Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought Thomas McCarthy, General Editor Todor W. Adorn, Assit Epitemology: A Metcrtiqne “Theodor W. Adowno, Prime " KarhOuo Ape, Undersmingand Explanation t Tancendenal: Pragmatic Ponpecace Richard J. Berscin et Habermas ad Modernity inst Bish, Nea Laon Panay Diy Ernst ich Fe rape of Hope Est Bch The Urpin Bsn of Arend Later: Sted Bway Tian Blumer. The Gent of te Copemuan World Hin Blumen. The Leginay of he ser Age Fans Hlumenber. Work ow Mah elt Dubie, Thor ond Poi Sade onthe Dec lopment of Crical Tico John Forester editor, ie Theory and Pale Life David Fess Papmonts of Mody Theo of Mader h the Nor of Somat, Rrciter on Besponm Hans-Georg Gadaner Phlvphad Aprensehps Hans-Georg Galimer, Reso nthe ge of Sten Jurgen Haberman, The Piosophl Dison of Maman Tecve Eecares "teen Haber Pisopi-otta hls Sirgen Habermas nots Obearons oh "Pe Spal hction ofthe Age’ Mane fone Mud Contemporary Resocminatio of te Fought Reinhart ovals Citigu and Cp Eugcument avd the Pathogen of Sto Sty Reinhart Kose, Fates Pa On the Sent of Herc Tine Hove Marans Hegel's Onelgy tnd the Theory of Hoarty Clio Ge Conran of te Wel suse Chas Oe, Doargnied Captain: Contenporay Troon: of Work ad ence, Action, ant Fenders Tes: Toward « Tovlogy Ie Fonh Relat Esa othe Philosophy of abe Ae Schmit, Hoy and Seca tm Esa om Hepa: Mast and Siac Theone of History Dennis Sch The Uagy ofthe rte Hegel Mrideger ad the tener 9f Phicwphy car Schmit, The Cra of Parhameary Deora ‘Lari Sonny Poles! Romane a Thea Fo Chapter a the Concept of Sovereign The Ober Sade th Sua! Once) of Fase Heseguy See, nd Baber Gay Sith ediog, On Wales npn Ciel Eye and Restle Tint Toundha, el Concionsne dS Decrmiation Mink Warns isce soe Poll Thaaghe lav Pour, Joachim Rin, Hegel an Cael Seis, Poi ‘Michael Theuanisen, Critique and Crisis Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society REINHART KOSELLECK ‘The MIT Press Cantbridge, MassachusettsFirst MIT Pees « This Engh transition @) 1988 Recg Publisters Lid ie, Eine Studi er Pato der bingetichen Wele by Verlag Kael Alber Gi, Preibung/Murich, West German 989 Verlag Kal Alber Crib Hl Originally published as Ki» I sighs ese No part this book maybe roredaced in an form or by Contents permission in writing fom the pubs Livy of Congres Cxalogingin-Pulcon Dat Kosei, Rear Foreword Victor Gonrevitch Paahayencts of Modern Sectey Preface to the English Edition Cais in contenparary German i Hough Introduction Fat of ek cd Ri Bioguh Part |The Political Structure of Absolutism as the Incades index 1 Policlscence—History, 2, Enlightenment. 3, Divine ght of kings. History—Phiknophy Precondi mn of Enlightenment 1, The Absolutist State, Raison d’Ftat and the Tiles Me Series, JAS Koss 1988 320.09 159 Emergence of the Apolitical Sphere (Barclay, ISUN'O 262 11127 & ’Aubigne) 2. Hobbesian Rationality and the Origins of Prins in Gres Britain Enlightenment 3. The Exclusion of Natural Law Morality from International Polities and the Concept of War between States as a Precondition of Moral Progress Part IL The Self-Image of the Enlightenment Thinkers as a Response to their Situation within the Absolutist State 4. Locke’s Law of Private Censure and its Significance for the Emergence of the Bourgeoisie 5. The Creation of Indirect Countervailing Powers and the Arcanum of Politics 6. The Proliferation of Indirect Power and the Schism of Morals and Politics 41 fa 767. The Political Function of the Lodges and the Plans of the Illuminati 8. The Process of Criticism (Schiller, Simon, Bayle, Voltaire, Diderot and the Encyclopédie, Kant) Part III Cris 9. ‘The Philosophy of Progress and its Prognosis of Revolution and Philosophy of History 10. The Recognition of the Crisis and the Emergence of a Moral Totalism as a Response to Political Absolutism (Turgor) 11. Crisis, Consciousness and Historical Construstion (Rousseau, Diderot, Raynal, Paine) Excursus graphy Indexes 36 98 Foreword Professor Koselleck’s learned and influential study remains as ab- sorbing today as it was when first published, nearly thirty years ago, under the title Kritik und Krise. is good to have it available at last. in English In Professor Koselleck’s view the modern understanding of poli- tics, and hence modern political practice, has become dangerously depoliticised. The basic differences between the political realm proper and other public but non-political realms, have become blurred. At the same time visions of eventually escaping the hard constraints of politics distort the real altern Professor Koselleck traces this malady — to use his own metaphor — to the changing status of political authority in the age of Absolutism and Enlightenment, the period that stretches from the Peace of Utrecht to the waning years of the ancien régime, from the major writings of Hobbes 10 those of Rousseau and Raynal. His thesis, reduced to a formula, is that during that period the widening breach, in fact and in theory, between State and society, and between politics and ethics, inevitably led to the challenge — the critique — and the eventual subversion — the crisis — of the political by the social, cultural and moral realms The specifically modern order which was established by the middle of the seventeenth century redistributed the public space into two sharply separate domains: that of politcal authority proper, the prince or State; and the striedly subordinate domain of the sub- jects, the domain which at about that time came to be known as society. In Professor Koselleck’s view this ordering of sovereign and subject is given its clearest theoretical formulation by Hobbes. ives here and nowvill Foreword Hobbes fully recognised that such an ordering entails the strict subordination of the claims of individual morality to the require- ments of political necessity. He argues for it none the less, on the grounds that ‘the state of man can never be without some incom- modity or other’, and that the ordering of sovereign and subjects which he proposes makes for fewer incommodities than does any other. For it at least permits subjects to lead secure, commodious, and hence decent and just lives. Yet when and wherever men are denied an active share in the ‘exercise of political authority, when and wherever they are subjects without being citizens, they inevitably endow other concerns and pursuits — economic, cultural, moral — with an independent, and hence rival, authority. The absolutisms of seventeenth and eight- centh-century continental Burope are in large measure themselves responsible for the criticism and the challenges to which they finally succumbed. Professor Koselleck makes the point in the fascinating, chapters in which he traces the gradual transformation of such free, voluntary associations