Various factors determine how great the complications
carried forward and enhanced the past positive experiences and are, but one cannot conceive of there being no complications
ideas; furthermore, it profoundly, rather than shallowly, compre¬
hensively rather than lopsidedly, learned lessons from past errors 31 One must realize that in spite of the tortuousness and setbacks,
and derived the correct line, principles and policies.
 845
CONCLUSIONS
844 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
97.9 percent. Students in institutes of higher learning, secondary
generally speaking, China has made remarkable achievements schools and primary schools were 17.63 times, 36.17 times and
during its forty-two years of socialist construction. The following 5 02 times that of 1949. By 1988, the number of graduates from,
are some facts and figures: and postgraduates in, institutes of higher learning was 30 times
In 1990, China’s gross national product (GNP) reached 1,768.6 of the total in the thirty-seven years prior to the founding of New
billion yuan, with the national income hitting 1,442.9 billion
yuan. The price factor taken into consideration, the national ChASato public health and medical care, in 1990 the country had
income was 20.23 times that of 1949. 3 898 million professional medical personnel with 2.624 million
From 1950 to 1988, the total investment in fixed assets by units hospital beds, 7.72 times and 30.87 times, respectively, that of
owned by the entire population reached 2,153.8 billion yuan; 1949. Simultaneously, cultural and sports undertakings also dc
4,393 big and medium-sized projects were constructed and put veloped rapidly. . .
into operation, adding 1,561.9 billion yuan to the fixed assets. An The people’s living standards show conspicuous improvement.
independent and relatively complete industrial setup and a na¬ In 1990, the actual consumption level of the Chinese people rose
tional economic system have been established. Statistics show that from an annual 76 yuan per person in 1952 to 714 yuan The price
the daily production of major industrial products is equivalent to rise considered, the annual average increase rate was 3.5 percent.
the production of two months in 1949. This means that the whole The problem of food and clothing in China has been basically
year’s production in 1949 can now be finished in six days. In solved and some of the people have begun to live a comparatively
1990, steel output climbed to 66.35 million tons, raw coal 1.08 comfortable life. The death rate has decreased to>6.67 per thou¬
billion tons, crude oil 138.31 million tons and generated electric¬ sand (it was as high as 25 per thousand m old China before the
ity 621.2 billion kwh. They were 419.9 times, 33.8 times, 1,152.6 Anti-Japanese War) and average life expectancy rose to 70 years
times and 144.5 times that of 1949, respectively. from only 35 years in old China before the War of Resistance
As to agriculture, in 1990, grain output was 446.24 million Against Japan. , . . . . e.
tons, cotton 4.51 million tons, oil crops 16.13 million tons, pork, Although the socialist system established in China is imperfect,
beef and mutton 25.14 million tons and aquatic products 12.37 contains flaws and has even experienced big setbacks in the
million tons. They were, respectively, 3.9 times, 10.2 times, 6.3 course of its construction, the 42-year economic development
times, 11.4 times and 27.5 times that of 1949. It is considered a relying on the socialist system, has been fast as compared with
miracle that China feeds 22 percent of the world’s population developed capitalist countries and developing countries taking the
with only 7 percent of the world’s land. capitalist road during the same period. From 1949 to 1989, the
Great progress has been made in science, education, culture, average annual GNP increase rate was 7.37 percent in China, 3.17
public health and sports. In 1990, units owned by the entire percent in the United States, 6.98 percent in Japan and 4.01
population boasted 10.808 million scientists and technicians, 25.4 percent in India. The average annual per capita GNP increase
times the number in 1952. All along during the forty-two years, rate during the same period was 5.44 percent in China (despite
important achievements in scientific and technological research the rapid increase of population), 1.87 percent in the United
were being scored. Some technological levels in the fields of States, 5.95 percent in Japan and 1.73 percent in India. As or
atomic energy, biology, agronomy, high-energy physics, computer industrial production, the average annual increase rate was 11.5
technology, carrier rocket and satellite communications have percent in China during 1953-1988, compared with 4.2 percent in
reached or approached international standards. developed countries, 5.9 percent in developing countries and 4.4
In 1990, the attendance rate of school-age children reached
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC 847
846 conclusions

percent in the world as a whole, between 1951 and 1986. to this method does not completely show the level ot economic
Since the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee increase and the people’s consumption level.
of the CPC, China has conducted a policy of reform and opening To compare the per capita GNP among countries in dillerent
up. As a result, the speed of China’s economic development stages of development is a complicated matter. This is because the
greatly surpassed that of major capitalist countries. From 1979 to extent of commercialization and the price levels vary in different
1989, the average annual GNP increase rate was 2.6 percent in countries, while in addition, the exchange rate between the cur¬
the United States, 4.3 percent in Japan, 2.1 percent in Federal rency of each country and the U.S. dollar keeps changing. There¬
Germany, but 9.1 percent in China. The average annual increase fore the above-mentioned method is limited and otten leads to
rate in industrial production during 1979-90 was 2.2 percent in underestimation of the development and income levels in devel¬
the United States, 4.1 percent in Japan, 1.9 percent in the German oping countries. Chinese scholars make estimations according to
Federal Republic, and 12.0 percent in China. purchasing power parity, a method tried out by the World Bank
Of course, these kinds of comparisons are relative, because in scores of countries, and calculated that China’s per capita GNP
they involve factors which cannot be compared. However, one has reached U.S.$500 to U.S.$700.
basic fact is certain: socialist China is one of the countries ol Economic index alone is not enough to have a correct and
relatively high speed in economic development; the economic gap comprehensive judgement of the degree of society s progress.
between China and the developed countries is not widening. On Early in the 1960s, developed capitalist countries and some
the contrary, it is narrowing. This is illustrated by the toremost international organizations set up a new social index system to
places occupied by major Chinese industrial and agricultural assess and monitor the trend of social development and various
products in the world. Comparing 1989 with 1949, China’s steel social problems. Considering Chinese conditions and referring to
output rose from 26th to 4th place, raw coal from 9th to 1st, crude the theoretical framework of the foreign index system, Chinese
oil from 27th to 6th and generated electricity from 25th place to researchers made an analysis of the social index system consisting
4th; grain from 3rd in 1957 to 1st in 1987, cotton and pork, beef of 16 major indexes. In 1987, the average score of 120 countries
and mutton from 4th and 3rd in 1949 to 1st in 1987. Some other and regions was 76 points, with China scoring 68 points and
products have also reached a leading place in the world. For ranking 70th in the world. That was 33 percent higher than the
example, cement, cloth and television sets occupy 1st place, average 51 points of 39 low-income countries, and 13 percent
sulphuric acid and chemical fertilizer the 3rd, and chemical fibre lower than the average 78 points of 48 medium-level income
the 4th. China’s GNP has also risen to the 8th in the world. countries. China’s general level of social development is lower
But generally speaking, the level of China’s social development than medium. This estimation is similar to that made by foreign
is relatively low in the world. Calculated by the method used in scholars. According to the human development indexes of the
“the World Bank Atlas,” i.e., calculating a country’s per capita United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development
GNP in U.S. dollars according to the exchange rate in that Report of 1990, which was based on average life expectancy, adult
specific year, although China’s GNP doubled in the 1980s, its per literacy rate and per capita GNP, China was placed 65th among
capita GNP is only U.S.$300 or so, ranking after the 100th in the the 130 countries that were brought into comparison.
Through these comparisons with other countries, we should
world, due to the several reductions in the exchange rate of
learn to recognize our deficiencies as well as our achievements.
Renminbi against the U.S. dollar. Because the exchange rate
between the Renminbi and the U.S. dollar reflects only a price Due to historical reasons, there is still a big gap between China
and the developed countries in economy and culture. The devel-
relation in foreign trade, the per capita GNP calculated according
 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC CONCLUSIONS 849
848