as the Masonic lodges and the Republic of Letters from enclaves of internal exile into centres of moral auth- rity, and eventually into surrogates and even models for political society. In the process, existing political societies came to be judged by standards which take litle or no account of the constraints which political men must inevitably take into account, standards which for all politcal intents and purposes are therefore Utopian. But Utopia is not, properly speaking, a politica. alternative at all In Professor Koselleck’s view, political Utopianism is as much a contradiction in terms as is, for example, dogmatic scepticism. In theoretical terms, it draws from all those political constraints which, in practice, it challenges and subverts. And in so far as it either fails or refuses to take cognisance of its self-evident political role, he regards it as an outright hypocrisy as well. He does not ever consider the possibility of a politically self-conscious and respon- sible Utopia. ‘The study concludes with some particularly incisive analyses of how Enlightenment Utopianism becomes rationalised, radicalised and transmuted into the new philosophy of history. The philo- sopher of history or, more precisely, the philosopher of historical progress, by stationing himself in the hoped-for future, typically looks back upon the conflicts and the suffering caused by the clash between intransigently held norms and political realities as if these Foreword ix conflicts had been happily resolved, and therefore had been jus- tified. He confidently expects that, to paraphrase a remark of Hegel’s, the wounds inflicted by history invariably heal without leaving sears. By thus justifying confrontation, conflict and crisis, the philosophy of history abets them and so contributes further to that depoliticisation which Professor Koselleck sees as pethaps the most distinctive feature of the Enlightenment. By contrast, he himself adopts the stance by which he believes that political matters are most accurately perceived as the viewpoint of the citizen or of the statesmen on the spor. By studying the doctrines of the philosophers and the opinions of representative ‘men or groups as they appear to a political agent rather than to a detached chronicler, he calls attention to a great deal that otherwise goes unnoticed. ‘This political perspective on the history of ideas also makes for much that is fresh, original and absorbing in his book. Admittedly a number of his judgements are impassioned; political judgements are apt to be so. It is, indeed, altogether striking how engaged much of the most valuable recent Enlighten- ment scholarship continues to be. Although Professor Koselleck himself refrains from pointing to possible morals, he clearly recog- nises that his critical history of criticism and of what he regards as its hypoerisies, from the mid-seventeenth to the late-cighteenth century, also serves as a critique of the critical theories of the mid-nineteenth and, especially, of the mid-twentieth century. ‘The reader of Critique and Crisis is left with the distinct impression that ic is the political teaching of Hobbes that captures what Profes- sor Koselleck regards as the essential features of political life Clearly, he does not wish to restore any particular doctrine of Hobbes's, so much as to restore the characteristically Hobbesian awareness that there is no escaping the constraints of political life, and that itis not possible to reduce some measure of contingency, conflict and compulsion to the status of differences of opinion or to resolve them by discussion and peaceful competition. He certainly shares the conviction, so forcibly articulated by Hobbes, that the only alternative to politics that takes these constraints into account is the war of all against all. He is, of course, also aware of the fact that the great and very real evils of civil strife can be exagger- ated, and that such exaggerations ean serve as a screen behind which far greater evils are introduced into the civil order. It would seem that he wants to warn against both of these extremes when heapprovingly alludes co "Nowadays, fate is politics” Foreword joleon’s remark t0 the ag ing Goethe: Vietor Goureviteh Preface to the English Edition This study is a product of the early postwar period. It represented an attempt to examine che historical preconditions of German National Socialism, whose loss of reality and Utopian self- exaltation had resulted in hitherto unprecedented crimes. There was also the context of the cold war, Here, too, I was trying to enquire into ity Utopian roots which, it seemed, prevented the two super~ powers from simply recognising each other as opponents. Instead they blocked one another and thereby destroyed the opportunity for a peace which each superpower self-confidently proclaimed to be capable of establishing single-handedly. It was in the Enlighten ment, to which both liberal-democratic America and socialist Russia rightly retraced themselves, that I began to look for the common, roots of their claim to exclusiveness with its moral and philosophi- cal legitimations, My starting-point was therefore to explain the Utopian ideas of the twentieth century by looking at their origins in the eighteenth, My original intention was to test my arguments by reference to Kane’ critiques whose politial function during the age of Absolucism 1 was planning to investigate. But, as tends to happen to German scholars, I never got beyond the preliminaries. The analysis of the concepts of ‘critique’ and ‘crisis’ became an end in itself and the basis of a new hypothesis. This hypothesis argues that che Enlight- enment itself became Utopian and even hypocritical because — as far as continental Europe was concerned — it saw itself excluded from political power-sharing. The steucture of Absolutism, which wwas rooted in the dichotomy between sovereign and subject, be- tween public policy and private morality, prevented the Enlighten- ment and the emancipation movement produced by it from seeing 12 Preface to the English Edition itself as a political phenomenon. Instead the Enlightenment deve- loped patterns of thought and behaviour which, a the latest from 1789 onwards, foundered on the rocks of the concrete political challenges that arose. The Enlightenment succumbed to a Utopian image which, while deceptively: propelling it, helped to produce contradictions which could not be resolved in practice and prepared the way for the Terror and for dictatorship. Here was an ideal-type framework which time and again made its reappearance in the subsequent history of the modern world Given that this book raised a question which was topical not only from an historical, but also from a