oped capitalist countries are still advancing fast and they will set ries already won and fail to sense the urgency of working with a
up various obstacles against socialist China. If we fail to catch up will to make the country strong. A backward China can be
with them, the narrowing gap will become larger again, since attacked, insulted and even reduced to the status of a semi¬
China has a huge population, relatively speaking, but a limited colonial dependency. In today’s world, negative examples of this
amount of arable land, water and other natural resources. All which constantly emerge present a disturbing sight. As attested
these are difficulties China must confront over a long time, and by seventy years’ history, the Chinese people will not resign
we must do our utmost to surmount them. In the 1990s and early themselves to backwardness and the Communist Party of China
in the next century, China will go on as before it will continue is fully competent to lead them to get rid of poverty and advance
to develop diplomatic, trade and cultural relations with all coun¬ along the socialist road. In the future, the Party and the nation
tries in the world on the basis of the five principles of peaceful as a whole must keep up the spirit of “sleeping on brushwood and
co-existence, develop good-neighbourly relations with surround¬ tasting gall” (strengthening resolve to wipe out national humilia¬
ing countries, continue its friendly relations of cooperation with tion) as well as the spirit of the Foolish Old Man Who Removed
the third world countries and make contributions to maintaining the Mountains. Concerted efforts must be pooled to surmount all
world peace, improving North-South relations and establishing a kinds of difficulties and hardships so as to make China a strong
new international order of equality and mutual benetit. We and really great socialist country.
believe that all these efforts will result in considerable achieve¬ Upholding the socialist system in the past, we have made
ments since they conform to the interests of peace and progress brilliant achievements in China, a country with a huge population
for all mankind. and a poor foundation. Looking into the future and upholding
However, we must bear in mind an objective factor indepen¬ socialism as a premise, so long as we continue to improve our
dent of man’s will to change; i.e., the Western powers’ basic policy economic and political systems (namely reform) and absorb all
of seeking to dominate the world and to sabotage socialist coun¬ the achievements of world civilization (namely opening up), we
tries will never change. Therefore, the Chinese people must can certainly accomplish a great deal more.
remain aware of this harsh international factor. While giving full
play to the advantages of the socialist system, China must develop The Road Ahead and Its Objectives
its economy, culture and science and technology in the midst of
fierce international competition and struggle. Currently, science General Secretary Jiang Zemin said in his speech celebrating
and technology are making giant strides. Although China has the Party’s 70th anniversary, “In the struggle of the past seventy
made progress in science and technology, it still has a long way years, our Party has accumulated a wealth of experiences. This
to go to reach the world advanced level. We must try to master experience boils down to one point: we must integrate the funda¬
all advanced science and technology, otherwise we will lag be¬ mental principles of Marxism with the concrete realities of the
hind. Chinese revolution and national construction and keep to our
Historical conditions have determined that only by maintain¬ own road.”
ing its socialist system can China stand erect in the world as an Beginning from the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central
independent and strong nation. Deviating from the socialist road, Committee and through the 12th and 13th National Party Con¬
China will fall behind, sink into chaos and collapse. Even though gresses, our Party has re-established the ideological line of eman¬
we have the correct policies and line for socialist construction, cipating the mind and seeking truth from facts. Combining the
backwardness will be inevitable if we are content with the victo¬ general truth of Marxism with China’s concrete realities as a
 851
CONCLUSIONS
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC
850 ic sectors; impose correct management and guidance on individ¬
ual economy, private economy and other economic sectors in
principle and taking the profound study of historic and present
order to enhance their function as supplementary and beneficial
practical experience as the foundation, the Party has advanced
the scientific thesis that China is in the primary stage of social¬ to the public-owned economy.
6. Actively develop the socialist planned commodity economy,
ism and drawn up its basic line of focusing on economic con¬
combine the planned economy with market regulation and try to
struction, upholding the Four Cardinal Principles and persisting
promote the sustained, stable and co-ordinated development of
in reform and opening up. In keeping with the basic line, a series
of effective policies was adopted. In regard to the basic theory the national economy. _
7. Implement the distribution system of to each according to
and practice of building socialism with Chinese characteristics,
his work” as the main form with other methods of distribution
the whole Party has reached a common understanding. As for the
existing as supplementary; permit and support some people and
building of socialist road with Chinese characteristics, the Propo¬
some areas to get rich first through honest labour and legal
sals for Drawing Up the Ten-Year Programme and the Eighth
operation and encourage those getting rich first to help those who
Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development
are still poor so that the Chinese people as a whole and various
adopted by the 7th Plenary Session of the 13th Central Commit¬
tee held in December 1990 made the following generalizations: regions can gradually get rich together.
8. Under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong
1 Adhere to the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the
Thought, inherit and carry on the outstanding Chinese cultural
working class and based on the alliance of the workers and
legacy, borrow and assimilate all excellent cultural achievements
peasants; continue to perfect the system of the people s congress¬
in the world and continue to raise the whole nation s ideological
es of multi-party cooperation and of the political consultation led
and moral level as well as its scientific and cultural qualities to
by the Communist Party; steadily consolidate and develop the
build a socialist society with an advanced culture and ideology.
widest patriotic united front and try to strengthen the construc¬
9 Among the nationalities, establish and develop socialist
tion of socialist democracy and a socialist legal system.
relationships based on equality, mutual help, unity, cooperation
2 Develop the social forces of production as the fundamental
and common prosperity, persist in and perfect the system of
task of socialism; concentrate on the successful construction of
regional national autonomy and oppose racial discrimination,
modernization and keep raising the people’s material and cultural
ethnic oppression and separatism.
living standards. 10. Further the motherland’s reunification according to the
3 Perfect the socialist economy, political structure and systems
concept and practice of “one country, two systems.”
of management in other fields through reform, and fully mobilize
11. Stick to the peaceful diplomatic policy of maintaining
the initiative and creativity of the central and local governments,
independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands devel¬
enterprises as well as of the broad masses of working people.
op friendly relations with all countries on the basis of the live
4 Continuously broaden the opening up to the outside world
principles of peaceful co-existence, oppose hegemomsm and pow¬
by adopting various forms such as developing foreign economic
er politics, support the just struggle of the oppressed nations and
and trade relations, using foreign investments and introducing
peoples, maintain world peace and promote the progress of man¬
advanced technology, as well as by establishing special economic
zones and economic development zones and carrying out neces kind. * . _
12. Adhere to the leadership of the Communist Party, improve
sary special policies and flexible measures.
the Party’s system of leadership, working style and methods ol
5 Stick to the ownership structure with socialist public owner-
ship as the main form, in co-existence with various other econom-
852 A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CPC 853
CONCLUSIONS