political point of view, its impact went beyond the debate originally generated in Germany. Transla- tions into Spanish, Italian and French appeared in 1965, 1972 and 1979 respectively. It appears to be more than a coincidence that all three were continental European languages. If nothing else, their societies had at least one thing in common with Central Europe: they had all been ruled by Absolutist regimes, whatever the political differences between these regimes may have been. Accordingly it ‘was only in these countries that there emerged a type of Enlighten- mene which, while trying to evade censorship and other chicancries, was directed against the Absolutist claims of the sovereign ruler. Whoever refused to follow che majority, who adapted and subjected. themselves to their ruler, invented way’ of camouflage and mystifi cation as well as other indirectly operative modes of behaviour which ultimately began to pervade the ideas of the Enlightenment themselves. It is true that arguments about rationality and natural justice subjected the Absolutise State to fresh pressure to legitimate itself and to respond to change. But, none the ess, such arguments. remained confined to the corridors outside the chambers of actual political decision-making. As a result there emerged, by way of compensation, a progressive philosophy of history which promised victory to the intellectual elive, but one gained without struggle and civil war Since 1688 at the latest Britain, by contrast, underwent a different development. She never experienced the tension between State and society which so shaped the nations of the European continent. Both spheres remained sufficiently interlinked through Parliament and the judicial constitution to appreciate that all moral questions represented at the same time political problems. The Utopian ideas of the continental Enlightenment therefore never gained a foothold Preface to the English Edition 3 across the Channel. There it was the Scottish moral philosophers with their sober theories rooted in social history who set the tone and who began to respond to the economic lead gained by Britain, Ac first the Scots moved in the wake of Britain's progress which was soon also to affect the whole of the European continent. This was an important point to which my book gives no more than marginal attention. Against the background of these considerations, it may be appro- priate to add a few further remarks, now that this translation into English has become available. During the past two decades many and methodologically very sophisticated studies have appeared in the fields of intellectual as well as social history. It would be impossible to list chem here. This research on Hobbes, Locke, Diderot, Rousseau and Raynal has become so intensified that my contribution to an interpretation of their writings may seem rather peripheral, Similarly, the social history of Freemasonry and of the Mluminati, research on the Republic of Letters and its networks of communication, on literary societies, academies and libraries, on reading habits, in short on the mentalités of divergent social groups in different European countries, has expanded our knowledge so much that my study will not teach the reader anything new. However, what I hope will be of value to the interested reader of this book is its theoretical framework. This framework provides a larger, ideal-typically constructed context into which detailed events and findings can be put. Thus this book tries to interpret the origins of Absolutism as an outgrowth of religious wars. As a next step, it attempts to explain the genesis of the modern Utopia from the context of the political interaction in which the men of the Enlightenment found themselves vis-a-vis the system of Absolut- ism, It is in this way that two major themes of the early modern period have been connected, with the aim of deducing therefrom the evolution of a long-term process which went beyond what the contemporaries had intended. As a result I hope to highlight more persistent structures of the modern age which may be seen as elements of historical anthropology: the sense that we are being sucked into an open and unknown future, the pace of which has kept us in a constant state of breathlessness ever since the dissolu- tion of the traditional standische societies; and the pressure on our post-theological age to justify politics and morals without us being able to reconcile the two. These were the challenges which the4 Preface to the English Edition Enlightenment faced, and they produced mentalities, attitudes and behavioural patterns which have survived the special circumstances of their birth. Putin a nutshell this book attempts to offer a genetic theory of the modern world which may help us co explain individ- ual historical phenomena, If this assumption is correct, my central hypothesis will also serve to provoke criticism. After all, itis not merely historical problems that are being raised here, but questions which are challenging us to this day to search for an answer. RK. Biclefeld, September 1987 Introduction In the fires of a evolution, when hatreds prevail and the sovereign power is spit, itis difficult to write history Rivarol From an historical point of view the present tension between ewo superpowers, the USA and the USSR, is a result of European history. Europe's history has broadened; it has become world history and will run its course as that, having allowed the whole world to drift into a state of permanent crisis, As bourgeois society was the first to cover the globe, the present crisis stems from a mainly Utopian self-conception on the part of the philosophers of history — Utopian because modern man is destined to be at home everywhere and nowhere. History has overflowed the banks of tradition and inundated all boundaries. The technology of com- ‘munications on the infinite surface of the globe has made all powers omnipresent, subjecting all to each and each to all. At the same time, wwe have seen the opening up of interplanetary space, although the result may well be to blow up mankind as well in a sell-initiated process of self-destruction. Unified, the ewo phenomena are historically one. ‘They constitute the political crisis which — if it really is a crisis — presses for a decision, and they are the philosophies of history that correspond to the crisis and in whose name we seek to anticipate the decisi influence it, steer it, or, as catastrophically, to prevent it. common root lies in the eighteenth century, and this indicates the direction of questions determined by the situation of today The eighteenth century witnessed the unfolding of bourgeois 5 heir6 Introduction society, which saw itself as the new