leadership, strengthen Party-building politically, ideologically, economic development, so that people will be relatively well off
theoretically and organizationally so that the Party can always be By well off, we mean an upgraded quality of life on the basis of
the strong leading core of the socialist undertaking. enough food and clothing, which includes not only an improved
In his speech at the Party’s 70th anniversary, Jiang Zemin said, material life but also a rich spiritual life, and not only a rise in
“In short, the Party’s basic line and the twelve principles point to people’s individual consumption level but also the betterment ol
the need to build a socialist economy, political system and culture social welfare and work environment.
with Chinese characteristics through the self-improvement and After attaining the second-step strategic objectives, we will
self-development of the socialist system, in order to facilitate and strive to realize the strategic objectives of the third step. A
promote the continued development of the social productive development of thirty to fifty years will help basically achieve
forces and social progress in all fields and achieve socialist socialist modernization and approach the level of moderately
modernization.” developed countries.
The twelve basic principles specify the basic line of “one The road of building socialism with Chinese characteristics
central task and two basic points” and clearly outline the socialist opened in the 1980s provides a firm guarantee for realizing the
road with Chinese characteristics. If over ten years ago we had strategic objectives of the second step. The enormous achieve¬
little idea of what socialism with Chinese characteristics meant or ments made in the reform and opening-up drive and moderniza¬
of how socialism with Chinese characteristics was to be built, we tion construction laid a solid foundation for social-economic
are now clearer. development in the 1990s. We are confident that the second-step
Looking backward, we feel proud; looking ahead, we are full objectives will definitely be fulfilled by the year 2000 and the
of confidence. After the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Party third-step objectives, in the 2050s or earlier, given the concerted
Central Committee, the Central Committee decided on the stra¬ efforts of the Party and the people.
tegic plan that China’s construction of socialist modernization More than 140 years ago, Marx and Engels clearly proclaimed
should be divided into three steps. The strategic objectives of the in The Communist Manifesto that the ultimate aim of the Com¬
first step, i.e., double the 1980 GNP and solve the people’s munist Party is the realization of communism. At its founding,
problem of food and clothing were basically fulfilled in the late the Communist Party of China also clearly proclaimed its aim to
be the establishment of a communist society. Over the past
1980s. In the 1990s, efforts must be pooled to realize the strategic
objectives of the second step. China’s output of major agricultural seventy years, the Party has led the people in carrymg out the
new-democratic revolution, the socialist revolution and socialist
and industrial products are to increase by a big margin. By the
construction. All these efforts were aimed at the realization of
year 2000, it is predicated that grain output will reach 500 million
communism. In the days to come, we will firmly continue the
tons; steel, over 80 million tons; coal, 1.4 billion tons; and
struggle to build communism. So long as we advance victoriously
generated electricity, 1,100 billion kwh. The production catego¬
on the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics, we can
ries will be more complete, the levels of science, technology and
surely reach the magnificent goal of socialist modernization, and
management will be higher and the national defence further
the lofty ideals of communism will certainly be realized at last.
strengthened. The building of socialist material civilization and
socialist culture and ideology will proceed hand in hand. By then,
China’s composite strength will have been risen to a new level.
On reaching the second-step strategic objectives, the standards
of living will see a rather big improvement on the basis of
 INDEX 855

Boxer Uprising 4
Braun, Otto 179
Brezhnev 598

INDEX C

Cai Hesen 22, 36, 63, 66

A Cai Tingkai 163
Cai Yuanpei 9, 168, 169
Acheson, Dean 325, 328, 394 Campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucianism 695
Advancement of the general line 536 Campaign to oppose bourgeois liberalization 790
Advancing towards the Dabie Mountains 348 Cao Dajun 147
Agrarian reform movement 416 Cao Kun 62
Agricultural cooperative movement 471, 475 Cao Mengjam 202
Anti-Communist Coup of April 12, 1927 93, 261 Cao Rulin 16
Anti-Gao Gang and anti-Rao Shushi struggle 468 Cao Yu 284
Anti-Right deviationist campaign 582, 586 Chen Boda 635, 638, 640, 650, 655, 662, 668
Anti-Rightist movement 527 Chen brothers 281
August 1st Declaration 194 Chen Cheng 175, 331
August 7th Meeting 112 Chen Duxiu 10, 21, 25, 32, 34, 36, 63, 73, 74, 75, 76, 85, 90, 92,
Autumn Harvest Uprising 114 94, 98, 101, 102, 103, 145, 257
Chen Geng 62, 68, 349
B Chen Gongbo 34, 36
Chen Guofu 281
Bai Chongxi 93, 94, 371, 382, 402 Chen Guohui 135
Bakulin, A.B. 103 Chen Hansheng 169
Bao Huiseng 26, 34 Chen Jiongming 69
Beiping-Tianjin campaign 378 Chen Lifu 281, 357
Bergson, Henri 11 Chen Qiaonian 108
Bethune, Dr. Norman 234 Chen Shaomin 659
Blucher, Vasily (who assumed the name of Galen during his stay Chen Tanqiu 26, 34, 60
in China) 61 Chen Wangdao 25, 27
Bo Gu 153, 156, 179, 182, 186, 200, 208, 214 Chen Yannian 75, 108
Bo Yibo 198, 226, 573, 737, 786 Chen Yi 111, 117, 126, 131, 133, 136, 189, 231,245, 262, 337, 348,
Borodin, Mikhail Markovich 57, 69, 98, 102 349, 375, 390, 506, 578, 650, 659, 662, 680
Bose Uprising of December 1929 147 Chen Yun 155, 293, 298, 319, 362, 405, 445, 478, 508, 510, 511,