world, laying intellectual claim to the whole world and simultancously denying the old. It grew out of the territories of the European states and, in dissolving this link, developed a progressive philosophy in line with the process. The subject of that philosophy was all mankind, to be unified from its European centre and led peacefully towards a better future. Today its field of action, a single global world, is claimed in the name of analogous philosophies of history, but now by two powers at once. ‘To speak in historico-philosophical terms, today's world unity turns out — and it is this which makes its fictitious character apparent — to be a politically dichotomous unity. One half, sworn to progress like the other, lives by that other’s imagined reaction. ‘The two halves block each other's way, but it is this very fact chat gives them identity. They mutually segregate each other in order to feign a non-existent unity. Their testimony is therefore one of terror and fear. The world’s Utopian unity reproduces its own fission, In the eighteenth century, Utopian planning for the future had a specifically temporal historic function. As the European bour- sgeoisie externally encompassed the whole world and in so doing postulated one mankind, it set out inwardly, in the name of the same argumentation, to shatter the Absolutist order. Philosophers of history prepared and made available the coreepts by which the rise and the role of the bourgeoisie of that time were justified. The eighteenth century can be seen as the antechamber to our present epoch, one whose tensions have been increasingly exacerbated since the French Revolution, as the revolutionary process spread exten- sively around the globe and intensively to all mankind. This book seeks to illuminate that antechamber. The link aerween the origins ‘of the modern philosophy of history and the start of the crisis ‘which, initially in Europe, has been determining political events ever since 1789, will come within our purview. This is how the mode of enquiry was narrowed and rendered historically precise: we shall not question the contents of past philosophies of history nor their Utopian goals, nor will their ‘ideological structure be measured, for example, by the economic rise of the bourgeoisie in those times, Instead, and in order to illuminate its original link with the beginning o* the political crisis, we shall try to understand the philosophical sense of history by studying the political situation of the bourgeoisie in the Absolutist ‘State. The philosophies of history chemselves will be left aside, save Introduction 7 for exemplary exceptions; our investigation will focus on the politi- cal function which bourgeois thought and endeavour served in the framework of Absolutism. To elaborate the political significance of, the Enlightenment, we shall have to look at the structure of the “Absolutise State, for this Stare was the first victim of the great Revolution; its disappearance was what enabled a Utopian mod- » cemnism to unfold. A primary understanding, of Absolutism requires us to look back farther, to the seventeenth century in which the sovereign princely State was perfected. The point of this retrospec- sion is not to construe causalities; suggesting these could only take us back to prehistoric times and Co the problems of any beginning. — in short, to the questions af a philosophy of history that goes beyond ideology, that resorts to historic reality in order to lay the ground for an historical science which excludes precisely the pseudo- explanations of a regressus in infinitum. Such an historical regressus would be nothing but progress in reverse, the very thing we are obliged to question. ‘Our analyses will concentrate on the present that has passed, not ‘on its past. The earlier past will be considered only in so far as it contains conditions relevant to our questions about the eighteenth century. Our theme is the genesis of Utopianism from an historically deveimined functional context, the context of the eighteenth cen- tury. We thus have recourse to political history as far as necessary t0 establish the value of civic consciousness in the Absolutist system. This simultaneously allows us to view the reverse of our investiga sion: the nascent political erisis. Iris only as a reaction to Absolutist policies that — intentionally or not — Enlighteners’ historico- philosophical self-consciousness makes political sense. The State, as it was, demanded a response, and the response was discovered. Derivations from the history of ideas were deliberately waived. The heritage of ideas, already all but completely at the Enlighteners’ disposal, was not accepted until a specific situation arose, and not until — this was the novelty — che situation was interpreted in terms of the philosophy of history. In narrowing our enquiry to historic situations we do not, of course, mean to present the people of those days with a moral indictment, to find them more or less guilty. This is self-prohibiting, for man as an historic creature is always responsible, for what he willed as well as for what he did not will, and more often, perhaps, for the latter than for the former. ‘The method used is thus a combination of analyses from the8 Introduction history of ideas and analyses of sociological conditions. We emulate thought movements, but only far enough for their political accent to come into view, and we clarify the situations in which the thoughts were conceived and to which they reacted, but only far enough to ‘extract what was politically manifest in the ideas. We do not show cither the political course of events as such or the ideas’ declension as mere ideas, ‘The general conditions from which the Enlighten ment arose and to which it reacted did not change during the eighteenth century. Only particular circumstances changed, though in a manner that brought the Absolutise system's basic difficulties into so much sharper relief. The French State, above al, lost power and prestige; with increasing bourgeois affluence it ran up more and more debts, ceased to score visible successes, lost wars and colonies, until at last che Enlightenment spread to the State's representatives themselves. The Enlightenment became ‘a proper ally’ As for the political premises as such, there ean be no doubs that the State’s own structure remained unchanged. The sovereiga de- cision continued to lie in the monarch’s hands; he chose between war and peace, dismissed Parliament at his pleasure, maintained the standards of his court regardless of all liabilities, until finally the more stubbornly Louis XVI insisted upon his sovereignty the less he found himself able to struggle through to effective decisions. The State had changed; it