854
 INDEX 857
INDEX
856
Deng Yanda 96, 168
514, 518, 534, 537, 544, 548, 553, 582, 583, 588, 624, 638, 643, Deng Yingchao 738
659, 662, 720, 729, 731, 737, 749, 751, 760, 764, 786 Deng Zhongxia 18, 22, 23, 24, 32, 44, 66, 173
Chen Zanxian 88 Deng Zihui 118, 475, 484, 518, 588, 601, 605, 643, 659
Cheng Zihua 187 Dimitrov, Georgi 194, 236
Chiang Kai-shek 61, 70, 71, 72, 76, 87, 89, 93, 96, 97, 109, 149, Ding Guangen 798
156, 158, 162, 172, 176, 183, 190, 202, 203, 213, 252, 253, 260, Dong Biwu 22, 26, 34, 85, 264, 337, 468, 508, 551, 699
263, 264, 279, 280, 281, 287, 312, 329, 331, 354, 357, 381, Dong Jianwu 200
382, 384 Dong Qiwu 380
Chinese Eastern Railway Incident 148 Dong Yongwei (Dong Biwu) 60
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 388 Dong Zhentang 159
Chinese workers’ movement 45 Dongjiang Uprising 117
Chongqing peace negotiations 313 Downfall of the Lin Biao clique 667
Churchill, Winston 387 Du Bincheng 367
Clark, Mark W. 414 Du Xiujing 131
Counter-revolutionary coup in Changsha 101 Du Yuesheng 93, 95
Counter-revolutionary rebellion in Beijing 795 Du Yuming 375, 377
Criticism of Peng Dehuai’s “Right opportunism” 604 Duan Dcchang 174
Criticism of the film of The Life of Wu Xun 458 Duan Qirui 62
Crossed the Yalu River 413
Crossing the Yangtze 386 E
“Cultural revolution” 623, 627, 632, 648, 715, 716, 841
Currie, Laughlin 263 Eastern expedition campaign 196
Engels 753
D Enlargement of the struggle against the Rightists, 530

Dai Jitao 71 F
December 1st Massacre 320
December 1st Movement 321 Failure of the Great Revolution of 1924-1927 105
December 9th Movement 191, 193 Fang Zhimin 179
Deng Enming 26, 34 February 7th Massacre 48
Deng Pei 49 Feng Xuefeng 197
Deng Xiaoping 147, 176, 215, 319, 348, 375, 386, 508, 511, 573, Feng Yuxiang 62, 78, 81, 100, 102, 149, 156, 159, 163, 207,
579, 582, 586, 588, 597, 598, 612, 622, 624, 636, 638, 640, 643, 263, 286
646, 680, 683, 688, 698, 699, 709, 720, 722, 727, 729, 731, 733, Fifth campaign of “encirclement and suppression” 176
738, 740, 744, 749, 751, 756, 760, 764, 765, 777, 787, 794, 795, First anti-Communist onslaught 254
799, 801, 820, 829, 831
 INDEX INDEX
858

First Zhengzhou Meeting 545 Hartling, Paul 703

He Long 109, 110, 118, 146, 173, 174, 188, 216, 680, 714
First “encirclement and suppression” campaign 157
Founding of the People’s Republic of China 388, 398 He Mengxiong 151, 153, 155
He Shuheng 26, 34, 60
Four clean-ups and five-anti movements 605, 606
He Xiangning 76, 96, 207, 263
Fourth “encirclement and suppression” campaign 172, 175
He Yingqin 158, 191, 204, 262, 386
Fu Chongbi 656, 680
Hideki Tojo 265, 266
Fu Donghua 170
Fu Zuoyi 371, 377, 380 Hirohito, Emperor 302
Ho Chi Minh 634
Hong Kong-Guangzhou Strike 79
G
Hou Shaoqiu 60
Howe, Jeffrey 829
Galen 78, 84
Gao Gang 390, 466 Hu Delin 274

Ge Zhenlin 274 Hu Feng 459, 745

Gorbachev, Mikhail 826 Hu Fucai 274

Great leap forward 533, 545, 841 Hu Qiaomu i, 738

Great production campaign 275 Hu Qili 786, 798

Great Revolution 52 Hu Sheng ii

Hu Shi 10, 19,20,43,458
Gu Bai 176
Hu Yaobang 729, 738, 744, 760, 764, 774, 780, 791
Gu Zhenghong 66
Gu Zhutong 337 Hu Yuzhi 96, 169
Hu Zongnan 338, 371, 402
Guan Feng 630, 635, 654
Hua Guofeng 700, 709, 711, 722, 723, 727, 738, 744
Guan Xiangying 174
Guangdong-Guangxi Incident 202 Huai-Hai Campaign 376, 377
Huang Baitao 376
Guangzhou Uprising 117
Guo Diren 118 Huang Fu 88
Huang Gongltte 133
Guo Liang 108
Huang Jing 192
Guo Mingqiu 192
Guo Moruo 89, 234, 286, 320, 384 Huang Jinrong 93
Huang Kecheng 557, 738
Guo Shushen 147
Huang Shaohong 94, 116
Gutian Meeting 138
Huang Wei 377
Huang Yanpei 263, 284
H
Huang Yongsheng 656, 668, 679
Huang Zhongyue 159
Hai Rui 552
Huang’an and Macheng Uprising 118, 147
Han Deqin 259
 t

860 INDEX 861

INDEX

Hurley, Patrick J. 280, 287, 315, 321

Lao She 456
Large-scale class struggle 604
J Lei Feng 621, 808
Lenin 391
James, William 11
Japan’s unconditional surrender 302 Li Dazhao^lO, 12, 14, 18, 20, 23, 24, 25, 27, 33, 57, 58, 60, 96
Ji Zhentong 159 Li De (the Chinese name of the German Otto Braun) 1 /
Jiang Guangnai 163
Li Desheng 684
Jiang Hua 135
Jiang Qing 609, 628, 631, 635, 646, 650, 653, 659, 679, 682, 684, Li Fuchun 70, 85, 506, 572, 573, 638, 650, 659, 662
695, 697, 711, 719
Li Gongpu 202, 331, 367
Jiang Xianyun 62
Li Hanjun 25, 34
Jiang Zemin 798, 799, 802, 826, 843
Li Jingquan 683
Jiao Yulu 621, 808 Li Jishen 94, 116, 177, 284, 369, 384, 390
Jinggang Mountains base area 129
Li Kenong 155, 198
Li Liejun 207
K
Li Liewen 170
Li Lisan 46, 104, 149, 150, 152, 154
Kang Sheng 296, 601, 631, 635, 638, 646, 650, 655, 659, 662, 684
Li Mi 377
Kenji Dohihara 191
Li Peng 786, 787, 791, 797, 798, 826
Khrushchov 559, 598, 634
Li Qihan 32
Kissinger, Dr. Henry 687
Li Qiushi 155
KMT began launching its “encirclement and suppression” 156
Li Ruihuan 798
KMT’s fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign 190
Li Shizeng 94, 207
KMT’s third attempt at “encirclement and suppression” 159.
Li Siguang 456
KMT-CPC cooperation 214
Li Tiefu 165
KMT-CPC negotiations 215
Li Weihan 36, 104, 480, 606
Kossigin 691
Kotnis, Dr. D.S. 234 u Zlnnln'm, 330, 503, 650, 659, 700, 709, 711, 722, 729, 751,
Kuibishev, N.V. 75
760, 764, 765
Kung, H.H. 204, 281, 357
Li Xianzhou 337
Li Yongsheng 60
L
Li Zhong 32
Li Zongren 77, 94, 382, 384, 386
Lai Ning 808
Li Zuopeng 668, 679
Land reform movement 351
Liang Qichao 13, 28
 INDEX
862
Luo Yinong 92, 108
Liao Chengzhi 262, 683 Luo Zhanglong 47, 154, 155
Liao Zhongkai 61, 70 Luochuan Meeting 222, 227
Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign 373 Lushan Meeting 545, 558, 603
Lin Biao 216, 227, 374, 379, 537, 582, 628, 631, 638, 646, 655, 659,
Lu’an-Huoshan Uprising 147
662, 671
Lin Biao incident 679
Lin Boqu 8, 208, 214, 232, 246, 285
Lin Liguo 670, 672
Ma Baoyu 274
Lin Weimin 45, 66 Ma Benzhai 274
Lin Xiangqian 48 Ma Shangde 118
Lin Yunan 155 Ma Xulun 329
Lin Zuhan (Lin Boqu) 57, 58, 60, 70, 85, 96
Ma Zhanshan 162
Liu Bannong 10
Liu Bocheng 110, 183, 185, 187, 216, 319, 348, 375 Mao Zedong 7, 12, 21, 26, 34, 46, 58, 61, 62, 73, 75, 82, 91, 96,
Liu Qingshan 430 104 114 115 124, 129, 131, 133, 137, 138, 139, 146, 151, 168,
Liu Renjing 34 171* 174* 182*, 184, 186, 195, 200, 207, 213, 222, 223, 238 239,
Liu Shaoqi 46, 66, 165, 239, 245, 262, 293, 298, 301, 338, 351, 390, 211 292, 294, 297, 301, 312, 317, 333, 338, 345, 348, 350, 355,
416, 436, 442, 461, 462, 467, 503, 507, 511, 516, 533, 551, 561, 358’ 372 373, 383, 386, 387, 388, 390, 398, 408, 413, 424, 436,
579, 580, 586, 588, 597, 604, 606, 608, 614, 624, 634, 636, 638, 442* 447! 452*, 458, 461, 462, 467, 484, 503, 507, 511, 514, 520,
640, 643, 653, 659,714, 745 526 533! 535, 542, 545, 548, 552, 555, 562, 569, 575, 579, 581,
Liu Yazi 76, 263, 284, 315 589* 595*, 601, 606, 610, 623, 624, 627, 631, 639, 646,641, 653,
Liu Zhenhuan 69, 72 656* 658, 662, 671, 679, 684, 685, 687, 695, 697, 703, 710,
Liu Zhi 371, 375
715*, 743
Liu Zhidan 118, 187 Mao Zetan 176
Lominadze, B. 112, 120 Marco Polo Bridge Incident 212, 225
Long March 180, 184, 188, 189
Maring, G. 34, 55
Longzhou Uprising of February 1930 147 Marshall, George 321, 324, 335
Lu Dingyi 505, 632, 634 May 20th Movement 344
Lu Futan 156 May 30th Movement 66
Lu Xinming 135 May 4th Directive 329, 351
Lu Xun 10, 109, 168, 170 May 4th Movement 15
Lu Zongyu 16 McArthur 410
Luo Han 70 Mif, Pavel 153, 154
Luo Ming 176 Mopping-up operations 244, 267
Luo Ronghuan 374, 379 Movement to criticize Hu Feng’s literary and art theory 459
Luo Ruiqing 620, 631, 634, 680, 729
 865
INDEX
INDEX
864 413, 414, 556, 558, 561, 582, 601, 629, 714, 731, 737

Movement to form people’s communes 542 Peng Lihe 47

Movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea 415 Peng Pai 61
Peng Zemin 263
N Peng Zhen 319, 612, 629, 630, 634, 765
People’s commune movement 545
Nanchang Uprising 110 Planned purchase and supply of grain 477
Negotiation between China and the Soviet Union 450 Political Consultative Conference 324

Neumann, Heinz 117 Primary stage of socialism 850

Principle of letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred
New cultural movement 11, 22
schools of thoughts contend 505
Nicolsky 34