had become corrupt, but only because it remained Absolutist. The Absolutist system, he situation from which the bourgeois Enlightenment took its departure, remained in force until the outbreak of the Revolution. It constitutes the one constant element of our enquiry, the yardstick which, through a variety of examples, enables us to take successive measurements of she Enlightenment’s political development. The Enlightenment ac~ quired a gravity of its own, which came at last to be one of its political conditions. Absolutism necessitated the genesis of the . Enlightenment, and the Enlightenment conditioned the genesis of the French Revolution. It is around these ewo theses that the action of this book takes place Sources will be cited only from the period before 1789. No testimonials will be adduced to make personal statements about the authors. Singular events and specific writings are always referred to bbut are never the issue, The theme remains the unity of the Enlight- enment as it happened in the Absolutist State, Each action and each act of thought should direct us towards this event. For our enquiry, Introduction 9 all authors remain substitutes. All citations and occurrences could casily be exchanged for others without disturbing the course of the investigation, The notes often contain parallel quotations even though cumulative documentation does not enhance the thesis itself. Great thinkers and anonymous pamphleteers are equally given the floor; it is precisely what they have in common that indicates the unity of the Enlightenment’s occurrence, in. which anonymity and political import generally coincide. Only a few documents bear the stamp of personality clearly enough — in the cases of Hobbes or Diderot, for instance — to remain unique in the overall flow of events; but even their uniqueness serves to bring out the typical once it is moved into focus. ‘The heuristic comprehension, meant to clarify the link between the Utopian philosophy of history and the revolution unleashed since 1789, lies in the presupposed connection of critique and crisis This grasp will prove itself. The fact that the eighteenth century failed to note any connection between the critique it practised and the looming crisis — no literal proof of an awareness of the link could be found — this very fact led to our thesis: that the eritical process of enlightenment conjured up the crisis in the same measure in which the political significance of that crisis remained hidden from ie. The crisis was as much exacerbated as it was obfuscated in the philosophy of history. Never politically grasped, it remained concealed in historico-philosophical images of the future which caused the day’s events to pale — events that became so much less inhibited in heading for an unexpected decision. The basis of this dialectic was the specific manner of critique which the eighteenth century favoured and from which it derived its name. The role of the rising bourgeoisie was determined by the critical practice of the bourgeois intelligentisia and coalesced in the new world ‘The entire period under discussion presents the picture of a uniquely powerful process. In the eighteenth century, history as a whole was unwittingly transformed into a sort of legal process. This occurrence, which inaugurates the Modern age, is identical with the genesis of the philosophy of history. ‘In critique, history wens automatically into a philosophy of history’ (Ferdinand Cheistian Baur). The tribunal of reason, with whose natural members the rising elite confidently ranked itself, involved all spheres of activity in varying stages of its development. Theology, at, history, the law, the State and politics, eventually reason itself — sooner or later all10 Introduction were called upon to answer for themselves. In these proceedings the bourgeois spirit functioned simultaneously as prosecutor, as the court of last resort, and — due co be of crucial importance to the Philosophy of history — as a party. From the outset, progress always sided with the bourgeois judges. Nothing and nobody could evade the new jurisdiction, and whatever failed in the bourgeois critics’ judgement was turned over to moral censors who diserimi- nated against the convicted and thus helped to carry out the sen- tence. ‘He who does not recognise this / is to be viewed with contempt.” In the rigorous process of critique — a process of social ferment at the same time — the bourgeois philosophy of history came into being. All regions touched by criticism contributed to furthering, the rise of that philosophy. To begin with, the contrast of ancients and moderns was articulated within the republic of scholars by art and literary critics developing an understanding of time that sun- dered future and past. A central target of the citical offensive, the Christian religion in its manifold divisions, prepared the chars ‘matic-historical heritage that was subsumed into the future-orien~ tated world-view, in the most varied ways. We know the process of secularisation, which transposed eschatology into a history of prog ress, But likewise, consciously and deliberately, che elements of divine judgement and the Last Day were applied to history itself, above all in the exacerbated critical situation. The critical ferment altered the nature of political events. Subjec~ tive self-righteousness ceased reckoning with given values. Every~ thing that was historically given, indeed history itself, was transformed into a process — the outcome of which, of course, remained open as long as the categories of private judgement could never catch up with events they had helped co bring about. Eventually, to reach them after all the divine, heretofore impervious plan of salvation was itself transformed: it, too, became enlightened. Tt was trans- formed into the morally just and rational planning of the future by the new elite. Since misconceiving the indigenous side of the criti- ised realms in both religion and polities was a peculiarity of rational critique, it had to look for an escape hatch, the pledge of a tomorrow in whose name today could in good conscience be allowed to perish. To justify itself at all, the critique of the eight eenth century had to become Utopian. Its ultimate object, the Absolutist State, helped in its way to establish the Utopian view of Introduction u history upheld by the bourgeoisie. In the political order which it restored by pacifying the areas devastated by religious wars, the state created the premise for the unfolding of a moral world. However, just as soon as their religious bonds are outgrown, the politically powerless individuals will clash with the State: even though morally emancipating them, the State will deny them responsibility