Nie Rongzhen 216, 233, 350, 379, 506, 574, 620, 650, 659, 662, Q
729
Qi Benyu 630, 635, 653
Nie Yuanzi 635
Qian Xuantong 10
Nixon, Richard 687
Northeastern J iangxi Uprising 117 Qiao Shi 786, 798
Northeast Frontier Forces be formed into the CPV 413 Qiongya Uprising 117

Northern Expedition 77, 79 Qiu Huizuo 668, 679

Qiu Qingquan 377
“Northwest doctrine” 99
Qu Qiubai 18, 57, 58, 63, 92, 112, 152, 154, 170
Noulens, Paul 168
Queshan Uprising 118
O
R

October 10th Agreement 316

Rao Shushi 466
October Revolution 13
On the Ten Major Relationships 504 Rectification campaign 519
Rectification movement 288
One country, two systems 832
Rectify people’s communes 548
Outbreak of full-scale civil war 331
Red Guard movement 639
P
Reform Movement of 1898 4
Ren Bishi 174, 188, 215, 240, 277, 298, 301, 398, 359
Restoration of the rightful seat of the PRC in UN 690
Pan Hannian 197 ...
Party’s general line and general tasks during this transitional Revolution of 1911 5, 6
Roosevelt 263
period 443
Ruan Xiaoxian 61
Peace conference in Paris 15
Peng Dehuai 109, 133, 147, 171, 200, 213, 215, 222, 226, 252, 350,
 INDEX 867
866 INDEX

Russell, Bertrand 11, 28 Stopping the turmoil and quelling the counter-revolutionary

rebellion 800
S Strike of the Beijing-Hankou railway workers 47
Strike of the workers of the Anyuan Coal Mines 46
Sabotage operations 272 Strong, Anna Louise 333
San wan reorganization 115 Struggle against Right Deviation 561
Seamen’s strike in Hong Kong 45 Stuart, Leighton 335
Second anti-Communist onslaught 260 Student unrest 793
Second Zhengzhou Meeting 548 Study movement 457
Second “encirclement and suppression” campaign 158 Su Yu 231, 334, 337, 348, 349, 375
September 13th Incident 672 Su Zhaozheng 45, 49, 68
September 18th Incident 161 Sun Chuanfang 78, 79, 86, 95
Sha Qianli 202 Sun Ke 207
Shao Lizi 214, 316 Sun Xiaocun 202
Shen Junru 197, 202, 283, 286, 320, 368, 384 Sun Yat-sen 4, 7, 22, 45, 53, 54, 56, 57, 61, 65, 69, 71
Shi Liang 202, 283, 368 Sun Yuanliang 377
Shi Wenbin 49 Suppression of counter-revolutionaries 420
Shi Yang 48
Socialist education movement 604, 608 T
Socialist reform of agriculture, handicraft industry and capitalist
industry and commerce 490 Taiping Heavenly Kingdom 4
Song Ping 798 Tai’erzhuang campaign 225
Song Renqiong 738, 786 Tan Kah Kee 217, 263
Song Xilian 402 Tan Pingshan 26, 57, 58, 96,^384
Song Xueyi 274 Tan Zhenlin 126, 131, 350, 375, 650, 68-
Song Zheyuan 191, 197, 214 Tan Zhitang 26

SS5S 390, 462, 551,699

IM. 1". »’• » m. *
Tanaka Kakuei 688
Tao Xingzhi 197
Tao Zhu 638, 737
Soong Mei-ling 204 Teng Daiyuan 133, 147
Southern Anhui Incident 260 The 100-Regiment Campaign 250
Southern Hunan Uprising 117 The 1954 Geneva Agreement 594
Southern Shangcheng Uprising 147 The 20th Soviet Party Congress 501
Southwestern Jiangxi Uprising 117 The 7000-Person Conference 579, 583
Stalin 501 The 8th National Party Congress 500
Stilwell, Joseph W. 280 Third anti-Communist onslaught 279
 869
index
INDEX
868
Wang Ruofei 255, 313
Third generation of the central leading group 802 Wang Shiying 198
Three Great Policies 71 Wang Yaowu 373
Three Red Banners 580 Wang Zaoshi 202
Three-step strategy of economic development 785 Wang Zhen 174, 276, 282, 720, 738

Tian Han 170 Wang Zuo 115, 126

Tiananmen Incident 710 Wan’an Uprising 117
Truman 321, 381 War of Resistance Against Japan -t-

Tunnel warfare 272 Washington Conference 40

Two big mistakes 841 Wayaobu Meeting 194
Two-whatevers approach 724, 728 Wedemeyer, Albert C. 280
Wei Baqun 147
U Wei Lihuang 255, 371 _
Wei nan and Huaxian Uprising 118
Ulanhu 345, 683 Wen Yiduo 331, 367
Upheaval in Beijing 794 Western Fujian Uprising 118
Western Hunan-Hubci Uprising 11
V Work of checking and sorting 803
Wu Faxian 668, 679
Visinsky 24 Wu Han 629
Voroshilov, K.Y. 218 Wu Huawen 372
Wu Juenong 96
W Wu Peifu 47, 48, 62, 78, 80
Wu Yuzhang 22, 36, 96, 337
Wan Li 787 Wu Zhihui 94
Wang Chonglun 452
X
Wang Dongxing 722, 728
Wang Feng 198
Wang Hebo 49 Xi Zhongxun 601, 738
Wang Hongwen 683, 684, 697, 711, 719 Xia Douyin 101
Wang Jiaxiang 171, 174, 182, 606, 683 Xia Minghan 108
Wang Jingwei 69, 75, 94, 98, 100, 104, 109, 242 Xia Xi 60, 174
Wang Jinmci 26, 34 Xia Yan 170
Wang Jinxi 621 Xiang Jingyu 108
Wang Li 635, 653, 654 Xiang Ying 49, 66, 171, 189, 230, 260
Wang Ming 153, 156, 236, 237, 239, 288, 295 Xiang Zhongfa 122, 155
Wang Renzhong 738
 871
INDEX
870 INDEX

684, 695, 698, 711, 722, 729, 742, 760, 764, 831
Xiao Chunll 95
Ye Qun 631, 668, 672
Xiao Jingguang 255
Ye Ting 70, 80, 101, 110, 116, 126, 230, 245, 260
Xiao Ke 174, 216
Yi He Tuan Movement (the Boxers) 39
Xiao Yedan 183
Yoshijiro Umezu 191
Xie Fuzhi 348, 349, 653, 655
Yu Fangzhou 60
Xie Weijun 176
Yu Lijin 656, 680
Xinkou campaign 227
Yu Xiusong 25, 32, 33
Xiong Xiong 95
Yu Zisan 365
Xi’an Incident 203, 205
Yuan Shikai 7, 40,
Xu Chengzhang 68
Yuan Wencai 115, 124
Xu Haidong 187
Yun Daiying 36, 63
Xu Jishen 62, 147, 173
Xu Kcxiang 101 Z
Xu Shiyou 350
Xu Teli 109
Zcng Zhongsheng 173
Xu Xiangqian 62, 147, 172, 186, 187, 216, 350, 650, 659, 662,
Zhang Bojun 283
723, 729
Xuan Zhonghua 60 Zhang Chunqiao 631, 635, 647, 650, 655, 666, 683, 684, 697, 700,
Xue Muqiao 169
711,719
Zhang Dingcheng 118
Y
Zhang Dongsun 28
Zhang Fakui 110, 116
Yan Xishan 95, 149, 156, 198, 226, 254, 319
Zhang Gongquan 88
Yang Angong 36 Zhang Guotao 25, 34, 36, 44, 47, 57, 74, 76, 85, 104, 171, 173,
Yang Chengwu 655, 680
184, 186, 187, 188
Yang Hansheng 170
Zhang Hao 188
Yang Hucheng 203
Zhang Huizan 157
Yang Jingyu 163, 232, 249
Zhang Jingjiang 94, 207
Yang Shangkun i, 338, 632, 634, 737, 787
Zhang Lan 286, 390
Yang Ximin 69, 72
Zhang Naiqi 197, 202
Yang Xingfo 168
Zhang Shenfu 284
Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art 293
Zhang Tailei 104, 116, 117
Yao Wenyuan 612, 629, 635, 647, 666, 683, 684, 697, 71 1, 719
Yao Yilin 192, 786, 798
Yasuji Okamura 265
Ye Jianying 116, 186, 207, 213, 215, 221, 337, 338, 650, 659, 679,
 873
INDEX INDEX
872
Zou Taofen 169, 197, 202, 286
Zhang Xun 9
Zunyi Meeting 182
Zhang Yunyi 147, 262
Zuo Quan 62, 215, 274
Zhang Zhizhong 163, 285, 315, 324, 385
Zhang Zishan 430
Zhang Zongxiang 16
Zhang Zuolin 62, 78, 79, 97
Zhao Bosheng 159
Zhao Shangzhi 163
Zhao Shiyan 92, 108

Zhao Ziyang 744, 764, 765, 780, 781, 786, 788, 794, 797, 807
Zheng Weisan 330
Zheng Zhenduo 96
Zhongshan Warship Incident 75
Zhou Baozhong 163
Zhou Enlai 22, 59, 61, 62, 67, 70, 75, 90, 92, 104 110, 122, 136,
149 154, 155, 174, 182, 184, 186, 198, 204, 207, 214, 221, 234,
244, 245, 260, 262, 264, 277, 285, 298, 301, 313, 322, 324, 328,
335 338 385 390, 410, 442, 445, 457, 462, 470, 503, 505, 506,
507, 51 1, 514, 516, 534, 537, 544, 551, 552, 572, 575, 578, 582,
586’, 592! 598, 615, 620, 624, 638, 642, 654, 662, 672, 677, 679,
684’, 685, 687, 691, 695, 698, 700, 707
Zhou Fohai 34, 36
Zhou Peiyuan 681
Zhou Xiaozhou 557
Zhou Yang 170

in’, 126, 129, 131, 133, 137, 138, 151, 171, 174, 184,
187, 188, 213, 215, 221, 226, 239, 252, 255, 276, 277, 294, 29
301, 338, 386, 390, 398, 462, 508, 511, 551, 582, 624, 638, 659,
699^710 . , . t•
Zhu De and Mao Zedong joined iorccs m the Jinggang
Mountains 126
Zhu Kejing 70
Zhu Peide 101
Zhu Zhixin 13
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