by restricting them to a private sphere. Inevitably, citizens will come into conifict with a State that subordinates morality: to polities, adopts a purely formal under- standing of the political realm and thus reckons without develop- ments peculiar to the emancipation of its subjects. For their goal will be to perfect themselves morally to an extent that will permit them to know, and let every man know for himself, what is good and what is evil. Each one thus becomes a judge who knows, on grounds of his enlightenment, that he is authorised to try whatever heteronomous definitions concradict his moral autonomy. Once implemented by the State the separation of morality and polities hhence turns against the State itself: itis forced into standing a moral trial for having achieved something, ic. to have created a space in which it was possible (for the individual) to survive In the course of unfolding the Cartesian cogito ergo sum as the self-guarantee of a man who has dropped out of the veligious bouids, eschatology recoils into Uropianism. Planning history comes to be just as important as mastering nature. ‘The misconception that history is open to planning is furthered by the technicise State because its political value cannot be made comprehensible to its subject. Politically powerless as a subject of his sovereign lord, the citizen conceived himself as moral, felt that the existing rule was overpowering, and condemned it proportionally as immoral since hhe could no longer perceive what is evident in the horizon of human finiteness. ‘The dichotomy of morality and politics made morality's alienation from political reality inevitable. The expression of this inevitability is that morality skips the political aporia. Unable to integrate politics, moral man stands in a void and must make a virtue of necessity. A stranger to reality, he views the political domain as a heteronomous definition that can only stand in his way In consequence, this morality makes men think that in so far as they attain the heights of their destiny they can completely eliminate the political aporia. That politics is fate, that it is fate not in the sense of blind fatality, this is what the enlighteners fail to understand. Their2 Introduction attempts to allow the philosophy of history ro negate historical factuality, to ‘repress’ the political realm, are Utopian in origin and character. The crisis caused by moraliy's proceeding against history will be a permanent crisis as long as history is aienaced in terms of its philosophy ‘That crisis and the philosophy of history are mutually dependent and entwined — that ultimately’ one must indeed go so far as to call them identical — this must, when our enquiry has reached its goal, have become visible a several points in the course of the eighteenth century. Its Utopianism arose from an irtelation to polities that was caused by history, but which was then solidified by a philosophy of history. The critical crossfire not only ground up topical polities; politics itself, as a constant task of human existence, dissolved in the same process into Utopian constructs of the future. The political edifice of the Absolutist State and the unfolding of Utopianism reveal one complex occurrence around which the political crisis of our time begins The Political Structure of Absolutism as the Precondition of EnlightenmentCHAPTER | The Absolutist State, Raison d'Etat and the Emergence of the Apolitical Sphere (Barclay, D'Aubigné) ‘Two epochal events mark the beginning and the end of classical Absolutism. Its point of departure was the religious civil war. The modern State had laboriously fought its way out of the religious disorders; not until these had been overcome did it achieve its full form and delineation. A second civil war — the French Revolution — brought the Absolutist State ro an abrupt end. The effective context of both these chains of events touched Europe as a whole, but by the fact that on this island the two happened, as it were, to coincide. Here, the nascent Absolutist State had already been und mined by religious warfare; the struggle for the faith already tokened the bourgeois revolution. On the Continent, on the other hand, as far as one can trace the evolution of the Absolutist State there, it remained the time-bound outcome of the post-Reformation disorders. It was in the locally differing solutions of sectarian conflicts, and in chronologically distinct phases, that the moderna State power was established. Its policies were the theme of the seventeenth century; their paths outlined the history of Absolutism. The following period, though marked by the same State form, bore another name: ‘the Enlightenment’. It was from Absolutism that the Enlightenment evolved — initially as its inner consequence, later a5 its dialectical counterpart and antagonist, destined to lead the Ab- solutist State to its demise Just as the Enlightenmene’s political point of departure lay within igland’s exceptional position is elucidated 156 The Political Structure of Absolmism the Absolutise system, so that of Absolutism hy in the religious ‘wars, An inner connection links the formal completion of Absolut- ism with its end, a connection that becomes visible in the role which the Enlightenment was able to play within the confines of the Absolutist State, The Enlightenment reached its zenith in France, the very country in which the Absolutist system had for the frst time, and most decisively, overcome the internal religious conflict. ‘The abuse of power by Louis XIV accelerated che process, in the course of which the subject discovered himself as a citizen. In France this same citizen would one day storm the Bastille. The political structure of the Absolutist State, initially an answer to religious strife, was no longer understood as such by the Enlighten- ment that followed. The first task of our enquiry is to focus on that connection, to clarify the initial situation of the modern State as far as may’ be necessary in order to perceive the point of the Enlightenment’s political attack on that State. The methodological limitation which this places on any analysis of the politcal structure of Absolutism — beyond any social or economic questions — is objectively justified. The princely State, supported by the military and the bureaucracy, developed a supra-religious, rationalistc field of ac~ tion which, unlike its other aspects, was defined by the policies of the State. Socially, the monarchies remained entirely bound by traditional feudal stratification, so much so that in most instances they sought to preserve that stratification. Politically, however, the monarchs strove to eliminate or neutralise all institutions with an independent base. Mercantilism, 100, was an economic system subject to political planning and State guidance; similarly, religious and ecclesiastical questions were treated with an eye to their useful- ness to the State, whether within the framework of an established Church or under toleration with a purpose. The -ealm of a political system covering all of Europe constituted the constellation from which the Enlightenment started out, ‘This realm found its theoretical expression in the doctrine of raison d'état, What was made room for here was an area where politics could unfold regardless of moral considerations. ‘Dans les ‘monarchies, la politique fai fare les grandes choses avec le moins de vertu qu'elle peut.” When Montesquieu made that statement in 1 Montesquieu, Esprit des Loss, A, chap. 8 The Absolutist State "7 1748, to characterise the politics of his own day, his formula — apart from its polemical content — had already ceased to be intel- ligible to the Enlighteners. The historical evidence of the formula was derived from the period of religious wars. In the sixteenth century the traditional order had disintegeated. As a result of the split in ecclesiastical unity, the entire sovial order became unhinged. (Old ties and loyalties were dissolved. High treason and the struggle for the common good became interchangeable concepts, depending, fon the point of view of the ascendant faction. The general anarchy led to duels, violence and murder, while the pluralisation of the Ecclesia sancta fermented corruption in whatever else remained swhole: families, estaces, countries, nations. Thus, from the second half of the sixteenth century onwards, a problem developed with a virulence which overreached the resources of the traditional order: the need to find a solution to the intolerant, fiercely embactled and, mutually persecuting Churches or religion-bound fractions of the old estates, a solution that would circumvent, settle, or smother the conflict, How to make peace? On the greater part of the Continent this epoch-making question found its historic answer in the Ab- solutis State, And indeed, the State could not be constituted as such until it had found its specific answer to religious civil warfare. What was this answer? What did it mean to the monarch? And to the subject? While the religious parties drew their energies from sources outside the domains of princely power, the princes could not prevail over them unless they challenged the primacy of religion. It was the only way for rulers to subordinate the various protagonists to the authority of the State. Cuius regio eins religio was already a conse- quence of the fact that even if princes were committed to a particu- lar faith, as rulers they placed themselves above the religious patties. ‘The absolute ruler recognised no other authority over himself than God, whose atcributes in the political and historic field he appro- priated: ‘Majestas vero nec a majore potestate nec legibus ullis nec tempore definitur’.* In his Argenis, a roman a clef published in 1621, John Barclay supplied a vindication of absolute monarchy that was widely knowa at the time and translated into almost all European languages. The 2. Bodin, De rep, libri sex, a quoted by Friedrich Meinsche in Die Fee der Seaesrsan’ od W" Hofer, Munchy 195, p72,18 The Political Structure of Absolution author, a humanist learned in the law, had shared the fate of many of his contemporaries; he was the son of a refugee family whose carly impressions had been formed by the confrontations with the League and the trauma of the Gunpowder Plot. Alluding to occurrences of that sort, he confronted the monarch with a chal lenging alternative: ‘Either give the people back their freedom or assure the domestic eranquillty for whose sake they relinquished that freedom’.* What appears from such passages is the historical mission accorded the monarchy of those days, the mission that was pro. claimed as justified® by the great majority of Richelieu's generation — against the League, the Fronde, or the monarchomachists Drawing further on the doctrine of the sovereign contract, Barclay tended towards the Absolutist State, depriving the embattled parties of their rights and transferring those rights — along with all re- sponsibility — to the sovereign alone. Argenis was part of Riche- lieu's constant reading matter; its train of argument, commonplace at the time, recurs in his political testament.” Forbearance, it pro- claimed, was more dangerous than stringency, more than cruclty even, for the consequences of clemency were bloodier and more devastating than those of instant severity. A monarch who tolerated opposition did indeed relieve himself of responsibility, but he also shouldered the guilt deriving from any unrest that emer ged fom his tolerance.’ His postulated monopoly on peace-making enforced the monarch’s absolute responsibility, the time-bound expression of which was the notion of his sole responsibility to God In his novel, Barclay also showed the direction the King would have to take in order to pacify the country. Bither he must subjugate all or no one would be subjugated.* The sovercign’s absolute responsibility required and presupposed his absolute domination of all subjects. Only if all subjects were equally under che rulers thumb, could he assume sole responsibilty for peace and onder. Thus, a deep 1 Gt: Richard Barnet, Barcly’ in Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 1921-2, 4. John Barlay (Lsmnis BarcleiArgens, Editio V, Franlun, 1626): "Aviles in libeiatem reste, aut domesticam prkers quleten, proptes iam Rhee oe guerunt 5. Ch the contemporaries listed by G, Hanotaus, Histoire da Cardinal de Riche. fen Soles Bar SS el 6, Cle rgent il, chape 4 and 6: and Casdinal de Richelieu, Testament politique cd, Louis Andre, Pais, 1047, Par I, chap. 5, Sand Por Me chags Peed ee il surmpsetne Toa. 2s. The Absolutist State 9 breach was lai in the subjects’ position. Previously they had their places in a manifold, if loose, structure of responsibilities: as mem- bers of a Church, as dependent vassals, in the framework of their own political institutions or of the feudal order of estates. But the more the sense of this pluralistic world was reversed into the senselessness of civil warfare, the more the subjects faced a similarly cogent alternative as that facing the King himself: ‘Know then that almost all men have been reduced to this point: to be on bad terms Sites with thei coscence or withthe course of che century’? midst the toing and froing of persecutors and persecuted, of cts ad encase saris snore a sob is faith but he who sought peace for its own sake. These were the theses which Agrippe d’Aubigné, the life-long frondeur, the ostra- cised and rigorous batter for the faith, put into the mouth of his apostate comrade-in-arms, the palitician de Sancy.”® Conscience and the needs of the situation are reconcilable no longer hence — dAubigné’s politician continues — there must be a clean break between the internal and the external. A prudent man withdraws into the secret chambers of his heart, where he remains his own judge, but external actions are to be submitted co the ruler’s judgement’and jurisdiction, ‘The voice of conscience must never emerge: outwardly it has to be put to slee tthy; those who are dead wanted to let their conscience live, and twas their conscience that killed them." An ironical inversion burdened conscience with the guilt of its own ruin. The lines separating murder, manslaughter, and execution were still fluid and indefinite, but in the politician’s mind any violent death in a war of religion was tantamount to suicide, He who submits to the sovereign lives by the sovereign; he who does not submit is destroyed, but the guil is his own, To survive, the subject must submerge his conscience. Conscience, the intrinsic relationship between responsibility PAubigne, La confession du Sieur de Suncy, ed. Reaume et Caussade, Pari, 1997 B69, De Sane sion of she Haley famiy of juss, had converted in 1897 and tecome Sopeinicndcnc ot Hinances incwhich po fe ould induce al opportuni smone bin former so-chgonns tose the Edit of Nantes (ore Av Carn Agrppe dt: Aubrgné ete Ba Protest sols. Pans 1938 Th 35 Tact Stour de Sucys‘La ran ose aces ean Gu Sone moes ont20 The Political Structure of Absolutism and guilt, was forced open. Both elements found a novel co- ordination in the persons of ruler and subject. In che subjects’ domain the ruler was freed from all guilt, but he accumulated all responsibility. The subject, on the other hand, was relieved of all political responsibility but threatened, in exchenge, with a wwofold guilt: externally when acting counter to his sovereign’s interest — something the sovereign had the sole right to determine — and inwardly by sceking refuge in anonymity. This fission within the horizon of religious civil warfare paved the way for the ‘innocence of power’. The prince alone could claim that innocence, but to ain it he had to remain aware of the augmented responsibility it entailed. Then, and only then, was he in possession of the authority thae guaranteed his power. He came to feel a compulsion to act which continually conjured up new decisions, including decisions involving the use of forees the consequences of inaction ‘could be as serious as those of its opposite, che over-utilisation of power. One tisk matched and constantly challenged the other. Indeed, the danger of falling from one extre the very source of the evidence of sovereign decisions. ‘To meet his all-encompassing responsiblity, the prince had to seek the measure of his actions in their calculable effect on everyone else, The compulsion to act thus provoked a need for heightened foresight. A rational calculation of all possible consequences came to be the first political commandment." However, in order to keep the consequences of his actions (which, once committed, were not humanly alterable) under his own control as long as possible, the prince was driven further to augment his power, which in turn increased the sources of danger, the risks of abusing or failing to use the accumulated power, that i, of relinquishing its innocence. Louis XIV would succumb to this logic of absolute responsibility, yet obedience to its laws became the art of politics, The scope of the innocence of power remained narrowly citcumscribed by the guidelines of a sharpened morality of action. These made up the political rules, rules which to the powerless subject could not but remain essentially alien Both politicians and teachers of the secular ethic agreed on this. Not until the cighteeath century were they to divide into two into the other was 12, CF, Richeiew's Testament patie, Uh chap. 42°. idest plus imporane de privenis Iavenir que le presen ‘fll yood police was ov antcipate Existather than have thers surpese you The Absolutist State a hostilé camps: in the seventeenth they still made common cause against the theologians. Spinoza continued co maintain that only theologians believed that statesmen were bound by the same rules of piety as were private individuals." The exclusion of ‘morality’ from polities was not directed against a secular ethic, but against a religious one with political ‘The doctrine of raison d sicuation that it did not even confine itself to monarchival Absolut- ism, On the Continent the doctrine filtered into a tradition of enhanced royalty, but it gained just as much ground in countries with a parliamentary — that is, republican — constitution. Every power which in those days Sought to equip itself with authority and 4 generally binding nature required this exclusion of the private conscience in which the bonds of religion or of feudal loyalty were anchored. Thus the English Parliament in 1649, when ie wished to strip Charles | of his prerogatives, hastily embraced the argument that every conscience, even the King's, must bow to the interest of the State. Parliament claimed coral sovereignty, to the extent af forcing the King to act against his good conscience." Even Spinoza in Holland, far from advocating monarchical Ab~ solutism, deemed it perfectly reasonable to look on every good deed as sinful if it harmed the State — just as, conversely. sins became pious works if they served the common weal." Paradigmatic for the modern Scare theory's genesis from the situation of religious civil warfare is Hobbes, whom Spinoza cited. Hobbes lends himself especially well to a description of this genesis because he had already dispensed with such traditional arguments as the God-King analogy. On the contrary, countering these with the guiding principles of a scientific method, as Dilthey pur it" he wanted to bring the phenomena in all their naked reality 13, Spinoes, Tracatas Palins pars 2 4 Clendon isthe apgmnets a which Charles had 1 bow 4 st Tega Parhument™s proceslings saint Sirabord. That here was 2 private and» pu ‘blige hin odo shadahich wae againe his peat asctence wa mat Tithe Ainevay obliged an conscience to contornyhumsell an hs own undersanding, 10 thalsce an conscience of his pariament’ "Which war a doce aeely ‘esofed beter diinen and of rest ane them tor the pursuing the furuee ouasele, Clarendon adds in rerespect(Clagendom, Phe Hitury of the Rebelo Jind isa Wars on Bland, 6 sols, Oxford, 1888 821 and 3884 is. Spinart, Tastatr Throlgaco-Paacas chap. 19; camcsrning the connection with rls stl arte ef chap. Ue and Evice WV) 1h. Ch Dishes, Genammalee Schriften een, uuttgare snd Giingen, 1987, Hy